LEONEBURTON

MOVINGTOWARDSA FEMINISTEPISTEMOLOGYOF
MATHEMATICS

ABSTRACT.Thereis, now, an extensive criticalliteratureon genderand the natureof science threeaspects of which, philosophy,pedagogy and epistemology,seem to be pertinent
to a discussion of gender and mathematics.Although untanglingthe inter-relationships
between these three is no simple matter,they make effective startingpoints in order to
ask similar questions of mathematicsto those asked by our colleagues in science. In the
process of asking such questions, a major difference between the empiricalapproachof
the sciences, and the analytic natureof mathematics,is exposed and leads towards the
definitionof a new epistemologicalposition in mathematics.

1. INTRODUCTION

Received science has been criticisedon three groundsfrom a genderperspective. The first is its reductionismand its claim to be objective and
value-free(e.g. Harding,1986, 1991; Keller, 1985; Rose andRose, 1980).
Second, the conventional style of learning and teaching in science, its
pedagogy,has been challenged.It is suggestedthatenquirymethodsused
by scientists are often intrusiveand mechanistic,separatingobserverand
observed,andreinforcingcompetition.Further,these methodsarepresented not only as 'correct'but also as the only way possible (e.g. Kelly, 1987;
Whyte et al., 1985). Third, having rejected objectivity as an untenable
criterionfor judging science, a new scientific epistemology was required
and has been derived (see Rosser, 1990) by examining the connections
between the discipline and those who use it, and the society within which
it develops. This line of reasoning is consistent with a broad range of
thinkingin the sociology of science.
The old certainties about science, the old belief in its cultural uniqueness and the old
landmarksof sociological interpretationhave all gone. (Mulkay,1981, p. vii).

Mathematicsand mathematicseducation have been subject to a similar

challenge from within on philosophical, pedagogic and epistemological
grounds. The philosophical argumentsfor a rejection of absolutism in
mathematicshave been explored elsewhere (see Emnest,1991). Lakatos
(1976, 1983), Bloor (1976, 1991) and Davis and Hersh (1983) have all
made similar philosophical and epistemological criticisms to those outEducationalStudiesin Mathematics 28: 275-291, 1995.
? 1995 KluwerAcademicPublishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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lined in the science literaturewith respect to the so-called objectivity of

mathematics.
Likewise, a gender critique similar to that found in science has been
made of mathematicalpedagogy (see, for example, Burton, 1986, 1990a;
Fennemaand Leder, 1990; Lederand Sampson, 1989). Despite
many reports calling for curriculumreform in mathematicsand science ... the reforms
suggested do not take feminist concerns into account;in fact, in the case of mathematics
they tend to put added emphasis on curricularareas in which young women regularly
performless well thantheirmale counterparts.(Damarin,1991, p. 108).

Mathematicstends to be taught with a heavy reliance upon writtentexts

which removes its conjecturalnature,presentingit as inert information
which shouldnot be questioned.Predominantpatternsof teachingfocus on
the individuallearnerand inducecompetitionbetween learners.Language
is pre-digestedin the text, assumingthatmeaningis communicatedand is
non-negotiable.In Hull's termsthis defines
knowledge as an object and so equatesknowing, and coming to know, with its possession;
it effaces the crucial distinction between the leamer's subjective experience of moving
towardsknowledge and the objectifying of a knowledge finally achieved. (1985, pp. 4550).

Like science, therefore,mathematicsis perceived by many studentsand

some teachers as "a body of established knowledgeaccessible only to a
few extraordinaryindividuals"(Rosser,op.cit. p. 89). Indeed,the supposed
'objectivity'of the discipline,a cause for questioningandconcernby some
of those within it, is often perceived by non-mathematiciancurriculum
theorists as inevitable (see, for example, Hirst, 1965 and 1974 and, for a
critiqueexpandingthe points being made here, Kelly, 1986). But
the processes of knowing (and so also of science) in no way resemble an impersonal
achievement of detached objectivity. They are rooted throughout...in personal acts of
tacit integration.They are not groundedon explicit operationsof logic. Scientific inquiry
is accordingly a dynamic exercise of the imaginationand is rooted in commitmentsand
beliefs aboutthe natureof things. (Polanyi and Prosch, 1975, p. 63).

Adopting an objectivist stance within mathematicalphilosophy means

accepting that mathematical'truths' exist and the purpose of education
is to convey them into the heads of the learners.This leads to conflicts
both in the understandingof what constitutesknowing, and of how that
knowing is to be achieved throughdidactic situations.For example, such
conflicts can be found betweenthe U.K. mathematicsnationalcurriculum,
expressedin termsof a hierarchyof mathematicaltruthstatements,andthe
supportdocumentationgiven to teacherswhich includes such relativistic
statementsas:
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Eachperson's"map"of the networkandof the pathwaysconnectingdifferentmathematical

ideas is different, thus people understandmathematicsin different ways (Non-statutory
Guidanceto the MathematicsNationalCurriculum,para.2.1, p. Cl).
The teacher'sjob is to organise and provide the sorts of experiences which enable pupils
to construct and develop their own understandingof mathematics,ratherthan simply
communicatethe ways in which they themselves understandthe subject (Ibid, para.2.2,
p. C2).

- Although "the ideal of pure objectivityin knowingand in science has

beenshownto be a myth"(PolanyiandProsch,op.cit.p. 63) it is a philosophicalmythwhichcontinuesto exerciseenormouspowerovermatheterms.

andin methodological
maticsbothin curricular
posiis a philosophical
socialconstructivism
Proposedas analternative,
tion whichemphasisesthe interactionbetweenindividuals,societyand
meaningis created.Ithasprofound
knowledgeoutof whichmathematical
behaviours,formsof organisation,
Classroom
pedagogy.
implicationsfor
and roles, rightsand responsibilitieshave to be re-thoughtin a classroomwhichplacesthe learner,ratherthanthe knowledge,at the centre.
froma theoreticalpositionof
too, requiresreconsideration
Epistemology,
knowledgeas given,as absolute,to a theoryof knowledge,orperhapsbetandwithinwhichmeaning
ter,of knowing,as subjectivelycontextualised
is negotiated.
Withrespectto science,Rosserstated:
If science is socially constructed,then attractinga more heterogeneousgroupof scientists
would resultin differentquestionsbeing asked,approachesandexperimentalsubjectsused,
and theories and conclusions drawnfrom the data (Rosser, 1990, p. 33).

of
outsidethemainstream
Howmightincludingmanyof thosecurrently
itsmethodsof enquiry
influenceitsconjectures,
development
mathematical
of its results?Inturn,howmightanychangeswhich
andthe interpretation
resultedfroma philosophicalshift,affectthepedagogyandepistemology
whatare the epistemologicalquestions
of the discipline?In particular,
bybringinga feministcritiqueto bearonthediscipline
whicharesharpened
Theseissuesarethefocusof thispaper.
of mathematics?
2.

VIEWOFMATHEMATICS
A CULTURAL
ADOPTING

Hardingdrewattentionto itsculturaldepenInwritingaboutmathematics,
dency:
Physics and chemistry, mathematicsand logic, bear the fingerprintsof their distinctive
culturalcreatorsno less thando anthropologyand history.A maximallyobjective science,
naturalor social, will be one that includes a self-conscious and criticalexaminationof the
relationshipbetween the social experienceof its creatorsand kinds of cognitive structures

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favouredin this inquiry... whateverthe moraland politicalvalues andinterestsresponsible

for selecting problems, theories, methods, and interpretationsof research,they reappear
at the other end of the inquiryas the moral and political universethat science projectsas
naturaland therebyhelps to legitimate.(Harding,1986, pp. 250-1).

Despite the stancetakenby manymathematicianson the objectivityand

value-freenatureof the discipline, Bloor convincingly arguedfrom a historicalperspectivethatit is possible to conceive of alternativemathematics
differentlyderived at differentperiods:
Seeing how people decide what is inside or outside mathematicsis part of the problem
confrontingthe sociology of knowledge, and the alternativeways of doing this constitute
alternativeconceptions of mathematics.The boundary(between mathematicsand metamathematics)cannot just be taken for grantedin the way that the critics do. One of the
reasons why thereappearsto be no alternativeto our mathematicsis because we routinely
disallow it. We push the possibility aside, renderingit invisible or definingit as erroror as
nonmathematics.(Bloor, 1991, pp. 179-80).

More recently,Harding(1991) has pushedthe argumentfurtherto locate

mathematics firmly within its interpretativecontext despite its overtly
comparableformalisticexpression:
There can appearto be no social values in resultsof researchthat are expressedin formal
symbols; however, formalisationdoes not guaranteethe absence of social values. For
one thing, historianshave arguedthat the history of mathematicsand logic is not merely
an external history about who discovered what when. They claim that the general social
interests and preoccupationsof a culture can appearin the forms of quantificationand
logic that its mathematicsuses. Distinguished mathematicianshave concluded that the
ultimatetest of the adequacyof mathematicsis a pragmaticone: does it work to do what
it was intended to do? Moreover,formal statementsrequireinterpretationin order to be
meaningful...Withoutdecisions abouttheirreferentsand meanings,they cannotbe used to
make predictions,for example, or to stimulatefutureresearch.(Harding,1991, p. 84).

In his discussion of mathematicalepistemology, Joseph (1993) drew

attentionto two majorphilosophicalpre-suppositionswhichunderlieWestern (European)mathematics.These are, first, that mathematicsis a body
of absolute truths which are, second, argued (or 'proved') within a formal, deductive system. However, he pointed out that dependence upon
an axiomatically deduced system of proof was a late nineteenthcentury
development which was pre-datedby 'proofs' closer in style to that of
non-Europeanmathematicians:
The Indian (or, for that matter,the Chinese) epistemological position on the natureof
mathematicsis very different. The aim is not to build up an imposing edifice on a few
self-evident axioms but to validatea resultby any method,includingvisual demonstration.
(Joseph, 1993, p. 9).

Joseph furtherstatedthat:
None of the majorschools of Westernthought... gives a satisfactoryaccountof whatindeed
is the natureof objects (such as numbers)and how they are relatedto (other) objects in

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everyday life. It is an arguable point ... that the Indian view of such objects ... may lead

to some interestinginsights on the natureof mathematicalknowledge and its validation.

Irrespectiveof whetherthis point can be substantiatedor not, a more balanceddiscussion
of differentepistemological approachesto mathematicswould be invaluable.However,a
different insight into some of the foundationalaspects of the subject is hinderedby the
prevalence of the Eurocentricview on the historical development of mathematics.(pp.
11-12).

Joseph is criticising the dominanceof a Eurocentric(and male) mathematical hegemony which has created a judgmentalsituationwithin the
discipline whereby,for example,decidingwhatconstitutespowerfulmathematics, or when a proof proves and whatform a rigorousargumenttakes,
is dictated and reinforcedby those in influentialpositions. How often do
we hear statements,often made about a geometricproof, dismissing it as
'merely a demonstration'or the suggestion that computer-assistedproofs
are not quite as 'good' as those developed withouta computer?How frequentlyare studentsencouragedto believe thatthe mathematico-scientific
and technological developmentof the West has been made independently
of a systematic knowledge and resource exploitation of the rest of the
world? The colonisation of mathematicshas been so successful that the
history of their own mathematicalculture and its contributionto knowledge is often unknown to students in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
Such bias is increasinglyunderattack(see, for example, Needham, 1959;
Zaslavsky, 1973; van Sertima, 1986; Joseph, 1991; Nelson et al., 1993)
as researchersuncover the richness and power of mathematicaland scientific development in the non-Europeanworld which has been obscured
by the re-writingof history from a Europeanperspective.If the body of
knowledge known as mathematicscan be shown to have been derived in
a mannerwhich excluded non-Europeansand their mathematicalknowledge, why not conjecturethat the perceivedmale-ness of mathematicsis
equally an artefactof its productionand its producers?
Since I am arguingthatmathematicsis socio-culturalin nature,the conditions underwhich it is producedare factorsin determiningthe products.
"Important"mathematicalareas are identified,value is accordedto some
resultsratherthanothers,decisions aretakenon whatshouldor shouldnot
be publishedin a society determnined
by powerrelationships,one of which
is gender. Mathematicalproductscan then be seen as the outcome of the
influence of a particular'reading' of events at a given time/place. Such
readingsare referredto by Sal Restivo as
stories about commercial revolutions and mathematicalactivity, as in Japan, or about
the 'mathematicsof survival' that is a universalfeatureof the ancient civilizations. And
they can be stories about how conflict and social change shape and reflect mathematical
developments.(1992, p. 20).

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In a Plenarylecturegivenat the 1994AmericanEducational

Research
AssociationConference,JeromeBrunerpointedout thatexplanationas
causalis a post-nineteenth
A longerhistorycan be
centuryphenomenon.
andnot explafoundfor interpretation
whoseobjectiveis understanding
nation.He madeout a case for understanding
beingviewedas bothcontextualisingandsystematising
andhe advocateda routeto contextualising
in a disciplinedway throughnarrative.Fromthis perspective,codified
mathematics
can be viewedas reifiednarrative
andit no longerseemsso
absurdto askhowdifferentnarratives,
or stories,mightconstitutealternaformof story
tive mathematics
as a particular
(in theplural).Mathematics
as a powerful
abouttheworldfeels,to me,verydifferentfrommathematics
explanationor tool. Re-tellingmathematics,
bothin termsof contextand
person-ness,wouldconsequentlydemystifyandthereforeseem to offer
opportunities
forgreaterinclusivity.

3.

KNOWINGSCIENCEAND MATHEMATICS

The feministliteratureon the philosophyof scienceI findveryvaluable

fortheclaritywithwhichit hassharpened
thecriticaldebateon thenature
of knowledgein scienceand how thatknowledgeis derived.However,
it is noticeablethat the contentcriticismsof scienceare rootedin the
empiricaldisciplines.Forexample,femaleprimatologists
suchas Goodall
(1971), Fossey(1983) andHrdy(1986)challengedconceptionsof interactive behaviourby refusingto acceptthe prevailing(male)views on
dominanceandhierarchyin sexualselection.Keller(1985) highlighted
McClintock'sapproachto herstudyof maizeas a symbioticrelationship
betweentheplantandits environment
whichwasdistinctivelydifferentto
the moreusual'objective'investigationundertaken
by botanists.Carson
(1962)is frequently
citedforherearlyworkonecologyandthebroadview
thatshetookabouttheenvironmental
effectsof pesticides.Inallthesecases, theresultsof thescienceweredifferentfromwhathad,formerly,been
expectedbecausedifferentquestionswere askedaboutwhatwas being
observedanddifferentmethodswereusedto maketheobservations.
However,criticismsof, forexample,nuclearphysicsaremorelikelyto
focus uponthe socialeffectsof the science,ratherthanthe scienceitself.
(See, for example,Easlea,1983).Thisis not to diminishthe importance
of developingmodelsof scientificuse andabusewhichcriticisethe purposes,productsandimplicationsof scientificdevelopments.
But,as with
mathematics,
it is difficultto confrontthe abstractions
whicharethesubstanceandtoolsof thedisciplineandthemethodsusedin theirderivation
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especially where these are analytic and non-observationalin orderto ask

what differencesa female perspectivewould make to them.
In what ways might the questions,or the styles of enquiryor the mathematical productsdiffer if mathematicswere to be admittedto be a sociocultural construct? Part of the difficulty in respondingto this question
resides in the highly successful socialisation experiences throughwhich
we all go in order to achieve success at mathematics.It is exceedingly
difficult to dismantle the beliefs which have been integral to our learning experiences of mathematicsand almost impossibleto constructin our
imaginationsalternativesto the processes which we have been taughtand
with which we have gained 'success'. Hence, scratch a pedagogical or
philosophical constructivistand underneathyou are likely to expose an
absolutist.In otherwords,it might be acceptableto negotiatea curriculum
or introducea collaborative,language-richenvironmentwithin which to
make the learningof mathematicsmore accessible, but the mathematics
itself is considered non-negotiable.However, to be consistentin our critiques, we cannot avoid addressingthe nature of knowing mathematics
along with the philosophyand pedagogy of the discipline.
Knowingmathematics,andscience, has traditionallyrequiredentryinto
a community of knowers who accord the status of 'objective', "in some
sense eternal and independentof theflux of historyand culture"(Restivo,
1992, p. 3), to the knowledge items as well as to the meansby which these
items are derived. However,
objectivity is a variable;it is a functionof the generalityof social interests.Aesthetic and
truthmotives exist in the realm of ideas, but they are groundedin individualand social
interests ranging from making one's way in the world (literally,surviving) to exercising
controlover naturaland culturalenvironments.(Restivo, 1992, p. 135).

A consequence of this is that

a mathematicalobject ... like a hammeror a screwdriver,is conceived, constructed,and
put to use througha social process of collective representationand collective elaboration.
(Restivo, 1992, p. 137).

If we are to arguefor a differentconceptionof mathematicalknowingfrom

that traditionallyaccepted, we must addressthe meaning which is to be
understoodby 'objectivity' since the truthstatusaccordedto mathematical
objectsunderpinsthe pervadingepistemology.Criticisingscientific'objectivity' along similarlines, Harding(I 991) called for an epistemologyof the
sciences which requiresa more robuststandardthanthatcurrentlyin use.
This would include the critical examination,4"within
scientific research"
(original italics, p. 146)
of historicalvalues and intereststhatmay be so sharedwithinthe scientificcommunity,so
invested in by the very constitutionof this or that field of study, that they will not show

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up as a culturalbias between experimentersor between researchcommunities.(Harding,

1991, p. 147).

and she furthernoted that:

the difficulty of providing (such) an analysis in physics or chemistry(and, I would add,
mathematics)does not signify thatthe questionis an absurdone for knowledge-seekingin
general,Qrthat there are no reasonableanswersfor those sciences too. (p. 157)

Rosser, in her book Female-FriendlyScience (1990), used women's experience of knowing and doing science to draw out differences from what
she called the conventional androcentricapproaches.Amongst many of
the inclusionarymethodsshe listed are:
* expandingthe kindsof observationsbeyondthosetraditionallycarried
out;
* increasingthe numbersof observationsand remaininglonger in the
observationalstage of the scientific method;
* acceptingthe personalexperienceof women as a valid componentof
experimentalobservation;
* being more likely to undertakeresearchwhich explores questionsof
social concernthanthose likely to have applicationsof directbenefit
to the military;
* workingwithinresearchareasformerlyconsideredunworthyof investigation because of links to devaluedareas;
* formulatinghypotheses which focus on genderas an integralpart;
* defining investigationsholistically.
This list, useful as it is for science, does not generaliseeasily to mathematics although the links to the history, philosophy and pedagogy of
mathematicsare more obvious. But help appearsto be at hand.

4.

BEING A MATHEMATICIAN

In The Emperor's(sic) New Mind, Penrose(1990) arguingfrom the powerful position of a research mathematicianat the top of his profession,
claimed that the mathematician's"consciousness"is a necessary ingredient to the comprehensionof the mathematics.He said:
We must 'see' the truthof a mathematicalargumentto be convinced of its validity.This
seeing' is the very essence of consciousness.It mustbe presentwhenever(originalemphasis) we directly perceive mathematicaltruth.When we convince ourselves of the validity
of G6del's theoremwe not only 'see' it, butby so doing we revealthe very non-algorithmic
natureof the 'seeing' process itself. (p. 541)

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Elsewhere in his book, and in contradictionto the above, Penrosesupported a Platonic approachto mathematicsin thathe propoundeda discovery,
rather than an invented, perspective on the discipline. That is, mathematics is out there waiting to be uncoveredratherthan within the head
(and possibly the heart?)of the mathematician.And yet, Penrosehimself
admittedthat 'seeing' the validity of a mathematicalargumentmust be a
personalexperience and one which, it seems reasonableto me to assert,
can be assumed to differ between individuals.By arguingthat 'seeing' is
non-algorithmic,Penrose permittedthe personalisationof the process. He
reinforcedthis with the statement:
Thereseem to be many differentways in which differentpeople think- and even in which
differentmathematiciansthinkabouttheirmathematics.(Penrose, 1990, p. 552).

However, for me, far from accepting that the outcomes of mathematical
thinkingarediscoveredmathematical'truths',the inevitableconclusionof
his statementis thatthere are potentiallymany differentmathematics.
The contradictionwould appearto lie in a differentperspectiveon the
mathematicianthanon mathematicsitself. Penroseviewed a mathematical
statement,once articulated,as being absolute,thatis eitherrightor wrong,
and its statusverifiableby any interestedparty.But he said, in the
conveying of mathematics,one is not simply communicatingfacts.For a stringof (contingent) facts to be communicatedfrom one person to another,it is necessarythat the facts
be carefully enunciatedby the first, and that the second should take them in individually
... the factual content is small. Mathematicalstatementsare necessarytruths... andeven if
the firstmathematician'sstatementrepresentsmerely a gropingfor such a necessarytruth,
it will be thattruthitself which gets conveyed to the second mathematician... The second's
mental images may differ in detail from those of the first, and their verbal description
may differ, but the relevant mathematicalidea will have passed between them. (original
emphases, p. 553).

Despite the assumed personal nature of the communicationand the

expectation of differences in human images and descriptions,there is an
assumptionthat the 'mathematics', the essential 'truth'of the statement,
can and will be the same for all. This is repeatedlyrefuted by the message of many of the anecdotes which are recountedby and about mathematicians. For example, how is it possible to interpretthe kind of intuitive insights which Penrose himself, and other mathematicianssuch as
Poincare,Hadamard,Thom, claim to have had and which have led to their
findingparticular,personalresolutionsof a mathematicalproblem?Given
that it is reasonableto expect that any one problemmight be amenableto
a numberof differentroutesfor solution, an individualis likely to fall on
the one which matches her or his experience,approach,preferences,possibly making the mathematicaloutcome differentfrom that which would
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nal consistencyof themathematical

argumentis claimedto be verifiable.
However,themostrecentattemptto proveof Fermat'sLastTheoremprovidedan exampleof the unverifiability,
by most mathematicians,
of the
claimsbeingmadeand,consequently,
boththe potentialnon-uniqueness
andfragilityof theirstatus.And,even if the intemalconsistencyis substantiated,this does not additionallyencompassany objectivestatusnor
any implicationof uniqueness,it seemsto me. The socialcontextwithin whichthe mathematics
is placeddoes,however,offerone explanation
forapparentuniqueness,or at leastconvergenceof 'solutions',giventhat
it describesand constrainsthe 'possible'. Thus,a piece of mathematics is bothcontributory
to, anddefinedby, the contextwithinwhichit is
derived.

A beliefin the worldof mathematical

conceptsexistingindependently
of those who developor workwith themis attachedto embracingthe
An imageof 'variable'truth,thatis
'objective'truthsof mathematics.
degreesof correctness,or solutionsresponsiveto differentconditions,is
to manywithinthe disciplinedespitethe supportfromthe
unacceptable
thatunderstandings
historyof mathematics
changeovertimeasthefociand
thecurrentstateof knowledgechange.Thesocialcontextof a mathematical statement,the impactuponit of the interests,drivesandneedsof the
personderivingandthencommunicating
it, aredismissedby manymathematiciansas inappropriate
to the product.Thus,the distinctionis made
betweenthe personwho is workingat the mathematics,
andthe mathematicsitself. But I believethatPenrosefailedto sustainthis distinction
in his discussionof intuition,insightandthe aestheticqualiparticularly
ties of mathematical
an
thinking.He underlined
person-ness
by reiterating
argument(see, forexample,Thom,1973,pp.202-206)that:
the importanceof aesthetic criteriaapplies not only to the instantaneousjudgementsof
inspiration,but also to the much more frequentjudgementsthat we make all the time in
mathematical(or scientific) work. Rigourousargumentis usually the last step! (original
emphasis, Penrose,p. 545).

In drawinga close analogybetweenmathematical

thoughtandintuition
andinspiration
in thearts,Penroseadded:
The globality of inspirationalthought is particularlyremarkablein Mozart's quotation
(from Hadamard,1945) 'It does not come to me successively ... but in its entirety'andalso
in Poincar6's'I did not verify the idea; I should not have had time'. (p. 347).

of themathematical
Any de-personalisation
processandreificationof the
productpushesmathematics
backintotheabsolutistpositionbyobjectivising the 'truths'.However,acceptinga mathematics
whichis notabsolute,
is culturallydefinedand influencedby individualandsocial differences
is not only of greatinterestto those who have arguedfor an inclusive
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mathematicsbut challenges the discipline epistemologically as well as

philosophicallyand pedagogically.
It does not seem untimely to suggest a theory of knowing that draws attentionto the
knower's responsibilityfor what the knowerconstructs.(von Glasersfeld, 1990, p. 28)

Once we re-focus from knowing that a particularmathematicaloutcome

exists to knowing why that outcome is likely under particularcircumstances, we are distinguishingbetween the 'objective' knowledge of the
outcome and the 'subjective' knowing which underlies how to achieve
thatoutcome. This begins to be familiaras the old debatebetweenproduct
and process. However, by attemptingto constructa theory of knowing, I
am moving past the false dichotomy of product/processwhich polarised
the how and the what, towards a re-conceptualisationand integrationof
the how with the what. The value to pedagoguesof such an approachis
obvious. As teachers, we can recognise when learnersmimic a piece of
mathematicalbehaviourratherthan acquiringit as their own. The articulation of an epistemological position on knowing mathematicswhich
is predicatedon mathematicalenquiry,ratherthan receptivity,challenges
teacher behaviour.Ratherthan demandingevidence of the acquisitionof
mathematicalobjects by students,it assumesthatmathematicalbehaviours
and the changes in behaviourthat might signify learningare productsof,
and responsive to, the community within which the learningis situated.
Recounting different narratives,speculating about their similarities and
differences, querying their derivations and applications,denies 'objectivity' and reinstatesthe person and the communityin the mathematics.
Such re-considerationof the characteristicsof science and mathematics
has under-pinnedmuch of the feminist work in the philosophy of science already referencedand is exemplified in the work of Damarin.She
presenteda table of generaliseddescriptors
not as a definitive descriptionof feminist science, but ratheras defininga tentativeframeworkforexaminingwhetherandhow the teachingof science mightbe mademoreconsistent
with feminist conceptionsof science. (Damarin,1991, p. 112).

As statedabove, the philosophicalchallenge,while not necessarilyacceptable to a largenumberof mathematicians,has been well formulated.(Reference has alreadybeen madeto the workof Bloor,Davis andHersh,Harding, Lakatosand Restivo). Gadamer(1975) addedhis argumentthat:
all humanunderstandingis contextual,perspectival,prejudiced,that is hermeneutic(and)
fundamentallychallenges the conception of science as it has been articulatedsince the
Enlightenment(cited in Hekman, 1990, p. 107);

as did Fee (1982) to:

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attack the objectivity that is part of the 'mythology' of science ... (and) ...re-admitthe
human subject into the productionof scientific knowledge. (also cited in Hekman, 1990,
p. 130).

Much of the pedagogic challenge is focussed on the dysfunctional

natureof the continuumbetween an absolutistphilosophy of mathematics and a transmissivepedagogy and the poverty of the product/process
distinction:
On the one hand, authorsand publishersproducetextbooks that do not have to be read
before doing the exercises; on the other hand, teachersacquiesce by agreeing that this is
the way mathematicsought to be taught. ... the real importancelies not in the students'
ability to conceptualize,but ratherin theirability to compute.Teacherstend to underscore
this by their rapt attentionto correctness,completeness,and procedure.Studentscomply
with the grandscheme by establishingas theirlocal goal the correctcompletionof a given
assignmentand as their global goal receiving their desiredgrade in the course. For most,
once it's over, it's over. (Gopen and Smith, 1990, p. 5).

Comparethis with a student-centredproblem-solvingapproach:

An instructorshould promoteand encouragethe developmentfor each individualwithin
his/herclass of a repertoireof powerfulmathematicalconstructionsforposing,constructing,
exploring, solving andjustifying mathematicalproblemsand concepts and should seek to
develop in studentsthe capacityto reflecton andevaluatethe qualityof theirconstructions.
(Confrey, 1990, p. 112).

Researchershave arguedthat creative mathematiciansare more likely to

develop by encounteringand learningmathematicsin a classroomclimate
which supportsindividuals within social groupings;that the negotiation
of meaning both within the group and between the group and conventional social understandingsneeds to be encouraged.(See for example
Davis, Maher and Noddings, 1990) These philosophical and pedagogical critiques, in my view, would be strengthenedby the focus, structure
and consistency which is gained from an epistemologicalstance,that is, a
formulationof the natureof knowing mathematics.

5. THEEPISTEMOLOGICAL
CHALLENGE

I believe thatwe can discernthe outlineof an epistemologicalchallengeto

mathematicswhich, potentially,incorporatesapproachesconsistent with
and familiarto broaderconstituenciesthanEuropean,middle-classmales.
These approachesare inclusive, ratherthan exclusive, accessible rather
thanmystifying, encompassingof as wide a rangeof styles of understanding anddoing mathematicsas possible ratherthanreducibleto those styles
currentlyvalidatedby the powerful.I am claimingthatknowing,in mathematics, cannot be differentiatedfrom the knowereven thoughthe knowns
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FEMINISTEPISTEMOLOGY

287

ultimatelybecome publicpropertyandsubjectto publicinterrogationwithin the mathematicalcommunity.Knowing,however:

involves encouragingrebellious spirits to blossom with free rein to the imagination,preserving a certain nimbleness of mind while affordingit the means of being creative. The
'training'procedures,as we conceive them andordinarilypracticethem,hardlylend themselves, one must admit, to that kind of enticement, since they more often emphasize the
transmissionof acquiredknowledge and apprenticeshipin provenmethods.And considering thatthose proceduresresemblean obstacle course where the competitionis tighterand
tighter,this hardlyencouragesdepartingfrom the beatenpath.(Flato, 1992, p. 75).

I am speculatingthat five categories, drawnfrom the work alreadycited

andconsistentwith the above critique,mightdistinguishthe ways in which
(creative) mathematicianscome to know mathematicsand that, in their
choice of mathematicalareas to pursue, more women (and men) might
feel comfortablewith an epistemology of mathematicsdescribed in this
way.The assumptionis thatsuch an epistemologywoulddisplacedualisms
such as the relativist/absolutistdichotomyandexpectationsof a value-free
mathematicswith an hermeneuticand pluralistapproach. It would open
the way towardsan inclusive perspectiveon mathematicsby challenging
our understandingof what constitutesknowing in mathematics.
I proposedefiningknowing in mathematicsin relationto the following
five categoriesderivedfromthe readingreviewedabove in the philosophical, pedagogicaland feminist literature:
* its person-and cultural/social-relatedness;
* the aestheticsof mathematicalthinkingit invokes;
* its nurturingof intuitionand insight;
*

its recognitionandcelebrationof differentapproachesparticularlyin styles of thinking;

* the globality of its applications.

Knowing mathematicswould, underthis definition,be a function of

who is claiming to know, related to which community,how that knowing is presented,what explanationsare given for how that knowing was
achieved,andthe connectionsdemonstratedbetweenit andotherknowings
(applications).What evidence we have, usually sited in the learningand
assessing of school mathematics,suggests that inviting studentsto define
anddescribetheirknowingin mathematicsin these ways does have gender
implications.(For example, see Burton, 1990b;Forgasz, 1994; Stobartet
al., 1992)
The similaritieswith Rosser's (1990) and Damarin's(1991) lists of the
differences between male- and female-friendlyscience are encouraging.
For example, both referto the expansionof the kinds of observationscarried out, the recognitionof and concernfor personalresponsibilityandthe
consequences of actions. I have listed a valuing of intuitionand insight
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288

LEONEBURTON

and the recognitionand celebrationof differentapproaches.Globality,or

in bothRosser's andDamarin'stermsholism, is a feature. A need to accept
the personalexperience of women as a valid componentof experimental
observationsis acknowledgedwhere I have pointedto person-relatedness
which is importantto knowing mathematics.Hekman's(1990) analysis of
the relationshipbetween genderand post-modernismwas also supportive
of this approachboth in drawingout the similaritiesin argumentbetween
feminists and post-modernistsas well as pointingout the pervadinginfluence of absolutismin affecting these stances. In Rose's words:
A feminist epistemology ... transcendsdichotomies,insists on the scientificvalidity of the
subjective, on the need to unite cognitive and affective domains; it emphasises holism,
harmony,andcomplexity ratherthanreductionism,dominationand linearity.(1986, p. 72).

The next step is to open a dialogue with practisingmathematicianswith

a view to discussing the appropriatenessof my descriptionto their understandingof the natureof knowing in mathematics.This would be done in
a style which would be rich in ethnographicdata,encouragingthe expression of feelings, aesthetics,intuitions,andinsights.It wouldalso attemptto
challenge the effects of socialisationinto the mathematicalculturein order
to untangle differences from cultural similarities. Outcomes which are
supportiveof the suggested epistemologicalframework,especially where
these emphasiseimpacton genderinclusivity,wouldprovidea strongargument in favourof a re-perceptionandre-presentationof mathematics.The
resultingnarrativewould have an internalconsistencywhichshouldplease
all mathematicians.
Such anecdotal approachesas have already been made confirm the
validity of the five categories in describinghow mathematicianscome to
know. Argumentsin favour of humanisingand demystifying the mathematicscurriculumin schools have long been madewith an implicationthat
such attemptschange perceptionsof mathematics,and subsequentperformance by formerlyunder-represented
groups.However,these suggestions
are rarelyconnectedto epistemologicalframeworksof the disciplinemore
frequentlyrelatingeitherto constructivistphilosophyor empoweringpedagogy. And SuzanneDamarincriticises curriculumreformersfor their
relianceon the models of expertiseandinformationprocessing,whicharepopularin current
researchon the cognitive bases of teachingand learningof science andmathematics(and)
appear to be diametricallyopposed to first-orderimplications of feminist pedagogical
research.(Damarin,1991, p. 108).

If the nature of knowing mathematicswere to be confirmed as matching the descriptiongiven in this paper,the scientism and technocentrism
which dominate much thinking in and about mathematics,and constrain
many mathematicsclassrooms, would no longer be sustainable.MatheThis content downloaded from 128.97.245.208 on Sun, 22 Nov 2015 21:46:17 UTC
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FEMINIST
EPISTEMOLOGY

289

as humane,responsive,negotiableand
maticscouldthenbe re-perceived
creative.One expectedproductof such a changewouldbe in the conbutI would
to studymathematics
stituencyof learnerswhowereattracted
also expectchangesin the perceptionof whatis mathematics
andof how
mathematicsis studiedand learned.Thatsuch a possibility,in schools,
is not outsidethe realmsof possibilityis suggestedin Boaler(1993).We
canalso learnfromexperiencesin otherdisciplines.English,forexample,
attractspredominantly
of learnersat the undergradfemaleconstituencies
uatelevel, manyof whomhavebeensuccessfulin developingacademic
careers.
English was constructedas a liberal humanistdiscipline which demandedpersonal and
thoughtfulresponse...Themost importantcharacteristicof English, in the view of students
and staff, is its individualism:the possibility of holdingdifferentviews from otherpeople.
(Thomas, 1990, p. 173).

Providinga new epistemologicalcontextwouldenablethe questioning

of whatmathematicsis taught,how it is learnedandassessedwithina
consistenttreatment.
By adopting an epistemological view of mathematicalknowledge that stresses change,
development,and its social foundationsgenerally,and by consciously relatingthis to the
curriculumprocess, the result would be to make the subject more open in its natureand
more easily accessible. (Nickson, 1992, p. 131).

Myaimin attempting
thisworkis to questionthenatureof thedisciplinein
sucha waythattheresultof suchquestioning
is to openmathematics
to the
experienceandtheinfluenceof membersof as manydifferentcommunities
as possible,thereby,I hope,notonlyenrichingtheindividuals
butalsothe
discipline.
NOTES

This is a version of a paper first given at the ICME7 theme group of the International
Organisationon Women and MathematicsEducation,Quebec, 1992. Its presentcontent
owes much to discussion with and comments from membersof that network.In addition,
I would particularlylike to thank Mary Barnes, Leonie Daws, Stephen Lermanand the
anonymousreviewers for challengingand provokingre-workingof the ideas.

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The Universityof Birmingham,

School of Education,Edgbaston,
BirminghamB15 2TT, UK
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