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Abstract
Some of the accomplishmentsand shortcomingsof Arabsociology duringthe
last few years are assessed from the perspective of Arab sociologists. This
assessment of Arab sociology from the insiders' perspective involves (a)
reviewing selected paperspresentedat one of the most recent Arab sociology
conferences, (b) analyzingthe resultsof a survey of 36 Arabsociologists, and
(c) describingin detail the majorcontributionsof Arabsociologists and social
scientists to the study of Islam, with particularreference to Islamic social
movements. Recent socioeconomic changes and political events in the Arab
world help explain the rising interest in sociology. Arab sociologists view
their discipline as still in process of becoming and in a state of crisis. The
sociopolitical and disciplinaryaspects of this crisis and the solution suggested
to remedy it are described. Arab sociological studies of Islamic social movements have the following features:(a) an emphasison the diversity, complexity, and historical specificity of these movements, (b) a recognition of the
need for an interdisciplinaryapproach,(c) a focus on the sociological characteristics of leaders and followers, (d) analyses of the origin of the movements,
and (e) an emphasis on the need for a methodology more personal and
subjective than the one used in the West. This research,as well as the survey
of Arab sociologists, indicates that there is a noticeable trend toward the
substantive indigenizationof Arab sociology and that Arab sociologists are
aware of the need to be innovative and flexible in their selection and use of
research methods. These also show that there has been little theoretical
indigenization of Arab sociology. This may explain, in part, the sense of
crisis felt by Arab sociologists.
373
0360-0572/86/0815-0373$02.00
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SABAGH& GHAZALLA
INTRODUCTION
This review presents an assessment of some of the accomplishmentsand
shortcomingsof Arabsociology duringthe last few years. Such an assessment
can be done either from an "outsider"or an "insider"perspective. There are,
of course, advantages in looking at both perspectives. In the words of
Hamnett et al (1984:85), "Insider's research can provide insights, inner
meanings, and subjective dimensions that are likely to be overlooked by
outsiders. The outsider can bring a comparablydetached perspective to the
problemshe investigates."While Westernsociologists, particularlyin France
and the United States, have made importantcontributionsto the sociological
study of the Arab World, most of them are obviously "outsiders."The most
compelling reasonsfor focusing on the "insiders'" views of Arabsociology is
the Arab sociologists' call for the "indigenization"of their discipline. Hamnett et al identified as follows the two majorcomponentsof the indigenization
of social sciences, widely advocated in the Third World:
Theoreticalindigenizationis a conditionin which social scientistsof a nation are involved
in constructingdistinctive conceptual frameworksand metatheoriesthat reflect their own
world views, social and cultural experiences, and perceived goals. . . . Substantive
indigenization is concerned with the content focus of the social sciences. The essential
argumentfor substantiveindigenizationis thatthe main thrustof researchand teachingin a
country should be toward its own society and people and their economic and political
institutions (1984:78).
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ARABSOCIOLOGY
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376
sequences not only in the Gulf States but also in the whole Arabworld. There
was an increase in the gap between "poor"and "rich"Arab countries and a
rising tide of internationalmigrationfrom the former to the latter countries.
As can be seen in Table 1, therewas in 1983 an enormousrangein the GNP
per capita, from a high of around$20,000 in Kuwait, Qatar, and the United
Arab Emirates to a low of around $400-$500 in the Sudan, Mauritania,
Yemen AR, and Yemen PDR. The highest incomes are in the smallest Arab
countries, and the most populous Arab countries (Sudan, Egypt, Morocco)
have among the lowest incomes. This income differentialis in partresponsible for a massive labor migrationfrom the poor Arab countries, particularly
Egypt and the Yemens, to the rich Arabcountries(Amin & Awny 1985). One
measureof the importanceof this migrationis providedby the figures on the
share of workers' remittances in the GNP of the smaller labor-exporting
countries:such remittancesconstituted43.4%, 37.8%, and 21.2% of the GNP
of Yemen PDR, Yemen AR, and Jordanrespectively (see Table 1). Estimates
Table 1 Per capita income and worker remittancesfor Arab countries
Arab countries by
income levels
Population
in millions GNP per capita($)
1983
1983
Average annual
growth of GNP Remittances as
per capita
per cent of GNP
1965-1983
1983
1.2
.3
1.6
10.4
.4
3.4
1.1
23,870
21,210
17,880
12,230
10,510
8,480
6,250
14.7
20.6
3.2
9.6
6.9
20.8
45.2
7.6
2.0
1.6
20.8
5.1
NA
2,320
1,640
1,760
1,290
760
700
550
520
480
400
250
NA
-7.0a
.2
6.7
NA
-.9
6.5
__b
__b
__b
__b
__b
__b
.6
NA
3.6
6.9a
4.9
5.0
2.9
4.2
5.7
NA
.3
1.3
-.8
NA
.8
21.2
2.7
4.0
5.8
10.4
37.8
43.4
.1
.3
1.7
aForperiodsotherthan1965-1983
'These countries have a net negative workers' remittances
Source: The World Bank (1985), pp. 174-75, 200-01, and 232
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of the size of the Arab labor migrationstreamsvary widely (Amin & Awny
1985, Ibrahim1982b), but thereis no doubtthatit was substantialin 1980 and
increased rapidly in the 1970s. For Egypt alone, one estimate places the
numberof workers abroadat over 1,000,000 in 1980 as comparedto around
400,000 in 1975 (Amin & Awny 1985).
The sudden increase in the wealth of some Arab countriesis part of what
Saad Eddin Ibrahim(1982b) has called the "New Arab Social Order,"which
involves the appearanceof new social forces and new values and behavior
patterns.This has resultedin a greatdeal of social chaos andthe emergenceof
new social problems.
There has been an increase in the military, economic, and sociocultural
penetration of Arab countries by the United States and other Western
countries. This penetration, which the ruling elites have been unable to
counteract, is furtherexacerbatedby the consolidationof Israel in the occupied territoriesof the West Bank, which no wars or diplomatic maneuvers
appear to thwart.
There is increasing social fragmentationwithin several Arab countries
which is based on legitimate and semilegitimate claims of diversity and
particularism(Ibrahim 1985).
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SABAGH& GHAZALLA
still "in process," which explains the title, "Towardan Arab Sociology," of a
recent conference of Arab sociologists in Tunis. In Irabi's view, "it is
imperativefor Arab sociology to develop an independenttheory in which the
particularismsof Arab developmentand society stand at the center of sociological interest"(1982:183). Sari echoes the opinions of many Arab sociologists when he states that "it is ironic that Arab sociologists acknowledge the
limitations of Western theories, but continue to depend on them-often
entirely-in their research and studies" (1983:52).
One of us completed an assessment of the state of sociology in the Arab
world, Iran, and Turkey in the 1960s and the early 1970s (Sabagh 1976).
While it was noted that much had already been accomplished, much more
researchand theoreticalwork was neededto shed light on the key problemsof
the region, including the consequences of rapidurbanization,social inequality, and such major social issues as the role of Islam in society. Where does
Arab sociology stand now? The general picturethat emerges from the papers
presented at a conference in Tunis, January 1985, is one of "sociology in
crisis." In the words of Hegazy (1985:75), "A critical appraisalof the state of
sociology in the Arab world shows that it is in a state of crisis theoretically
and methodologically, in additionto being isolated and alienatedfrom actual
social reality." Since the Tunis conference constitutes the most recent and
most extensive assessmentof the state of the field by the majorArab sociologists, we shall focus on some of the themes thatemerged:the currentstatusof
the field, reasons for the current"crisis," reasons for the discontent of the
Arab sociologists with their discipline, and solutions suggested to remedythe
present situation.
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ARABSOCIOLOGY
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ample, the lack of democracyand the resultantpolitical apathy, the ideological and economic dependencyon the West, the Arab-Israeliconflict, and the
deepening of social inequality(Sari 1985). An even more pessimistic view is
expressed by the Algerian sociologist el-Kanz (Nasr 1985:171), who argues
that "sociology is disfigured by the political institution . . . society is the
monopoly of the governmentand not a subject for research . . .there is no
legitimacy whatsoever for a rational discourse about the social structureof
any Arab country."Consequently,Arabsociology is "animpossible practice,
a superficialendeavorin universities;"its only chance to develop is "eitherin
exile or in secret." A somewhat less pessimistic view is offered by the
Egyptian sociologist Abdel Moty (Nasr 1985:170).
While few Arab sociologists have criticizedthe statusquo in theirwritings,
there is some indication of change with the emergence of neo-Marxistsand
groups favoringturath(neoculturalheritage).They agreeon the criticalissues
in sociology but are in theoreticalconflict. Hegazy and Abdel Moty see the
beginning of a critical Arab sociology. Participantsat the Tunis 1985 conference disagreed about the extent to which Arab sociologists are free to
express their views and investigate crucial topics such as political authority,
class conflict, and other importantissues pertaining to religion, sex, and
minorities. They also disagreedaboutthe extent to which sociologists have to
make ideological choices. By contrast,there was consensus that the political
climate in Arab countriesplaces serious restraintson sociological theory and
research.
The oppressive political climate has a number of negative personal and
professionalconsequencesfor Arabsociologists. Accordingto Abdel Moty, it
tends to foster the emergence of a class of "compradorial"researchsociologists who are dependenton foreign countries"intellectually,financially, and
behaviorally"(Nasr 1985:171). A bleak pictureis paintedof Arabsociologists
who submit to authority, are opportunistic, and supervise foreign-funded
research that involves the exploitation of younger scholars and graduate
students. Furthermore,they are uselessly engaged in "tribal"conflicts between Marxists, functionalists, and followers of the French, American, English, and Soviet schools. Ibrahim(1985) has concluded that this "tribalism"
has become the opiate of Arab sociology.
Most prominentArab sociologists deplore the dependence of their discipline on Western sociology, and some view this dependence as a form of
apology for colonialism and neocolonialism and a justification of the status
quo. The most radical critique is provided by Sari (1985). In his view, the
intellectual effort of Arab sociologists is dominated by Western analytic
frameworkssuch as structural-functionalism.Most Arab research produced
from the 1950s to the mid-1970s is based on positivism in its old and revised
forms, and this has led to the neglect of the development of dialectical
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SABAGH& GHAZALLA
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While Arab sociologists paint a bleak pictureof the state of their discipline
and of their intellectual and social ineffectiveness, their self-appraisalis a
necessary step to remedy the inadequaciesof Arab sociology. On the more
positive side, in the selection of researchtopics the Arab sociologist is on his
own ground. For example, the many studies of the social, economic, and
political impact of the massive Arab internationalmigrationemerge out of
recent Arab experience (e.g. Ali 1983, Amin & Awny 1985, Abdel Moty
1983, Bouhdiba 1979, Fergany 1983, Saad el-din & Abdel Fadil 1983,
Serageldin 1983, al-Tamimi 1982). They indicate that this migration will
have far-reachingconsequences for the Arab world.
It is illuminatingto consider Ibrahim's(1985) delineation of the sociological studies needed to betterunderstandArab social reality and the futureof
Arab society. His suggestions, however, cover the whole rangeof the sociological enterpriseand are so comprehensiveas to lead one to think that Arab
sociology has progressedvery little beyond what was described in the early
1970s. Unfortunately, his discussion does not differentiatebetween topics
thathave been fairly well studied, such as populationstructureand trendsand
urbanization, and those that have been relatively neglected, such as the
sociology of the state. His suggestions may be summarizedas follows.
Demographic studies are needed to assess the growth, distribution,movement, and characteristicsof the populationof the Arab world. Of particular
importance are the rates of economic participation, the structure of the
available labor force, and its effects on rural-urbanmigration and internationalmigration between Arab countries. Basic demographicdata are
already available, but they need to be fully analyzed in order to provide a
general picture of the demographicbase of the Arab world.
Ecological studies are needed to deal with the main patternsof livelihood
resultingfrom the interactionbetween man and his naturalenvironmentin the
Arab world. The most importantof these are the beduintribalpatternsand the
process of urbanization.The aim of these studies should be to evaluate the
effects of development and alternativepopulation distributionpolicies on
these ecological interrelations.Special attention should be paid to the influence of the size and social structureof cities on contemporaryand future
political stability.
Studies of class structureare needed to delineate the class system and its
degree of crystallizationin each Arab country and in the Arab world as a
whole. Such studies should also evaluate the effect of class structureon the
productiveprocess, sociopolitical stability, and the process of social change.
Ethnic social formations should be describedand analyzed, particularlyin
relation to class structureand the effects of majority-minority relationship
on the level of internalconflict.
The present and future roles of organized occupational groups (unions,
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ARABSOCIOLOGY
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and they emphasize the need for an Arab sociology. Most of them are also
believers in secularism and the secular outlook of Western sociology even
while they try to transcendthe latter. They represent a major sociological
currentin the Arab world, but by no means the only existing one. According
to Adel Hussein, "Renewalstartswith refusingthe principleof secularismand
going back to Islamic values; any theoreticalbase must reflect the indigenous
environment"(Hegazy 1985:79). Thus, the call for an Arab or an Islamic
sociology is in reality a call for the indigenizationof sociology in terms of
theoreticalperspective, methodology, and prioritiesof topics for study. The
need for the indigenizationof sociology has also been stressedby sociologists
in Africa and the Third World in general (e.g Akiwowo 1980). In the Arab
world, this need focuses on an Arabicor Islamic orientationdependingon the
ideological preference of those involved.
The Iranianrevolution and the creationof an Islamic Republic, as well as
the emergence of Islamic fundamentalistsocial movements both in and
outside the Arab world, have stimulateda real wave of scholarly interest in
these movements, the sociopolitical aspects of Islam, and more generally of
Islam as a system of values and as a social system. While an understandingof
these aspects of Islam will requirea multidisciplinaryapproach,there is no
doubt that sociology has much to contribute. It can provide an important
departurefrom the usual exegetic analysis of Islam and move toward an
analysis of the sociology of Muslims and of societies organizedon a Muslim
basis. The sociological study of Islam not only addresses importantsocial
issues in Arab countries, but also provides a vehicle for attempts at the
indigenizationof Arab sociology. This is no argument,however, on whether
the sociological study of Islam should be from the perspective of an indigenous Arab sociology or from that of Islamic sociology with its own
distinctive theories, methods, and research priorities.
Before we turnto a descriptionof the contributionsof Arab sociologists to
the sociological study of Islam, particularlycontemporaryIslamic social
movements, we present a more "quantitative"assessment of Arab sociology
today. This evaluation is based on a survey of Arab sociologists.
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SABAGH& GHAZALLA
current and prior position, university where highest degree was obtained,
theoreticalorientation,researchmethodsused and reasonsfor using methods,
sources of funding of research, areas of specialization in sociology, list of
publications, and "the highest prioritiesfor sociological researchin the Arab
world."
The list of names was drawn from those who were members of the
American Sociological Association and other professional associations or
who were known to Bassiouni or to the senior author.The distributionof the
questionnairessent and received by country is listed in Table 2.
In addition, letters were sent in 1984 to heads of departmentsof sociology
at the University of Baghdad and the University of Khartoum.As a result,
three questionnaireswere received from sociology professors at the University of Baghdad, includingthe head of the Department,and one questionnaire
came from Khartoum.There were English, French, and Arabic versions of
the questionnaire, and about half of all those that were completed were in
Arabic.
The fact that Egypt heads the list of sociologists to whom questionnaires
were sent is not surprisingand reflects the quantitativegrowthof sociology in
Egypt noted above. (See also Akiwowo 1980, Bassiouni 1979, el-Saaty
1977.) According to a survey carriedout in 1976 by the Organizationfor the
Promotionof Social Science in the Middle East, 40 of the 80 Arab sociologists who respondedto the survey were from Egypt (Rentz 1977). In another
study in 1980, Egyptiansconstituted85% of 46 Arab sociologist respondents
(al-Isa & al-Husseini 1982). The same study indicates that these sociologists
had a predominantlymiddle-class origin.
Table 2 Results of questionnairesent
to Arab sociologists
Country
Egypt
USA, Canada
Tunisia
Saudi Arabia
Qatar
Kuwait
Libya
Morocco
France
Lebanon
Jordan
Yemen AR
Total
Questionnaires
Sent
Received
28
14
11
7
7
5
4
3
2
1
1
1
84
13
4
5
2
3
0
2
1
0
1
1
0
32
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385
83%
70%
70%
63%
63%
50%
386
SABAGH& GHAZALLA
Priorities(%)
54
24
33
21
68
20
31
54
33
15
15
6
43
23
14
43
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social impactof oil on the Arabcountries."On the otherhand, Arabsociologists sharewith sociologists in manypartsof the world an interestin the studyof
change andsocial class. The interestin "development"was also notedby al-Issa
& al-Husseini (1982) in their survey.
Comparedto priorities,currentresearchprojectsdeal morewith substantive
issues that are immediately relevant to the Arab world or a particularArab
country.They also show thatArabsociologists do not shy awayfrompolitically
or sociologically sensitive topics. The following is a partial list of current
researchprojects as describedin the questionnaires:"Minoritiesand political
integrationin the ArabWorld;the Arabworldin the year2,000; social realityin
the Arabnovel; the sociology of IbnKhaldun;interpersonalrelationsin Islamic
society; social control in the Islamic context; Islamism in Tunisia;effects of
legal reforms in Tunisia; kinship and patrimonyin Tunisia; the dialectic of
traditionalmodernityin Lebanon;the impactof the civil warin Lebanon;social
and political orientationof some members of the educated class in Egypt;
democracyin Egypt;poverty in some Egyptiangroups;populationand family
planningin Egypt;cost of dowries;indicatorsof changein SaudiArabia;social
configurationof a region in Qatar;the situationand needs of children in the
Gulf."
The surveythusindicatesa strongtrendtowardsubstantiveindigenizationof
Arab sociology. On the other hand, there appearsto be no similartrendwith
respectto theoreticalindigenization.However, the latterfinding may be partly
a consequence of the natureof the questions asked as well as the particular
sample of those Arab sociologists who respondedto the questionnaire.
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SABAGH& GHAZALLA
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interpretationor cause for all of them"(1982:8). Westernscholarshipis criticized for often portrayingIslamicgroupsas extremist,with dogmaticreactions
to modernity,the scholarshipthusrepresentinga retrogressivedevelopment.In
contrast,Arab sociological writingson the phenomenonemphasizeits diversity, complexity, and historicalspecificity. The most adequateapproachhas to
be interdisciplinaryand has to relatethe contemporarymovementsto previous
ones; it mustallow for diversityandcontradictionsbetweenIslamicgroups,and
between them and the political regimes. The analysis of Islamic groupshas to
be in terms of the specific process of social change, such as the changing
position of social classes andgroups, politicalparticipation,identitycrisis, the
stability of regimes and distributivejustice. Finally, we cannot ignore the
transnationalnatureof Islam and the appealto Islam, and we thereforemust
investigatethe interactionof internalandexternalfactors.While some of these
promises have been met, others have yet to be fulfilled.
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SABAGH& GHAZALLA
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this Islamic alternativehas been expressedin Egypt. Those thatdo not question
the social or political system of the country, as the fundamentalistgroupsdo,
areallowed to multiplywithoutany obstacles. Some examplesarethe construction of mosques, the multiplicationof Islamic publishers,the growing sale of
religious books (some of which have become best-sellers), the broadcastingof
prayers through loudspeakersin the streets, and the slogan calling for the
applicationof the Shari'a(Islamiclaw)-increasingly used by all parties.Some
Muslim preachershave become as popularas movie stars. The preachingof
Sheikh Metuwalli on television attractsmillions of viewers and is widely used
by the rulingelite to persuadethe massesto supportpublicpolicy. It is precisely
because these elites arefrightenedby the possibilityof a Khomeni-typeIslamic
revolutionthatthey encouragethese variousandnonthreateningexpressionsof
the Islamic alternative.
Ibrahim(1982a) also examines the possibilities of an Islamic alternativein
Egypt. Some Islamic groups such as the Moslem Brothersdemonstratea clear
historicalcontinuitywhich dispels the currentWesternviews that see Islamic
movementseverywhereas if they sprangfromnowhere. The Moslem Brothers
in Egypt are orientedtowarda total change of society; they see no separation
between religion and state, and they seek maximum involvement in wordly
affairs. A grass roots movement, they appeal to the lower middle class, the
fastest growingclass in Egyptin recentyears. Only afterthe 1967 defeatdid the
Moslem Brothersbegin to win back the supportof an increasingsegment of
Egypt's middle classes. The movementemergedas the most vocal critic of the
Sadat's socioeconomic policies. They openly attackedthe regime's failure to
deal effectively with Egypt's problemsof education, housing, transportation,
and inflation. The dramaticfood riots of January1977 gave them the opportunity to launch a sharpattackon Sadat'sregime. They mocked the government
for blamingthe widespreadriotson communistsandassertedthatthe riots were
merely normalsymptomsof more profoundand prevalentproblemsaffecting
various sectors of the population.
It is interestingto note thatthe Moslem Brothers'attackon Sadat'ssocioeconomic policies was nearlyidenticalwiththatof the secularleft. The necessity of
looking at contradictionsamong differentIslamic groupsis clearly spelled out
by Ibrahim(1982a). He points out thatthe leadershipof the Moslem Brothers
has detached itself from other Islamic groups, which engage in violent confrontations with the regime. The Moslem Brothers opted for nonviolence
instead. But Ibrahim's assessment is that the condemnationof the violent
fringes of the Islamic movement is only tactical and provisional until the
movementrebuildsandconsolidatesitself. Because of the historicalcontinuity
of the movement, its leadershave learnedfrom past prematureconfrontations
with the regime, for example, with Nasser's regime. They have also learnedto
engage in alliances and coalition formationwith the other secular groupsincluding secular liberals and leftists.
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This contrasts sharply with the tactics and policies of the more militant
Islamic groups in Egypt also studiedby Ibrahim.The bloody confrontationof
July 1977 between the regime and membersof a militantislamic grouplabeled
by the media as "Repentanceand Holy Flight" (RHF) reflected the growing
despair of the most volatile elements of the population-youth of the lower
middle and workingclass who sought salvationin Islamic militancy. The size
of the group came as a surprise to both the government and the public.
Interrogationsrevealed a sizable movementof between 3000 and 5000 active
members who are highly organizedand quite widely spreadhorizontallyand
vertically throughoutEgyptiansociety. This violent confrontationwas not the
firstof its kind againstthe Sadatregime. Earlier,in April 1974, anothermilitant
Islamic group, the Islamic LiberationOrganization,attemptedto stage a coup
d'etat which was spectacular in scope, planning, and timing. In addition,
scattered confrontationsoccurredbetween the authoritiesand other militant
Islamic elements which, however, attractedmuch less publicity than the one
mentioned above. From 1975 to 1979, Muslim groups achieved landslide
victories in university studentunions. This promptedthe governmentto dissolve these unions by presidentialdecree in the summerof 1979. Accordingto
Ibrahim, the use of violence by some militant groups gives the regime a
legitimateexcuse to go all-outagainstall Islamicgroups.Governmentcounterattacks,however, do not seem to have stemmedthe tide of the militantgroups.
For every group that is liquidated, two or three new organizationsemerge.
The analyses by Ibrahimand Hermassiof militantIslamic groups indicate
thatArabsociologists studyingsuch groupsareinterestedin the same aspectsof
movements as theirWesterncolleagues: the generalsocietal conditionsgiving
rise to a movement, its ideology, leadership,mode of recruitmentof members,
social origins of members, internal organization, and strategy and tactics.
According to Ibrahim (1980a), the members interviewed believed that the
righteousMuslim cannotexist individuallyand must strive to build and maintain a communityof the faithful. It is his religious duty to see to it that a truly
Muslim social ordercomes about. Ibrahimsuggests thatsuch a belief sooneror
later takes on an organizationalform that leads to an inevitable confrontation
with the rulingelite. They perceive Egypt's presenteconomic problemsas the
outcome of mismanagementof resources,the applicationof importedpolicies,
the corruptionof top officials, conspicuousconsumerism,and low productivity. An importantcomponentof the militants'economic thinkingis condemnation of excessive wealth differentialsboth between and withinMuslim countries. Social differentiationandstratification,however, areacceptedpillarsof the
Muslim order, but it is man's labor that is the only acceptablemechanismof
differentiation.They believe thatit is the dutyof every trueMuslimto remove
injustice.
The founding leaders of the two militantgroups studied had been hanged,
and informationaboutthem was obtainedfromtheirfollowers. They were said
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ARABSOCIOLOGY
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395
to have greatcharisma,to be extremelyeloquent, andto be highly knowledgeable not only about religion but also about national and internationalaffairs.
Both leadersrecruitedfollowers fromamong studentswho were recentuniversity graduates.The threerecruitmentmethodsemployed were kinship, friendship, and worship. Those recruitedin turn enlisted their close friends and
relatives. What Ibrahim found most significant sociologically is the social
selectivity of members.The typicalmemberis young, fromruralor small-town
background,fromthe upwardlymobile middleor lower middleclass, with high
achievement and motivation, and from a normallycohesive family. Ibrahim
indicatesthatthis profile poses some perplexingtheoreticalproblems,"since it
is sometimes assumedin social sciences thatmembersof 'radicalmovements'
must be alienated, marginal, anomic, or must possess some other abnormal
characteristics"(1980a:440). On the basis of observationsand interviews of
militantIslamicwomen, Fadawel-Guindi,an Arabanthropologist,agreeswith
Ibrahimthat membersof militantIslamic groups are definitely not alienated,
marginal, or anomic individuals. In her words, "they are not dropoutsfrom
society to a primitivecommune, or from college to find themselves, nor from
this world to other-wordlyasceticism"(1982:482-83).
396
CONCLUSION
It is significant that a whole conference was held in 1985 on the issue of
"Authenticityand Modernization,"to discuss its intellectual,political, social,
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TODAY
ARABSOCIOLOGY
397
and legal aspects. The argumenthere is that social science and intellectual
discourse on authenticityand indigenization is another aspect of the same
search for authenticityand indigenizationby Islamic movements. Before this
authenticityand indigenizationof Arabsociology, and of Arabsocial sciences
in general, can be achieved, a numberof complex methodologicaland theoretical problems have to be resolved. To paraphraseHanafi (1982), the Arab
social scientist is not an impartialspectatorbut someone who is trying to
perceive a trendof which he is a part.The social scientistis at once the subject
andobjecttryingto analyzehis own society. Thus, thepessimisticreview of the
state of Arab sociology by Arab sociologists is understandable.But solutions
are being and will be found within the Arab world for some of the complex
problems posed by the indigenizationof Arab social sciences. In our view,
thereis alreadya trendtowardthe substantiveindigenizationof Arabsociology.
This is suggestednot only by the resultsof oursurvey, butalso by ourreview of
sociological studies of Islamic social movements. Furthermore,many Arab
sociologists are keenly awareof the need to be flexible and innovativein their
selection and use of researchprocedures. The stumbling block remains the
theoreticalindigenizationof Arabsociology, and this is the main sourceof the
pessimism of Arabsociologists. But, therecan be little or no indigenizationof
theory until there have been ample systematicstudies and analyses of various
facets of Arab society. For some time to come, such studies will have to be
guided by a numberof specific hypothesesandtheoreticalhunchesthatemerge
out of the experience of Arab sociologists. It could be argued, however, that
theoreticalindigenizationis a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the
establishmentandthe growthof an Arabsociology. WhenArabsociologists do
constructtheirown theoreticalmodels, they will have to relatethemto sociological theories developed in other parts of the world, or face the risk of
theoretical provincialism. Such a task will have to be accomplished in collaborationwith sociologists from different regions of the world, and on the
basis of equality and mutualunderstanding.
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