The Evolution with Age of Probabilistic, Intuitively Based Misconceptions

Author(s): Efraim Fischbein and Ditza Schnarch

Source: Journal for Research in Mathematics Education, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Jan., 1997), pp. 96-105
Published by: National Council of Teachers of Mathematics
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Brief Report

The Evolution With Age of Probabilistic,

Intuitively Based Misconceptions
EfraimFischbein, TelAviv University
Ditza Schnarch,TelAviv University
The purposeof thisresearchwas to investigatethe evolution,withage, of probabilistic,intuitively
basedmisconceptions.We hypothesized,on the basisof previousresearchwith infinityconcepts,
thatthese misconceptionswould stabilizeduringthe emergenceof the formaloperationperiod.
The responsesto probabilityproblemsof studentsin Grades5, 7, 9, and 11 and of prospective
teachersindicated,contraryto ourhypothesis,thatsome misconceptionsgrewstrongerwith age,
whereasothersgrew weaker.Only one misconceptioninvestigatedwas stableacross ages. An
attemptwas madeto find a theoreticalexplanationfor this ratherstrangeandcomplexsituation.

In a previous study we found that various intuitively based misconceptions

relatedto the notion of infinitywere relativelystableacrossages, beginningat the
formaloperationalperiod(Fischbein,Tirosh,& Hess, 1979). The mainpurposeof
the present study was to investigate whether this finding is generally true by
extendingourresearchto a differentdomain,namelythatof probabilisticintuitions.
As far as we know, the evolution of probabilisticintuitionswith age has not been
extensivelystudied.(Forresearchon the developmentalaspectsof probabilisticintuitions see Fischbein, 1975; Fischbein& Gazit, 1984; Fischbein,Nello, & Marino,
1991; Garfield& Ahlgren, 1988; Green, 1983; Hawkins& Kapadia,1984; Piaget
& Inhelder, 1951; and Shaughnessy, 1992.) In addition, we hoped this study
of the mechanismsthatcontributeto intuitive
wouldlead to a deeperunderstanding
misconceptionsin generaland probabilisticmisconceptionsin particular.
The Conceptof Intuition
We have previouslydefinedthe concept of intuitionas a cognition thatappears
subjectivelyas self-evident,directlyacceptable,holistic, coercive, andextrapolative (Fischbein,1987). An intuitivecognitionis distinguishedfroman analytically
andlogically based cognitionby the feeling of obviousness,of intrinsiccertainty.
Forexample,I am surethatthe sumof the anglesof a triangleis 180' becauseI have
been taughtthis or because I can prove it. But it is not obvious thatit must be so.
On the otherhand,the fact thatthe shortestdistancebetweentwo pointsis a straight
line subjectivelyappearsto be absolutelytruewithoutthe need for any formalor
empiricalproof. In the first case we deal with a nonintuitivecognition, and in the
second with an intuitivecognition.

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Evolutionof Misconceptions

97

Why do some of ourcognitionshave the characterof evidence anddirectimperativenesswhile othersdo not? We hypothesizethatthe reasonis thatwe naturally
tendto organizeandto integrateourcognitionsinto coherentandbehaviorallyefficient structures.The resultis the developmentwith age andexperienceof crystalbehavior.
lized,firm,andstablebeliefson whichwe mayrelyin ourmentalandpractical
These cognitivebeliefs may,however,conflictwithreality.One reasonfor thisconflictis thatourexperienceis usuallylimited.Anotheris thattheneedto actpurposefully
implies thatwe may manipulatecauses to get a desiredeffect. As a consequence
we tend,in interpretingevents,to distinguishbetweencauseandeffect, andwe tend
to believe that a certain cause will always produce the same effect. Although
such beliefs may help in the elaborationof internallycoherentrepresentations,
these
representationsmay be in dissonancewith reality.
In seekingcoherencefor ourcognitiveorganization,we tendin the courseof our
mentaloperationsto integrateinformationthatis easily availableandto ignoreinformationthatrequiresa more sophisticatedresearcheffort. Also, we tend to rely on
informationthatseems to be representativefor an entireclass. Finally-and this is
a fundamentalaspectof the entiretheoryof intuitiveknowledge-the aspectsand
conditionsmentionedabovecannotworkindependentlyof whatPiaget(1976) called
the operational(logical, analytical)capacitiesof the individual.These additional
factorscausedus to extendouroriginalresearchquestion:How do thefactorsrelated
to coherenceandefficiencyinfluencethedevelopmentof intuitionswithage?It would
appearthatthe impactof logical constraintson intuitionsmightincreasewith age;
thatis, if intuitionsevolve withage, one mightexpectthatthe strengthandfrequency
of intuitivelybasedmisconceptionswould diminishas the subjectgrows older.But
this logical conclusioncontradictsourhypothesis,derivedfrompreviousfindings
concerningintuitionsrelatedto infinity, thatintuitionsare stable across ages. As
we shall see, our initial hypothesiswas foundto be too simplisticwhen compared
with the realityof experimentalfindings in the domainof probability.
METHODOLOGY
Subjects

Five groupsof studentswere investigated:20 studentsin Grade5 (ages 10-11),

20 studentsin Grade7 (ages 12-13), 20 studentsin Grade9 (ages 14-15), 20 studentsin Grade11 (ages 16-17), and 18 college studentswho wereprospectiveteachers specializing in mathematics.The 11th graders were in the average ability
level of the threelevels of instructionin Israelihigh schools. None of the students
hadpreviouslyreceivedanyinstructionin probability.The studentsreceivedno informationregardingthe purposeof the study.The sample representeda rangeof students with respectto socioeconomic level and culturalbackground.
Instrument

A questionnaire
consistingof sevenprobability
problemswas developed.Eachproblem was relatedto a well-knownprobabilisticmisconception(see the first column

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Evolution of Misconceptions

98

of Table 1). Answerswereto be written.Thequestionnairewas administeredto each

groupof studentsduringa regularlyscheduledclass, underusual classroomconditions, in a session lasting aboutone hour.
Table 1
Problemsand percentages of studentanswers.
Problems

Grades
11 CSa
9

1. Representativeness
In a lotto game, one has to choose 6 numbersfrom a total
of 40. Vered has chosen 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. Ruthhas chosen
39, 1, 17, 33, 8, 27. Who has a greaterchance of winning?
Vered has a greaterchance of winning.
Ruthhas a greaterchance of winning. (Mainmisconception)
Vered and Ruthhave the same chance to win. (Correct)

0
70
30

0
55
45

0
35
65

0
35
65

0
22
78

2. Negative and Positive Recency Effects

When tossing a coin, thereare two possible outcomes:
eitherheads or tails. Ronni flipped a coin threetimes and in
all cases heads came up. Ronni intendsto flip the coin
again. Whatis the chance of getting heads the fourthtime?
Smallerthanthe chance of getting tails
(Main misconception;negative recency effect.)
Equalto the chance of getting tails (Correct.)
Greaterthanthe chance of getting tails (Positive recency effect.)
Othertypes of answers

35
40
0
25

35
55
5
5

20
70
0

10
90
0
0

0
94
6
0

15

20
0
70

10
0
75

25

0
75

10

15

0
78
16

70
30

80
20

40
60

44
56

3. Compoundand Simple Events

Supposeone rolls two dice simultaneously.Which of the
following has a greaterchance of happening?
Gettingthe pair5-6 (Correct)
Gettingthe pair6-6
Both have the same chance. (Mainmisconception)

Otheranswers

70
15

4. The ConjunctionFallacy
Dan dreamsof becoming a doctor.He likes to help people.
When he was in high school, he volunteeredfor the Red
Cross organization.He accomplishedhis studies with high
performanceand served in the armyas a medical attendant.
After ending his armyservice, Dan registeredat the university. Which seems to you to be more likely?
Dan is a studentof the medical school. (Misconception)
Dan is a student.

85
15

5A. Effect of Sample Size

In a certaintown there aretwo hospitals,a small one in
which thereare, on the average,about 15 birthsa day and a
big one in which thereare, on the average,about45 births
a day. The likelihood of giving birthto a boy is about50%.
(Nevertheless,therewere days on which more than50% of
the babies bornwere boys, and therewere days on which
fewer than50% of the babies bornwere boys.) In the small

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10

(table continued)

Evolutionof Misconceptions

99

Table 1--continued
Problemsand percentagesof studentanswers.
Problems
5A. Effect of Sample Size--continued
hospital a recordhas been kept duringthe year of the days
in which the total numberof boys bornwas greaterthan9,
which representsmore than60% of the totalbirthsin the
small hospital.In the big hospital,they have kept a record
duringthe year of the days in which therewere morethan
27 boys born, which representsmore than60% of the
births.In which of the two hospitals were theremore such
days?
In the big hospitaltherewere more days recordedwhere
more than60% boys were born.
In the small hospitaltherewere more days recorded
where more than60% boys were born. (Correct)
The numberof days for which more than60% boys were
born was equal in the two hospitals. (Main misconception)
Otheranswers
No answer
5B. The Effect of Sample Size
The likelihood of getting heads at least twice when tossing
threecoins is:
Smallerthan (Incorrect)
Equalto (Incorrect;main misconception)
Greaterthan (Correct)
the likelihood of getting heads at least 200 times out
of 300 times.
Otheranswers
No answer
6. The Heuristicof Availability
When choosing a committeecomposed of 2 membersfrom
among 10 candidatesthe numberof possibilities is
Smallerthan (Incorrect)
Equalto (Correct)
Greaterthan (Main misconception)
the numberof possibilities when choosing a committeeof
8 membersfrom among 10 candidates.
Otheranswers
No answer

Grades
11 CSa
9

20

35

10

10
10

30
5

70
5

80
10

60

30

15

89
0
11

25
60
10

10
75
5

6
44

0
5

0
10

10

0
15

22

5
30
35

45
30

50

5
25

10

20
0
10

5
5
20

5
65

85

6
72

15
55

30
40

15
5

0
0

0
0

10

7. The Effect of the Time Axis (The Falk Phenomenon)

Yoav and Galit each receive a box containingtwo white marbles
and two black marbles.
(A.) Yoav extractsa marblefrom his box and finds out thatit is
a white one. Withoutreplacingthe first marble,he extractsa second
marble.Is the likelihood thatthis second marbleis also white smaller
than,equal to, or greaterthanthe likelihood thatit is a black marble?
(B.) Galit extractsa marblefrom her box and puts it aside without
looking at it. She then extractsa second marbleand sees thatit is
white. Is the likelihood thatthe first marbleshe extractedis white
smallerthan,equal to, or greaterthanthe likelihood thatit is black?
(table continued)

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Evolutionof Misconceptions

100

Table 1-continued
Problemsand percentages of studentanswers.
Problems
Category 1 (Both correct)
Category2 (Firstcorrect,second incorrect.Main misconception)
Category3 (Both incorrect:Equalchances for both.)
Others

5
45
5
25
25

7
50
30
15
5

Grades
11 CSa
9
35 30
39
44
35 70
25
0
0
5
17
0

students.
"aCollege
bMainmisconceptionresponsesare highlighted.

Problem1 testedfor the misconceptionof representativeness.

Peopletendto estimatethe likelihoodof an event by takinginto accounthow well it representssome
aspectof its parentpopulation(see Kahneman& Tversky,1972;Shaughnessy,1992;
Tversky & Kahneman,1982).
Problem 2 tested for negative and positive recency effects. One who tosses a coin

threetimes andgets threeheadsmay thenbelieve thatthe fourthtoss is morelikely

to be tails. This is called "thenegative recency effect" or "thegambler'sfallacy."
This belief may be relatedto the heuristicof representativeness:Intuitively,alternatingoutcomes seermto betterrepresenta randomsequence;however, the belief
thatthe fourthtoss is morelikelyto be headson thebasis,for example,of animplicit
or explicitassumptionthatthe conditionswerenot fairis called"thepositiverecency
effect" (see Cohen, 1957; Fischbein, 1975; Fischbein,Nello, & Marino, 1991).
Problem3 tested for simpleand compoundevents.For example,if two dice are
rolled simultaneously,the tendency is to say that obtaining two sixes has the
same likelihood as obtaininga five and a six (see Lecoutre& Durant,1988).
Problem4 testedfor the conjunctionfallacy. The probabilityof an event appears,
undercertainconditions,to be higherthanthe probabilityof the intersectionof the
same event with another(see Shaughnessy,1992; Tversky& Kahneman,1983).
Problems5A and5B testedfor theeffectof samplesize. Individualstendto neglect
the influenceof themagnitudeof a samplewhenestimatingprobabilities
(see Tversky
& Kahneman,1982).
Problem6 testedfor availability.Frequencyor probabilityis estimatedby theease
with which instancescan be broughtto mind (see Kahneman& Tversky, 1973).
Problem 7 tested for the time-axis fallacy (also called the Falk phenomenon). In

this problempeople are likely to answerPart I correctly,then answerPart2 difon its cause.
ferentlyon thebasisof theprinciplethatan eventcannotactretroactively
An inversionof the time axis, of cause implyingeffect, contradictsone of ourbasic
intuitions(see Falk, 1979, 1983; Shaughnessy,1992).
Remarks Concerning the Methodology

The presentresearchconstitutesthe first stage of a largerproject.The purpose

here was to gatherpreliminaryempiricaldatathatwouldhelp us obtaina globalpictureof the evolutionof probabilisticmisconceptionsas an effect of age. We intend

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Evolutionof Misconceptions

101

in the second stage of the projectto undertakea numberof interviewsbased on the

findingsdiscussedhere.Because of the lack of literatureon the evolutionof probability conceptswith age, the basic theoreticalingredientsfor analyzingthe mechanisms of this evolutionwere not availableto us.
RESULTS
Althoughwe collectedexamplesof studentjustificationsof answers,we will not
include them here. The problem of the relationshipbetween the initial direct
answerand its justificationis a complex one (Konold,Pollatsek,Well, Lohmeier,
& Lipson, 1993). The initial answerexpresses immediateintuition,while thejustification,coming afterthe expressedintuition,may or may not reflectthe rationale
for the subject'schoice;it may be a subsequentlogical construction.Consequently,
at this stageof ourresearchwe will not tryto interpretthesubjects'reactionsin terms
of theirown justifications.In the next stage an attemptwill be made to cope with
this complex theoreticaland methodologicalproblem.
We next consider the results pertaining to each misconception, as shown in
Table 1.
The representativeness
Representativeness.
misconceptiondecreasedwithage.
Negativeandpositiverecencyeffects.The impactof the negativerecencystrategy decreasedwithage, whereasthepositiverecencyeffect was almostabsent.
Konoldet al. (1993) have shownthatsome subjectsbelievethatthey areasked
to predicta certainoutcome,whereasothersconsiderthatthey have to evaluatethe probabilityof a stringof outcomes.Betweenthetwo approachesthere
may arise conflicts thatlead to inconsistencies,even for the same subject.
Compoundand simple events. This misconceptionwas frequentand stable
across ages, the only stable misconceptionidentifiedin this study.
Theconjunctionfallacy. This misconceptionwas very strongthroughGrade
9 but less strong(by abouthalf) for high school and college students.
Effectof samplesize. ForProblems5A and5B the basicmisconceptionis that
samplesize is notrelevant.Thismisconceptionis relatedto theheuristicof representativeness(Tversky& Kahneman,1982).Table 1 shows thatfor 5A this
misconceptiondevelopedwith age in a surprisinglyregularmanner,while the
correctanswer(the small hospital)was almostneverchosen. For 5B the frequenciesof the mainmisconceptionagainincreasedwiththe age of the student,
except in the case of college students.The basic belief expressedin this misof anindefinitenumconceptionis basedon theideathata ratiois representative
ber of pairsof numbers,a belief so strongthatit masksa moresubtleidea:As
theconsideredsamplebecomeslarger,theprobabilityof gettinga certainempirical resulttendsto betterapproximatethe theoreticalprediction.On the basis
of this finding,we assumethata certainlogical position thatimprovesas the
student's age increases(as a resultof instructionandintellectualdevelopment)

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102

Evolutionof Misconceptions

The influmaybecomean influentialcomponentof anintuitiveinterpretation.

ence of sucha positionmaybe positivewhenit is adequate(forinstance,in the
exampleof the negativerecencyeffect) butdestructivewhenthe logical view
is inadequate,suchas in the case of believingsamplesize to be irrelevant.
Availability.Once again we have a case in which the frequencyof the misconceptionincreasedwith the age of the student.The complementarityand
subsequentequalityof the two groupswas not graspedintuitively.The only
explanationwe could find is thatas subjectsgrow older,they become better
ableto identifypossiblecombinations.But becauseit is easierto producevarious combinationsof two elementsthancombinationsof eightelements(availability), two elementsis selected as the answer.
The effect of the time axis (the Falk phenomenon). Our wording of this
problemavoided the termprobability.We divided the responsesinto three
categories:In CategoryI both responsesare correct;in CategoryII the first
andin CategoryI bothresponses
responseis correctwhilethesecondis incorrect;
areincorrect.CategoryII representsthe mainmisconception.Here we have
anotherexamplein which the frequencyof an intuitivelybased misconception increasedwith age (except in the case of college students).We consider
In this problemthe generalprinthis responseat two levels of rationalization.
ciple of causality,withits apparentone-directedness,seemedto becomemore
theintuitiveinterpretation
as theageof thesubjectincreased:
effectivein structuring
Whathappensat the second extractioncannotretroactivelyinfluence what
has alreadyhappenedin the first extraction.Whatthe subjectsdid not seem
to realizeis thatthe knowledgeof the secondoutcomeshouldbe usedin determining the probabilityof the first outcome. If we know the second drawis
white, then of the remainingthree,from which the first one was drawn,two
are black and one is white, so it is more likely that a black one was drawn.
The apparentlycausal orderof the story as it is told in a sequenceof events
hidesthe genuinestochasticstructureof the problem:The two questionsactually expressthe same problem.The erroneousintuitionis causedby the tacit
embeddingof the principleof causality,with its uniquetime-direction,in the
intuitiveevaluation.
DISCUSSIONAND CONCLUSIONS
Ourpurposewas to investigatethe evolution,as studentsage, of probabilisticmisconceptions.Ourinitialhypothesiswas thatafterthe emergenceof formalreasoning
(aboutage 12), intuitionstendto stabilizeandbecome resistantto the influenceof
age and instruction.This hypothesiswas suggestedby our previousfindings with
regard to intuitions about infinity. In this first phase of our present study we
selecteda set of well-knownprobabilityproblemsthathavebeen describedas leading to intuitivelybased misconceptions.
The resultsobtainedwere contraryto the generalassumptionaboutthe stability

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Evolutionof Misconceptions

103

of intuitions.Only the problemon the simultaneousrollingof two dice yielded stable frequenciesacrossages. Forthe othersix problemsthe frequenciesvariedacross
andthe one on negativerecency
ages.In two cases (theproblemon representativeness
effect) the frequenciesof the typicalmisconceptionsdiminishedas the studentaged.
The misconceptiondescribedas the conjunctionfallacy was relativelyconstantin
Grades5, 7, and9, then droppedfor Grade11 andfor college students.In the other
threecases (theproblemson the effectof samplesize on availability,andon theeffect
of thetimeaxis)thefrequenciesof wrongintuitiveanswersincreasedwithage,except
in thecaseof collegestudents,
forwhom,in mostcases,frequencies
of themisconceptions
decreased.One may assumethatthe increasedmathematicalexperience(andpossibly the increasedmaturityof reasoning)of college studentswas strongenough
to oppose the effect of the respectivemisconceptions.In the end then, the picture
was rathercomplex:Some misconceptionsdiminishedwith age, one was stable,and
some gained greaterinfluence.
Oneplausibleinterpretation
of thesefindingsis thatin eachintuitionthereis embedded a certainintellectualschemathatinfluencedthe results.The schemaactedtacitly and, in our opinion, became an integralpartof the respectiveintuition.As the
studentsaged, these intellectualschemata(generalprinciples)becamestrongerand
betterintegratedintothe intellectualactivityof the individual,andconsequentlywere
more influentialin the individual'stheoreticaldecisions.
Let us considerthe principlesthatcan be identifiedas havinginfluencedthe intuitions thatguided the decisions made in these problems.
1. Forthe problemsrelatingto representativeness
(thenegativerecencyeffect and
the higherlikelihoodof a groupof randomnumberswinningin a lotterygame),the
basic principleis the independenceof outcomesin a stochasticexperience.It is this
principle,thisintellectualschema,thatimprovesas the studentages andfinallyovercomes the primitive,global, intuitiveheuristicof representativeness.
2. The generalprincipleidentifiablein the problemsrelatingto the effect of sample size is the equivalenceof ratios.For example, the concept of ratiois involved
in the students'incorrectsolutionof the problemof the two hospitals.Studentsare
misledby theirbeliefthatone mustuse ratiosto solvethisproblem.Instead,
apparently
one has to consideranotherstochasticlaw, the law of large numbers.As the sample size (or the numberof trials)increases,the relativefrequenciestendtowardthe
theoreticalprobabilities.For our subjects,not trainedin stochastics,the principle
of equivalenceof ratiosimposes itself as relevantto the problemandthus dictates
the answer.It is the evolutionof thisprinciplethatshapesthe evolutionof therelated
misconceptionand causes it to become strongeras the studentages.
3. The Falkphenomenon,the misconceptionfoundin responsesto thelastproblem,
is thatthe secondextractioncannotinfluencethepreviousextraction.Here,too, there
is deeplyrootedin ourmentalactivitya generalprinciplethatdeterminesthe answer.
It is the principle of causality:The antecedentdeterminesthe consequent.The
strengthof this principleleads the individualto neglect an essentialbit of information:The secondmarbleextractedis knownto be white.Hereone mustmakethesubtle shiftfroma concrete,causal,time-oriented
relationto a formalmathematical
relation.

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Evolutionof Misconceptions

104

Ourfindings show thatwith age, studentsbecome betterable to employ the principles of causalityandirreversibilityof time, despitethe fact thatthese principles
alone are inadequatefor solving the problem.
Generallyspeaking,in the students'intuitivesolutionsto these problems,we can
identifythe following commonstructure:The solutionis shapedby the interaction
betweena generalintellectualschema,acceptedintuitivelyby the student,andcertainspecificconstraintsof the problem.The impactof these schemataincreaseswith
the age of the subject.The interventionsof the schemata(tacit,of course) may be
adequateor inadequate.Whenthe constraintsof the problemaresimpleenough so
thatthe generalprincipleis adequateto addressthem,frequenciesof the respective
misconceptions diminish as the student ages. In other situations the general
schemata,thoughmeaningfulin themselves, are inadequateto deal with the specific constraintsof the problem,and the frequenciesof the respectivemisconceptions increasewith the student'sage.
We believe it could be useful to discuss, duringinstructionon probability,problems such as those we have analyzedhere. There are many such problemsin the
literature.We suggest that it may be appropriatenot only to presentthe problem
andits correctsolutionbutalso to analyzepsychologicallythe structureof the correspondingmisconceptions.Probabilitydoes not consist of mere technicalinformationand proceduresleading to solutions.Rather,it requiresa way of thinking
that is genuinely different from that requiredby most school mathematics.In
learningprobability,studentsmust createnew intuitions.Instructioncan lead studentsto activelyexperiencethe conflicts betweentheirprimaryintuitiveschemata
andthe particulartypes of reasoningspecificto stochasticsituations.If studentscan
learnto analyzethe causesof theseconflictsandmistakes,they may be ableto overcome them and attaina genuine probabilisticway of thinking.
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Authors
Efraim Fischbein, Professor,School of Education,Tel Aviv University,Tel Aviv 69978, Israel
Ditza Schnarch, School of Education,Tel Aviv University,Tel Aviv 69978, Israel

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