Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
ARTICLE OUTLINE
I Background
§ 1 In general
§ 1.5 Vindictive enforcement
§ 2 Availability of defense; common situations in which defense is raised
§ 2.3 Discrimination in tender of plea bargain
§ 2.5 Discrimination in selection of participants for pre-trial diversion
program
§ 2.7 Death penalty discrimination claims
§ 3 Persons or officials responsible for discriminatory enforcement
§ 4 Remedies and relief available
§ 4.3 Remedies--Under Hyde Amendment
§ 4.5 Remedies--Under Civil Rights Acts
§ 5 Elements of discriminatory enforcement--In general
§ 6 Elements of discriminatory enforcement--Requirement of selectivity
§ 7 Elements of discriminatory enforcement--Requirement of purpose or intent to
discriminate
§ 8 Elements of discriminatory enforcement--Requirement of arbitrary or
invidious standard of enforcement
§ 9 Burden and quantum of proof
§ 10 Burden and quantum of proof--The prima facie case
§ 11 Evidence
§ 12 Evidence--Discovery
§ 13 Evidence--Rebuttal
§ 14 Criticisms and suggested changes
§ 15 Practice pointers
II Proof of Discriminatory Enforcement of Law Against Individual Exercising
Constitutional Rights
A Elements of Proof
§ 16 Guide and checklist
B Testimony of Chief of Police
§ 17 Knowledge of frequent violations of law
§ 18 Policy of nonenforcement of law
C Testimony of Prosecutor
§ 19 Previous and subsequent nonenforcement of law
§ 20 Use of special procedures in prosecution of defendant
Page 1 of 99
§ 21 Knowledge of political activity by defendant
D Testimony of Defendant
§ 22 Previous nonenforcement of law
§ 23 Political activity by defendant
§ 24 Prosecutor's admission of improper motive
III Proof of Discriminatory Enforcement of Prostitution Laws Against Women
A Elements of Proof
§ 25 Guide and checklist
B Testimony of Commander of Vice Division
§ 26 Enforcement policies and procedures directed at women
§ 27 Enforcement statistics
§ 28 Failure to arrest male customers
§ 29 Lack of justifiable reasons for selective enforcement of law
C Testimony of Commander of Vice Division in Comparable Jurisdiction
§ 30 Use of sexually neutral enforcement policies
§ 31 Enforcement statistics
§ 32 Deterrent effect of sexually neutral enforcement
D Testimony of Investigator
§ 33 Violations of statute by men
§ 34 Police knowledge of violations by men
INDEX
Page 2 of 99
generally,, § 12
alternatives to,, §§ 12, 15
criticisms of restrictions on,, §§ 12, 14
Discretion of authorities, exercise of—,
criteria of selectivity, as justification for,, § 8
rebuttal, sufficiency of explanation based on,, §§ 10, 13
selective enforcement—,
lack of justifiable reasons for, testimony concerning,, §§ 29, 32
permissibility of,, §§ 3, 5, 8
Dismissal, motion for, as remedy,, § 4
Double jeopardy, attachment of,, § 4
Due process clause, as basis of claim,, § 1
Duration of policy of discriminatory enforcement, showing required,, § 5
Equal protection clause, as basis of claim,, § 1
Evidence—,
generally,, §§ 11– 13, 15
discovery of,, § 12
rebuttal,, § 13
First Amendment rights, prosecution based on excercise of—,
arbitrary or invidious discrimination, as constituting,, §§ 2, 8
evidence showing,, § 11
rebuttal of claim,, §§ 10, 13
Gambling laws, discriminatory enforcement as defense to prosecution for,, § 2
Individuals, discriminatory enforcement of law against—,
generally,, § 2
difficulty of proving,, § 11
proof of,, §§ 16– 24
Injunctive relief, availability of,, § 4
Intent to discriminate—,
generally,, § 7
allegation of, necessity of,, § 15
criticisms of requirement,, § 14
difficulties of proof,, §§ 7, 11
element of claim,, §§ 1, 5, 7
evidence of,, §§ 7, 11
inference of, prima facie case as raising,, § 10
rebuttal,, § 13
selectivity, evidence of as relevant on issue of,, § 6
Investigation by defendant—,
evidence obtained by,, § 11
investigator, testimony of concerning,, §§ 33, 34
necessity or desirability of,, § 15
Judge, claim based on actions of,, § 3
Knowledge of authorities—,
denials of, effect of,, §§ 7, 13
evidence of,, § 7
political activity of defendant, prosecutor's knowledge of, testimony
concerning,, §§ 21, 24
requirements concerning—,
generally,, §§ 7, 8
criticisms of,, § 14
violations by others—,
police knowledge of, testimony concerning,, §§ 17, 27, 28, 34
prosecutorial knowledge of, testimony concerning,, § 19
Labor unions, discriminatory enforcement against members or supporters of—,
defense to criminal prosecution, as constituting,, § 2
evidence of,, § 11
Page 3 of 99
Law enforcement officials—,
discriminatory enforcement, responsibility for,, § 3
examination of by defendant, necessity or desirability of,, § 15
reluctance to admit discriminatory enforcement policies,, §§ 7, 11, 15
testimony of—,
chief of police,, §§ 17, 18
commanders of vice divisions,, §§ 26– 32
discriminatory enforcement, as showing,, § 11
Laxity in enforcement, effect of,, §§ 5, 7
Nonenforcement of law against others—,
laws generally unenforced—,
dangers of discriminatory enforcement of,, §§ 2, 14
evidence showing, effect of,, §§ 7, 11
policy of nonenforcement, testimony concerning,, § 18
previous nonenforcement, testimony concerning,, §§ 18, 19, 22
subsequent nonenforcement, testimony concerning,, § 19
laws selectively enforced—,
generally,, §§ 5– 8
lack of justification for selectivity, testimony concerning,, §§ 29, 32
neutral enforcement, greater deterrent effect of, testimony concerning,, §§
29, 30, 32
selective enforcement, testimony concerning,, § 26
statistical evidence showing, testimony concerning,, § 27
Officials responsible for discriminatory enforcement, generally,, § 3
Ordinance, discriminatory enforcement of,, § 1
Passive enforcement, effect of,, § 7
Persons responsible for discriminatory enforcement, generally,, § 3
Policies and procedures of authorities—,
discriminatory policies, reluctance to admit,, §§ 7, 15
examination of government officials concerning, necessity or desirability
of,, § 15
nonenforcement of law, general policy of—,
evidence showing, effect of,, § 11
testimony concerning,, § 18
normal policy, evidence showing,, § 11
selective enforcement—,
against particular class or group, policy of, testimony concerning,, § 26
lack of justifiable reasons for policy of, testimony concerning,, §§ 29, 32
neutral enforcement policies in other jurisdiction, use and greater
deterrent effect of, testimony concerning,, §§ 29, 30, 32
nonenforcement against other groups or classes, policy of, testimony
concerning,, §§ 28, 34
policy of, proof of,, § 7
use of special procedures in prosecution of defendant—,
discriminatory enforcement, as evidence of,, §§ 11, 20
testimony concerning,, § 20
Practice pointers,, § 15
Prima facie case—,
generally,, § 10
arguments for,, § 14
evidence establishing,, § 11
rebuttal of,, §§ 10, 13
Proof—,
burden of, see Burden of proof
constitutional rights, discriminatory enforcement against individual
exercising,, §§ 16– 24
difficulties of,, §§ 1, 10, 11, 14, 15
Page 4 of 99
elements of—,
discriminatory enforcement case generally,, § 5
guide and checklist,, §§ 16, 25
prima facie case,, § 10
prostitution laws, discriminatory enforcement against women,, §§ 25– 34
quantum of,, § 9
Sunday law, discriminatory enforcement of,, §§ 16– 24
Prosecutorial authorities—,
admission of improper motive—,
evidence of discriminatory enforcement, as constituting,, § 11
testimony concerning,, § 24
discriminatory enforcement, responsibility for,, § 3
examination of by defendant, necessity or desirability of,, § 15
reluctance to admit discriminatory enforcement policies,, §§ 7, 11, 15
testimony of—,
discriminatory enforcement, as showing,, § 11
prosecutor,, §§ 19– 21
Prosecutorial regularity, presumption of—,
burden of proof, as justification for,, § 9
criticisms of,, § 14
Prostitution laws, discriminatory enforcement of—,
defense to criminal prosecution, as constituting,, §§ 2, 8
proof of,, §§ 25– 34
selective enforcement, sufficiency of evidence showing,, § 6
Purpose, see Intent to discriminate
Racial discrimination—,
arbitrary or invidious discrimination, as constituting,, §§ 2, 8
rebuttal of evidence showing,, §§ 10, 13
Rebuttal,, §§ 10, 13
Regulations, discriminatory enforcement of,, § 1
Religious discrimination—,
arbitrary or invidious discrimination, as constituting,, §§ 2, 8
rebuttal of evidence showing,, §§ 10, 13
Remedies and relief available,, § 4
Selective enforcement—,
generally,, § 6
element of claim,, §§ 1, 5, 6
evidence of,, §§ 6, 11
permissibility of, on basis of nonarbitrary criteria,, §§ 1, 5, 8
rebuttal of,, § 13
unintentional, effect of,, § 7
Selective service law, evidence showing discriminatory enforcement of,, §§ 11,
20
Sex crimes, discriminatory enforcement of—,
defense to criminal prosecution, as constituting,, §§ 2, 8
prostitution laws, see Prostitution laws, discriminatory enforcement of
selective enforcement, sufficiency of evidence showing,, § 6
Statistical evidence—,
generally,, §§ 6– 8, 10– 12
arbitrary or invidious criteria, as proof of use of,, §§ 8, 11
discovery of,, § 12
intent to discriminate, as proof of,, § 7
prima facie case, use of to establish,, § 10
selective enforcement, as proof of,, §§ 6, 11
testimony concerning,, §§ 27, 31
Sunday laws, discriminatory enforcement of—,
defense to criminal prosecution, as constituting,, § 2
Page 5 of 99
evidence of,, § 11
investigation of defendant showing,, § 15
proof of,, §§ 16– 24
Victimless crimes, discriminatory enforcement as defense to prosecution for,, §
2
Violations by others—,
evidence of,, §§ 6, 7, 11
failure to prosecute, testimony concerning,, §§ 18, 19, 22, 28, 34
investigation by defendant showing—,
evidence of,, §§ 11, 15
testimony concerning,, §§ 33, 34
knowledge of authorities concerning—,
police knowledge, testimony concerning,, §§ 17, 27, 28, 34
prosecutorial knowledge, testimony concerning,, § 19
requirement of,, § 7
necessity of showing,, §§ 6, 11
statistical evidence showing, testimony concerning,, § 31
testimony concerning,, §§ 17, 22, 27, 28, 33
Topic of Article:
This fact question may arise in a criminal proceeding where the defendant seeks
dismissal of the charges or an acquittal on the ground that the law he is
accused of violating has been selectively and discriminatorily enforced by
prosecutorial or other government officials. The fact question may also arise in
a civil proceeding seeking injunctive relief against such discriminatory
enforcement.
I. Background
§ 1. In general
[Cumulative Supplement]
Page 6 of 99
greater recognition to the right to nondiscriminatory enforcement of criminal
laws.[FN3]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
Page 7 of 99
Improper selective prosecution arises when a defendant has been singled out for
prosecution when others similarly situated have not been prosecuted and the
prosecutor's reasons for doing so were impermissible. U.S. v. Graham, 146 F.3d 6
(1st Cir. 1998).
Court may consider alien's claim that immigration laws are being selectively
enforced against him in order to deport him because of his association with
certain groups since foreign policy powers which permit political branches of
government great discretion to determine which aliens to exclude from entering
country do not authorize those political branches to subject aliens who reside
here to fundamentally different First Amendment associational rights. American-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v Reno (1995, CA9 Cal) 70 F3d 1045, 95 CDOS 8608,
95 Daily Journal DAR 14893.
Defendant's due process rights are not violated by referral of his case for
federal rather than state prosecution unless defendant can prove that federal
prosecutors' decision is based on impermissible considerations even where motive
of federal prosecution is that harsher penalties are possible. United States v
Nance (1992, CA9 Or) 962 F2d 860, 92 CDOS 3270, 92 Daily Journal DAR 5145, amd
(CA9) 92 CDOS 4208, 92 Daily Journal DAR 6654.
Prisoner failed to state 42 USCA § 1983 equal protection claim based on state
statute providing for early release of some prisoners but not others in attempt
to alleviate overcrowding, where state had legitimate interest in designating
that only prisoners convicted of lesser crimes or subject to no higher than
medium security could be released early, and there was no evidence that
plaintiff prisoner was being treated differently than similarly situated
prisoners. Keeton v Oklahoma (1994, CA10 Okla) 32 F3d 451.
Page 8 of 99
While some discretion is inherent in prosecutorial decision making, it cannot be
without bounds, and a crime defined by statute is too open-ended when the
statute could be used to prosecute as a crime the most insignificant of
transgressions or to misuse the judicial process. Roque v State (1995, Fla) 664
So 2d 928, 20 FLW S 476.
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[Cumulative Supplement]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
Page 9 of 99
To establish vindictive prosecution, defendant must prove that the prosecutor
had some stake in deterring the exercise of his right to trial, and that the
prosecutor's conduct was unreasonable. U.S. v. Walls, 293 F.3d 959 (6th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 454 (U.S. 2002) and cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 543
(U.S. 2002); West's Key Number Digest, Criminal Law 37.15(1).
A defendant claiming vindictive prosecution must show that (1) the prosecutor
harbored animus such that the prosecutor could be considered a "stalking horse,"
and (2) he would not have been prosecuted except for the animus. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14. U.S. v. Wilson, 120 F. Supp. 2d 550 (E.D. N.C. 2000); West's
Key Number Digest, Criminal Law 37.15(1).
Page 10 of 99
appeal denied, 189 Ill. 2d 667, 246 Ill. Dec. 918, 731 N.E.2d 767 (2000); West's
Key Number Digest, Criminal Law 330.
Page 11 of 99
Realistic likelihood of vindictiveness: As matter of law, prosecutor acted
vindictively following defendant's withdrawal of his guilty plea to various
offenses associated with series of home invasion robberies and exercised his
constitutional right to trial; record demonstrated "realistic likelihood of
vindictiveness" given that State retaliated against defendant by doubling the
number of charges against him, by increasing its sentencing recommendation ten-
fold, by distending already stacked multiple kidnapping charges against him
which were clearly incidental to robberies, and by citing no legitimate,
articulable, and objective reasons to justify its actions, with the result that
defendant's sentence far exceeded that of his more culpable codefendants.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 6, 14; West's RCWA Const. Art. 1, §§ 21, 22. State v.
Korum, 120 Wash. App. 686, 86 P.3d 166 (Div. 2 2004); West's Key Number Digest,
Mandamus 37.15(2).
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[Cumulative Supplement]
There has been considerable disagreement concerning the extent to which proof of
discriminatory enforcement constitutes a defense to criminal charges. Some
courts have indicated that the defense is available in any criminal prosecution,
regardless of how serious the crime; other courts have opined that the defense
may be raised only in a prosecution for an offense that is relatively minor or
malum prohibitum, but not in a prosecution for a serious offense that is malum
in se; a few courts have even indicated that discriminatory enforcement is never
a valid defense to a criminal prosecution.[FN17] The trend appears to be toward
the view that the defense is available in a prosecution for any crime, even a
serious one, and that no distinction should be made between crimes that are
malum prohibitum and those that are malum in se.[FN18] Moreover, where the
discriminatory enforcement pattern involves many penal statutes, rather than one
specific statute, the claim may be raised with respect to the entire enforcement
pattern.[FN19]
Discriminatory enforcement cases have usually involved claims that some group or
class was invidiously discriminated against, and it is clear that, where the
defense is otherwise available, proof of purposeful discrimination on the basis
of race, religion, or other arbitrary classification will establish the
defense.[FN20] Thus, it has been said that invidious prosecutorial
Page 12 of 99
discrimination against a class is illegal, whether the "class consists of black
or white, Jew or Catholic, Irishman or Japanese, United Farm Worker or
Teamster."[FN21] Moreover, although it has sometimes been argued that
discrimination on the basis of class membership is a prerequisite to
availability of the defense, the generally accepted view is that discrimination
against an individual, as well as a class, is also prohibited and will give rise
to the defense.[FN22]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
Property owners could not establish that city officials engaged in selective
enforcement of city building and fire codes against them, for purpose of § 1983
claim, absent showing that they belonged to an identifiable group, such as a
particular race or religion, or a group exercising constitutional rights, and
that they were targeted for law enforcement action as a result of that group
status. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Banks v. City of Whitehall, 344 F.3d 550, 2003 FED
App. 0340P (6th Cir. 2003); West's Key Number Digest, Civil Rights 1015.
Defendant was not victim of selective prosecution for resisting arrest and
obstructing governmental administration arising from incident in which he became
embroiled in argument with pizza shop employees after they refused to serve his
Page 13 of 99
brother, where evidence showed that pizza shop employees immediately complied
with police officers' order to stop fighting and that sole basis for defendant's
prosecution was his subsequent attack on police officers. People v England
(1993, 2d Dept) 191 AD2d 706, 595 NYS2d 793.
Prosecutor who, on his own motion, had previously dismissed several other cases
for alleged speeding violations in same geographic area where defendant was
charged with speeding violation, because speed sign was obliterated by foliage,
acted arbitrarily and capriciously, in violation of defendant's right to equal
protection under both Fourteenth Amendment and CLS NY Const Art I § 11 in
failing to afford defendant same treatment extended to other defendants in same
circumstances by opposing his motion to dismiss charge. In any event prosecutor
was collaterally estopped to deny sign obliteration in defendant's case,
necessitating dismissal of charge. People v Fox (1993, Just Ct) 157 Misc 2d 238,
596 NYS2d 984.
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[Cumulative Supplement]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
Fact that defendants who plead generally receive more lenient treatment, or at
least a government recommendation of more lenient treatment than co-defendants
who go to trial, does not in and of itself constitute an unconstitutional burden
on defendant's right to go to trial and prove his case. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.
U.S. v. Yeje-Cabrera, 430 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005); West's Key Number Digest,
Sentencing and Punishment 115(3).
Page 14 of 99
Sarracino, 340 F.3d 1148, 62 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 992 (10th Cir. 2003); West's
Key Number Digest, Criminal Law 37.15(1).
Record did not refute presumption, arising from judge's imposition of harsher
sentence following trial than was contemplated in failed plea negotiations in
which judge was involved, that sentence was vindictive; record reflected that
judge was aware of defendant's criminal record prior to trial and referred to
defendant's previous violations of probation, as well as his previous juvenile
record, while discussing state's plea offer. Harris v. State, 845 So. 2d 329
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2003); West's Key Number Digest, Sentencing and
Punishment 115(3).
[Top of Section]
Page 15 of 99
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[Cumulative Supplement]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[Cumulative Supplement]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
Black defendant charged with capital murder, in connection with killing of two
whites and one black in coffee shop, failed to present colorable claim of
selective prosecution under Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA) sufficient to
support discovery request seeking corroborative information, when defendant
stated that total of five persons were killed in police precinct where killings
occurred and majority of white population of District of Columbia resided, with
federal prosecution occurring in 60% of cases, while there were 301 homicides in
District generally with only one other request for death penalty. 18 U.S.C.A. §§
3591 et seq. U.S. v. Cooper, 91 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D.D.C. 2000); West's Key Number
Digest, Criminal Law 37.10(2).
Defendant failed to produce even some evidence that the decision to seek the
death penalty in his case was made with discriminatory purpose or that it had a
discriminatory effect, as required to entitle him to discovery regarding the
decision-making process used by the Justice Department and the Attorney General;
Page 16 of 99
while statistics indicated that the Attorney General decided to seek the death
penalty against 30% of the white defendants charged under a federal arson
statute, and against 20% of the non-white defendants charged with the same
offense, those statistics were based on only 15 defendants. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 5; Fed.Rules Cr.Proc.Rule 16(a)(1)(C), 18 U.S.C.A.. U.S. v. Minerd,
182 F. Supp. 2d 459 (W.D. Pa. 2002); West's Key Number Digest, Criminal Law
37.10(1).
Trial court did not err in refusing to allow defendant to call district attorney
general and assistant prosecutor as witnesses on issue of state's abuse of
discretion in pursuing death penalty, where defendant did not allege facts to
show how his constitutional rights were violated. Cooper v State (1992, Tenn
Crim) 847 SW2d 521, post-conviction proceeding (Tenn) 849 SW2d 744.
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[Cumulative Supplement]
While some courts have indicated that a claim of discriminatory enforcement must
be based on the actions of the prosecutor, most courts have rejected this view,
recognizing that the police or other investigative agencies may be responsible
for discrimination and that the prosecutor is answerable for those who prepare
or assist in the preparation of the case.[FN34]
Although discriminatory enforcement claims therefore are most often based on the
actions of the police or prosecutors, such claims may also be based on the
actions of other government officials who are not normally involved in the
prosecutorial decision-making process. In an appropriate case a claim of
discriminatory enforcement may be premised on the actions of judges,[FN35] or on
the discriminatory application of an ordinance by a city council or other local
legislative body.[FN36] Moreover, a claim of discriminatory enforcement may also
be based on the actions of county officials generally, including the prosecutor,
the sheriff, and other law enforcement agents.[FN37]
Page 17 of 99
Finally, many penal laws are either generally unenforced or only passively
enforced, and decisions to prosecute are sometimes merely reactions to
complaints by private citizens.[FN38] It has been held that a policy of
enforcement only on complaint invites discrimination by one group against
another, and that, where violations of a generally unenforced statute were
prosecuted only at the instance of a union for its own private purposes, the
actions of the union were attributable to the state and discriminatory
enforcement was established.[FN39]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[Cumulative Supplement]
Page 18 of 99
Where discriminatory enforcement is recognized as a defense to a criminal
prosecution, some courts have held that the appropriate procedure is to raise
the defense by means of a pretrial motion to dismiss or to quash the indictment,
while others have held that the contention should be raised as a defense at the
trial itself.[FN43] The trend appears to be toward the view that such a claim is
more appropriately raised by means of pretrial motion, on which the court may
hold a hearing and take evidence if necessary.[FN44]
However, other courts have held that injunctive relief is appropriate to prevent
or restrain discriminatory enforcement of a criminal law, such courts often
noting that an injunction can be framed in such a manner that it does not
prevent all enforcement of a valid law, but merely prohibits discriminatory
enforcement, thereby permitting nondiscriminatory prosecution of subsequent
offenders if the prosecutorial authorities choose to do so.[FN47]
It has been noted that when the criminal laws are being discriminatorily
enforced against a class, individual relief is not an adequate remedy for the
entire class, and class relief is necessary. Although there are sometimes great
obstacles to effective class relief,[FN48] it has been held that in an
appropriate case injunctive relief may be granted to prevent future
discriminatory enforcement against members of the class.[FN49]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
Page 19 of 99
individuals of the same persuasion, had not been prosecuted, but, rather, one
may base action for selective prosecution on government's failure to prosecute
individuals of the same viewpoint as person arrested if government's motivation
was an unconstitutional one, for example, if reason for selecting particular
person charged was to chill exercise of that person's First Amendment rights.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1. U.S. v. Vazquez, 145 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 1998).
State prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity for decision not to prosecute
alleged gang leader for death threat against robbery witness who later was shot
and killed by gang members, since decision whether to prosecute is absolutely
privileged, but prosecutor was entitled only to qualified immunity against
claims that he exposed witness to unreasonable risk by forcing face-to-face
identification and that he failed to provide police protection to preclude fatal
attack on witness, since last two claims did not arise from traditional
prosecutorial functions. Ying Jing Gan v New York (1993, CA2) 996 F2d 522.
Failure to raise selective prosecution claim before trial was not excused by
fact that trial counsel, who had been serving as cocounsel in defendant's case,
was not officially appointed by court until two days before trial. United States
v Bryant (1993, CA10 Utah) 5 F3d 474.
Page 20 of 99
Although a selective-prosecution claim is not a defense on the merits to the
criminal charge itself, a defendant may raise it as an independent assertion
that the prosecutor has brought the charge for reasons forbidden by the
Constitution. State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St. 3d 181, 2002 -Ohio- 2128, 767 N.E.2d
166 (2002), cert. denied, 2002 WL 31308791 (U.S. 2002); West's Key Number
Digest, Criminal Law 37.10(1).
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[Cumulative Supplement]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
Bad faith finding for award of attorneys' fees: "Bad faith" on part of
government in taking position in an unsuccessful criminal prosecution, as will
permit a prevailing defendant to recover attorney fees and expenses under Hyde
Amendment, involves not simply bad judgment or negligence, but rather, implies
the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity;
bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design or ill will. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary,
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, § 617, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A note.
U.S. v. True, 250 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 2001); West's Key Number Digest, Costs 308.
Page 21 of 99
the United States was vexatious, has both a subjective and objective component;
government's position is "vexatious" if it has a subjective element of
maliciousness, or an intent to harass, and if it is objectively deficient. 18
U.S.C.A. § 3006A, note. U.S. v. Sherburne, 249 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2001); West's
Key Number Digest, Costs 308.
Federal defendants who sought recovery of reasonable attorney's fees and other
litigation expenses following prosecution, pursuant to Hyde Amendment, were not
subject to separate provision within Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) limiting
fee recovery to $125 per hour, since exception to EAJA cap in instances of "bad
faith" prosecution was consistent with Hyde Amendment's granting of fees and
expenses in cases of prosecution that was "vexatious, frivolous or in bad
faith"; section of EAJA imposing fee cap in instances of "substantially
unjustified" litigation was inapplicable, notwithstanding Hyde Amendment's
adoption of general procedures and limitations of EAJA. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412. U.S.
v. Aisenberg, 247 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (M.D. Fla. 2003); West's Key Number Digest,
Costs 308.
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[Cumulative Supplement]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
Page 22 of 99
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[Cumulative Supplement]
While some courts have required a showing of a fixed and continuous policy of
discriminatory enforcement before they will find a violation of equal
protection,[FN59] the general view appears to be that the discrimination need
not be systematic or of long duration, and that one act of discriminatory
enforcement, especially if directed at an individual rather than a class, is
sufficient to sustain a claim.[FN60]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
In action under Civil Rights Act, 42 USCA § 1983, defendant's claim of selective
prosecution was not supported by evidence where defendant failed to demonstrate
that decision to prosecute was intentional form of discrimination against him,
that others similarly situated had not been prosecuted, and that decision to
prosecute had been motivated by impermissible reason. Willhauck v Halpin (1991,
CA1 Mass) 953 F2d 689.
Page 23 of 99
Defendant failed to establish vindictive or selective prosecution on drug charge
based on defendant's prior challenge to earlier governmental attempt to forfeit
his vehicle where there was no direct evidence of actual vindictiveness by
prosecutor even though defendant's forfeiture claim brought his unprosecuted
activities to prosecutor's attention. United States v White (1992, CA2 NY) 972
F2d 16.
It has also been held that selectivity may be based in part on the ground of
vocal opposition to the law; thus, vigorous prosecution of tax protestors for
violations of tax laws held to demonstrate a legitimate interest in punishing
flagrant violators and deterring other violations. United States v Johnson (CA5
Tex) 577 F2d 1304, reh den (CA5 Tex) 584 F2d 389 (the court also noting that tax
laws are generally enforced to the extent allowed by prosecutorial resources).
Defendant, former police chief of commuter railroad company who was indicted for
his alleged improper use of state computer system containing individual criminal
histories, was not entitled to dismissal of indictment for invidious selective
prosecution since (1) statutes under which defendant was charged were only
recently enacted, (2) another police chief who apparently misused computer was
permitted to resign to avoid prosecution, but defendant refused such offer, (3)
prosecutor stated that defendant was being prosecuted because lengthy
investigation revealed that he had abused his authority and engaged in repeated
Page 24 of 99
serious violations of law, and (4) defendant failed to show that alleged
selectiveapplication of law was deliberately based on racial, religious or other
impermissible standard. People v Esposito (1989) 144 Misc 2d 919, 545 NYS2d 468,
later proceeding 144 Misc 2d 1085, 545 NYS2d 673, later proceeding (Sup) 146
Misc 2d 847, 553 NYS2d 612 and affd (1st Dept) 160 AD2d 378, 554 NYS2d 16, app
den 76 NY2d 787, 559 NYS2d 992, 559 NE2d 686.
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[Cumulative Supplement]
To prove actual selectivity, a defendant basically must prove that, out of the
total number of people who violated a given law or laws, only a few were
prosecuted. In other words, the defendant must show both the relevant population
of violators and that not all of the violators are prosecuted.[FN61]
Page 25 of 99
the number of men who committed the crime.[FN62] Similarly, in a case dealing
with a charge of sexual perversion, it was pointed out that the defendant
alleging discriminatory enforcement must show a persistent failure to prosecute
both men and women involved in prostitution.[FN63]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[Cumulative Supplement]
Page 26 of 99
intentional selectivity in a case where the selectivity is based on subtle
criteria, as opposed to a situation in which the criteria of selectivity are
more obvious.[FN68]
Deliberate selectivity may in some cases appear on the face of the action taken
by the prosecutor, but more often is shown either by direct evidence indicating
prosecutorial selectivity on the basis of certain criteria, or by statistical
evidence indicating enforcement against certain classes or persons possessing
certain characteristics, but not against other classes or persons.[FN69]
Generally, if the defendant can prove a pattern of enforcement indicating
policies of selectivity, the requirement of deliberateness can be met, and it is
unnecessary to actually prove specific knowledge and intent on the part of
prosecutorial authorities or police.[FN70] Thus, evidence showing prosecution of
only a few violators, coupled with evidence indicating that the information-
gathering system of the authorities should have revealed other offenders, was
held sufficient to establish intentional selective prosecution, even though
authorities disclaimed knowledge of any other offenders.[FN71]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
Page 27 of 99
reasons for having brought prosecution against defendant in federal court rather
than in state court. United States v Johnson (1991, DC Colo) 765 F Supp 658.
Defendant failed to establish his claim that because of his race he was victim
of selective enforcement of gambling statute following raid of illegal game
parlor, since defendant failed to allege that government singled out black
persons for prosecution. Dix v State (1994, Ind App) 639 NE2d 363, reh den (Nov
3, 1994).
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[Cumulative Supplement]
Page 28 of 99
In cases where other standards of selectivity are shown, however, there is no
clear analytic framework for determining whether such standards are arbitrary or
unjustifiable.[FN80] Although seldom defined in the context of discriminatory
prosecution, an arbitrary or unjustifiable criterion is one that has no rational
relationship to the purpose of the penal law allegedly violated, and the issue
of whether a particular criterion is arbitrary is generally a mixed question of
fact and law.[FN81] One test often used to determine whether certain criteria
are arbitrary or permissible is whether the legislature could have used such
criteria in enacting the statute.[FN82]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
Substantive due process rights of property owners were not violated when city
and city officials rigorously enforced city's building and fire codes in a
Page 29 of 99
specific area of town in order to shut down businesses around which drug dealers
and prostitutes often congregated, where owners either admitted the existence of
various code violations or made necessary repairs to properties to get city to
lift condemnation orders. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. Banks v. City of Whitehall,
344 F.3d 550, 2003 FED App. 0340P (6th Cir. 2003); West's Key Number Digest,
Constitutional Law 278.2(1).
In Hatheway v Secretary of Army (1981, CA9 Cal) 641 F2d 1376, cert den (1981)
454 US 864, 70 L Ed 2d 164, 102 S Ct 324, an army lieutenant who had been
convicted by a court-martial of sodomy claimed that the army's prosecution of
homosexual sodomy cases, but not heterosexual sodomy cases, amounted to
unconstitutional selective enforcement. The court rejected the claim, holding
that the government has a compelling interest in maintaining a strong military
force, which interest is served by prohibition of homosexual conduct among
servicemen, and that a valid reason therefore existed for prosecuting only
homosexual acts of sodomy.
See People v Superior Court of Alameda County, 19 Cal 3d 338, 138 Cal Rptr 66,
562 P2d 1315, where the trial court's finding that the prostitution law was not
discriminatorily enforced against women was upheld. The court held that the
admitted practice of using more male than female decoys was adopted not to
discriminate against women, but as a consequence of the sexually neutral policy
of concentrating on the "profiteer" rather than the customer; that evidence of
enforcement efforts directed against pimps and other non-prostitutes showed that
at least one-half of the vice unit's resources were devoted to prosecutions of
men; and that the policy of subjecting prostitutes, but not customers, who were
arrested to incarceration and quarantine for veneral disease testing was applied
to both male and female prostitutes and was based on valid reasons not related
to sexual discrimination.
In Chavez v United States (1985, Dist Col App) 499 A2d 813, the court rejected a
claim that a prosecutorial policy of refusing to allow illegal aliens to enter a
diversion program for first offenders constituted invidious discrimination. The
court noted that illegal aliens are not members of a suspect class, that an
illegal alien is chargeable with at least two crimes—illegal entry and willful
failure to register—in addition to the crime for which he was arrested, and thus
is not classifiable as a firstoffender, and that the defendant failed to show
that other similarly situated persons (for example, those with significant
arrest records) were treated differently from illegal aliens.
Page 30 of 99
To establish selective prosecution in violation of the equal protection clause,
a defendant must show that he has been singled out for prosecution while others
similarly situated have not been prosecuted for similar conduct and that the
government's discriminatory selection was based upon an impermissible ground,
such as race, religion, or exercise of a First Amendment right to free speech.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 1, 14. State v. 192 Coin-Operated Video Game Machines,
338 S.C. 176, 525 S.E.2d 872 (2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 62 (U.S. 2000);
West's Key Number Digest, Constitutional Law 250.1(3).
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
[Cumulative Supplement]
While this burden has often been called a heavy one, and is frequently justified
by the presumption of prosecutorial regularity, there are no clear standards as
to the quantum of proof required or the type of proof that is sufficient.[FN89]
Although the most common requirement appears to be proof by a mere preponderance
of the evidence, and the trend appears in that direction, some courts have
required proof of discriminatory enforcement by a clear preponderance of the
evidence, and other courts have ignored the issue.[FN90] The uncertainty
surrounding the burden and quantum of proof required has sometimes resulted in
claims being rejected where the evidence overwhelmingly indicated invidiously
discriminatory prosecution.[FN91]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
Page 31 of 99
prosecuting others who were similarly situated, and (2) that the reasons for any
such discrimination were illegitimate. U.S. v. Serafino, 281 F.3d 327 (1st Cir.
2002); West's Key Number Digest, Criminal Law 37.10(2).
Defendant who was indicted on federal firearms charge after being acquitted in
state court murder trial failed to prove prosecutorial vindictiveness; district
court's findings that state prosecutor and investigators did not act with
vindictive animus as result of defendant's exercise of right to fair trial in
murder case were not clearly erroneous, and defendant failed to show that
federal prosecutor did not make ultimate decision to bring indictment or did so
with actual animus. U.S. v. Spears, 159 F.3d 1081 (7th Cir. 1998).
The defendant has the burden of proving the government engaged in selective
prosecution. To make a prima facie case a defendant must show: (1) people
similarly situated to him were not prosecuted, and (2) the decision to prosecute
was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. U.S. v. Hirsch, 360 F.3d 860 (8th
Cir. 2004); West's Key Number Digest, Mandamus 37.10(1).
Fact that 2 weeks before knife carrying incident inmate had received payment of
$28,000 in settlement of litigation he had brought against Department of
Correction for illegal segregation and the postulated fact of past breaches of
the statutory duty to notify did not together warrant presumption of
prosecutorial vindictiveness or retaliation with respect to knife carrying
incident. Commonwealth v Smith (1996) 40 Mass App 770, 667 NE2d 1160, review den
423 Mass 1108, 671 NE2d 951.
Page 32 of 99
Prosecutors have wide discretion in deciding what actions will be prosecuted,
and the person claiming selective prosecution carries the burden of showing that
they were arbitrarily or unconstitutionally targeted. Farris v. State, 764 So.
2d 411 (Miss. 2000); West's Key Number Digest, District and Prosecuting
Attorneys 8.
Assertion that there had been no similar prosecutions for more than 15 years,
without more, did not establish selective enforcement of city ordinance. People
v Bergen Beach Yacht Club (1994, City Crim Ct) 160 Misc 2d 939, 612 NYS2d 545.
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
Page 33 of 99
[Cumulative Supplement]
It has been widely recognized that placing the burden of proof on the defendant
to establish all elements of discriminatory prosecution makes it extremely
difficult to prove such a claim.[FN92] In recent years there has been a trend
toward some reduction in the burden on the defendant, and a number of courts
have held that the burden is on the defendant to establish a prima facie case of
improper discrimination, after which the burden of proof shifts to the
prosecution to justify the discrimination.[FN93]
The concept of a prima facie case that will shift the burden to the prosecution
is premised basically on the idea that the state, as the party with knowledge of
and the power to produce the facts necessary to rebut an inference of
discrimination, should be required to produce the facts once a preliminary
showing of discrimination has been made.[FN94] The concept has been utilized
especially in the federal courts, and is essentially the same standard of proof
used in cases involving racial discrimination.[FN95]
The test has been stated variously by different courts, with some speaking in
terms of proof sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt or to establish a prima
facie case, and others tending to speak of proof sufficient to raise an
inference or strong inference of purposeful discrimination.[FN96] Regardless of
the wording used to describe the test, once the defendant presents proof
sufficient to raise an inference of discriminatory selection, or proof
sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to the prosecutor's purpose, a prima
facie case is established, and the burden shifts to the prosecution.[FN97]
The amount of evidence necessary to establish a prima facie case has not clearly
been specified,[FN98] and will probably differ depending on the facts of the
particular case. Generally, however, the party claiming discriminatory
enforcement must introduce some evidence indicating selective prosecution based
on some arbitrary or invidious standard.[FN99] Such proof may consist of
statistical evidence indicating prosecution based on some characteristic or
characteristics irrelevant to law enforcement purposes, or of evidence
indicating prosecution of only a very few of the many knowable violators of the
law.[FN1]
Once the defendant has established a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to
the prosecution to present evidence to rebut the inference of improper purpose
or motive.[FN2] The amount of proof necessary on rebuttal will differ with the
classification or standard of selectivity involved. If the selectivity is based
on a suspect classification, such as race or religion, or on the exercise of
some fundamental right, the prosecution can meet its burden only by presenting
compelling evidence of nondiscriminatory enforcement, or evidence showing a
compelling state interest for use of such a classification, and prosecutorial
discretion is an insufficient explanation.[FN3] If the criteria of selectivity
are not based on suspect classifications or fundamental rights, the prosecution
can meet its burden on rebuttal by showing that the criteria have some rational
relationship to a legitimate state interest, and proof of an exercise of valid
prosecutorial discretion would be sufficient.[FN4]
Page 34 of 99
The concept of the prima facie case lowers the amount of proof necessary to
compel the prosecution to present rebuttal evidence. However, the ultimate
burden of persuasion remains on the defendant, provided the prosecution is able
to present rebuttal evidence.[FN5] If the government is unable to meet its
burden on rebuttal, then the defendant is entitled to dismissal of the
case.[FN6]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
Page 35 of 99
To raise a reasonable doubt as to the propriety of charges added before trial, a
defendant alleging vindictive prosecution must affirmatively show through
objective evidence that the prosecutorial conduct at issue was motivated by some
form of prosecutorial animus, such as a personal stake in the outcome of the
case or an attempt to seek self-vindication. U.S. v. Falcon, 347 F.3d 1000 (7th
Cir. 2003); West's Key Number Digest, Criminal Law 37.15(1).
To state claim for vindictive enforcement, plaintiff must show: (1) exercise of
protected right; (2) prosecutor's "stake" in exercise of that right; (3)
reasonableness of prosecutor's conduct; and presumably, (4) that prosecution was
initiated with intent to punish plaintiff for exercise of protected right.
Heaton v. City of Princeton, 47 F. Supp. 2d 841 (W.D. Ky. 1997), aff'd, 178 F.3d
1294 (6th Cir. 1999); West's Key Number Digest, Criminal Law 37.15(1).
Defendant, a circuit court judge, failed to make prima facie showing that he was
being singled out for prosecution for attempt to evade or defeat payment of
sales tax, and thus, was not entitled to evidentiary hearing on motion;
defendant provided no factual basis showing he was singled out for prosecution
Page 36 of 99
while others similarly situated were not, and judges were not protected class,
for purposes of requirement that defendant show that motive for prosecution was
impermissibly based on race, religion, or exercise of constitutional right.
Owens v. State, 354 Ark. 644, 128 S.W.3d 445 (2003); West's Key Number Digest,
Mandamus 37.10(2).
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
§ 11. Evidence
[Cumulative Supplement]
Direct evidence of improper motive is usually hard to come by, since law
enforcement officials will rarely admit to the use of any improper criteria, and
circumstantial evidence normally must be relied on to create an inference of
improper discrimination.[FN9]
Page 37 of 99
In addition to introducing evidence showing the characteristics of those
prosecuted, a party claiming discriminatory enforcement must also introduce
evidence showing that the known or knowable population of violators is much
larger and includes people who do not share the characteristics that are alleged
to be the criteria of selectivity.[FN12] The defendant must not overlook the
necessity of proving the total population of violators, since failure to
introduce evidence on the issue may result in an adverse decision,
notwithstanding overwhelming statistical evidence of selectivity.[FN13] Such
proof may consist of evidence showing massive and flagrant violations of the
law,[FN14] or evidence of other specific unprosecuted violators who are known,
or through the use of normal information-gathering techniques should be known,
to the prosecution.[FN15]
In some cases the defendant may be able to elicit direct evidence from
prosecutorial or police authorities indicating discriminatory enforcement. For
example, statements of broad prosecutorial policy may suggest standards of
enforcement used by the authorities.[FN19] Such evidence may be elicited through
examination of government officials or through introduction of government
documents and may, if it establishes enforcement of a statute only against
certain types or classes of violators, be strong evidence of discriminatory
enforcement.[FN20] Thus, in a case where the district attorney and police
officials all testified that their policy was not to enforce a Sunday closing
law except on complaint by citizens, discriminatory enforcement was found to
exist.[FN21] Similarly, in a case involving prosecution for failure to carry a
draft card, evidence of a government policy statement of nonprosecution for such
offenses, coupled with other evidence indicating that the defendant was
prosecuted as punishment for his exercise of first amendment rights, was held to
establish a prima facie case of discriminatory enforcement.[FN22]
Page 38 of 99
discriminatory enforcement.[FN23] For example, the participation of high-level
government officials in the decision to prosecute the defendant, or the
preparation of a special background dossier on the defendant is evidence
indicating discriminatory prosecution.[FN24] In addition, in any case in which
the prosecutor has admitted to the defendant that his prosecution was prompted
by improper considerations, evidence of such admission should be
introduced.[FN25]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
Speeding motorcyclist charged with reckless driving following high speed chase
was not "similarly situated" to companion motorcyclist who was also speeding,
but not charged with reckless driving, as required to demonstrate selective
prosecution of speeding motorcyclist, where speeding motorcyclist was pursued by
county officers and attempted to evade officers, but companion motorcyclist did
not. Poole v. County of Otero, 271 F.3d 955 (10th Cir. 2001); West's Key Number
Digest, Counties 146.
The court held that the plaintiffs, three "adult" book stores engaged in the
sale of sexually explicit materials, were entitled to preliminary injunctive
relief from harassment through improper use of the obscenity laws, where the
evidence showed that, as part of New York City's campaign to clean up the
midtown area, building, fire, and health code inspections and enforcement had
been aimed disproportionately at sexually oriented businesses; that such
administrative code enforcement actions had often been based on information
known to be false; that law enforcement officials had decided to concentrate
their efforts on the plaintiff bookstores, in connection with which almost daily
arrests and seizures were made, with between 20 and 30 arrests on obscenity
charges being made in less than three weeks; that the arrests were effected at
such times and in such ways as to have the maximum negative impact on the
plaintiffs' business operations; that the policy of releasing arrestees on "desk
appearance tickets" was discontinued with respect to persons arrested in adult
book stores on obscenity charges, thereby forcing such persons to spend the
night in jail; that many of the arrests and seizures were illegal; that there
had not been prosecution of any of the arrests; and that public statements by
and memoranda of various public officials confirmed the inference that the
defendants were engaged in a persistent pattern of misconduct aimed at
eliminating the sale of all sexually oriented materials in the midtown area, and
particularly in the plaintiffs' stores, in violation of the First Amendment.
Black Jack Distributors, Inc. v Beame (DC NY) 433 F Supp 1297.
Page 39 of 99
That pictures of Iranian clerics were seized during search of defendant's home
but picture of former United States President and his wife was not did not raise
inference of discrimination supporting claim of selective prosecution asserted
by defendant, who was charged with making transfers of funds and equipment to
Iran in violation of International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and
executive order, inasmuch as pictures of clerics could possibly be proof of
motive, whereas picture of former President and his wife would prove nothing for
the prosecution. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, §§ 203, 206, 50
U.S.C.A. §§ 1702, 1705. U.S. v. Anvari-Hamedani, 378 F. Supp. 2d 821 (N.D. Ohio
2005); West's Key Number Digest, Criminal Law 37.10(2).
Statement in United States Attorneys' Manual that robbery provision of Hobbs Act
was to be utilized "only in instances involving organized crime or wide-ranging
schemes" did not prohibit Hobbs Act robbery prosecution that allegedly did not
involve such circumstances; Manual provided only guidance, and could not be
relied upon to create any rights. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1951. U.S. v. Hodge, 77 F. Supp.
2d 674 (D.V.I. 1999); West's Key Number Digest, Criminal Law 29(11).
In Griffin v Municipal Court for Desert Judicial Dist. 20 Cal 3d 300, 142 Cal
Rptr 286, 571 P2d 997, it was held that the two defendants, former sheriff's
deputies charged with willful inhumanity or oppression of a prisoner, had made a
prima facie showing of discriminatory enforcement based on the fact that one
deputy was black, where they submitted declarations alleging nine specific
unprosecuted incidents of prisoner beatings and maltreatment by white officers
over a period of five years, such incidents being as serious as or more serious
than the incident charged against the defendants.
Page 40 of 99
A defendant appealed his conviction of several tax-related misdemeanors on the
ground of selective prosecution, arguing that he was singled out for prosecution
because of his affiliation with an organization opposed to personal income tax
laws. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that defendant failed to present
convincing statistical evidence for discriminatory selective prosecution.
Defendant pointed out that in 1988 five of eight charges for tax-related
offenses initiated by the department of revenue special investigations unit were
against persons affiliated with his organization. He stated, by contrast, that
600,000 out of 3.2 million North Carolinians did not file a tax return and could
have been prosecuted by the unit. The court found that defendant failed to show
that his prosecution was based on his affiliation with a recognizable, distinct
class that suffered discrimination while others similarly situated were ignored.
Defendant's statistical evidence compared dissimilarly situated groups in
contrasting his treatment with that of other North Carolinians who didn't pay
personal income taxes in 1988. It also ignored the fact that preceding 1988 the
department of revenue initiated charges against numerous non-organization
members. Defendant failed to include the number of prosecutions initiated by the
department outside the special investigations unit or the number of prosecutions
that occurred under other statutes. Finally, a special investigator from the
department of revenue testified that when he began his investigation he was not
aware of defendant's affiliation with the organization. State v Davis (1989) 96
NC App 545, 386 SE2d 743.
Fact that only three of five police officers involved in arrest and death of
arrestee were prosecuted did not support finding of selective prosecution, as
would bar retrial of the prosecuted officers following mistrial, though
coroner's jury had recommended that all five officers face criminal charges, and
Commonwealth's medical theory was that combined actions of all five officers had
caused arrestee's death, absent showing of impermissible reason for such
selection; one of uncharged officers had been chosen to establish corpus delicti
of crime based on fact that he had been involved in incident from beginning to
end, and other uncharged officer had arrived later to scene of incident and had
physically participated in struggle with arrestee to minimal extent. Com. v.
Mulholland, 702 A.2d 1027 (Pa. 1997).
Evidence that white police officers were not prosecuted for wiretap violations
was insufficient to establish selective prosecution claim brought by African
American defendant, who was police officer and charged with wiretap violations;
unlike defendant, officers who were not prosecuted did not employ police wiretap
training to perpetrate their alleged crimes, district attorney did not know the
race of defendant when he made the decision to prosecute, and pattern of bias in
favor of white officers could not be imputed to district attorney based upon
actions of other prosecuting authorities. Com. v. Murphy, 2002 PA Super 83, 795
A.2d 997 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002); West's Key Number Digest, Criminal Law 37.10(2).
Page 41 of 99
for disorderly conduct. Carreras v State (1996, Tex App Houston (14th Dist)) 936
SW2d 727.
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
§ 12. Evidence--Discovery
[Cumulative Supplement]
Various solutions have been proposed for this dilemma, and in some recent cases
the showing required to obtain discovery has been relaxed somewhat. Thus, in one
case where a motion for dismissal alleged facts clearly sufficient to support a
claim of invidious discrimination, it was held that the defendants were entitled
to discovery of both direct evidence, including memoranda and correspondence of
prosecutorial and police agencies, and circumstantial evidence, including
statistical data concerning prosecutions and arrests, relevant to the claim of
discriminatory enforcement. The court held that in such a case traditional
discovery principles required that the defendants be allowed discovery of
relevant information, subject to any objections to specific items that the
prosecution might make.[FN29] In another case it was held that the defendant's
discovery motion should have been granted, even though he conceded that he could
not establish discriminatory prosecution without the discovery, where the
defendant had established plausible justification for the motion and
demonstrated that the discovery would facilitate the ascertainment of relevant
facts, the court stating that the showing necessary to obtain discovery need not
necessarily be strong.[FN30]
One reason for the reluctance to order discovery is the reluctance to compel the
prosecution to reveal confidential items. One proposed solution is to require
the prosecution to provide the defendant any relevant enforcement statistics,
since such statistics are not privileged, and, if the defendant can prove
selective enforcement, then the court could examine any privileged prosecutorial
documents in camera, giving the defense any documents determined to be relevant
to the issue of discriminatory enforcement.[FN31] At least one court has used
this approach, noting that the test for disclosure to the defense in such a
situation should be the relevancy of any government documents to the defense of
discriminatory prosecution, not the confidentiality of any such documents.[FN32]
Page 42 of 99
In a proper case the defendant should press for discovery even in the face of an
adverse response by the prosecution, since noncooperation by the prosecution
might well be taken into consideration by the court. Thus, in one case
discriminatory enforcement was found, despite the prosecutorial authorities'
claim of lack of knowledge concerning other offenders, the court noting that the
defendant, although hampered by the government refusal to provide data on
similar offenses, had still proved the existence of at least six nonprosecuted
offenders, and that normal prosecutorial procedures should have revealed other
offenders.[FN33]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
Defendant of Arab ethnicity who was being prosecuted for unlawfully procuring
naturalization through sham marriage was not entitled to discovery on his claim
that persons of Arab ethnicity were being selectively prosecuted for such
immigration-related offenses following the September 11th terrorist attack by
Arab extremists, where only evidence that defendant presented of discriminatory
purpose and effect was dubious statistical evidence which suffered from serious
methodological deficiencies, and where, in addition, most of government's nearly
18-month investigation into defendant's case had been completed prior to events
of September 11th. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. U.S. v. Alameh, 341 F.3d 167, 62
Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 327 (2d Cir. 2003); West's Key Number Digest, Criminal Law
627.8(3).
In Griffin v Municipal Court for Desert Judicial Dist. 20 Cal 3d 300, 142 Cal
Rptr 286, 571 P2d 997, where the two defendants, former sheriff's deputies
charged with willful inhumanity or oppression of a prisoner, established a prima
facie case of discriminatory enforcement based on the fact that one of the
officers was black, the court held they were entitled todiscovery consisting of
a statistical summary of the sheriff's department records for the preceding 14
years, showing annual figures as to the number and percentage of black officers
employed and terminated by the department, the total number of investigations by
Page 43 of 99
the department into alleged violations of the statute involved and the number of
such investigations that involved a black officer, and the total number of
prosecutions under the statute and the number of such prosecutions involving a
black officer.
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
§ 13. Evidence--Rebuttal
[Cumulative Supplement]
Although the courts have generally stated that the government must introduce
compelling evidence to rebut a prima facie case of discriminatory prosecution,
the issue of the sufficiency of rebuttal evidence has not received a great deal
of attention.[FN34] Generally, however, rebuttal evidence may consist of proof
that there was actually no selectivity, that any selectivity was unintentional,
or that any intentional selectivity was not arbitrary or invidious.[FN35]
To rebut a prima facie case, the prosecution must introduce evidence that rebuts
the inference of purposeful discrimination or shows some specific legitimate
justification for the selectivity, and mere denials of discriminatory purpose or
claims of prosecutorial ignorance of the selectivity are insufficient.[FN36] The
sufficiency of any rebuttal evidence will differ with the particular
classification, with a more substantial showing required in cases involving
suspect classifications or fundamental rights.[FN37] Since not all violators of
a statute need be prosecuted, evidence showing that the defendant was chosen for
prosecution by random selection would be sufficient rebuttal.[FN38]
Page 44 of 99
be justified by evidence showing that the selectivity was part of an attempt to
control organized commercial prostitution.[FN39]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
See Cook v Price, (CA10 Utah) 566 F2d 699 (zoning ordinance enforced against
most flagrant violator thereof). See also United States v Johnson (CA5 Tex) 577
F2d 1304, reh den (CA5 Tex) 584 F2d 389 (vigorous prosecution of tax protesters
for tax law violations permissible to punish flagrant violators and to deter
violations by others). Moreover, the prosecution might justify its decision to
prosecute the particular defendant, notwithstanding the fact that similar crimes
were not prosecuted in the past, on the ground that increased community
awareness and sensitivity to the crimes involved is responsible for the decision
to prosecute the particular defendant. United States v Hayes (CA5 Tex) 589 F2d
811, reh den (CA5 Tex) 591 F2d 1343, and cert den 444 US 847, 62 L Ed 2d 60, 100
S Ct 93 (prosecution of police chief under federal civil rights statute).
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
Page 45 of 99
The justification generally offered for the heavy requirements placed on a
defendant is the necessity of deference to prosecutorial decisions and the
presumption of regularity.[FN42] However, the presumption of regularity has been
described as questionable, and it has been noted that in many cases the decision
to prosecute a particular person is merely a reaction to the decision of an
individual police officer, rather than the result of an exercise of legitimate
prosecutorial discretion.[FN43] Moreover, many discriminatory enforcement claims
are made with respect to laws that are outmoded or cover relatively trivial
conduct, and that are rarely enforced, and the danger that prosecutions for
violations of such laws will be based on improper motivation is much greater
than in the case of generally enforced laws.[FN44]
Most of the proposed changes have involved suggestions for greater recognition
of the concept of the prima facie case, usually coupled with elimination of the
requirement that the defendant prove the prosecutor's improper motivation. Thus,
it has been argued that when the defendant presents sufficient proof to raise a
reasonable doubt as to the prosecutor's purpose, the presumption of regularity
should disappear, and the burden should shift to the prosecution to show the
neutrality of the defendant's selection for prosecution.[FN45] Proponents of
such a change often suggest that the defendant be required to present only a
minimum of proof of discriminatory enforcement, and that the prosecution have a
heavy burden on rebuttal.[FN46]
Under such an approach, the defendant would not be required to prove purposeful
or invidious discrimination. Proof of some gross disparity, such as enforcement
of the law against only one of many possible groups, or against only a very few
of many possible actual violators, would be sufficient to shift the burden to
the state.[FN47] The burden would then be on the state to prove lack of
invidiousness, rather than on the defendant to affirmatively show
invidiousness.[FN48] Moreover, it has been suggested that the only method of
rebutting such a prima facie case should be by proof of some proper
justification for the selectivity, and that it should not matter whether the
prosecutor or police actually knew of other violators, or whether they knew they
were using improper standards.[FN49]
It has also been argued that, once the defendant introduces a minimum of proof,
the burden of persuasion should be on the prosecution, rather than the
defendant,[FN50] and it has further been suggested that when the particular law
is normally disregarded and seldom enforced, such general nonenforcement alone
should create a prima facie case of discriminatory enforcement.[FN51]
Page 46 of 99
[Cumulative Supplement]
Page 47 of 99
of improper motivation or selectivity,[FN60] especially if the defendant has
introduced other evidence indicating a substantial possibility of the use of
some arbitrary or invidious standards of enforcement.
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
Any selective prosecution claim was foreclosed once defendant pled guilty,
despite claim that selective prosecution claim did not ripen until after
defendant had entered its plea. U.S. v. Tucor Intern., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1172
(N.D. Cal. 1998), aff'd, 189 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 1999); West's Key Number Digest,
Criminal Law 273.4(1).
Cases growing out of an unlawful air traffic controllers' strike in 1981 also
illustrate the importance of making an adequate factual showing in the trial
court. The indictment of one controller for participating in the strike was
dismissed on the ground of discriminatory prosecution where, the court held, the
defendant had established a prima facie case showing a direct causal connection
between his status as a union official and the government's decision to
prosecute him. United States v McDonald (1983, SD Tex) 553 F Supp 1003, 112 BNA
LRRM 2428. However, the convictions of other controllers for participating in
the strike were upheld, the courts holding that the evidence showed that the
government had prosecuted the controllers because of their status as strike
leaders and not because of their status as union officials or participants.
United States v Greene (1983, CA5 Tex) 697 F2d 1229, 113 BNA LRRM 2507, cert den
463 US 1210, 77 L Ed 2d 1391, 103 S Ct 3542, 113 BNA LRRM 3056; United States v
Taylor (1982, CA9 Ariz) 693 F2d 919, 112 BNA LRRM 2068.
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
Page 48 of 99
A. Elements of Proof
The following facts and circumstances, among others, tend to establish that a
generally unenforced law is being enforced against a particular defendant due to
his exercise of constitutionally protected rights:
[In the following proof it is assumed that the defendant is being prosecuted for
violation of a Sunday sales law, and that the defendant does not deny having
made the sale in question, but seeks to defend on the ground that the statute is
generally unenforced and is being enforced against him solely as a result of his
political activity.]
Page 49 of 99
Q. What is your present occupation?
A. For years.
A. Well, I joined the force as soon as I got out of the army, so altogether I've
been on the force for years.
A. I started out as a patrol officer, and I went from that to sergeant, and then
to a detective position, which was the last position I held before being
promoted to chief.
A. Yes, I am.
Q. Specifically, are you familiar with what can and cannot be sold on Sunday
under the terms of that statute?
A. Generally, yes. I can't honestly say that I know all the exceptions, but I
know most of them.
Q. [Defendant] has been charged with the sale of [a pair of men's slacks] on a
Sunday. To your knowledge, is such a sale prohibited by the statute?
A. Yes, it is.
A. Yes, the statute prohibits the sale of any item of clothing on a Sunday.
Q. During the time you have been on the police force in the city of , has it
been a common practice for various stores to be open on Sundays?
A. Yes, it has.
Q. What types of stores have commonly remained open for business on Sundays?
A. I'm not sure I can really classify them. All kinds of stores stay open on
Sundays, including supermarkets, drug stores, small groceries.
Q. Of the stores that remain open on Sunday, do any of them carry items of
clothing for sale?
Page 50 of 99
Q. To your knowledge, do any of those stores sell items of clothing on Sundays?
Q. Have you ever personally observed clothing being sold on a Sunday in such a
store, other than the store operated by [defendant]?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. Have you ever purchased an item of clothing on a Sunday from any such store?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. During the time that you have been on the police force here, do you recall
any previous prosecution for violation of this statute?
Q. Have you, as chief of police, ever issued any policy statement with respect
to enforcement of that statute?
A. Well, I have never made any formal written pronouncement, if that is what you
mean.
Q. Do you have any informal policy with respect to enforcement of that statute?
A. Frankly, I have never bothered to try to enforce the Sunday sales law. I
don't know if that qualifies as an informal policy, but that has always been my
attitude, not only as chief but while I was a patrol officer also.
Q. Prior to the time that you became chief, were you ever instructed by any
superior officer with respect to enforcement of the Sunday sales law?
A. I can't really recall. I know for sure that no one ever told me to enforce
it, but I'm not sure whether anyone told me not to enforce it.
Q. Since you have been chief, have any of your officers questioned you regarding
enforcement of that statute?
A. I told them not to worry about such violations, and to concentrate their
energies on more serious crimes.
Q. To your knowledge, since you have been chief has any officer cited anyone
other than [defendant] for violation of this statute?
Page 51 of 99
Q. During the years that you have been on the force, have you ever known of any
officer citing anyone other than [defendant] for violation of that law?
A. No.
C. Testimony of Prosecutor
A. Since .
A. It is an elective office.
A. On , .
Q. When will the next election for the position of city attorney be held?
A. The primary election will be held in , , and the general election will be
held the following November.
Q. Does the city attorney's office have any responsibility for prosecution of
criminal offenses in the city of ?
Page 52 of 99
Q. Is your office in charge of the present prosecution of [defendant] for
violation of [statute]?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. To your knowledge, during your term as city attorney have any other stores in
the city of sold clothing on Sundays?
In the absence of other evidence showing frequent violations of the statute, the
prosecutor might deny any knowledge concerning other violators. By presenting
substantial independent proof of frequent violations, the defendant can
effectively force the prosecutor either to admit knowledge of other violations
or to make a denial that the court is unlikely to believe.
Q. How many deputy city attorneys are presently employed by your office?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. What are the responsibilities of those deputy attorneys who are assigned to
the criminal division?
Page 53 of 99
A. They are generally responsible for the handling of a criminal case, from the
time a complaint is received through the trial or other disposition of the
particular case.
Q. Once an arrest has been made or a citation has been issued, what is normally
the next step?
A. In the case of an arrest, the usual procedure is that the arrest report is
routed to my office, where one of the deputy attorneys reads and evaluates it
and decides what, if any, further action will be taken with respect to
prosecution of the case. If the deputy determines that the facts warrant
prosecution, he or she then files a complaint, and the case proceeds from there.
A. This varies somewhat depending on the type of offense involved. For example,
if it is a traffic violation and the person cited posts bail, and does not seek
to contest the citation, then my office is not involved at all. In such cases my
office gets involved only if there is to be a trial. In some other citation
offenses, such as violation of the fire code, the citation is sent to my office
and a deputy is assigned to prosecute the case through the courts, if warranted.
A. Well, we normally refer such people to the police department for initial
investigation of their complaint to see if there has been any criminal
violation. However, on occasion, when the facts clearly indicate a prosecutable
offense, we may file a criminal complaint with the court.
Q. Who makes the referral to the police department or decides to file the
criminal complaint in such cases?
Q. Was the prosecution of [defendant] for violation of the Sunday sales law
initiated in response to either an arrest or a citation made or issued by some
member of the police department?
Page 54 of 99
Q. Was the prosecution initiated in response to a complaint from some private
citizen?
A. Yes, it was.
A. It was [name].
Q. Do you recall on what date the original complaint was made by [name]?
A. No, not the exact date, but it was sometime during the week prior to the
citation.
A. Yes, they are, with the exception of supervision. [Name] is the investigator
in charge.
Q. How does a deputy attorney normally secure the assistance of one of the
investigators?
A. Well, it is the way that they receive most of their assignments, but I also
have the power to request an investigation if I desire.
Q. During the past year, approximately how many times have you yourself
requested such investigative assistance?
Page 55 of 99
A. I can't really give an approximation, but I have done so several times since
I have held the office.
Q. After [investigator] issued the citation, what was the next step in the
prosecution of [defendant]?
Q. Can you tell me the approximate number of complaints that you have personally
filed in the last year?
In holding that the defendant, convicted for failure to carry a draft card, had
established a prima facie case of discriminatory enforcement on the basis of his
exercise of First Amendment rights, the court relied on evidence showing that
there were massive unprosecuted violations, that the general government policy
was one of nonprosecution, that an assistant United States attorney had admitted
that the defendant's draft counseling activities were one reason for his
prosecution, and that high-level government officials had participated in the
decision to prosecute the defendant, the court noting that it was difficult to
believe that such procedures were normally followed in a draft case. United
States v Falk (CA7 Ill) 479 F2d 616.
Q. Prior to your election as city attorney, did you hold any other elective
office in the city of ?
A. Yes, I did.
Page 56 of 99
Q. What other elective office or offices have you held in the city?
A. I was elected to the school board in , and I served on the board for years. I
was then elected to the city council, where I served until my election as city
attorney.
Q. During your terms of service in these various positions, have you ever been
involved in any partisan political activity?
A. Yes, I have.
A. I have served on the Party County Committee, and I have also endorsed and
campaigned for various party candidates.
A. Yes, I do.
A. Yes, he is.
A. Yes.
Q. When you ran for the city council did you and he endorse each other and
campaign together?
A. Yes, we did.
Q. When you ran for city attorney, did he support you for that position?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. At the same time, did you support him for reelection to the city council?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. During that election, did you again campaign together with him?
A. Yes.
Q. During the past year, have you become aware of a public controversy
concerning him and his performance as a city councilman?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. Are you aware of certain specific charges that have been leveled against him?
Page 57 of 99
A. I know that some people have accused him of conflicts of interest.
A. Yes, I have.
Q. In fact, [defendant] has been among the more vocal critics of [city
councilman], hasn't he?
A. Yes, he has.
A. Yes, I was.
Q. During the period of controversy concerning [city councilman], have you made
public statements in support of him?
Q. Have you suggested to [city councilman] that he run for mayor next year?
A. I have mentioned to him that that was a possibility he might consider, yes.
A. I couldn't possibly answer that without knowing who else was running, but I
certainly do consider him a capable and dedicated public official.
A. Yes, he is a .
A. No.
Q. Had you heard any talk prior to that time about such a possibility?
Page 58 of 99
A. Yes, I knew that.
D. Testimony of Defendant
A. years.
A. I purchased the store just after I moved here, and I have been running it
ever since.
Page 59 of 99
Q. What type of store is that?
A. I can't enumerate everything, but we sell just about everything we can, toys,
cosmetics, clothing, television sets, sporting goods, and a lot of other stuff
in addition.
Q. Have you sold clothing at that store since you first purchased it?
A. Yes, I have.
A. Yes.
A. I always have.
Q. Do you know of any other variety stores that sell clothing on Sundays?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Do you know how many other variety stores in the city of sell clothing on
Sundays?
A. I have never taken a survey, but I know that at least several others do sell
clothing on Sundays, and I don't know of any that does not.
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Do you recall how many times previous to that date you visited a competitor's
store on a Sunday?
A. No, but over the years I have visited a great many other stores, both on
Sundays and other days of the week.
A. Yes.
Page 60 of 99
A. It is a good business practice to know what your competitors are doing. For
example, since many people shop on Saturdays and Sundays, it is important to
know whether your competitors are offering any special incentives to customers
on those days.
Q. During the course of any of these visits, did you ever observe clothing being
sold in such stores?
Q. Prior to , 20 [date of alleged violation], did you ever receive any citation
for violation of the Sunday sales law?
A. No.
[Cumulative Supplement]
Q. During the time that you have lived and worked here, have you ever engaged in
political activities?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. During the past year, did you become aware of a controversy involving [city
councilman]?
A. Yes, I did.
A. Yes.
Page 61 of 99
Q. During the past year, have you made public statements indicating your
position?
A. Yes, I have.
A. Frankly, I have made them just about wherever I can, in speeches, in city
council meetings, and whenever possible through the news media.
A. I have given interviews and written letters to the editor of the newspaper.
A. No, I have given interviews to reporters for radio and television stations as
well.
Q. During the month prior to , 20 [date of alleged violation], did your public
opposition to [city councilman] take any new form or direction?
A. Yes, it did.
A. About three weeks prior to that time I announced the formation of a citizens
group for the recall of Councilman .
Q. Did you do anything further with respect to such a recall prior to , 20 [date
of alleged violation]?
A. Yes, I did.
A. On the Monday before I received the citation, I went down to secure the
necessary papers for a recall petition.
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
Page 62 of 99
court. Thus, the city did not undertake enforcement actions against defendant in
retaliation for his seeking federal relief; rather, the record showed he had
threatened and filed legal action against the city for trying to enforce its
ordinances. People v Fishel (1991) 1 Cal App 4th Supp 1, 3 Cal Rptr 2d 76, 92
CDOS 2643.
[Top of Section]
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
Q. Prior to the time you took out these papers, had you ever in any way been
warned by any city official or officials that you were violating the Sunday
sales law?
A. No, never.
Q. After you took out the recall papers, and prior to your citation for
violation of that law, did you in any way receive any such warning from any city
official?
A. Well, I was warned that I might face a prosecution, but I wasn't specifically
told on what grounds.
A. He telephoned me.
A. Yes.
Page 63 of 99
Q. Did you recognize his voice?
A. Yes, I did.
A. Yes, I told [prosecutor] that I believed in what I was doing, and that I had
every right to express myself in the matter.
A. Yes, he told me that I was witch-hunting, and that two could play that game.
Then he told me to either shut up or be prepared to meet him in court.
A. Yes, I told [prosecutor] that I had not done anything wrong and that there
was nothing he could bring me into court for.
A. He again told me to drop the recall movement, and he said that if I did not I
had better check up on the Blue Laws, because he was certainly going to do so.
Then he hung up.
Q. Did [prosecutor] at any time during the conversation indicate to you that a
private complaint had been made by a citizen?
Q. At any time prior to this hearing, did [prosecutor] indicate that he had
received such a citizen complaint?
Q. When did you receive the citation for violation of the Sunday sales law?
Page 64 of 99
III. Proof of Discriminatory Enforcement of Prostitution Laws Against Women
A. Elements of Proof
The following facts and circumstances, among others, tend to establish that a
statute prohibiting solicitation for prostitution is being discriminatorily
enforced against women as a group without justifiable reasons:
? Lack of justifiable reasons for selective enforcement against women [§§ 29,
32]
[In the following proof it is assumed that selective enforcement against women
of a statute prohibiting solicitation for prostitution is being challenged,
either by means of an action seeking an injunction against such enforcement, or
by way of a defense to a prosecution or prosecutions for solicitation. It is
further assumed that the solicitation statute is facially neutral as to sex.]
Page 65 of 99
§ 26. Enforcement policies and procedures directed at women
A. For years.
A. years.
A. Altogether, a total of years. I was on the vice division from to , then I was
assigned to various other divisions, and I returned to the vice division as
commander in .
Q. Will you describe generally the law enforcement responsibilities of the vice
division?
Q. In terms of allocation of officers and other resources, can you estimate what
percentage of the division's activities are directed at enforcement of the
prostitution laws?
A. [Number].
Q. Has this number remained substantially the same during the time you have been
commander of the division?
A. Substantially, yes. When I first took over, there were [number] officers
assigned to the division, so there has been a slight increase during the past
years, but the increase has been very gradual and there has been no real
fluctuation in size.
Q. Do any other divisions of the police department have any responsibility for
enforcement of the prostitution laws?
Page 66 of 99
A. No, the vice division is the only one with direct responsibility for
enforcement of the prostitution laws. Of course, any officer can make arrests
for prostitution offenses, but most of the arrests in that area are made by
members of the vice division.
Q. Of the [number] officers presently assigned to the vice division, how many of
them are men?
Q. During the period that you have been commander of the division, how many
female officers have been assigned to it?
A. None.
Q. During the time you were previously assigned to the vice division, how many
female officers were assigned to it?
A. None.
Q. In all the years you have been on the police force, can you recall any female
officers who have ever been assigned to the vice division?
A. No, I cannot.
Q. Have you, as commander of the vice division, ever requested the assignment of
female officers to the division?
Q. Have you ever requested the police department to recruit female officers for
the vice division?
A. No.
Q. Is there any particular reason for the emphasis on the solicitation statute?
Q. With respect to enforcement of the solicitation law, have you instructed your
officers to direct their efforts at any primary target or targets?
A. Yes, I have.
Page 67 of 99
A. The bulk of the enforcement effort is directed at the control of street
prostitution. I would estimate that at least two-thirds of our prostitution
control efforts are in the area of the street prostitute.
Q. Are there any subsidiary targets at which enforcement efforts are directed?
A. There is some enforcement effort directed against the control of call girl
rings and houses of prostitution. Raids of houses of prostitution, or attempts
to crack call girl rings, usually come about as a result of some information we
receive. In other words, we don't look for them, but if we have the information
we check it out. In addition, we also prosecute pimps and panderers whenever we
can obtain sufficient information, but that is very difficult to come by.
Q. You testified that the bulk of your effort was directed at the street
prostitute. Is there any particular method that you use to detect solicitation
violations committed by street prostitutes?
A. Yes, almost all of our solicitation arrests of street prostitutes result from
the use of undercover officers acting as decoys.
A. Almost always, yes. We have used officers from other divisions on occasion,
but we do not normally do so.
Q. Since you have been commander of the vice division, how many female decoys
have you used in your attempts to control street prostitution?
A. None.
Q. Would you describe the method of operation used by your undercover male
decoys?
Q. Have your officers been given any instructions concerning the clothing they
should wear when acting as decoys?
A. Yes, they are told ordinarily to wear high quality but casual clothing, such
as a nice pair of slacks and a good sports shirt. Occasionally we instruct an
officer to go out in a sport coat or business suit.
Page 68 of 99
Q. Is there any particular reason for these instructions as to clothing?
A. Yes, we don't want an officer to look like a bum, since no one would approach
him under those circumstances. In our experience most of the customers are
employed People, and frequently businessmen, and we want the officers to appear
as a customer would.
A. The officers are instructed to look interested but not to initiate the
conversation. For example, if an officer sees a suspected prostitute, it is
proper procedure to look her over and either walk or drive by slowly, and
perhaps to turn around and go past her a couple more times. But the officer is
never to say the first word.
Q. Is there any common manner in which she does so, or words she commonly speaks
in doing so?
A. There are certain common greetings that prostitutes use to indicate their
availability.
A. Generally, the suspected prostitute will say, "Hi, how are you?" If you
respond favorably to her, she then commonly asks if you want a date, and from
there negotiations proceed concerning the act and the price desired.
A. No, they are specifically instructed not to do so. Any solicitation must come
directly and solely from the suspect.
Q. At what point in the conversation is the officer directed to make the arrest?
A. The officer is to make an arrest when the actual solicitation occurs, which
normally consists either of the suspect quoting a price or asking the officer if
he is willing to pay for a specific act.
Q. In your capacity as head of the vice division, do you keep any kind of
records or make any kind of reports on the total number of prostitution-related
arrests?
Page 69 of 99
A. Yes, I do. I prepare an annual report for the chief of police concerning the
total number of arrests made by the vice division during the year, and that
report contains a breakdown with respect to various types of arrests.
A. Yes, it does.
All records and reports prepared by public officials are generally admissible as
proof of the facts stated therein, so long as the facts stated are within the
personal knowledge of the recording official or his subordinates, and so long as
the records are properly identified or authenticated. See 29A Am. Jur. 2d,
Evidence §§ 991, 996.
Q. I would like to direct your attention now to that report. Does that contain
the total number of arrests last year for prostitution and prostitution-related
offenses?
A. Yes, it does.
A. [Number].
Where the facts contained in a writing exist independently of the writing, such
facts may be proved both by the writing, if properly authenticated and
admissible, and by oral testimony. The best evidence rule is inapplicable in
such a situation, since the oral testimony is offered to prove the existence of
the independent facts, not the existence or contents of the writing. See 29 Am.
Jur. 2d, Evidence § 449; 2 Jones on Evidence (6th ed.) § 7:4. If objection is
made to the fact that the testimony concerning arrests is based on the
statistics contained in the report, it might be necessary to qualify the report
as past recollection recorded or to show that it is necessary to refresh the
memory of the witness. See 29A Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence §§ 876, 877.
Q. Of that number, how many of the arrestees were women, and how many were men?
Page 70 of 99
Q. Does the report also contain the total number of arrests for solicitation for
prostitution last year?
Q. Does the report indicate what percentage of the total number of prostitution-
related arrests were for solicitation for prostitution?
Q. Does the report indicate how many of those arrested for solicitation were
women, and how many were men?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. Does the report indicate the number of arrests for solicitation that were
effected by decoy officers?
Q. Does the report indicate what percentage of the total number of solicitation
arrests were effected by decoy officers?
Q. Does the report contain any breakdown concerning arrests for solicitation
other than by decoy officers?
A. Yes, the report breaks solicitation arrests down into three categories: decoy
arrests, "trick" arrests, and all other arrests.
A. Yes, those are arrests that are made in a situation where an apparent
customer is with an apparent prostitute.
A. [Number].
Q. And all of these arrests occurred where there was an apparent customer and an
apparent prostitute together, is that correct?
Q. Of the total number of "trick" arrests made last year, how many were men and
how many were women?
Page 71 of 99
Q. Are the practices and procedures used by the vice division in prostitution
control substantially the same this year as they were last year?
Q. To your knowledge, have any men been arrested for solicitation for
prostitution this year?
A. No, there have not been any arrests of men for solicitation violations.
A. Yes, it does.
Q. Could you tell us what types of offenses the men were arrested for?
[Counsel proceeds in the same manner with respect to annual reports for
preceding years.]
Q. You testified that in so-called trick cases, where there is both an apparent
male customer and an apparent prostitute, you arrested only the apparent
prostitute. Is the arrest of the apparent prostitute in such a situation
pursuant to established department policy?
Q. In any of these "trick" cases, is the apparent male customer ever discovered
in the room with the apparent prostitute?
Q. In "trick" cases, does the apparent male customer ever admit to having
engaged in an act of prostitution with the female suspect?
A. Yes, on occasion.
Q. Has a vice division officer ever observed an apparent male customer engaging
in an act of sexual intercourse with the female suspect?
Q. Has the apparent male customer ever been arrested in any of the above
situations?
Page 72 of 99
Q. Is the apparent female prostitute normally arrested in such situations?
Q. If there is a trial on the charge, is the apparent male customer normally the
main witness against the prostitute?
A. Yes.
Q. Do vice division officers ever promise not to prosecute or arrest the male
customer on condition that he testify against the apparent prostitute?
Q. You testified earlier that your officers on occasion raid suspected houses of
prostitution, is that correct?
Q. You testified further that your officers sometimes attempt to break call girl
rings, is that correct?
Q. Do your officers, in the course of such searches, ever seize what appear to
be lists of male customers?
Q. Do you, or your officers, ever make any effort to determine whether any of
the men whose names are on such lists may be guilty of prostitution-related
offenses?
A. No, we do not.
Page 73 of 99
prostitution, and never made any effort to pursue leads provided by lists of
male customers. United States v Wilson (DC Super) 15 Crim L 2001.
A. Yes, it is.
A. Yes, it is.
Q. But your concentration on women, rather than men, is not part of any effort
to eliminate any organized crime in the city, is it?
A. No, it is not.
In one case the court held that a showing of selective and persistent
discriminatory enforcement of prostitution laws against women created a prima
facie case of discriminatory enforcement, shifting the burden to the state, but
that a desire to combat organized commercial prostitution might be a valid
reason for such selectivity. State v Johnson, 74 Wis 2d 169, 246 NW2d 503.
Q. Is there any major reason behind your decision to concentrate your efforts on
women prostitutes?
Page 74 of 99
A. That is really hard to say. While the problem of prostitution is probably as
great now as it ever has been, in my opinion it would be totally out of control
without any enforcement at all.
Q. With respect to venereal disease, does the police department keep any records
concerning the number of women arrested for prostitution-related offenses who
have infectious venereal disease?
Q. During the time you have been commander of the vice division, have you
attempted to gather any statistics concerning the incidence of venereal disease
among arrested prostitutes?
Q. Do you have any knowledge from any source concerning the incidence of
venereal disease among arrested prostitutes in the city of ?
A. No, I do not.
Where evidence revealed that only one or two women out of hundreds arrested had
infectious syphilis, and slightly more than five percent had gonorrhea, it was
held that control of venereal disease was not a sufficiently compelling state
interest to justify the application of prostitution laws only to women. State v
Fields (Alaska Dist Ct) 13 Crim L 2376.
A. years.
Q. How long have you been on the police force of the city of ?
A. For years.
Page 75 of 99
Q. How large is the city of ?
A. Yes, the bulk of our enforcement effort is related to the law prohibiting
solicitation for prostitution.
A. [Number].
Q. Have there been female officers in the vice division since you became
commander?
A. No, the division consisted entirely of male officers when I took over.
A. Yes, that is our primary method of detecting violations and securing arrests.
Q. Would you describe the manner in which such undercover officers operate?
A. The number varies from time to time, but generally about [number] of the
officers in the division are assigned in such a manner.
A. That varies also, depending on various factors, but we generally have about
an even number of male and female undercover officers working the streets.
Page 76 of 99
§ 31. Enforcement statistics
Q. In connection with your job, do you keep any kind of records or make any kind
of reports on the total number of prostitution-related arrests made by the vice
division?
A. Yes, I do. I make monthly reports to the chief, and I also make a cumulative
annual report each year.
Q. During that year, did you have any female vice officers?
Q. During that year, did you use any female officers as decoys in enforcement of
the solicitation law?
Q. Does that report contain breakdowns with respect to the total number of
prostitution and prostitution-related arrests, including classification as to
the type of offense and the sex of the offender?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. During that year, did you have female vice officers and utilize female
undercover officers in enforcement of the solicitation law?
A. Yes, we did.
Q. Does that report contain the same type of information as that contained in
defendant's Exhibits through ?
A. Yes, it does.
Page 77 of 99
[Counsel proceeds to elicit the same information elicited with respect to annual
reports made for years prior to adoption of a neutral enforcement policy, and
introduces and elicits information concerning other annual reports for years
following adoption of a sexually neutral enforcement policy.]
Q. In the field of prostitution control, do you have any broad policy goals?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. During the years through 20 [years prior to neutral enforcement policy], was
there any increase in the number of prostitution-related arrests?
Q. During those years, was there any increase in the number of so-called
prostitution zones within the city of ?
A. Yes, there was. In the primary area known for prostitution was the area, but
by Street and the area had also developed high rates of prostitution and were
commonly considered prostitution zones.
A. No, there has been what I consider a rather drastic decrease in the overall
number of arrests.
Q. During those years, has there been any increase in the number of prostitution
zones within the city of ?
A. No, as of now there is no known prostitution zone within the city. That does
not mean that we have eliminated prostitution in the city, but in my opinion we
have sharply reduced it and forced most of it off the streets.
Q. During the years you have been commander of the vice division, what has been
the rate of recidivism among arrested prostitutes?
A. Yes, it has.
Page 78 of 99
Q. During those years, what has been the rate of recidivism among males arrested
for solicitation or other prostitution-related offenses?
Q. In your opinion, is there any major factor that has been responsible for the
decline in solicitation and other prostitution related arrests in the city of ?
In one case the court, while not faced directly with a problem of discriminatory
enforcement, was strongly critical of a prostitution statute applying only to
females, the court noting that enforcement against men would probably sharply
reduce the number of men searching for prostitutes. State v McGhee (Mil City Ct
Wis) 15 Cr L 2315.
D. Testimony of Investigator
A. At [address].
A. I am a private investigator.
A. I am self-employed.
A. At [address].
A. years.
Page 79 of 99
Q. How many investigations have you personally conducted during that time?
A. years.
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And also at my request, did you limit your investigation to one particular
facet of that subject?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Would you describe the manner in which you conducted that investigation?
A. Yes, on [number] occasions I went to various areas in the city, and either
walked up and down the sidewalk or simply stayed at a certain spot on the
sidewalk, in an effort to determine whether any men would solicit me for
prostitution.
A. That is the type of clothing that prostitutes are commonly reputed to wear
when working.
Q. Do you recall the date that you first went to such an area?
A. Yes, it was on , .
Page 80 of 99
Q. Why did you pick that area?
A. That area is known to have a high rate of prostitution, and a great many
solicitation arrests of alleged prostitutes are made there.
A. I went there at o'clock in the evening, and I stayed for one hour.
A. Most of that time I stood on the sidewalk in front of the Motel and faced in
the direction of oncoming automobile traffic.
Q. During that hour, did you have conversations with any men?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Do you recall the number of men with whom you had conversations?
Q. Were these men on foot or in automobiles when they began the conversations?
Q. Did those men who were in cars talk to you while driving, or did they stop
the automobile?
A. They stopped their car in the parking lane, and talked to me while stopped.
Q. During the course of your conversations with these [mumber] men, did you ever
in any way verbally suggest to them that you were available for prostitution?
Q. Did any of these men ever in any way request you to perform an act of
prostitution?
Q. Did any of these men suggest either a specific act or a specific price that
they were willing to pay?
Some courts have said that it is contrary to human experience to assume that
only women solicit for prostitution. United States v Wilson (DC Super) 15 Cr L
2001; State v Fields (Alaska Dist Ct) 13 Cr L 2376. However, one court found no
unconstitutional discriminatory enforcement, notwithstanding overwhelming
Page 81 of 99
evidence of intentional selective enforcement of a solicitation law against
women, the court relying on a lack of evidence concerning the number of male
violators and stating that it appeared probable that more women solicited than
men. Re G., Cal App 3d 725, 126 Cal Rptr 118. Since a particular court may
refuse to assume that men solicit, it is important to present evidence of
solicitation by men.
A. After a particular man departed, I would go into the telephone booth up the
street, and while pretending to write down a telephone number I would jot down
certain information concerning that conversation.
Q. Did you ever communicate with the police department concerning this?
A. Yes, I went to the police department the following day and offered them my
information.
A. I offered to give him the written information I have just referred to.
Q. Did you request him to investigate these men for possible violations of the
solicitation law?
A. Yes, I asked him to investigate and told him I was willing to be a witness
against the men.
Page 82 of 99
Q. I show you now defendant's Exhibit for identification and ask if you can
identify it.
A. Yes, that is one of the slips that I prepared concerning a conversation I had
with a man during the evening of , .
Q. Did you prepare this writing immediately after the conversation with the man?
Q. Does this writing contain the substance of the conversation you had with that
man?
A. Yes, it does.
A. Yes, it does.
A. Yes, it does.
A. I told Lieutenant that I would act as a decoy for the department, without
charge.
A.L.R. Library
Page 83 of 99
What constitutes such discriminatory prosecution or enforcement of laws as to
provide valid defense in state criminal proceedings, 95 A.L.R. 3d 280
Legal Encyclopedias
Trial Strategy
Page 84 of 99
Reliability of Polygraph Examination, 14 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 1
Comment, Prostitution and the Law: Emerging Attacks on the "Women's Crime," 43
UMKC L Rev 413
LAPD denies it still practices illegal profiling but prejudice drives system,
4/12/2001 L.A. Daily J. 6 (2001)
Let's play jeopardy: Where the question comes after the answer for stopping
prosecutorial misconduct in death-penalty cases, 28 N. Ky. L. Rev. 34 (2001)
Page 85 of 99
Comment, Murguia v Municipal Court: California Recognizes the Defense of
Discriminatory Prosecution, 6 Golden Gate U L Rev 885
Police told to cease selective lewd conduct enforcement, 2/28/2001 L.A. Daily J.
1 (2001)
Russo, Equal Protection From the Law: The Substantive Requirements for a Showing
of Discriminatory Law Enforcement, 3 Loyola U L Rev 65
Screening versus plea bargaining: exactly what are we trading off? 55 Stan. L.
Rev. 1399 (2003 WL 21498815)
Page 86 of 99
Comment, The Ramifications of United States v. Falk on Equal Protection from
Prosecutorial Discrimination, 65 J Crim L 62
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 1 Footnotes:
[FN1]
A.L.R. Library
4 A.L.R. 3d 404.
Page 87 of 99
[FN5] Amsterdam, 6 Rutgers Camden L J 1, 5–6; United States v Crowthers (CA4 Va)
456 F2d 1074.
4 A.L.R. 3d 404.
Legal Encyclopedias
[FN8] Givelber, 1973 U Ill L F 88, 89; Note, Development of the Defense of
Discriminatory Prosecution: Murguia v Municipal Court, 8 Sw U L Rev 687, 693–94;
Weissman, 69 Nw U L Rev 489, 503.
See also, §§ 6– 8, infra.
Page 88 of 99
Section 2 Footnotes:
[FN17]
4 A.L.R. 3d 404.
[FN18] Comment, 65 J Crim L 62, 63; Murgia v Municipal Court, 15 Cal 3d 286, 124
Cal Rptr 204, 540 P2d 44.
[FN19] Murguia v Municipal Court for Bakersfield Judicial Dist., 15 Cal 3d 286,
124 Cal Rptr 204, 540 P2d 44.
[FN21] Murguia v Municipal Court for Bakersfield Judicial Dist., 15 Cal 3d 286,
124 Cal Rptr 204, 540 P2d 44.
[FN22] Amsterdam, 6 Rutgers Camden L J 1, 4; United States v Falk (CA7 Ill) 479
F2d 616.
[FN27] Comment, 1974 U Ill L F 648, 652; Givelber, 1973 U Ill L F 88, 89, 94.
[FN28] Murguia v Municipal Court for Bakersfield Judicial Dist., 15 Cal 3d 286,
124 Cal Rptr 204, 540 P2d 44.
[FN29] Comment, Prostitution and the Law: Emerging Attacks on the "Women's
Crime," 43 UMKC L Rev 413, 417–420.
See, for example, State v Johnson, 74 Wis 2d 169, 246 NW2d 503.
Page 89 of 99
Section 3 Footnotes:
[FN31] Tieger, 1971 Duke L J 717, 720–721; Weissman, 69 Nw U L Rev 489, 493.
[FN32] Givelber, 1973 U Ill L F 88, 103–04; Tieger, 1971 Duke L J 717, 720–21.
[FN36] Yick Wo v Hopkins, 118 US 356; People v Amdur, 123 Cal App 2d Supp 951,
267 P2d 445.
[FN37] Murguia v Municipal Court for Bakersfield Judicial Dist., 15 Cal 3d 286,
124 Cal Rptr 204, 540 P2d 44.
[FN38] Givelber, 1973 U Ill L F 88, 102–04; Russo, Equal Protection From the
Law: The Substantive Requirements For a Showing of Discriminatory Law
Enforcement, 3 Loyola U L Rev 65, 70–71; Tieger, 1971 Duke L J 717, 732.
[FN39] People v Acme Markets, Inc., 37 NY2d 326, 372 NYS2d 590, 334 NE2d 555.
Section 4 Footnotes:
[FN40]
4 A.L.R. 3d 404.
[FN41]
4 A.L.R. 3d 404.
[FN42] Weissman, 69 Nw U L Rev 489, 517–19; Lewis v Kugler (CA3 NJ) 446 F2d
1343.
[FN43]
4 A.L.R. 3d 404.
Page 90 of 99
4 A.L.R. 3d 404.
See, for example, Murguia v Municipal Court for Bakersfield Judicial Dist., 15
Cal 3d 286, 124 Cal Rptr 204, 540 P2d 44; People v Goodman, 31 NY2d 262, 338
NYS2d 97, 290 NE2d 139; People v Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App Div 2d 12, 225
NYS2d 128, 4 ALR3d 393.
[FN45]
4 A.L.R. 3d 404.
Legal Encyclopedias
[FN46]
4 A.L.R. 3d 404.
[FN47]
4 A.L.R. 3d 404.
Legal Encyclopedias
[FN51] Comment, 65 J Crim L 62, 72; People v Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App Div 2d
12, 225 NYS2d 128, 4 ALR3d 393.
[FN52] People v Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App Div 2d 12, 225 NYS2d 128, 4 ALR3d
393.
Section 5 Footnotes:
[FN53]
4 A.L.R. 3d 404.
Page 91 of 99
[FN54] Givelber, 1973 U Ill L F 88, 92–93.
4 A.L.R. 3d 404.
4 A.L.R. 3d 404.
Legal Encyclopedias
[FN56] Comment, 1974 U Ill L F 648, 651; Note, 8 Sw U L Rev 687, 693–94.
4 A.L.R. 3d 404.
[FN57] Murguia v Municipal Court for Bakersfield Judicial Dist., 15 Cal 3d 286,
124 Cal Rptr 204, 540 P2d 44.
Section 6 Footnotes:
[FN61] Givelber, 1973 U Ill L F 88, 92, 109; Weissman, 69 Nw U L Rev 489, 510.
Page 92 of 99
officer for such activity, and no evidence that the city had selected the
defendant's movie house as an exclusive target of prosecution.
[FN64] Comment, 1974 U Ill L F 648, 654; Comment, 65 J Crim L 62, 65; People v
Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App Div 2d 12, 225 NYS2d 128, 4 ALR3d 393.
[FN65] Comment, 1974 U Ill L F 648, 654; Comment, 65 J Crim L 62, 65; People v
Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App Div 2d 12, 225 NYS2d 128, 4 ALR3d 393.
4 A.L.R. 3d 404.
Section 7 Footnotes:
[FN66] Amsterdam, 6 Rutgers Camden L J 1, 3–4; Comment, 65 J Crim L 62, 65;
Tieger, 1971 Duke L J 717, 732–33; Weissman, 69 Nw U L Rev 489, 502–04.
[FN67] Givelber, 1973 U Ill L F 88, 92–93; Weissman, 69 Nw U L Rev 489, 510.
[FN68] Comment, 1974 U Ill L F 648, 654; Comment, 65 J Crim L 62, 65; Givelber,
1973 U Ill L F 88, 93–94.
[FN69] Comment, 1974 U Ill L F 648, 654–57; Gilvelber, 1973 U Ill L F 88, 94;
Weissman, 69 Nw U L Rev 489, 510–11.
Section 8 Footnotes:
[FN72] Gilvelber, 1973 U Ill L F 88, 100; Tieger, 1971 Duke L J 717, 720–21.
[FN73] Amsterdam, 6 Rutgers Camden L J 1, 6–7; Comment, 1974 U Ill L F 648, 650;
Weissman, 69 Nw U L Rev 489, 503.
4 A.L.R. 3d 404.
Page 93 of 99
4 A.L.R. 3d 404.
[FN79] Gilvelber, 1973 U Ill L F 88, 94; Weissman, 69 Nw U L Rev 489, 506.
[FN80] Gilvelber, 1973 U Ill L F 88, 94; Weissman, 69 Nw U L Rev 489, 503, 505.
[FN82] Tieger, 1971 Duke L J 717, 729; Weissman, 69 Nw U L Rev 489, 506–07.
[FN83] Comment, 1974 U Ill L F 648, 654–55; Weissman, 69 Nw U L Rev 489, 510.
Section 9 Footnotes:
[FN87] Amsterdam, 6 Rutgers Camden L J 1, 19; Weissman, 69 Nw U L Rev 489, 510.
[FN88] Comment, 65 J Crim L 62, 71; Tieger, 1971 Duke L J 717, 738–39.
[FN89] Amsterdam, 6 Rutgers Camden L J 1, 15–17; Tieger, 1971 Duke L J 717, 738–
39.
4 A.L.R. 3d 404.
[FN90] Comment, 1974 U Ill L F 648, 654; Comment, 65 J Crim L 62, 65; Tieger,
1971 Duke L J 717, 740.
Section 10 Footnotes:
[FN92] Comment, 65 J Crim L 62, 74; Tieger, 1971 Duke L J 717, 738–40, 743.
Page 94 of 99
[FN93] Amsterdam, 6 Rutgers Camden L J 1, 20–22; Comment, 1974 U Ill L F 648,
654; Weissman, 69 Nw U L Rev 489, 512.
[FN94] Comment, 65 J Crim L 62, 70; Givelber, 1973 U Ill L F 88, 106–07;
Weissman, 69 Nw U L Rev 489, 512.
[FN96] Comment, 1974 U Ill L F 648, 654–55; Comment, 65 J Crim L 62, 70–71.
[FN99] Givelber, 1973 U Ill L F 88, 106–09; United States v Crowthers (CA4 Va)
456 F2d 1074; State v Johnson, 74 Wis 2d 169, 246 NW2d 503.
[FN1] Givelber, 1973 U Ill L F 88, 106–111; Weissman, 69 Nw U L Rev 489, 511;
United States v Steele (CA9 Hawaii) 461 F2d 1148.
[FN2] Comment, 65 J Crim L 62, 70; Givelber, 1973 U Ill L F 88, 106, 112.
Section 11 Footnotes:
[FN7] Givelber, 1973 U Ill L F 88, 93–94; Note, 8 Sw U L Rev 687, 704; Weissman,
69 Nw U L Rev 489, 509.
[FN8] Comment, 65 J Crim L 62, 65; Givelber, 1973 U Ill L F 88, 93–94; Weissman,
69 Nw U L Rev 489, 506.
Page 95 of 99
[FN9] Givelber, 1973 U Ill L F 88, 94; Note, 8 Sw U L Rev 687, 704.
[FN10] Comment, 1974 U Ill L F 648, 654; Givelber, 1973 U Ill L F 88, 109; Note,
8 Sw U L Rev 687, 704.
[FN12] Comment, 65 J Crim L 62, 65; Givelber, 1973 U Ill L F 88, 106–09; Note, 8
Sw U L Rev 687, 704.
[FN14] People v Acme Markets, Inc., 37 NY2d 326, 372 NYS2d 590, 334 NE2d 555.
[FN15] Comment, 1974 U Ill L F 648, 654; Note, 8 Sw U L Rev 687, 704; United
States v Steele (CA9 Hawaii) 461 F2d 1148.
[FN16] People v Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App Div 2d 12, 225 NYS2d 128, 4 ALR3d
393.
[FN17] Murguia v Municipal Court for Bakersfield Judicial Dist., 15 Cal 3d 286,
124 Cal Rptr 204, 540 P2d 44.
[FN18] United States v Crowthers (CA4 VA) 456 F2d 1074; People v Amdur, 123 Cal
App 2d Supp 951, 267 P2d 445.
[FN21] People v Acme Markets, Inc., 37 NY2d 326, 372 NYS2d 590, 334 NE2d 555.
[FN24] United States v Falk (CA7 Ill) 479 F2d 616; United States v Steele (CA9
Hawaii) 461 F2d 1148.
Page 96 of 99
[FN25] Comment, 1974 U Ill L F 648, 658–59; United States v Falk (CA7 Ill) 479
F2d 616.
Section 12 Footnotes:
[FN26] Amsterdam, 6 Rutgers Camden L J 1, 19; Comment, 1974 U Ill L F 648, 650.
[FN29] Murguia v Municipal Court for Bakersfield Judicial Dist., 15 Cal 3d 286,
124 Cal Rptr 204, 540 P2d 44.
[FN30] Bortin v Superior Court of San Francisco, 64 Cal App 3d 873, 135 Cal Rptr
30.
Section 13 Footnotes:
[FN34] Amsterdam, 6 Rutgers Camden L J 1, 21; Givelber, 1973 U Ill L F 88, 112–
13; Weissman, 69 Nw U L Rev 489, 512.
[FN36] Comment, 65 J Crim L 62, 70; Givelber, 1973 U Ill L F 88, 113–14;
Weissman, 69 Nw U L Rev 489, 511.
Section 14 Footnotes:
[FN40] Givelber, 1973 U Ill L F 88, 94.
Page 97 of 99
[FN41] Comment, 65 J Crim L 62, 64; Tieger, 1971 Duke L J 717, 738–39, 743.
[FN44] Givelber, 1973 U Ill L F 88, 96–97, 117–18; Russo, 3 Loyola U L Rev 65,
70–71.
[FN45] Amsterdam, 6 Rutgers Camden L J 1, 15–17; Tieger, 1971 Duke L J 717, 735.
[FN46] Givelber, 1973 U Ill L F 88, 112–17; Tieger, 1971 Duke L J 717, 732, 735,
743.
Section 15 Footnotes:
[FN53] Amsterdam, 6 Rutgers Camden L J 1, 13; Tieger, 1971 Duke L J 717, 735.
[FN55] People v Acme Markets, Inc., 37 NY2d 326, 372 NYS2d 590, 334 NE2d 555.
[FN56] Murguia v Municipal Court for Bakersfield Judicial Dist., 15 Cal 3d 286,
124 Cal Rptr 204, 540 P2d 44.
Page 98 of 99
[FN57] People v Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App Div 2d 12, 225 NYS2d 128, 4 ALR3d
393.
[FN59] Comment, 1974 U Ill L F 648, 658, 660; Givelber, 1973 U Ill L F 88, 93–
94.
© 2006 Thomson/West
END OF DOCUMENT
© 2006 Thomson/West
Page 99 of 99