ICS 120803/220803 F15: The Divine (at) Risk: Open Theism,

Classical Theism, and Beyond

Dr. Nik Ansell
Seminar Presentation on Jeffrey S. Hockings Freedom
Unlimited
Fisseha Feleke
November 18, 15
A preliminary note:
Surely, the views and paradigms we have been examining so
far (including Hockings) are developed within Western
Christian traditions. But we know Christianity is bigger and
wider than the West. Could the Eastern and African Christian
traditions also shade some light on what is at stake here? Let
me start by saying few words about the tradition that informs
my viewpoint.
To speak of Churches of the Miaphysite family, I recall that
Alexandria (Egypt) and Antioch (Syria) were once major
centers for deep theological learning, and to some extent
Nisibis and Edessa as well (Syria).
Later, with Islam conquering the area, the Churches in
those lands were pushed to the edge of survival. Hence:
theology there stagnated ever since! Moreover, the people
developed different life styles. Which makes it difficult to
find direct responses from these traditions to modern
problems.
With Ethiopia, the story is a little different: theological
learning has in fact continued to thriveit lacks
philosophical refinement, though, as it is almost entirely
biblical in nature [So I do feel great ease with what we
have been doing here (in this class)!]
To the matter:
This in fact is not a review. Nor is it a summary. What I would
like to do here is highlight few points that strike me as
remarkable, due partly to the fact that I found them fully
supported by the biblical tradition I came from, but also to their
attractive novelty. I shall also raise a particular concern that I
think is worth discussing. The points I am focusing pertain to
the issue where Hocking engages Pinnock at the very root of his
motivation for embracing libertarian freedom: theodicy.

The challenge of evil is a serious matter. As Hocking nicely puts

it, For many Christians (myself included), [and I too include
myself in this] any justification of evil is unacceptable, even if
this requires compromising or, better, re-articulating the
concept of omnipotence (23). Indeed, there seems to be no
misunderstanding with respect to the task; the differences
come with the proposed solutions. According to Hocking,
Pinnocks alternative to the multitudes of theodicies
constructed in classical theology, is a more robust form of the
free will defense (22). Problem is, however, that the kind of
freedom Pinnock adoptslibertarian freedomimplies a
position of moral indifference (52), according to which we are
by nature given not only the ability to choose, but are
presented with the possibility of choosing otherwise (49). This
means: In creating the world in this way, God takes more than
a risk that someone will choose evil at some point. The fall is an
accident waiting to happen (50). In order to avoid such a
difficulty, following Ansell, Hocking sets out to articulate an
alternative understanding of the origin of evil that centers upon
the human capacity to create, and not just realize, fundamental
possibilities (50). This indeed is a very deep insight and it
attracts me so strongly as it is fully supported by the Bible.
When I say the Bible, the verses I have in mind at this moment
are in fact not from texts commonly considered to belong to the
canon but from the Book of Sirach and that of Enoch. Notice,
however, in the Ethiopian tradition, both belong to the canon.
So let me first quote Sirach (37:1-3), who seems to be troubled
by the presence and spread of evil:
Anyone can claim to be your friend, but some people are
friends in name only. The grief caused when a close
friendship turns sour is as bad as death. This evil impulse
we have! Why was it ever formed? How did it manage to
cover the earth with deceit?
We may now direct ourselves to the Book of Enoch (98:4) for a
possible answer:
I have sworn unto you, ye sinners,
As a mountain has not become a slave,
and a hill does not become the handmaid of a woman,
Even so sin has not been sent upon the earth,

but man of himself has created it,

and under a great curse shall they fall who commit it.
To refer to at least one Church Father of the Miaphysite
tradition, the biblical theologian St. Cyril concurs with Enoch
when he says:
For we are ruined due to a big sin that persisted on us
because of our will, which sin came out of its own being,
which is the original sin.
Nevertheless, I am fascinated less by the answer than by the
inquiry. I want to keep the question open. I want to continue
pondering with Sirach over the why and whence of evil. After
all, as Ansell sincerely acknowledges, The origin of evil is
deeply mysterious, as evil has no legitimate place in the order
of things (55).
To come back to Hocking, what makes his position so attractive
is that it allows for speaking of evil in such a way that, let alone
the reality, even the possibility of its origin cannot be traced
back to God. Evil had never been possible until it was made
real, by men. This means: with the Fall, it is not that something
which had been logically possible eventually became actual,
but rather something for the possibility of which no prior
condition was set, came to be real, that is, itself creating
primordially the condition of its own possibility. There is, in
other words, no Fall before the Fall (50), so Ansell. And hence,
Hockings framing of the topic as: The (Impossible)
Anthropocentric Origin of Evil. If this is so, to uncritically
accept this libertarian model of freedom is philosophically and
theologically irresponsible (52). We may now ask: what would
a philosophically and theologically responsible model look like?
Hocking claims that his alternative model of freedom is at once
responsive, transformative and unlimited.
In this model, Freedom is not found at the fork in the road
Instead, freedom is found on the path of life (67). Which path
Hocking tells us leads to ever abundant freedom for all of
Gods creatures, and even for God and which enables us
escape the zero-sum game that the understanding of the
divine/human relationship has become (67). Hocking
established his position by appropriating ideas from theologians
3

of various schools. One such theologian who clearly emphasizes

the participatory nature of freedom is Juergen Moltmann, who
says: Then freedom means the unhindered participation in the
eternal life of the triune God himself, and in his inexhaustible
fullness and glory (100). This indeed is what we are called for:
The one who gives life appeared! We saw it happen, and
we are witnesses to what we have seen. Now we are
telling you about this eternal life that was with the Father
and appeared to us. We are telling you what we have seen
and heard, so that you may share in this life with us. And
we share in it with the Father and with his Son Jesus
Christ. We are writing to tell you these things, because this
makes us truly happy. (1 John 1:2-4) [Cited from CEV, this
is the closest to the Ethiopic version, which has you may
participate our participation instead of
share/fellowship/partnership/communion]
Now such freedom, Hocking maintains, is participatory
freedom. And what this new model helps us avoid is conceiving
human freedom in such a way that it requires limitation on
divine power. Not only freedom, divine power also should be
unlimited. But Hocking goes further: In each instance of
participation, true power is found, but it is the true power of
each individual. Yes, they participate in Gods power, but it is
given to them to make their own (95). My concern, however,
is this: as much as I like the emphasis on the participatory
nature of freedom, I wonder whether it did not remain prone to
overlook a distance that should not be overlooked. Speaking of
Israels response as a dialog partner to God, Hans-Joachim
Kraus demands that It must be stressed clearly and
unequivocally that Israels praise and prayer rise out of the
depths (Psalm 130), even in the hymns and invocations offered
on the prominent heights of the sanctuary and from the peaks
of religious life. This is always a distance that cannot be
ignored (Theology of the Psalms, trans. Keith Crim, Augusburg
Publishing House: 1986. p.12 emphasis mine). However much it
is made their own, I think the always already givenness of
power should continue to have for its correlate the kind of
distance Kraus has nicely captured.
Further question:

In what does the essence of evil consist? Indeed Hocking has

already pointed to an answer when he says: Genuine evil is
associated with ultimate choices against the other: rape,
murder, genocide, etc. Genuine evil is violence, and it is
violence because it is a valuing of the self at the expense of all
else (45). I would like some more elaborations on this.
[Cf. Peter Trawny: The essence of evil consists, however, not
in the mere baseness of human action, but rather in the
malice of rage Yet no individual deed ever reaches the evil of
the malice of rage itself. This holds for every deed, i.e., even
for the most un-imaginably bad.]