United States vs Ang Tang Ho

Political Law Delegation of Power Administrative Bodies

On 30July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868
entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act under
extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and
Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, On 01 August 1919, the
GG issued EO 53 which was published on 20 August 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice
should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a
ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that
prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6 th of August 1919. On 08 August 1919, he was charged
in violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment
plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to
the Governor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.
HELD: Fist of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the
publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be
convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order
fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. The said Act, as to the judgment of the SC, wholly fails to
provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a
uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance
commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be
delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its
terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to
the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and
substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if
necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
CERVANTES v. AUDITOR GENERAL
(G.R. No. L-4043, May 26, 1942)
FACTS

This is a petition to review a decision of Auditor General denying petitioners claim for quarters
allowance as manager of the National Abaca and other Fibers Corp. (NAFCO).
Petitioner was general manager in 1949 of NAFCO with annual salary of P15,000.00
NAFCO Board of Directors granted P400/mo. Quarters allowance to petitioner amounting to
P1,650 for 1949.
This allowance was disapproved by the Central Committee of the government enterprise council
under Executive Order No. 93 upon recommendation by NAFCO auditor and concurred in by the
Auditor general on two grounds:
a) It violates the charter of NAFCO limiting managers salary to P15,000/year.
b) NAFCO is in precarious financial condition.

ISSUES: Whether or not Executive Order No. 93 exercising control over Government Owned and
Controlled Corporations (GOCC) implemented under R.A. No. 51 is valid or null and void.
Whether or not R.A. No. 51 authorizing presidential control over GOCCs is Constitutional.

DECISION: R.A. No. 51 is constitutional. It is not illegal delegation of legislative power to the executive as
argued by petitioner but a mandate for the President to streamline GOCCs operation. Executive Order 93
is valid because it was promulgated within the 1 year period given. Petition for review DISMISSED with
costs

Ynot vs IAC - A case Digest

RESTITUTO YNOT -petitioner; an owner of carabaos
Station Commander, Integrated National Police, Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo & the Regional Director, Bureau of
Animal Industry, Region IV- respondents
Type of petition filed: PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

ISSUE:
Whether Executive Order No. 626-A is constitutional or not.

FACTS:
Petitioner was charged of violation of EO 626 when he transported six carabaos in a pump boat from
Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00.

Petitioner raised the issue of EOs constituitonality and filed case in the lower court. However, the court
sustained the the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the
confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as
raised by the petitioner. Therefore, petitioner appealed the decsion to IAC with the following contentions:
1. EO is unconstitutional as confiscation is outright
2. Penalty is invalid as it is imposed without the owner's right to be heard before a competent and
impartial court.
3. Measure should have not been presumed

4. Raises a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President.

HELD:
Petiton is GRANTED with the following justifications:
1. Right of the petitioner to question for constitutionality is valid as theres no exigency showing to justify
the exercise of this extraordinary power of the President
2. Properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction
3. Case involved roving commission and invalid delegation of powers and invalid exercise of police
power
4. Due process is violated because the owner is denied the right to be heard in his defense and was
immedeiately condemned and punish
pelaez vs auditor general
FACTS: During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines,
purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders
Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin.
Soon after the date last mentioned, or on November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice
President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of
prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his
representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of
said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has
been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective January 1, 1960 and constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power. The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the
provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
Respondent herein relies upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binagonan
ISSUE: W/N the President, who under this new law cannot even create a barrio, can create a municipality
which is
composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities
HELD: On Cardona vs Municipality of Binangonan, such claim is untenable, for said case involved, not
the creation of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory from an already existing municipality
(Cardona) to another municipality (Binagonan), likewise, existing at the time of and prior to said transfer.
It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle
conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature
involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said
municipalities the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the
language of other courts, it is strictly a legislative function or solely and exclusively the exercise of
legislative power
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in
the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle
of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy
to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate2 and (b) fix a standard the limits
of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in
effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned

standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has
acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the
power, not only to make the law, but, also and this is worse to unmake it, by adopting measures
inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of
separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very
foundation of our Republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid
delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to
be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to
avoid the evil effects above referred to.
The power of control under the provision Section 10 (1) of Article VII of the Consti implies the right of the
President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the
executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such
officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are
concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than
that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by
statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same
or its officers act Within the scope of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal
council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law,
although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action
therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of
its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a
regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the
corresponding provincial board.
Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of
its officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official
concerned resides, for his office would thereby become vacant. Thus, by merely brandishing the
power to create a new municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local
officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control
denied to him by the Constitution.
People vs Dacuycuy
GR No. 45127 May 5, 1989
FACTS: several pubic school officials of Leyte were charged for violation of RA 4670 (Magna Carta for
public school teachers).These officials motioned to quash the charges against them for (1)lack of
jurisdiction (2) unconstitutionality of Section 32. This motion was denied for lack of merit. The private
respondents filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Leyte.They added to the grounds
of unconsttutionality of Section 32 the following reasons: (1) it imposes a cruel and unusual punishment
(2) it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, for the duration of penalty of the imprisonment
is left to the discretion of the court. Judge Dacuycuy, the respondent judge denied the motion saying that
RA 4670 particularly Section 32 is valid and constitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 32 of RA 4670 is constitutional
HELD: NO. Section 32 is unconstitutional since it provides an indeterminable period of imprisonment. Too
much discretion was left by the legislature to the court, making it undue delegation of power of the
legislature. Section 32 did not pass the test of sufficient standard. If section 32 will be allowed, it will
violate not just the rules of separation of powers but also the delegability of legislative powers.
Nota Bene: The charge against the public school officials will still be remanded to the municipal court
where it was first filed. RA 4670 ontains a separability clause in Section 34. Although Sec 32 was
declared unconstitutional, other parts are still valid.

COCOFED vs. Republic,

GR Nos. 177857-58, January 24, 2012
FACTS:
In 1971, Republic Act No. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Fund (CIF). The source of
the CIF was a P0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kg. of copra. The Philippine Coconut Administration
was tasked to collect and administer the Fund. Out of the 0.55 levy, P0.02 was placed at the disposition of
the COCOFED, the recognized national association of coconut producers declared by the PCA. Coco
fund receipts were ought to be issued to every copra seller. During the Martial Law regime, then President
Ferdinand Marcos issued several Presidential Decrees purportedly for the improvement of the coconut
industry. The most relevant among these is P.D. No. 755 which permitted the use of the Fund for the
acquisition of a commercial bank for the benefit of coconut farmers and the
distribution of the shares of the stock
of the bank it [PCA] acquired free to the
coconut farmers (Sec.2).
Thus, the PCA acquired the First United Bank, later renamed the United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB). The PCA bought the 72.2% of PUBs outstanding capital stock
or 137,866 shares at P200 per share (P27, 573,200.00) from Pedro Cojuangco
in behalf
of the coconut farmers.
The rest of the Fund was deposited to the UCPB interest free.Farmers who had paid the CIF and
registered their receipts with PCA were giventheir corresponding UCPB stock certificates. Only 16 million
worth of COCOFUNDreceipts were registered and a large number of the coconut farmers opted to sell
all/partof their UCPB shares to private individuals.Simply put, parts of the coconut levy funds went directly
or indirectly to variousprojects and/or was converted into different assets or investments through the
years. After the EDSA Revolution, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order 1which created the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).The PCGG aimed to assist the President in the
recovery of ill-gotten wealthaccumulated by the Marcoses and their cronies. PCGG was empowered to
file casesfor sequestration in the Sandiganbayan. Among the sequestered properties were the shares of
stock in the UCPBregistered in the name of
over a million coconut farmers held in trust by the PCA. The
Sandiganbayan allowed the sequestration by ruling in a Partial Summary Judgment thatthe Coconut Levy
Funds are
prima facie
public funds and that Section 1 and 2 of PDNo. 755 (and some other PDs) were unconstitutional.
The COCOFED representing the over a million coconut farmers via Petition for
review under Rule 45 sought the reversal of the ruling contending among others that the