Ethics Day 2

LEGAL ETHICS
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IV. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

THE LAWYER AND SOCIETY
CANON 1: PROMOTE AND RESPECT, LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS
A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
[G.R. Nos. 79690-707. October 7, 1988.]
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and
HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALES, claiming to be and acting as TanodbayanOmbudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 80578. October 7, 1988.]
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner, vs. HON. RAUL M. GONZALES, claiming to be and
acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
The following are the subjects of this Resolution:
1)
a Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by a petitioner
Enrique A. Zaldivar against public respondent Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan)
Raul M. Gonzales, in connection with G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578, and 2) a
Resolution of this Court dated 2 May 1988 requiring respondent Hon. Raul Gonzalez to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to
administrative sanctions for making certain public statements.
I
The pertinent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and
12163-12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) pending before the
Sandiganbayan. The Office of the Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary investigation
and filed the criminal informations in those cases (originally TBP Case No. 86-00778).
On 10 September 1987, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus (G.R. Nos. 79690-707) naming as respondents both the
Sandiganbayan and Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez. Among other things, petitioner assailed: (1)
the 5 February 1987 Resolution 1 of the Tanodbayan" recommending the filing of
criminal informations against petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in TBP Case No. 86-
00778; and (2) the 1 September 1987 Resolution 2 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163-12177 denying his Motion to Quash the criminal
informations filed in those cases by the "Tanodbayan." In this respect, petitioner alleged
that respondent Gonzales, as Tanodbayan and under the provisions of the 1987
Constitution, was no longer vested with power and authority independently to
investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and corruption against public
officials and employees, and hence that the informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos.
12159-12161 and 12163-12177 were all null and void.
On 11 September 1987, this Court issued a Resolution, which read:
"G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan and
Honorable Raul M. Gonzalez, Claiming To Be and Acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman
under the 1987 Constitution). Acting on the special civil action for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with urgent motion for
preliminary injunction, the Court Resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to
require the respondents to COMMENT thereon, within ten (10) days from notice.
The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective
immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering respondent
Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from hearing and trying Criminal cases Nos.
12159 to 12161 and 12163 to 12177 insofar as petitioner Enrique Zaldivar is concerned
and from hearing and resolving the Special Prosecutor's motion to suspend dated
September 3, 1987."
The parties later filed their respective pleadings.
Petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a second Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
(G.R. No. 80578) on 19 November 1987, initially naming only Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez as
respondent. The Petition assailed the 24 September 1987 Resolution 3 of the
"Tanodbayan" in TBP Case No. 87-01304 recommending that additional criminal charges
for graft and corruption be filed against petitioner Zaldivar and five (5) other individuals.
Once again, petitioner raised the argument of the Tanodbayan's lack of authority under
the 1987 Constitution to file such criminal cases and to investigate the same. Petitioner
also moved for the consolidation of that petition with G.R. No. 79690-707.
In a Resolution dated 24 November 1987, 4 this Court, without giving due course to the
second petition: (1) required respondent Gonzales to submit Gonzalez to submit a
comment thereon: and (2) issued a temporary restraining order "ordering respondent
Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in TBP Case No. 8701394 . . . and particularly, from filing the criminal information consequent thereof and
from conducting preliminary investigation therein." In a separate resolution of the same
date, 5 G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578 were ordered consolidated by the Court.
In the meantime, however, on 20 November 1987 or four (4) days prior to issuance by
this Court of a temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 80578, the Office of the
Tanodbayan instituted Criminal Case No. 12570 6 with the Sandiganbayan, which issued
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on 23 November 1987 an Order of Arrest 7 for petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in
Criminal Case No. 12570. Upon Motion 8 of petitioner Zaldivar, this Court issued the
following Resolution on 8 December 1987.
"G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan). The
motion filed by the Solicitor General for respondents for extensions of thirty (30) days
from the expiration of the original period within which to file comment on the petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining
order is GRANTED.
Acting on the manifestation with motion to treat the Sandiganbayan as partyrespondent, the Court Resolved to (a) Consider IMPLEADED the Sandiganbayan as party
respondent; and (b) In pursuance of and supplementing the Temporary Restraining
Order of November 24, 1987 ordering respondent Hon Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and
DESIST from further acting TBP No. 87-01304 entitled, "Commission on Audit vs. Gov.
Enrique Zaldivar, et al., and particularly, from filing the criminal information consequent
thereof and from conducting preliminary investigation therein" ISSUE a TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER effective immediately and continuing until further orders from
this Court, ordering respondents Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan to CEASE
and DESIST from further acting in Criminal case No. 12570, entitled, "People of the
Philippines vs. Enrique M. Zaldivar, et al.' and from enforcing the order of arrest issued
by the Sandiganbayan in said case."
The Solicitor general filed a Comment 9 on the petition in G.R. No. 80578, and we
required the petitioner to submit a Reply 10 thereto.
On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to Cite in Contempt
11 directed at respondent Gonzalez. The Motion cited as bases the acts of respondent
Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the filing of the information against petitioner in Criminal
case No. 12570 before the Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing certain allegedly
contemptuous statements to the media in relation to the proceedings in G.R. No. 80578.
In respect of the latter, petitioner annexed to his Motion a photocopy of a news article,
reproduced here in toto, which appeared in the 30 November 1987 issue of the
"Philippine daily Globe."
Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case
TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said yesterday the Supreme Court order
stopping him from investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar
"can aggravate the thought that affluent persons can prevent the progress of a trial.'
'What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while rich and
influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, it is difficult for an
ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course.' Gonzales told the Daily Globe
in an exclusive interview.
Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order 'heightens the people's apprehension over the
justice system in this country, especially because the people have been thinking that
only the small fry can get it while big fishes go scot-free.'
Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the tribunal last week after Zaldivar
petitioned the court to stop the Tanodbayan from investigating graft cases filed against
him.
Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased in his investigations because the latter
wanted to help promote the political fortunes of a friend from Antique, lawyer Bonifacio
Alentajan.
Acting on Zaldivar's petition, the high court stopped Gonzalez from investigating a graft
charge against the governor, and from instituting any complaint the Sandiganbayan.
'While President Aquino had been prodding me to prosecute graft cases even if they
involve the high and mighty, the Supreme Court had been restraining me.' Gonzalez said.
In accordance with the President's order, Gonzalez said he had filed graft cases against
two 'very powerful' officials of the Aquino government Commissioner Quintin Doromal
of the Presidential Commission on Good Government and Secretary Jiamil I.M. Dialan of
the Office of Muslim Affairs and Cultural Communities.
'While I don't with to discuss the merits of the Zaldivar petition before the Supreme
Court, I am a little bit disturbed that (the order) can aggravate the thinking of some
people that affluent persons can prevent the progress of a trial,' he said.
He disclosed that he had a talk with the Chief Executive over the weekend and that while
she symphatizes with local officials who are charged in court during election time, 'she
said that it might be a disservice to the people and the voters who are entitled to know
their candidates.'
Gonzalez said that while some cases against local against local officials during election
time could be mere harassment's suits, the Constitution makes it a right of every citizen
to be informed of the character of the candidate, who should be subject to
scrutiny."(Italics supplied)
Acting on petitioner's Motion to Cite in Contempt, the Court on 16 February 1988
required respondent Gonzalez "to COMMENT on aforesaid Motion within ten (10) days
from notice." 12
On 27 April 1988 , the Court rendered its Decision 13 (per curiam) in the Consolidated
Petitions. The dispositive portion thereof read:
"WHEREFORE, We hereby:
(1)
GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner Zaldivar and hereby
NULLIFY the criminal informations filed against him in the Sandiganbayan; and
(2)
ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez ro cease and desists from conducting
investigations and filing criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise exercising
the powers and functions of the Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED."
A Motion for Reconsideration 14 was filed by respondent Gonzalez the next day, 28 April
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1988. In his Motion, respondent Gonzalez, after having argued the legal merits of his
position, made the following statements totally unrelated to any legal issue raised either
in the Court's Decision or in his own Motion:
1.
That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a leading member of the court . . .
and he was asked to 'go slow' on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him;'"
2.
That he "was approached and asked to 'refrain' from investigating the COA
report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarrass the
Court; '" and
3.
That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the
phone be a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against
(two Members of the Court)."
Respondent Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten notes 15 which he claimed
were sent by "some members of this Honorable Court, interceding for cases pending
before this office (i. e., the Tanodbayan)." He either released his Motion for
Reconsideration with facsimiles of said notes to the press or repeated to the press the
above extraneous statements: the metropolitan papers for the next several days carried
long reports on those statements and variations and embellishments thereof.
On 2 May 1988, the Court issued the following Resolution in the Consolidated Petitions:
"G.R. No. 79690-707 (Enrique Zaldivar vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al.); G.R. No.
80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, etc.).
1.
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Gonzalez under
date of April 28, 1988, the Court Resolved to REQUIRE the petitioner to COMMENT
thereon within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
2.
It appearing that respondent Raul M. Gonzalez has made public statements to
the media which not only deal with matters sub-judice but also appear offensive to and
disrespectful of the Court and its individual members and calculated, directly or
indirectly, to bring the Court into disrepute, discredit and ridicule and to denigrate and
degrade the administration of justice, the Court Resolved to require respondent
Gonzalez to explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he should not
be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for
making such public statements reported in the media, among others, in the issues of the
'Daily Inquirer,' the 'Journal,' the 'Manila Time,' the 'Philippine Star,' the 'Manila
Chronicle,' the 'Daily Globe' and the 'Manila Standard' of April 29 and 30, and May 1,
1988, to wit:
(a)
That the Court resolution in question is merely 'an offshoot of the position he
had taken that SC Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by
government prosecutors,' or motivated by a desire to stop him 'from investigating cases
against some of their portages or friends;'
(2)
That no less than six of the members of the Court 'interceded for and on
behalf of persons with pending cases before the Tanodbayan,' or sought 'to pressure
him to render decisions favorable to their colleagues and friends;'

(c)
That attempts were made to influence him 'to go slow' on Zaldivar and 'not to
be too hard on him,' and 'to refrain' from investigating the Commission on Audit report
on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarrass the Court;'
(d)
That there were also attempts to cause the dismissal of cases against two
Associate Justices; and
(e)
That the Court had dismissed judges 'without rhyme or reason' and disbarred
lawyers 'without due process.'
3.
It further appearing that three (3) affidavits relative to the purpose of and
circumstances attendant upon the notes written to said public respondent by three (3)
members of the Court have since been submitted to the Court and now form part of its
official records, the Court further Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to ATTACH to
this Resolution copies of said sworn statements and the annexes thereto appended, and
to DIRECT respondent Gonzalez also to comment thereon within the same period of
ten(10) days.
4.
It finally appearing that notice of the Resolution of February 16, 1988
addressed to respondent Gonzalez was misdelivered and therefore not served on him,
the Court Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to CAUSE SERVICE of said Resolution
on the respondent and to REQUIRE the latter to comply therewith."
Respondent Gonzalez subsequently filed with this Court on 9 May 1988 an Omnibus
Motion for Extension and Inhibition 16 alleging, among other things: that the above
quoted 2 May 1988 Resolution of the Court "appears to have overturned that
presumption [of innocence] against him;" and that "he gravely doubts whether that 'cold
neutrality [of an impartial judge]' is still available to him" there being allegedly "at least 4
members of this Tribunal who will not be able to sit in judgment with substantial sobriety
and neutrality." Respondent Gonzalez closed out his pleading with a prayer that the four
(4) Members of the Court identified and referred to there by him inhibit themselves in the
deliberation and resolution of the Motion to Cite in Contempt.
On 19 may 1988, 17 after receipt of respondent's Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration, 18 this Court in an extended per curiam Resolution 19 denied the
Motion and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. That denial was made "final and
immediately executory."
Respondent Gonzalez has since then filed the following pleadings of record:
1.
Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to Inhibit, 20 dated 23 May 1988;
2.
Motion to Transfer Administrative Proceedings to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, 21 dated 20 May 1988;
3.
Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time to File Explanation Ex
Abundante Cautelam, 22 dated 26 May 1988;
4.
Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion
(a)
For Extension of Time
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(b)
For Inhibition, and
(c)
For Transfer of Administrative Proceedings to the IBP, Under Rule 139-B, 23
dated 4 June 1988 (with Annex "A;' 24 an anonymous letter dated 27 May 1988 from the
alleged Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court" and addressed to respondent);
5.
Ex-Parte Manifestation, 25 dated 7 June 1988;
6.
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration, 26 dated 6 June 1988; and
7.
Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with Motion 27 dated 23 September 1988.
In compliance with the 2 may 1988 Resolution of this Court quoted earlier, respondent
Gonzalez submitted on 17 June 1988 an Answer with Explanation and Comment 28
offering respondent's legal arguments and defenses against the contempt and
disciplinary charges presently pending before this Court. Attached to that pleading as
Annex "A" thereof was respondent's own personal Explanation/Compliance. 29 A
second explanation called "Compliance," 30 with annexes, was also submitted by
respondent on 22 July 1988.
II
We begin be referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the
court and members of the court and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regular
and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys.
The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court's constitutional mandate to
regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as well authority to regulate the
practice itself of law. 31 Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary
authority of the Supreme Court over members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental
to the proper administration of justice and essential to an orderly discharge of judicial
functions. 32 Moreover, the Supreme Court has inherent to punish for contempt, to
control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court
including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the
Court. 33 The power to punish for contempt is "necessary for its own protection against
an improper interference with the due administration of justice, " "(it) is not dependent
upon the complaint of any of the parries litigant." 34
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like that
before us here; the Court's inherent power to discipline attorneys and the contempt
power. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is broader that
the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be committed both by lawyers
and non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer,
the contumacious conduct also constitutes professional misconduct which calls into
play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. 35 Where the respondent is a
lawyer, however, the Supreme Court's disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into
play whether or not the misconduct with which the respondent is charged also
constitutes contempt of court. The powers to punish for contempt of court does not
exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. 36 The disciplinary
authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive
power of admission to the Bar. A lawyers is not merely a professional but also an officer
of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of
dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly
tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of justice
constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action
against him and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.
It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power to punish for contempt or to
the disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar, the Court is acting as
offended party, prosecutor and arbiter at one and the same time. Thus, in the present
case, respondent Gonzalez first sought to get some members of the Court to inhibit
themselves in the resolution of this case for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A
little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the
issues involved in this proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due
process from this Court, that the Court has become incapable of judging him impartially
and fairly.
Respondent Gonzalez misconceives the nature of the proceeding at bar as well as the
function of the members of the Court in such proceeding. Respondent's contention is
scarcely an original one. In In Re Almacen, 37 then Associate (later Chief) Justice Fred
Fruiz Castro had occasion to deal with this contention in the following lucid manner:
"xxx
xxx
xxx
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in the
premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have it appear, the members of the Court are the
'complaints, prosecutors and judges' all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an
utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding
at hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and does not
involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the
conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor there. It
may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and
the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileged as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer
of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who
by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there
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can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.

Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any
tirade against the individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual
personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court,
the individual members act not as such individuals as a duly constituted court. The
distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. So that, in a very real sense,
if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only by the Court itself, not the
individual members thereof as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes
and properties, may, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the
administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to
discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary
incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this
power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it
cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. So that even if it be
concede that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact
alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of the power because
public policy demands that they, acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which
call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly
of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complaint, prosecutor and judge is
absolutely inexistent.
xxx
xxx
xxx." 38
It should not be necessary for the members of this Court expressly to disclaim any bias
or prejudice against the respondent that would prevent them from the acting in
accordance with the exacting requirements of their oaths of office. It also appears to the
Court that for all the members to inhibit themselves from sitting on this case is to
abdicate the responsibility with which the Constitution has burdened the. Reference of
complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the
Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the Supreme Court; such reference to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an exclusive
procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where
the charge consists of acts done before the Supreme Court. There is no need for further
investigation of facts in the present case for it is not substantially disputed by
respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed to him. In any
case, respondents had the amplest opportunity to present his defense; his defense is
not that he did not make the statements ascribed to him but that those statements give
rise to no liability on his party, having been made in the exercise of his freedom of
speech. The issues which thus need to be resolved here are issues of law and of basic
and the Court, not any other agency, is compelled to resolve such issues.
III
It is necessary to become very explicit as to what respondent Gonzalez was saying in his
statements set out above. Respondent has not denied making the above statements;
indeed, he acknowledges that the newspaper reports of the statements attributed to him
are substantially correct. 39
Respondent Gonzalez was in effect saying, firstly, that the Supreme Court deliberately
rendered an erroneous or wrong decision when it rendered its per curiam Decision dated
27 April 1988 in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. That decision according to respondent
Gonzales, was issued as an act of retaliation by the Court against him for the position he
had taken "that the (Supreme Court) Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or
investigation by government prosecutors," and in order to stop respondent from
investigating cases against "some of (the) proteges or friends (of some Supreme Court
Justices)." The Court cannot, of course, and will not debate the correctness of its
Decision of 27 April 1988 and of its Resolution dated 19 May 1988 (denying respondent
Gonzalez' Motion for Reconsideration) in the consolidated Zaldivar case. Respondent
Gonzalez, and anyone else for that matter, is free intellectually to accept or not accept
the reasoning of the Court set out in its per curiam Decision and Resolution in the
consolidated Zaldivar cases. This should not, however, obscure the seriousness of the
assault thus undertaken by respondent against the Court and the appalling implications
of a such assault for the integrity of the system of administration of justice in country.
Respondent has said that the Court rendered it Decision and Resolution without regard
to the legal merits of the Zaldivar cases and had used the judicial process to impose
private punishment upon respondent for positions he had taken (unrelated to the
Zaldivar cases) in carrying out his duties. It is very difficult to imagine a more serious
affront to, or greater outrage upon, the honor and dignity of this Court that this.
Respondent's statements is also totally baseless. Respondent's statements were made
in complete disregard of the fact that his continuing authority to act as Tanodbayan or
Ombudsman after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, had been questioned before
this Court as early as 10 September 1987 in the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus filed against him in these consolidated Petitions, 40 that is more than seven
(7) months before the Court rendered its Decision. Respondent also ignores the fact that
one day later, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order effective immediately
Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from hearing the criminal cases filed against
petitioner Zaldivar by respondent Gonzalez Respondent also disregards the fact that on
24 November 1987, upon the filing of a second Petition for Certiorari for Prohibition by
Mr. Zaldivar, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order this time requirement the
respondent to cease and desist from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-0934. Thus, the
decision finally reached by this Court in April 1988 on the constitutional law issue
pending before the Court for the preceding eight (8) months, could scarcely have been
invented as a reprisal simply against respondent.
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A second charge that respondent Gonzalez hurled against members of the Supreme
Court is that they have improperly "pressured" him render decisions favorable to their
"colleagues and friends," including dismissal of "cases" against two (2) members of the
Court. This particularly deplorable charge too is entirely baseless, as even a cursory
examination of the contents of the handwritten notes of three (3) members of this Court
addressed to respondent (which respondent attached to his Motion for Reconsideration
of the Decision of this Court of 27 April 1988 in the consolidated Petitions) will show. It is
clear, and respondent Gonzalez does not pretend otherwise, that the subject matters of
the said notes had no relation at all to the issues in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. This
charge appears to have made in order to try to impart some substance (at least in the
mind of respondent) to the first accusation made by respondent that the Court had
deliberately rendered a wrong decision to get even with respondent who had, with great
fortitude, resisted "pressure" from some members of the Court. Once again, in total
effect, the statements made by respondent appear designed to cast the Court into gross
disrepute, and to cause among the general public scorn for and distrust in the Supreme
Court and, more generally, the judicial institutions of the Republic.
Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing him from
prosecuting "rich and powerful persons," that the Court was in effect discriminating
between the rich and powerful on the one hand and the poor and defenseless upon the
other, and allowing "rich and powerful" accused persons to go "scot-free" while
presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor and small offenders. This
accusation can only be regarded as calculated to present the Court in an extremely bad
light. It may be seen as intended to foment hatred against the Supreme Court; it is also
suggestive of the divisive tactics of revolutionary class war.
Respondents, finally, assailed the Court for having allegedly "dismissed judges 'without
rhyme or reason' and disbarred lawyers 'without due process.'" The Court notes that this
last attacks is not without relation to the other statements made by respondent against
the Court. The total picture that respondent clearly was trying to paint of the Court is
that of an "unjudicial" institution able and willing to render "clearly erroneous" decisions
by way of reprisal against its critics, as a body that acts arbitrarily and capriciously
denying judges and lawyers due process of law. Once again, the purport of respondent's
attack against the Court as an institution unworthy of the people's faith and trusty, is
unmistakable. Had respondent undertaken to examine the records of the two(2) judges
and the attorney he later identified in one of his Explanations he would have discovered
that the respondents in those administrative cases had ample opportunity to explain
their side and submit evidence in support thereof. 41 He would have also found that
there were both strong reasons for and an insistent rhyme in the disciplinary measures
there administered by the Court in the continuing effort to strengthen the judiciary and
upgrade the membership of the Bar. It is appropriate to recall in this connection that due
process as a constitutional precept does not, always and in all situations, require the
trial-type proceeding, 42 that the essence of due process is to be found in the

reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in
support' of one's defense. 43 "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in
court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process. 44
As noted earlier, respondent Gonzalez was required by the Court to explain why he
should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative discipline for
making the statements adverted to above. In his subsequent pleadings where asked the
full Court to inhibit itself and to transfer the administrative proceedings to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, respondent made, among others, the following allegations:
(a)
That the Members of the Court "should inhibit [themselves] in the contempt
and administrative charges against the respondent, in the light of the manifest prejudice
and anger they hold against respondents as shown in the language of the resolution on
the Motion for Reconsideration;' (b) That "the entire membership of the court has already
lost that 'cold neutrality of an impartial judge' [to] be able to allow fairness and due
process in the contempt citation as well as in the possible administrative charge;"
(c)
That "respondent honestly feels that this court as angry and prejudiced as it
is, respondent has no china man's chance to get fair hearing in the contempt and
possible administrative charges;"
(d)
That one must consider "the milieu before this Tribunal with, perhaps passion
and obfuscation running riot;"
(e)
That respondent, "after having been castigated with such venom by the entire
Court in its decision denying the Motion for Reconsideration, does not have confidence
in the impartiality of the entire Court" and that he "finds it extremely difficult to believe
that the members of this Tribunal can still act with unbiased demeanor towards him; and
(f)
That "the Tribunal is determined to disbar [respondent] without due process"
and that a specified Member of the court "has been tasked to be the ponente, or at least
prepare the decision." (Underscoring in the original)
Thus, instead of explaining or seeking to mitigate his statements earlier made,
respondent sought to heap still more opprobrium upon the Court, accusing it of being
incapable of judging his acts and statements justly and according to law. Once again, he
paints this Court as a body not only capable of acting without regard to due process but
indeed determined so to act. A grand design to hold up this Court to public scorn and
disrespect as an unworthy tribunal, one obfuscated by passion and anger at respondent,
emerges once more. It is very difficult for members of this Court to understand how
respondent Gonzalez could suppose that judges on the highest tribunal of the land
would be ready and willing to violate their most solemn oath of office merely to gratify
any imagined private feelings aroused by respondent. The universe of the Court
revolves around the daily demands of law and justice and duty, not around respondent
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nor any other person or group of persons.

Whether or not the statements made by respondent Gonzalez may reasonably be
regarded by this Court as contumacious or as warranting exercise of the disciplinary
authority of this Court over members of the Bar, may best be assayed by examining
samples of the kinds of statements which have been held in our jurisdiction as
constituting contempt or otherwise warranting the exercise of the court's authority.
1.
In Montecillo v. Gica, 45 Atty. Quirino del Mar as counsel for Montecillo, who
was accused in a slander case, moved to reconsider a decision of the Court of Appeals
in favor of the complainant with a veiled threat that he should interpose his next appeal
to the President of the Philippines. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he referred to the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment," and
"judgment rendered through negligence" and implied that the Court of Appeals had
allowed itself to be deceived. Atty. del Mar was held guilty of contempt of court by the
Court of Appeals. He then sued the three (3) justices of the Court of Appeals for
damages before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, seeking to hold them liable for their
decision in the appealed slender case. This suit was terminated, however, by
compromise agreement after Atty. del mar apologized to the Court of Appeals and the
justices concerned and agreed to pay moral damages to the justice. Atty. del Mar some
time later filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari of a decision of the
Court of Appeals in a slander case. This Court denied the Petition for review. Atty. del
Mar then filed a Motion for reconsideration and addressed a letter to the Clerk of the
Supreme Court asking for the names of the justices of this Court who had voted in favor
of and those who had voted against his Motion for Reconsideration. After his Motion for
Reconsideration was denied fore lack of merit, Atty. del Mar filed a Manifestation in this
Court saying:
"I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with certified
of the last two Resolutions of the supreme court confirming the decision of the Court of
Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed
against the Justices supporting the same, civil and criminal suits as i did to the justices
of the Court of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorrent falsification committed by Mr.
Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with
a view to obtaining a favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of exposing to the
people the corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they may well know them
and work for their extermination." (60 SCRA at 240' italics supplied)
Counsel was asked to explain why he should not be administratively dealt with for
making the above statements. In his additional explanation, Atty. del mar made the
following statements:
". . . Graft, corruption and justice are rampant in and outside of the Government. It is this
state of things that convinced me that all human efforts to correct and/or reform the said
evils will be fruitless and as stated in my manifestation to you. I have already decided to
retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling-up
deficiencies." (60 SCRA at 242)
The Court suspended Atty. del mar, "until further orders," from the practice of law
saying:
". . . Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption and
injustice allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as justification for his
contemptuous statements. In other words, he already assumed by his own
contemptuous utterances that because there is an alleged existence of rampant
corruption, graft and injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our act in G.R. No.
L-36800, are among the corrupt , the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice.
We are at a complete loss to follow respondent del Mar's logic. . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
"To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to
the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the
Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b)
Rule 138, Rules of court). But We do remind them of said duty to emphasize to their
younger brethren its paramount importance. A lawyer must always remember that he is
an officer of the court exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of
administering justice."
xxx
xxx
xxx
As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. No. 45604-R was
based on its evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in turn denied in
G.R. No. L-368000 the petition for review on certiorari of the decision because We found
no reason for disturbing the appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both instances,
both the Court of Appeals and this Court exercised judicial discretion in a case under
respective jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in
resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand in the
decision and the resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but
pure contumely for said tribunals.
It is manifest that respondent del mar has scant respect for the two highest court of the
hand when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to
challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust
judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with
gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.
xxx
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xxx
. . . To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will choose to
enter this profession. We with to point to this case as a reminder for them to imprint in
their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to himself to respect the courts of justice
and its officers as a fealty for the stability of our democratic institutions.: (60 SCRA at
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242-247; italic supplied)

2.
In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 46 four (4) members of the
bar, acting as counsels for MacArthur International Minerals Company were required by
this Court to explain certain statements made in MacArthur's third Motion for
Reconsideration:
"d.
' . . .; and the Supreme Court has overlooked the applicable law due to the
misrepresentation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel.' (Last sentence, par. 1,
Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
e.
'. . . Never has any civilized democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick
(referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous executives to
cover and excuse losses to the public, a government agency or just plain fraud . . . and it
is thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing and schooling, even under may of the
incumbent justices, that the Honorable supreme Court intends to create a decision that
in effect does precisely that in a most absolute manner.' (Second sentence, par. 7, Third
Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968)." (31 SCRA at 6)
They were also asked to explain the statements made in their Motion to inhibit filed on
21 September 1968 asking
"Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit
themselves from considering, judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect
thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges '[t]hat the brother of the
Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is the
chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31, 1968' and
the ex-parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above entitled case, the latter in effect
prejudging and predetermining this case even before the joining of an issue. As to the
Chief Justice, the motion states '[t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto to
Conception was given a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the
President a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case.'
The appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board of
Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, makes a
number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of
the July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates 'incidents' which, according to the motion,
brought about respondent MacArthur's belief that 'unjudicial prejudice' had been caused
it and that there was 'unjudicial favoritism' in favor of 'petitioners, their appointing
authority and a favored party directly benefited by the said decision.'" (31 SCRA at 6-7)
Another attorney entered his appearance as new counsel for MacArthur and filed a
fourth Motion for Reconsideration without leave of court, which Motion contained the
following paragraphs:]
"4.
The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of
the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case which
condition is prohibited by the new Rules of Court _ Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote" '
Justices; who may take part. . . . Only those members present when any matter is
submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication . . .' This
requirement is especially significant in the present instance because the member who
penned the decision was the very member who was absent for approximately four
months or more. This provision also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio
Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
xxx
xxx
xxx
6.
That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons
its quest for justice in the judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will inevitably either
raise the graft and corruption of Philippine Government Officials in the bidding of May
12, 1965, required by the Nickel law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel
deposits, the World Court on grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation or
property and/or to the United States Government either its executive or judicial branches
or both, on the grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested rights by the
Philippine Government without either compensation or due process of law and
invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to
the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than
fifty million dollars annually, until restitution or compensation is made." (31 SCRA at 1011)
Finding their explanations unsatisfactory, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Sanchez, held three (3) attorneys guilty of contempt:
"1.
We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for
reconsideration, we indeed, find language that is not to be expected of an officer of the
courts. He pictures petitioners as 'vulturous executives.' He speaks of this Court as a
'civilized, democratic tribunal,' but by innuendo would suggest that it is not.
In his motion tom inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as
'false, erroneous and illegal' in a presumptuous manner. He then charges that the ex
parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined the
case even before the joining of an issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two justices
of this Court for being interested in the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred
Ruiz Castro, because his brother is the vice president of the favored party who is the
chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was
appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, 'a significant
appointment in the Philippine Government by the President, a shortime before the
decision of July 31 1968 was rendered.' In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that 'it
would seem that the principles thus established [the moral and ethical guidelines for
inhibition of any judicial authority] by the Honorable Supreme Court should removed
conditions have been known to create favoritism, only to conclude that there is no
reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and
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justice Castro 'would be less likely to engender favoritism and prejudice for or against a
particular cause or party.' Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice
Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which could make their actuation suspect. He makes
it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not free
from the appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did
affect their judgment. He appoints out that courts must be above suspicion at all times
like Ceasar's wife, warns that loss of confidence for the Tribunal; or a member thereof
should not be allowed to happen in our country, 'although the process has already
begun.'
xxx
xxx
xxx
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in
law. The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Justice Castro. It sweepingly
casts aspersion on the whole court. For, inhibition is also asked if, we repeated, 'any
other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the
petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or their agents or principals,
including the president.' The absurdity of this posture is at once apparent. For one thing,
the justices of this Court are appointed by the President and in that sense may be
considered to have each received a favor from the President. Should these justices
inhibit themselves every time a case involving the Administration crops up? Such a
thought may not certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof would be to paralyze
the machinery of this Court. we would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite system
of government operating in this country. Counsel is presumed to know this But why the
unfounded charge? There is the not-too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing
litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court.
The mischief that system from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern.
Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an
expression of faith, councel's words are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of
disbelief.
xxx
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The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers.
And yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and
degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the
Rules against improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice is
thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court.
xxx
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xxx
Third. The Motion contained an express threat to take the case to the world Court and/or
the United States government. It be member that respondent MacArthur at that time was
still trying to overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so,
unnecessary statements were injected. More specifically, the motion announced that
MacArthur 'will inevitably . . . raise the graft and corruption of [the] Philippine
government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 . . . to the world Court' and would
invoke 'the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to
the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amount to more than fifty
million dollars annually . . .'
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of this Court to decide the case' in
its favor. A notice of appeal to the World Court has even been embodied in Meads'
return. There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal and the move to reconsider
the decision. An appeal from a decision presupposes that a party has already
abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. And yet, it would appear that the
appeal to the World Court is being dangled as threat to effect a change of there decision
of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard explanation.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The dignity of the court, experience teaches, can never be protected where infraction of
ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. The people should not be given
cause to break faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To
preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect.
Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer
pleading as cause before a court of justice." (31 SCRA at 13-23; italics supplied)
3.
In In re Almacen, supra, Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, in protest against what he
asserted was "a great injustice committed his client by the Supreme Court," filed a
Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title. He alleged that his client was deeply
aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," and had become "one of the sacrificial
victims before the altar of hypocrisy," saying that "justice as administered by the
presents members of the Supreme Court [was] not only blind, but also deaf and dumb."
Atty. Almacen vowed to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum" so that "the
people may know of this silent injustice committed by this Court" and that "whatever
mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed [may] never be repeated." Atty.
Almacen released to the press the contents of his Petition and on 26 September 1967,
the "Manila Times" published statements attributed to him as follows:
"Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did not expose the
tribunal's unconstitutional and obnoxious' practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or
appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's 'short-cut justice.' Almacen deplored, his client was
condemned to pay P120, 000, without knowing why he least the case.
xxx
xxx
xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, 'where our
Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of justice, who
ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of
the Constitution with impunity.'
xxx
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He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living,
the present members of the Supreme Court 'will become responsible to all cases
brought to, its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those
unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or denied resolutions.'" (31 SCRA 1t 565566; italics supplied)
Atty. Almacen was required by this Court to show cause why disciplinary action should
not be taken against hi. His explanation which in part read:
"xxx
xxx
xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolized in paintings that can be found in all courts
and government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and
dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for
charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and for justice; dumb in the
sense, that inspire of or beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why
our appeals has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given . . . We refer to no
human defect or ailment in the above statement. WE only described the impersonal state
of things and nothing more.
xxx
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xxx
As we have sated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court
and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY.
Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended
as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our
self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith an
confidence in the members of then Court but disregard our Constitution and to uphold
the Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice we
must uphold the latter." (31 SCRA at 572; italics supplied)
was found by the Court to be "undignified and cynical" and rejected. The Court
indefinitely suspended Almacen from the practice of law holding through Mr. Justice
Fred Ruiz Castro, that Almacen had exceeded the boundaries of "fair criticism."
4.
In Paragas v. Cruz, 47 counsel, whose Petition for Certiorari was dismissed by
this Court, made the following statements in his Motion for Reconsideration:
"The petitioner respectfully prays for a reconsideration of the resolution of this
Honorable Court dated April 20, 1965 on the ground that it constitutes a violation of
Section 14 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court promulgated by this very Hon. Supreme
Court, and on the further ground that is likewise a violation of the most important right in
the bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Philippines, a culpable violation which is a
ground for impeachment.
. . . The rule of law in a democracy should always be upheld and protected by all means,
because the rule of law creates and preserves peace and order and gives satisfaction
and contentment to all concerned. But when the laws and the rules are violated, the
victims resort, sometimes, to armed force and to the ways of the cave-men! We do not
want Verzosa and Reyes repeated again and again, killed in the premises of the Supreme
Court and in those of the City Hall of Manila. Educated people should keep their temper
under control at all times! But justice should be done to all concerned to perpetuate the
very life of Democracy on the face of the earth.'" (14 SCRA 1t 810; italics supplied)
The Court considered the above statements as derogatory to the dignity of the Court and
required counsel to show cause why administrative action should not be taken against
him. Counsel later explained that he had merely related factual events (i.e., the killing of
Verzosa and Reyes) and to express his desire to avoid repetition of such acts. The Court,
through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, found these explanations unsatisfactory and the above
statements contumacious:
". . . The expressions contained in the motion fore reconsideration . . . are plainly
contemptuous and disrespectful, and reference to the recent killing of two employees is
but a covert threat upon the members of the Court. . . That such treats and disrespectful
language contained in a pleading filed in courts are constitutive of direct contempt has
been repeatedly decided(Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil,. 724; People vs. Venturanza, 52
Off. Gaz. 769; Medina vs. Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; De Joya vs. Court of First Instance of
Rizal , L-9785, September 19, 1956; Sison vs. Sandejas, L-9270, April 29, 1959; Lualhati
vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 86). What makes the present case more deplorable is that the guilty
party is a member of the bar; for, as remarked in People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 580
'Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges who try his cases with that
courtesy all have a right to expect. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral
duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards
the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.'
It is right and plausible that an attorney in defending the cause and rights of his client,
should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and ever
will be so, for him to exercise said by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the
propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts require. (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, [In
re Francisco], 61 Phil. 729)" (14 SCRA at 811-812; italics supplied)
5.
In In re Sotto, 48 a newspaper reporter, Mr. Angel Parazo, invoking the Press
Freedom Law, refused to divulge the source of the news item which carried his by-line
and was sent to jail for so refusing. Atty. Vicente Sotto, a senator and author of said law,
caused the publication of the following item in a number of daily newspapers in Manila:
"As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53), interpreted by the Supreme
Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reported of a local daily, who now has suffer 30 days
imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a news published in his paper, I
regret to say that our high Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but
that it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the
majority of its members. In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately
committed during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so
much evil, is to change the members of the supreme Court. To this effect, I announce
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11
that one of the first measures, which I will introduce in the coming congressional
sessions, will have as its object the complete reorganization of the supreme Court. As it
is now constituted, the Supreme Court of today constitutes a constant peril to liberty
and democracy. It need be said loudly,, very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: The
supreme Court of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those
memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other
learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." (82 Phil. at 597598; italics supplied)
In finding Atty. Sotto in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith his invocation of the
constitutional guarantee of free speech and in requiring to show why he should not be
disbarred, the Court, through Mr. Justice Feria, said
"To hurl the false charged that this Court been for the last years committing deliberately
'so many blunders and injustices,' that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one
party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the
one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in may cases decided during the last
years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty
and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower and degrade the
administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippine is, under the
Constitution, the last bulwark to which the filipino people may repair to obtain relied for
their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the
people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this court
and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the
law into their hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member
of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound
to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to
the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration
of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, without
such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation." (82 Phil. at 601-602; italics
supplied)
6.
In Salcedo v. Hernandez, 49 Atty. Vicente Francisco filed a Motion before the
supreme Court which contained the following paragraph (in translation:
"We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this
court, denying our motion for reconsideration is absolutely erroneous and constitutes
an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular
will expressed at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all
the means within our power in order that this error may be corrected by the very court
which has committed it, because we should now want some citizen. particularly some
voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as
he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the
victim, and because it is pour utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable
court and of each and very member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same
time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the affected
party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase the
proselytes of sakdalism' and make the public lose confidence in the administration of
justice." (61 Phil. at 726; italics supplied)
When required by the Court to show cause why he should not be declared in contempt,
Atty. Francisco respondent by saying that it was not contempt to tell the truth. examining
the statement made above, the Court held:
'. . . [they] disclose, in the opinion of this court, an inexcusable disrespect of the
authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is
thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the
rights of the parties, and of the untoward consequences, or with having abused its
power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client,
because the acts of outraging and mocking from which the words 'outrage' and
mockery' used therein are derived, means exactly the same as all these, according to the
Dictionary of the Spanish Language published by the Spanish Academy (Dictionary of
the Spanish Language, 15th ed., pages 132-513).
The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco,
for may years a member of the Philippine bar, was either justified nor in the least
necessary, because in order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the
essential points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the
many reasons stated in his said motion were sufficient and the phrases in question were
superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is highly improper and amiss to
make trouble and resort to, threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done, because
both means are annoying and good practice can ever sanction them by reason of their
natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of serene and impartial
judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of question submitted for
resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente Francisco's motion
contains a more or less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein, after
the author shows the course which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in
his attempt, that they will resort to the press for the purpose of denouncing, what he
claim to be judicial outrage of which his client has been victim; and because he states in
a threatening manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the reader against
the court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in order to make it odious
in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion to promote
distrust in the administration of justice an increase the proselytes of sakdalism, a
movement with seditious and revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of
public knowledge, occurred in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise
than contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority thereof on the
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part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so devoid
of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error
notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven,, with good reasons, that it has acted
erroneously.
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco], as
any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its
integrity, not only because it has conferred upon him the high privilege, not a right
(Malcolm, Legal ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now is: a priest of justice (In re
Thatcher, 80 Ohio St., Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he neither creates
nor promotes distrust in the administration of justice, and prevents anybody from
harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder,
thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to
which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief." (61 Phil. at 727-728; italics
supplied)
It should not be supposed that the six (6) cases above discussed exhaust our case law
on this matter. In the following cases, among others, the supreme Court punished for
contempt or administratively disciplined lawyers who had made statements not very
different from those made in the cases discussed above:
1)
In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987);
2)
Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, 87 SCRA 67 (1978);
3)
Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferre, 20 SCRA 441 (1967);
4)
Malolos v. Reyes, 1 SCRA 559 (1961);
5)
De Joya, et al. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, 99 Phil.
907 (1956);
6)
People v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211 (1956);
7)
In re Suzano A. Velasquez, per curiam Resolution (unreported), Promulgated
29 April 1955;
8)
Cornejo v. Tan, 85 Phil. 772 (1950);
9)
People v. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572 (1946);
10)
Intestate Estate of Rosario Olba; Contempt Proceedings against Antonio
Franco, 67 Phil. 312 (1939); and
11)
Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 (1932).
Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which the Court has in
the past penalized as contemptuous or as warranting application of disciplinary
sanctions, this Country is compelled to hold that the statements here made by
respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the
disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Respondent's statements, especially the
charge that the Court deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decisions in the
Consolidated Petitions, necessarily implying that the justices of this Court betrayed their
oath of office, merely to wreak vengeance upon the respondent here, constitute the
grossest kind of disrespect for the Court. Such statements ever clearly debase and
degrade the supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration
of justice in the country. That respondent's baseless charges have had some impact
outside the internal world of subjective intent, is clearly demonstrated by the filing of a
complaint for impeachment of thirteen (13) out of the then fourteen (14) incumbent
members of this Court, a complaint the centerpiece of which is a repetition of the
appalling claim of respondent that this Court deliberately rendered a wrong decision as
an act of reprisal against the respondent.
IV
The principal defense of respondent defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was
merely exercising his constitutional right of free speech. He also invokes the related
doctrines of qualified privileged communications fair criticism in the public interest.
Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one
seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of
is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not
absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interest. One of these
fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning
of the administration of justice. There is bo antinomy between free expression and the
integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of
freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and
orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable
independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general
community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:
". . . A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent
judiciary ro a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a
free society.
The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through which
that freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. And one of the potent means for assuring
judges their independence is a free press." 50
Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the following:
"The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This constitutional
right must be protected in its fullest extent. The Court has heretofore given evidence of
its tolerant regard for charges under the Libel Law which come dangerously close to its
violation. We shall continue in this chosen path. The liberty of the citizens must be
preserved in all of its completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of the press and of
the citizens should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as is the
maintenance of unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizens is the
maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be
had if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good
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purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to diffuse

inaccurate accounts of confidential proceedings to the embarrassment of the parties
and the courts." 51 (Italics supplied)
Only slightly (f at all ) less important is the public interest in the capacity of the Court
effectively to prevent and control professional misconduct on the part of lawyers who
are, first and foremost, indispensable participants in the task of rendering justice to
every man. Some courts have held, persuasively it appears to us, that a lawyer's right of
free expression may have to be more limited than that of a layman. 52
It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of
the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the
Republic and to this Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in
the government of the republic. The responsibility of the respondent "to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court" and "not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice "53 is heavier that of a private practicing lawyer.
Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to criticize the rulings of
this court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. Once more,
however, the right of criticism is not unlimited. Its limits were marked out by Mr. Justice
Castro in In re Almacen which are worth noting:
"But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall
not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair
criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on
the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to
courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action."
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the
orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' right, lawyers
even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
. . . "54 (Italics supplied)
The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has criticized the
Court; it is addressed rather to the nature of that criticism or comment and the manner
in which it was carried out.
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the court. The
subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct
or misconduct is concerned. He will not, however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and
plain import of his words and acts. 55 It is, upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point
out that respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations and exhibited no
repentance. 56
Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no injury to the judiciary has
been shown, and points to the fact that this Court denied his Motion for reconsideration
of its per curiam Decision of 27 April 1988 and reiterated and amplified that Decision in
its Resolution of 19 May 1988. In the first place, proof of actual damage sustained by a
court or the judiciary in general is not essential for a finding of contempt or for the
application of the disciplinary authority of the Court. Insofar as the Consolidated
Petitions are concerned this Court after careful review of the bases of its 27 April 1988
Decision, denied respondent's Motion for reconsideration thereof and rejected the public
pressures brought to bear upon this Court by the respondent through his much
publicized acts and statements for which he is here being required to account.
Obstructing the free and undisturbed resolution of a particular case is not the only
species of injury that the Court has a right and a duty to prevent and redress. What is at
stake in cases of this kind is the integrity of the judicial institutions of the country in
general and of the Supreme Court in particular. Damage to such institutions might not be
quantifiable at a given moment in time but damage there will surely by if acts like those
of respondent Gonzalez are not effectively stopped and countered. The level of trust and
confidence of the general public in the courts, including the court of last resort, is not
easily measured; but few will dispute that a high level of such trust and confidence is
critical for the stability of democratic government.
Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggest that punishment for contempt is not the proper
remedy in this case and suggests that the members of this Court have recourse to libel
suits against him. While the remedy of libel suits by individual members of this Court
may well be available against respondent Gonzalez, such is by no means an exclusive
remedy. Moreover, where as in the instant case, it is not only the individual members of
the Court but the Court itself as an institution that has been falsely attacked, libel suits
cannot be an adequate remedy. 57
The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in
facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the
practice of law indefinitely and until further others from this Court, the suspension to
take effect immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be finished the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman, the
Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their information
and guidance.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Raul M. Gonzalez suspended from the practice of law indefinitely.
2004 RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE

A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC: Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004
(August 1, 2004)
Qualifications of a Notary Public
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4.
5.
Jurisdiction and Term

A notary public may perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing on the 1st day of January of the year
in which the commissioning is made UNLESS earlier revoked or the notary public has resigned
according to these Rules and the Rules of Court (Rule III, Section 11).
Powers and Limitations of Notaries Public
Powers
A notary public is empowered to do the following acts: (JAOSAC)
1. Acknowledgments;
2. Oaths and affirmations;
3. Jurats;
4. Signature witnessings;
5. Copy certifications; and
6. Any other act authorized by these Rules.
A notary public is authorized to certify the affixing of a signature by thumb or other
mark on an instrument or document presented for notarization if:
1. The thumb or other mark is affixed in the presence of the notary public and of two (2)
disinterested and unaffected witnesses to the instrument or document;
2. Both witnesses sign their own names in addition to the thumb or other mark;
3. The notary public writes below the thumb or other mark: Thumb or Other Mark affixed
by (name of signatory by mark) in the presence of (names and addresses of witnesses)
and undersigned notary public, and
4. The notary public notarizes the signature by thumb or other mark through an
acknowledgment, jurat or signature witnessing.
A notary public is authorized to sign on behalf of a person who is physically unable to
sign or make a mark on an instrument or document if:
1. The notary public is directed by the person unable to sign or make a mark to sign on his
behalf;
2.
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Must be citizen of the Philippines

Must be over twenty-one (21) years of age
Must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one (1) year and maintains a regular
place of work or business in the city or province where the commission is to be issued
Must be a member of the Philippine Bar in good standing with clearances from the
Office of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines
Must not have been convicted in the first instance of any crime involving moral turpitude
(Rule III, Section 1)
3.
4.
Page
1.
2.
3.
5.
The signature of the notary public is affixed in the presence of two (2) disinterested and
unaffected witnesses to the instrument or document;
Both witnesses sign their own names;
The notary public writes below his signature: Signature affixed by notary in the
presence of (names and addresses of person and two (2) witnesses), and
The notary public notarizes his signature by acknowledgment or jurat (Rule IV, Section
1).
Prohibitions
General Rule: A notary public shall not perform a notarial act outside his regular place of
work or business.
Exceptions: A notarial act may be performed at the request of the parties in the following
sites located within his territorial jurisdiction:
a. Public offices, convention halls and similar places where oaths of office may be
administered;
b. Public function areas in hotels and similar places for the signing of instruments or
documents requiring notarization;
c. Hospitals and medical institutions where a party to the instrument or document is
confined for treatment; and
d. Any place where a party to the instrument or document requiring notarization is under
detention.
1.
2.
3.
A person shall not perform a notarial act if:

the person involved as signatory to the instrument or documenta. Is not in the notarys presence at the time of the notarization; and
b. Is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules (Rule IV, Section 2).
the certificate containing an information known or believed to be false; and
he shall not affix an official signature or seal on a notarial certificate that is incomplete (Rule
IV, Section 5).
Disqualifications
A notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial if he:
1) Is a party to the instrument or document;
2) Will receive, as a direct or indirect result any commission, fee, advantage, right, title,
interest, cash, property, or other consideration, except as provided that is to be
notarized;
3) Is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or
consanguinity of the principal within the fourth civil degree (Rule IV, Section 3).
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NOTE: A blank or incomplete instrument or document OR an instrument or document

without appropriate notarial certification is considered an Improper Instrument/Document
(Rule IV, Section 6).
Notarial Certificates
Contents of the Concluding part of the Notarial Certificate:
1) The name of the notary public as exactly indicated in the commission;
2) The serial number of the commission of the notary public;
3) The words Notary Public and the province or city where the notary public is
commissioned, the expiration date of the commission and the office address of the
notary public; and
4) The Roll of Attorneys number, the Professional Tax Receipt number and the place and
date of issuance thereof and the IBP Membership number (Rule VIII, Section 2).
Fails to identify a principal on the basis of personal knowledge or competent

evidence;
9) Executes a false or incomplete certificate under Section 5, Rule IV;
10) Knowingly performs or fails to perform any other act prohibited or mandated by
these Rules; and
11) Commits any other dereliction or act which in the judgment of the Executive
Judge constitutes good cause for the revocation of the commission or imposition
of administrative sanction (Rule XI, Section 1).
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8)
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When notary public may refuse to notarize even if appropriate fee is tendered:
1) When the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or
transaction is unlawful or immoral.
2) When the signatory shows a demeanor which engenders in the mind of the notary
public reasonable doubt as to the formers knowledge of the consequences of the
transaction requiring a notarial act.
3) If in the notarys judgment, the signatory is not acting in his/her own free will (Rule
IV, Section 4).
4) If the document or instrument to be notarized is considered as an improper
document by these Rules.
Punishable Acts
The Executive Judge shall cause the prosecution of any person who:
1) Knowingly acts or otherwise impersonates a notary public;
2) Knowingly obtains, conceals, defaces, or destroys the seal, notarial register,
or official records of a notary public; and
3) Knowingly solicits, coerces, or in any way influences a notary public to
commit official misconduct (Rule XII, Section 1).
Revocation of Commission
The Executive Judge shall revoke a commission for any ground on which an application for a
commission may be denied.
In addition, the Executive Judge may revoke the commission of or impose sanctions upon any
notary public who:
1) Fails to keep a notarial register;
2) Fails to make the appropriate entry or entries in his notarial register concerning
his notarial acts;
3) Fails to send the copy of the entries to the Executive Judge within the first ten
(10) days of the month following;
4) Fails to affix to acknowledgments the date of expiration of his commission;
5) Fails to submit his notarial register, when filled, to the Executive Judge;
6) Fails to make his report, within a reasonable time, to the Executive Judge
concerning the performance of his duties, as may be required by the Judge;
7) Fails to require the presence of the principal at the time of the notarial act;
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A.C. No. 5838. January 17, 2005]

SPOUSES BENJAMIN SANTUYO AND EDITHA SANTUYO, complainants, vs. ATTY.
EDWIN A. HIDALGO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In a verified complaint-affidavit dated September 18, 2001,[1] spouses Benjamin Santuyo
and Editha Santuyo accused respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo of serious misconduct
and dishonesty for breach of his lawyers oath and the notarial law.
Complainants stated that sometime in December 1991, they purchased a parcel of land
covered by a deed of sale. The deed of sale was allegedly notarized by respondent
lawyer and was entered in his notarial register as Doc. No. 94 on Page No. 19 in Book No.
III, Series of 1991. Complainant spouses averred that about six years after the date of
notarization, they had a dispute with one Danilo German over the ownership of the land.
The case was estafa through falsification of a public document.
During the trial of the case, German presented in court an affidavit executed by
respondent denying the authenticity of his signature on the deed of sale. The spouses
allegedly forged his notarial signature on said deed.[2]
According to complainants, respondent overlooked the fact that the disputed deed of
sale contained all the legal formalities of a duly notarized document, including an
impression of respondents notarial dry seal. Not being persons who were learned in the
technicalities surrounding a notarial act, spouses contended that they could not have
forged the signature of herein respondent. They added that they had no access to his
notarial seal and notarial register, and could not have made any imprint of respondents
seal or signature on the subject deed of sale or elsewhere.[3]
In his answer[4] to the complaint, respondent denied the allegations against him. He
denied having notarized any deed of sale covering the disputed property. According to
respondent, he once worked as a junior lawyer at Carpio General and Jacob Law Office
where he was asked to apply for a notarial commission. While he admitted that he
notarized several documents in that office, these, however, did not include the subject
deed of sale. He explained that, as a matter of office procedure, documents underwent
scrutiny by the senior lawyers and it was only when they gave their approval that
notarization was done. He claimed that, in some occasions, the secretaries in the law
firm, by themselves, would affix the dry seal of the junior associates on documents
relating to cases handled by the law firm. Respondent added that he normally required
the parties to exhibit their community tax certificates and made them personally
acknowledge the documents before him as notary public. He would have remembered
complainants had they actually appeared before him. While he admitted knowing
complainant Editha Santuyo, he said he met the latters husband and co-complainant
only on November 5, 1997, or about six years from the time that he purportedly notarized
the deed of sale. Moreover, respondent stressed that an examination of his alleged
signature on the deed of sale revealed that it was forged; the strokes were smooth and
mild. He suspected that a lady was responsible for forging his signature.
To further refute the accusations against him, respondent stated that, at the time the
subject deed of sale was supposedly notarized, on December 27, 1991, he was on
vacation. He surmised that complainants must have gone to the law office and enticed
one of the secretaries, with the concurrence of the senior lawyers, to notarize the
document. He claimed he was a victim of a criminal scheme motivated by greed.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. In a report[5] it submitted to the Court, the
IBP noted that the alleged forged signature of respondent on the deed of sale was
different from his signatures in other documents he submitted during the investigation
of the present case.[6] However, it ruled that respondent was also negligent because he
allowed the office secretaries to perform his notarial functions, including the
safekeeping of his notarial dry seal and notarial register.[7]It thus recommended:
WHEREFORE[,] in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that
respondents commission as notary public be revoked for two (2) years if he is
commissioned as such; or he should not be granted a commission as notary public for
two (2) years upon receipt hereof.[8]
After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, complainants did not
categorically state that they appeared before respondent to have the deed of sale
notarized. Their appearance before him could have bolstered this allegation that
respondent signed the document and that it was not a forgery as he claimed. The
records show that complainants themselves were not sure if respondent, indeed, signed
the document; what they were sure of was the fact that his signature appeared thereon.
They had no personal knowledge as well as to who actually affixed the signature of
respondent on the deed.
Furthermore, complainants did not refute respondents contention that he only met
complainant Benjamin Santuyo six years after the alleged notarization of the deed of
sale. Respondents assertion was corroborated by one Mrs. Lyn Santy in an affidavit
executed on November 17, 2001[9] wherein she stated that complainant Editha Santuyo
had to invite respondent to her house on November 5, 1997 to meet her husband since
the two had to be introduced to each other. The meeting between complainant Benjamin
Santuyo and respondent was arranged after the latter insisted that Mr. Santuyo
personally acknowledge a deed of sale concerning another property that the spouses
bought.
In finding respondent negligent in performing his notarial functions, the IBP reasoned
out:
xxx xxx xxx.
Considering that the responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive respondent
should have been more discreet and cautious in the execution of his duties as such and
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A.C. No. 5864

April 15, 2005
ARTURO L. SICAT, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. GREGORIO E. ARIOLA, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In an affidavit-complaint,1 complainant Arturo L. Sicat, a Board Member of
the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Rizal, charged respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola,
the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, Rizal, with violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by committing fraud, deceit and falsehood in his dealings, particularly the
notarization of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed by a one Juanito
C. Benitez. According to complainant, respondent made it appear that Benitez executed
the said document on January 4, 2001 when in fact the latter had already died on
October 25, 2000.
He alleged that prior to the notarization, the Municipality of Cainta had entered into a
contract with J.C. Benitez Architect and Technical Management, represented by Benitez,
for the construction of low-cost houses. The cost of the architectural and engineering
designs amounted to P11,000,000 and two consultants were engaged to supervise the
project. For the services of the consultants, the Municipality of Cainta issued a check
dated January 10, 2001 in the amount of P3,700,000, payable to J.C. Benitez Architects
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17
should not have wholly entrusted everything to the secretaries; otherwise he should not
have been commissioned as notary public.
For having wholly entrusted the preparation and other mechanics of the document for
notarization to the secretary there can be a possibility that even the respondents
signature which is the only one left for him to do can be done by the secretary or
anybody for that matter as had been the case herein.
As it is respondent had been negligent not only in the supposed notarization but
foremost in having allowed the office secretaries to make the necessary entries in his
notarial registry which was supposed to be done and kept by him alone; and should not
have relied on somebody else.[10]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo is hereby found GUILTY of negligence
in the performance of his duties as notary public and is hereby SUSPENDED from his
commission as a notary public for a period of two years, if he is commissioned, or if he
is not, he is disqualified from an appointment as a notary public for a period of two years
from finality of this resolution, with a warning that a repetition of similar negligent acts
would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
and Technical Management and/or Cesar Goco. The check was received and encashed
by the latter by virtue of the authority of the SPA notarized by respondent Ariola.
Complainant further charged respondent with the crime of falsification penalized under
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code by making it appear that certain persons
participated in an act or proceeding when in fact they did not.
In his Comment,2 respondent explained that, as early as May 12, 2000, Benitez had
already signed the SPA. He claimed that due to inadvertence, it was only on January 4,
2001 that he was able to notarize it. Nevertheless, the SPA notarized by him on January
4, 2001 was not at all necessary because Benitez had signed a similar SPA in favor of
Goco sometime before his death, on May 12, 2000. Because it was no longer necessary,
the SPA was cancelled the same day he notarized it, hence, legally, there was no public
document that existed. Respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed on the
ground of forum-shopping since similar charges had been filed with the Civil Service
Commission and the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. According to him, the
complaints were later dismissed based on findings that the assailed act referred to
violations of the implementing rules and regulations of PD 1594, 3 PD 1445,4 RA 71605 and
other pertinent rules of the Commission on Audit (COA). He stressed that no criminal
and administrative charges were recommended for filing against him.
In a Resolution dated March 12, 2003, 6 the Court referred the complaint to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. On August 26,
2003, the IBP submitted its investigation report:
x x x it is evident that respondent notarized the Special Power of Attorney dated 4
January 2001 purportedly executed by Juanito C. Benitez long after Mr. Benitez was
dead. It is also evident that respondent cannot feign innocence and claim that he did not
know Mr. Benitez was already dead at the time because respondent, as member of the
Prequalification and Awards Committee of the Municipality of Cainta, personally knew
Mr. Benitez because the latter appeared before the Committee a number of times. It is
evident that the Special Power of Attorney dated 4 January 2001 was part of a scheme of
individuals to defraud the Municipality of Cainta of money which was allegedly due them,
and that respondent by notarizing said Special Power of Attorney helped said parties
succeed in their plans.7
The IBP recommended to the Court that respondent's notarial commission be revoked
and that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.8
After a careful review of the records, we find that respondent never disputed
complainant's accusation that he notarized the SPA purportedly executed by Benitez on
January 4, 2001. He likewise never took issue with the fact that on said date, Benitez was
already dead. His act was a serious breach of the sacred obligation imposed upon him
by the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which
prohibited him from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. As a
lawyer and as an officer of the court, it was his duty to serve the ends of justice, 9 not to
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corrupt it. Oath-bound, he was expected to act at all times in accordance with law and
ethics, and if he did not, he would not only injure himself and the public but also bring
reproach upon an honorable profession.10
In the recent case of Zaballero v. Atty. Mario J. Montalvan,11 where the respondent
notarized certain documents and made it appear that the deceased father of complainant
executed them, the Court declared the respondent there guilty of violating Canon 10,
Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.12 The Court was emphatic that
lawyers commissioned as notaries public should not authenticate documents unless the
persons who signed them are the very same persons who executed them and personally
appeared before them to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The
Court added that notaries public must observe utmost fidelity, the basic requirement in
the performance of their duties, otherwise the confidence of the public in the integrity of
notarized deeds and documents will be undermined.
In the case at bar, the records show that Benitez died on October 25, 2000. However,
respondent notarized the SPA, purportedly bearing the signature of Benitez, on January
4, 2001 or more than two months after the latter's death. The notarial acknowledgement
of respondent declared that Benitez "appeared before him and acknowledged that the
instrument was his free and voluntary act." Clearly, respondent lied and intentionally
perpetuated an untruthful statement. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless and
routinary act.13 It converts a private document into a public instrument, making it
admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and
due execution.14
Neither will respondent's defense that the SPA in question was superfluous and
unnecessary, and prejudiced no one, exonerate him of accountability. His assertion of
falsehood in a public document contravened one of the most cherished tenets of the
legal profession and potentially cast suspicion on the truthfulness of every notarial act.
As the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, he should have been aware of his great
responsibility not only as a notary public but as a public officer as well. A public office is
a public trust. Respondent should not have caused disservice to his constituents by
consciously performing an act that would deceive them and the Municipality of Cainta.
Without the fraudulent SPA, the erring parties in the construction project could not have
encashed the check amounting to P3,700,000 and could not have foisted on the public a
spurious contract all to the extreme prejudice of the very Municipality of which he was
the Administrator. According to the COA Special Task Force:
Almost all acts of falsification of public documents as enumerated in Article 171 in
relation to Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code were evident in the transactions of the
Municipality of Cainta with J.C. Benitez & Architects Technical Management for the
consultancy services in the conduct of Detailed Feasibility Study and Detailed
Engineering Design of the Proposed Construction of Cainta Municipal Medium Rise Low
Cost Housing, in the contract amount of P11,000,000. The agent resorted to
18
misrepresentation, manufacture or fabrication of fictitious document, untruthful
narration of facts, misrepresentation, and counterfeiting or imitating signature for the
purpose of creating a fraudulent contract. All these were tainted with deceit perpetrated
against the government resulting to undue injury. The first and partial payment, in the
amount of P3,700,000.00 was made in the absence of the required outputs. x x x15
We need not say more except that we are constrained to change the penalty
recommended by the IBP which we find too light.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, Jr., is found guilty of gross
misconduct and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let copies of this
Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered in the records of
respondent, and brought to the immediate attention of the Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.
RULE 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
[A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000]
LESLIE UI, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for
allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant,
Leslie Ui.
The relevant facts are:
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of
Lourdes Church in Quezon City[1] and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4)
children, namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in
December 1987, however, complainant found out that her husband, Carlos Ui, was
carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot
a daughter sometime in 1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San
Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of
the College of Law of the University of the Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar
in 1982.
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant
then visited respondent at her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself
as the legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a
child with Carlos Ui and alleged, however, that everything was over between her and
Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the representations of respondent and thought things
would turn out well from then on and that the illicit relationship between her husband
and respondent would come to an end.
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However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband
and respondent continued, and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her
husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant then met again with respondent
sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit
relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and
complainant even came to know later on that respondent had been employed by her
husband in his company.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August
11, 1989 by the complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter,
Commission) on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit
relationship with the complainants husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer, [2] respondent
averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a
bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman
in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She stated that during one of
their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact got
married in Hawaii, USA in 1985[3]. Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not live
with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his children in their Greenhills residence
because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the children gradually to know and
accept the fact of his second marriage before they would live together.[4]
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only
return occasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties.
During one of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, respondent was surprised
when she was confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of
Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui,
respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned only in
March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after she reported to
work with the law firm[5] she was connected with, the woman who represented herself to
be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has
been communicating with her.
It is respondents contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they
were married abroad and that after June 1988 when respondent discovered Carlos Uis
true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui
never lived with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills,
San Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which
belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house was built
exclusively from her parents funds.[6] By way of counterclaim, respondent sought moral
damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for
having filed the present allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case against
respondent.
In her Reply[7] dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent
knew perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children with her
even at the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went
abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also
charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same
was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense
charged. The resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads:
Complainants evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit
relationship" between the respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in
December 1987. The same evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui was still
living with complainant up to the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.
It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents
started and was discovered by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent
Carlos were still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan,
MetroManila and they, admittedly, continued to live together at their conjugal home up to
early (sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the same.
From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship, illicit
as complainant puts it, had been prima facie established by complainants evidence, this
same evidence had failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of respondents
cohabitation in the concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang
house, proof of which is necessary and indispensable to at least create probable cause
for the offense charged. The statement alone of complainant, worse, a statement only of
a conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation does not make the complainants
evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).
It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their
respective positions on the matter support and bolster the foregoing
conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be
dismissed for want of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[8]
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the
Secretary of Justice, but the same was dismissed [9] on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence to prove her allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as
husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a
Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the Commission [10] wherein she charged
respondent with making false allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting
document which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of
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respondent filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she
was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to
substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of Marriage [11] duly certified by the
State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii State Department of
Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii,
USA revealed that the date of marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris
Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in
her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false allegation was because
respondent wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos
Ui was within the wedlock.[12] It is the contention of complainant that such act constitutes
a violation of Articles 183[13] and 184[14] of the Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of
the Commission; and that the act of respondent in making false allegations in her
Answer and submitting an altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral
perversity and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt), [15] respondent averred
that she did not have the original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was
in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because she relied in
good faith on what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum [16] on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of
whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves
to be barred from the practice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be
dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of good
moral character for the practice of the legal profession; and
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in an
immoral manner.[17]
In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim
in this case and not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already
married, and that upon learning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties
with Carlos Ui. She stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that the
civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so much time with her,
and he was so open in his courtship.[18]
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly
incredible for her to have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer
had she known that the same was altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no
compelling reason for her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place
either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got
married before complainant confronted respondent and informed the latter of her earlier
marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who
testified and admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the date of the
marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present evidence to
rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter.
Respondent posits that complainants evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent
with a child, pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a
picture of a light colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and
portion of the house and ground, and another picture of the same car bearing Plate No.
PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the garage, [19] does not prove that she acted in
an immoral manner. They have no evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were
taken by a photographer from a private security agency and who was not presented
during the hearings. Further, the respondent presented the Resolution of the Provincial
Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui
against respondent for lack of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense
charged [20] and the dismissal of the appeal by the Department of Justice [21]to bolster her
argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act because of her
relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent claims that she entered the relationship
with Carlos Ui in good faith and that her conduct cannot be considered as willful,
flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Carlos
Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status,
she parted ways with him.
In the Memorandum [22] filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for
the disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed
immorality by having intimate relations with a married man which resulted in the birth of
two (2) children. Complainant testified that respondents mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio,
personally knew complainant and her husband since the late 1970s because they were
clients of the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was the Branch Manager. [23] It was thus highly
improbable that respondent, who was living with her parents as of 1986, would not have
been informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant
likewise averred that respondent committed disrespect towards the Commission for
submitting a photocopy of a document containing an intercalated date.
In her Reply to Complainants Memorandum [24], respondent stated that complainant
miserably failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists
that contrary to the allegations of complainant, there is no showing that respondent had
knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that her
mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that such information was
made known to respondent.
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its
Report and Recommendation, finding that:
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the
latter represented himself to be single. The Commission does not find said claim too
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difficult to believe in the light of contemporary human experience.

Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to be
single, separated, or without any firm commitment to another woman. The reason
therefor is not hard to fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men.
The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status of
Carlos Ui, she left for the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with
him. When she returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her brother,
Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each other because
of the children whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did they live together.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part of
respondent that can be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible
to a high degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic) anything else and
should deserve compassion rather than condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode
destroyed her chance of having a normal and happy family life, a dream cherished by
every single girl.
x..........................x..........................x"
Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a
Notice of Resolution dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, the complaint for Gross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully attaching to her
Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same will merit a more severe penalty."
We agree with the findings aforequoted.
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the
practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege
that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his
oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law
are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or
pending in court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and
g. pass the bar examinations.[25] (Italics supplied)

Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that
an applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good
moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege
of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such
privilege. It has been held If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued
possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the
legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to
have good moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in
addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly
immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a
lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what
appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral
conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community." (7 C.J.S. 959).[26]
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos
Ui, she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got
married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her
knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent
are not only far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms
of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today
is a far cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding,
lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social
responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts
of this case lead us to believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself in
such a compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in
finding out more about Carlos Uis personal background prior to her intimate
involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondents
suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to
ask probing questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui
had children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the
slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also,
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despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first child,
a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible considering respondents allegation that
Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was
imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her
relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid
marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows
indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community.[27] Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action,
the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.[28]
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to
refrain from adulterous relationships x x x but must also so behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards."[29] Respondents act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon
discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves
that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal
profession. Complainants bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary
powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.
[30]
This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her
Answer, we find improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied
on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an
event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the
date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as
in the case at bar, can forget the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary
to human experience and highly improbable.
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an
attachment to her pleading, especially so when she has personal knowledge of the facts
and circumstances contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an
intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of
morality. The legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called
upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of
malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the
highest degree of morality.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio,
for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy
of her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a

STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition
of the same or similar offense in the future.
SO ORDERED.
[SBC Case No. 519. July 31, 1997]
PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant, vs. SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent
Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal profession. Respondent had
passed the 1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in
1966, 1967 and 1968. Before he could take his oath, however, complainant filed the
instant petition averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child out
of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to
marry her.
The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in June
and July 1971. Respondent and complainant were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since
1953, when they were both in their teens, they were steadies. Respondent even acted as
escort to complainant when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town fiesta. Complainant
first acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime in 1960. Their intimacy
yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born on December 11, 1964. [1] It was after the child was
born, complainant alleged, that respondent first promised he would marry her after he
passes the bar examinations. Their relationship continued and respondent allegedly
made more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child
on the latters birthdays. Her trust in him and their relationship ended in 1971, when she
learned that respondent married another woman.Hence, this petition.
Upon complainants motion, the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of witnesses
by deposition in 1972. On February 18, 1974, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion
to Dismiss the case citing complainants failure to comment on the motion of Judge
Cuello seeking to be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid testimonies by
deposition. Complainant filed her comment stating that she had justifiable reasons in
failing to file the earlier comment required and that she remains interested in the
resolution of the present case. On June 18, 1974, the Court denied respondents motion
to dismiss.
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the ground of
abandonment filed by respondent on September 17, 1979.[2] Respondents third motion to
dismiss was noted in the Courts Resolution dated September 15, 1982. [3] In 1988,
respondent repeated his request, citing his election as a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active participation in civic organizations
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and good standing in the community as well as the length of time this case has been
pending as reasons to allow him to take his oath as a lawyer. [4]
On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of
complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow
Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyers oath upon payment of the required fees.[5]
Respondents hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the Court, in
response to complainants opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. On
June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBPs report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and that
respondent be allowed to take the lawyers oath.
We agree.
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyers oath in 1971 because of the charges
of gross immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore an
illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not
fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent
exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual
relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character
on his part but the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has
held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false
as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to
a high degree.[6] It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community.[7]
We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang [8] quite relevant because mere intimacy between
a man and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried
on and devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so
unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as
a result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.[9]
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently
consensual. We do not find complainants assertions that she had been forced into
sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be respondents girlfriend even
after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of amicable and
intimate relations refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual congress
with him. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their
relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could be easily led
astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle permanently with another
woman. We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for
marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love,
23
not for any other reason.
We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman scorned,
bitter and unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely
and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be admitted
into. Even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that
respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment
therefor. During this time there appears to be no other indiscretion attributed to him.
[10]
Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age, should thus be allowed, albeit
belatedly, to take the lawyers oath.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco,
Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 4585. November 12, 2004]
MICHAEL P. BARRIOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO P. MARTINEZ, respondent
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a verified petition[1] for disbarment filed against Atty. Francisco Martinez for
having been convicted by final judgment in Criminal Case No. 6608 of a crime involving
moral turpitude by Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City.[2]
The dispositive portion of the same states:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Francisco Martinez guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime for (sic) violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 charged in the
Information. He is imposed a penalty of ONE (1) YEAR imprisonment and fine double the
amount of the check which is EIGHT THOUSAND (8,000.00) PESOS, plus payment of the
tax pursuant to Section 205 of the Internal Revenue Code and costs against the accused.
[3]
Complainant further submitted our Resolution dated 13 March 1996 and the Entry of
Judgment from this Court dated 20 March 1996.
On 03 July 1996, we required[4] respondent to comment on said petition within ten (10)
days from notice. On 17 February 1997, we issued a second resolution[5] requiring him to
show cause why no disciplinary action should be imposed on him for failure to comply
with our earlier Resolution, and to submit said Comment. On 07 July 1997, we imposed a
fine of P1,000 for respondents failure to file said Comment and required him to comply
with our previous resolution within ten days.[6] On 27 April 1998, we fined respondent an
additional P2,000 and required him to comply with the resolution requiring his comment
within ten days under pain of imprisonment and arrest for a period of five (5) days or
until his compliance.[7] Finally, on 03 February 1999, or almost three years later, we
declared respondent Martinez guilty of Contempt under Rule 71, Sec. 3[b] of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure and ordered his imprisonment until he complied with the
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aforesaid resolutions.[8]
On 05 April 1999, the National Bureau of Investigation reported [9] that respondent was
arrested in Tacloban City on 26 March 1999, but was subsequently released after having
shown proof of compliance with the resolutions of 17 February 1997 and 27 April 1998 by
remitting the amount of P2,000 and submitting his long overdue Comment.
In the said Comment[10] dated 16 March 1999, respondent stated that:
1. He failed to respond to our Resolution dated 17 February 1997 as he was at that time
undergoing medical treatment at Camp Ruperto Kangleon in Palo, Leyte;
2. Complainant Michael Barrios passed away sometime in June 1997; and
3. Said administrative complaint is an offshoot of a civil case which was decided in
respondents favor (as plaintiff in the said case). Respondent avers that as a result of his
moving for the execution of judgment in his favor and the eviction of the family of herein
complainant Michael Barrios, the latter filed the present administrative case.
In the meantime, on 11 September 1997, a certain Robert Visbal of the Provincial
Prosecution Office of Tacloban City submitted a letter[11] to the First Division Clerk of
Court alleging that respondent Martinez also stood charged in another estafa case
before the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 9, as well as a civil case
involving the victims of the Doa Paz tragedy in 1987, for which the Regional Trial Court
of Basey, Samar, Branch 30 rendered a decision against him, his appeal thereto having
been dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
In the said Decision of Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Basey, Samar,[12] it
appears that herein respondent Atty. Martinez offered his legal services to the victims of
the Doa Paz tragedy for free. However, when the plaintiff in the said civil case was issued
a check for P90,000 by Sulpicio Lines representing compensation for the deaths of his
wife and two daughters,Atty. Martinez asked plaintiff to endorse said check, which was
then deposited in the account of Dr. Martinez, Atty. Martinezs wife. When plaintiff asked
for his money, he was only able to recover a total of P30,000. Atty. Martinez claimed the
remaining P60,000 as his attorneys fees. Holding that it was absurd and totally ridiculous
that for a simple legal service he would collect 2/3 of the money claim, the trial court
ordered Atty. Martinez to pay the plaintiff therein the amount of P60,000 with interest,
P5,000 for moral and exemplary damages, and the costs of the suit.
Said trial court also made particular mention of Martinezs dilatory tactics during the trial,
citing fourteen (14) specific instances thereof. Martinezs appeal from the above
judgment was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for his failure to file his brief, despite
having been granted three thirty (30)-day extensions to do so.[13]
On 16 June 1999, we referred [14] the present case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
The report[15] of IBP Investigating Commissioner Winston D. Abuyuan stated in part that:
Several dates for the hearing of the case were scheduled but none of the parties
appeared before the Commission, until finally it was considered submitted for resolution
last 27 June 2002. On the same date respondent filed a motion for the dismissal of the
case on the ground that the complainant died sometime in June 1997 and that dismissal
is warranted because the case filed by him does not survive due to his demise; as a
matter of fact, it is extinguished upon his death.
We disagree with respondents contention.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, the Honorable Supreme
Court or the IBP may motu proprio initiate the proceedings when they perceive acts of
lawyers which deserve sanctions or when their attention is called by any one and a
probable cause exists that an act has been perpetrated by a lawyer which requires
disciplinary sanctions.
As earlier cited, respondent lawyers propensity to disregard or ignore orders of the
Honorable Supreme Court for which he was fined twice, arrested and imprisoned reflects
an utter lack of good moral character.
Respondents conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude (estafa and/or violation of
BP Blg. 22) clearly shows his unfitness to protect the administration of justice and
therefore justifies the imposition of sanctions against him (see In re: Abesamis, 102 Phil.
1182; In re: Jaramillo, 101 Phil. 323; In re: Vinzon, 19 SCRA 815; Medina vs. Bautista, 12
SCRA 1, People vs. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 Jan. 1990).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent
Atty. Francisco P. Martinez be disbarred and his name stricken out from the Roll of
Attorneys immediately.
On 27 September 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution [16] adopting and
approving the report and recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner.
On 03 December 2003, respondent Martinez filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Reinvestigation,[17] in the instant case alleging that:
1. The Report and Recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner is
tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law, although admittedly
the practice of law is a privilege;
2. If respondent is given another chance to have his day in court and allowed to adduce
evidence, the result/outcome would be entirely different from that arrived at by the
Investigating Commissioner; and
3. Respondent is now 71 years of age, and has served the judiciary in various capacities
(from acting city judge to Municipal Judges League Leyte Chapter President) for almost
17 years prior to resuming his law practice.
On 14 January 2004, we required[18] complainant to file a comment within ten days. On 16
February 2004, we received a Manifestation and Motion[19] from complainants daughter,
Diane Francis Barrios Latoja, alleging that they had not been furnished with a copy of
respondents Motion, notwithstanding the fact that respondent ostensibly lives next door
to complainants family. Required to Comment on 17 May 2004, respondent has until now
failed to do so.
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The records show that respondent, indeed, failed to furnish a copy of said Motion to
herein complainant. The records also show that respondent was given several
opportunities to present evidence by this Court [20] as well as by the IBP.[21] Indeed, he
only has himself to blame, for he has failed to present his case despite several
occasions to do so. It is now too late in the day for respondent to ask this court to
receive his evidence.
This court, moreover, is unwilling to exercise the same patience that it did when it waited
for his comment on the original petition. At any rate, after a careful consideration of the
records of the instant case, we find the evidence on record sufficient to support the IBPs
findings.
Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority to do so.
In the present case, respondent has been found guilty and convicted by final judgment
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for issuing a worthless check in the amount of P8,000. The
issue with which we are now concerned is whether or not the said crime is one involving
moral turpitude. [22]
Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty,
or good morals.[23] It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.[24]
In People of the Philippines v. Atty. Fe Tuanda,[25] where the erring lawyer was indefinitely
suspended for having been convicted of three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, we held
that conviction by final judgment of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude and
stated:
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import
deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does
not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, itcertainly relates to
and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense [26] (emphasis
supplied)
Over ten years later, we reiterated the above ruling in Villaber v. Commission on
Elections[27] and disqualified a congressional candidate for having been sentenced by
final judgment for three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in accordance with Sec. 12 of
the Omnibus Election Code, which states:

SEC. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority
insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty
of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary
pardon or granted amnesty. (emphasis supplied)
Enumerating the elements of that crime, we held that the act of a person in issuing a
check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds
in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the check in full upon its presentment, is a
manifestation of moral turpitude. Notwithstanding therein petitioners averment that he
was not a lawyer, we nevertheless applied our ruling in People v. Tuanda, to the effect
that
(A) conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, imports deceit and certainly relates to and
affects the good moral character of a person. [Indeed] the effects of the issuance of a
worthless check, as we held in the landmark case of Lozano v. Martinez, through Justice
Pedro L. Yap, transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates
is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public since the
circulation of valueless commercial papers can very well pollute the channels of trade
and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and
the public interest. Thus, paraphrasing Black's definition, a drawer who issues an
unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or
society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice,
honesty or good morals.[28] (emphasis supplied)
In the recent case of Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro,[29] we stated that:
(T)he issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a
closed account indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on
her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her
unworthy of public confidence. [Cuizon v. Macalino, A.C. No. 4334, 07 July 2004] The
issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of
respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and
public order. [Lao v. Medel, 405 SCRA 227] It also manifests a lawyers low regard for her
commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined her peers, seriously and
irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in high esteem.
[Sanchez v. Somoso, A.C. No. 6061, 03 October 2003]
Clearly, therefore, the act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover
the same constitutes such willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the
public confidence in law and lawyers. And while the general rule is that a lawyer may not
be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to
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discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity, where,

however, the misconduct outside of the lawyer's professional dealings is so gross a
character as to show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege which
his licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be justified in suspending or
removing him from the office of attorney.[30]
The argument of respondent that to disbar him now is tantamount to a deprivation of
property without due process of law is also untenable. As respondent himself admits,
the practice of law is a privilege. The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to
protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important
function shall be competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom courts and clients
may repose confidence.[31] A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any
sense a civil action where the complainant is plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, and
for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministrations of persons
unfit to practice them.[32] Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients. Their conduct must always reflect
the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for
any professional or private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity and good demeanor or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the
Court.[33]
Nor are we inclined to look with favor upon respondents plea that if given another
chance to have his day in court and to adduce evidence, the result/outcome would be
entirely different from that arrived at. We note with displeasure the inordinate length of
time respondent took in responding to our requirement to submit his Comment on the
original petition to disbar him.These acts constitute a willful disobedience of the lawful
orders of this Court, which under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself a
cause sufficient for suspension or disbarment.Thus, from the time we issued our first
Resolution on 03 July 1996 requiring him to submit his Comment, until 16 March 1999,
when he submitted said Comment to secure his release from arrest, almost three years
had elapsed.
It is revealing that despite the unwarranted length of time it took respondent to comply,
his Comment consists of all of two pages, a copy of which, it appears, he neglected to
furnish complainant.[34] And while he claims to have been confined while undergoing
medical treatment at the time our Resolution of 17 February 1997 was issued, he merely
reserved the submission of a certification to that effect. Nor, indeed, was he able to offer
any explanation for his failure to submit his Comment from the time we issued our first
Resolution of 03 July 1996 until 16 March 1999. In fact, said Comment alleged, merely,
that the complainant, Michael Barrios, passed away sometime in June 1997, and imputed
upon the latter unsupported ill-motives for instituting the said Petition against him,
which argument has already been resolved squarely in the abovementioned IBP report.
Moreover, the IBP report cited the failure of both parties to appear before the
Commission as the main reason for the long delay, until the same was finally submitted
for Resolution on 27 June 2002. Respondent, therefore, squandered away seven years to
have his day in court and adduce evidence in his behalf, which inaction also unduly
delayed the courts prompt disposition of this petition.
In Pajares v. Abad Santos,[35] we reminded attorneys that there must be more faithful
adherence to Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court [now Rule 7, Section 3] which
provides that the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has
read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is
good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay, and expressly
admonishes that for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to
disciplinary action.[36] It is noteworthy that in the past, the Court has disciplined lawyers
and judges for willful disregard of its orders to file comments or appellants briefs, as a
penalty for disobedience thereof. [37]
For the same reasons, we are disinclined to take respondents old age and the fact that
he served in the judiciary in various capacities in his favor. If at all, we hold respondent
to a higher standard for it, for a judge should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity, and independence,[38] and his conduct should be above reproach. [39] The fact
that respondent has chosen to engage in private practice does not mean he is now free
to conduct himself in less honorable or indeed in a less than honorable manner.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege, [40] demanding a high
degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also
as a continuing requirement for the practice of law. [41] Sadly, herein respondent falls
short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended that respondent be disbarred from the
practice of law. We agree.
We come now to the matter of the penalty imposable in this case. In Co v.
Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we upheld the imposition of one years suspension for nonpayment of debt and issuance of worthless checks, or a suspension of six months upon
partial payment of the obligation.[42] However, in these cases, for various reasons, none
of the issuances resulted in a conviction by the erring lawyers for either estafa or B.P.
Blg. 22. Thus, we held therein that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of
law.
In the instant case, however, herein respondent has been found guilty and stands
convicted by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. In People v. Tuanda,
which is similar to this case in that both respondents were convicted for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 which we have held to be such a crime, we affirmed the order of suspension from
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the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals, until further orders.
However, in a long line of cases, some of which were decided after Tuanda, we have held
disbarment to be the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime
involving moral turpitude. Thus:
1. In In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo, [43] we disbarred a
lawyer convicted of estafa without discussing the circumstances behind his
conviction. We held that:
There is no question that the crime of estafa involves moral turpitude. The review of
respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become
final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the respondent
unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that,
by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the administration
of justice.[44]
2. In In Re: Dalmacio De Los Angeles,[45] a lawyer was convicted of the crime of
attempted bribery in a final decision rendered by the Court of Appeals. And since bribery
is admittedly a felony involving moral turpitude (7 C.J.S., p. 736; 5 Am. Jur. p. 428), this
Court, much as it sympathizes with the plight of respondent, is constrained to decree his
disbarment as ordained by Section 25 of Rule 127.[46]
3. In Ledesma De Jesus-Paras v. Quinciano Vailoces,[47] the erring lawyer acknowledged
the execution of a document purporting to be a last will and testament, which later
turned out to be a forgery. He was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
falsification of public document, which the Court held to be a crime involving moral
turpitude, said act being contrary to justice, honesty and good morals, and was
subsequently disbarred.
4. In In Re: Disbarment Proceedings Against Atty. Diosdado Q. Gutierrez, [48] Atty.
Gutierrez was convicted for murder. After serving a portion of the sentence, he was
granted a conditional pardon by the President. Holding that the pardon was not absolute
and thus did not reach the offense itself but merely remitted the unexecuted portion of
his term, the court nevertheless disbarred him.
5. In In Re: Atty. Isidro P. Vinzon, [49] Atty. Vinzon was convicted of the crime of estafa for
misappropriating the amount of P7,000.00, and was subsequently disbarred. We held
thus:
Upon the other hand, and dealing now with the merits of the case, there can be no
question that the term moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to
justice, honesty, or good morals. In essence and in all respects, estafa, no doubt, is a
crime involving moral turpitude because the act is unquestionably against justice,
honesty and good morals (In re Gutierrez, Adm. Case No. 263, July 31, 1962; Bouvier's
Law Dictionary; In re Basa, 41 Phil. 275-76). As respondent's guilt cannot now be
questioned, his disbarment is inevitable. (emphasis supplied)[50]
6. In In Re: Attorney Jose Avancea,[51] the conditional pardon extended to the erring
lawyer by the Chief Executive also failed to relieve him of the penalty of disbarment
imposed by this court.
7. In In Re Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo,[52] a lawyer was charged and found guilty of the
crime of falsification of public document for having prepared and notarized a deed of
sale of a parcel of land knowing that the supposed affiant was an impostor and that the
vendor had been dead for almost eight years. We ruled that disbarment follows as a
consequence of a lawyer's conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral
turpitude, and since the crime of falsification of public document involves moral
turpitude, we ordered respondents name stricken off the roll of attorneys.
8. In Adelina T. Villanueva v. Atty. Teresita Sta. Ana,[53] we upheld the recommendation of
the IBP Board of Governors to disbar a lawyer who had been convicted of estafa through
falsification of public documents, because she was totally unfit to be a member of the
legal profession.[54]
9. In Victoriano P. Resurreccion v. Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson,[55] a lawyer was disbarred for
having been convicted of estafa by final judgment for misappropriating the funds of his
client.
In this case as well, we find disbarment to be the appropriate penalty. Of all classes and
professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn
servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to
trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bands of society, argues recreancy to his
position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous
elements of the body politic.[56]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco P. Martinez is hereby DISBARRED and his
name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be
entered in the respondents record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 9115
September 17, 2014
REBECCA MARIE UY YUPANGCO-NAKPIL, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROBERTO L. UY, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case against respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy (respondent) for
unprofessional and unethical conduct, stemming from a complaint filed by private
complainant Rebecca Marie Uy Yupangco-Nakpil (Rebecca), represented by her attorneyin-fact, Bella Asuncion Pollo (Bella).
The Facts
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Rebecca is the natural niece and adopted daughter of the late Dra. Pacita Uy y Lim
(Pacita).1 She was adjudged as the sole and exclusive legal heir of Paci ta by virtue of an
Order2 dated August 10, 1999 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34 in
SPEC. PROC. No. 95-7520 l (SP 95-75201). At the time of her death, Pacita was a
stockholder in several corporations primarily engaged in acquiring, developing, and
leasing real properties, namely, Uy Realty Company, Inc. (URCI), Jespajo Realty
Corporation, Roberto L. Uy Realty and Development Corporation, Jesus Uy Realty
Corporation, Distelleria La Jarolina, Inc., and Pacita Lim Uy Realty, Inc. 3
In her Complaint4 filed on May 9, 2005, 5 Rebecca, through her attorney-in fact, Bella,
averred that respondent, her alleged illegitimate halfcousin, 6 continuously failed and
refused to comply with the court order in SP 95-75201 declaring her as the successor-ininterest to all of Pacitas properties, as well as her requests for the accounting and
delivery of the dividends and other proceeds or benefits coming from Pacitas
stockholdings in the aforementioned corporations. 7 She added that respondent
mortgaged a commercial property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-133606
(subject property) in favor of Philippine Savings Bank in the total amount of
54,000,000.00,8 despite an existing Trust Agreement9 executed on October 15, 1993
(subject Trust Agreement) wherein respondent, in his capacity as President of URCI,
already recognized her to be the true and beneficial owner of the same. 10 Accordingly,
she demanded that respondent return the said property by executing the corresponding
deed of conveyance in her favor together with an inventory and accounting of all the
proceeds therefrom, but to no avail. 11 In this relation, Rebecca claimed that it was only
on September 2, 2005 or after she had already instituted various legal actions and
remedies that respondent and URCIagreed to transfer the subject property to her
pursuant to a compromise agreement.12
In his Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim,13 respondent denied Rebeccas
allegations and raised the affirmative defenses of forum shopping and prescription. He
pointed out that Rebecca had filed several cases raising the single issue on the correct
interpretation of the subject trust agreement. He also contended that the parties
transactions in this case were made way back in 1993 and 1995 without a complaint
having been filed until Bella came into the picture and instituted various suits covering
the same issue.14 As such, he sought the dismissal of the complaint, and further prayed
for the payment of moral damages and attorneys fees by way of counterclaim.15
On September 8, 2005, Rebecca filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint 16 in CBD Case No.
05-1484 for the reason that "the facts surrounding the same arose out of a
misunderstanding and misapprehension of the real facts surrounding their dispute."17
However, on October 6, 2005, Bella filed a Manifestation with Leave of Court to File
Motion for Intervention,18praying that the investigation of the charges against
respondent continue in order to weed out erring members of the legal profession. 19
The Report and Recommendation of the IBP
On October 8, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating

Commissioner issuedhis Report and Recommendation, 20 finding respondent guilty of
serious misconduct in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code), and, thus, recommended the penalty of suspension for a period of
six (6) months.21
On matters of procedure, the Investigating Commissioner opined that Rebeccas motion
to withdraw did notserve as a bar for the further consideration and investigation ofthe
administrative case against respondent. As basis, he cites Section 5, Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court which provides that "[n]o investigation shall be interrupted or terminated
by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the
charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same." Separately, the
Investigating Commissioner denied the claim of forum shopping, noting that disciplinary
cases are sui generis and may, therefore, proceed independently.22
On the merits of the charge, the Investigating Commissioner observed that respondent
lacked the good moral character required from members of the Bar when the latter failed
to comply with the demands of Rebecca under the subject trust agreement, not to
mention his unworthy and deceitful acts of mortgaging the subject property without the
formers consent. In fine, respondent was found guilty of serious misconduct in violation
of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, for which the above-stated penalty was
recommended.23
In a Resolution24 dated November 10, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation.
The Issue Before the Court
The basic issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable.
The Courts Ruling
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as itis applied to the members of the legal profession,
engraves an overriding prohibition against any form of misconduct, viz.:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
The gravity of the misconduct determinative as it is of the errant lawyers penalty
depends on the factual circumstances of each case.
Here, the Court observes that the squabble which gave rise to the present administrative
case largely constitutes an internal affair, which had already been laid to rest by the
parties. This is clearly exhibited by Rebeccas motion to withdraw filed in this case as
well as the compromise agreement forged in Civil Case No. 04-108887 which involves the
subject propertys alleged disposition in violation of the subject trust agreement. As the
Court sees it, his failure to complywith the demands of Rebecca which she takes as an
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invocation of her rights under the subject trust agreement as well as respondents acts
of mortgaging the subject property without the formers consent, sprung from his own
assertion of the rights he believed he had over the subject property. The propriety of
said courses of action eludes the Courts determination,for that matter had never been
resolved on its merits in view of the aforementioned settlement. Rebecca even states in
her motion to withdraw that the allegations she had previously made arose out of a
"misapprehension of the real facts surrounding their dispute" and even adds that
respondent "had fully explained to [her] the real nature and extent of her inheritance x x
x toher entire satisfaction," leading her to state that she is "now fully convinced that
[her] complaint has no basis in fact and in law." 25 Accordingly, with the admitted
misstatement of facts, the observations of the Investigating Commissioner, as adopted
by the IBP, hardly hold water so as to support the finding of "serious misconduct" which
would warrant its recommended penalty.1wphi1
Be that as it may, the Court, nonetheless, finds that respondent committed some form of
misconduct by, as admitted, mortgaging the subject property, notwithstanding the
apparent dispute over the same. Regardless of the merits of his own claim, respondent
should have exhibited prudent restraint becoming of a legal exemplar. He should not
have exposed himself even to the slightest risk of committing a property violation nor
any action which would endanger the Bar's reputation. Verily, members of the Bar are
expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by
the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. 26 By no
insignificant measure, respondent blemished not only his integrity as a member of the
Bar, but also that of the legal profession. In other words, his conduct fell short of the
exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice. Although to a
lesser extent as compared to what has been ascribed by the IBP, the Court still holds
respondent guilty of violating Rule 1. 01, Canon 1 of the Code. Considering that this is
his first offense as well as the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court believes
that a fine of P15,000.00 would suffice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is ordered to pay a
FINE of P15,000.00 within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution. Further, he is
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's record in this Court as
attorney. Further, let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them
to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
RULE 1.02: NOT TO COUNSEL OR DEFY LAW

A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
A.C. No. 6057

June 27, 2006
PETER T. DONTON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco
("respondent") for serious misconduct and deliberate violation of Canon 1, 1 Rules
1.012 and 1.023 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code").
The Facts
In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed
a criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of a public document 4 against Duane O.
Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who
notarized the Occupancy Agreement.
The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for
perjury5 against complainant. Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint, stated that:
5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and notarized
by me under the following circumstances:
A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located at No.
33 Don Jose Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.
B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier a U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to own
real property in his name agreed that the property be transferred in the name of Mr.
Donton, a Filipino.
C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several documents
that would guarantee recognition of him being the actual owner of the property despite
the transfer of title in the name of Mr. Donton.
D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT,
recognizing Mr. Stiers free and undisturbed use of the property for his residence and
business operations. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which Mr.
Stier had extended to Mr. Donton.6
Complainant averred that respondents act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement,
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despite knowledge that Stier, being a foreign national, is disqualified to own real
property in his name, constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the
Code. Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do
something in violation of law and assisting Stier in carrying out a dishonest scheme.
In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the
disbarment case against him upon the instigation of complainants counsel, Atty.
Bonifacio A. Alentajan,7 because respondent refused to act as complainants witness in
the criminal case against Stier and Maggay. Respondent admitted that he "prepared and
notarized" the Occupancy Agreement and asserted its genuineness and due execution.
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan
("Commissioner San Juan") of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent
liable for taking part in a "scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition against
foreign ownership of land in the Philippines." Commissioner San Juan recommended
respondents suspension from the practice of law for two years and the cancellation of
his commission as Notary Public.
In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted,
with modification, the Report and recommended respondents suspension from the
practice of law for six months.
On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as
provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B8 of the Rules of Court.
On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP.
Respondent stated that he was already 76 years old and would already retire by 2005
after the termination of his pending cases. He also said that his practice of law is his
only means of support for his family and his six minor children.
In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for reconsideration
because the IBP had no more jurisdiction on the case as the matter had already been
referred to the Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve
defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold and obey. 9 A lawyer who assists a
client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which
justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.10
By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified
from owning real property. 11Yet, in his motion for reconsideration, 12 respondent admitted
that he caused the transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent,
however, aware of the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in
complainants name. But respondent provided "some safeguards" by preparing several

documents,13including the Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee Stiers
recognition as the actual owner of the property despite its transfer in complainants
name. In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional
prohibition against foreign ownership of lands14 by preparing said documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the
Code when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law
against foreign ownership of lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the law to
achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he
may be suspended.15
In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice of
law for three years for preparing an affidavit that virtually permitted him to commit
concubinage. In In re: Santiago,17 respondent Atty. Santiago was suspended from the
practice of law for one year for preparing a contract which declared the spouses to be
single again after nine years of separation and allowed them to contract separately
subsequent marriages.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of
Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended
to respondents personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 1203, In re Terrell, 2 Phil. 266
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
In the matter of the suspension of HOWARD D. TERRELL from the practice of law.
Solicitor-General
Araneta
for
Government.
W. A. Kincaid for defendant.
PER CURIAM:
Howard D. Terrell, an attorney-at-law, was ordered to show cause in the Court of First
Instance, in the city of Manila, on the 5th day of February, 1903, why he should not be
suspended as a member of the bar of the city of Manila for the reasons:
First, that he had assisted in the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club, after he
had been notified that the said organization was made for the purpose of evading the law
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[G.R. No. 159486-88. November 25, 2003]

PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN [SPECIAL DIVISION], HON. MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO, HON.
EDILBERTO SANDOVAL, HON. TERESITA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Page
then in force in said city; and,

Secondly, for acting as attorney for said "Centro Bellas Artes" during the time of and
after its organization, which organization was known to him to be created for the
purpose of evading the law.
The accused appeared on the return day, and by his counsel, W. A. Kincaid, made
answer to these charges, denying the same, and filed affidavits in answer thereto. After
reading testimony given by said Howard D. Terrell, in the case of the United States vs. H.
D. Terrell,1 wherein he was charged with estafa, and after reading the said affidavits in
his behalf, and hearing his counsel, the court below found, and decided as a fact, that
the charges aforesaid made against Howard D. Terrell were true, and thereupon made an
order suspending him from his office as a lawyer in the Philippine Islands, and directed
the clerk of the court to transmit to this court a certified copy of the order of suspension,
as well as a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based.
We have carefully considered these facts, and have reached the conclusion that they
were such as to justify the court below in arriving at the conclusion that the knowledge
and acts of the accused in connection with the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes"
Club were of such a nature and character as to warrant his suspension from practice.
The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their objects, for the purpose of
violating or evading the laws against crime constitutes such misconduct on the part of
an attorney, an officer of the court, as amounts to malpractice or gross misconduct in
his office, and for which he may be removed or suspended. (Code of Civil Procedure,
sec. 21.) The assisting of a client in a scheme which the attorney knows to be dishonest,
or the conniving at a violation of law, are acts which justify disbarment.
In this case, however, inasmuch as the defendant in the case of the United
States, vs. Terrell was acquitted on the charge of estafa, and has not, therefore, been
convicted of crime, and as the acts with which he is charged in this proceeding, while
unprofessional and hence to be condemned, are not criminal in their nature, we are of
opinion that the ends of justice will be served by the suspension of said Howard D.
Terrell from the practice of law in the Philippine Islands for the term of one year from the
7th day of February, 1903.
It is therefore directed that the said Howard D. Terrell be suspended from the practice of
law for a term of one year from February 7, 1903. It is so ordered.
31
On 23 September 2003, this Court issued its resolution in the above-numbered case; it
read:
The case for consideration has been brought to this Court via a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Joseph Ejercito Estrada, acting
through his counsel Attorney Alan F. Paguia, against the Sandiganbayan, et al. The
Petition prays
1. That Chief Justice Davide and the rest of the members of the Honorable Court
disqualify themselves from hearing and deciding this petition;
2. That the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be vacated and set aside; and
3. That Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905 pending before the
Sandiganbayan be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Attorney Alan F. Paguia, speaking for petitioner, asserts that the inhibition of the
members of the Supreme Court from hearing the petition is called for under Rule 5.10 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibiting justices or judges from participating in any
partisan political activity which proscription, according to him, the justices have violated
by attending the EDSA 2 Rally and by authorizing the assumption of Vice-President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency in violation of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner contends that the justices have thereby prejudged a case that would assail the
legality of the act taken by President Arroyo. The subsequent decision of the Court
in Estrada v. Arroyo (353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108) is, petitioner states, a patent
mockery of justice and due process.
Attorney Paguia first made his appearance for petitioner when he filed an Omnibus
Motion on 19 May 2003, before the Sandiganbayan, asking that the appointment of
counsels de officio (sic) be declaredfunctus officio and that, being the now counsel de
parte, he be notified of all subsequent proceedings in Criminal Cases No. 26558, No.
26565 and No. 26905 pending therein. Finally, Attorney Paguia asked that all the
foregoing criminal cases against his client be dismissed.
During the hearing of the Omnibus Motion on 30 May 2003, petitioner presented to the
court several portions of the book, entitled Reforming the Judiciary, written by Justice
Artemio Panganiban, to be part of the evidence for the defense. On 9 June 2003,
petitioner filed a motion pleading, among other things, that
a) x x x President Estrada be granted the opportunity to prove the truth of the statements
contained in Justice Artemio Panganibans book, REFORMING THE JUDICIARY, in
relation to the prejudgment committed by the Supreme Court justices against President
Estrada in the subject case/s of Estrada v. Arroyo, 353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108;
and,
b) A subpoena ad testificandum and duces tecum be issued to Justice Artemio
Panganiban, Justice Antonio Carpio, Justice Renato Corona, Secretary Angelo Reyes of
the Department of National Defense, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., and Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. for them to testify and bring
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whatever supporting documents they may have in relation to their direct and indirect
participation in the proclamation of Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on January
20, 2001, as cited in the book of Justice Panganiban, including the material events that
led to that proclamation and the ruling/s in the Estrada vs. Arroyo, supra. (Rollo, pp. 6-7.)
The truth referred to in paragraph a) of the relief sought in the motion of petitioner
pertains to what he claims should have been included in the resolution of the
Sandiganbayan; viz:
The request of the movant is simply for the Court to include in its Joint Resolution the
TRUTH of the acts of Chief Justice Davide, et al., last January 20, 2001 in:
a) going to EDSA 2;
b) authorizing the proclamation of Vice-President Arroyo as President on the ground of
permanent disability even without proof of compliance with the corresponding
constitutional conditions, e.g., written declaration by either the President or majority of
his cabinet; and
c) actually proclaiming Vice-President Arroyo on that same ground of permanent
disability.
It is patently unreasonable for the Court to refuse to include these material facts which
are obviously undeniable. Besides, it is the only defense of President Estrada. (Petition,
Rollo, pp. 13-14.)
On 2 July 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued an order denying the foregoing motion, as
well as the motion to dismiss, filed by petitioner. Forthwith, petitioner filed a Mosyong
Pangrekonsiderasyon of the foregoing order. According to Attorney Paguia, during the
hearing of his Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon on 11 June 2003, the three justices of the
Special Division of the Sandiganbayan made manifest their bias and partiality against his
client. Thus, he averred, Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario supposedly employed
foul and disrespectful language when she blurted out, Magmumukha naman kaming
gago, (Rollo, p. 13.) and Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro characterized the motion
as insignificant even before the prosecution could file its comments or opposition
thereto, (Rollo, p. 12.) remarking in open court that to grant Estradas motion would result
in chaos and disorder. (Ibid.) Prompted by the alleged bias and partial attitude of the
Sandiganbayan justices, Attorney Paguia filed, on 14 July 2003, a motion for their
disqualification. On 31 July 2003, petitioner received the two assailed resolutions, i.e.,
the resolution (Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 28 July 2003, denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration of 6 July 2003; viz:
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
accused-movant
Joseph
Ejercito
Estradas Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon (Na tumutukoy sa Joint Resolution ng Hulyo 2,
2003) dated July 6, 2003 is DENIED for lack of merit. (Rollo, p. 37.)
and the resolution (Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 25 July 2003, denying petitioners
motion for disqualification of 14 July 2003; viz:
WHEREFORE, prescinding from all the foregoing, the Court, for want of merit, hereby
DENIES the Motion for Disqualification. (Rollo, p. 48.)

The instant petition assailing the foregoing orders must be DISMISSED for gross
insufficiency in substance and for utter lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan committed no
grave abuse of discretion, an indispensable requirement to warrant a recourse to the
extraordinary relief of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. On the one hand, petitioner would disclaim the authority and jurisdiction of
the members of this tribunal and, on the other hand, he would elevate the petition now
before it to challenge the two resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. He denounces the
decision as being a patent mockery of justice and due process. Attorney Pagula went on
to state thatThe act of the public officer, if LAWFUL, is the act of the public office. But the act of the
public officer, if UNLAWFUL, is not the act of the public office. Consequently, the act of
the justices, if LAWFUL, is the act of the Supreme Court. But the act of the justices, if
UNLAWFUL, is not the act of the Supreme Court. It is submitted that the Decision in
ESTRADA vs. ARROYO being patently unlawful in view of Rule 5.10 of the CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, is not the act of the Supreme Court but is merely the wrong or
trespass of those individual Justices who falsely spoke and acted in the name of the
Supreme Court. (Urbano vs. Chavez, 183 SCRA [347]). Furthermore, it would seem
absurd to allow the Justices to use the name of the Supreme Court as a shield for their
UNLAWFUL act. (Petition, Rollo, p. 11.)
Criticism or comment made in good faith on the correctness or wrongness, soundness
or unsoundness, of a decision of the Court would be welcome for, if well-founded, such
reaction can enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed.
(In Re Sotto, 82 Phil 595.)
The ruling in Estrada v. Arroyo, being a final judgment, has long put to end any question
pertaining to the legality of the ascension of Arroyo into the presidency. By reviving the
issue on the validity of the assumption of Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to the
presidency, Attorney Paguia is vainly seeking to breathe life into the carcass of a long
dead issue.
Attorney Paguia has not limited his discussions to the merits of his clients case within
the judicial forum; indeed, he has repeated his assault on the Court in both broadcast
and print media. Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a
member of the bar from making such public statements on any pending case tending to
arouse public opinion for or against a party. By his acts, Attorney Paguia may have
stoked the fires of public dissension and posed a potentially dangerous threat to the
administration of justice.
It is not the first time that Attorney Paguia has exhibited similar conduct towards the
Supreme Court. In a letter, dated 30 June 2003, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., and Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, he has demanded, in a clearly
disguised form of forum shopping, for several advisory opinions on matters pending
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before the Sandiganbayan. In a resolution, dated 08 July 2003, this Court has strongly
warned Attorney Alan Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to desist from further
making, directly or indirectly, similar submissions to this Court or to its Members. But,
unmindful of the well-meant admonition to him by the Court, Attorney Paguia appears to
persist on end.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED, and the Court hereby
orders Attorney Alan Paguia, counsel for petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, to SHOW
CAUSE, within ten days from notice hereof, why he should not be sanctioned for
conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court.
On 10 October 2003, Atty. Paguia submitted his compliance with the show-cause order.
In a three-page pleading, Atty. Paguia, in an obstinate display of defiance, repeated his
earlier claim of political partisanship against the members of the Court.
Canon 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which Atty. Paguia has tirelessly quoted to
give some semblance of validity for his groundless attack on the Court and its members,
provides Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions. But to
avoid suspicion of political partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches,
contribute to party funds, publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate in
other partisan political activities.
Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code defines the term partisan political activities;
the law states:
The term election campaign or partisan political activity refers to an act designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office
which shall include:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons
for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a
candidate;
(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a candidate.
(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or
against the election of any candidate for public office;
(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or
oppose the election of any candidate; or
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.
It should be clear that the phrase partisan political activities, in its statutory context,
relates to acts designed to cause the success or the defeat of a particular candidate or
candidates who have filed certificates of candidacy to a public office in an election. The
taking of an oath of office by any incoming President of the Republic before the Chief
Justice of the Philippines is a traditional official function of the Highest Magistrate. The
assailed presence of other justices of the Court at such an event could be no different
from their appearance in such other official functions as attending the Annual State of
the Nation Address by the President of the Philippines before the Legislative
Department.
The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce criticism made by
anyone against the Court for, if well-founded, can truly have constructive effects in the
task of the Court, but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of
our peoples faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been privileged by
it to practice law in the Philippines.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed,
should insist on similar conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and devious
motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the
Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the
dispensation of justice.
The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been called to the mandate of Rule 13.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility prohibiting a member of the bar from making such
public statements on a case that may tend to arouse public opinion for or against a
party. Regrettably, Atty. Paguia has persisted in ignoring the Courts well-meant
admonition.
On the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune, Atty. Paguia wrote to say What is the legal effect of that violation of President Estradas right to due process of
law? It renders the decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo unconstitutional and void. The
rudiments of fair play were not observed. There was no fair play since it appears that
when President Estrada filed his petition, Chief Justice Davide and his fellow justices
had already committed to the other party - GMA - with a judgment already made and
waiting to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal
hearing. After the justices had authorized the proclamation of GMA as president, can
they be expected to voluntarily admit the unconstitutionality of their own act?
Unrelentingly, Atty. Paguia has continued to make public statements of like nature.
The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to become
mindful of his grave responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court.
Apparently, he has chosen not to at all take heed.
WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely suspended from the practice
of law, effective upon his receipt hereof, for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer
of the Court.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and all courts of the land through the Office of the Court
Administrator.
SO ORDERED.
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RULE 1.03: NOT TO ENCOURAGE LAWSUIT OR PROCEEDINGS
A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or
delay any man's cause.
[A.C. No. 4497. September 26, 2001]
MR. and MRS. VENUSTIANO G. SABURNIDO, complainants, vs. ATTY. FLORANTE E.
MADROO,[1] respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For our resolution is the administrative complaint [2] for disbarment of respondent, Atty.
Florante E. Madroo, filed by spouses Venustiano and Rosalia Saburnido. Complainants
allege that respondent has been harassing them by filing numerous complaints against
them, in addition to committing acts of dishonesty.
Complainant Venustiano Saburnido is a member of the Philippine National Police
stationed at Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, while his wife Rosalia is a public school
teacher. Respondent is a former judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, BalingasagLagonglong, Misamis Oriental.
Previous to this administrative case, complainants also filed three separate
administrative cases against respondent.
In A. M. No. MTJ-90-383,[3] complainant Venustiano Saburnido filed charges of grave
threats and acts unbecoming a member of the judiciary against respondent. Respondent
was therein found guilty of pointing a high-powered firearm at complainant, who was
unarmed at the time, during a heated altercation. Respondent was accordingly
dismissed from the service with prejudice to reemployment in government but without
forfeiture of retirement benefits.
Respondent was again administratively charged in the consolidated cases of SealanaAbbu v. Judge Madrono, A.M. No. 92-1-084-RTC and Sps. Saburnido v. Judge
Madrono, A.M. No. MTJ-90-486.[4]In the first case, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Florencia Sealana-Abbu charged that respondent granted and reduced bail in a criminal
case without prior notice to the prosecution. In the second case, the spouses Saburnido
charged that respondent, in whose court certain confiscated smuggled goods were
deposited, allowed other persons to take the goods but did not issue the corresponding
memorandum receipts. Some of the goods were lost while others were substituted with
damaged goods. Respondent was found guilty of both charges and his retirement
benefits were forfeited.
In the present case, the spouses Saburnido allege that respondent has been harassing
them by filing numerous complaints against them, namely:
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1. Adm. Case No. 90-0755,[5] for serious irregularity, filed by respondent against
Venustiano Saburnido. Respondent claimed that Venustiano lent his service firearm to
an acquaintance who thereafter extorted money from public jeepney drivers while
posing as a member of the then Constabulary Highway Patrol Group.
2. Adm. Case No. 90-0758,[6] for falsification, filed by respondent against Venustiano
Saburnido and two others. Respondent averred that Venustiano, with the help of his corespondents in the case, inserted an entry in the police blotter regarding the loss of
Venustianos firearm.
3. Crim. Case No. 93-67, [7] for evasion through negligence under Article 224 of the
Revised Penal Code, filed by respondent against Venustiano Saburnido. Respondent
alleged that Venustiano Saburnido, without permission from his superior, took into
custody a prisoner by final judgment who thereafter escaped.
4. Adm. Case No. 95-33,[8] filed by respondent against Rosalia Saburnido for violation of
the Omnibus Election Code. Respondent alleged that Rosalia Saburnido served as
chairperson of the Board of Election Inspectors during the 1995 elections despite being
related to a candidate for barangay councilor.
At the time the present complaint was filed, the three actions filed against Venustiano
Saburnido had been dismissed while the case against Rosalia Saburnido was still
pending.
Complainants allege that respondent filed those cases against them in retaliation, since
they had earlier filed administrative cases against him that resulted in his dismissal from
the judiciary. Complainants assert that due to the complaints filed against them, they
suffered much moral, mental, physical, and financial damage. They claim that their
children had to stop going to school since the family funds were used up in attending to
their cases.
For his part, respondent contends that the grounds mentioned in the administrative
cases in which he was dismissed and his benefits forfeited did not constitute moral
turpitude. Hence, he could not be disbarred therefor. He then argues that none of the
complaints he filed against complainants was manufactured. He adds that he was so
unlucky that Saburnido was not convicted. [9] He claims that the complaint for serious
irregularity against Venustiano Saburnido was dismissed only because the latter was
able to antedate an entry in the police blotter stating that his service firearm was lost. He
also points out that Venustiano was suspended when a prisoner escaped during his
watch. As for his complaint against Rosalia Saburnido, respondent contends that by
mentioning this case in the present complaint, Rosalia wants to deprive him of his right
to call the attention of the proper authorities to a violation of the Election Code.
In their reply, complainants reiterate their charge that the cases against them were meant
only to harass them. In addition, Rosalia Saburnido stressed that she served in the BEI
in 1995 only because the supposed chairperson was indisposed. She stated that she told
the other BEI members and the pollwatchers that she was related to one candidate and
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Page
35
that she would desist from serving if anyone objected.Since nobody objected, she
proceeded to dispense her duties as BEI chairperson. She added that her relative lost in
that election while respondents son won.
In a resolution dated May 22, 1996,[10] we referred this matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
In its report submitted to this Court on October 16, 2000, the IBP noted that respondent
and his counsel failed to appear and present evidence in the hearing of the case set for
January 26, 2000, despite notice. Thus, respondent was considered to have waived his
right to present evidence in his behalf during said hearing. Neither did respondent
submit his memorandum as directed by the IBP.
After evaluating the evidence before it, the IBP concluded that complainants submitted
convincing proof that respondent indeed committed acts constituting gross misconduct
that warrant the imposition of administrative sanction. The IBP recommends that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year.
We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to disagree with the
findings and recommendation of the IBP.
A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that
renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. [11] Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to at all times uphold the dignity and
integrity of the legal profession. Specifically, in Rule 7.03, the Code provides:
Rule 7.03. -- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Clearly, respondents act of filing multiple complaints against herein complainants
reflects on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His act evinces
vindictiveness, a decidedly undesirable trait whether in a lawyer or another individual, as
complainants were instrumental in respondents dismissal from the judiciary. We see in
respondents tenacity in pursuing several cases against complainants not the
persistence of one who has been grievously wronged but the obstinacy of one who is
trying to exact revenge.
Respondents action erodes rather than enhances public perception of the legal
profession. It constitutes gross misconduct for which he may be suspended, following
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. -A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. xxx
Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred. However, we find that suspension from
the practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.
[12]
While we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will also not disbar him where
a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. [13] In this case, we find
suspension to be a sufficient sanction against respondent. Suspension, we may add, is
not primarily intended as a punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the
legal profession.[14]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Florante E. Madroo is found GUILTY of gross misconduct
and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year with a WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Respondents
suspension is effective upon his receipt of notice of this decision. Let notice of this
decision be spread in respondents record as an attorney in this Court, and notice of the
same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, A.C. No. 6672
Complainant,
- v e r s u s -.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
September 4, 2009
x-----------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment[1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan

Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of
clients and encroachment of professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano,
convinced his clients[2] to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them
financial assistance[3] and expeditious collection on their claims. [4] To induce them to hire
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To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit [5] of James
Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client
relations with complainant and utilize respondents services instead, in exchange for a
loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached respondents calling card:[6]
Front
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Page
his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.
36
Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for
gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 [12] of
the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with
a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify
the recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into
complainants professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means
employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted
distinct violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner
by which a lawyers services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY
TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF
FACTS.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and
not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their
wares.[13] To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice
of law, degrade the profession in the publics estimation and impair its ability to
efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is
called.[14]
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719
Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
(emphasis supplied)
Hence, this complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and
circulation of the said calling card.[7]
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. [8]
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and
recommendation,[9] found that respondent had encroached on the professional practice
of complainant, violating Rule 8.02[10] and other canons[11] of the Code of Professional
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED
PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers.[15] Such actuation constitutes malpractice,
a ground for disbarment.[16]
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST,
ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MANS CAUSE.
This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal
business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment)
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as a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty.
Complainant presented substantial evidence[19] (consisting of the sworn statements of
the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondents office) to prove
that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it
during the mandatory hearing.
Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen
were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labianos word that
respondent could produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03,
and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a
lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a
promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. [20] Again the Court
notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving
benefits from Labianos referrals. Furthermore, he never denied Labianos connection to
his office.[21] Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal
practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers,
respondent violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests
are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a
lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when
in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees,
stenographers fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for
surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free
exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected. [22] It seeks to ensure his
undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity
to the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the clients
case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an
additional stake in its outcome.[23] Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to
consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which
may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his
37
[18]
Page
[17]
duty of undivided fidelity to the clients cause.[24]

As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice [25] which calls
for the exercise of the Courts disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes
warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose
of obtaining employment.[26] Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the
public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the
nobility of the legal profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition
on lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand,
is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its
findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyers
best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust based on his character and conduct.[27] For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to
announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple
professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
lawyers name;
name of the law firm with which he is connected;
address;
telephone number and
special branch of law practiced.[28]
Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The phrase was
clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a
promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away
from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and
emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and
deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial
evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was
personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labianos calling
cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02
and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
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Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
RULE 1.04: ENCOURAGE CLIENT TO AVOID CONTROVERSY

A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a
fair settlement.
G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994
JON DE YSASI III, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU CITY, and JON
DE YSASI,respondents.
F.B. Santiago, Nalus & Associates for petitioner.
Ismael A. Serfino for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in this case,
notwithstanding the vinculum of paternity and filiation between the parties. It would
indeed have been the better part of reason if herein petitioner and private respondent
had reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial atmosphere of familial amity and with
the grace of reciprocal concessions. Father and son opted instead for judicial
intervention despite the inevitable acrimony and negative publicity. Albeit with distaste,
the Court cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve their dispute with the same reasoned
detachment accorded any judicial proceeding before it.
The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father, herein private
respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental
sometime in April, 1980. Prior thereto, he was successively employed as sales manager
of Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later as operations manager of Top Form
Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His employment as farm administrator was on a fixed salary,
with other allowances covering housing, food, light, power, telephone, gasoline, medical
Page
one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY

WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
38
and dental expenses.
As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities
and operations of the sugarcane farm such as land preparation, planting, weeding,
fertilizing, harvesting, dealing with third persons in all matters relating to
the hacienda and attending to such other tasks as may be assigned to him by private
respondent. For this purpose, he lived on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the
house there.
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife
and commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two
separate occasions in June and August, 1982. In November, 1982, he underwent
fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer. During his
recuperation which lasted over four months, he was under the care of Dr. Patricio Tan. In
June, 1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious
hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his
medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in April,
1984, without due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner
made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his
salary from Atty. Apolonio Sumbingco, private respondent's auditor and legal adviser, as
well as for the remittance of his salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon.
Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC, for
brevity), Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984, docketed
therein as RAB Case No. 0452-84, against private respondent for illegal dismissal with
prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of full back wages,
thirteenth month pay for 1983, consequential, moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney's fees.
On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the
NLRC, 1 holding that petitioner abandoned his work and that the termination of his
employment was for a valid cause, but ordering private respondent to pay petitioner the
amount of P5,000.00 as penalty for his failure to serve notice of said termination of
employment to the Department of Labor and Employment as required by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 130 and consonant with this Court's ruling in Wenphil Corporation
vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al. 2 On appeal to the Fourth Division of the
NLRC, Cebu City, said decision was affirmed in toto. 3
His motion for reconsideration 4 of said decision having been denied for lack of
merit, 5 petitioner filed this petition presenting the following issues for resolution: (1)
whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled to
reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and other benefits; and (3)
whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees because of illegal dismissal. The discussion of these issues will necessarily
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39
subsume the corollary questions presented by private respondent, such as the exact
date when petitioner ceased to function as farm administrator, the character of the
pecuniary amounts received by petitioner from private respondent, that is, whether the
same are in the nature of salaries or pensions, and whether or not there was
abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm administrator.
In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the Solicitor General recommended a
modification of the decision of herein public respondent sustaining the findings and
conclusions of the Executive Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. 0452-84, 6 for which reason
the NLRC was required to submit its own comment on the petition. In compliance with
the Court's resolution of November 16, 1992, 7 NLRC filed its comment on February 12,
1992 largely reiterating its earlier position in support of the findings of the Executive
Labor Arbiter. 8
Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the observation of the labor arbiter is
worth noting:
This case is truly unique. What makes this case unique is the fact that because of the
special relationship of the parties and the nature of the action involved, this case could
very well go down (in) the annals of the Commission as perhaps the first of its kind. For
this case is an action filed by an only son, his father's namesake, the only child and
therefore the only heir against his own father. 9
Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:
. . . After an exhaustive reading of the records, two (2) observations were noted that may
justify why this labor case deserves special considerations. First, most of the complaints
that petitioner and private respondent had with each other, were personal matters
affecting father and son relationship. And secondly, if any of the complaints pertain to
their work, they allow their personal relationship to come in the way. 10
I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal because of want of
just cause therefor and non-observance of the requirements of due process. He also
charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in relying upon the findings of the
executive labor arbiter who decided the case but did not conduct the hearings thereof.
Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was abandonment by petitioner of his
functions as farm administrator, thereby arming private respondent with a ground to
terminate his employment at Hacienda Manucao. It is also contended that it is wrong for
petitioner to question the factual findings of the executive labor arbiter and the NLRC as
only questions of law may be appealed for resolution by this Court. Furthermore, in
seeking the dismissal of the instant petition, private respondent faults herein petitioner
for failure to refer to the corresponding pages of the transcripts of stenographic notes,
erroneously citing Sections 15(d) and 16(d), Rule 44 (should be Section 16[c] and [d],
Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which provide that want of page
references to the records is a ground for dismissal of an appeal.
Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the Labor Code that
technical rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling,
and that every and all reasonable means to speedily and objectively ascertain the facts
in each case shall be availed of, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure in
the interest of due process.
It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case to be
rendered by a judge, or a labor arbiter for that matter, other than the one who conducted
the hearing. The fact that the judge who heard the case was not the judge who penned
the decision does not impair the validity of the judgment, 11 provided that he draws up his
decision and resolution with due care and makes certain that they truly and accurately
reflect conclusions and final dispositions on the bases of the facts of and evidence
submitted in the case. 12
Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T.
Octavio, who conducted the hearings therein from December 5, 1984 to July 11, 1985,
and was later transferred to Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who eventually decided
the case, presents no procedural infirmity, especially considering that there is a
presumption of regularity in the performance of a public officer's functions, 13 which
petitioner has not successfully rebutted.
We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code relaxing the
application of technical rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due process,
ever mindful of the long-standing legal precept that rules of procedure must be
interpreted to help secure, not defeat, justice. For this reason, we cannot indulge private
respondent in his tendency to nitpick on trivial technicalities to boost his arguments.
The strength of one's position cannot be hinged on mere procedural niceties but on
solid bases in law and jurisprudence.
The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no
worker shall be dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and
after due process. 14 Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the causes for which an
employer
may
validly
terminate
an
employment,
to
wit:
(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of
his employer or representative in connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual
neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the
trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative; (d) commission
of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e) other
causes analogous to the foregoing.
The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the installation of
labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or
cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking, unless the closing is for the
purpose of circumventing the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, by serving a
written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one
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40
(1) month before the intended date thereof, with due entitlement to the corresponding
separation pay rates provided by law.15 Suffering from a disease by reason whereof the
continued employment of the employee is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his and
his co-employee's health, is also a ground for termination of his services provided he
receives the prescribed separation pay. 16 On the other hand, it is well-settled that
abandonment by an employee of his work authorizes the employer to effect the former's
dismissal from employment. 17
After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that public respondent gravely
erred in affirming the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding that petitioner
abandoned his employment and was not illegally dismissed from such employment. For
want
of
substantial
bases,
in
fact
or
in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to the
factual findings of an administrative agency, such as herein public respondent
NLRC, 18 as even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared "final" by law
are not exempt from judicial review when so warranted. 19
The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this point deserve
acceptance:
It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from October 1982 to
December 1982, cannot be construed as abandonment of work because he has a
justifiable excuse. Petitioner was suffering from perennial abscess in the peri-anal
around the anus and fistula under the medical attention of Dr. Patricio Tan of Riverside
Medical Center, Inc., Bacolod City (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, February 19, 1986 at 20-44).
This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by medical bills sent to
Hacienda Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, January 22, 1987 at 49-50).
During the period of his illness and recovery, petitioner stayed in Bacolod City upon the
instruction(s) of private respondent to recuperate thereat and to handle only
administrative matters of the hacienda in that city. As a manager, petitioner is not really
obliged to live and stay 24 hours a day inside Hacienda Manucao.
xxx xxx xxx
After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special circumstances involved
and basic human experience, petitioner's illness and strained family relation with
respondent Jon de Ysasi II may be considered as justifiable reason for petitioner Jon de
Ysasi III's absence from work during the period of October 1982 to December 1982. In
any event, such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice and hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an employee are as follows:
(1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) clear
intention to sever the employer-employee tie (Samson Alcantara, Reviewer in Labor and
Social Legislation, 1989 edition, p. 133).
This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates what constitute abandonment.
In Dagupan Bus Company v. NLRC (191 SCRA 328), the Court rules that for
abandonment to arise, there must be a concurrence of the intention to abandon and
some overt act from which it may be inferred that the employee has no more interest to
work. Similarly, in Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC(184 SCRA 25), for
abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of employment, there must be a
deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. . . Mere
absence is not sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to
the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore.
There are significant indications in this case, that there is no abandonment. First,
petitioner's absence and his decision to leave his residence inside Hacienda Manucao, is
justified by his illness and strained family relations. Second he has some medical
certificates to show his frail health. Third, once able to work, petitioner wrote a letter
(Annex "J") informing private respondent of his intention to assume again his
employment. Last, but not the least, he at once instituted a complaint for illegal
dismissal when he realized he was unjustly dismissed. All these are indications that
petitioner had no intention to abandon his employment. 20
The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of petitioner's
confinement in the hospital for his various afflictions which required medical treatment.
Neither can it be denied that private respondent was well aware of petitioner's state of
health as the former admittedly shouldered part of the medical and hospital bills and
even advised the latter to stay in Bacolod City until he was fit to work again. The
disagreement as to whether or not petitioner's ailments were so serious as to
necessitate hospitalization and corresponding periods for recuperation is beside the
point. The fact remains that on account of said illnesses, the details of which were amply
substantiated by the attending physician, 21 and as the records are bereft of any
suggestion of malingering on the part of petitioner, there was justifiable cause for
petitioner's absence from work. We repeat, it is clear, deliberate and unjustified refusal to
resume employment and not mere absence that is required to constitute abandonment
as a valid ground for termination of employment. 22
With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao, petitioner unmistakably
may be classified as a managerial employee 23 to whom the law grants an amount of
discretion in the discharge of his duties. This is why when petitioner stated that "I
assigned myself where I want to go," 24 he was simply being candid about what he could
do within the sphere of his authority. His duties as farm administrator did not strictly
require him to keep regular hours or to be at the office premises at all times, or to be
subjected to specific control from his employer in every aspect of his work. What is
essential only is that he runs the farm as efficiently and effectively as possible and, while
petitioner may definitely not qualify as a model employee, in this regard he proved to be
quite successful, as there was at least a showing of increased production during the
time that petitioner was in charge of farm operations.
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If, as private respondent contends, he had no control over petitioner during the years
1983 to 1984, this is because that was the period when petitioner was recuperating from
illness and on account of which his attendance and direct involvement in farm
operations were irregular and minimal, hence the supervision and control exercisable by
private respondent as employer was necessarily limited. It goes without saying that the
control contemplated refers only to matters relating to his functions as farm
administrator and could not extend to petitioner's personal affairs and activities.
While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties as farm
administrator, petitioner would be staying at the house in the farm, there really was no
explicit contractual stipulation (as there was no formal employment contract to begin
with) requiring him to stay therein for the duration of his employment or that any transfer
of residence would justify the termination of his employment. That petitioner changed
his residence should not be taken against him, as this is undeniably among his basic
rights, nor can such fact of transfer of residence per se be a valid ground to terminate an
employer-employee relationship.
Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he was yet uncertain of his son's
intention of returning to work after his confinement in the hospital, he kept petitioner on
the payroll, reported him as an employee of thehacienda for social security purposes,
and paid his salaries and benefits with the mandated deductions therefrom until the end
of December, 1982. It was only in January, 1983 when he became convinced that
petitioner would no longer return to work that he considered the latter to have
abandoned his work and, for this reason, no longer listed him as an employee.
According to private respondent, whatever amount of money was given to petitioner
from
that
time
until
April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere gratuitous doles from
a father to a son, and not salaries as, in fact, none of the usual deductions were made
therefrom. It was only in April, 1984 that private respondent completely stopped giving
said pension or allowance when he was angered by what he heard petitioner had been
saying about sending him to jail.
Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez taken on oral
deposition regarding petitioner's alleged statement to him, "(h)e quemado los
(p)ue(n)tes de Manucao" ("I have burned my bridges with Manucao") as expressive of
petitioner's intention to abandon his job. In addition to insinuations of sinister motives
on the part of petitioner in working at the farm and thereafter abandoning the job upon
accomplishment of his objectives, private respondent takes the novel position that the
agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned the administration of the farm
legally converts the initial abandonment to implied voluntary resignation. 25
As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private respondent undoubtedly knew
about petitioner's illness and even paid for his hospital and other medical bills. The
assertion regarding abandonment of work, petitioner argues, is further belied by his
continued performance of various services related to the operations of the farm from
May to the last quarter of 1983, his persistent inquiries from his father's accountant and
legal adviser about the reason why his pension or allowance was discontinued since
April, 1984, and his indication of having recovered and his willingness and capability to
resume his work at the farm as expressed in a letter dated September 14, 1984. 26 With
these, petitioner contends that it is immaterial how the monthly pecuniary amounts are
designated, whether as salary, pension or allowance, with or without deductions, as he
was entitled thereto in view of his continued service as farm administrator. 27
To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a finding of abandonment may justly
be made there must be a concurrence of two elements, viz.: (1) the failure to report for
work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the
employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative
factor and being manifested by some overt acts. Such intent we find dismally wanting in
this case.
It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son's
plans of returning to work. The absence of petitioner from work since mid-1982,
prolonged though it may have been, was not without valid causes of which private
respondent had full knowledge. As to what convinced or led him to believe that
petitioner was no longer returning to work, private respondent neither explains nor
substantiates by any reasonable basis how he arrived at such a conclusion.
Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given credence as even
after January, 1983, when private respondent supposedly "became convinced" that
petitioner would no longer work at the farm, the latter continued to perform services
directly required by his position as farm administrator. These are duly and
correspondingly evidenced by such acts as picking up some farm machinery/equipment
from G.A. Machineries, Inc., 28 claiming and paying for additional farm equipment and
machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to Bacolod through Zip
Forwarders, 29 getting the payment of the additional cash advances for molasses for crop
year 1983-1984 from Agrotex Commodities, Inc., 30 and remitting to private respondent
through
Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and oil. 31
It will be observed that all of these chores, which petitioner took care of, relate to the
normal activities and operations of the farm. True, it is a father's prerogative to request
or even command his child to run errands for him. In the present case, however,
considering the nature of these transactions, as well as the property values and
monetary sums involved, it is unlikely that private respondent would leave the matter to
just anyone. Prudence dictates that these matters be handled by someone who can be
trusted or at least be held accountable therefor, and who is familiar with the terms,
specifications and other details relative thereto, such as an employee. If indeed
petitioner had abandoned his job or was considered to have done so by private
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respondent, it would be awkward, or even out of place, to expect or to oblige petitioner

to concern himself with matters relating to or expected of him with respect to what
would then be his past and terminated employment. It is hard to imagine what further
authority an employer can have over a dismissed employee so as to compel him to
continue to perform work-related tasks:
It is also significant that the special power of attorney 32 executed
by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of petitioner, specifically stating
xxx xxx xxx
That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married, and a resident of Hda. Manucao,
hereinafter called and referred to as PRINCIPAL, am a sugarcane planter, BISCOM Mill
District, and a duly accredited planter-member of the BINALBAGAN-ISABELA
PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.;
That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have check/checks with BIPA representing
payment for all checks and papers to which I am entitled to (sic) as such plantermember;
That I have named, appointed and constituted as by these presents
I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and lawful ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
JON de YSASI III
whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO GET FOR ME and in my name, place
and stead, my check/checks aforementioned, said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being herein
given the power and authority to sign for me and in my name, place and stead, the
receipt or receipts or payroll for the said check/checks. PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that my
said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT cannot cash the said check/checks, but to turn the same over
to me for my proper disposition.
That
I
HEREBY
RATIFY
AND
CONFIRM
the
acts
of
my
Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing the receipts therefor.
That I further request that my said check/checks be made a "CROSSED CHECK".
xxx xxx xxx
remained in force even after petitioner's employment was supposed to have been
terminated by reason of abandonment. Furthermore, petitioner's numerous requests for
an explanation regarding the stoppage of his salaries and benefits, 33 the issuance of
withholding tax reports, 34 as well as correspondence reporting his full recovery and
readiness to go back to work, 35 and, specifically, his filing of the complaint for illegal
dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has abandoned his work.
We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo Gomez, as witness for
private respondent, ascribing statements to petitioner supposedly indicative of the
latter's intention to abandon his work. We perceive the irregularity in the taking of such
deposition without the presence of petitioner's counsel, and the failure of private
respondent to serve reasonably advance notice of its taking to said counsel, thereby
foreclosing
his
opportunity
to
cross-examine the deponent. Private respondent also failed to serve notice thereof on
the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI of the NLRC, as certified to by Administrative
Assistant Celestina G. Ovejera of said office. 36 Fair play dictates that at such an
important stage of the proceedings, which involves the taking of testimony, both parties
must be afforded equal opportunity to examine and cross-examine a witness.
As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner, whether denominated as salary,
pension, allowance orex gratia handout, there is no question as to petitioner's
entitlement thereto inasmuch as he continued to perform services in his capacity as
farm administrator. The change in description of said amounts contained in the pay slips
or in the receipts prepared by private respondent cannot be deemed to be determinative
of petitioner's employment status in view of the peculiar circumstances above set out.
Besides, if such amounts were truly in the nature of allowances given by a parent out of
concern for his child's welfare, it is rather unusual that receipts therefor 37 should be
necessary and required as if they were ordinary business expenditures.
Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that petitioner's alleged
abandonment was converted into an implied voluntary resignation on account of the
father's agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned his work. As we have
determined that no abandonment took place in this case, the monthly sums received by
petitioner, regardless of designation, were in consideration for services rendered
emanating from an employer-employee relationship and were not of a character that can
qualify them as mere civil support given out of parental duty and solicitude. We are also
hard put to imagine how abandonment can be impliedly converted into a voluntary
resignation without any positive act on the part of the employee conveying a desire to
terminate his employment. The very concept of resignation as a ground for termination
by the employee of his employment 38 does not square with the elements constitutive of
abandonment.
On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that there was a violation by private
respondent of the due process requirements under the Labor Code for want of notice
and hearing. 39 Private respondent, in opposition, argues that Section 2, Rule XIV, Book V
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies only to cases where the
employer seeks to terminate the services of an employee on any of the grounds
enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code, but not to the situation obtaining in this
case where private respondent did not dismiss petitioner on any ground since it was
petitioner who allegedly abandoned his employment. 40
The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor cases are set
out in Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code in this wise:
Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish
him a written notice stating the particular acts or omission(s) constituting the grounds
for his dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work, notice shall be served at the
worker's last known address.
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xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. The worker may answer the allegations as stated against
him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The
employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself
with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.
Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. The employer shall immediately notify a worker in writing
of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor.
Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. Any decision taken by the employer shall be
without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his
dismissal by filing a complaint with the Regional Branch of the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 11. Report of dismissal. The employer shall submit a monthly report to the
Regional Office having jurisdiction over the place of work at all dismissals effected by
him during the month, specifying therein the names of the dismissed workers, the
reasons for their dismissal, the dates of commencement and termination of employment,
the positions last held by them and such other information as may be required by the
Ministry for policy guidance and statistical purposes.
Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no question that
petitioner was denied his right to due process since he was never given any notice about
his impending dismissal and the grounds therefor, much less a chance to be heard. Even
as private respondent controverts the applicability of the mandatory twin requirements
of procedural due process in this particular case, he in effect admits that no notice was
served by him on petitioner. This fact is corroborated by the certification issued on
September 5, 1984 by the Regional Director for Region VI of the Department of Labor that
no notice of termination of the employment of petitioner was submitted thereto. 41
Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it nonetheless cannot be
denied that notice still had to be served upon the employee sought to be dismissed, as
the second sentence of Section 2 of the pertinent implementing rules explicitly requires
service thereof at the employee's last known address, by way of substantial compliance.
While it is conceded that it is the employer's prerogative to terminate an employee,
especially when there is just cause therefor, the requirements of due process cannot be
lightly taken. The law does not countenance the arbitrary exercise of such a power or
prerogative when it has the effect of undermining the fundamental guarantee of security
of tenure in favor of the employee. 42
On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case, the Solicitor
General rejoins as follows:
The Labor Arbiter held thus:
While we are in full agreement with the respondent as to his defense of implied
resignation and/or abandonment, records somehow showed that he failed to notify the
Department
of
Labor and Employment for his sons' (sic)/complainants' (sic) aba(n)donment as required
by BP 130. And for this failure, the other requisite for a valid termination by an employer
was not complied with. This however, would not work to invalidate the otherwise (sic)
existence of a valid cause for dismissal. The validity of the cause of dismissal must be
upheld at all times provided however that sanctions must be imposed on the respondent
for his failure to observe the notice on due process requirement. (Wenphil Corp. v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 80587). (Decision Labor Arbiter, at 11-12, Annex "C" Petition), . . .
This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 69.
In Wenphil, the rule applied to the facts is: once an employee is dismissed for just cause,
he
must
not
be
rewarded
re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to observe procedural due
process. The public policy behind this is that, it may encourage the employee to do even
worse and render a mockery of the rules of discipline required to be observed. However,
the employer must be penalized for his infraction of due process. In the present case,
however, not only was petitioner dismissed without due process, but his dismissal is
without just cause. Petitioner did not abandon his employment because he has a
justifiable excuse. 43
II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding the mandatory
provisions of Article 279 of the Labor Code which entitles an illegally dismissed
employee to reinstatement and back wages and, instead, affirmed the imposition of the
penalty of P5,000.00 on private respondent for violation of the due process
requirements. Private respondent, for his part, maintains that there was error in
imposing the fine because that penalty contemplates the failure to submit the employer's
report on dismissed employees to the DOLE regional office, as required under Section 5
(now, Section 11), Rule XIV of the implementing rules, and not the failure to serve notice
upon the employee sought to be dismissed by the employer.
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain terms the right of
every worker to security of tenure. 44 To give teeth to this constitutional and statutory
mandates, the Labor Code spells out the relief available to an employee in case of its
denial:
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this
Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits of their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the
time of actual reinstatement.
Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages in the
absence of just cause for dismissal. 45 The Court, however, on numerous occasions has
tempered the rigid application of said provision of the Labor Code, recognizing that in
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some cases certain events may have transpired as would militate against the
practicability of granting the relief thereunder provided, and declares that where there
are strained relations between the employer and the employee, payment of back wages
and severance pay may be awarded instead of reinstatement, 46 and more particularly
when managerial employees are concerned. 47 Thus, where reinstatement is no longer
possible, it is therefore appropriate that the dismissed employee be given his fair and
just share of what the law accords him. 48
We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor General's ratiocination, to
wit:
As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his backwages computed from the
time his compensation was withheld up to the time of his reinstatement. (Morales vs.
NLRC, 188 SCRA 295). But in Pacific Cement Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, 173 SCRA 192,
this Honorable Court held that when it comes to reinstatement, differences should be
made between managers and the ordinary workingmen. The Court concluded that a
company which no longer trusts its managers cannot operate freely in a competitive and
profitable manner. The NLRC should know the difference between managers and
ordinary workingmen. It cannot imprudently order the reinstatement of managers with
the same ease and liberality as that of rank and file workers who had been terminated.
Similarly, a reinstatement may not be appropriate or feasible in case of antipathy or
antagonism between the parties (Morales, vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295).
In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner should not be reinstated as farm
administrator of Hacienda Manucao. The present relationship of petitioner and private
respondent (is) so strained that a harmonious and peaceful employee-employer
relationship is hardly possible. 49
III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral damages, arguing that his dismissal
from employment was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted oppression, or was
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. He further prays for exemplary
damages to serve as a deterrent against similar acts of unjust dismissal by other
employers.
Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, may be awarded to compensate
one for diverse injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, and social humiliation, provided that such injuries spring from a wrongful act or
omission of the defendant which was the proximate cause thereof. 50Exemplary
damages, under Article 2229, are imposed by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. They are
not recoverable as a matter of right, it being left to the court to decide whether or not
they should be adjudicated. 51
We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in the past allowing
recovery of moral damages where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad
faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner

contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, 52 and of exemplary damages if the
dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. 53 We do not feel,
however, that an award of the damages prayed for in this petition would be proper even
if, seemingly, the facts of the case justify their allowance. In the aforestated cases of
illegal dismissal where moral and exemplary damages were awarded, the dismissed
employees were genuinely without fault and were undoubtedly victims of the erring
employers' capricious exercise of power.
In the present case, we find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally be
faulted for fanning the flames which gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this
controversy, instead of sincerely negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate
claims. The records reveal how their actuations seethed with mutual antagonism and the
undeniable enmity between them negates the likelihood that either of them acted in good
faith. It is apparent that each one has a cause for damages against the other. For this
reason, we hold that no moral or exemplary damages can rightfully be awarded to
petitioner.
On this score, we are once again persuaded by the validity of the following
recommendation of the Solicitor General:
The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. 0452-84 should be modified. There was no
voluntary abandonment in this case because petitioner has a justifiable excuse for his
absence, or such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice and
hearing. Private respondent, therefore, is guilty of illegal dismissal. He should be
ordered to pay backwages for a period not exceeding three years from date of dismissal.
And in lieu of reinstatement, petitioner may be paid separation pay equivalent to one (1)
month('s) salary for every year of service, a fraction of six months being considered as
one (1) year in accordance with recent jurisprudence (Tan, Jr. vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 651).
But all claims for damages should be dismissed, for both parties are equally at fault. 54
The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the records, sorely
disappoints the Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may well be reminded that their
ethical
duty
as
lawyers
to
represent
their
clients
with
zeal 55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is just
as much their responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to
smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the
direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients. Once again, we
reiterate that the useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid
it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He is often called upon
less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. He should
be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of
technicality in the conduct of litigation. 56
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer
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G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975

VENANCIO
CASTANEDA
and
NICETAS
HENSON, petitioners,
vs.
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Quijano and Arroyo for petitioners.
Jose M. Luison for respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
Page
45
shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair
settlement." On this point, we find that both counsel herein fell short of what was
expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. The records do
not show that they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement
between their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not
but have exacerbated the situation even as they may have found favor in the equally
hostile eyes of their respective clients.
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has
been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor
arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within
his jurisdiction." 57 If he ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the copious
records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection of the same.
One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been obliged to
make. The task of resolving cases involving disputes among members of a family leaves
a bad taste in the mouth and an aversion in the mind, for no truly meaningful and
enduring resolution is really achieved in such situations. While we are convinced that we
have adjudicated the legal issues herein squarely on the bases of law and
jurisprudence, sanssentimentality, we are saddened by the thought that we may have
failed to bring about the reconciliation of the father and son who figured as parties to
this dispute, and that our adherence here to law and duty may unwittingly contribute to
the breaking, instead of the strengthening, of familial bonds. In fine, neither of the
parties herein actually emerges victorious. It is the Court's earnest hope, therefore, that
with the impartial exposition and extended explanation of their respective rights in this
decision, the parties may eventually see their way clear to an ultimate resolution of their
differences on more convivial terms.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is
hereby SET ASIDE. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a
period not exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or deduction, 58 and, in lieu of
reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service, a
fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.
SO ORDERED.
The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have been commuting to this Court for
more than a decade.
In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit
against Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries
(civil case 27251). In 1957 judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Ago
to return the machineries or pay definite sums of money. Ago appealed, and on June 30,
1961 this Court, in Ago vs. Castaeda, L-14066, affirmed the judgment. After remand, the
trial court issued on August 25, 1961 a writ of execution for the sum of P172,923.87. Ago
moved for a stay of execution but his motion was denied, and levy was made on Ago's
house and lots located in Quezon City. The sheriff then advertised them for auction sale
on October 25, 1961. Ago moved to stop the auction sale, failing in which he filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the
petition and Ago appealed. On January 31,1966 this Court, in Ago vs. Court of Appeals,
et al., L-19718, affirmed the dismissal. Ago thrice attempted to obtain a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution "to save
his family house and lot;" his motions were denied, and the sheriff sold the house and
lots on March 9, 1963 to the highest bidders, the petitioners Castaeda and Henson. Ago
failed to redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of sale in favor
of the vendees Castaeda and Henson. Upon their petition, the Court of First Instance
of Manila issued a writ of possession to the properties.
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his coplaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986)
to annul the sheriff's sale on the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon which
judgment was rendered against him in the replevin suit was his personal obligation, and
that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half share in their conjugal residential house and lots which
were levied upon and sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached for the satisfaction
of the judgment. They alleged in their complaint that wife Lourdes was not a party in the
replevin suit, that the judgment was rendered and the writ of execution was issued only
against husband Pastor, and that wife Lourdes was not a party to her husband's venture
in the logging business which failed and resulted in the replevin suit and which did not
benefit the conjugal partnership.
The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of preliminary
injunction restraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon
City, from registering the latter's final deed of sale, from cancelling the respondents'
certificates of title and issuing new ones to the petitioners and from carrying out any writ
of possession. A situation thus arose where what the Manila court had ordered to be
done, the Quezon City court countermanded. On November 1, 1965, however, the latter
court lifted the preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and the Register of deeds
of Quezon City cancelled the respondents' certificates of title and issued new ones in
favor of the petitioners. But enforcement of the writ of possession was again thwarted as
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the Quezon City court again issued a temporary restraining order which it later lifted but
then re-restored. On May 3, 1967 the court finally, and for the third time, lifted the
restraining order.
While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining order was
being fought in the Quezon City court, the Agos filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with this Court under date of May 26, 1966, docketed as L-26116, praying for
a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing the writ of
possession. This Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it in a minute
resolution on June 3, 1966; reconsideration was denied on July 18, 1966. The
respondents then filed on August 2, 1966 a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 37830-R), praying for the same preliminary injunction.
The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition. The respondents then appealed to this
Court (L-27140).1wph1.t We dismissed the petition in a minute resolution on
February 8, 1967.
The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they filed another
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. 39438-R). The
said court gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction. After
hearing, it rendered decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from enforcement of the writ of possession
on and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties involved belonging to
Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15, 1967 is made permanent pending decision on the merits
in Civil Case No. Q-7986 and ordering respondent Court to proceed with the trial of Civil
Case No. Q-7986 on the merits without unnecessary delay. No pronouncement as to
costs.
Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castaeda and Henson filed the present
petition for review of the aforesaid decision.
1. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with the orders of a coequal court can apply in the case at bar. The Court of First Instance of Manila, which
issued the writ of possession, ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal court,
the Court of First Instance of Quezon City as the latter lifted the restraining order it had
previously issued against the enforcement of the Manila court's writ of possession; it is
the Court of Appeals that enjoined, in part, the enforcement of the writ.
2. Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al., 1 where the wife was a party in one case and the
husband was a party in another case and a levy on their conjugal properties was upheld,
the petitioners would have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly bound by the replevin judgment
against her husband for which their conjugal properties would be answerable. The case
invoked is not at par with the present case. In Comilang the actions were admittedly
instituted for the protection of the common interest of the spouses; in the present case,
the Agos deny that their conjugal partnership benefited from the husband's business
venture.
46
3. Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court of Appeals held that a writ of
possession may not issue until the claim of a third person to half-interest in the property
is adversely determined, the said appellate court assuming that Lourdes Yu Ago was a
"stranger" or a "third-party" to her husband. The assumption is of course obviously
wrong, for, besides living with her husband Pastor, she does not claim ignorance of his
business that failed, of the relevant cases in which he got embroiled, and of the auction
sale made by the sheriff of their conjugal properties. Even then, the ruling in Omnas is
not that a writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a third person is adversely
determined, but that the writ of possession being a complement of the writ of execution,
a judge with jurisdiction to issue the latter also has jurisdiction to issue the former,
unless in the interval between the judicial sale and the issuance of the writ of
possession, the rights of third parties to the property sold have supervened. The ruling
in Omnas is clearly inapplicable in the present case, for, here, there has been no change
in the ownership of the properties or of any interest therein from the time the writ of
execution was issued up to the time writ of possession was issued, and even up to the
present.
4. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P. San Diego) that it is
much too late in the day for the respondents Agos to raise the question that part of the
property is unleviable because it belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago, considering that (1) a wife
is normally privy to her husband's activities; (2) the levy was made and the properties
advertised for auction sale in 1961; (3) she lives in the very properties in question; (4)
her husband had moved to stop the auction sale; (5) the properties were sold at auction
in 1963; (6) her husband had thrice attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction to
restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution; (7) the sheriff executed the deed
of final sale on April 17, 1964 when Pastor failed to redeem; (8) Pastor had impliedly
admitted that the conjugal properties could be levied upon by his pleas "to save his
family house and lot" in his efforts to prevent execution; and (9) it was only on May 2,
1964 when he and his wife filed the complaint for annulment of the sheriff's sale upon
the issue that the wife's share in the properties cannot be levied upon on the ground that
she was not a party to the logging business and not a party to the replevin suit. The
spouses Ago had every opportunity to raise the issue in the various proceedings
hereinbefore discussed but did not; laches now effectively bars them from raising it.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it. 2
5. The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal infirmities.
(a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment from the onehalf share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago. This half-share is
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not in esse, but is merely an inchoate interest, a mere expectancy, constituting neither
legal nor equitable estate, and will ripen into title when only upon liquidation and
settlement there appears to be assets of the community. 3 The decision sets at naught
the well-settled rule that injunction does not issue to protect a right not in esse and
which may never arise. 4
(b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even the impossibility, of its
enforcement. The Ago spouses admittedly live together in the same house 5 which is
conjugal property. By the Manila court's writ of possession Pastor could be ousted from
the house, but the decision under review would prevent the ejectment of Lourdes. Now,
which part of the house would be vacated by Pastor and which part would Lourdes
continue to stay in? The absurdity does not stop here; the decision would actually
separate husband and wife, prevent them from living together, and in effect divide their
conjugal properties during coverture and before the dissolution of the conjugal union.
6. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the
sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary justice demands that the petitioners, long
denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the
respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal remedies
and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the
extended prejudice of the petitioners. The respondents, with the assistance of counsel,
maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru
manifold tactics in and from one court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court).
We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who,
far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them
to subvert the very ends of justice. 6
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an
officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of
controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a
conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead
of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice.
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause
must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance
is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at
bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and
vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's
cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and
submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and
caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to
uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is
indisputable. 7
47
7. In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts for purposes other
than to seek justice, and in order to obviate further delay in the disposition of the case
below which might again come up to the appellate courts but only to fail in the end, we
have motu proprio examined the record of civil case Q-7986 (the mother case of the
present case). We find that
(a) the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11 years ago) but trial on the
merits has not even started;
(b) after the defendants Castaedas had filed their answer with a counterclaim, the
plaintiffs Agos filed a supplemental complaint where they impleaded new partiesdefendants;
(c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos filed a motion to admit
an amended supplemental complaint, which impleads an additional new party-defendant
(no action has yet been taken on this motion);
(d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted supplemental complaint; and
(e) the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April 20, 1974, grants an extension
to the suspension of time to file answer. (Expediente, p. 815)
We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint, supplemental complaint
and amended supplemental complaint are all untenable, for the reasons hereunder
stated. The Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff levied upon conjugal
properties of the spouses Ago despite the fact that the judgment to be satisfied was
personal only to Pastor Ago, and the business venture that he entered into, which
resulted in the replevin suit, did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
The issue here, which is whether or not the wife's inchoate share in the conjugal
property is leviable, is the same issue that we have already resolved, as barred by
laches, in striking down the decision of the Court of Appeals granting preliminary
injunction, the dispositive portion of which was herein-before quoted. This ruling applies
as well to the first cause of action of the complaint.
Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on January 5, 1959 the
Castaedas and the sheriff, pursuant to an alias writ of seizure, seized and took
possession of certain machineries, depriving the Agos of the use thereof, to their
damage in the sum of P256,000 up to May 5, 1964. This second cause of action fails to
state a valid cause of action for it fails to allege that the order of seizure is invalid or
illegal.
It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of the conjugal properties
was irregular, illegal and unlawful because the sheriff did not require the Castaeda
spouses to pay or liquidate the sum of P141,750 (the amount for which they bought the
properties at the auction sale) despite the fact that there was annotated at the back of
the certificates of title a mortgage of P75,000 in favor of the Philippine National Bank;
moreover, the sheriff sold the properties for P141,750 despite the pendency of L-19718
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where Pastor Ago contested the amount of P99,877.08 out of the judgment value of
P172,923.37 in civil case 27251; and because of said acts, the Agos suffered P174,877.08
in damages.
Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no obligation to require payment
of the purchase price in the auction sale because "when the purchaser is the judgment
creditor, and no third-party claim has been filed, he need not pay the amount of the bid if
it does not exceed the amount of his judgment." (Sec. 23, Rule 39, Rules of Court)
The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the vendees Castaedas
but did not affect the sheriff's sale; the cancellation of the annotation is of no moment to
the Agoo.
Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99,877.08 out of the amount of
the judgment was dismissed by this Court on January 31, 1966.
This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid cause of action and is
moreover barred by prior judgment.
The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly suffered by the Agos on
account of the acts complained of in the preceding causes of action. As the fourth cause
of action derives its life from the preceding causes of action, which, as shown, are
baseless, the said fourth cause of action must necessarily fail.
The Counterclaim
As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castaedas aver that the action was unfounded
and as a consequence of its filing they were compelled to retain the services of counsel
for not less than P7,500; that because the Agos obtained a preliminary injunction
enjoining the transfer of titles and possession of the properties to the Castaedas, they
were unlawfully deprived of the use of the properties from April 17, 1964, the value of
such deprived use being 20% annually of their actual value; and that the filing of the
unfounded action besmirched their feelings, the pecuniary worth of which is for the
court to assess.
The Supplemental Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of the complaint, the
defendants, taking advantage of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction, in
conspiracy and with gross bad faith and evident intent to cause damage to the plaintiffs,
caused the registration of the sheriff's final deed of sale; that, to cause more damage,
the defendants sold to their lawyer and his wife two of the parcels of land in question;
that the purchasers acquired the properties in bad faith; that the defendants mortgaged
the two other parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation while the defendants'
lawyer and his wife also mortgaged the parcels bought by them to the Rizal Commercial
Bank; and that the bank also acted in bad faith.
The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional damages caused by
the defendants' bad faith in entering into the aforesaid agreements and transactions.
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
48
The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the supplemental
complaint, which is, the inclusion of a paragraph averring that, still to cause damage and
prejudice to the plaintiffs, Atty. & Mrs. Juan Quijano, in bad faith sold the two parcels of
land they had previously bought to Eloy Ocampo who acquired them also in bad faith,
while Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson in bad faith sold the two other parcels to
Juan Quijano (60%) and Eloy Ocampo (40%) who acquired them in bad faith and with
knowledge that the properties are the subject of a pending litigation.
Discussion
on
The
Causes
of
Action
of
The
Supplemental
Complaint
And
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of action of the
supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint, the validity of the
cause of action would depend upon the validity of the first cause of action of the original
complaint, for, the Agos would suffer no transgression upon their rights of ownership
and possession of the properties by reason of the agreements subsequently entered into
by the Castaedas and their lawyer if the sheriff's levy and sale are valid. The reverse is
also true: if the sheriff's levy and sale are invalid on the ground that the conjugal
properties could not be levied upon, then the transactions would perhaps prejudice the
Agos, but, we have already indicated that the issue in the first cause of action of the
original complaint is barred by laches, and it must therefore follow that the first cause of
action of the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint is also
barred.
For the same reason, the same holding applies to the remaining cause of action in the
supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set aside. Civil case
Q-7986 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed, without prejudice to
the re-filing of the petitioners' counterclaim in a new and independent action. Treble
costs are assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu Ago, which shall be
paid by their lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison. Let a copy of this decision be made a part of
the personal file of Atty. Luison in the custody of the Clerk of Court.
Makasiar, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concu
CANON 2: PROVIDE EFFICIENT AND CONVINIENT LEGAL SERVICES

A LAWYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEGAL SERVICES AVAILABLE IN AN EFFICIENT AND
CONVENIENT MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROFESSION.
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JONAR SANTIAGO, A.C. No. 6252

Complainant,
- versus Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN,
Respondent.
October 5, 2004
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Notaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, which are
impressed with public interest. They are enjoined to comply faithfully with the solemnities and
requirements of the Notarial Law. This Court will not hesitate to mete out appropriate sanctions
to those who violate it or neglect observance thereof.
__________________
The Case and the Facts
Before us is a verified Complaint[1] filed by Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology (BJMP), for the disbarment of Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The
Complaint was filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on January 16, 2001. It charged Atty. Rafanan with deceit; malpractice or
other gross misconduct in office under Section 27 of Rule 138[2] of the Rules of Court; and
violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and 1.03[3], Canon 5[4], and Canons 12.07[5] and 12.08 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
49
Rule 2.02 - In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept a case, he shall not refuse to
render legal advice to the person concerned if only to the extent necessary to safeguard the
latter's rights
In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr. summarized the
allegations of the complainant in this wise:
Page
RULE 2.01: A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of the defenseless
or the oppressed.
IBP Guidelines, Art.1, Sec. 1. Public Service:
1. Legal aid is not a matter of charity but a public responsibility.
2. It is a means for correction of social imbalance.
3. Legal aid offices must be so organized as to give maximum possible assistance to
indigent and deserving members of the community and to forestall injustice.
x x x. In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged, among others, that Respondent in

notarizing several documents on different dates failed and/or refused to: a)make the proper
notation regarding the cedula or community tax certificate of the affiants; b) enter the details of
the notarized documents in the notarial register; and c) make and execute the certification and
enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized, all in violation of the
notarial provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.
Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit in favor of his client and
offered the same as evidence in the case wherein he was actively representing his
client. Finally, Complainant alleges that on a certain date, Respondent accompanied by several
persons waited for Complainant after the hearing and after confronting the latter disarmed him
of his sidearm and thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled threats.[6]
On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of the CBD,[7] Atty. Rafanan filed
his verified Answer.[8] He admitted having administered the oath to the affiants whose Affidavits
were attached to the verified Complaint. He believed, however, that the non-notation of their
Residence Certificates in the Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits was allowed.
He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied only to documents acknowledged
by a notary public and was not mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending before courts
and other government offices. He pointed out that in the latter, the affidavits, which were sworn
to before government prosecutors, did not have to indicate the residence certificates of the
affiants. Neither did other notaries public in Nueva Ecija -- some of whom were older
practitioners -- indicate the affiants residence certificates on the documents they notarized, or
have entries in their notarial register for these documents.
As to his alleged failure to comply with the certification required by Section 3 of Rule 112[9] of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure, respondent explained that as counsel of the affiants, he had
the option to comply or not with the certification. To nullify the Affidavits, it was complainant who
was duty-bound to bring the said noncompliance to the attention of the prosecutor conducting
the preliminary investigation.
As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR, respondent argued that lawyers could
testify on behalf of their clients on substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony is
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50
Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had threatened and harassed his clients after
the hearing of their case by the provincial prosecutor on January 4, 2001. Respondent
requested the assistance of the Cabanatuan City Police the following day, January 5, 2001,
which was the next scheduled hearing, to avoid a repetition of the incident and to allay the fears
of his clients. In support of his allegations, he submitted Certifications[10] from the Cabanatuan
City Police and the Joint Affidavit[11] of the two police officers who had assisted them.
fine to P3,000 with a warning that any repetition of the violation will be dealt with a heavier
penalty.
Page
essential to the ends of justice. Complainant charged respondents clients with attempted
murder. Respondent averred that since they were in his house when the alleged crime
occurred, his testimony is very essential to the ends of justice.
The other charges -- violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and Canons 1.01
to 1.03, 12.07 and 12.08 of the CPR -- were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated for no other purpose than to harass him,
because he was the counsel of Barangay Captain Ernesto Ramos in the cases filed by the
latter before the ombudsman and the BJMP against complainant.
After receipt of respondents Answer, the CBD, through Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca,
set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001, at two oclock in the afternoon. Notices[12] of the
hearing were sent to the parties by registered mail. On the scheduled date and time of the
hearing, only complainant appeared.Respondent was unable to do so, apparently because he
had received the Notice only on June 8, 2001.[13] The hearing was reset to July 3, 2001 at two
oclock in the afternoon.
On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his Reply[14] to the verified Answer of
respondent. The latters Rejoinder was received by the CBD on July 13, 2001.[15] It also
received complainants Letter-Request[16] to dispense with the hearings. Accordingly, it granted
that request in its Order[17] dated July 24, 2001, issued through Commissioner Cimafranca. It
thereby directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within fifteen days from
receipt of the Order, after which the case was to be deemed submitted for resolution.
The CBD received complainants Memorandum[18] on September 26, 2001. Respondent did
not file any.
Respondents Administrative Liability
Violation of the Notarial Law
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to
certify that the party to every document acknowledged before them has presented the proper
residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of
issue and date as part of such certification.[21] They are also required to maintain and keep a
notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by them; and to give to each
instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding to the
one in [their] register [and to state therein] the page or pages of [their] register, on which the
same is recorded.[22] Failure to perform these duties would result in the revocation of their
commission as notaries public.[23]
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the degree of
importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries public entering
into their commissions are presumed to be aware of these elementary requirements.
The IBPs Recommendation

On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2003172[19] approving and adopting the Investigating Commissioners Report that respondent had
violated specific requirements of the Notarial Law on the execution of a certification, the entry of
such certification in the notarial register, and the indication of the affiants residence
certificate. The IBP Board of Governors found his excuse for the violations unacceptable. It
modified, however, the recommendation[20] of the investigating commissioner by increasing the
In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,[24] the Court explained the value and meaning of notarization as
follows:
The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is
not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such
that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts
a private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence
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For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to their
office. Slipshod methods in their performance of the notarial act are never to be
countenanced. They are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties,
[25] which are dictated by public policy and are impressed with public interest.
It is clear from the pleadings before us -- and respondent has readily admitted -- that he
violated the Notarial Law by failing to enter in the documents notations of the residence
certificate, as well as the entry number and the pages of the notarial registry.
Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with those requirements is not mandatory
for affidavits relative to cases pending before the courts and government agencies. He points to
similar practices of older notaries in Nueva Ecija.
We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His belief that the requirements do not
apply to affidavits is patently irrelevant. No law dispenses with these formalities. Au contraire,
the Notarial Law makes no qualification or exception. It is appalling and inexcusable that he did
away with the basics of notarial procedure allegedly because others were doing so. Being
swayed by the bad example of others is not an acceptable justification for breaking the law.
We note further that the documents attached to the verified Complaint are the Joint CounterAffidavit of respondents clients Ernesto Ramos and Rey Geronimo, as well as their witnesses
Affidavits relative to Criminal Case No. 69-2000 for attempted murder, filed by complainants
brother against the aforementioned clients. These documents became the basis of the present
Complaint.
As correctly pointed out by the investigating commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure expressly requires respondent as notary -- in the absence of any fiscal,
state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer the oath -- to certify that he has
personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood their affidavits. Respondent failed to do so with respect to the subject Affidavits and
Counter-Affidavits in the belief that -- as counsel for the affiants -- he was not required to
comply with the certification requirement.
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and legal processes.[26] They are expected to be in the forefront in
the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be
Page
51
without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely
upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.
well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent
enactments and jurisprudence.[27] It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles.Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge
competently and diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become
susceptible to committing mistakes.
Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is placed upon them by reason of
their solemn oath to obey the laws.[28] No custom or age-old practice provides sufficient
excuse or justification for their failure to adhere to the provisions of the law. In this case, the
excuse given by respondent exhibited his clear ignorance of the Notarial Law, the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and the importance of his office as a notary public.
Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from the practice of
law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution.[29] Disbarment will be imposed
as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Where any lesser
penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.[30] Considering
the nature of the infraction and the absence of deceit on the part of respondent, we believe that
the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors is a sufficient disciplinary measure in
this case.
Lawyer as Witness for Client
Complainant further faults respondent for executing before Prosecutor Leonardo Padolina an
affidavit corroborating the defense of alibi proffered by respondents clients, allegedly in violation
of Rule 12.08 of the CPR: A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client.
Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:
Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:
a)
on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument
and the like;
b)
on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of
justice, in which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another
counsel.
Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness,[31] except only
in certain cases pertaining to privileged communication arising from an attorney-client
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Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the same time
counsels for a cause, the preference is for them to refrain from testifying as witnesses, unless
they absolutely have to; and should they do so, to withdraw from active management of the
case.[34]
Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in
favor of his clients, we cannot hastily make him administratively liable for the following reasons:
First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense that is authorized
by law for the benefit of the client, especially in a criminal action in which the latters life and
liberty are at stake.[35] It is the fundamental right of the accused to be afforded full opportunity
to rebut the charges against them. They are entitled to suggest all those reasonable doubts that
may arise from the evidence as to their guilt; and to ensure that if they are convicted, such
conviction is according to law.
Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as defense counsel, was thus
expected to spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong conviction. He had the duty to
present -- by all fair and honorable means -- every defense and mitigating circumstance that the
law permitted, to the end that his clients would not be deprived of life, liberty or property, except
by due process of law.[36]
The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the defense of his clients,
since it pointed out the fact that on the alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were at
his residence and could not have possibly committed the crime charged against them. Notably,
in his Affidavit, complainant does not dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the falsity
Page
The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of dissociating their
relation to their clients as witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses are expected to tell the
facts as they recall them. In contradistinction, advocates are partisans -- those who actively
plead and defend the cause of others. It is difficult to distinguish the fairness and impartiality of
a disinterested witness from the zeal of an advocate. The question is one of propriety rather
than of competency of the lawyers who testify for their clients.
Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness for the client will
provoke unkind criticism and leave many people to suspect the truthfulness of the lawyer
because they cannot believe the lawyer as disinterested. The people will have a plausible
reason for thinking, and if their sympathies are against the lawyers client, they will have an
opportunity, not likely to be neglected, for charging, that as a witness he fortified it with his own
testimony. The testimony of the lawyer becomes doubted and is looked upon as partial and
untruthful.[33]
52
relationship.[32]
of its contents.
Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which lawyers give their
testimonies during the trial. In this instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the preliminary
investigation which, as such, was merely inquisitorial.[37] Not being a trial of the case on the
merits, a preliminary investigation has the oft-repeated purposes of securing innocent persons
against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions; protecting them from open and public
accusations of crime and from the trouble as well as expense and anxiety of a public trial; and
protecting the State from useless and expensive prosecutions.[38]The investigation is advisedly
called preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by the trial proper.
Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to refrain from accepting
employment in any matter in which he knows or has reason to believe that he may be an
essential witness for the prospective client. Furthermore, in future cases in which his testimony
may become essential to serve the ends of justice, the canons of the profession require him to
withdraw from the active prosecution of these cases.
No Proof of Harassment
The charge that respondent harassed complainant and uttered insulting words and veiled
threats is not supported by evidence. Allegation is never equivalent to proof, and a bare charge
cannot be equated with liability.[39] It is not the self-serving claim of complainant but the version
of respondent that is more credible, considering that the latters allegations are corroborated by
the Affidavits of the police officers and the Certifications of the Cabanatuan City Police.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon
5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is herebyFINED P3,000 with a warning that
similar infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Exceptions: Canon 14, Rule 14.01 and 14.02

Rule 14.01 - A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person solely on account of the latter's
race, sex. creed or status of life, or because of his own opinion regarding the guilt of said
person.
Intelligentia et
Scientia Semper Mea
LEGAL ETHICS
Rule 14.03 - A lawyer may not refuse to accept representation of an indigent client if:
(a) he is not in a position to carry out the work effectively or competently;
(b) he labors under a conflict of interest between him and the prospective client or between
a present client and the prospective client.
Rule 2.03: A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit
legal business.
Rule 138 sec 27 ROC: Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what
grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission
to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, A.C. No. 6672
Complainant,
-versusATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,
Respondent. Promulgated:
September 4, 2009
x-----------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment[1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan

Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of
Page
Exception to the Exception: Canon 14, rule 14.03
53
Rule 14.02 - A lawyer shall not decline, except for serious and sufficient cause, an
appointment as counsel de officio or as amicus curiae, or a request from the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines or any of its chapters for rendition of free legal aid.
clients and encroachment of professional services.

Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano,
convinced his clients[2] to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them
financial assistance[3] and expeditious collection on their claims. [4] To induce them to hire
his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit [5] of James
Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client
relations with complainant and utilize respondents services instead, in exchange for a
loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached respondents calling card:[6]
Front
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719
Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
(emphasis supplied)
Hence, this complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and
circulation of the said calling card.[7]
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated
Intelligentia et
Scientia Semper Mea
LEGAL ETHICS
CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY
TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF
FACTS.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and
not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their
wares.[13] To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice
of law, degrade the profession in the publics estimation and impair its ability to
efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is
called.[14]
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED
PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers.[15] Such actuation constitutes malpractice,
a ground for disbarment.[16]
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST,
ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MANS CAUSE.
Page
54
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. [8]
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and
recommendation,[9] found that respondent had encroached on the professional practice
of complainant, violating Rule 8.02[10] and other canons[11] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for
gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 [12] of
the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with
a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify
the recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into
complainants professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means
employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted
distinct violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner
by which a lawyers services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal
business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment)
[17]
as a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty.[18]
Complainant presented substantial evidence[19] (consisting of the sworn statements of
the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondents office) to prove
that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it
during the mandatory hearing.
Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen
were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labianos word that
respondent could produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03,
and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a
lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a
promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. [20] Again the Court
notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving
benefits from Labianos referrals. Furthermore, he never denied Labianos connection to
his office.[21] Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal
practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers,
respondent violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests
are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a
lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when
in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees,
stenographers fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for
surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free
exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected. [22] It seeks to ensure his
undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity
to the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the clients
Intelligentia et
Scientia Semper Mea
LEGAL ETHICS
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition

on lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand,
is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its
findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyers
best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust based on his character and conduct.[27] For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to
announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple
professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
lawyers name;
name of the law firm with which he is connected;
address;
telephone number and
special branch of law practiced.[28]
Page
55
case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an
additional stake in its outcome.[23] Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to
consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which
may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his
duty of undivided fidelity to the clients cause.[24]
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice [25] which calls
for the exercise of the Courts disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes
warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose
of obtaining employment.[26] Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the
public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the
nobility of the legal profession.
Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The phrase was
clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a
promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away
from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and
emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and
deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial
evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was
personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labianos calling
cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02
and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
RULE 15.08 A Lawyer Shall Make Clear Whether He Is Acting In Another Capacity.
RULE 2.04: A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those customarily prescribed unless
the circumstances so warrant.
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Scientia Semper Mea

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LEGAL ETHICS

IV. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

him to render decisions favorable to their colleagues and friends;'

can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.

trial-type proceeding, 42 that the essence of due process is to be found in the

nor any other person or group of persons.

242-247; italic supplied)

purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to diffuse

2004 RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE

Jurisdiction and Term

Must be citizen of the Philippines

A person shall not perform a notarial act if:

NOTE: A blank or incomplete instrument or document OR an instrument or document

Fails to identify a principal on the basis of personal knowledge or competent

A.C. No. 5838. January 17, 2005]

A.C. No. 5864

difficult to believe in the light of contemporary human experience.

g. pass the bar examinations.[25] (Italics supplied)

of her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a

the Omnibus Election Code, which states:

discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity, where,

On October 8, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating

RULE 1.02: NOT TO COUNSEL OR DEFY LAW

A.C. No. 6057

complainants name. But respondent provided "some safeguards" by preparing several

[G.R. No. 159486-88. November 25, 2003]

then in force in said city; and,

DENIES the Motion for Disqualification. (Rollo, p. 48.)

This is a complaint for disbarment[1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan

Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

duty of undivided fidelity to the clients cause.[24]

RULE 1.04: ENCOURAGE CLIENT TO AVOID CONTROVERSY

one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY

respondent, it would be awkward, or even out of place, to expect or to oblige petitioner

xxx xxx xxx

faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner

G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975

CANON 2: PROVIDE EFFICIENT AND CONVINIENT LEGAL SERVICES

JONAR SANTIAGO, A.C. No. 6252

x x x. In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged, among others, that Respondent in

We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

Respondents Administrative Liability

Violation of the Notarial Law

The IBPs Recommendation

Exceptions: Canon 14, Rule 14.01 and 14.02

This is a complaint for disbarment[1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan

Exception to the Exception: Canon 14, rule 14.03

clients and encroachment of professional services.

Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition

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