STUDY

The Alevi Issue in Turkey

Rostom Mahmoud | April 2012

The Alevi Issue in Turkey

Series: Studies
Rostom Mahmoud | April 2012
Copyright 2012 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. All Rights Reserved.

____________________________
The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies is an independent research institute
and think tank for the study of history and social sciences, with particular emphasis on
the applied social sciences.
The Center's paramount concern is the advancement of Arab societies and states, their
cooperation with one another and issues concerning the Arab nation in general. To that
end, it seeks to examine and diagnose the situation in the Arab world - states and
communities- to analyze social, economic and cultural policies and to provide political
analysis, from an Arab perspective.
The Center publishes in both Arabic and English in order to make its work accessible to
both Arab and non-Arab researchers.
Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies
PO Box 10277
Street No. 826, Zone 66
Doha, Qatar
Tel.: +974 44199777 | Fax: +974 44831651
www.dohainstitute.org

Table of Contents

Introduction

Research Methodologies

Three Forms of Political Marginalization

The History of the Alevis in Turkey

Major Changes in the Ottoman Empire

Notes on the Strained Relationship with Political Islam

16

Conclusions

17

THE ALEVI ISSUE IN TURKEY

Introduction
The radical form of political and civil secularism applied in Turkey for more than threequarters of a century has been insufficient to insulate the countrys political life from the
communal and cultural structures of its citizens.1 The impact of these structures has
remained prominent, and in many cases provides a formative and constructive
dimension of political life. Ethnic diversity (Turkish/Kurdish) on the national level and
doctrinal diversity (Sunni/Alevi) on the religious are the most significant features on the
landscape of Turkish society, each appearing to have clear political reflections. This
study analyzes the historical, dialectical relationship between the doctrinal social
structure of the Alevi sect in Turkey and the communitys political position in the
Turkish state.

Research Methodologies
The authors adopts a historical approach, one which looks into the political situation of
the Alevi sect in Turkey, beginning with the Ottoman era, through the major
transformations experienced by the sect at the dawn of the 20 th century, concluding
with the modern Turkish state founded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1923.
This paper analyzes the contemporary political situation of the Alevis, and takes in the
major dilemmas they face. In doing so, it attempts to form a comprehensive historicalpolitical image of Turkeys Alevis by examining the sects traditional positions, in
particular the historical relationship that tied followers of the sect to the oldest Kemalist
party, the Republican Peoples Party.2

The various versions of the Turkish Constitution that have regulated the countrys political life
since 1923 have not acknowledged the political identity of Turkish citizens except on the basis of
citizenship, according to which citizens are considered Turks belonging to the Turkish nation.
These constitutions have extended that logic to other aspects of public life in the modern Turkish
state (e.g., education, judicial system, military, economy, media and culture).
2

A prevalent opinion in Turkish political and cultural circles, especially among minority social
blocs, asserts that the ruling class in modern Turkey is a historical extension of the one that led
the Ottoman Empire. For more than three-quarters of a century, no one outside the Sunni Hanafi
community has been the prime minister, president, chief of the militarys general staff, or
1

ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES

A Quarter of the Population

Turkeys Alevi community accounts for about 20 million of the countrys 70 million
citizens; in other words, they constitute more than a quarter of the population. The
Alevis are divided into three main groups. The first lives near the border with Syria,
particularly in the region of Iskenderun, constituting a demographic extension of the
Syrian Alevi in other Arab countries, where they are called Alevi Nusayris The second
group is known as the Alevis of Anatolia, and they differ from the residents of the Arab
region in terms of doctrine, most of them being ethnic Turks. The third group live in
mountainous areas in the southeastern provinces of Elazg, Bingol, Mus and Tunceli
(also known as Dersim); these are the Alevi Kurds, though they prefer to be called Zaza
Kurds, whose belief system is close to that of the Turkish Alevis. It has long been
thought that Alevi Turks suffer from political persecution.
Is there really equality among Turkish citizens in the modern Turkish state? Specifically,
is there equality between followers of the Sunni Hanafi sect (the major sect of Turkeys
population) and the Alevi sect? As the discussion below will show, most Alevis in Turkey
believe otherwise.

Three Forms of Political Marginalization

The Religious Affairs Directorate
With about 80,000 employees across Turkey, the Presidency of Religious Affairs, which
in Turkish is known as the Diyanet leri Bakanl, is an institution responsible for the
management of all mosques in the country, the placement of all imams and preachers,
all of whom are under its control, and the organizing of religious courses for children
and adults during summer holidays. The directorate serves only the Sunni population,
however, bypassing the structure of the secular state. In addition, the main activities of
the directorate depend on interpretations and views of Sunni doctrine alone.
Some secularists, liberalists, and even a few Islamic intellectuals complain that the
directorates status as a public institution goes against the principles of secularism,
arguing that the state must be neutral, not just regarding all religious sects but also the

president of the Constitutional Court, despite the fact that members of other sects constitute
about half of Turkeys population.
2

THE ALEVI ISSUE IN TURKEY

very issue of faith versus non-faith. Islamic activists arrive at this view from their desire
to have more freedom and independence to conduct their own activities without state
control. They argue that religious activities should be preserved by civil society
organizations.
Likewise, secularist critics of this institution argue that the state should not be a source
of funding for the directorate as this money is provided by taxes, which are collected
from all of the states citizens, including non-Muslims and atheists. More importantly,
the institution forms the general religious awareness of citizens of various backgrounds
and ages, and inspires in them religious feelings, which are the essence of human
identity and spiritual authority. According to the practices of this institution, it gives this
spiritual authority to a group of citizens and withdraws it from another. Therefore,
justice requires that the Turkish Alevi citizens should be represented in this national
institution in proportion to their size of population, and that attention should be paid to
their religious beliefs like their Sunni counterparts, or, alternatively, the state should
allow the formation of a state-sponsored and funded religious affairs institution to look
after the Alevi doctrine matters, like the present one that serves and manages the
Sunni Islamic affairs in the country.3
Mandatory Religious Instruction at Schools
Pre-university education in Turkey, following their primary education, contains religious
studies as a compulsory component for pupils who are Turkish citizens, making this
course a main component of their official school marks. This reality leads many of the
leaders of the Alevi community to wonder: how can a country that claims to be secular
include religious doctrines within its state curriculum? Alevi students are faced with a
major contradiction as the set of spiritual and educational concepts they receive at
school differ completely from what they receive in their own homes. Many Alevi children
whose home environment does not impose a strict religious orientation tend towards
adopting the Sunni interpretation of the Muslim religion, as the school interpretations
are their only source of learning about religious affairs.4 Alevi elites suggest a solution:
3

For more information on the duties and roles of the Turkish Presidency for Religious Affairs,
visit the official website, http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/ingilizce/Default.aspx.
4

Ayen Canda and Aye Bura, TrkiyeDe Eitsizlikler: Kalici eitsizliklere genel bir baki
(English Trans.: Forms of Equality in the Turkish Society), 2010.
http://www.aciktoplumvakfi.org.tr/pdf/turkiyede_esitsizlikler.pdf.
3

ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES

either remove religious instruction from school curricula, thereby allowing civil society to
become the basis of religious teaching for all citizens; or include non-Sunni teachings
into the curricula of both the public and private schools.
Inequality in Posts
Turkey does not have a strong civil society to exert a moderating influence, and it lacks
high-level administrative decentralization. In other words, authority is often exercised
by the central state authority, which is the decisive player in all affairs, parceling out
authority as it sees fit. Therefore, the various branches of the Turkish state (i.e., the
legislature, executive and judiciary braches) hold the keys to all social forces impacting
on Turkish society. The treatment of citizens by these three branches of government
remains unfair and inequitable. While it is true that the Turkish state does not disclose
the religious affiliations of its citizens, nor does it openly use such information in the
appointment of public officials, such as might happen in non-secular states,, the Alevis,
who constitute a quarter of the countrys population, are not adequately represented in
the public sector, the ministries, the judicial system, or the army leadership. 5 A blatant
example of this is that the Justice and Development Party, which has been ruling the
country single-handedly for almost a decade, has one Alevi representative out of more
than three hundred representatives in the Parliament. How can this single
representative put pressure on the Parliament to obtain the rights of his doctrinal sect?

The History of the Alevis in Turkey

Alevis opposed integration in the Ottoman Empire during the 15th and 16th centuries
when the Ottoman Empire had the upper hand on the Alevi areas under the reign of
Sultan Selim I. Throughout his reign, the Alevis were called Qizilbash, or the Red Heads.
They hung their hopes on the Persian Shah Ismail because of his quarrel with the
Sultan, which is why the Ottomans came to view them as traitors and enemies of the
public. Accordingly, the religious propaganda began to call them infidels, labeling them
as unethical, claiming that they had no divine religious books; after this, they were
considered worse than Christians and Jews. They had to live on the outskirts of the
country and in remote areas, such as Dersim, which is the main area of the Alevis
5

Ali Yaman, Alevilik Neden Aratirilamiyor?, 06/12/2011,

http://www.alevibektasi.org/ali_yaman6.htm.
4

THE ALEVI ISSUE IN TURKEY

located between Sivas, Erzurum and Harput (later called Tunceli in 1936), and Elbistan,
southwest of Tunceli (Dersim) of Turkey. This banishment coincided with the beginning
of the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, which effectively divides the political history of
the Alevi sect in Turkey from this point until the beginning of the democratic era in the
modern state of Turkey (1950) into three main phases:6
1. Hamidite (attributable to the Sultan Abdul Hamid II)
2. The major changes in the Ottoman Empire [specifically the Tanzimat and
Constitutional periods]
3. The period of the Alevi uprisings against Mustafa Kemal
The Reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid
In the 1880s, young Sultan Abdul Hamid II, spurred on by the Russian-Turkish war in
the Balkans and East Anatolia (1877-1878), followed a new policy aimed at restoration
of the nation; in other words, he promoted the idea of Islamic unity as a counter-weight
to the risks of the fragmentation of his empire.
As a result of their failure to incorporate guarantees of religious and social equality,
which had been demanded by the Tanzimat during the 1839-1876 reform period, Sultan
Abdul Hamids attempts to defend the eastern provinces proved to be ineffective. Abdul
Hamid IIs policies displayed, more than any other reformist who had come before, the
centrality of concepts of [good] administration, and also the willingness to modernize
administrative practices; this meant the provision of telecommunications, education,
and health.
He tried to integrate the Alevis and other groups, including, for example, the Yazidis,
into the Islamic community or Ummah, by bringing them within the Sunni fold. He
successfully reintegrated Sunni Kurds by placing some Kurdish tribes within privileged
cavalry units, which came to be called the Hamidite Knights (Sunni Kurds had been
disappointed with the Tanzimat State and the period immediately preceding it as it
destroyed the autonomy of Kurdish provinces).
Sultan Abdul Hamid II also founded schools for the elite of the children of tribal leaders
and sent his Hanafi missionaries to Muslim provinces to disseminate his policies. It
6

Mete Tuncay, Socialism and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1923, (London 1994);
Gerber Haim, the Social Origins of the Modern Middle East, (Boulder 1987).
5

ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES

seems this work, which we know little about, had a key role in the tragic violence
suffered by Armenians between 1895 and 1896. Such violence was clearly directed
against the Armenian nationalist movement, and bore a clear sign of antagonism
against Protestant missionaries. Having strengthened their formal and material position
in the operations against Armenians, cavalry units exercised similar violence against
members of the Alevi, especially in Kurdish areas in southeast Anatolia, populated by
Alevi Arabs. As a result of the scarcity of natural resources and high levels of population
density, these local quarrels were very intense in areas of a mixed confessional
composition. The formation of these Hamidite cavalry units thus meant the
militarization of Alevi-populated areas at their own expense.7

Major Changes in the Ottoman Empire

Since the early days in power in June 1908, the robust authority of the Young Turks
instigated a campaign against Hamidite rule, albeit a campaign which did not radically
change the structure of authority. All members of the Committee of Union and
Progress, also known as the Young Turks, were influenced by European ideas prevalent
at the time, particularly Positivism, Social Darwinism, and ideas of racial nationalism.
The declared goal of this [new] elite was the founding of a liberal regime instead of the
Hamidite regime, centered as it was on an individual. Yet its members [sought to
achieve this] through unmitigated national homogenization and the authority of the
state. The perfect moment seemed to be on the horizon during 1908 when various
ethnic and religious groups were subdued, and a common construction of a Middle
Eastern Ottoman Nation with a constitutional regime came into being.
Despite the remarkable lack of research on Ottoman Alevis, it can be argued that no
other ethnic group was more invested in the promises of the new regime than these
Alevis. Promises of freedom, equality, and justice seemed attractive to that community
that knew nothing about privileges or guarantees extended to the groups that made up
the Ottoman Empire.

Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire 1700 - 1922, translated by Ayman Al-Armanazi
(Riyadh: Obeikan Press, 2004). Also see: Majed Mohammed Zakhubi, The Ottoman Empire:
Political Situation from Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Formation of the Hamidite Cavalry
Units, 1891-1923, (Dohuk, Iraq, Spirez Publishing House).
6

THE ALEVI ISSUE IN TURKEY

The 1908 revolt was the first time since the 16 th century that there was a public,
collective declaration of Alevi identity. It served to re-affirm, and possibly spread, their
oppressed religious beliefs, and turned them into supporters of the new state. It is for
this that the events of 1908 are sometimes described as an Alevi Renaissance. The
attitude of Kurdish-speaking Alevis in the regions of Tunceli (also known as Dersim),
Sivas and Elbistan, was even more remarkable given the fact that their traditional
hostility to the central state was motivated by Kurdish nationalism.
The declared intent of Young Turk patriots, who demonstrated themselves as warriors
for freedom against Sultan Abdul-Hamid, was to integrate Tunceli (Dersim) into the
state through political persuasion, rather than military power, which was done by state
during the Tanzimat era and again at the spring of 1908. This policy was successful to a
great extent, as the people in Tunceli (Dersim) found themselves forced to show loyalty
to the new regime. In the summer of 1908, the state summoned the twenty-one
battalions that engaged in the fight on tribes at Tunceli (Dersim), sending, instead,
enthusiastic youngsters who explained the advantages of the new regime across
Tunceli (Dersim).
The Alevi revival of 1908 rekindled an earlier split, previously obscured, between the
state and Alevis. For the new Turkish regime, the affirmation of identity by Qizilbash
Turks, being distinct from Sunni identity, was the result of false Armenian propaganda
during the Hamidite era. However, in early 1914, as the international reforms agreed
upon with the Ottoman rulers applied in the eastern provinces of present Turkey, the
Alevis had to vote alongside with Armenians in planned elections. This could have led to
a comprehensive reorganization of the eastern provinces, especially the area between
Sivas and Erzurum, as well as Harput and Malatya, as the votes of Alevis and Armenians
would constitute a majority between Sivas and Harput. Also the Alevis and Armenians,
isolated from community or deemed as minority, would have a critical influence in the
political life in those regions, which cause Armenians and Alevi Kurds to become targets
of political repression and violence since 1915.8
The First World War alienated the Alevis from the state as they no longer saw any
similarities with the state they once welcomed in 1908. From the beginning, most tribal
8

Majed Mohammed Zakhubi, The Ottoman Empire: Political Situation from Mid-Nineteenth
Century to the Formation of the Hamidite Cavalry Units, 1891-1923, (Dohuk, Iraq, Spirez
Publishing House).
7

ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES

leaders of Dersim stood against taking part in that war. Then, they contributed to the
expulsion of Armenian militias who had a historic rivalry with the Alevis in the final
stages of the war after the withdrawal of Russian troops.
Furthermore, there were inherent contradictions in the essence of the relationship
between all Alevis and post-Hamidite ruling elite.

The shiny slogans of the Young Turks, which approached the idea of civil society
touched upon the woes and needs of Alevis, after centuries of suffering under
the Sultanate, whereas the federal ideology headed into the direction of fusing
and integrating them in the country.

The federal practices were consistent with the wishes of Alevis to dissolve the
Hamidite Sunni military units and the rest of irregular militias backed by the
Ottoman central authority though in return the authorities imposed new forms of
military recruitment on Alevi tribes that ultimately introduced changes into the
Alevi community structure.

The bloody conflict between the central forces of Union and Progress and rebel
Armenian forces excluded a traditional enemy of the Alevis in clash areas. Yet
this conflict strengthened the military influence of Kurdish and Anatolian Sunni
tribes, and the scene in south-east Anatolia was cleared from any group hostile
to them.

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (or the age of Alevi uprisings)

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk established the modern Turkish state in 1923, and abolished the
Caliphate in 1924, a paradigm shift in the political history of Alevis. The slogans hailed
by Ataturk were in line with the modernizing attitudes of the Alevi elite, who advocated
the values of equality, citizenship, democracy, and, political and social freedoms, as well
as the construction of educational, judicial and utility institutions across Turkey.
Additionally, the major war of liberation, led by Ataturk after the defeat that fragmented
the Ottoman Empire, began in Alevi regions, particularly Sivas, where Ataturk was able
to form the Turkish National Congress, since Istanbul and its surrounding areas were
under British occupation, the Cilician Mountains under French occupation, and Izmir and
its vicinity under Greek occupation.9
9

John Shindeldecker, Turkish Alevis Today, Alevi Bektasi,

http://www.alevibektasi.org/xalevis1.htm.
8

THE ALEVI ISSUE IN TURKEY

However, the Kurdish issue exploded in the face of Ataturk after the victories of
liberation that ended in 1924, shortly after the Turkish diplomacy managed to replace
the Treaty of Svres, which granted Kurds autonomy in their southeast areas of the
country, with the Treaty of Lausanne in which the paragraph granting autonomy was
erased.
The first major Kurdish uprising broke out a year after, under the leadership of Sheikh
Said Piran in the areas adjacent to the Alevi mountains, north of Diyarbakir. The first
Kurdish rebellion was repressed by pure military force. No other area was out of the
control of the central authority at the time, except the fortified mountainous civil center
(Alevi-Kurdish), or in other words, Dersim.
Remarkably, the dissolution of Hamidite (Sunni Kurdish) cavalry units in the early days
of the founding of the modern state brought about a sort of estrangement between the
new state and the most religious classes of Kurds (i.e., Sunnis). This was a strong
motive for the early revolutions, which had a Sunni religious nature, in the areas of
Diyarbakir (Sheikh Said Pirans revolt mentioned above) and in surrounding areas. This
created a kind of estrangement between them and the Alevi-Kurdish community.
As of the early 1930s, the central state prepared a decisive attack on Alevi- Kurdish
Tunceli (Dersim), the last self-ruled area in eastern provinces, forcibly disarming and
relocating tribes while at the same timeconstructing roads and railways with the
purpose of linking such areas to the urban center (Alevi-Turkish) Elazig. This was a
means, among others, to achieve the strategic goal of integrating Tunceli (Dersim) in
the federal state.
In the secular vision, Tunceli (Dersim) was like a sore or a cancerous organ that should
be surgically removed, if not amputated. At that time, the use of the language of
biology and social engineering was not limited to the Kemalists, but was also prevalent
in the radical movements of Europe at large.
The profound fears of the young republic were embodied in Tunceli (Dersim). Such fear
of intellectuals was stronger than a dread of banditry because of poverty and the
traditional right to get orphanage care. While this shaped a social reality that never
approved of discussion in Dersim, the city was like an abscess and unbearable spot for

ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES

the early republicans, in a nation heading towards all-out homogeneity.10 The

government and press depicted the work against Tunceli (Dersim) as a liberation from
feudal exploitative people (Aghas) who indulged in evangelism. The Kemalists promised
to introduce civilization to Tunceli (Dersim), whose reputation was marred with
backwardness, intolerance, and chaos. Some really believed the republic would bring
them a better living, real industry, and infrastructure.
The Tunceli (Dersim) Campaign (1937 1938) resulted in widespread devastation and
massacres that left more than 10,000 people, mostly women and children, dead.
Kemalists changed the citys name which led to abject poverty and frightened dwellers.
The suffering of Alevis under Kemalists was due to the gap dividing them from the
people who were supposed to believe in the ideology of rulers and yield to their own
principles.
The Alevis and the Kemalist Party
When Mustafa Kemal Ataturk declared the modern Turkish state in 1923, Alevis thought
a new era of civil rule was started. A divorce with the past of the Ottoman Empire that
Ataturk called for meant a departure from a religion-based state and a rationalized
relationship between state-dependency and the state. Differences in belief, doctrine,
and religion were the toughest problem facing the Alevis if they wanted to play roles in
the new state and face their perceived significance. The State of Ataturk meant a shift
to an absolute opposite (i.e., a civil state where each citizen is equal). This shift was the
most prominent political concept Ataturk targeted as regards the comprehensive
modernity of his country since then. Ataturk passed away in 1937 and his companions
formed the Republican Peoples Party or the Kemalist Party, which promoted the same
concept and vision, with a vast majority of Alevis supporting it for the same reason.11
Notably, the attitudes of Kurds were inconsistent with the vision of the modern state.
The social and political secularization advocated by Ataturkism won their satisfaction,
while the policy of Turkifying Kurdish areas in 1932 the plan was to absorb the
farthest areas to the south-east, as well as deep into the areas of Tunceli (Dersim) in
10

Hans-Lukas Kieser, The Alevis Ambivalent Encounter with Modernity: Islam, Reform and
Ethnopolitics in Turkey (19th 20th) (Zurich: University of Zurich, 2004).
11

To view the principles and ideologies of the Republican Peoples Party, visit the partys
official website, http://www.chp.org.tr/.
10

THE ALEVI ISSUE IN TURKEY

1938, subsequently burning the whole rebel city after a renowned revolution led by
Seyed Reza was the hardest wall inhibiting full integration of Alevis and the Ataturkist
current.
The Traditional History Against the Republican Peoples Party
The significant, symbolic status of the Republican Peoples Party across the political
history of Turkish state over three-quarters of a century rarely drove it to the helm of
the country. After stagnation loomed over the political life in Turkey (1937-1950), the
first democratic elections took place in 1950 in which the Turkish Democratic Party, led
by Adnan Menderes, ascended to power and distanced the Republican Peoples Party,
which had been in power since 1920s. The Democratic Party remained in power for
almost a decade. The first, renowned coup in Turkeys modern history was in 1961
when Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was executed in cold blood after he introduced
qualitative amendments to the structure of the state.12
After the coup, the Justice Party succeeded the Democratic Party through bargaining
and creating mutual agreements with Kemalist elites and secular intellectuals. Veteran
Suleiman Demirel, who later won the presidency, and relied on the same socioeconomic
forces the late Menderes had counted on, led the Justice Party. Both leaders achieved a
kind of unspoken collusion between bourgeoisie economic liberalism and conservative
religious circles in Central Anatolia, particularly the sheiks of religious sects who
retained a symbolic, material influence, in spite of the ban long imposed on them under
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.
The Alevi community forces were the most affected by this alliance as a majority of
them tended to left/Marxist forces in the 1960s. These forces strongly extended to the
Alevi community, and to other circles of Turkish society; ultimately, the conflict between
bourgeoisie liberals and religious forces and the leftist/Marxist forces took the country
to the verge of civil war.
Two observations by the Alevis of the Menderes era:

The relatively long era of Menderes (ten years) was the first spring in the
newborn democratic Turkey. It had impacts on all the files of former Ataturkist

12

Eitim retim Forumu, 27 Mays Askeri Darbesi...Menderesin idam, Reform Turk,

http://www.reformturk.com/turk-tarihi/22714-27-mayis-askeri-darbesi-menderesin-idami.html.
11

ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES

governments, including the issue of migration of tens of thousands of Alevi

families and their displacement at the turn of the 1930s. The government of
Menderes allowed them, for the first time, to return to their homes, though with
no recognition or compensation for victims. This is understandable in the context
of Menderess fear of the grip of the military and their allies, the Republican
Peoples Party, and the will to keep conservative parties (the Sunnis) in northern
Tunceli (Dersim) away from any direct responsibility for such events.

The rule of Menderes coincided with the rise of the Arab nationalist movement
after the July revolution in Egypt. The effects of this nationalist rise arrived at the
political environment of Arabs living in Turkey (the Alevis), resulting in tight
control over them. This spurred tensions between Menderes and Arab Alevis
starting in 1952, progressing after the mobilization of Turkish military forces on
Syria borders in 1955.

The 1980 Coup and Its Consequences

As a result of the political assassinations, starting in the mid-seventies, between leftist
forces (Alevis and Kurdish Sunnis as a prevailing majority) and the rightist religious and
national forces, a coup began in 1980, targeting all leftist forces, trade unions,
intellectuals, and secularists, all of whom were dubbed as the biggest supporters of
Ataturkist thought in the country.13 The most significant result of the 1980 coup was
the liquidation of Turkish left forces, the biggest sign of eliminating political expression
tool of the followers of Alevi doctrine. The coup leaders banned all political parties and
imposed a political state of emergency until 1985. Court judgments were rendered
against 30,000 political prisoners, 42 percent of them were Alevis, though Alevis were
only 22% of population.
Repression was not the most prominent address of the 1980 coup, but radical change in
the states ideology marked the subsequent stage. For the first time in modern Turkey,
the military, who guarded Kemalist ideology, tended towards a complete Sunni
Islamization of its own concepts and organization. The aim was forming a deep
cohesion between all forces to face the left-wing tide. From a deeper historical
viewpoint, the consistency of Turkish coups in the 1970s and 1980s can be considered
as part of a comprehensive picture of ideological shifts towards political Islam in Sadats
Egypt and Zia ul-Haqs Pakistan. The Turkish model, seeking the implementation of
13

Pnar Kaya zelik, 12 Eyll Anlamak, http://www.politics.ankara.edu.tr/dergi/cilt66sayi1-4_Pinar_Kaya_Ozcelik.pdf.

12

THE ALEVI ISSUE IN TURKEY

such ideology shifts, found what it wished for in the person of Turgut Ozal, who
became prime minister in 1983 (until 1989), and then president from 1989 until 1993.
Ozal was the civil interface of religious military coup leaders.
The Transformations in Society and Ozals Era
The resounding success of Ozal in the 1983 elections allowed him to start his own party
rather than serving the coup forces. He formed the Motherland Party and over his days
in the prime ministers post, he exercised an exaggerated policy of Islamizing the public
life. In his time, the number of institutions teaching the fundamentals of Islam doubled
and mosques nation-wide increased from 54,000 to 84,000. The number of students of
religious sciences also doubled from 100,000 at the onset of his rule. Turkey organized,
for the first time, an exhibition for religious books. Turkish pilgrims soared from around
10,000 at the early 1980s to 90,000 at the end of his premiership. Ozal himself travelled
for pilgrimage in 1988. All religious transformations during Ozals era took place at the
expense of non-Sunni sects. The direction of the country towards religiosity coincided
with a marginalization of other doctrines in the society.
Notably though, the loosening of state control over the financing of civil associations
permitted political currents outside Turkey to offer them funds and help them activate
their role. Two hundred thousand religious sciences students received private religious
lessons and their institutions were funded without questioning the sources of such
funds. The same applied in television and radio religious programs, wherein the
followers of the Sunni doctrine benefited from funding by the Sunni Muslim World
League, while Alevis suffered a lack of funds for religious activity. Turkeys
transformation towards the conservative religious right meant a departure towards a
doctrinal state (i.e., Sunni/Hanafi).14
The Alevis and the Kurdistan Workers Party
In its wake, the coup left compound effects within Alevi-Kurdish circles, and ignited a
deep hatred for the coup forces among the Alevi Kurds, including the coups right-wing
nationalist and doctrinal inclination, the extensive repression they practiced against
public leftist organizations (wherein the Alevis played a key role), and the brutalities the
14

Kemal kirisci, Turkish Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times (Paris: Institute for Security Studies
European Union, 2006), http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp092.pdf. Also see: Ayse
Kadioglo, Civil Society, Islam and Democracy in Turkey (Istanbul: Sabanci University, 2009).
13

ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES

Kurdish nationalists faced. It was the motive that shaped the ideology of Kurdistan
Workers Party that combined the leftist romantic vision with Kurdishs radical
nationalism, thus deepening the differentiation between Turks and Alevi Kurds. This led
to a rapid integration of the Alevis in the party that included prominent Alevi faces.
In the 1990s, the party faced a lot of publicity from the state, as a strong reaction to a
solid union between Alevis and Armenians, claiming these two groups are responsible
for the demolition of the Muslim structure of the state. Publicity campaigns spread
within conservative Kurdish circles, rendering the Kurdistan Workers Party unable,
despite its vitality, to win the loyalty of half of Alevi Kurds in their regions, according to
election results in recent years. A relative majority of Alevi Kurds remained politically
loyal to the Republican Peoples Party.
From Moderate Ozal to Radical Erbakan
Later on, after the community shifts championed by Ozal, Ali Turkmen founded the
Welfare Party that won the support of a dissident group of the National Salvation Party.
The Welfare Party was conservatively religious and founded at the time of Suleiman
Demirel under Erbakan in 1973, who was deposed by the coup in 1980. Since then,
Erbakan has been considered the architect of religionizing political life after Turgut Ozal
created a moderate national religious model.
A prominent engineer, Erbakan had deep admiration for the famous Naqshbandi Sheikh
Mehmet Zahid Kotku, but he never showed a provocation for secular elite. His dress
was European-style, no beard, but did not hide an inclination to the founding of a
religious state. When he joined the Justice Party led by Suleiman Demirel, he led the
conservative current vis--vis liberals. When he left the party in 1969, and formed
purely religious National Order Party, the new party became the spokesman of the
Naqshbandi Tariqa in the country. The 1980 Coup forces revealed that Erbakans party
sought, in specific ways and platforms, to transform the country into a theocracy.
Erbakan was expelled to Switzerland, and returned two years later to head the National
Salvation Party that included passages lending support to Islamisms, such as: The
party strives towards the spiritual development of the Turkish people, The main goal
of the party is to resist moral decay, and The basic problem in the country is in the
control of the foreign-allied comprador elite who deny Islamic values and concepts in
public life. It is notable that the term comprador elite was then known in Turkey more

14

THE ALEVI ISSUE IN TURKEY

than Turkeys traditional kebabs, as pointed out by author Aziz Nesin in his famous
novel Zubuk.15
The results of conservative political shifts on Alevis:
1. The rise of religious and semi-religious parties resulted in an imaginary conflict
between two forces. A force that wanted the militarization of Turkish society, the
imposition of steel restrictions on social initiative, and who would secretly give
concessions to conservative powers; the other was an Islamist force apparently
willing to create a dominant sense of religiosity in public life, while accepting the
authority of the military on foreign policy and the formation of major alliances.
For Alevis, both options were bad. At that difficult time, and after the dissolution
of left-wing movements, there was no longer a party to reflect their desires and
maintain their interests. The Alevi cultural elite was ironically divided on the basis
of tribe, origin, and region as a second line of self-defense since they were
banned from forming political movements.
2. Such shifts in political and national structures were not far from deeper shifts in
socio-economic structures. In that period, the Anatolianization phenomenon
emerged, with its cultural aspect bringing Islamization. As a result, the size of
the Turkish cities (between 1950 and 1990) doubled ten folds, and huge waves
of rural exodus poured towards the interior; Ankara, inhabited by only 400,000
became home to four million. The population of Izmir grew from a 150,000 to
almost one and half million. Unbelievably, the city of Istanbul alone became
home to one quarter of the population (around 14 million in 1993), resulting in
the spread of shantytowns and the inclusion of nearly a third of the population.
This made the Sunnization (i.e., the conversion to Sunnism) soar among Alevi
Turks, both socially and spiritually.
3. Due to the exodus from countryside to cities, the Alevi sect lost its basic
centralization in their clear majority-dominated regions, and became a minority
on the outskirts of cities. The mountainous villages extending across middle,
south, and east areas were the historic vessel protecting Alevis from the
domination of Sunni interpretations, especially in the absence of boundaries
dividing them as two distinct religions. This eased a shift from Alevism to
Sunnism.

15

Refah Partisinin resmi sitesi. http://www.necmettinerbakan.org/default.asp.

15

ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES

The lack of a firm Alevi religious clergy compared to Sunni counterpart was the
product of the ban imposed by the state on the Alevi sect to form religious circles
and found cleric structure to protect religious awareness, unlike the Sunni
community.
On high mountains, natural boundaries and the spirit of majority protected Alevi
interpretations and beliefs. On the outskirts of cities though, the situation
changed, and many followers of the Alevi doctrine tended to embrace the Sunni
interpretations, especially because of the scarcity of Alevi literature on laws
legislation and the rulings required for urban citizens, due to the lack of an
effective clergy which were needed in an earlier simpler rural setting. The
Alevis exodus to cities made a significant group of them adopt the Sunni
literature, especially with respect to marriage, divorce, and inheritance.
4. The Sunni religious parties extended a strong urban social protection network to
their followers in shantytowns, granting Sunnis the freedom to attack the
ideology of other sects, especially Alevis, which led to the intensification of the
ideological tone of the few Alevi cultural associations, who could do nothing but
cry aloud. This stage was marked by the violent events of Sivas in 1993, which
coincided with the events of Gazi neighborhood of Istanbul. They rapidly spread,
and the severe violence practiced was a proof of reaching the height of
aggravation.

Notes on the Strained Relationship with Political Islam

The problem that was facing the Alevi political elites in Turkey, specifically the strained
relation with Sunni political Islam, was that a refusal of such communication might be
interpreted as a rejection of democratic values. All political Islamic parties reached
power through ballot box and were removed by a direct military coup or through postmodernism coups, a term by renowned writer Gengis Chandar to mock the judiciary
coup by the military against the Welfare Party in 1997. To put in different way, the
dilemma of confronting Islamic currents in Turkey would mean direct opposition to
democratic values.
Additionally, the Alevis failed to gather under a single umbrella, but were divided into
various spectrums: a leftist group with an ideological discourse alienated from domestic
concerns; a nationalist Kurdish group interested in organizing the relationship between
the state and the south-east region of the country; liberalists colluding with Islamists;
and an Alevi doctrinal group unable to mobilize the three masses and that was
16

THE ALEVI ISSUE IN TURKEY

extremely suppressed by the state. This does not, however, underestimate the ability of
a vigorous political elite that led the religious political mainstream over half a century or
more. The Welfare Party employed for its own favor the secular discourse, and had not
named itself an Islamist party, despite its actual and direct practices that embodied
Islamism. In this context, one may wonder: why has no political organization stood for
the political interests of millions of Alevis, like the Islamic parties, even if they do not
have an expression of the Alevi identity?
The Welfare Party, and others such as National Salvation Party, Democratic Party, and
Justice Party all religious parties have not announced being against the values of
secularism. They instead directed criticism to the secular model, and called for a real
secularism that if implemented shall mean a total Islamization of society. The Welfare
Partys literature stressed that secularism was a strict separation between state and
religion, yet the Turkish model, as viewed by this party, violates such rule. The state
prohibits female students from wearing hijab in classrooms and universities; it
designates Sunday as a public holiday instead of Friday; it teaches Darwins theory in
schools. According to the Welfare Party, real secularism must be reconsidered through
resolutions that can actively achieve this purpose.
Now, imagine a political party or current that does not expressly voice association with
the Alevi doctrine, but aims, through political platform, at striking the balance with
Sunnis? If such a movement did exist, it would demand a real secularism that
eliminates religion-based ideologies from public life. This would mean putting strict
criteria on the flow of funds to civil associations, and considering compulsory religious
education as anti-secular, thus creating a general ideological balance. It seems,
however, that the power of religious movements that have dominated the country for
half a century does not spring from organizational strength alone. It banks on the
disunity of the political pulpits of other political movements, especially the Alevis.16

Conclusions
Basic conclusion

16

Stefan Martens, Being Alevi in Turkey: Discursive Unity and the Contestation of Communal
Boundaries, 1980-2009, (M.A. Thesis, Simon Fraser University, 2009).
17

ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY STUDIES

The Ataturkist Republican Peoples Party, the most outstanding front representing the
Alevi sect, did not reach power except for a short period in modern history (1950 2011); rather, it was always the main opposition party. The center-right represented
by the parties of Adnan Menderes, Suleiman Demirel, Turgut Ozal, Necmettin Erbakan,
and Recep Tayyip Erdogan has always won 60% to 70% of total votes while the
Republican Peoples Party won the rest. This is a reflection of the structure of Turkish
society.
The most prominent feature in those long years is that the ideological trend of the
Kemalist Party retained a lot of state institutions and has not left them to the centerright. Such institutions include the presidency post, the presidency of the Constitutional
Court, and the top leading positions of the army staff. Since the ruling of the Justice
and Development Party, these institutions have begun to fall from the hands of
Kemalists. This is the new political sign that will draw the engagement of Alevi
members in the political public life.
Overall Results of the Study

18

All forms of secularism in the Turkish political system cannot blur the noticeable
overlap and interpenetration between the Turkish doctrinal structure and the
Turkish life and political currents.

Turkish Sunni politics have a long history of evasion and circumvention with
respect to national laws and state customs though no Alevi party has managed
to do the same. Disunity was the most prominent feature of the political choices
of Turkish Alevis.

In times of great political crisis, an unspoken alliance was always forged between
ruling military powers and conservative currents at the expense of choices of
Turkish Alevis.

There has been a large overlap between the Kurdish and Alevi cases in Turkey
since the founding of the modern state.

The Alevi case has not obtained political and media attention equal to its
magnitude. It has not been a requirement or an item on the agenda of any
Turkish party or political current, though it has remained an issue of the Alevi
religious associations, some human rights bodies and civil societies.

THE ALEVI ISSUE IN TURKEY

The topic of social Sunnization remains the biggest dilemma facing the Alevi
situation in near future. The major exodus, during the 1980s and 1990s, from
countryside between the center and southeast of the country to metropolitan
Turkish Kurdish cities, caused the Alevi sect to lose the natural environment that
developed their identity for years.

A lot of illusions and misconceptions with regards to the Alevis exist in the
imagination of the Turkish public due to the lack of transparency in educational
curricula and media and the isolation of the Alevi religious clergy, thus deepening
such fantasies traded between either party.

The European criteria (Copenhagen criteria), adopted by Turkish government, in

its run-up for the European Union membership, remedies the problem to some
extent by bolstering the political and legal rights of Alevis in Turkey.

19