1.

Introduction
A 2 m section of RTRP pipe was delivered to. Opens through Inspection Engineer. A leak had
occurred from this section of the pipe on 12-08-2007, resulting in a small fire in the form of a
needle flame which was immediately extinguished on site.
The accompanying work request No. 26 dated 25-08-2007 contended a suspected excess
condensate carry-over into this manual drain line, possibly under excess surge conditions caused
by rapid opening of manual valve. It had been recorded that the normal auto dump control valve
was under maintenance at the time of the incident.
The facility involved was vessel # B - 235 manual drain. It is a part of RTRP manual drain line
downstream fr0m vessel B - 235.
It has been reported that although the normal fluid service is oily water, process upset might
have introduced condensate carry-over into the line. It has further been reported that the line had
been in operation but for four months only.
It has been mentioned in the work request that several previous failures of other sections of both
auto dump drain and manual drain lines, in the form of pinholes, cracks and broken joints had
been observed during commissioning.
The only reported inspection finding recorded on the work request was that inspection team were
not informed until three days after the leakage and fire incidence and a new pipe section had
been already installed by the contractor.
The piping material is Ameron Bondstrand series 2416 RTRP. The joints are specified to be
the key-lock type for straight sections and adhesive type for various fittings.

2. Visual Inspection
The pipe section with a pin-hole was visually inspected and photographed (see attached
photographs - Attachment I). A 2 mm polarized Laser torch was aimed at the pin-hole exterior to
see if the light propagated the pipe interior. No light was seen at the pipe interior.
A cross section of the pipe was then taken exactly at the pin-hole to see if it would shed any light
on the whole morphology and crack path that resulted in the formation of the pin-hole. It was
found that this pin-hole only went through the paint thickness. Visual inspection did not reveal
any through-wall pin-holes, nor on either the pipe wall interior or exterior surfaces. Fine cracks
were seen which emanated from the edge of the hole. When the paint was peeled off, there was
no trace of any pin-hole where the pin-hole was originally situated on the paint.
3. SEM and EDS Analysis

Generalremarks
SEM and EDS analyses were conducted for the RTRP pipe that had leaked while in service.
SEM morphological examination at different magnifications revealed the presence of a

perforation where the leak had occurred as shown in Figures 1a and Figure 2. Presence of thin
branched cracks was also observed on the outer surface of the pipe emanating from the
perforation as shown in Figures 3-6.
Figures 8-12 show the appearance of the inner surface of the pipe revealing the presence
of defects such as voids and partially exposed fiberglass. Figure 8 shows the disruption
to the inner surface of the pipe with a lot of fiber reinforcement missing leading to the
formation of more voids and gaps in the matrix. Figure 9 shows a different view of
similar surface as described earlier. Figure 10 and 11 show a number of voids in the
inner surface with inter connecting cracks and damage to the surface.
EDS elemental analysis of the pipe sections as shown below indicate the composition of
the pipe material, namely the glass fibers and that of the outer coating. Elements of S,
Ca, Na, Mg, and Fe are probably those of the oily water.

Figure 1(a). SEM micrograph of the fracture surface of the outer side of the pipe received from
(40X) showing the perforated section of the pipe.

Figure 1(b). EDS analysis of the outer surface adjacent to the crack. The elements Si and Ca
are probably those of the glass fibers and Ti is that of the outer coating. The gold (Au) is from
the coating applied to the sample to make it conductive for SEM analysis.

Figure 12(b). EDS analysis of the point "a" in figure 12(a) showing the elemental composition of
the glass fibers.

4.Discussion
A combination of visual inspection, microstructural characterization (SEM analysis) and
EDS analysis was used to establish the most likely causes of failures or leaks, which
resulted in the reported fire. Possible leak paths are:

Poor impregnation around deficiencies in the

filaments, e.g. knots Poor temperature control
during resin curing

Poor wetting of the fibers, leading to a leak path from the pipe
interior to exterior or the flat female end of the pipe

Cracking of the resin during operation

The need for fiber wetting, which is the complete coverage of fibers by the resin matrix
such that the surface tension of the resin does not allow the fibers to be exposed to the
environment, is evident when levels of wetting are so poor that a leak path is present
directly after manufacture or installation of the pipe. Even if this is not the case, poor
wetting has negative impact on the long-term performance of these pipes in both static
and dynamic (fatigue) service. One of the main long-term failure modes of RTRP pipes
is weep age, where a pattern of cracks develops within the resin to create a leak path
from the bore to the external surface. These cracks generally develop parallel to the
fibers and propagate along the fiber-resin matrix interface. When fiber wetting is poor,
the rate of formation, i.e. initiation and propagation, of such cracks will increase
significantly.

Poor wetting of the fibers results in voids in the material. It is not the void content itself
that should be used as a measure of risk to leakage but the shape and distribution of the
voids that is important. Small spherical voids due to matrix shrinkage are not harmful as
long as their distribution is random. It is large, elongated voids that are indicative of the
possibility of a leak path. Elongated voids were evident in the subject pipe (see Figures #
8(a), 9(a), 10,11 AND 12).However , SEM analysis does not prove that these flaws were
pre existing as delaminated resin, arising from resin cracking, may have been
subsequently washed out .

Morphology of the cracks themselves clearly shows that they have originated and propagated at
very low elastic strain energy release rate and therefore the cracks have taken the route of least
resistance, which has been the resin. The energy has been further dissipated by branching of
these cracks (see Figures # 3, 4 and 5). The cracking, rather than lack of wetting, in the resin
tends to suggest that the defect is likely to have taken place during operation and not during
manufacture.
Energy Dispersive Spectrophotometric (EDS) elemental analysis of the pipe sections (see
Figures # 1(b), 6(b), 6(c), 8(b), 8(c), 9(b) and 12(b)) indicates the composition of the pipe
material, namely glass fibers and that of the coating. Other elements, particularly Ca, Na, Mg, Fe
and S, are evidently the residual elements from the oily water, which has seeped through the
pipe wall.
This RTRP piping has a system design pressure of 15 barg and is not expected to be capable of
withstanding any high pressure surges from the vessel # B - 235, of which the operating pressure
is 21.4 barg and design pressure 34.8 barg. However, surges could have been experienced by the
piping during rapid opening and closing of the adjacent drain valves, thereby exposing the
piping to mechanical 'shock', as a result of which the resin may have cracked. The fine cracks
which emanated from the pin-hole in the exterior paint were evidently owing to high localized
hoop stresses. This supports the hypothesis that there might have been a pressure surge.
Operational upsets may have led to entry of the condensate into this piping. This class of RTRP
pipe is designed for oily water only and is not adequate for handling condensate. Condensate
freezing inside the pipe may cause expansion, leading to localized cracking and possible rupture
of the resin matrix. The RTRP pipe material has a minimum design temperature of -3 C, which
is likely to be surpassed if the condensate freezes.
The reported fire evidently took place due to ignition of the condensate which leaked through
the pipe wall along with the oily water. Two factors could have contributed to a more or lesser
degree of the fire:

Ambient summer temperature, which was sufficiently high to reach/exceed the flash
point of the condensate

Static electric charge, which could have been a source of ignition. It has been reported in
operation tram. MOM dated 19-07-06 that static electric charge was, in fact, detected on
the subject RTRP piping by Maintenance personnel.

5.Conclusions
The following conclusions were made, based on the work carried out:

It is construed that the primary cause of failure of this pipe has been process upset(s) which
led to pressure surge(s), imparting excessive hoop stresses on the piping material. These
stresses resulted in cracking of the resin and some delamination.

Although the possible presence of pre-existing flaws, such as voids and delaminations
arising from incomplete fiber wetting, in the RTRP pipe cannot be ruled out, it is not
considered to be the principal contributory factor to the failure/leakage of this pipe.

Process upset(s) allowed entry of condensate into the piping, which found its way to the
pipe exterior through the leak paths. Upon reaching the pipe wall exterior, auto-ignition
occurred due to high ambient temperatures and/or static electrical charge accumulated on
the pipe wall exterior, which was not grounded adequately.

6. Recommendations
Based on the work carried out and available technical literature reports, the following
recommendations are made:

RTRP piping may be continued to be used in future service, provided the as received
material is subjected to thorough QA/QC checks, as per the acceptance criteria set forth
PIC STD, and that process upset conditions are not expected to result in pressure surges
and carryover of condensate. Detailed Hazop studies should be carried out to identify
such potential risk areas and, if appropriate, modify the extent and piping class of the
RTRP material.

Under no circumstances should condensate or any other hydrocarbon be allowed entry

into the RTRP piping system, as this piping is designed only for water and oily water
service.

In order to reduce the possible static electrical charge accumulation and sparking due to
the same, appropriate earthling must be provided.

Internally epoxy coated carbon steel pipe is not recommended as a replacement to RTRP
for this application, as there is previous history of these piping classes having failed
frequently and prematurely by under deposit corrosion at preexisting coating defects.