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OF "HORIZON"
Helmut Kuhn
of " h o r i z o n " with its family of compounds
appeared first in Husserl's Ideen (1913), simultaneously
with the disclosure of the " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " type of
phenomenological research. It soon assumed, in Husserl's
own words, an "all-commanding r o l e , " 1 prescribing to phenomenology an " absolutely new method." 2 Thus it is in the
nature of our subject-matter to frame its treatment as a study
of the phenomenological method. As this is far too great
a subject to be fully dealt with in short compass, I propose to
put in relief one aspect of this method. I shall present it as
a development of experience, that is, of a type of knowledge
which perpetually springs from the contact of the intelligent
mind with objects of all kinds. T o think of Husserl's teaching
as of a modern Platonism standing in contrast to the analysis
of experience initiated by Locke and H u m e is misleading and
detrimental to a fair appraisal of his achievements. This is not
to say that phenomenology should be classed with empiricism.
T h e votaries of experience commonly request us to clear our
mind of all beliefs and generalities taken on trust or engrained
by habit and to give ourselves whole-heartedly to the experienced world. Precisely this is enjoined by Husserl. But he
warns us also not to let ourselves be deceived by the false
pretensions often attached to the generalizations of science and
not to take for ultimate reality the " c l o a k of ideas" cast over
nature by mathematical physics. T h e fact that we are able
to explain colors in terms of a microcosmic mechanics does
not warrant the assertion: colors are " i n reality" ether-waves
of a determinate length, or they are " n o t h i n g b u t " etherwaves. " T h e tradesman on the market," Husserl says, " h a s
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2
Logik, p. 177.
Meditations Cartesiennes, p. 42.
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his truth the truth of the market. Is that not, taken in its
relations, a good truth and the best of which he may avail
himself? Is it the mere semblance of a truth, because the
scientist, forming his judgments with respect to other relations,
other goals and ideas, seeks a different sort of truths and
because these truths, though instrumental within a far broader
range of application, happen to be unfit just for the purposes
of the market?" 3
The assertion that philosophy develops experience is
equivocal, and so is the epithet "empirical" affixed to philosophical systems or procedures. It may mean (a) that
philosophy moves on the same level with specialized empirical
research, either combining its results into a systematic whole
or carving out for itself a special sector of experience. In the
second place, the notion may be (b) that philosophy has to
work on experience, subjecting it to a critical analysis. Philosophy, then, as the "experience of experience," would
constitute a new plane of reflective experience. In this second
sense alone phenomenology can claim to be a development of
experience. It is an attempt to base philosophical analysis on
an impartial and adequate account of what really happens in
experience. For the attainment of this end, the concept of
" h o r i z o n " is one of the foremost instruments.
In order to grasp the meaning of the notion under analysis,
it may be well to retrace the steps of the terminological
creation from which it sprang. Three elements of meaning
may be pointed out, all three adumbrated by the pre-philosophical usage. (1) Horizon is the ultimate circumference
within which all things, real and imaginable, are bound to
appear. T o explore the horizon means to move away from
the ordinary foci of attention with a view to integrating the
things at hand in a broader and ever broader context. The
idea of horizon stands for the progressive drive inherent in
experience. (2) While limiting the totality of given things,
the horizon also frames it. The frame of a picture, though
forming no part of it, helps to constitute its wholeness. Simi3
Logik, p. 245.
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"HORIZON"
ANSWERS TO T H E D R I V E FOR
EXTENSION
box
Rethe
this
this
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(Halle,
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Again, the present percept points forward to its successors.
The object offers itself in various modes as abiding or evanescent, with the promise of its future presence, as a momentary or as a periodical appearance.
There are relative discontinuities, but there is no real break
in the temporal background encircling the "here and now"
of actuality. The absolutely new is inconceivable. Novelty
exists only in conjunction with familiarity. Every object, it
was asserted a while ago, presents itself within the world.
And this world is the world of the percipient. Now " w o r l d "
defined in terms of temporal experience is an organized body
of expectations based on recollections. Previous to any single
experience, our mind is already armed with a framework of
regions, outlines, and typical shapes of experienced objects.
To perceive an object means to locate it within this system of
expectations. Compared with the actual perception, the
expectation of " w h a t a thing of such and such a sort may look
like" is indistinct, a mere diagram. With respect to this
dormant mold, the perception which awakens it is a fulfillment. Then the actual saturated experience in its turn lays
the foundation of new more or less formalized expectations.
Both elements, however, anticipation and nisus toward
continuance, the "before" and the "hereafter," do not belong
to separate acts in the succession of experiences. They are
rather ingredients of the one act under consideration, composing the temporal horizon of the object intended, the
noema. And each previous or subsequent act has its own
temporal extension, its own past and future.
O n the strength of the above analysis, it may not be overbold to assert that seeing this box before me I see the whole
world " w o r l d " taken in the strictly subjective sense to
which we confined this term. Prerequisite for the coming
about of this perception is, e.g., the acquaintance with spatial
objects of a characteristic make-up: filling a certain sector
of the total space, being limited by other objects, visible when
exposed to light, impenetrable to touch, having a determinate
weight, etc. These are the features I expect things to bear.
They constitute the basic lineament or "style" in which
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"HORIZON"
ANSWERS TO THE
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ASPIRATION
CONCRETENESS
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istic mode of thought in two ways. T h e notion of "impression" with its physiological implications is obviously modeled
on the smallest unit in contemporary physics, the atom; and
the attempt to reduce to a mere difference of degree the
qualitative difference between impression or direct senseperception on the one hand and idea as the result of reflection
on the other is a specimen of misplaced quantification. These
are spurious idealizations of authentic experience: instead of
articulating genuine implications, they impose upon actual
findings an alien order.
In our day a powerful anti-naturalistic current in psychology and sociology opposes atomism. Gestalt, the whole
prior to the part, synopsis such are the catch-words of a
trend of thought which successfully aids modern research in
tightening its grip on experience. From a phenomenological
point of view, however, the "holistic" system of reference is
no less apt than its predecessor to harden into a dogma which
overrules an unbiased inspection of the actual data. This is
particularly evident in sociology. T h e fact that the individual
necessarily acts and thinks as a member of a community, of a
family, tribe, or nation, should not entice theorists into
assuming a collective super-person logically anterior to the
individual. No part can extricate itself out of the whole in
which it belongs by a withdrawal of its assent. But the human
member of a community can do so, and the individual's
ability to make such a decision is constitutive of, and prior to,
the societal unity. This unity rests on the loyalty of its members. This example calls attention to a fundamental problem.
It will not do to advocate the permanent contact with experience as the fountainhead of intellection, nor can we rest content with the demand that abstract schemes should be confined to an explication of actually given horizons. As we go
into the business of the explication or actualization of the
potential, we shall have to confront an order of priority
and posteriority. In each single case we shall have to decide
which of two structural features conditions the other, or
whether there is a third layer of phenomena on which both
are based. T h e ideal of true empiricism is not to be reached
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