Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
SUMMARY
Because public action matters in all countries and political systems, how it is organised now and in the future must exercise the
minds of policy-makers in and beyond government. In response, we argue that there is considerable merit in having a widely
applicable analytical lens through which to look at and assess present arrangements and future possibilities. The lens has multiple dimensions, which we address here in terms of three broad approaches to organising public action. We label these approaches as statism, statemarket dualism and statemarketcivil society synergism. Their components and distinctive
features are discussed, followed by a consideration of signicant application issues and concerns. A fundamental matter is
how best to balance the demands of public action and organised responses with the requirements of publicness and legitimacy
as systems of government and governance are maintained and reformed. Copyright 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
key wordsgovernment; governance; public action; organising; statism; statemarket dualism; statemarketcivil society
synergism
INTRODUCTION
We begin with the proposition that public action denitely mattersand, accordingly, that approaches to
organising it must be a core concern of government and governance. This proposition has universal application
and signicance. Of course, how action is conceived, the nature of its publicness and the organised means of
pursuing it can, and do, differ quite markedly from country to country, political system to political system. This
is inevitable given diverse histories, cultures, traditions, political regimes and socio-economic conditions.
Nevertheless, the fundamentals are certain and clear, with some distinctive, interrelated approaches being
discernible of practical and scholastic signicance alike.
In all countries and polities, action of public scope and interest not only is taken but also needs to be taken by
means that are organised, however formal or informal and however effective or ineffective. Consequently, whatever the circumstance, there is logic in having a comprehensive and widely applicable analytical lens through
which to look at government and governance in at least two situations. One is when describing, assessing and comparing how public action is presently organised in various contexts, with an appreciation also of the past. The other
is when considering, proposing and taking decisions on how public action might more appropriately be organised
in those contexts in the future in the light of the present and past. The two situations are intertwined in practice and
theory, with considerable benets for practitioners in having a well-informed understanding of the present and past
as an essential precondition for deciding meaningfully on future change and continuity.
*Correspondence to: I. Thynne, Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University, Canberra, A.C.T. 2601, Australia.
E-mail: ian.thynne@anu.edu.au
74
Hence, the value of our considering the components of three broad approaches to organising public action. The
approaches assist in addressing the present and the future, with the roles and means of organising public action being articulated as the discussion proceeds. The roles and means are central to a re-phrasing of the opening proposition as a two-part question underpinning the discussion. Thus, because public action matters and must therefore
be a core concern of government and governance, what are its constituent roles and by what organised means are
those roles (appropriately) performed?
THE APPROACHES: OVERVIEW
We refer to the three approaches as statism, statemarket dualism and statemarketcivil society synergism.
The rst is long-standing, and although still pertinent especially for the core policy, command and control activities
of the state, it has been built on and complemented by the other two. The second has similarly been a basis of and
reworked by the third, while also retaining its distinctiveness. The third has become increasingly more prominent,
while not detracting from the continuing importance of the other two. All three are relevant in considering
signicant aspects of the forms and dynamics of government and governance in various political systems involving
the state, market and civil society.
The rst approach is founded in old public administration (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2003: 512, 2829) and
progressive-era public administration (Hood, 1994: ch 7) as classic interventionist governance (Knill and
Tosun, 2012: 210). The second draws on new public management (Hood, 1991, 1994: ch 7) and managerialism
(Pollitt, 1990) with elements of regulated self-governance (Knill and Tosun, 2012: 210211). The third aligns
with new governance (Rhodes, 1996; Salamon, 2002) and new public governance (Osborne, 2010) essentially
as cooperative governance (Knill and Tosun, 2012: 211). Their combined canvass includes the administration of
policies in legislative and non-legislative form; the management of people, programmes and projects; and the
governance of institutionalorganisational structures and interactionsall in the public arena (Thynne, 2014).
Each of the approaches embraces action as the performance of interrelated roles vis--vis various goods and services. The roles are owner, producer, provider, regulator and facilitator, such that goods and services are owned,
produced, provided, regulated and facilitated, with relevant policies being developed, implemented, evaluated
and adjusted, reactively and proactively. The goods and services are public, private, toll and common pool, according to the nature of their accessibility and the consequences of their consumption or use, with important implications for the roles performed in relation to them.
In addressing the approaches with reference to roles, goods and services, we use two interdependent organising couplets. As Simon (1946) argued, most of what we do administratively comes as dichotomies. Each component of the dichotomy has some practical utility, but each also has its costs. This applies to our two dichotomies as couplets. The rst couplet
is integration and autonomy embracing types of organisations as legalstructural entities. The second is verticalism and
horizontalism comprising hierarchies and networks within and across organisations. Both couplets variously involve issues of power, legitimacy, coordination, specialisation, collaboration, competition, control and accountability.
Together, the approaches based on organising couplets and issues of signicance to roles, goods and services
constitute a comprehensive analytical lens through which to address the present and future organising of public
action in various political systems. The components of the approaches are interrelated as depicted in Figure 1.
THE APPROACHES: ELABORATION OF COMPONENTS
Public: state, market and civil society
All three approaches, in differing ways, involve the state, market and civil society as organised political, economic and social communities of public importance, respectively. These aspects of the state, market and civil society as sectors of organised action are captured in Table 1. As shown, the arrangements in each sector include
legal foundations, institutions/organisations, relationships, decision-making, spatial dimensions and people. Most
of the arrangements are sector specic and distinctive, but become mixed and blended in practice, as the
approaches appreciate.
Copyright 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
75
As the organising of public action is re-aligned and re-congured from statism through statemarket dualism to
statemarketcivil society synergism, different legal tools, norms and values become intertwined, as do different
institutionalorganisational structures and cultures comprising different types of relationships and decision-making
of signicance to different delineations of people and place. Such intertwining results, in particular, from the
dominance of the state being complemented and conditioned by the involvement of the market and civil society
in the pursuit of the public interest. This sees extensive state activity as interventionist governance being softened,
and often replaced, by forms of regulated self-governance, cooperative governance and private selfgovernance, with varying levels of market and civil society activity as the softening or replacement occurs (Knill
and Tosun, 2012: 209212).
In the process, power as a multi-dimensional core of government and governance is increasingly dispersed,
shared and conditioned by multiple shadows (Peters, 2011). The coercive power of the state is exercised both
alongside and along with the exercise of contractual power of the market and consensual power of civil society.
This inevitably raises issues and challenges concerning the legitimacy of the arrangements and the forms and likely
efcacy of public control and accountability.
76
The MARKET
as an
CIVIL SOCIETY
as an
Organised
Organised
Organised
Legal foundations:
Legal foundations:
Legal foundations:
Constitution
Statutes and ordinances
Regulations and orders
Contracts
Constitutions as member agreements
(in accordance with a Companies
Act or the like)
Institutions/organisations:
Institutions/organisations:
Institutions/organisations:
Legislature
Executive (government)
Judiciary
Government organisations
(ministries/departments, executive
agencies, statutory bodies, etc)
Not-for-prot non-government
organisations (associations, cooperatives,
unions, clubs, etc)
Families, clans, tribes
Political
Economic
Social
Relationships:
Inuence and command
Relationships:
Money and exchange
Relationships:
Trust and association
Decision-making:
Debates and votes leading to
majority decisions
Reasoning leading to judgements
Discharge of duty or exercise
of discretion leading to appropriate
decisions and action
Decision-making:
Bidding and negotiations
leading to agreements
Decision-making:
Discussion and debates leading
to consensus
Community
Community
Community
Spatial dimensions:
Spatial dimensions:
Spatial dimensions:
People:
People:
People:
Members
Employees and volunteers
Donors
Beneciaries
In Figure 1, roles are recorded as owner, producer, provider, regulator and facilitator. These roles can all apply
to one good or service at the same time. For example, electricity as a private good of public signicance can include
ownership of the generation plant and transmission lines; production through generation; provision through supply;
regulation of plant, lines, supply and so on; and facilitation by way of grants, subsidies, fee-relief and so on. Here,
the roles, while distinguishable and able to be performed separately from one another, are interrelated by reason of
electricity being their common focus.
Copyright 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
77
Availability of the good or service once access is gained and consumption or use occurs
Available for subsequent
consumption or use by
someone else
The ve roles can also be combined in terms of their use and purpose, with possible consequences for more than
one good or service. An example is ownership of a railway as a toll service in a public transport system. Such ownership can be used to facilitate provision and to regulate fares, with possible ow-on effects being the facilitation
and/or regulation of other public transport services with which the railway is competing commercially while also
needing to collaborate in the interconnection of transport services for commuters.
These and other alignments of roles, goods and services are all the result of policy decisions, which can sometimes
alter the inherent character of a good or service. For example, institutionalised education as a toll good becomes a
public good when its provision is free and other barriers to its accessibility are removed. Similarly, a public forest
as a common pool good becomes a public good when a ban on logging is imposed and enforced, and a toll good when
a ban on logging is accompanied by a physical barrier to access and the charging of entry fees.
Whatever the situation, roles concern goods and services in terms of the extent and consequences of their
availability, accessibility and consumption or use. In doing so, they raise the issue of what policy instruments
are appropriately adopted. For example, pure public goods and services depend largely on public law and power
for production and provision as they are incapable of being marketed. By contrast, the other three types of goods
and services are open to some possibilities for market instruments such as contracts, but using market instruments
may have negative consequences especially for common pool goods. The negotiated instruments of governance
involving various alliances of the state, market and civil society may be usable for all of the four types, although
they tend to be more effective for common pool and toll goods and services.
Organising: couplets and issues
The three approaches comprise different organisational bases of public action as roles, goods and services, in accordance with the arrangements outlined in Figure 2. Of particular signicance are two organising couplets: integration and autonomy, and verticalism and horizontalism. The rst of these couplets is formally manifest in the
establishment, apexes and power of organisations that constitute their legalstructural foundations. The second
couplet embraces various structural and operational alignments both within and across organisations. The couplets
are interrelated, with mixed arrangements being affected by issues of power, legitimacy, coordination, specialisation and so on, as depicted in Figure 2.
Formal degrees of organisational integration and autonomy in government and governance are inherent in
the legal instruments by which organisations are established, coupled with who heads them and who has legal
power (Thynne, 2003). For example, a ministry or department established by an executive decision and headed
by a government member with legal power is formally integrated into the executive. By contrast, an agency or
authority established by an executive decision or statute and headed by someone other than a government
member or by a board or council with legal power has a degree of formal autonomy from the executive. This
is also so with a company established by an agreement pursuant to a Companies Act and headed by a board of
directors with legal power, including the power to enter into contracts, to buy and sell property, and to sue and
be sued in the companys own corporate name. Such a power is acquired through the companys incorporation
Copyright 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
78
as a legal person, which is a status a ministry, department, agency or authority can similarly be given by formal
legal prescription. The other legal power of a ministry, department and so on is the power to administer policies in legislative and non-legislative forms as a matter of administrative law and practice.
These arrangements comprising mixes of instruments, apexes and power with integration and autonomy
opportunities embodied in them have considerable strategic importance and value for governments, as the
approaches appreciate. They enable governments by conscious organisational design to subject some forms of
public action to direct political control and accountability as a matter of integration, while giving other forms
varying degrees of autonomy within the bounds of alternative control and accountability mechanisms (Thynne
and Wettenhall, 2004).
Integration and autonomy in government and governance are complemented by verticalism and horizontalism
involving hierarchies and networks. Signicantly, degrees of organisational integration and autonomy are shaped
by formal and informal modes of intra-organisational and inter-organisational interaction, vertically and horizontally.
The modes are pertinent at all levels in a hierarchy and at all stages of development and consolidation in a network.
Organisations, as ministries, departments, agencies, authorities and companies alike, are usually position-task
hierarchies, with coordination, control and accountability vertically up and down the hierarchy and horizontally
at various levels within it, as inuenced by the span of control and division of labour by specialisation. These formal arrangements are supported and often strengthened by informal alliances as networks that can enhance specialist collaboration rather than competition and thereby foster coordinative initiatives, vertically and horizontally.
Accordingly, intra-organisational networks, far from being alternatives to hierarchies, are frequently crucial to their
sustainability, efciency and effectiveness.
Organisations as hierarchies and networks internally are inevitably locked into various inter-organisational networks. Such networks can be effective bases of coordination and collaboration as differing levels of interactive intensity and value in inter-organisational relationships. As they develop and consolidate, their management can
require as much attention and effort as that of the organisations which comprise them. This can sometimes lead
to their becoming sufciently structured and cemented as to result in their emerging as new free-standing organisations at or beyond the hubs of other networks.
Copyright 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
79
In all integrative, autonomous, vertical and horizontal arrangements within and across organisations, mechanisms of control and accountability are central in conditioning and reviewing the exercise of power. Their impact
in this regard has immediate consequences for the legitimacy of organised public action, as founded in conformity
to rules, the justiability of rules in terms of shared beliefs, and legitimation through expressed consent
(Beetham, 2013: 20).
THE APPROACHES: EXPOSITION OF DISTINCTIVENESS
Statism
This approach to organising public action is characterised by a highly active and all-encompassing state. It
embraces ideas and practices of the welfare state (Wilensky, 1975), administrative state (Waldo, 1948)
and developmental state (Johnson, 1982), with the exercise of the states coercive power being central to
how a society is served and an economy managed. The action taken in the public interest is enabled and shaped
by a large body of law, within the bounds of the rule of law. The widespread use of law and the roles prescribed thereby permeate and affect most aspects of public life and well-being involving all manner of goods
and services.
The state in this approach is a big owner, producer, provider, regulator and facilitator of goods and services, with
direct consequences for their availability, accessibility and consumption or use. There is comprehensive state provision of social services, with ownership of associated goods, in education, health care, housing, income maintenance and so on. This is accompanied by state ownership, production and provision of public utility goods and
services such as water, sanitation, electricity, telecommunications and transport, as well as various other goods
and services. There is also extensive state regulation and facilitation of economic and social activity in the market
and civil society. The combined effect is a state whose presence and impact are widely and rmly felt throughout
an economy and society.
The control basis of the states coercive power concerning such an array of goods and services inevitably
results in the triumph of integration over autonomy and verticalism over horizontalism. This is especially so
in the provision of social services and in the regulation and facilitation of economic and social activity. In
these areas of action, integration and verticalism are catered for through the use of ministries and departments
as core organisational means of aligning politics, policy and administration. The justication is that these
organisations enable the direct coupling of political control and accountability with essential professional
support arrayed hierarchically with an appropriate layering of administrative control, accountability and
specialisation.
Where a loosening of control and the exercise of contractual power are relevant in the ownership, production
and provision of public utility goods and services and other areas of activity, incorporated authorities as statutory
corporations are favoured. Such corporations can be given degrees of operational autonomy especially in stafng
and nancing, while concomitantly being subject to political control through the power of appointment and
direction, in addition to legislative intervention given their statutory foundations. These limits to their autonomy
and any associated horizontality ensure the maintenance of integration and verticalism (Verhoest et al., 2004;
Thynne, 2006).
Another loosening of control occurs in the review of administrative decisions resulting from the exercise of coercive power in provision and regulation, as well as in the conduct of nancial and related audits. Here, administrative tribunals, ombudsmen, audit ofces and other review authorities have signicant regulatory and facilitative
responsibilities, as prescribed in their statutory foundations and supported by appropriate degrees of stafng and
operational autonomy.
The dominance of integration and verticalism in this approach is complemented by inter-organisational coordination and collaboration largely being dictated politically rather than more naturally occurring in response to the
interrelationship of roles, goods and services. Similarly, where there is inter-organisational competition over access
to human and nancial resources, political determination and direction supported by the input of control-oriented
personnel authorities and nance departments are the main responses. There is little, or no, effective use made of
Copyright 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
80
81
82
becomes how to make the approaches work in assessing systems and in appreciating the dynamics of choice
among the alternatives available to policy-makers. There is a need to know how policy-makers decide when
faced with the alternatives.
The distinctive organisations in the approaches are set out in Table 3, accompanied by reference to their main
roles. Given the alignments, where statism or statemarket dualism are appropriate because of the types of roles
and power involved, the organisational choices are reasonably straightforward. By contrast, where the adoption
of statemarketcivil society synergism is favoured and justied, the choices become more complex and potentially quite uncertain. The main reason for this is that, while organisations in the rst two approaches are
characterised largely by their legalstructural foundations which immediately convey something about their role
suitability, the dening features of those in the third approach are their essential capacities. Such capacities are
not a given; they are not objective and are not susceptible to simple assumption and allocation. Instead, they are
context dependent and have consciously to be developed, maintained and appliedby an array of organisations
with differing foundations, responsibilities and obligations. These factors compound the situation and the
choice-making necessarily entailed.
The issue of capacity, which policy-makers must address when determining appropriate means of organising
public action, is not conned to the capacities addressed above. It applies as well to the capacities of market
and civil society organisations to contribute to public action in ways essential in statemarket dualism and state
marketcivil society synergism. Here, the capacities involved need to complement, and sometimes even replace,
those of state organisations. This means that state organisations not only need to be fully cognisant of their own
capacities and the limitations thereof, but also need to be aware of what capacities exist and could be tapped in
the market and civil society, along with an appreciation of what the incentives might or might not be for market
and civil society organisations actually to become involved.
With regard to capacities, Grindles (1996: ch 1) analysis of four essential state capacitiesinstitutional, technical, administrative and politicalhas value in identifying specic sorts of capacities and in highlighting the
need for them to be interrelated and mutually reinforcing. When one or more of these state capacities is weak and
could be complemented by proven capacities in the market or civil society, there might be considerable merit in
statism giving way to one of the other approaches (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). But the question will remain as
to how the change could be accomplished politically without undermining the legitimacy of the state.
Capacity considerations in the adoption of one or more of the approaches need to be accompanied by a clear
appreciation of underlying values and the assurance of some form of public value. For example, natural justice,
as fairness and due process, is essential in administrative decision-making and review in the statism approach and
must continue to be adhered to in the exercise of the states coercive power, whatever use is made of the other
Table 3. Approaches, organisations and roles
Approaches
Distinctive organisations
Main roles
Statism
Statemarket dualism
Executive agencies
Government companies
Regulatory authorities
Statemarketcivil society
synergism
Service collaborators
Network synthesisers
Social
Social
Social
Social
Social
Instinctive adaptors
service provision
service provision
and economic regulation/facilitation
service provision
and economic regulation/facilitation
Public Admin. Dev. 35, 7385 (2015)
DOI: 10.1002/pad
83
approaches in other areas of public action. By contrast, a form of negotiated agreement-based justice is relevant
when contracts are favoured instruments of public action involving the exercise of contractual power in exchange
relationships; or where consensual power and associational relationships are appropriate, involving the use of compacts or accords in service provision, regulation or facilitation, a form of associative social justice assumes
importance.
Other values such as efciency, economy and cost-effectiveness are similarly pertinent in the adoption and justication of the approaches as various forms of organisational intervention. These values tend, in particular, to be
associated with statemarket dualism and general neo-liberal thinking in conceptualising and organising public action. They are complemented by such values as openness, transparency and responsiveness in the fostering of
statemarketcivil society synergism, as well as by the more political values associated, for example, with
clientelismthus demonstrating the numerous ways of pursing and justifying public governance and the roles
of the organisations involved.
Capacity and value considerations in the organising of public action are embodied in traditional common law
doctrines of prime necessity, common calling and business affected with a public interest (Taggart, 1997:
67; Klappstein, 2014). A prime necessity is a good or service of immediate signicance to the public weal and,
therefore, should be readily accessible, with relevant action inspired by a public calling or commitment similar
to a public service motivation (Perry, 2014). Such a calling or commitment is pertinent to and can nd expression
in all three approaches, just as a business affected with a public interest can be state, market, civil society or some
combination thereof.
More broadly, there are issues and concerns of failure and alternatives to degrees of state involvement in public
action. At the extreme, state failure may generate the need to move policy-making and governance largely or
completely away from the state towards the market or civil society. If the state, because of fragmentation, corruption, inadequate resources or poorly trained staff, is not able to provide needed goods and services to the public,
there can be sense in using market or civil society organisations and not just in bringing them into governance
in alliance with the state. In some instances, such use can be voluntary, as when a government decides no longer
to perform an activity in recognition of the knowledge, skills and operational ability of signicance to it existing
beyond the state. In other instances, market or civil society organisations may simply assume control of a policy
area or may create some competition to state action. For example, if public education or health care is inadequate,
religious or other civil society organisations may supplement, or compete with, the state systemas they do in
many contexts. Market organisations may also provide these services, again as they frequently do. Less obvious
contemporary examples are those of mining companies in some African countries, while historical precedents
are the British and Dutch East India companies.
Alternatives to statism may be especially important options for some less developed political and administrative
systems. Migdal (1992) recognises that these are often cases of strong societies and weak states in which the alternatives to the state are readily apparent and appear to provide mechanisms for avoiding many of the governance
challenges being faced. Yet, that said, the rather facile use of non-state means at times may lock states into
long-term cycles of incapacity and low performance (Grindle, 2007). Further, civil society may also be weak in
many developing contexts, so that the only available option for supplementing the roles of the state may be the
market engaging in public action primarily for its own purposes rather than for the public good.
The possibility of such consequences of moving away from state involvement in public action conrms the need
to be careful not to assume too readily that the use of alternative approaches represents benign options for governance. Even in more developed political and economic systems, the reliance on the market may allow the extraction of monopoly rents by presumably regulated industries. In less developed systems, sections of the marketfor
example, the drug cartels in Mexicomay well be capable of providing a governance of a sort, including education, health care and public safety, albeit at a very high cost.
Much the same may be true for providing governance largely through civil society organisations. Most of the
literature on network-based governance assumes an almost angelic character in this form of governance, but it need
not be. Many organisations presumably participate in networks in order to advance their own interests, so we
should expect them to pursue those interests. Also, networks can segment governance at least as much as freeCopyright 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
84
standing organisations acting reasonably autonomously, thus exacerbating the already vexing problems of horizontal integration of policies and service provision. This segmentation may enhance capacity in one policy area but
weaken the overall capacity of the state.
Some social networks beyond the state are perhaps the most benign of the alternatives to state involvement in
organising public action. For example, clientelism in Latin America (and elsewhere) can be conceptualised as a form
of social governance, but it is far from benecial to most of the participants, and certainly not to those excluded from
participation (Piatoni, 2003). Other social forms of governance, such as the Maa in Southern Italy or street gangs in
many cities, are far from benign, although they supply a form of public governing that is sometimes quite effective.
But even the benign networks may create a downward spiral of state capacity and a loss of legitimacy.
These are just some of the more pertinent application issues and concerns. There are numerous others, both specic and broad. All need to be factored into how roles, power and organisations are aligned in the approaches and
how decisions are made about the appropriateness of the alignments given the importance of capacity, values and
legitimacy in the organising and achievement of public action.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
This discussion provides a preliminary analysis of the complex patterns of interaction between the state, market and
civil society in contemporary governance. In particular, it considers how three fundamental sets of variables
public, organising and actionare currently being addressed in the practical world of government and governance, as well as in academic studies of these matters. Each of the sets of variables itself has a great deal of internal
variation.
A crucial matter appreciated in the discussion is that dependence on the state as the key contributor to public
action in most policy sectors is not viable, if it ever was. Understanding what governments do for their citizens
has for some years required extending the analysis to include private contributorsboth market and civil society.
Hence, the relevance of the analytical lens advanced here, which provides a way of understanding the array of organisations and roles available in providing public governance at present and in the future.
Concomitantly, the discussion also demonstrates that any announcements of the death of the state in favour of
the market and/or civil society in public governance are very premature. Despite imperfections and failures of the
state, its involvement in governing and public action remains essential, especially when governing is intended to
ensure fair and equitable treatment for all citizens.
REFERENCES
Alford J, OFlynn J. 2012. Rethinking Public Service Delivery: Managing with External Providers. Palgrave Macmillan: Melbourne.
Beetham D. 2013. The Legitimation of Power (2nd edn). Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke.
Boston J. (ed) 1995. The State under Contract. Bridgett Williams Books: Auckland.
Braithwaite J. 2011. The essence of responsive regulation. UBC Law Review 44(3): 475520.
Denhardt JV, Denhardt RB. 2003. The New Public Service: Serving not Steering. MS Sharpe: New York.
Emerson K, Nabatchi T, Balogh S. 2011. An integrative framework for collaborative governance. Journal of Public Administration Research
and Theory 22(1): 129.
Evans P. (ed) 1997. StateSociety Synergy: Government and Social Capital in Development. University of California at Berkeley (International
and Area Studies): Berkeley.
Grindle MS. 1996. Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
Grindle MS. 2007. Going Local: Decentralization, Democratization and the Promise of Good Governance. Princeton University Press:
Princeton, N J.
Helmke G, Levitsky S. 2004. Informal institutions and comparative politics: a research agenda. Perspectives on Politics 2(4): 725740.
Hood CC. 1986. Administrative Analysis: An Introduction to Rules, Enforcement and Organisations. Wheatsheaf: Brighton.
Hood CC. 1991. A public administration for all seasons? Public Administration 69(1): 319.
Hood CC. 1994. Explaining Economic Policy Reversals. Open University Press: Buckingham.
Johnson C. 1982. MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy 19251975. Stanford University Press:
Stanford, CA.
Klappstein V. 2014. The obligation to contract in British law. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2375092, accessed 19
September 2014.
Knill C, Tosun J. 2012. Public Policy: A New Introduction. Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke.
Copyright 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
85
Majone G. 1999. The regulatory state and its legitimacy problems. West European Politics 22(1): 124.
Migdal J. 1992. Strong Societies and Weak States. Princeton University Press: Princeton, N J.
Milward HB. 2014. The increasingly hollow state: challenges and dilemmas for public administration. Asia Pacic Journal of Public Administration 36(1): 7079.
Oliver D, Prosser T, Rawlings R. (eds) 2010. The Regulatory State: Constitutional Implications. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Osborne SP. (ed) 2010. The New Public Governance? Emerging Perspectives on the Theory and Practice of Public Governance. Routledge:
Abingdon.
Ostrom V, Ostrom E. 1977. Public goods and public choices. In Alternatives for Delivering Public Services: Toward Improved Performance,
Savas ES, (ed). Westview Press: Boulder; 749.
Perry JL. 2014. The motivational bases of public service: foundations for a third wave of research. Asia Pacic Journal of Public Administration
36(1): 3447.
Peters BG. 2011. Governing in the shadows. The Asia Pacic Journal of Public Administration 33(1): 116.
Piatoni S. 2003. Clientelism, Interests and Democratic Representation: The European Experience in Historical and Comparative Perspective.
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
Pollitt C. 1990. Managerialism and the Public Services: The Anglo-American Experience. Blackwell: Oxford.
Popp JK, Milward HB, MacKean G, Casebeer A, Lindstrom R. 2014. Inter-organizational Networks: A Review of the Literature to Inform
Practice. IBM Center for the Business of Government: Washington, DC.
Rhodes RAW. 1996. The new governance: governing without government. Political Studies XLIV: 652667.
Salamon LM. (ed) 2002. The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance. Oxford University Press: New York.
Simon HA. 1946. The proverbs of administration. Public Administration Review 6(1): 5367.
Sorensen E, Torng J, Peters BG, Pierre J. 2012. Interactive Governance: Advancing the Paradigm. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Taggart M. 1997. The province of administrative law determined. In The Province of Administrative Law, Taggart M (ed). Hart Publishing:
Oxford; 120.
Thynne I. 2003. Making sense of organizations in public management: a back-to-basics approach. Public Organization Review 3(3):
317332.
Thynne I. 2006. Statutory bodies: how distinctive and in what ways? Public Organization Review 6(3): 171184.
Thynne I. 2011. Ownership as an instrument of policy and understanding in the public sphere: trends and research agenda. Policy Studies 32(3):
183197.
Thynne I. 2014. In celebration of public administration: the sustaining signicance of powerintroductory perspectives. Asia Pacic Journal of
Public Administration 36(1): 18.
Thynne I, Massey A. 2013. Globalism and constellational governance: challenges for service in the global public interest. In Moving
Beyond the Crisis: Reclaiming and Reafrming our Common Administrative Space, Argyriades D, Timsit G (eds). Bruylant: Brussels;
295326.
Thynne I, Wettenhall R. 2004. Public management and organisational autonomy: the continuing relevance of signicant earlier knowledge.
International Review of Administrative Sciences 70(4): 609621.
Verhoest K, Peters BG, Bouckaert G, Verschuere B. 2004. The study of organisational autonomy: a conceptual review. Public Administration
and Development 24(2): 101118.
Waldo D. 1948. The Administrative State: A Study of the Political Theory of American Public Administration. The Ronald Press Company: New
York.
Weimer DL, Vining AR. 1992. Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice (2nd edn), Prentice Hall: Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
Wilensky HL. 1975. The Welfare State and Equality: Structural and Ideological Roots of Public Expenditures. University of California Press:
Berkeley, CA.
World Bank 2004. Statesociety synergy for accountability: lessons for the World Bank. World Bank Working Paper No. 30, Washington,
DC: The World Bank, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPCENG/214578-1116499844371/20524131/297010PAPER0State1society
0synergy.pdf accessed 19 September 2014.