SALVADOR C. FERNANDEZ and ANICIA M. DE LIMA, petitioners,vs. HON.

PATRICIA
A. STO. TOMAS, Chairman, and HON. RAMON B. ERENETA, Commissioner,Civil
Service Commission
FACTS:
Petitioners in the instant case, Salvador Sanchez here serving as Director of the Office of
Personnel Inspection and Audit ("OPIA") while petitioner de Lima was serving as Director of
the Office of the Personnel Relations ("OPR"), both at the Central Office of the Civil Service
Commission. Petitioners assailed the validity of the resolution promulgated by the CSC and its
authority to issue such, the Resolution No. 934710 resolves to effect changes in the
organizations specifically Central Offices (rearranged and merged some offices. It also allocated
some functions (internal organizations). The objective which is to improve on the delivery of
services
ISSUE 1:
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to issue Resolution No. 94-3710
to the extent it merged the OCSS [Office of Career Systems and Standards], the OPIA
[Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit] and the OPR [Office of Personnel Relations], to form the
RDO[Research and Development Office];
HELD:
YES. Examination on the statutory provisions specifically The Revised Administrative Code of
1987(Executive Order No. 292 dated 25 July 1987) sets out, in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter
3, theinternal structure and organization of the Commission Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission
reveals that the OCSS, OPIA and OPR, and as well each of the other Offices listed in Section
16 above, consist of aggregations of Divisions, each of which Divisions is in turn a grouping of
Sections.
In short theseoffices constitute administrative subdivisions of the CSC. Legislative Authority have
validly delegated to CSC by Sec. 17 and also Sec 1 of 1997 Revised Administrative Code.
The reorganization of offices is moved by legitimate considerations of administrative efficiency
and convenience.
ISSUE 2:
Whether the reorganization abolished offices?
HELD:
It did not abolished any public office nor terminate relationship whatsoever employees by the
Civil Service Commission Office or any of its officers and employees.

RATIONALE why CSC can validly reorganized: Because only CSC knows the ever changing needs
with the call of times or demand of times, as long as this will not involve any reduction in rank or
status or neither the salaries of such employees and itis not amounting to removal nor
constructive dismissal

SEGOVIA VS NOEL
47 Phil 543 Law on Public Officers No Vested Right In A Public Office
In 1907, Vicente Segovia was appointed as judge in Dumanjug, Cebu. In 1923, Act 3107 was
enacted. Said law made it mandatory for judges to retire upon reaching the age of 65. In 1924,
Judge Segovia reached the age of 65. The Secretary of Justice the ordered Segovia to retire from
his post and since then, Judge Pedro Noel acted as the judge in Dumanjug. Thereafter, Segovia
filed a petition for quo warranto where he assailed the constitutionality of Act 3107 as it impairs

the contractual right of Segovia to his office; that no age limit has been prescribed when he was
appointed as judge hence Act 3107 should not be applied retroactively.
ISSUE: Whether or not Segovia should be reinstated to his office.
HELD: Yes. But only because the law should not be applied retroactively; Act 3107 is therefore
constitutional.
Though Segovia abandoned his theory on the unconstitutionality of Act 3107, the Supreme Court
emphasized that public office cannot be regarded as the property of whoever is incumbent. A
public office is not a contract contrary to how Segovia viewed it in his abandoned theory.
But though there is no vested right in an office, which may not be disturbed by legislation, yet
the incumbent has, in a sense, a right to his office. If that right is to be taken away by statute,
the terms should be clear in which the purpose is stated. In the case at bar, Act 3107 did not
provide for retroactive application. Hence, it can only be applied prospectively. As such, the old
law is still applicable in the case of Segovia hence, pursuant to the old law, he can remain in his
post as a judge so long as he maintains good behavior.

JULIO AGCAOILI, vs. ALBERTO SUGUITAN,

Facts:
Julio Agcaoli was appointed as justice of the peace on on the 25th day of March, 1916, with
authority "to have and to hold the said office with all the powers, privileges, and emoluments
thereunto of right appertaining unto him, subject to the conditions prescribed by law. He
continued to occupy said office until the age of 65. He was ordered by the secretary of justice to
vacate the office on april 1923. Since then, the auxiliary justice of the peace, acted as justice of
the peace of the municipality. Agcaoli instituted qou warranto proceedings to inquire to the
acting justices right to occupy said office and to procure reinstatement as justice of the peace.
Issue
Won the provision of Act 3107 stating that the justices of the peace and auxiliary justices
shall be appointed to serve until they reach the age of 65 should be given retroactive or
prospective effect.
Held
It should be given prospective effect only. Act no. 3107 amended sec 203 of the
administrative code by adding at the end thereof the following proviso: provided: that justices of
the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached
the age of 65 years however, section 206 of the administrative code, entitled Tenure of Office
and reading a justice of the peace having the requisite legal qualifications shall hole\d office
during good behaviour unless his office be aboliched or merged into the jurisdiction of some
other justice.
Agcaoili v. Suguitan G.R. No. 24806. February 13, 1926
Facts: Julio Agcaoili was appointed as justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag, Ilocos
Norte by Francis Harrison on March 25, 1916, with authority to have and hold the said office with
all the powers, privileges, and emoluments thereinto of right appertaining into him, subject to
the conditions prescribed by law. Agcaoili received a letter from Luis Torres, Undersecretary of
Justice, saying that he should cease to be a justice because he is now over 65 years old. Justice
Agcaoili filled a protest through a letter addressed to the undersecretary to which he asserted
that he will not cease from the office because he was appointed as justice of peace before the
enactment of Act 3107, and he has the right to hold office during good behaviour. Agcaoili filed
protest at Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte. He waited for a reply but nothing came. So, he filed for
a petition for writ of quo warranto in the CFI of the Province of Ilocos Norte.

Issue: Whether or not Sec. 216 of Act 190 is applicable to the petitioner with regard to his
petition for quo warranto
Held: No.
Ratio: Article 190 provides remedies for the usurpation of office and franchise. Section 216
provides Nothing herein contained shall authorize an action against a corporation for forfeiture
of charter, unless the same be commenced within five years after the act complained of was
done or committed; nor shall an action be brought against an officer to be ousted from his office
unless within one year after the cause of such ouster, or the right to hold the office, arose. The
Supreme Court held that this provision is applicable only to private officials. Hence, it has no
applicability to the petitioner, who is a justice of the peace. The second point the court made is
with regard to the rules of Statutory Construction, given that the said provision is applicable to
public officials, the sentence after the word committed; should not be treated as a separate
thought from the preceding phrase. In the end, the court ruled that the petitioner remain in
office.
StatCon maxim: A semicolon is a mark of grammatical punctuation, in the English language, to
indicate a separation in the relation of the thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a
comma, and what follows that semicolon must have relation to the same matter which precedes
it. A semicolon is not used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. A semicolon is used for the
purpose of continuing the expression of a thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a
mere comma. It is never used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. The comma and
semicolon are both used for the same purpose, namely, to divide sentences and parts of the
sentences, the only difference being that the semicolon makes the division a little more
pronounced than the comma.

MORFE VS MUTUC
Facts:
The Law: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 (RA No. 3019)
Every public officer within 30 days after its approval or after his assumption of office and within
the month of January of every year thereafter, as well as upon termination of his position, shall
prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, a true detailed and sworn
statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his
income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid
for the next preceding calendar year.
Plaintiff Morfe, a judge of a CFI, contends that the periodical submission within the month of
January of every other year thereafter of their sworn statement of assets and liabilities (SAL) is
violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of
the constitutional right to privacy implicit on the ban against unreasonable search and seizure
construed together with the prohibition against self-incrimination.
Executive Secretary and DOJ Sec:
Acceptance of public position = voluntary assumption of obligation
Merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of insuring the interest of general welfare in honest
and clean public service and is therefore a legitimate exercise of police power.
CFI of Pangasinan held that the requirement exceeds the permissible limit of the police power
and is thus offensive to the due process clause

Issue/s:
Whether the periodical submission of SAL for public officers is: 1. An oppressive exercise of police
power; 2. Violative of due process and an unlawful invasion of the right to privacy implicit in the

ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against
self-incrimination; 3. An insult to the personal integrity and official dignity of public officials.

Ruling: Decision reversed.

Ratio:
Presumption of validity
Plaintiff asserted that the submission of SAL was a reasonable requirement for employment so a
public officer can make of record his assets and liabilities upon assumption of office. Plaintiff did
not present evidence to rebut the presumption of validity.
If the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of
governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects
the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider. (ErmitaMalate Hotel v. Mayor of Manila)
Exercise of Police power and the defense provided by the Due Process Clause
inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society (Justice Malcolm)
The power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits of its domain
(Justice Taney, going beyond curtailment of rights)
Anyone with an alleged grievance regarding the extension of police power to regulatory action
affecting persons in public or private life can invoke the protection of due process.
It has been held that due process may be relied upon by public official to protect the security of
tenure which in a limited sense is analogous to property. Therefore he could also use due process
to strike down what he considers as an infringement of his liberty.
Under the Constitution, the challenged provision is allowable as long as due process is observed.
The standard for due process is REASONABLENESS. Test: Official action must not outrun the
bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression.
It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities
of public service with its ever-present temptation to heed the call of greed and avarice to
condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as that imposed upon public officials and
employees to file such sworn statement of assets and liabilities every two years after having
done so upon assuming officeThere was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police
power.
Right to privacy
Right to be let alone
It cannot be said that the challenged statutory provision calls for disclosure of information which
infringes on the right of a person to privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational relationship
such a requirement possesses with the objective of a valid statute goes very far in precluding
assent to an objection of such character. This is not to say that a public officer, by virtue of
position he holds, is bereft of constitutional protection; it is only to emphasize that in subjecting
him to such a further compulsory revelation of his assets and liabilities, including the statement
of the amounts of personal and family expenses, and the amount of income taxes paid for the
next preceding calendar year, there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be
a private sphere.
Unreasonable Search and Seizure

The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure does not give freedom
from testimonial compulsion.
Right against self-incrimination
We are not aware of any constitutional provision designed to protect a mans conduct from
judicial inquiry, or aid him in fleeing from justice.
Insult to personal integrity and official dignity
Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, mey be the basis
for declaring a statute invalid.
Title Seven
CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
Chapter One
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS
Art. 203. Who are public officers. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this and the
preceding titles of this book, any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election or
appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the
Government of the Philippine Islands, of shall perform in said Government or in any of its
branches public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of any rank or class, shall
be deemed to be a public officer.

RA 3019
(b) "Public officer" includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or
temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation,
even nominal, from the government as defined in the preceding subparagraph.
Sec 3, RA 6713
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the term:
(a) "Government" includes the National Government, the local governments, and all other
instrumentalities, agencies or branches of the Republic of the Philippines including governmentowned or controlled corporations, and their subsidiaries.lawphi1.net
(b) "Public Officials" includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or
temporary, whether in the career or non-career service, including military and police personnel,
whether or not they receive compensation, regardless of amount.
(c) "Gift" refers to a thing or a right to dispose of gratuitously, or any act or liberality, in favor of
another who accepts it, and shall include a simulated sale or an ostensibly onerous disposition
thereof. It shall not include an unsolicited gift of nominal or insignificant value not given in
anticipation of, or in exchange for, a favor from a public official or employee.
(d) "Receiving any gift" includes the act of accepting directly or indirectly, a gift from a person
other than a member of his family or relative as defined in this Act, even on the occasion of a
family celebration or national festivity like Christmas, if the value of the gift is neither nominal
nor insignificant, or the gift is given in anticipation of, or in exchange for, a favor.
(e) "Loan" covers both simple loan and commodatum as well as guarantees, financing
arrangements or accommodations intended to ensure its approval.
(f) "Substantial stockholder" means any person who owns, directly or indirectly, shares of stock
sufficient to elect a director of a corporation. This term shall also apply to the parties to a voting
trust.

(g) "Family of public officials or employees" means their spouses and unmarried children under
eighteen (18) years of age.
(h) "Person" includes natural and juridical persons unless the context indicates otherwise.
(i) "Conflict of interest" arises when a public official or employee is a member of a board, an
officer, or a substantial stockholder of a private corporation or owner or has a substantial interest
in a business, and the interest of such corporation or business, or his rights or duties therein,
may be opposed to or affected by the faithful performance of official duty.
(j) "Divestment" is the transfer of title or disposal of interest in property by voluntarily,
completely and actually depriving or dispossessing oneself of his right or title to it in favor of a
person or persons other than his spouse and relatives as defined in this Act.
(k) "Relatives" refers to any and all persons related to a public official or employee within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, including bilas, inso and balae.
SEC 2, RA 7080
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties - Any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof, in
the aggregate amount or total value of at least Seventy-five million pesos (P75,000,000.00), shall
be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by life imprisonment with perpetual
absolute disqualification from holding any public office. Any person who participated with said
public officer in the commission of plunder shall likewise be punished. In the imposition of
penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten
wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of
stock derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State.
Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts: Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling dirt and
ore. His services were contracted by PICOP. Occasionally, he engaged the services of subcontractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the formers premises.
On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by BIR commanding one
of its Regional Directors to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of
Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and a delinquent taxpayer. A Warrant of
Garnishment was issued to and subsequently signed by accused Azarcon ordering him to
transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his possession owned by Ancla.
Azarcon then volunteered himself to act as custodian of the truck owned by Ancla.
After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Reg. Dir of BIR stating that while he had made
representations to retain possession of the property of Ancla, he thereby relinquishes whatever
responsibility he had over the said property since Ancla surreptitiously withdrew his equipment
from him. In his reply, the BIR Reg. Dir. said that Azarcons failure to comply with the provisions
of the warrant did not relieve him from his responsibility.
Along with his co-accused, Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of
malversation of public funds or property. On March 8, 1994, the Sandiganbayan rendered a
Decision sentencing the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 10 yrs and 1
day of prision mayor in its maximum period to 17 yrs, 4 mos and 1 day of reclusion temporal.
Petitioner filed a motion for new trial which was subsequently denied by Sandiganbayan. Hence,
this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual designated by BIR
as a custodian of distrained property.
Held: SC held that the Sandiganbayans decision was null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

Sec. 4 of PD 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It was specified therein that
the only instances when the Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a private individual is
when the complaint charges the private individual either as a co-principal, accomplice or
accessory of a public officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within its
jurisdiction.
The Information does no charge petitioner Azarcon of becoming a co-principal, accomplice or
accessory to a public officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. Thus,
unless the petitioner be proven a public officer, Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the
crime charged.
Art. 203 of the RPC determines who public officers are. Granting that the petitioner, in signing
the receipt for the truck constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to take part in an
activity constituting public functions, he obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular
election. Neither was he appointed by direct provision of law nor by competent authority. While
BIR had authority to require Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the National
Internal Revenue Code did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer. The BIRs power
authorizing a private individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power
to appoint him as a public officer. Thus, Azarcon is not a public officer.

G.R. No. 111091 August 21, 1995

ENGINEER CLARO J. PRECLARO, vs.SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: The Industrial Technology Development Institute (ITDI), a component of the DOST
employed Petitioner under a written contract of services as Project Manager to supervise the
construction of the ITDI-CMD (JICA) Building. Petitioner was to be paid a monthly salary drawn
from counter-part funds duly financed by foreign-assisted projects and government funds. DOST
contracted the services of the Jaime Sta. Maria Construction Company with Engr. Alexander
Resoso, as the company's project engineer. Alexander Resoso, was in the process of evaluating a
Change Order for some electricals when petitioner approached him at the project site and made
some overtures that expenses in the Change Order will be deductive (meaning, charged to the
contractor by deducting from the contract price), instead of additive (meaning, charged to the
owner). Petitioner intimated that he can forget about the deductive provided he gets
P200,000.00, a chunk of the contractor's profit estimated to be around P460,000.00.
Petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with a violation of Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for having either directly
requested and/or demanded for himself or for another, the sum of (P200,000.00), claimed as part
of the expected profit of (P460,000.00) in connection with the construction of that government
building wherein the accused had to intervene under the law in his capacity as Project
Manager/Consultant of said construction said offense having been committed in relation to the
performance of his official duties.
The Second Division of the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE,
INSTEAD OF DISMISSING IT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION, PETITIONER NOT BEING A PUBLIC
OFFICER;
RULING: We find the petition unmeritorious.
Petitioner asserts that he is not a public officer because he was neither elected nor appointed to
a public office but is merely a private individual hired by the ITDI on contractual basis for a
particular project and for a specified period . He was not issued any appointment paper neither
was he required to use the bundy clock to record his hours of work nor did he take an oath of
office.

Petitioner miscontrues the definition of "public officer" in R.A. No. 3019 which "includes elective
and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or
unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government. .
. ."
The word "includes" used in defining a public officer in Sec. 2(b) indicates that the definition is
not restrictive. The terms "classified, unclassified or exemption service" were the old categories
of positions in the civil service which have been reclassified into Career Service and Non-Career
Service.
Non-career service in particular is characterized by
(1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness utilized for the
career service;and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is
coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to
the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made.
The Non-Career Service shall include:
(4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with
a special contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or technical skills not
available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case
shall exceed one year, and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own
responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency; and
From the foregoing classification, it is quite evident that petitioner falls under the non-career
service category of the Civil Service and thus is a public officer as defined by Sec. 2(b) of the
Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act.

Jose Jinggoy Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002)
FACTS:
Jinggoy Estarda, former President Estradas son and then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila was
charged for plunder under Republic Act No. 7080.
An Information was filed but was subsequently amended: (I quoted it kc di kaya ng powers ko
iparaphrase!)
AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB Office of the Ombudsman,
hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a. ASIONG
SALONGA AND a.k.a JOSE VELARDE, together with Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie Atong Ang,
Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio
Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of
Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659,
committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER,
BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in
CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES
BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER
PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY,
RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten
wealth in the aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
[P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT
THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR

SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a)
by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE
AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE
OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR
ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE
ATONG ANG, Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AN (sic) JOHN DOES
AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b)
by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00], more or less, representing a portion of the
TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000] tobacco excise tax share allocated for the
Province of Ilocor Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused
Charlie Atong Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr.
Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c)
by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCK
MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR
LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE
HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS
AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR
MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
[P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND
FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES,
COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE
AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
[P189,700,000.00], MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF
THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME JOSE VELARDE;
(d)
by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES,
KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION
ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME JOSE
VELARDE AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash or Suspend" the Amended Information on the ground that the
Anti-Plunder Law, Republic Act No. 7080, is unconstitutional and that it charged more than one
offense.The Motion was DENIED.
Respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner and his co-accused. Petitioner and his
co-accused were placed in custody of the law.
Petitioner was arraigned but refused to enter a plea. So the court entered a plea of not guilty.
Hence this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Anti-Plunder Law, Republic Act No. 7080, is unconstitutional;
2. Whether petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada may be tried for plunder, it appearing that he was
only allegedly involved in one act or offense that is illegal gambling and not in a "series or
combination of overt or criminal acts" as required in R.A. No. 7080; (ito ata ang pertinent sa crim)

3.Whether

the

petitioner

is

entitled

to

bail

as

matter

of

right.

RULING:
1. NO. The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7080 has already been settled in the case of
Joseph
Estrada
v.
Sandiganbayan.
2. YES. Petitioners contention that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional as applied to him is
principally perched on the premise that the Amended Information charged him with only one act
or one offense which cannot constitute plunder.
Petitioners premise is patently false. A careful examination of the Amended Information will
show that it is divided into three (3) parts: (1) the first paragraph charges former President
Joseph E. Estrada with the crime of plunder together with petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada,
Charlie Atong Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda Ricaforte and others; (2) the second paragraph
spells out in general terms how the accused conspired in committing the crime of plunder; and
(3) the following four sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts constitutive
of the crime of plunder pursuant to items (1) to (6) of R.A. No. 7080, and state the names of the
accused who committed each act.
Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information which is of receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money
in the aggregate amount of P545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling in the form of gift, share,
percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary benefit x x x. In this sub-paragraph (a),
petitioner, in conspiracy with former President Estrada, is charged with the act of receiving or
collecting money from illegal gambling amounting to P545 million. Contrary to petitioners
posture, the allegation is that he received or collected money from illegal gambling on several
instances. The phrase on several instances means the petitioner committed the predicate act
in series. To insist that the Amended Information charged the petitioner with the commission of
only one act or offense despite the phrase several instances is to indulge in a twisted, nay,
pretzel interpretation.
It matters little that sub-paragraph (a) did not utilize the exact words combination or series
as they appear in R.A. No. 7080. For in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, i[13] we held that where these
two terms are to be taken in their popular, not technical, meaning, the word series is
synonymous with the clause on several instances. Series refers to a repetition of the same
predicate act in any of the items in Section 1 (d) of the law. The word combination
contemplates the commission of at least any two different predicate acts in any of said items.
Plainly, sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information charges petitioner with plunder
committed by a series of the same predicate act under Section 1 (d) (2) of the law.
While it is clear that all the accused named in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) thru their individual acts
conspired with the former President Estrada to enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire
ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17, as the Amended Information is
worded, however, it is not certain whether the accused persons named in sub-paragraphs (a) to
(d) conspired with each other to enable the former President to amass the subject ill-gotten
wealth.
In view of the lack of clarity in the Information, the Court held petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada
cannot be penalized for the conspiracy entered into by the other accused with the former
President as related in the second paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its subparagraphs (b) to (d). Instead, the petitioner can be held accountable only for the predicate acts
that he allegedly committed as related in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which
were allegedly done in conspiracy with the former President whose design was to amass illgotten
wealth
amounting
to
more
than
P4
billion.
The Court added that it cannot fault the Ombudsman for including the predicate offenses alleged
in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended information in one and not four separate
Informations. The court explained that the history of R.A. No. 7080 will show that the law was
crafted to avoid the mischief and folly of filing multiple informations. The preparation of multiple

Informations was a legal nightmare.R.A. No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder Law was enacted precisely
to address this procedural problem.
3. The Court noted that the hearings on which respondent court based its Resolution denying the
motion for bail involved the reception of medical evidence only and which evidence was given
five months earlier in September 2001. The records do not show that evidence on petitioner's
guilt was presented before the lower court. Thus, the Sandiganbayan was ordered to conduct
hearings to ascertain whether evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong to determine whether to
grant
bail
to
the
latter.

Codilla vs. Martinez

DE FACTO OFFICER
FACTS:
Mayor of Tagum designated his Vice Mayor to act in his place for the reason that he needs to
attend to his sick brother in Negros Occidental, the designation takes effect until further advice
from the Mayor. The Vice Mayor had lung trouble and so he designated his ranking Councilor,
who also was not in good health and designated the third ranking Councilor Jose Martinez, herein
respondent.

When Martinez accepted his designation, and assumed office, his first official act being to
separate from the service the petitioners as policemen of the Municipality in compliance with
Sec. 682 of the Revised Administrative Code which provided that the appointment of Petitioners
are in a temporary capacity, because they are not Civil Service Eligibles and such appointments
were valid only for three months.
The action of Acting Mayor Martinez was validated when the incumbent Mayor endorsed and
ratified the same by his subsequent official actuation; and that, not being Civil Service Eligibles,
petitioners may be separated from service upon the expiration of the term of three months.
ISSUE:
W/N Acting Mayor Martinez designation as Acting Mayor was valid and W/N his actuation was
legal?
HELD:
Although his designation was irregular, still he was acting under a color of authority, as
distinguished from a usurper who is "one who has neither title nor color of right of an office. . .
The acts of Jose L. Martinez are therefore official acts of a de facto officer. If they are made within
the scope of the authority vested by the law in the office of the mayor of Tagum, such acts of
a de facto office are here present.
An officer de facto is to be distinguished from an officer de jure, and is one who has the
reputation or appearance of being the officer he assumes to be but who, in fact, under the law,
has no right or title to the office he assumes to hold. He is distinguished from a mere usurper or
intruder by the fact that the former holds by some color of right or title while the latter intrudes
upon the office and assumes to exercise its functions without either the legal title or color of right
to such office.
To constitute a de facto officer, there must be an office having a de facto existence, or at least
one recognized by law and the claimant must be in actual possession of the office under color of
title or authority.
Another factor that may be invoked in favor of the validity of the official actuation of Acting
Mayor Martinez is the fact that all his official acts done under his designation were subsequently

endorsed and ratified by the incumbent mayor when he returned to office. This ratification
served to cure any legal infirmity the acts of Acting Mayor Martinez may have suffered because
of his irregular designation
DIGEST 2
Facts:
January 24, 1956, Mayor Baloyo of Tagum, Davao left for Negros Occidental to attend to a sick
brother. Thereupon, he designated the vice mayor to act in his place until advice on his part. The
vice mayor in turn fell sick of certain lung trouble which led the vice mayor to designate councilor
Macario Bermudez a acting mayor until notice of the contrary. Bermudez was not also in good
health so he designated the 3rd ranking councilor Martinez.
Martinez accepted the designation and assumed office, his first official act was to separate the
petitioners as policemen of the municipality. Petitioners immediately filed their protest invoking
the right to continue in office under RA 557. But acting mayor Martinez appointed Duaso
municipal policemen in lieu of Codilla who immediately qualified by taking his oath of office. The
appointment was approved by the President of the Philippines and Commission of Civil Service
among other appointments.
February 15, 1956, Codilla and his companions filed a petition for mandamus before the CFI of
Davao against Martinez and Mayor Baloyo alleging that their separation from the service was
illegal because civil service employees cannot be terminated except for cause.
Respondents in their answer set up the defense that the appointments having been made in a
temporary capacity, because they are not civil service eligibles, that the same were valid even
assuming that Martinez does not have the authority because their office have expired
nonetheless.

The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the separation was made in accordance with
the law. Hence the present appeal.
Issue: Martinez, being a 3rd ranking councilor is the lawful designate to be the acting mayor.
Held:
The trial court did not consider the designation of Martinez as acting mayor entirely void, or one
that would make him a usurper, but at most a de facto officer whose acts maybe given validity in
the eye of the law. Thus, the trial court said: "Although his designation was irregular, still he was
acting under a color of authority, as distinguished from a usurper who is "one who has neither
title nor color of right of an office." . . . The acts of Jose L. Martinez are therefore official acts of a
de facto officer. If they are made within the scope of the authority vested by the law in the office
of the mayor of Tagum, such acts of a de facto office are here present.
To constitute a de facto officer, there must be an office having a de facto existence, or at least
one recognized by law and the claimant must be in actual possession of the office under color of
title or authority.
Another factor that may be invoked in favor of the validity of the official actuation of Acting
Mayor Martinez is the fact that his entire official acts done under his designation were
subsequently endorsed and ratified by the incumbent mayor when he returned to office. This
ratification served to cure any legal infirmity the acts of Acting Mayor Martinez may have
suffered because of his irregular designation.
The fact that they were merely given temporary appointments for the reason that they do not
have civil service eligibility thus making their status as employee wholly dependent upon the
grace of the ruling power. And this we say because, as we ruled in a series of cases, "A
temporary appointment is similar to one made in acting capacity, the essence of which lies in its
temporary character and its terminability at the pleasure of the appointment power."