Isidro Cario vs The Commission on Human Rights

FACTS: On September 17, 1990, some 800 public school teachers in

Manila did not attend work and decided to stage rallies in order to air
grievances. As a result thereof, eight teachers were suspended from work
for 90 days. The issue was then investigated, and on December 17, 1990,
DECS Secretary Isidro Cario ordered the dismissal from the service of
one teacher and the suspension of three others. The case was appealed to
the Commission on Human Rights. In the meantime, the Solicitor General
filed an action for certiorari regarding the case and prohibiting the CHR
from continuing the case. Nevertheless, CHR continued trial and issued a
subpoena to Secretary Cario.
ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and
determine certain specific cases such as the alleged human rights violation
involving civil and political rights.
HELD: No. The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no judicial
power. It can only investigate all forms of human rights violation involving
civil and political rights but it cannot and should not try and decide on the
merits and matters involved therein. The CHR is hence then barred from
proceeding with the trial.

G.R. No. 96681

December 2, 1991

HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education,

Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City
Schools of Manila, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN,
ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA
REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.

DECISION
NARVASA, J.:p
The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted by
the Solicitor General, may be formulated as follows: where the relief sought from the
Commission on Human Rights by a party in a case consists of the review and reversal or

modification of a decision or order issued by a court of justice or government agency or

official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may the Commission take cognizance of the case
and grant that relief? Stated otherwise, where a particular subject-matter is placed by law
within the jurisdiction of a court or other government agency or official for purposes of trial
and adjudgment, may the Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the same
subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing and adjudication?
The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence taken as
substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions posed in the present
action. These facts, 1 together with others involved in related cases recently resolved by this
Court 2 or otherwise undisputed on the record, are hereunder set forth.
1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers,
among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and
Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as mass concerted
actions to dramatize and highlight their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the
public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the
latters attention. According to them they had decided to undertake said mass concerted
actions after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without
disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands
had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The mass actions consisted in
staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in
peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the
mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in
24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to
initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their
replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week,
with more teachers joining in the days that followed. 3
Among those who took part in the concerted mass actions were the eight (8) private
respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had
agreed to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA. 4
2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents)
were administratively charged on the basis of the principals report and given five (5) days
to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days
pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits,
Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the
charges in accordance with P.D. 807. 5
3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR
complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber were,

among others, named respondents, 6 the latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal
investigation, and also moved for suspension of the administrative proceedings pending
resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their application for issuance of an injunctive
writ/temporary restraining order. But when their motion for suspension was denied by
Order dated November 8, 1990 of the Investigating Committee, which later also denied their
motion for reconsideration orally made at the hearing of November 14, 1990, the
respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire
proceedings. 7 The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cario dated
December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers,
affidavits and documents submitted by the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the
service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and
del Castillo. 8
4. In the meantime, the MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila against petitioner (Cario), which was dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex
I). Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said
dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking teachers right to due process
and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar
petition before the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590. 9 Both petitions in this
Court were filed in behalf of the teacher associations, a few named individuals, and other
teacher-members so numerous similarly situated or other similarly situated public school
teachers too numerous to be impleaded.
5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated
September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were
participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as
teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to
them. 10
6. Their complaints and those of other teachers also ordered suspended by the . . .
(DECS), all numbering forty-two (42) were docketed as Striking Teachers CHR Case
No. 90775. In connection therewith the Commission scheduled a dialogue on October 11,
1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cario requiring his attendance therein. 11
On the day of the dialogue, although it said that it was not certain whether he (Sec.
Cario) received the subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the) Commission, with
the Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro,
proceeded to hear the case; it heard the complainants counsel (a) explain that his clients
had been denied due process and suspended without formal notice, and unjustly, since
they did not join the mass leave, and (b) expatiate on the grievances which were the
cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR

complainants) sympathize. 12 The Commission thereafter issued an Order 13 reciting these

facts and making the following disposition:
To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly guided in its
investigation and resolution of the matter, considering that these forty two teachers are now
suspended and deprived of their wages, which they need very badly, Secretary Isidro
Cario, of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, school
superintendent of Manila and the Principal of Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, are
hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at
11:00 A.M. and to bring with them any and all documents relevant to the allegations
aforestated herein to assist the Commission in this matter. Otherwise, the Commission will
resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cario sought and was granted
leave to file a motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted on
November 14, 1990 alleging as grounds therefor, that the complaint states no cause of
action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case. 14
8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting
the striking teachers were promulgated in two (2) cases, as aforestated, viz.:
a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cario in Case No. DECS
90-082, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for
nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo; 15 and
b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590
dismissing the petitions without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the individual
petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on the matters complained
of, 16 and inter alia ruling that it was prima facie lawful for petitioner Cario to issue returnto-work orders, file administrative charges against recalcitrants, preventively suspend them,
and issue decision on those charges. 17
9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec. Carios
motion to dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga to submit their counteraffidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after which) the Commission shall proceed to hear and
resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents counter affidavit. 18 It held that
the striking teachers were denied due process of law; . . . they should not have been
replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges; there had been a violation
of their civil and political rights which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and
while expressing its utmost respect to the Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are
different from those in the case decided by the Supreme Court (the reference being

unmistakably to this Courts joint Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and
95590, supra).
It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor General,
in behalf of petitioner Cario, has commenced the present action of certiorari and
prohibition.
The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel bound
by this Courts joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has also made plain
its intention to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on
the merits. It intends, in other words, to try and decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise
jurisdiction over the following general issues:
1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause exists for
the imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their superiors; and
2) whether or not the grievances which were the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA
teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize, justify their mass
action or strike.
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with
character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and
decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil
Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the
teachers affected may take appeals to the Civil Service Commission on said matters, if still
timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power
under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasijudicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and
decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights
violations involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it
was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this
country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that
it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed
human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication,
and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of
a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the
faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be

accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end
that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. 21 This function, to
repeat, the Commission does not have. 22
The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers of the
Commission on Human Rights.
The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. 23 Upon its
constitution, it succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee on Human Rights
existing at the time of the effectivity of the Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are the
following 25
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for
violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons
within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance
respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to
provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Governments compliance with international treaty obligations on
human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession
of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any
investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance
of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears
any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically
grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on
complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as
it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with
the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it
may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession
of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may
also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance
of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be
required by its findings. 26
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or
even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the
popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct
meanings.
Investigate, commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe
into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of investigate is to observe or study
closely: inquire into systematically. to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official
probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry. 27 The purpose of investigation, of course, is to
discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the
notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by
application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of investigate is essentially the same: (t)o follow up step by step by
patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into
with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of
evidence; a legal inquiry; 28 to inquire; to make an investigation, investigation being in
turn describe as (a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not
require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the
discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters. 29
Adjudicate, commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge,
decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as to settle
finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . .
to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge. 30 And adjudge means to decide
or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant
judicially in a case of controversy . . . . 31

In the legal sense, adjudicate means: To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To
determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense; and adjudge means:
To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a
judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment. 32
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power to investigate,
cannot and should not try and resolve on the merits (adjudicate) the matters involved in
Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot
do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the
teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or
political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to
resolve on the merits the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions
engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b)
whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the
teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this
effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations
warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances
complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual
teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.
These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil
Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance of the
issues and resolved them, 33 and it appears that appeals have been seasonably taken by
the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself has had
occasion to pass upon said issues. 34
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of
Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial
evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having
accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had
in truth committed human rights violations involving civil and political rights, are matters
which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed
to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed
by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.
The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no
business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil
Service Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter
and making its own judgment on the questions involved. This would accord success to what

may well have been the complaining teachers strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the
judgment of the Education Secretary in the administrative cases against them which they
anticipated would be adverse to them.
This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.
In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no useful
purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those reached by
Secretary Cario, it would have no power anyway to reverse the Secretarys conclusions.
Reversal thereof can only be done by the Civil Service Commission and lastly by this Court.
The only thing the Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cario was in error, is
to refer the matter to the appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that
would be the Civil Service Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE, and the respondent Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman and
Members thereof are prohibited to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC
Case No. 90-775) on the merits.
SO ORDERED.