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Arab Sociology Today: A View From Within

Author(s): Georges Sabagh and Iman Ghazalla


Source: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 12 (1986), pp. 373-399
Published by: Annual Reviews
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Ann. Rev. Sociol. 1986. 12:373-99


Copyright ? 1986 by Annual Reviews Inc. All rights reserved

ARAB SOCIOLOGYTODAY: A VIEW


FROM WITHIN
Georges Sabagh and Iman Ghazalla
Von GrunebaumCenterfor Near EasternStudiesand Departmentof Sociology,
Universityof California,Los Angeles,California90024

Abstract
Some of the accomplishmentsand shortcomingsof Arabsociology duringthe
last few years are assessed from the perspective of Arab sociologists. This
assessment of Arab sociology from the insiders' perspective involves (a)
reviewing selected paperspresentedat one of the most recent Arab sociology
conferences, (b) analyzingthe resultsof a survey of 36 Arabsociologists, and
(c) describingin detail the majorcontributionsof Arabsociologists and social
scientists to the study of Islam, with particularreference to Islamic social
movements. Recent socioeconomic changes and political events in the Arab
world help explain the rising interest in sociology. Arab sociologists view
their discipline as still in process of becoming and in a state of crisis. The
sociopolitical and disciplinaryaspects of this crisis and the solution suggested
to remedy it are described. Arab sociological studies of Islamic social movements have the following features:(a) an emphasison the diversity, complexity, and historical specificity of these movements, (b) a recognition of the
need for an interdisciplinaryapproach,(c) a focus on the sociological characteristics of leaders and followers, (d) analyses of the origin of the movements,
and (e) an emphasis on the need for a methodology more personal and
subjective than the one used in the West. This research,as well as the survey
of Arab sociologists, indicates that there is a noticeable trend toward the
substantive indigenizationof Arab sociology and that Arab sociologists are
aware of the need to be innovative and flexible in their selection and use of
research methods. These also show that there has been little theoretical
indigenization of Arab sociology. This may explain, in part, the sense of
crisis felt by Arab sociologists.
373
0360-0572/86/0815-0373$02.00
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SABAGH& GHAZALLA

INTRODUCTION
This review presents an assessment of some of the accomplishmentsand
shortcomingsof Arabsociology duringthe last few years. Such an assessment
can be done either from an "outsider"or an "insider"perspective. There are,
of course, advantages in looking at both perspectives. In the words of
Hamnett et al (1984:85), "Insider's research can provide insights, inner
meanings, and subjective dimensions that are likely to be overlooked by
outsiders. The outsider can bring a comparablydetached perspective to the
problemshe investigates."While Westernsociologists, particularlyin France
and the United States, have made importantcontributionsto the sociological
study of the Arab World, most of them are obviously "outsiders."The most
compelling reasonsfor focusing on the "insiders'" views of Arabsociology is
the Arab sociologists' call for the "indigenization"of their discipline. Hamnett et al identified as follows the two majorcomponentsof the indigenization
of social sciences, widely advocated in the Third World:
Theoreticalindigenizationis a conditionin which social scientistsof a nation are involved
in constructingdistinctive conceptual frameworksand metatheoriesthat reflect their own
world views, social and cultural experiences, and perceived goals. . . . Substantive
indigenization is concerned with the content focus of the social sciences. The essential
argumentfor substantiveindigenizationis thatthe main thrustof researchand teachingin a
country should be toward its own society and people and their economic and political
institutions (1984:78).

The thrustto indigenizationmeans thatArabsociologists would tend to assess


the state of theirdiscipline in differentways thanwould Westernsociologists.
To be sure, as we shall see from the results of our survey, many Arab
sociologists have been trainedin the United States or Europe, and often their
own theoretical and research work may reflect that training. Nevertheless,
they see indigenization as an importantgoal for their discipline. Indeed,
contributingto Arab scholarly journals and publishing the results of their
work in Arabic is one way of stressing the importanceof indigenization.
Ideally, one should make a comparativeanalysis of both insiders' and outsiders' views of and contributionsto Arabsociology, but this is beyond the scope
of this paper.
The evaluation of the state of Arab sociology from the insiders' perspectives is accomplished in three ways. First, we review in detail selected
papers presented at a recent conference of Arab sociologists assessing the
status of sociology in the Arab world. Secondly, we analyze the results of a
survey of the opinions of a small sample of Arab sociologists on their own
work and on prioritiesfor their discipline. Thirdly, we describemajorcontributions of Arab sociologists to the study of Islam, with particularreferenceto
Islamic social movements. Since these movements are committed to au-

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ARABSOCIOLOGY
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thenticity and indigenization,their study by Arab sociologists should provide


a distinctively insider's perspective.

THE RISING IMPORTANCEOF SOCIOLOGYIN THE


ARAB WORLD
The 1980s have witnessed an upsurgeof interestin the criticalappraisalof the
statusof sociology in the Arabworld not only by sociologists but also by other
Arab social scientists and intellectuals. Thus, the issue transcendsthe discipline itself and has implicationsfor the futureof criticalsocial thoughtin Arab
countries. In the last three years alone, the following six specialized conferences took place, all attemptingto evaluatethe state of Arabsociology and
Arab social sciences in general (Nasr 1985:168):
(a) The problem of methodology in social science research(Cairo, January
1983)
(b) The problematicof social sciences in the Arab world (Cairo, February
1983)
(c) Toward an Arab Sociology (Abu-Dabi, April 1983)
(d) The policy of social sciences in the Arab World (Tunis, February1984)
(e) Sociology and the issue of the Arab individual (Kuwait, April 1984)
(J) The status of Sociology in the Arab World (Tunis, January1985), which
culminated in the founding of an Arab Sociological Association.
Tothis list should be addedan internationalconferenceon "TheEvaluation
and Applicationof Survey Researchin the Arab World"(Bellagio, 1983), in
which both Arab and non-Arab social scientists participated(Tessler et al
1986).
Why has there been such a growth of interestin evaluationsof the state of
Arab sociology and social sciences in general? Answers to this difficult
question must be sought not only in the rapid social and economic changes
experienced by Arab countries in recent years, but also in terms of the
development of sociology in the Arab world and its response to the dominating theoretical and methodological influences of Western sociology.

Recent Socioeconomic Changes in the Arab World


The 1970s were markedby importantpolitical developments and economic
events that were to have a lasting impact in the Arab world and that help
explain the rising importanceof Arab sociology.
The 1973 Arab-Israeliwar challenged the presumed invincibility of the
Israeli armed forces. In the same year and as a result of this war, oil prices
rose dramaticallywith far-reachingsocial, economic, and demographiccon-

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SABAGH & GHAZALLA

sequences not only in the Gulf States but also in the whole Arabworld. There
was an increase in the gap between "poor"and "rich"Arab countries and a
rising tide of internationalmigrationfrom the former to the latter countries.
As can be seen in Table 1, therewas in 1983 an enormousrangein the GNP
per capita, from a high of around$20,000 in Kuwait, Qatar, and the United
Arab Emirates to a low of around $400-$500 in the Sudan, Mauritania,
Yemen AR, and Yemen PDR. The highest incomes are in the smallest Arab
countries, and the most populous Arab countries (Sudan, Egypt, Morocco)
have among the lowest incomes. This income differentialis in partresponsible for a massive labor migrationfrom the poor Arab countries, particularly
Egypt and the Yemens, to the rich Arabcountries(Amin & Awny 1985). One
measureof the importanceof this migrationis providedby the figures on the
share of workers' remittances in the GNP of the smaller labor-exporting
countries:such remittancesconstituted43.4%, 37.8%, and 21.2% of the GNP
of Yemen PDR, Yemen AR, and Jordanrespectively (see Table 1). Estimates
Table 1 Per capita income and worker remittancesfor Arab countries

Arab countries by
income levels

Population
in millions GNP per capita($)
1983
1983

Average annual
growth of GNP Remittances as
per capita
per cent of GNP
1965-1983
1983

High income oil exporters


United Arab Emirates
Qatar
Kuwait
Saudi Arabia
Bahrain
Lybian Arab Jamhariya
Oman

1.2
.3
1.6
10.4
.4
3.4
1.1

23,870
21,210
17,880
12,230
10,510
8,480
6,250

14.7
20.6
3.2
9.6
6.9
20.8
45.2
7.6
2.0
1.6
20.8
5.1

NA
2,320
1,640
1,760
1,290
760
700
550
520
480
400
250

NA
-7.0a
.2
6.7
NA
-.9
6.5

__b
__b
__b
__b
__b
__b

.6

Other Arab Countries


Iraq
Algeria
Jordan
Syrian Arab Rep.
Tunisia
Morocco
Egypt Arab Rep.
Yemen Arab Rep.
Yemen People D. R.
Mauritania
Sudan
Somalia

NA
3.6
6.9a
4.9
5.0
2.9
4.2
5.7
NA
.3
1.3
-.8

NA
.8
21.2
2.7
4.0
5.8
10.4
37.8
43.4
.1
.3
1.7

aForperiodsotherthan1965-1983
'These countries have a net negative workers' remittances
Source: The World Bank (1985), pp. 174-75, 200-01, and 232

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377

of the size of the Arab labor migrationstreamsvary widely (Amin & Awny
1985, Ibrahim1982b), but thereis no doubtthatit was substantialin 1980 and
increased rapidly in the 1970s. For Egypt alone, one estimate places the
numberof workers abroadat over 1,000,000 in 1980 as comparedto around
400,000 in 1975 (Amin & Awny 1985).
The sudden increase in the wealth of some Arab countriesis part of what
Saad Eddin Ibrahim(1982b) has called the "New Arab Social Order,"which
involves the appearanceof new social forces and new values and behavior
patterns.This has resultedin a greatdeal of social chaos andthe emergenceof
new social problems.
There has been an increase in the military, economic, and sociocultural
penetration of Arab countries by the United States and other Western
countries. This penetration, which the ruling elites have been unable to
counteract, is furtherexacerbatedby the consolidationof Israel in the occupied territoriesof the West Bank, which no wars or diplomatic maneuvers
appear to thwart.
There is increasing social fragmentationwithin several Arab countries
which is based on legitimate and semilegitimate claims of diversity and
particularism(Ibrahim 1985).

Arab Sociology in Process


With few exceptions, an Arab sociology with its own theories and methods
has not yet emerged (Irabi 1982). On the whole, Arab sociology is dependent
on copying and translatingWesternsociological works. The trainingof early
generationsof sociologists in the United States, France, or Germanyresulted
in almost slavish adherenceto Westernconcepts and models, even when these
were often irrelevantto the Arab context. The first stage of the development
of Arab sociology largely grew out of cultural interchangewith the West
broughtaboutby colonialism. It is not surprisingthatmany Arabsociologists,
particularlyin North Africa, have emphasized the importanceof the "decolonization"of sociology in the Arab World (Ben Jelloun 1977, Karoui &
Zghal 1975, Khatibi 1985).
Even though the proliferationof Western schools of social theory resulted
in the substantialtheoreticaleclecticism of Arab sociology (Ben Salem 1982,
Stambouli 1977), there are no distinctivetheoreticalperspectivesin sociology
that addressthe majorissues faced by Arab society (Bassiouni 1979). While
some Arab sociologists (el-Kordy 1980) have adopted and applied "dependency theory,"this paradigmemerged out of the Latin Americanand not
the Arab experience. There is nothing comparableto this paradigm, except
the reference back to Ibn Khaldun, which had already been noted in the
assessment of trends in the early 1970s (Sabagh 1976; see also Al-Qazzaz
1975; el-Saaty 1977). But the Khaldunianmodel is hardly adequatefor the
analysis of currentsocial changes in the Arab world. Thus Arab sociology is
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still "in process," which explains the title, "Towardan Arab Sociology," of a
recent conference of Arab sociologists in Tunis. In Irabi's view, "it is
imperativefor Arab sociology to develop an independenttheory in which the
particularismsof Arab developmentand society stand at the center of sociological interest"(1982:183). Sari echoes the opinions of many Arab sociologists when he states that "it is ironic that Arab sociologists acknowledge the
limitations of Western theories, but continue to depend on them-often
entirely-in their research and studies" (1983:52).
One of us completed an assessment of the state of sociology in the Arab
world, Iran, and Turkey in the 1960s and the early 1970s (Sabagh 1976).
While it was noted that much had already been accomplished, much more
researchand theoreticalwork was neededto shed light on the key problemsof
the region, including the consequences of rapidurbanization,social inequality, and such major social issues as the role of Islam in society. Where does
Arab sociology stand now? The general picturethat emerges from the papers
presented at a conference in Tunis, January 1985, is one of "sociology in
crisis." In the words of Hegazy (1985:75), "A critical appraisalof the state of
sociology in the Arab world shows that it is in a state of crisis theoretically
and methodologically, in additionto being isolated and alienatedfrom actual
social reality." Since the Tunis conference constitutes the most recent and
most extensive assessmentof the state of the field by the majorArab sociologists, we shall focus on some of the themes thatemerged:the currentstatusof
the field, reasons for the current"crisis," reasons for the discontent of the
Arab sociologists with their discipline, and solutions suggested to remedythe
present situation.

ARAB SOCIOLOGYIN CRISIS


The 1985 Tunis conference, as well as the otherconferencesheld in the early
1980s, indicateswhy leading Arab sociologists considertheir discipline to be
in crisis. Two major reasons are given. One pertains to the fundamental
sociopolitical conditionsfaced by Arabsociologists, and the otherrefersmore
specifically to the state of the discipline itself.

Sociopolitical Aspects of the Crisis


A recurrenttheme has been the negative impact of the political climate in
Arab countries on the growth of critical sociological work. According to
Hegazy (1985), sociology originated and developed in relation to ruling
institutions. Consequently, it confined itself to the imitation of Western
models, searchingfor solutions to social problems from an abstractpoint of
view within the confines of the statusquo. Thus, certaintopics were defined
as "politically forbidden" and sociologically sensitive, including, for ex-

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ample, the lack of democracyand the resultantpolitical apathy, the ideological and economic dependencyon the West, the Arab-Israeliconflict, and the
deepening of social inequality(Sari 1985). An even more pessimistic view is
expressed by the Algerian sociologist el-Kanz (Nasr 1985:171), who argues
that "sociology is disfigured by the political institution . . . society is the
monopoly of the governmentand not a subject for research . . .there is no
legitimacy whatsoever for a rational discourse about the social structureof
any Arab country."Consequently,Arabsociology is "animpossible practice,
a superficialendeavorin universities;"its only chance to develop is "eitherin
exile or in secret." A somewhat less pessimistic view is offered by the
Egyptian sociologist Abdel Moty (Nasr 1985:170).
While few Arab sociologists have criticizedthe statusquo in theirwritings,
there is some indication of change with the emergence of neo-Marxistsand
groups favoringturath(neoculturalheritage).They agreeon the criticalissues
in sociology but are in theoreticalconflict. Hegazy and Abdel Moty see the
beginning of a critical Arab sociology. Participantsat the Tunis 1985 conference disagreed about the extent to which Arab sociologists are free to
express their views and investigate crucial topics such as political authority,
class conflict, and other importantissues pertaining to religion, sex, and
minorities. They also disagreedaboutthe extent to which sociologists have to
make ideological choices. By contrast,there was consensus that the political
climate in Arab countriesplaces serious restraintson sociological theory and
research.
The oppressive political climate has a number of negative personal and
professionalconsequencesfor Arabsociologists. Accordingto Abdel Moty, it
tends to foster the emergence of a class of "compradorial"researchsociologists who are dependenton foreign countries"intellectually,financially, and
behaviorally"(Nasr 1985:171). A bleak pictureis paintedof Arabsociologists
who submit to authority, are opportunistic, and supervise foreign-funded
research that involves the exploitation of younger scholars and graduate
students. Furthermore,they are uselessly engaged in "tribal"conflicts between Marxists, functionalists, and followers of the French, American, English, and Soviet schools. Ibrahim(1985) has concluded that this "tribalism"
has become the opiate of Arab sociology.
Most prominentArab sociologists deplore the dependence of their discipline on Western sociology, and some view this dependence as a form of
apology for colonialism and neocolonialism and a justification of the status
quo. The most radical critique is provided by Sari (1985). In his view, the
intellectual effort of Arab sociologists is dominated by Western analytic
frameworkssuch as structural-functionalism.Most Arab research produced
from the 1950s to the mid-1970s is based on positivism in its old and revised
forms, and this has led to the neglect of the development of dialectical

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analysis and the critical-historicalmode of analysis. Thus for Sari, it is only in


the 1980s that some Arab sociologists have liberatedthemselves from dependence on Western analytic schemes and research orientations.He has high
praise for al-Bitar's (1979) study of Arab unity, Ibrahim's(1980b) survey of
Arab public opinion on Arab unity, El Sayed Yassin's (1980) analysis of the
content of Arabnationalthought, and Halim Barakat's(1984) comprehensive
analysis of the major issues facing Arab society.

Disciplinary Aspects of the Crisis


The two majordisciplinaryaspects of this crisis are the discrepancybetween
the quantitativeand qualitativegrowth of Arab sociology, and the discontent
with the present state of theory, methodology, and researchin Arab sociology. The argumentspresentedon this aspect of the crisis are briefly summarized.
While numbershave rapidly increasedof sociology departments,research
centers, sociology Phds, and sociological publications, it is rare to find an
Arab sociologist giving a comprehensiveand objective analysisof Arabsocial
reality. But even in quantitativeterms, there are differences among Arab
countries. While the quantitativegrowth of sociology has been considerable
in Egypt, Tunisia, and Lebanon, sociology still occupies a weak and peripheral position in most other Arab countries. Sari (1985) asserts that Arab
sociology cannot grow qualitatively without developing its own theoretical
framework and methodological tools. Only then can the contradictionsof
Arab society be confronted and eliminated.
There was consensus in Tunis about the paucity of empirical sociological
research and the inadequacyof researchtools. For Ibrahim(1985), the few
field studies about aspects of Arab social reality are still fragmented and
incomplete. There is very little integrationof relatedstudies or accumulation
of sociological knowledge aboutArab society. OtherArab sociologists attribute this situationto the lack of researchtopics relevantto the majorconcerns
of Arabs, to the inadequacyof the researchmodel, and to improperexecution
of researchplans. Despite the abundanceof major social problems, research
studies focus repeatedlyon traditional,and presumably"safe,"topics such as
divorce, adultery, and problems of adolescents. The main issues that Arab
sociologists should be dealing with include social, intellectual, and economic
backwardness,the fragmentationof the Arab world, and the dependencyon
the new colonial centers. Serious efforts are lacking in the importantfields of
the sociology of religion, social stratification,social history, and the sociology of social movements and revolutions. Researchdesigns are isolated from
the social process as well as from historical circumstances. For example,
studies of religious movementsfail "to answerthe importantquestionof what
these movements are responding to" (Hegazy 1985).

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While Arab sociologists paint a bleak pictureof the state of their discipline
and of their intellectual and social ineffectiveness, their self-appraisalis a
necessary step to remedy the inadequaciesof Arab sociology. On the more
positive side, in the selection of researchtopics the Arab sociologist is on his
own ground. For example, the many studies of the social, economic, and
political impact of the massive Arab internationalmigrationemerge out of
recent Arab experience (e.g. Ali 1983, Amin & Awny 1985, Abdel Moty
1983, Bouhdiba 1979, Fergany 1983, Saad el-din & Abdel Fadil 1983,
Serageldin 1983, al-Tamimi 1982). They indicate that this migration will
have far-reachingconsequences for the Arab world.
It is illuminatingto consider Ibrahim's(1985) delineation of the sociological studies needed to betterunderstandArab social reality and the futureof
Arab society. His suggestions, however, cover the whole rangeof the sociological enterpriseand are so comprehensiveas to lead one to think that Arab
sociology has progressedvery little beyond what was described in the early
1970s. Unfortunately, his discussion does not differentiatebetween topics
thathave been fairly well studied, such as populationstructureand trendsand
urbanization, and those that have been relatively neglected, such as the
sociology of the state. His suggestions may be summarizedas follows.
Demographic studies are needed to assess the growth, distribution,movement, and characteristicsof the populationof the Arab world. Of particular
importance are the rates of economic participation, the structure of the
available labor force, and its effects on rural-urbanmigration and internationalmigration between Arab countries. Basic demographicdata are
already available, but they need to be fully analyzed in order to provide a
general picture of the demographicbase of the Arab world.
Ecological studies are needed to deal with the main patternsof livelihood
resultingfrom the interactionbetween man and his naturalenvironmentin the
Arab world. The most importantof these are the beduintribalpatternsand the
process of urbanization.The aim of these studies should be to evaluate the
effects of development and alternativepopulation distributionpolicies on
these ecological interrelations.Special attention should be paid to the influence of the size and social structureof cities on contemporaryand future
political stability.
Studies of class structureare needed to delineate the class system and its
degree of crystallizationin each Arab country and in the Arab world as a
whole. Such studies should also evaluate the effect of class structureon the
productiveprocess, sociopolitical stability, and the process of social change.
Ethnic social formations should be describedand analyzed, particularlyin
relation to class structureand the effects of majority-minority relationship
on the level of internalconflict.
The present and future roles of organized occupational groups (unions,

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syndicates, etc) in political activity and development have to be assessed.


Major institutions such as the army; security; the religious, educational,
and scientific establishments;and the media have to be studiedin termsof the
degree of their independenceand their influence on value patterns,legitimacy, and sociopolitical control.
Studies are needed of values and behavioralpatterns, with special attention
given to the role of religion, especially Islam, the colonial heritage, and to
major value conflicts. Examples of such conflicts are authenticity versus
modernizationand nationalismversus local patriotism.
Of particularimportanceare sociological analyses of the Arab state. Such
analyses should include the following topics: the division and fragmentation
caused by Westerncolonialism and its impacton Arabunity and disunity;the
origins of the presentpatternsof local states andthe differencesbetween these
states in wealth, population,productionpatterns,and social solidarity;styles
of nation building before and after independenceand the relative role played
by religion and secularideologies, power, oppression, and political participation; the translation of legitimacy into laws, constitutions, and political
discourses;the natureof the influence (director indirect,legitimateor illegitimate) of different groups on political decision-making.
Studies are needed not only of ruling elites in the Arab Worldbut also of
alternate elites. Issues to be addressed include the class origins of ruling
elites, the degree to which they are representativeof their own society, and
the mechanismsfor exertingauthorityand insuringelite continuity. Studies of
alternateelites should map the differentparties, forces, and political elements
in the Arabworld aspiringto be in power and the degree of theirlegitimacy or
recognition by ruling elites. Research should focus on the rise and influence
of these groupsand on theirprogramsand ideologies with respectto the issues
of Arab unity, development, distributivejustice, national independence,the
Arab-Israeliconflict, religion, and democracy. Ibrahim(1985) recommends
that special attentionshould be given to contemporaryreligious movements.
Other Arab sociologists agree with him on the importanceof focusing on
contemporaryIslamic movementsand their alternativeideologies. It has been
suggested that such movements should be studied from the perspectiveof an
Islamic sociology. An Islamic sociology would provide an alternativeideological choice, competing with Marxistand functionalistideologies. Since this
issue is likely to become increasingly importantin the next few years, we
need to consider the probable natureof Islamic sociology.
Arab or Islamic Sociology? While these terms have increasinglybeen used
in the Arab and the non-Arab Muslim worlds, is there really an Arab
sociology or an Islamic sociology as compared,for example, to an Egyptian,
Tunisian, or Lebanese sociology? Many of the participantsin the Tunis
conference are sympatheticto the idea of Arab nationalismand Arab unity,

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and they emphasize the need for an Arab sociology. Most of them are also
believers in secularism and the secular outlook of Western sociology even
while they try to transcendthe latter. They represent a major sociological
currentin the Arab world, but by no means the only existing one. According
to Adel Hussein, "Renewalstartswith refusingthe principleof secularismand
going back to Islamic values; any theoreticalbase must reflect the indigenous
environment"(Hegazy 1985:79). Thus, the call for an Arab or an Islamic
sociology is in reality a call for the indigenizationof sociology in terms of
theoreticalperspective, methodology, and prioritiesof topics for study. The
need for the indigenizationof sociology has also been stressedby sociologists
in Africa and the Third World in general (e.g Akiwowo 1980). In the Arab
world, this need focuses on an Arabicor Islamic orientationdependingon the
ideological preference of those involved.
The Iranianrevolution and the creationof an Islamic Republic, as well as
the emergence of Islamic fundamentalistsocial movements both in and
outside the Arab world, have stimulateda real wave of scholarly interest in
these movements, the sociopolitical aspects of Islam, and more generally of
Islam as a system of values and as a social system. While an understandingof
these aspects of Islam will requirea multidisciplinaryapproach,there is no
doubt that sociology has much to contribute. It can provide an important
departurefrom the usual exegetic analysis of Islam and move toward an
analysis of the sociology of Muslims and of societies organizedon a Muslim
basis. The sociological study of Islam not only addresses importantsocial
issues in Arab countries, but also provides a vehicle for attempts at the
indigenizationof Arab sociology. This is no argument,however, on whether
the sociological study of Islam should be from the perspective of an indigenous Arab sociology or from that of Islamic sociology with its own
distinctive theories, methods, and research priorities.
Before we turnto a descriptionof the contributionsof Arab sociologists to
the sociological study of Islam, particularlycontemporaryIslamic social
movements, we present a more "quantitative"assessment of Arab sociology
today. This evaluation is based on a survey of Arab sociologists.

A SURVEY OF ARAB SOCIOLOGISTS


During 1983-1984 a survey of Arabsociologists was designed and carriedout
in collaborationwith Professor Salah Bassiouni of Ain Shams University in
Cairo. A brief questionnairewas mailed to 84 Arab sociologists, of whom 16
resided in the United States, Canada, and Franceat the time. Questionnaires
were also sent to five non-Arabsociologists who had done extensive research
on the Arab world, but they are not included in the present analysis. The
purposeof the questionnairewas to obtaininformationon the following items:

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current and prior position, university where highest degree was obtained,
theoreticalorientation,researchmethodsused and reasonsfor using methods,
sources of funding of research, areas of specialization in sociology, list of
publications, and "the highest prioritiesfor sociological researchin the Arab
world."
The list of names was drawn from those who were members of the
American Sociological Association and other professional associations or
who were known to Bassiouni or to the senior author.The distributionof the
questionnairessent and received by country is listed in Table 2.
In addition, letters were sent in 1984 to heads of departmentsof sociology
at the University of Baghdad and the University of Khartoum.As a result,
three questionnaireswere received from sociology professors at the University of Baghdad, includingthe head of the Department,and one questionnaire
came from Khartoum.There were English, French, and Arabic versions of
the questionnaire, and about half of all those that were completed were in
Arabic.
The fact that Egypt heads the list of sociologists to whom questionnaires
were sent is not surprisingand reflects the quantitativegrowthof sociology in
Egypt noted above. (See also Akiwowo 1980, Bassiouni 1979, el-Saaty
1977.) According to a survey carriedout in 1976 by the Organizationfor the
Promotionof Social Science in the Middle East, 40 of the 80 Arab sociologists who respondedto the survey were from Egypt (Rentz 1977). In another
study in 1980, Egyptiansconstituted85% of 46 Arab sociologist respondents
(al-Isa & al-Husseini 1982). The same study indicates that these sociologists
had a predominantlymiddle-class origin.
Table 2 Results of questionnairesent
to Arab sociologists

Country
Egypt
USA, Canada
Tunisia
Saudi Arabia
Qatar
Kuwait
Libya
Morocco
France
Lebanon
Jordan
Yemen AR
Total

Questionnaires
Sent
Received
28
14
11
7
7
5
4
3
2
1
1
1
84

13
4
5
2
3
0
2
1
0
1
1
0
32

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About 48% of those with a PhD in sociology hadreceivedthis degreefroma


universityin the United States and only 21% from an Arabuniversity,most of
which were in Egypt. In the 1976 survey, comparablefigures were:47% had a
Ph.D. in sociology from a US school, and only 30% from an Arabuniversity
(mostly in Egypt). The Arabsociologists' feeling of a "crisis"in theirdiscipline
may be traced, in part, to a conflict or tension that may exist between their
predominantlyWesterntrainingandtheirdesirefor indigenization.It shouldbe
kept in mind in interpretingthe resultsof the surveythatproportionatelyfewer
Arab sociologists with Arabgraduatetrainingrespondedto our questionnaire.
Social conflict theory was mentionedin almost40% of the responses as the
preferredtheoreticalperspective. Functionalisttheory came next with 23%.
The preferencefor functionalisttheory was much lower among US or Arabtrainedsociologists than among those trainedin England. Unfortunately,the
questionnairedid not distinguishbetweentypes of conflict theories. Reflecting
a pessimistic view of conditionsin the Arab world, the vast majorityof those
who espoused a conflict theory stated that they did so because it provides a
"betterinterpretationof the Arabcountries'situation."The preferenceof Arab
sociologists for "structuraltheories"was also noted by al-Issa & al-Husseini
(1982) in their 1982 survey of Arab sociologists.
When it comes to researchmethodsutilized by the Arab sociologists in our
sample, the following methods appearedto be the most popular:
Interviews..............................................................
Surveys.................................................................
Observations...........................................................
Questionnaires.........................................................
Statistical analysis ...........
Document study.......................................................

83%
70%
70%
63%
63%
50%

Many sociologists used more than one researchprocedure. In answer to an


openended question about the reasons for utilizing the particularmethods,
manyrespondentsindicatedthe importanceof versatilityandinnovativenessin
the use of these variousmethodsandthe need for adaptingthemto theparticular
social groupsthey are studying. For example, Saad EddinIbrahim(American
Universityin Cairo)statesthat"Ina diverseandfairlyinhospitableareavis a vis
social research, a sociologist has to be flexible and amenable to use all
techniquespossible." This point will be elaboratedin our review of Ibrahim's
work on Islamicmilitantgroups.SamirKhalaf(AmericanUniversityin Beirut)
agrees with Ibrahimwhen he states that "For the analysis of contemporary
problems, surveys, questionnairesand interviews, along with nonparticipant
observations,are useful, effective, illuminatingmeansfor generatingdataand
documentingtheoreticalhunches and propositions."Khalil Omar(University
of Baghdad) indicated a preference for "observation"as a research method
because "ourpeople still don't trustthe objectivityof questionnaires,surveys,
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and interviews." Musa Abdul Jalil (University of Khartoum)suggests that


"qualitativeresearchmethods"aremore appropriatefor the ruralpopulationhe
studies.
Even given such views on theoreticalperspectives,thereis no indicationthat
total methodological indigenizationwould be advocatedeven by those Arab
sociologists who have modified existing researchproceduresextensively to
facilitate their use in Arab countries. While there are many obstacles to field
research in the Arab world, there appears to be less sense of a "crisis" in
sociological methodology than in sociological theory.
Responses to the questionon sponsorshipof the researchpartlyconfirmthe
views cited above aboutthe dependenceof many Arab sociologists on foreign
sources of funding:The two categorieswith the highestresponserate(of about
43%) were "foreignorganizations"and"theresearcherhimself." However, the
fact that such a high percentage indicated sole dependence on their own
resourcespartlybelies the accusationof "compradorialsociologists"leveled at
Arab sociologists.
Answers to the following questionsallow us to delineatethe most important
substantivetopics/areasin Arabsociology: (a) topics/areasin the respondent's
work, (b) the highestprioritiesfor sociologicalresearchon the ArabWorld, and
(c) current research projects. The distributionof replies is summarizedin
Table 3.
Surprisingly, not one sociologist mentioned the study of Islam as a "high"
priority and only two mentioned "religious behavior/religionas a dynamic
factor."Nevertheless, a numberof specific topics/areasmentionedare closely
relatedto the sociopolitical situationin the Arab world. Apartfrom the ArabIsraeliconflict, the following are high priorityareas:"thesocial and economic
effects of migrationon the social structureof the ArabGulf states;social aspects
and impact of disunity in the Arab world; hindrancesto development in the
Arab World;social realitiesin the ArabWorld;the Arabsand imperialism;the
Table 3 Proportionof substantiveareasand/ortopics mentionedby Arabsociologists as priorities
or as topics of their own work
Substantiveareas and/or topics
Social change
Social class, inequality
Migration, population
Socioeconomic development, planning/underdevelopment
Women, women and development, women's emancipation,
youth
Rural society, villages, peasants
Arab-Israeliconflict
Social conflict in general, social conflict in Middle East

Priorities(%)

Own work (%)

54
24
33
21

68
20
31
54

33
15
15
6

43
23
14
43

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387

social impactof oil on the Arabcountries."On the otherhand, Arabsociologists sharewith sociologists in manypartsof the world an interestin the studyof
change andsocial class. The interestin "development"was also notedby al-Issa
& al-Husseini (1982) in their survey.
Comparedto priorities,currentresearchprojectsdeal morewith substantive
issues that are immediately relevant to the Arab world or a particularArab
country.They also show thatArabsociologists do not shy awayfrompolitically
or sociologically sensitive topics. The following is a partial list of current
researchprojects as describedin the questionnaires:"Minoritiesand political
integrationin the ArabWorld;the Arabworldin the year2,000; social realityin
the Arabnovel; the sociology of IbnKhaldun;interpersonalrelationsin Islamic
society; social control in the Islamic context; Islamism in Tunisia;effects of
legal reforms in Tunisia; kinship and patrimonyin Tunisia; the dialectic of
traditionalmodernityin Lebanon;the impactof the civil warin Lebanon;social
and political orientationof some members of the educated class in Egypt;
democracyin Egypt;poverty in some Egyptiangroups;populationand family
planningin Egypt;cost of dowries;indicatorsof changein SaudiArabia;social
configurationof a region in Qatar;the situationand needs of children in the
Gulf."
The surveythusindicatesa strongtrendtowardsubstantiveindigenizationof
Arab sociology. On the other hand, there appearsto be no similartrendwith
respectto theoreticalindigenization.However, the latterfinding may be partly
a consequence of the natureof the questions asked as well as the particular
sample of those Arab sociologists who respondedto the questionnaire.

THE CONTRIBUTIONSOF ARAB SOCIOLOGISTSTO


THE SOCIOLOGYOF ISLAM
A Western sociologist, Bryan Turner(1974), makes the most critical assessment of the presentstateof the sociology of Islam, as perceivedby an outsider.
According to him, the systematic study of Islam has been a neglected field in
sociology, with hardly any major sociological studies of Islam and Islamic
society. Marx and Durkheimhad little or nothingto say aboutIslam, although
some peripheralmembersof the Durkheimschool were interestedin the role of
Islam in North Africa (Valensi 1984). Weberdied before his Religionsoziologie was completed by a full study of Islam, and there are no other major
sociological theoristswho have been concernedwith IslamandIslamic society.
Although a few orientalistscholars have claimed a sociological approachto
Islam, it has had no impact on mainstreamsociology (cf Burke 1980). Bryan
Turner(1974:7) arguesthatthereis "astrongcase to be madefor the theoretically crucial importanceof Islam: as a prophetic,this-wordly, salvationreligion
with strongconnectionswith the otherAbrahamicreligions, Islamis a potential

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test case of Weber'sthesis on religionandcapitalism." Arabsociologists would


agree with the importanceof sociological studiesof Islam, but from a perspective clearly differentfromthatof Turner.In ourview, the indigenizationof the
sociology of the Arab world lies precisely in reversing Turner's priority.
Insteadof using Islam as a test case for Westerntheories, its studycan become
the basis for the theoreticalindigenizationof Arabsociology. The sociology of
Islamas the centerof the culturalheritageof the Arabworldlies at the core of an
overall comprehensivealternativesocioculturalenterpriseof which sociological theory and methodology are only one aspect.
The present emphasis on the contributionsof Arab social scientists to the
sociological study of Islam is not meant to minimize the contributionsof
Western social scientists. In recent years an increasing numberof Western
social scientists have providedimportanttheoreticaland comparativeinsights
in the sociological study of Islam and more particularlyIslamic social movements (e.g. Davis 1874, Snow & Marshall 1984). For example, to Snow &
Marshallthe importantquestion is "how this resurgenceof Islamic militancy
informsourunderstandingof social movementsandchangein the ThirdWorld"
(1984:145). This comes close to Jansen's(1980) argumentthat"militantIslam
today is partof the much wider ThirdWorldproblemof how to come to terms
with the Westernway of life that is rapidlybecoming the global way of life."
Few Arab sociologists would disagree with Snow & Marshall's (1984:146)
conclusion that "Islamicmovementsof today are in parta consequenceof the
culturaldegradationanddesecrationthatseems to be an inevitableconcomitant
of the imperialismassociated with the market-expandingefforts of Western
multinationalcorporations."While Snow & Marshall (1984) appropriately
emphasizethe political aspectsof Islamic social movements, they do not point
out that this is precisely what Arab social scientists are focusing on.
Western social scientists who contributeto the sociological study of Islam
have to be awareof the need to avoid the pitfalls of eitherthe orientalistor the
modernizationviews. According to Ibrahim(1980a), the "orientalist"view
treatedIslam "ideationally"and insulatedit from a changing social structure
while "modernization"theorists believed Islam to be a polar opposite of
secularism, science, and technology, and that as Arab countries modernize,
Islam is destined to weaken. The Islamic revolutionin Iranand the dramatic
emergence of Islamic fundamentalistgroupsprovideda real challenge to this
view. As a consequence, Islamwas "rediscovered"by Westernscholars.Thus,
in 1980 alone, 27 symposiaand conferenceson differentaspectsof Islamwere
held in universities and research centers in the United States. Saad Eddin
Ibrahimwarnsus of the creepingdangerof neo-orientalismandthe tendencyto
mystify Islamic militancy. This view is sharedby Dessouki who arguesthat"it
is conceptually inadequateand factually problematicto aggregate the many
diverse contemporarymovements and ideas and come up with a general

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interpretationor cause for all of them"(1982:8). Westernscholarshipis criticized for often portrayingIslamicgroupsas extremist,with dogmaticreactions
to modernity,the scholarshipthusrepresentinga retrogressivedevelopment.In
contrast,Arab sociological writingson the phenomenonemphasizeits diversity, complexity, and historicalspecificity. The most adequateapproachhas to
be interdisciplinaryand has to relatethe contemporarymovementsto previous
ones; it mustallow for diversityandcontradictionsbetweenIslamicgroups,and
between them and the political regimes. The analysis of Islamic groupshas to
be in terms of the specific process of social change, such as the changing
position of social classes andgroups, politicalparticipation,identitycrisis, the
stability of regimes and distributivejustice. Finally, we cannot ignore the
transnationalnatureof Islam and the appealto Islam, and we thereforemust
investigatethe interactionof internalandexternalfactors.While some of these
promises have been met, others have yet to be fulfilled.

WhatNeeds To Be KnownAbout Islamic Social Movements?


The study of Islamic social movements is a prime example of the kind of
contributionsthat Arab sociologists and social scientists can make to an understanding of the role of Islam in the contemporaryArab world. These
movements have been variously called Islamic revivalism, revitalization,
reassertion, renewal, awakening, fundamentalism,and neo-fundamentalism,
as well as militantor politicalIslam(Dessouki 1982). These movementsseek to
build "anew social orderbasedon Islam"(Ibrahim1980a:429).As is suggested
by Dessouki andothers, they all use politicalmeansto achieve this goal andare
thus engaged in the mobilization, organization, and possibly the seizure of
political authority.Theirpolitical activismis in the nameof Islam andinvolves
the growinguse of Islamicsymbolismandlegitimation.Dessouki also indicates
that the following questions from a sociological perspectiveneed to be asked
about these groups:
Why does a ruling class feel the need to resortto Islamic ideology as a legitimizingdevice?
Why do opposition Islamic movements emerge? What are the ideological and structural,
internalor external,factorsthatcreatethe milieu conduciveto theiremergence?Who arethe
potential, andactual, membersof these groupsandto whatsocial class or strataof society do
they belong?Why do these movementshave more appealto certainclasses andstratathanto
others? What do these groups understandof Islam, and which aspects of religion do they
emphasize?And what impactdo these Islamic resurgentgroupshave on social and political
change? (1982:6)

Answersto these questionsaredifficultto obtain,partlybecauseIslamicgroups


have emerged recently and are still evolving, and partly because there is a
scarcity of firsthandinformationbased on observations,intensive interviews,
or surveys. The fact thatthese groupsareoften engagedin clandestineactivities
makes knowledge of them very hard except throughgovernment-controlled

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media coverage of arrests and trials, coverage specifically geared toward


projecting a negative image. Nevertheless, different Arab sociologists and
other Arab social scientists have alreadystartedto give us valuableanswersto
Dessouki's questions. Most existing studiesare indeed interdisciplinary,comparative, and historical.
There are at least three systematicempiricalstudies aboutthe membership,
structure,anddynamicsof specific Islamicmovements;these studiesarebased
on interviewsandobservationscarriedout in the naturalsettingof these groups.
The first is a recent unpublishedstudy sponsoredby the National Center for
Sociological andCriminologicalResearchin Cairoandfocused on two Islamic
groups whose members were arrestedfor militant activity and violence and
whose leaderswere executed. Lengthyinterviewswere conductedwith members of these groups after they were imprisoned(Ibrahim1980a). The second
study is by Elbaki Hermassi (1984), a Tunisian sociologist, and is based on
interviewswith about50 jailed leadersof the IslamicMovementanda national
sample survey in Tunisia. The third study is by Fadwa el-Guindi (1982), an
Egyptian anthropologistand was based on field work among university students. In addition, there are numerousother studies of Islamic movementsin
different parts of the Arab world, mostly based on historical material and
secondarysources (e.g. Aly & Wenner1982, Ayubi 1980, Al-Thakeb& Scott
1982, Ansari 1984, Belhassen 1981, Ben Achour 1981, Zghal 1981).

Methodological Issues in Field Studies of Islamic Movements


Sociological field studiesof Islamic social movementsprovidecrucialmaterial
for an understandingof these movements. Thereare, however, many methodological issues and greatobstacles in the design andexecutionof such studies.
In most Arab countries no field study or survey can be carriedout without
permission from the appropriategovernmentalagency (Tessler et al 1986).
Thus, when a team from the NationalCenterfor Sociological and Criminological Researchin Cairo appliedfor the government'spermissionto interview
the leadersof the two most prominentmilitantgroups, they were turneddown
because these groupswere called "revivalistmovements"in the study design.
After prolonged negotiations, a compromisewas reached by stating that the
study would focus on "religiousviolence." This conformedto the government
policy of labelling membersof Islamic militantgroupsas deviants, abnormals,
andhereticsandtreatingthemas commoncriminals.Thus, sociological studies
of these groups in the Arab world raise many political, ethical, and practical
problems.Both the protagonistsandantagonistsmaybe temptedto use research
projects for their own purposes. There is an overall inhospitabilityto field
studies, even when initial goodwill is establishedand a greatdeal of suspicion
concerning the motives of the social scientist. The militants initially refused
to see the researchteam which, in their view, was defined either as part of a

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corruptsociety or as working for the government.The researchteam had to


promise them neutralityand objectivity. The militantsrequestedto be allowed
to read everythingthe membersof the researchteam had ever published, and
they discussed some of the materialwith the team. In Ibrahim'swords:
Some of the interviews were more like graduateseminar sessions, with lively and hottemperedexchanges. In other words, they refused to play the conventionalrole of research
subjects. They interviewedus as much as we interviewedthem. At times they asked us to
reactto theirviews, somethingthatgoes againstthe grammarof social research(1980a:428).

This kind of interactionbetween the researchersand research subjects led


Ibrahim to argue, in a special seminar held in Kuwait in 1985, that the
qualitative advancement of Arab sociology rests on modifying Western
methods to fit Arab reality. In a difficult researchenvironment, it is often
necessary to have more extensive interactionwith the researchsubjectsthanis
usually the case. In particular,when studyingsocial movementswhose members inquireaboutthe scope of the researchandwho pose questionsthemselves,
thereis a realneed to devise new interviewingmethodsadaptedto the particular
Arab sociopolitical environment.The Cairoresearchteam ended up spending
an averageof morethan 10 hoursperinterviewforthe 33 militantsinterviewed.
Thus, the kind of methodologyneededfor field studiesin the Arabworldis one
thatis morepersonalandsubjectivethanthatusedin theWest;it can thusreflect
the morepersonalizedsocial interaction.This is clearlydescribedas follows by
Ibrahim:
A humanbond developedbetweenthe researchteamandthe Muslimmilitants.They became
not only open but quite eager to talk . . .. So deeply did they become committed to our
research objective that when the governmentwithdrewour researchpermit, their leaders
tried to reach us through secret channels, bypassing the prison authorities altogether
(1980a:428).

In February1977 the Egyptian authoritiesput an end to prison interviewing


without giving any official reasons. The permit to resume interviewingwas
never granted;thus the researchis incomplete.

Sociological Characteristicsof Selected Islamic Movements


The diversity and multiplicity of Islamic movements and the contradictions
between them and secularArabregimesareapparentin the studiesandwritings
of leading Arab social scientists. Accordingto HannaBatatu(1982), an Iraqi
political scientist, the Muslim Brethrenin Syriarepresenta responseto distinguishable conditions and to the interestsof clearly identifiablesocial groups.
They put themselves forwardas the naturalspokesmen of the Islamic Sunni
community and define their conflict with Syria's Alawi rulers as a conflict
between Sunnis and Alawis. They arguethat the Alawis who representabout

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9-10% of the populationcannot indefinitely dominatethe Sunni majorityin


Syria. In Batatu'sview, the conflict is plainlynot aboutreligion. Whathas been
at stakesince the Ba'athisttakeoverin 1963 arethe social interestsof the upperand middle elements of the landed, mercantile, and manufacturingclasses.
While the conflict between Sunnis and Alawis is specific to Syria, the Muslim
Brethrenin Syria share in common with other opposition groups in the Arab
world the emphasis on political emancipationand democratic rights of the
common citizens. The fascinating aspect of the Islamic movement is that it
respondsboth to very specific sociopoliticalcircumstancesand to very general
sociopolitical aspirationsfor basic political freedom.
One importantsociological question pertains to the social origin of the
Muslim Brethrenof Syria, comparedto that of Islamic groups in other Arab
countries. In the last few years, the militants have carried out attacks on
governmentbuildings, police stations, andBa'athpartyheadquartersandhave
provoked demonstrationsand large-scale shutdowns of shops and schools.
According to Batatu,these militantswere universitystudentsandprofessional
men in their20s and 30s, as is evident fromthe occupationaldistributionof the
activistswho were arrestedbetween 1976 andMay 1981. Outof a totalof 1324,
no fewer than28%were students,8%school teachers,and 13%membersof the
professions, including engineers, physicians, lawyers, and pharmacists.
While the movement of Muslim Brethrenin Syria was essentially based in
cities and defended the interests of landed, mercantile, and manufacturing
classes, the Islamicmovementin Tunisia,accordingto Hermassi(1984), has its
greatest strengthin small towns. It is primarilya movement of the educated
youth (see also Belhassen 1981, Ben Achour 1981, Zghal 1981). The general
sample of membershas a medianage of 25 years and is constitutedmainly of
universitystudents. Even the jailed leadersof the movementat the time of the
study were young, with a medianage of 30 years. Otherimportantcharacteristics mentionedby Hermassiarethe strongconcentrationof studentmembersin
science faculties (comparedto theirweakerpresencein the humanitiesand the
social sciences) and the massive participationof women. The findings with
respect to the socioeconomic origins of jailed leaders of the movement in
Tunisiacontrastwith those reportedby SaadEddinIbrahim(1980a) for Egypt.
While the membersof militantIslamicgroupsin Egyptaremostly of middle-or
lower-middle-class origin, Tunisian activists are mainly from poor and uneducated families, and, in spite of their rapid educationalmobility, they are
blocked socioeconomically. With no chance of being "in"they identify with
those that are "out"and are in permanentand obsessive searchfor an alternative. The same search for an alternativealso characterizesthe Islamic movement in Egypt.
According to Hanafi (1982:67), the Islamic alternativein Egypt is the only
real one because it is "theonly organizationalform expressingthe deep-rooted
traditionalstream."As suggestedby Hanafi,therearemanydifferentways that
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TODAY

393

this Islamic alternativehas been expressedin Egypt. Those thatdo not question
the social or political system of the country, as the fundamentalistgroupsdo,
areallowed to multiplywithoutany obstacles. Some examplesarethe construction of mosques, the multiplicationof Islamic publishers,the growing sale of
religious books (some of which have become best-sellers), the broadcastingof
prayers through loudspeakersin the streets, and the slogan calling for the
applicationof the Shari'a(Islamiclaw)-increasingly used by all parties.Some
Muslim preachershave become as popularas movie stars. The preachingof
Sheikh Metuwalli on television attractsmillions of viewers and is widely used
by the rulingelite to persuadethe massesto supportpublicpolicy. It is precisely
because these elites arefrightenedby the possibilityof a Khomeni-typeIslamic
revolutionthatthey encouragethese variousandnonthreateningexpressionsof
the Islamic alternative.
Ibrahim(1982a) also examines the possibilities of an Islamic alternativein
Egypt. Some Islamic groups such as the Moslem Brothersdemonstratea clear
historicalcontinuitywhich dispels the currentWesternviews that see Islamic
movementseverywhereas if they sprangfromnowhere. The Moslem Brothers
in Egypt are orientedtowarda total change of society; they see no separation
between religion and state, and they seek maximum involvement in wordly
affairs. A grass roots movement, they appeal to the lower middle class, the
fastest growingclass in Egyptin recentyears. Only afterthe 1967 defeatdid the
Moslem Brothersbegin to win back the supportof an increasingsegment of
Egypt's middle classes. The movementemergedas the most vocal critic of the
Sadat's socioeconomic policies. They openly attackedthe regime's failure to
deal effectively with Egypt's problemsof education, housing, transportation,
and inflation. The dramaticfood riots of January1977 gave them the opportunity to launch a sharpattackon Sadat'sregime. They mocked the government
for blamingthe widespreadriotson communistsandassertedthatthe riots were
merely normalsymptomsof more profoundand prevalentproblemsaffecting
various sectors of the population.
It is interestingto note thatthe Moslem Brothers'attackon Sadat'ssocioeconomic policies was nearlyidenticalwiththatof the secularleft. The necessity of
looking at contradictionsamong differentIslamic groupsis clearly spelled out
by Ibrahim(1982a). He points out thatthe leadershipof the Moslem Brothers
has detached itself from other Islamic groups, which engage in violent confrontations with the regime. The Moslem Brothers opted for nonviolence
instead. But Ibrahim's assessment is that the condemnationof the violent
fringes of the Islamic movement is only tactical and provisional until the
movementrebuildsandconsolidatesitself. Because of the historicalcontinuity
of the movement, its leadershave learnedfrom past prematureconfrontations
with the regime, for example, with Nasser's regime. They have also learnedto
engage in alliances and coalition formationwith the other secular groupsincluding secular liberals and leftists.
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This contrasts sharply with the tactics and policies of the more militant
Islamic groups in Egypt also studiedby Ibrahim.The bloody confrontationof
July 1977 between the regime and membersof a militantislamic grouplabeled
by the media as "Repentanceand Holy Flight" (RHF) reflected the growing
despair of the most volatile elements of the population-youth of the lower
middle and workingclass who sought salvationin Islamic militancy. The size
of the group came as a surprise to both the government and the public.
Interrogationsrevealed a sizable movementof between 3000 and 5000 active
members who are highly organizedand quite widely spreadhorizontallyand
vertically throughoutEgyptiansociety. This violent confrontationwas not the
firstof its kind againstthe Sadatregime. Earlier,in April 1974, anothermilitant
Islamic group, the Islamic LiberationOrganization,attemptedto stage a coup
d'etat which was spectacular in scope, planning, and timing. In addition,
scattered confrontationsoccurredbetween the authoritiesand other militant
Islamic elements which, however, attractedmuch less publicity than the one
mentioned above. From 1975 to 1979, Muslim groups achieved landslide
victories in university studentunions. This promptedthe governmentto dissolve these unions by presidentialdecree in the summerof 1979. Accordingto
Ibrahim, the use of violence by some militant groups gives the regime a
legitimateexcuse to go all-outagainstall Islamicgroups.Governmentcounterattacks,however, do not seem to have stemmedthe tide of the militantgroups.
For every group that is liquidated, two or three new organizationsemerge.
The analyses by Ibrahimand Hermassiof militantIslamic groups indicate
thatArabsociologists studyingsuch groupsareinterestedin the same aspectsof
movements as theirWesterncolleagues: the generalsocietal conditionsgiving
rise to a movement, its ideology, leadership,mode of recruitmentof members,
social origins of members, internal organization, and strategy and tactics.
According to Ibrahim (1980a), the members interviewed believed that the
righteousMuslim cannotexist individuallyand must strive to build and maintain a communityof the faithful. It is his religious duty to see to it that a truly
Muslim social ordercomes about. Ibrahimsuggests thatsuch a belief sooneror
later takes on an organizationalform that leads to an inevitable confrontation
with the rulingelite. They perceive Egypt's presenteconomic problemsas the
outcome of mismanagementof resources,the applicationof importedpolicies,
the corruptionof top officials, conspicuousconsumerism,and low productivity. An importantcomponentof the militants'economic thinkingis condemnation of excessive wealth differentialsboth between and withinMuslim countries. Social differentiationandstratification,however, areacceptedpillarsof the
Muslim order, but it is man's labor that is the only acceptablemechanismof
differentiation.They believe thatit is the dutyof every trueMuslimto remove
injustice.
The founding leaders of the two militantgroups studied had been hanged,
and informationaboutthem was obtainedfromtheirfollowers. They were said
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to have greatcharisma,to be extremelyeloquent, andto be highly knowledgeable not only about religion but also about national and internationalaffairs.
Both leadersrecruitedfollowers fromamong studentswho were recentuniversity graduates.The threerecruitmentmethodsemployed were kinship, friendship, and worship. Those recruitedin turn enlisted their close friends and
relatives. What Ibrahim found most significant sociologically is the social
selectivity of members.The typicalmemberis young, fromruralor small-town
background,fromthe upwardlymobile middleor lower middleclass, with high
achievement and motivation, and from a normallycohesive family. Ibrahim
indicatesthatthis profile poses some perplexingtheoreticalproblems,"since it
is sometimes assumedin social sciences thatmembersof 'radicalmovements'
must be alienated, marginal, anomic, or must possess some other abnormal
characteristics"(1980a:440). On the basis of observationsand interviews of
militantIslamicwomen, Fadawel-Guindi,an Arabanthropologist,agreeswith
Ibrahimthat membersof militantIslamic groups are definitely not alienated,
marginal, or anomic individuals. In her words, "they are not dropoutsfrom
society to a primitivecommune, or from college to find themselves, nor from
this world to other-wordlyasceticism"(1982:482-83).

WhatAccountsfor the Spread of Islamic Militant Movements?


In search of an explanationfor the rising tide of Islamic militantmovements,
Batatu, Ibrahim,Dessouki, Tibi, and others have suggested placing the phenomenon in its historical and comparativeperspective and in the process of
social change taking place in the Arab countries. In modern Arab history,
militantIslamic movementshave sprungup in several countries, and many of
them have used violence to challenge the status quo. They are to be distinguished from Sufi movements oriented toward the individual ratherthan
towardchanginga social or political system. All Islamicmilitantmovementsof
the last ten centuries share the common objective of total change in the
individual and society and a willingness to use violence to bring about this
change. In modern times, several ideological and organizationalsimilarities
exist between the two militant groups studied by Ibrahimand the Muslim
Brotherhoodin Egypt and the Mujahideenin Iran. A comparativehistorical
analysis of these four groups would help to find answers to the following
questions:Whatarethe commonunderlyingstructuralfactorsbetweenpastand
presentIslamicmovements?Since militantIslamicgroupsarenot the only ones
whose ideology and actions challenge the presentsocial order,why have other
leftist opposition groups not been as successful? If, as Ibrahim(1980a) suggests, the social profile of those who join radicalleftist or Marxistgroups is
quite similarto Islamic militants, why is it thatin recentyears the balancehas
tilted in favor of Islamic groups?Ibrahim(1980a) indicatesthat the following
four factorsmay accountfor the failureof leftist movements:(a) the ability of
Arab ruling elites to dismiss Marxistopposition as atheistagents of a foreign
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power;(b) recentsetbackssufferedby quasi-socialistexperimentsin Egyptand


elsewhere in the Arabworld;(c) the sense of communionprovidedby Muslim
groupswith theiremphasison brotherhoodandmutualsharing;and(d) the deep
rootednessof Islam. The deep-rootednessof Islamandthe use of Islamby both
the rulingelites andoppositiongroupsarepointsthatappearin most sociological writingson Islamic movements. Among the masses, Islam providesa frame
of reference for their collective identity, a symbol of self-assertion, and a
consciousness thatis rootedin theirown historyandtradition,not derivedfrom
foreign penetrationand culturaldomination.This is recurrentlyreferredto by
Arab scholars and intellectuals as the question of authenticityversus modernization. A returnto Islam is a returnto authenticity(asala), an assertionof
national pride and independenceof thought (Dessouki 1981:7). It should be
emphasized, however, that Islamic resurgenceis not a reactionto modernization per se, but to a kind of Westernizationthat not only overlooks but often
despises nationaltraditionsand culturalsymbols. Dessouki insists thatIslamic
resurgence reflects a "society in crisis." Some Arab social scientists have
actually analyzed Islamic social movements in terms of modernizationand
authenticity.Thus, el-Guindi (1982) arguesthat Islamic movements are very
much "in" and "are aggressively building models based on an already established, recently legitimized indigenous culturaltheory of Islam."
In view of the complexity of the questionspertainingto the rise of Islamic
movements, we would have to agree with Tibi (1983:12) who statedthat"the
general assumptionsaboutthe relationsbetween Islam and social change must
be broken down to specific and detailed hypotheses." In our view, some of
these hypotheses would have to come from the theoreticalliteratureon social
movements. One example is RalphTurner's(1981) hypothesisthat "a movement grows in numberbecause it attractsand holds adherentswith diverse
motives, goals and conceptionsof the movement."Deukmejian(1985:4) in a
recent analysisof Islamic fundamentalistgroupsprovidesan elaborationof this
hypothesis when he statesthat"bothin its militantandpassive forms, contemporary Islamic fundamentalismpossesses the three general attributesof pervasiveness, polycentrism,andpersistence."It is pervasivein the sense thatit is
not limited to any individualcountryor social class. It is polycentricsince it
appears"topossess no single revolutionaryleadershipor organizationalepicenter .... butto the extentthatthe crisis situationsin differentsocieties aresimilar,
the Islamic movementcould eventuallyassumea trulytransnationalcharacter."
Thirdly, Islamic movementshave "persisted"in the recenthistoryof the Arab
Muslim world.

CONCLUSION
It is significant that a whole conference was held in 1985 on the issue of
"Authenticityand Modernization,"to discuss its intellectual,political, social,
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and legal aspects. The argumenthere is that social science and intellectual
discourse on authenticityand indigenization is another aspect of the same
search for authenticityand indigenizationby Islamic movements. Before this
authenticityand indigenizationof Arabsociology, and of Arabsocial sciences
in general, can be achieved, a numberof complex methodologicaland theoretical problems have to be resolved. To paraphraseHanafi (1982), the Arab
social scientist is not an impartialspectatorbut someone who is trying to
perceive a trendof which he is a part.The social scientistis at once the subject
andobjecttryingto analyzehis own society. Thus, thepessimisticreview of the
state of Arab sociology by Arab sociologists is understandable.But solutions
are being and will be found within the Arab world for some of the complex
problems posed by the indigenizationof Arab social sciences. In our view,
thereis alreadya trendtowardthe substantiveindigenizationof Arabsociology.
This is suggestednot only by the resultsof oursurvey, butalso by ourreview of
sociological studies of Islamic social movements. Furthermore,many Arab
sociologists are keenly awareof the need to be flexible and innovativein their
selection and use of researchprocedures. The stumbling block remains the
theoreticalindigenizationof Arabsociology, and this is the main sourceof the
pessimism of Arabsociologists. But, therecan be little or no indigenizationof
theory until there have been ample systematicstudies and analyses of various
facets of Arab society. For some time to come, such studies will have to be
guided by a numberof specific hypothesesandtheoreticalhunchesthatemerge
out of the experience of Arab sociologists. It could be argued, however, that
theoreticalindigenizationis a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the
establishmentandthe growthof an Arabsociology. WhenArabsociologists do
constructtheirown theoreticalmodels, they will have to relatethemto sociological theories developed in other parts of the world, or face the risk of
theoretical provincialism. Such a task will have to be accomplished in collaborationwith sociologists from different regions of the world, and on the
basis of equality and mutualunderstanding.

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