, August 17, 2015

Afghanistan: a Hard Country

Marium Irshad
Going by their way of management and governance, it gives little reason to doubt that, if
not for the US, the Afghans would have been fighting anyway all these years
Are the Taliban disintegrating? Are we witnessing the natural process of the aging of an
organisation that has done little ideologically to maintain itself except for fighting through a
number of commanders and obscure leadership? The Afghan Taliban never accepted the US
invasion of their country after 9/11. Afghanistan was never directly complicit in the attack
either, except that the leader of al Qaeda, the perpetrators of 9/11, Osama bin Laden, was
hiding in Afghanistan under the protection of Mullah Omer. Had Mullah Omar handed over
bin Laden to the US the country would have been saved of the savage destruction it
suffered for 13 years.
With the belated news of Mullah Omars death, the party is in disarray over the selection of
its new leader. From Quetta to Qatar leaders are leaving the party ostensibly annoyed at the
partys decision, first for hiding the news of Mullah Omars death for almost two years and
then for appointing his successor without due consultation. For all those years when Mullah
Omar was dead, he had been issuing instructions to field commanders and to those running
Qatar and other Taliban offices regularly. This organisational strategy to hide the demise of
top leadership in order to keep unity in the ranks and file is in fact an indication of the
Talibans vulnerability to disintegrate. It is also an indication of the organisation operating
less on ideology and more on a day-to-day tactic.
The Talibans desire to negotiate peace with the Afghan government signals pragmatism
eventually dawning on a handful of the Taliban leadership about the new reality concerning
Islamic State (IS) and its own ranks defecting to it. Mullah Omars death has only opened the
fissures the party has been experiencing over the years while tipping the scales in favour of
a new force that gives new direction to the warring sprits of the ever-fighting Afghans.
Afghanistan is a hard country where individuals with a clear leaning towards a
clan/tribe/group consider themselves the best of the lot among themselves and others.
Going by their way of management and governance, it gives little reason to doubt that, if
not for the US, the Afghans would have been fighting anyway all these years. This is the
nature of politics in a country that is neither democratic nor dictatorial in its dispensation.
The Afghans are the most misunderstood people as well, which is why there has been so
much misery coming their way. A myth about the Afghan resistance against foreign
invaders, throwing them out defeated, is just a myth after all. It so happens that the
Afghans, of all hues and stripes, clans and tribes, channelise their warring spirit towards a
new enemy that tries to dominate them at a given time. If before they had been fighting
among themselves, then with the invasion of a foreign force they fight against it.
The Afghans were losing the Soviet-lad war in Afghanistan when Charlie Wilson came up
with the novel idea to dispense shoulder missiles among the mujahideen, and the Cold

Wars direction changed. The collaborative efforts of the US, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia gave
the Afghans teeth to drum out the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. Later, the Afghans
penchant for corruption and disloyalty against one another plunged the country into a civil
war. From the wombs of the Afghans internal greed for power was born the Taliban and
not until the Taliban closed their eyes to the ever-expending imperialistic agenda of the
western power did its fall come about. What if the Taliban were denied sanctuaries in
Pakistans tribal areas? Could the Haqqanis have mounted detrimental attacks on the US in
Afghanistan without the logistical and financial support of Pakistan? That being the nature
of the Afghani warring sprit: relying much on outsiders to oust invading elements.
Some Afghans not all of them, just the Taliban and their supporters were against the
US invasion of their country after 9/11. Many, just like when the Soviet Union invaded
Afghan soil, rejoiced the invasion since it meant riddance from the Taliban who had become
notorious for their self-styled interpretation of Islamic sharia (jurisprudence). The irony was
that those staying back and putting up with the foreign elements made no effort to build
their country; the warlords became more powerful, the smugglers wealthier, the opium
grower multiplied and the bureaucracy made new records in corruption.
The solution to the Afghan conundrum lies not in crushing their warring spirit or in
modernising their political institutions but in giving them the independence to govern of
their own accord. The world has to change a bit; it has to stop considering Afghanistan a
buffer or a renter state now. Even if the Taliban are disintegrating their relevance cannot be
ignored in a country that has yet to learn how to govern itself.
The writer is a copywriter and freelance journalist with an academic background in public
policy and governance. She can be reached at marium042@gmail.com