Sps. Mendezona v. Ozamiz, Montalvan, et al.

R37; MNT, MR
1. Petitioner spouses filed a case for quieting of title against the respondents.
1.1 Petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land in Cebu City.
1.2 They alleged that their title can be traced to Carmen Ozamiz.
1.3 They sought to remove the lis pendens annotated in their title.
1.4 The lis pendens came from the special proceeding for guardianship filed by the
respondents.
1.5 The respondents in their guardianship suit contends that Carmen is a frail old lady and
does not have the capacity to take care of herself.
2. Respondents answered that the titles to the property are defective and illegal.
2.1 also, they alleged that the property was acquired in bad faith and there was no
consideration.
3. RTC: ruled in favour of the petitioners.
4. CA: reversed the RTC. CA held that the sale was simulated and further, at the time of the
sale, Carmen was already seriously impaired.
5. MR of petitioners denied.
6. Petitioners filed their MNT and/or reception of evidence.
6.1 petitioners alleged that the CA totally ignored the testimony of a certain Judge Durias
regarding the mental condition of Ozamiz.
6.2 Further, petitioners alleged that the testimony of Judge Durias is a newly discovered
evidence and that it couldnt have been discovered prior to trial in the lower court
even with the exercise of due diligence.
7. Denied!!!!
8. Hence this petition.
Motion for NT not granted to petitioners.
We find that the requirement of reasonable diligence has not been met by the petitioners. As early
as the pre-trial of the case at bar, the name of Judge Durias has already cropped up as a possible
witness for the defendants, herein respondents. That the respondents chose not to present him is
not an indicia per se of suppression of evidence, since a party in a civil case is free to choose
who to present as his witness. Neither can Judge Durias testimony in another case be considered
as newly discovered evidence since the facts to be testified to by Judge Durias which were
existing before and during the trial, could have been presented by the petitioners at the trial
below. The testimony of Judge Durias has been in existence waiting only to be elicited from him
by questioning.
A lack of diligence is exhibited where the newly discovered evidence was necessary or proper
under the pleadings, and its existence must have occurred to the party in the course of the
preparation of the case, but no effort was made to secure it; there is a failure to make inquiry of
persons who were likely to know the facts in question, especially where information was not
sought from co-parties; there is a failure to seek evidence available through public records; there
is a failure to discover evidence that is within the control of the complaining party; there is a
failure to follow leads contained in other evidence; and, there is a failure to utilize available
discovery procedures. Thus, the testimony of Judge Durias cannot be considered as newly
discovered evidence to warrant a new trial.

Lesson!!
A motion for new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence is properly granted only
where there is concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
(a) the evidence had been discovered after trial;
(b) the evidence could not have been discovered and produced during trial even with the exercise
of reasonable diligence; and
(c) the evidence is material and not merely corroborative, cumulative or impeaching and is of
such weight that if admitted, would probably alter the result.
[All three (3) requisites must characterize the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial.]

Garcia v. CA
R35; Summary Judgment
1. Petitioner Garcia (as representative of the Garcias) filed a case for collection of sum of
money against the Sps Dinglasan, the Rural bank of Sara, the Bank manager, and the
cashier.
2. Petitioner contends that:
2.1 Sps Dinglasan convinced the petitioner to place several monies in Time Deposit with
the Rural Bank of Sara.
2.2 Garcia now goes to the Rural bank to surrender the time deposit certificates and to
receive payment.
2.3 The respondents refused to pay and told Garcia to come back in a month.
2.4 After a month, no payment was made, hence the action.
3. The bank manager and the cashier interposed the following defenses:
3.1 no cause of action
3.2 petitioner Garcia is not the one authorized to transact with the Bank
3.3 the bank did not receive the withdrawal personally from the Garcias
4. The sps. Dinglasan interposed the following:
4.1 no cause of action
4.2 theyre not privy to the contract
5. Petitioners filed a Motion for Summary Judgment since the pleadings and supporting
affidavits submitted are bare of any genuine issue which may be controverted.
6. RTC: Motion for Summary Judgment denied!
7. CA: RTC affirmed.
8. Hence this petition
RTC and CA correct in denying Motion for Summary Judgment
In the case under consideration, the pleadings and exhibits on record reveal that there exist
genuine issues on material or pertinent facts sufficient to preclude a rendition of summary
judgment. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, the pleadings submitted below by the
parties raise the following issues:
1. Whether or not Florencio Junior Garcia is properly authorized to file the complaint for
the plaintiffs named in the title of the complaint?
2. Whether or not defendants (private respondents) spouses Dinglasan may be held jointly
and severally liable with their co-defendant (co-private respondent) rural bank?
A summary judgment is one granted upon motion by a party for an expeditious settlement of the
case, there appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that there are no
important questions or issues of fact posed (except as to the amount of damages) and therefore,
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Upon a motion for summary judgment, the sole function of the court is to determine whether or
not there is an issue of fact to be tried, and any doubt as to the existence of an issue of fact must
be resolved against the movantcourts are quite critical of the papers presented by the moving
party but not of the papers in opposition thereto; If the defense relied upon by the defendant is

legally sufficient and does not appear patently sham, the motion for summary judgment should
be denied.

People v. Li Ka Kim Ed
R37; MNT
1. A case was filed against the respondent for illegal possession of shabu through a buy bust
operation where he sold to a poseur buyer almost 1 kg of shabu.
2. The prosecution alleges:
2.1 The Intelligence Division of the PNP of Region 4 received a tip that a certain Ed, a
known drug dealer was looking for a buyer of his shabu.
2.2 PO2 Trambulo made contact with the accused.
2.3 At an agreed time and place, they met.
2.4 When the transaction happened, Ed was apprehended.
2.5 During trial, PO2 pointed to Ed as being the seller and the brown paper bag given
which contained the shabu.
3. The defense contends:
3.1 Ed alleged that he came from Fookien, China in a tourist Visa invited by his friend
Tan Eng Hong.
3.2 He alleges that he went to mall and while inside, he was accosted by 5 men.
3.3 He was forced inside a car and was brought to a gas station where he was frisked.
3.4 After yielding negative, he was brought to the police station and a Chinese woman
told him that if he could produce 1m, he would be set free.
4. RTC noted that it was unlikely that he would be singled out in the mall out of all the
people there.
4.1 Further, the RTC noted that he was an undocumented alien.
5. After several switching of counsel, he filed a motion to remand to conduct a new trial.
5.1 In his motion, he would attempt to overturn his conviction or, at the very least, to be
given a chance for a new trial, citing Section 14, Rule 121, of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, because of newly discovered evidence, i.e., his passport which would
establish his true identity as Huang Xiao Wei, a Chinese National, and as having
entered the Philippines as a tourist.
The passport is not a newly-discovered evidence.
The requisites of newly discovered evidence in order to justify a new trial are that(a) the
evidence is discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and of such weight that, if
admitted, would likely change the judgment.
Not one of the requisites mentioned is attendant. Appellants passport could have easily been
presented and produced during the trial. Then, too, the presentation of appellants passport,
would hardly be material to the outcome of the case. Appellant was positively identified by the
prosecution witnesses as being the perpetrator of the crime. Most importantly, appellant even
identified himself as Li Ka Kim at the trial and not as Huang Xiao Wei,9 that bolsters the
conclusion that appellant deliberately concealed his true identity in the nefarious enterprise.

PBCOM v. Sps Go.

R35;
1. The respondents obtained 2 loans from PBCOM evidenced by 2 promissory notes.
1.1 to secure the loans, Sps Go executed 2 pledge agreements over shares of stocks in
Ever Gotesco Holdings.
2. When the value of the stocks plunged to 4cts/share, PBCOM informed Go that they were
terminating the pledge agreements.
3. PBCOM now files a case for collection of sum of money against the respondents.
3.1 PBCOM alleged that the Sps Go failed to pay after 3 installments on the interest. And
as a consequence, the entire balance became due and demandable.
3.2 It also alleged that PBCOM demanded the payments but Go was insisting back that
certain conditions must be met first.
4. The Sps. Go answered with their counterclaim.
5. PBCOM now files a motion for summary judgment contending that the answer of the
respondents tendered no specific denials on the averments of the complaint.
6. Sps Go opposed the motion for summary judgment arguing that issues and now calls for
the presentation of evidence.
7. RTC: motion for summary judgment granted
8. CA: reversed RTC. Case remanded to the RTC for trial on the merits.
9. Hence this petition.
The CA correctly ruled that there exist genuine issues as to three material facts, which have to be
addressed during trial: first, the fact of default; second, the amount of the outstanding obligation,
and third, the existence of prior demand.
In this case, the admissions made by Sps Go are to be read and taken together with the rest of the
allegations made in the Answer, including the special and affirmative defenses.
As to Default

As to Prior Demand

As to amount of the
outstanding obligation

PBCom (COMPLAINT)
Alleged that Sps Go defaulted
in the payment for both PNs;
having
only paid
3%
installements
(September,
November, and December
1999).
Made repeated demands
which the sps acknowledged
to have incurred, however,
they imposed conditions such
that sps payments shall
depend upon the lifting of
garnishment effected by the
BSP on their accounts.
1st Loan: Php 21+M; 2nd
Loan: 95+M

Sps Go (ANSWER)
Denied said allegation. They
further alleged that they made
substantial payments on their
monthly loan amortizations.
Stated that they were not
aware of any demand made
by PBCom for the settlement
of the whole obligation.

Did not state any amount,

instead, they averred that
substantial monthly payments
had been made, and there was

a need to reconcile the

accounting records of the
parties.
Clearly then, when taken within the context of the entirety of the pleading, it becomes apparent
that there was no implied admission and that there were indeed genuine issues to be addressed.
Sps Go are not disclaiming knowledge of the transaction or the execution of the promissory
notes or the pledge agreements sued upon. The matters in contention are, as the CA stated,
whether or not respondents were in default, whether there was prior demand, and the amount of
the outstanding loan. These are the matters that the parties disagree on and by which reason they
set forth vastly different allegations in their pleadings which each will have to prove by
presenting relevant and admissible evidence during trial.
3 MODES OF SPECIFIC DENIAL (R8,S10):
1. by specifying each material allegation of the fact in the complaint, the truth of which the
defendant does not admit, and whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the
matters which he will rely upon to support his denial;
2. by specifying so much of an averment in the complaint as is true and material and
denying only the remainder;
3. by stating that the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of a material averment in the complaint, which has the effect of a
denial.
DETERMINATIVE FACTOR: The presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any material
fact:
1. A "genuine issue" is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.
2. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or
genuine issue or question as to the facts, and summary judgment is called for.
3. The party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the
absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently
unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.
4. Trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only
when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded
by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take
the place of trial.
A genuine issue is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished
from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.

Smart Communications v. Aldecoa

R35;
1. Smart constructed a tower in Roxas, Isabela
2. The respondents, being residents near the tower, filed a complaint for abatement of
stating that the cell tower affects their health and well-being
2.1 further, they contend that Smart did not comply with the necessary requirements for
the construction of the cell tower.
3. During Pre-Trial, Smart moved the summary judgment stating that there is no genuine
issue set forth by the respondents.
3.1 Aldecoa et al submitted its Pre-Trial brief alleging the following:
3.1.1 WON Smarts communication tower is a nuisance per se/ per accidens and
together with its standby generator maybe abated for posing danger to the
property and life of the residents therein
3.1.2 WON they are entitled to damages.
4. RTC: summary judgment granted.
5. CA: reversed the RTC.
6. Hence this petition.
There are genuine issues to be resolved here
Contrary to the claim of petitioner, there are several genuine issues as to the cause of action and
material facts related to the complaint. For one there is an issue on the structural integrity of the
tower, the ultra-high frequency (UHF) radio wave emission radiated by the communications
tower affecting the life, health and well-being of the[respondents] and the barangay residents,
especially their children. Also, the noxious/deleterious fumes and the noise produce[d] by the
standby generator and the danger posted by the tower if it collapses in regard to life and limb as
well as the property of the [respondents] particularly those whose houses abut, or are near/within
the periphery of the communications tower.
Likewise constituting real or genuine issues for trial, which arose from subsequent events, are the
following: whether the generator subject of respondents Complaint had been removed; whether
said generator had been replaced by another that produces as much or even more noise and
fumes; and whether the generator is a nuisance that can be abated separately from the rest of the
cellular base station.
A genuine issue is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished
from an issue which is a sham, fictitious, contrived or a false claim.
The trial court can determine a genuine issue on the basis of the pleadings, admissions,
documents, affidavits or counter affidavits submitted by the parties. When the facts as pleaded
appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or question as to any fact
and summary judgment called for. On the other hand, where the facts pleaded by the parties are
disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial. The
evidence on record must be viewed in light most favorable to the party opposing the motion who
must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences as can reasonably be drawn from the
evidence.
Courts must be critical of the papers presented by the moving party and not of the
papers/documents in opposition thereto. Conclusory assertions are insufficient to raise an issue of

material fact. A party cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact through mere speculations
or compilation of differences. He may not create an issue of fact through bald assertions,
unsupported contentions and conclusory statements. He must do more than rely upon allegations
but must come forward with specific facts in support of a claim. Where the factual context makes
his claim implausible, he must come forward with more persuasive evidence demonstrating a
genuine issue for trial.

McBurnie v. Ganzon
R37
1. The petitioner an Australian filed a case for illegal dismissal against EGI.
1.1 the case arose when the petitioner went back to Australia to recuperate after
sustaining injuries in an accident.
1.2 While in Australia, EGI informed the petitioner his services were no longer needed.
2. EGI opposed and contends that what they sought to enter into was not an employeremployee relationship but rather one for partnership in the development of a project.
3. LA: the petitioner was illegally dismissed.
4. The bond required to be posted was 54m something.
5. On appeal to the NLRC, EGI also filed a motion to reduce the bond.
6. NLRC: motion to reduce bond denied. LC provides that in cases involving monetary
award, an employer seeking to appeal the LAs decision in unconditionally required.
6.1 NLRC held that the bond must be paid.
7. EGI filed for a TRO with WPI with the CA.
8. CA granted the TRO and directed the parties to refrain the execution of the order of the
LA.
8.1 However, EGI was ordered to pay a bond of 10m.
9. EGI filed a motion to reduce the bond.
10. Meanwhile, The petitioner now files a petitioner for review on certiorari with the
SC.
11. SC: petitioner denied. Failure to follow rules on notarial practice.
12. MR of petitioner denied.
13. The petitioner filed Leave of Court to file and admit supplemental motion.
14. SC treated this as a second MR. (which is a prohibited pleading under R56.2)
15. Going back, the CA ruled on the reduction of the bond. Holding that 54m was excessive
and prohibitive.
16. CA: remanded the case back to the NLRC.
17. NLRC: reversed the decision of the LA
17.1 NLRC held that the petitioner was never an employee.
17.2 The petitioner was only a potential investor.

ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA, petitioner, vs. EDWARD RUMBAUA, respondent.

Same; Same; Same; New Trial; Pleadings and Practice; Attorneys; Blunders and mistakes in
the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the ignorance, inexperience or
incompetence of counsel do not qualify as a ground for new trial.In the present case, the
petitioner cites the inadequacy of the evidence presented by her former counsel as basis for
a remand. She did not, however, specify the inadequacy. That the RTC granted the petition
for declaration of nullity prima facieshows that the petitioners counsel had not been
negligent in handling the case. Granting arguendo that the petitioners counsel had been
negligent, the negligence that would justify a new trial must be excusable, i.e. one that
ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against. The negligence that the
petitioner apparently adverts to is that cited in Uy v. First Metro Integrated Steel
Corporation, 503 SCRA 704 (2006), where we explained: Blunders and mistakes in the
conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the ignorance, inexperience or
incompetence of counsel do not qualify as a ground for new trial. If such were to be admitted
as valid reasons for re-opening cases, there would never be an end to litigation so long as a
new counsel could be employed to allege and show that the prior counsel had not been
sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned. This will put a premium on the willful and
intentional commission of errors by counsel, with a view to securing new trials in the event
of conviction, or an adverse decision, as in the instant case.

Estinozo v. CA, People.

R45 v R65; 15 day reglementary period;
1. Several complainants filed a case against the petitioners for estafa.
1.1 the petitioner represented that shes a part owner of a recruitment of agency.
2. RTC: convicted her.
3. CA: affirmed RTC.
4. Within the 15 day reglementary period, petitioner filed a motion for extension of
time to file MR.
5. CA denied motion for extension citing R52.1 and R9.2 of the Revised Internal Rules
of the CA.
6. MR filed by the petitioner was denied.
7. Displeased with the denials, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the SC
arguing:
7.1 Her previous counsels negligence in filing a prohibited pleading foreclosed her
right and that she should not be bound by her previous counsels negligence.
R65 was not the proper remedy.
Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that a party desiring to appeal
by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the CA may file a verified
petition for review on certiorari. Considering that, in this case, appeal by certiorari was
available to petitioner, she effectively foreclosed her right to resort to a special civil action
for certiorari, a limited form of review and a remedy of last recourse, which lies only where
there is no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
are mutually exclusive remedies. Certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other
adequate remedy. The nature of the questions of law intended to be raised on appeal is of no
consequence. It may well be that those questions of law will treat exclusively of whether or
not the judgment or final order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion. This is immaterial. The remedy is appeal, not certiorari as a
special civil action.
Even granting arguendo that the instant certiorari petition is an appropriate remedy, still
this Court cannot grant the writ prayed for because we find no grave abuse of discretion
committed by the CA in the challenged issuances. The rule, as it stands now without
exception, is that the 15-day reglementary period for appealing or filing a motion
for reconsideration or new trial cannot be extended, except in cases before this
Court, as one of last resort, which may, in its sound discretion grant the extension
requested. This rule also applies even if the motion is filed before the expiration of the

period sought to be extended. Thus, the appellate court correctly denied petitioners Motion
for Extension of Time to File a Motion for Reconsideration.

Heirs of Sps Reterta v. Sps Mores

R45 v. R65
1. The petitioners filed a case for quieting of title against the respondents
1.1 respondents averred that theyre the true and real owners
1.2 that their father and predecessors were in OCEN possession for more than 30
years.
2. The respondents filed an MTD alleging that the RTC has no JD, the land being friar
land and that the petitioners have no legal capacity to sue.
3. RTC: MTD granted (sustained respondents)
4. MR of petitioner with the RTC denied.
5. Petitioner filed a petitioner under R65 with the CA.
6. CA: R65 petitioner dismissed for being improper remedy.
6.1 petitioner should have appealed.
7. Petitioner filed MR with CA.
8.
Whether

Manaloto v. Veloso III

Fresh Period Rule
1.
2.
3.
4.

Petitioner filed case for unlawful detainer against respondent

MTC: decided in favour of the petitioner.
Respondent appeals to the RTC.
Pending appeal, the respondent filed a separate action for breach of contract against
the petitioner.
4.1 respondent here interposed 2 causes of action. One for damages and one for the
breach.
5. The petitioner filed an MRD for lack of cause of action.
6. RTC: case dismissed for splitting of cause of action.
7. Order of dismissal was received on 9/26/2003
8. MR with RTC was filed on 10/10/2003 (14 days after receipt of dismissal)
9. Order of denial of MR received on 2/20/2004 [fresh period starts here]
10. Appeal to CA filed on 3/1/2004 (9 days after receipt of denial of MR)
11. Hence this petition.
11.1 petitioner alleges that appeal was filed out of time. Petitioner posits that the
respondent is left with just 1 more day to filed his appeal (petitioner totally
ignored Neypes)
petitioner is wrong, fresh period is granted upon receipt of order of denial.
Jurisprudence has settled the fresh period rule, according to which, an ordinary appeal
from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to the Court of Appeals, under Section 3 of Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court, shall be taken within fifteen (15) days either from receipt of the original
judgment of the trial court or from receipt of the final order of the trial court dismissing or
denying the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Sumiran v. Damaso, 596 SCRA 450 (2009), we presented a survey of the cases applying the
fresh period rule: As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared in Neypes v. Court of
Appeals, 469 SCRA 633 (2005), that by virtue of the power of the Supreme Court to amend,
repeal and create new procedural rules in all courts, the Court is allowing a fresh period
of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt
of the order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or motion
forreconsideration.
The fresh period rule has retroactive application to cases pending and undetermined upon
its effectivityprocedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of
procedure.

Generosa Latorre v. Luis Latorre

R41 x R45; 3 modes of appeal; questions of fact v questions of law
1. The petitioner filed a case against the respondent (her son) and a certain Ifzal Ali for
collection and nullity of deed of absolute sale.
1.1 she alleged that the respondent leased the contested lot to Ifzal.
2. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the sole ground of improper venue.
2.1 he alleged that despite it being titled as a collection and nullity, it is in reality a
real action affecting title.
3. Ifzal filed his own MTD alleging lack of JD over his person because hes an ADB
employee.
4. RTC: MTD of respondent denied.
4.1 RTC held that the nature of the action is determined by the allegations in the
complaint.
5. RTC: dismissed claim against Ifzal, holding that the action is really between the
petitioner and the respondent.
6. Aggrieved, petitioner filed MR.
7. RTC: MR denied.
8. Hence this petition under Rule 45
The direct resort to the SC is improper because when you petition under Rule 45 only
questions of law are threshed, however, in this case, petitioner in their R45 petition prayed
that the case be decided on the merits which would entail examination of facts. Basta, yung
hinihingi ng petitioner will involve determination of questions of facts which is contra to the
idea of R45 na only questions of law will be determined.
Lesson on 3 kinds of appeal
In Murillo v. Consul, we laid down a doctrine that was later adopted by the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. In that case, this Court had the occasion to clarify the three (3)
modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, namely:
1. ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or
criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; [governed by
Rule 41, is brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) on questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law.]
2. petition for review, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction; [covered by Rule 42, is brought to the CA on questions of fact,
of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.] and
3. petition for review to the Supreme Court. [provided in Rule 45, is filed with the
Supreme Court only on questions of law.]

Questions of Law
Velayo-Fong v. Velayo, 510 SCRA 320 (2006) is instructive: A question of law arises when
there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of
fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be
one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them.

Tres Reyes v. Maxims Tea House

R43;
1. respondent employed the petitioner as driver in their Ermita Branch.
2. While on duty, he encountered an accident in Pasig City.
2.1 He hit an oncoming truck.
2.2 Several passengers he picked up sustained injuries.
3. The respondent him to submit an explanation as to what happened.
4. The respondent found his explanation unsatisfactory.
5. The respondent terminated him.
6. Petitioner filed for illegal dismissal.
7. LA: petitioner was grossly negligent in failing to avoid the accident.
8. Instead of filing appeal, petitioner filed a partial MR with the NLRC.
9. NLRC treated the partial MR as an appeal.
10. Meanwhile, respondents filed a R65 petition with the CA alleging that the NLRC
acted in GAD in for allowing a prohibited pleading (the partial MR)
11. CA: in favour of respondents.
No issue in the NLRC treating the partial MR as an appeal.
In labor cases, rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense.
They are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and where their strict
application would result in the frustration rather than promotion of substantial justice,
technicalities must be avoided. Technicalities should not be permitted to stand in the way of
equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties.19 Where the
ends of substantial justice shall be better served, the application of technical rules of
procedure may be relaxed.
Had the court a quo, to use its own words, carefully perused the case records, it would
have readily seen that said pleading had complied with the technical requirements of an
appeal. Hence, we are constrained to conclude that the appellate court had no basis for
concluding that the NLRC had gravely abused its discretion when the NLRC gave due
course to the motion and treated it as an appeal.

Landbank v. Sps. De Leon

R42; mode of appeal of from Agri Cases.
1. The respondent Spouses voluntarily offered to sell their land to the government at
50,000/ ha.
2. The DAR made a counter offer of 17k plus per hectare.
3. No agreement was reached so DARAB took cognizance of the case pursuant toSec.
16d of RA 6657.
4. DARAB ordered the LBP to recomputed the value of the land.
5. Later, LBP petitioned to the court acting as a Special Agrarian Court to fix just
compensation of the property.
6. RTC as SAC: fixed the value at 1.26m and 2,957,250
7. DAR filed with the CA a petition for review of the Special Agrarian Court.
8. On the other hand, the LBP also filed an ordinary appeal.
9. CA (on petition for review of DAR): ordered the RTC to recomputed
9.1 LBP also must pay legal interest.
10. CA (on the ordinary appeal of the LBP): appeal dismissed. The mode of appeal was
erroneous considering that RA6657, Sec. 60 mandates an appeal be made as petition
for review.
11. Hence this petition by LBP
CA correct. Follow RA 6657 regarding mode of appeal to be used.
A petition for review, not an ordinary appeal, is the proper procedure in effecting an appeal
from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts acting as Special Agrarian Courts in cases
involving the determination of just compensation to the landowners concerned. Section 60 of
RA 6657 clearly and categorically states that the said mode of appeal should be adopted.
There is no room for a contrary interpretation. Where the law is clear and categorical, there
is no room for construction, but only application.
But what kind of petition for review?
Considering that RA 6657 cannot and does not provide the details on how the petition for
review shall be conducted, a suppletory application of the pertinent provisions of the Rules
of Court is necessary. In fact, Section 61 uses the word "review" to designate the mode by
which the appeal is to be effected. The reference therefore by Section 61 to the Rules of
Court only means that the procedure under Rule 42 for petitions for review is to be followed
for appeals in agrarian cases.

People v. Corpuz
R40-45; adopting of finding of facts of the TC.
1. Several complainants filed a case in the RTC for illegal recruitment in violation of
RA 8042 against the respondent.
1.1 in her defense, she resolutely denied having a hand in the illegal recruitment
and claimed that she merely received the money on behalf of Mrs. Reyes, the
President/General Manager of Alga-Moher International Placement Services
Corporation, where she had been working as secretary.
1.2 that day, Mrs. Reyes called her on the telephone and told her to receive private
complainants processing fees.
2. RTC convicted the respondent.
3. Hence this appeal.
It is axiomatic that findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the collective
testimonies of witnesses and probative weight thereof and its conclusions culled from said
findings are accorded by this Court great respect, if not conclusive effect, because of the
unique advantage of the trial court in observing and monitoring at close range, the conduct,
deportment and demeanor of the witnesses as they testify before the trial court. However,
this principle does not apply if the trial court ignored, misunderstood or misconstrued
cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome of
the case. The exception obtains in this case.
In the case at bar, we have carefully reviewed the records of the case and found that the
prosecution failed to establish that appellant, as secretary, had control, management or
direction of the recruitment agency. Appellant started her employment with the agency on
May 1, 1998 and she was tasked to hold and document employment contracts from the
foreign employers. She did not entertain applicants and she had no discretion over how the
business was managed. The trial courts finding that appellant, being the secretary of the
agency, had control over its business, is not only non sequitur but has no evidentiary basis.

PAL v. CA, Judy Amor, Jane Gamil, Gian Carlo Gamil (all represented by Atty. Amor);
Carlo Benitez (represented by Josephine Benitez)
R45, findings of facts of the TC.
1. Respondents filed a complaint for damages against PAL because PAL failed to
confirm their tickets.
1.1 it was alleged that PAL overbooked the flight and that they arrived on time. But
nonetheless they werent allowed to check-in.
1.2 it was also alleged that they werent allowed to board because non-revenue
passengers took their place.
2. RTC: held in favour of the private respondents.
3. CA: affirmed RTC.
4. Hence this petition under R45.
4.1 PAL insists that facts must be determined, specifically, PAL insists that the
reason why the complainants were not allowed to board the plane was that these
passengers checked in late.
4.2 According to PAL the findings of the RTC is grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures. Hence, they argue that this is an exception to the
general rule that findings of facts of the appellate court is binding upon the SC.
No need to review facts again. After a careful review of the records, we find no reason to
disturb the affirmance by the CA of the findings of the trial court that the private
respondents have checked-in on time.
Factual findings of the appellate court are generally binding on us especially when in
complete accord with the findings of the trial court. This is because it is not our function to
analyze or weigh the evidence all over again. However, this general rule admits of
exceptions, to wit: (a) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the finding is
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (c) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (d) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals
was based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the factual findings are conflicting; (f)
when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) when the Court
of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and, (h) where the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, or are mere
conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the
petitioner are not disputed by the respondent, or where the findings of fact of the disputed
by the respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.