SocialJusticeSocietyvsDangerous

DrugsBoardandPhilippineDrug
EnforcementAgency

PoliticalLawQualificationsofaSenatororaCongressRepresentative

NOTE:ThisisconsolidatedwithLasernavsDDBandPDEA(G.R.No.158633)andPimentelvs
COMELEC(G.R.No.161658)

FACTS:
In2002,RA9165ortheComprehensiveDangerousDrugsActof2002wasimplemented.Sec36
thereofrequiresmandatorydrugtestingofcandidatesforpublicoffice,studentsofsecondaryand
tertiaryschools,officersandemployeesofpublicandprivateoffices,andpersonschargedbeforethe
prosecutorsofficewithcertainoffenses.On23Dec2003,COMELECissuedResolutionNo.6486,
prescribingtherulesandregulationsonthemandatorydrugtestingofcandidatesforpublicofficein
connectionwiththeMay10,2004synchronizednationalandlocalelections.Pimentel,Jr.,asenator
andacandidateforreelectionintheMayelections,filedaPetitionforCertiorariandProhibitionunder
Rule65.Init,heseeks(1)tonullifySec.36(g)ofRA9165andCOMELECResolutionNo.6486
datedDecember23,2003forbeingunconstitutionalinthattheyimposeaqualificationforcandidates
forsenatorsinadditiontothosealreadyprovidedforinthe1987Constitution;and(2)toenjointhe
COMELECfromimplementingResolutionNo.6486.AccordingtoPimentel,theConstitutiononly
prescribesamaximumoffive(5)qualificationsforonetobeacandidatefor,electedto,andbea
memberoftheSenate.HesaysthatboththeCongressandCOMELEC,byrequiring,viaRA9165and
ResolutionNo.6486,asenatorialaspirant,amongothercandidates,toundergoamandatorydrugtest,
createanadditionalqualificationthatallcandidatesforsenatormustfirstbecertifiedasdrugfree.He
addsthatthereisnoprovisionintheConstitutionauthorizingtheCongressorCOMELECtoexpand
thequalificationrequirementsofcandidatesforsenator.

ISSUE:WhetherornotSec36ofRA9165isanamendmenttotheConstitutiononthequalifications
ofSenators.

HELD:Pimentelscontentionisvalid.Accordingly,Sec.36ofRA9165isunconstitutional.Itisbasic
thatifalaworanadministrativeruleviolatesanynormoftheConstitution,thatissuanceisnulland
voidandhasnoeffect.TheConstitutionisthebasiclawtowhichalllawsmustconform;noactshall
bevalidifitconflictswiththeConstitution.Inthedischargeoftheirdefinedfunctions,thethree
departmentsofgovernmenthavenochoicebuttoyieldobediencetothecommandsofthe
Constitution.Whateverlimitsitimposesmustbeobserved.Theprovision[n]opersonelectedto
anypublicofficeshallenteruponthedutiesofhisofficeuntilhehasundergonemandatorydrug
test.Isnottenableasitenlargesthequalifications.COMELECcannot,intheguiseofenforcingand
administeringelectionlawsorpromulgatingrulesandregulationstoimplementSec.36,validlyimpose
qualificationsoncandidatesforsenatorinadditiontowhattheConstitutionprescribes.IfCongress

cannotrequireacandidateforsenatortomeetsuchadditionalqualification,theCOMELEC,tobesure,
isalsowithoutsuchpower.Therightofacitizeninthedemocraticprocessofelectionshouldnotbe
defeatedbyunwarrantedimpositionsofrequirementnototherwisespecifiedintheConstitution.

VeteransFederationPartyv.Comelec
[Oct.6,2000]
24 Sep
FACTS:
Thereare4parameterstodeterminethewinnersinapartylistelectionunderRA7941:
1.20%allocation3.3seatlimit
2.2%threshold4.Proportionalrepresentation
TheCongressenactedRA7941onMar.3,1995whichstatesthattheStateshallpromoteproportional
representationintheelectionofrepresentativestotheHouseofRepresentativesthroughapartylist
systemofregisterednational,regionalandsectoralpartiesororganizationsorcoalitionsthereof,which
willenableFilipinocitizensbelongingtomarginalizedandunderrepresentedsectors,organizationsand
parties,andwholackwelldefinedpoliticalconstituenciesbutwhocouldcontributetotheformulation
andenactmentofappropriatelegislationthatwillbenefitthenationasawhole,tobecomemembersof
theHouseofRepresentatives.TheStateshallalsodevelopthesimplestschemepossibletoguaranteea
full,freeandopenpartysystembyenhancingtheirchancestocompeteforandwinseatsinthe
legislature.
ISSUES:
1.Isthe20%allocationmandatory?Shouldthe20%allocationforpartylistbefilledupcompletelyall
thetime?
2.Arethe2%thresholdandthe3seatlimitconstitutional?
3.Howshouldtheadditionalseatsbedetermined?
HELD/RULING:
(1)NO.Sec.5(2)Art.6merelyprovidesaceilingforpartylistseatsinCongress.TheCongresshas
prerogativetodeterminewhethertoadjustorchangethispercentagerequirement,andthemechanics
bywhichitistobefilledup.
(2)YES.The2%thresholdandthe3seatlimitareconsistentwiththeveryessenceof
representation.The3seatlimitensurestheentryofvariousinterestrepresentationsintothe
legislative.Thus,nosinglegroupwoulddominate.
(3)Todeterminetheadditionalseats,3stepswillbefollowed:
a.rankthehighesttolowest.Thehighestiscalledthefirstparty.
b.determinetheseatsthefirstpartywillhave.Forthefirstparty,itwillhavea6%benchmark.
Everysucceedingadditional2%ofvotesfromthefirst2%requirementwillconstitute1additional
seat.Ifthefirstpartygets2additionalseats,thenthenextinrankwillgetless.
c.tosolvefortheadditionalseatsofotherqualifiedparties,theformulaprovidedbelowwillbeused:
additionalseatsno.ofvotesno.of
forthe=ofthepartyxadditional
concernedno.ofvotesofseatsofthe
partythefirstpartyfirstparty

Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec

G.R. No. 147589

June 26, 2001

ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec

x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec

Facts
Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 , which approved the
participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001
party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private respondents, arguing
mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and
underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition,
petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioners recourse to the Court was proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785.

Ruling:

1.

The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other remedies
"where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of
urgency." The facts attendant to the case rendered it justiciable.

2.

Political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to
the requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law
pertinent to the Party List System.

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the
party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations . It is however, incumbent upon the Comelec to determine proportional
representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, the criteria for participation, in
relation to the cause of the party list applicants so as to avoid desecration of the noble
purpose of the party-list system.

3.

The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was
beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier of facts.

However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the
Constitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the
Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the petition be
remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists.

RA7941thePartylistAct(1995)
BANATV.COMELEC
,G.R.No.179271,April21,2009Facts:

BarangayAssociationforNationalAdvancementandTransparency(BANAT)filedbeforetheNationalBoardofCanvassers(NBC)a
petitiontoproclaimthefullnumberofpartylistrepresentativesprovidedbytheConstitution.However,the
recommendationoftheheadofthelegalgroupofCOMELECsnationalboardof
canvasserstodeclarethepetitionmootandacademicwasapprovedbytheCOMELECenbanc.

BANATfiledforpetitionforcertiorariandmandamusassailingtheresolutionofCOMELECtotheirpetitiontoproclaimthefull
numberofpartylistrepresentativesprovidedbytheConstitution.

TheCOMELEC,sittingastheNBC,promulgatedaresolutionproclaimingthirteen(13)partiesaswinnersinthepartylistelectionsin
May2007.TheCOMELECannouncedthat,uponcompletionofthecanvassofthepartylistresults,itwoulddeterminethetotalnumber
ofseatsofeachwinningparty,organization,orcoalitioninaccordancewith
VeteransFederationPartyv.COMELECformula.

BayanMuna,Abono,andAdvocacyforTeacherEmpowermentThroughAction,CooperationandHarmonyTowardsEducational
Reforms(ATeacher)askedtheCOMELEC,actingasNBC,toreconsideritsdecisiontousethe
Veterans
formula.COMELECdeniedtheconsideration.

BayanMuna,Abono,andATeacherfiledforcertiorariwithmandamusandprohibitionassailingtheresolutionoftheCOMELECinits
decisiontousetheVeteransformula.

ISSUES:

WhetherornotthetwentypercentallocationforpartylistrepresentativesinSection5(2),ArticleVIoftheConstitutionmandatoryor
merelyaceiling

WhetherornotthethreeseatlimitinSection11(b)ofRA7941isconstitutional

WhetherornotthetwopercentthresholdprescribedinSection11(b)ofRA7941toqualifyforoneseatisconstitutional

Howshallthepartylistrepresentativesbeallocated?

DoestheConstitutionprohibitthemajorpoliticalpartiesfromparticipatinginthepartylistelections?Ifnot,canthemajorpoliticalparties
bebarredfromparticipatinginthepartylistelections?
RULING:

The20%allocationofpartylistrepresentativesismerelyaceiling;partylistrepresentativescannotbemorethan20%ofthemembersof
theHouseofRepresentatives.

Yes,itisconstitutional.Thethreeseatcap,asalimitationtothenumberofseatsthataqualifiedpartylistorganizationmayoccupy,
remainsavalidstatutorydevicethatpreventsanypartyfromdominatingthepartylistelections.

ThesecondclauseofSection11(b)ofR.A.7941
thosegarneringmorethantwopercent(2%)ofthevotesshallbeentitledto
additionalseats
inproportiontotheir
totalnumberofvotes
isunconstitutional.Thetwopercentthreshold
onlyinrelationtothedistributionoftheadditionalseats
presentsanunwarrantedobstacletothefullimplementationofSection5(2),ArticleVIoftheConstitutionandpreventstheattainmentof
"thebroadestpossiblerepresentationofparty,sectoralorgroupinterestsintheHouseofRepresentatives."

IndeterminingtheallocationofseatsforpartylistrepresentativesunderSection11ofR.A.No.7941,thefollowingprocedureshallbe
observed:1.Theparties,organizations,andcoalitionsshallberankedfromthehighesttothelowestbasedonthenumberofvotesthey
garneredduringtheelections.2.Theparties,organizations,andcoalitionsreceivingatleasttwopercent(2%)ofthetotalvotescastforthe
partylistsystemshallbeentitledtooneguaranteedseateach.3.Thosegarneringsufficientnumberofvotes,accordingtotheranking
inparagraph1,shallbeentitledtoadditionalseatsinproportiontotheirtotalnumberofvotesuntilalltheadditionalseatsareallocated.4.
Eachparty,organization,orcoalitionshallbeentitledtonotmorethanthree(3)seats.

NeithertheConstitutionnorR.A.No.7941prohibitsmajorpoliticalpartiesfromparticipatinginthepartylistsystem.Onthecontrary,the
framersoftheConstitutionclearlyintendedthemajorpoliticalpartiestoparticipateinpartylistelectionsthroughtheirsectoralwings.Also,
indefininga"party"thatparticipatesinpartylistelectionsaseither"apoliticalpartyorasectoralparty,"R.A.No.7941alsoclearly
intendedthatmajorpoliticalpartieswillparticipateinthepartylistelections.Excludingthemajorpoliticalpartiesinpartylistelectionsis
manifestlyagainsttheConstitution,theintentoftheConstitutionalCommission,andR.A.No.7941.However,bythe
voteof87
,theCourtdecidedtocontinuetherulingin
Veterans

disallowing

majorpoliticalparties
fromparticipatinginthepartylistelections,directlyorindirectly.