Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
MARY
GRACE POE LLAMANZARES, respondent.
Promulgated: _______________
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The principle of vox populi est suprema lex cannot prevail over the
clear eligibility requirements for holding public office; the will of the people
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially
when this question was not raised when they voted the respondent into
office.6 Our republican and democratic government is a government of laws
that are intended to reflect the higher will of the sovereign people as
expressed through these laws.7 And there can be no law higher than the
Constitution that was ratified by the Filipino people as the ultimate
governing rules in running our country. The citizenship requirement is a
constitutional requirement for nationally elected representatives to the
legislature. This requirement, first provided in the 1935 Constitution and
reiterated in the 1987 Constitution, cannot be amended or cured by electoral
mandate to allow an unqualified candidate to hold office.
II.
THE CASE
II.A. The Facts
Grace Poe was found abandoned on September 3, 1968, by a certain
Edgardo Militar in front of the Parish Church in Jaro, Iloilo. Edgardo later
turned her over to the care of Emiliano Militar and his wife, residents of
Jaro, Iloilo.
On November 27, 1968, Emiliano registered Grace Poe s birth with
the Office of the Civil Registrar, Jaro, Iloilo, as a foundling under the name
Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar. 8
Sometime in 1974, the spouses Ronald Allan Poe (a.k.a. Fernando
Poe, Jr. ) and Jesusa L. Sonora (a.k.a. Susan Roces ) filed before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan, Rizal a petition to adopt Grace
Poe.
In its decision9 dated May 13, 1974, the MTC approved the spouses
Poe s petition for adoption. It ordered, among others, that Grace Poe s
name be changed to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe from Mary
Grace Natividad Contreras Militar.
6
Jacot v. Dal, 592 Phil. 661, 680 (2008), citing Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
87193, June 23, 1989, 174 SCRA 245, 255
See: Aquino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 400,
429.
See: Certified True Copy of Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, Exhibit P for
the petitioner and Exhibit 1 for the respondent. Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces )
registered Grace Poe s birth with the National Statistics Office on May 4, 2006. See: NSO
Certificate of Live Birth, Registry No. 4175, Exhibit O for the petitioner and Exhibit 3 for
the respondent.
Docketed as Special Proceeding No. 138 entitled In the Matter of the Adoption of the Minor
Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar. See: Exhibit Q-Q1 for the petitioner and Exhibit
2 2for the respondent.
When she turned 18 years old, Grace Poe applied for registration as
voter in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. On December 13, 1986, the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) issued in her favor a Voter s
Identification Card10 for Precinct No. 196, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro
Manila.
On April 4, 1988, she obtained Philippine Passport No. F92728711
from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). She renewed her passport
on April 5, 1993 and on May 19, 1998.12
In 1988, Grace Poe went to the United States of America (U.S.) for
her tertiary studies. She graduated in 1991 with a degree of Bachelor of Arts
in Political Science from the Boston College in Chestnut Hill,
Massachusetts.
On July 27, 1991, Grace Poe married Teodoro Misael Daniel V.
Llamanzares, a Filipino-American citizen, at the Sanctuario de San Jose
Parish in San Juan, Metro Manila.
On July 29, 1991, Grace Poe went to live with her husband in the U.S.
They have three children, namely: Brian Daniel, born in the U.S. in 1992;
Hanna MacKenzie, born in the Philippines in 1998; and Jesusa Anika,
likewise born in the Philippines in 2004.
On October 18, 2001, Grace Poe became an American citizen through
naturalization. She subsequently obtained U.S. Passport No. 17037793.13
On April 8, 2004, Grace Poe returned to the Philippines to give moral
support to her adoptive father, Fernando Poe, Jr., in his bid to be the
country s President in the May 2004 elections. She went back to the U.S.
on July 8, 2004.
On December 11, 2004, Fernando Poe, Jr. was hospitalized and
eventually slipped into coma. Grace Poe immediately returned to the
Philippines on December 13, 2004 after learning of her father s condition.
Fernando Poe, Jr. died the following day. Grace Poe stayed in the
Philippines until February 3, 2005, for her father s funeral and to help settle
her father s estate.14
10
11
12
13
14
See: Exhibit R for the petitioner and Exhibit 4 for the respondent.
See: Exhibit B1 for the petitioner and Exhibit 5 for the respondent.
See: Copies of her Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and DD156616, Exhibits B3 and B4 for
the petitioner and Exhibits 5-1 and 5-2 for the respondent.
On December 18, 2001. See: Exhibit KK for the petitioner and Exhibit 20 for the
respondent.
For the purpose of settling her father s estate, Grace Poe secured a Bureau of Internal Revenue
Identification Card issued on July 22, 2005. See: Exhibit S for the petitioner and Exhibit 6
for the respondent.
On May 24, 2005, Grace Poe returned to the Philippines with the
intent to resettle in the country for good.15
On July 10, 2006, Grace Poe filed with the Bureau of Immigration
(BI) a sworn Petition16 to reacquire Philippine citizenship under the
provisions of the Republic Act No. 9225 (RA 9225) or the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. On July 7, 2006, she took her
Oath of Allegiance under the Act.17
Grace Poe also filed petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of
her three children,18 who were all below 18 years of age at that time.
In its July 18, 2006 Order,19 the BI approved Grace Poe s petitions
for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and for the derivative
citizenship of her children. The BI issued Identification Certificates 20 in
Grace Poe s name and in the name of her three children.
On August 31, 2006, Grace Poe registered anew as voter, this time in
Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City.21
On October 13, 2009, Grace Poe obtained Philippine Passport No.
XX473199,22 which she renewed on March 18, 2014.23
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
Between October 18, 2001 (when Grace Poe became a naturalized American citizen) and July 18,
2006 (when the Philippine BI approved Grace Poe s petition for reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship), Grace Poe returned to the Philippines on numerous occasions, often under a
Balikbayan Visa or under the Philippine Government s Balikbayan program. The following
entries/stamped dates in Grace Poe s U.S. Passport were on December 27, 2001; January 13,
2002; November 9, 2003; April 8, 2004; December 13, 2004; March 11, 2006; and July 5, 2006.
See: copy of Grace Poe s U.S. Passport, Exhibit KK for the petitioner and Exhibit 20 for
the respondent.
See: Exhibit C for the petitioner and Exhibit 7 for the respondent.
See: Exhibit A for the petitioner and Exhibit 8 for the respondent. Grace Poe s Oath of
Allegiance reads:
I, Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares, solemnly swear that I will support and defend
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal
orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I
hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose
this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.
See: Exhibits F, I and L for the petitioner and Exhibits 9, 9-1 and 9-2 for the respondent.
Certified True Copy of the July 18, 2006 Order in CRR No. 06-7/ 10-9474 No. AFF-06-9133
signed by BI Associate Commissioner Roy M. Almoro on behalf of BI Commissioner Alipio F.
Fernandez, Jr. See: Exhibit E for the petitioner and Exhibit 10 for the respondent.
See: Exhibits N, G, J, and M for the petitioner and Exhibits 11, 11-1, 11-2, and 11-3 for
the respondent.
See: stub of Grace Poe s application form No. 7405300002355 for registration as voter at
Precinct No. 0349-A, San Juan City, Exhibit T for the petitioner and Exhibit 12 for the
respondent.
See: Exhibit B-5 for the petitioner and Exhibit 5-3 for the respondent.
Between July 18, 2006 (when when the Philippine BI approved Grace Poe s petition for
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship) and October 13, 2009 (when Grace Poe obtained a new
Philippine Passport after reacquiring her Philippine citizenship under RA 9225), Grace Poe still
used her U.S. Passport on several occasions in her trips abroad and to and from the Philippines.
But the Philippine BI-stamped marks on her U.S. Passport for her travels to and from the
23
24
25
Philippines on these occasions either classified her as RC (resident citizen) or indicated her
Identification Certificate No. 06-10918 issued pursuant to RA 9225 in relation with
Administrative Order No. 91, series of 2004, and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-2-005 after the
BI approved her petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. See: copy of her U.S.
Passport, Exhibit KK for the petitioner and Exhibit 20 for the respondent.
See: Philippine Passport No. EC0588861, Exhibit B-6 for the petitioner and Exhibit 5-5 for
the respondent.
See: Exhibit U for the petitioner and Exhibit 13 for the respondent
See: Exhibit V for the petitioner and Exhibit 14 for the respondent.
The Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of
American Citizenship reads:
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
Issued by U.S. Vice Consul Jason Gallian. See: Exhibit AA for the petitioner and Exhibit
19 for the respondent.
See: Exhibit MM for the petitioner and Exhibit 21 for the respondent.
Filed on August 17, 2015 at 10:05 a.m., or hours before David filed the petition for quo warranto
before the SET. See: Exhibit 22 for the respondent.
See: SET Resolution No. 15-07 dated September 17, 2015, p. 3.
2013 Rules of the SET, Rule 18.
that a
where the
terms and
Thus, the
law of the
36
37
38
39
See: Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure, Section 519 (1901); 1964 and 1997 RULES OF
COURT, Rule 66, Section 1.
Agcaoili v. Suguitan, 48 Phil. 676, 692 (1926). The writ of quo warranto originated from a 13th
century statute of King Edward I. It directed an alleged usurper of royal office a privilege to show
by what warrant he maintained his or her claim. For a history of the writ of quo warranto, see: D.
Sutherland. Quo Warranto Proceedings in the Reign of Edward I, 1278-1294 (1963).
RULES OF COURT, Rule 66, Section 1.
Id., Section 2.
Id., Sections 1, 2 and 3.
10
Section 2.
When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must
commence action. The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when
directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or
otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the
preceding section can be established by proof, must commence such
action.
41
42
43
44
45
11
qualified to his or her position.46 That the SET has exclusive jurisdiction
over contests involving the election, returns, and qualifications of Senators
even reinforces this purpose.
Further discussions of the powers of the SET shall be made under the
proper topic below.
III.A.2. Burden of Proof and the Presumption of
Regularity of the Respondent s Cited Government
Documents.
As part of her defense, the respondent paints the present quo warranto
proceeding as one where the petitioner carries the burden of proving the
respondent s disqualification. To discharge this burden, the respondent
posits that the petitioner must establish that both of the respondent s
parents are foreigners. The respondent claims, too, that in the absence of
such proof, the government documents acknowledging her status as a
natural-born Filipino should prevail.
These documents, according to the respondent, are presumed to have
been issued legally and in the regular course of business. Thus, the
information contained in these documents regarding the respondent s
citizenship should be deemed correct until proven otherwise.
III.A.2.i. Burden of proof, burden of evidence, and
presumptions in quo warranto proceedings
Jurisprudence characterizes a quo warranto proceeding as a civil
proceeding47 where the parties must prove their allegations by
preponderance of evidence, or by that degree of evidence that is more
worthy of belief to the court when compared with the opposing evidence
presented.48 Facts established in civil proceedings are thus considered to
46
47
48
The writ of quo warranto originated from a thirteenth century statute of King Edward the Statute
of Quo Warranto 1290, which grants the King the right to direct an alleged usurper of a royal
office or privilege to show by what warrant he maintained his claim. Shel Herman, The Code of
Practice of 1825: The Adaptation of Common Law Institutions, 24 Tul. Eur. & Civ. L.F. 207,
230 (2009) citing Donald W. Sutherland, Quo Warranto Proceedings in the Reign of Edward I
(1963); Helen Cam, The Quo Warranto Proceedings Under Edward I, in Liberties and
Communities of Medieval England (1963); T.F.T. Plucknett, Legislation of Edward I, at 38-50
(1949); J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 145 (4th ed. 2002).
Notably, the Statute of the Writ of Quo Warranto 1290 was said to have been a compromise
between the King and the barons in order to settle their disputes over titles. The king had been
asking the barons to present their titles to their royal offices, in order to reassert his authority
against the growing independence of the barons, who had forced him to sign the Magna Carta. See
the California Attorney General s Office, Quo Warranto: Resolution of Disputes -- Right to
Public Office (1990) p. 1 accessed from
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/ag_opinions/quo-warranto-guidelines.pdf, citing
Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (1979) pp. 125-126.
Casin v. Caluag, 80 Phil 758, 760-761 (1948).
RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Section 1. See: Magdiwang Realty Corporation v. Manila Banking
Corporation, 694 Phil. 392, 407 (2012).
12
embody the probable truth regarding the factual issues resolved, not the truth
beyond reasonable doubt that criminal proceedings require. 49
The SET has similarly characterized its own quo warranto
proceeding. Accordingly, its Rules of Procedure also recognize that the
quantum of evidence necessary to establish a claim is preponderance of
evidence.50
Thus, in quo warranto, the petitioner who challenges the
respondent s qualification to office carries the burden of proving, by
preponderance of evidence, the facts constituting the disqualification. 51
Upon such proof, the burden shifts to the respondent who must now present
opposing evidence constituting his or her defense or establishing his or her
affirmative defense.52
These dynamics highlight the difference between burden of proof and
burden of evidence: burden of proof involves the duty of a party to present
evidence establishing the facts in issue in his claim or defense, to the degree
required by law. 53 Burden of evidence, on the other hand, involves the duty
of a party to present evidence to counter the prima facie evidence presented
against him.54 In the present case, prima facie evidence is the proof
sufficient to establish the respondent s disqualification unless disproved by
her opposing evidence.
A distinct difference between burden of proof and burden of evidence
is that the burden of proof never shifts, and is always on the party claiming a
right or a defense;55 the burden of evidence shifts from one party to the other
as they adduce proof of their respective claims and defenses.
In civil proceedings, the plaintiff (the petitioner in the present case)
always carries the burden to prove that he is entitled to the relief he or she
prays for (in the present petition, the disqualification of Grace Poe as a
Senator).56 The defendant (or the respondent in the present case) can also
raise his or her affirmative and other defenses that he or she has to prove.57
Both the petitioner and the respondent yield to the rule that he or she who
alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proving it. 58
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
13
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
14
This evidentiary situation now presents to the Tribunal solely the legal
question of whether a person who, as a foundling found in the Philippines
and who has no known parents from whom her citizenship may be traced,
can be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen.
I reach my conclusion on the respondent s citizenship and
ineligibility after considering a very critical legal reality: that the
Constitution requires with no exceptions or qualifications that Filipino
senators must be natural-born Philippine citizens.
Article VII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides a clear,
absolute command, couched in the strongest language possible, that is,
through a negative phraseology No person shall be a Senator unless he
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
In Valdez v. Tuason,66 the Court held that negative statutes are
mandatory and must be presumed to have been intended as a repeal of all
conflicting provisions, unless the contrary can clearly be shown. The Court
then said:
Conformably with this idea, it will be found that constitutional provisions
which are intended to operate with universal force and to permit of no
exceptions are commonly expressed in negative form; as No person shall
be imprisoned for debt; No law impairing the obligation of contracts
shall be enacted; No person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law; No money shall be paid out of the
treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation by law, etc.67
15
72
73
People v. Delos Reyes, 672 Phil. 77, 121 (2011), citing People v. Sy Chua, 444 Phil. 757 (2003)
See: People v. Capuno, 655 Phil. 226, 244 (2011).
Approved on November 26, 1930.
Office of the Civil Registrar-General (OCRG) Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 or the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Act No. 3753 and Other Laws on Civil Registration, Rule
7(1)(b)
Id., Rule 29(a).
See: OCRG Form No. 101, revised January 1993, available from
http://www.nsor12.ph/pdf_files/CIVIL%20REGISTRATION%20LAWS/AO11993%20(IRR%20on%20Civil%20Registration%20Laws%20&%20Procedures).pdf
16
75
76
77
See: Certified True Copy of Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, Exhibit P for
the petitioner and Exhibit 1 for the respondent.
See: Exhibit O for the petitioner and Exhibit 3 for the respondent.
See: Item No. 7 in the Certificate of Live Birth, supra Note 8.
OCRG Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993, Rule 55 (1)(d).
17
18
19
81
82
83
20
21
English
xxx
xxx
87
88
89
Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment Through Alternative Legal Services, Inc. v. Power
Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation, G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2012, 682
SCRA 602, 649.
A. Scalia and B. Garner. Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012) at 93.
1934 Constitutional Convention, Vol.VI, Journal No. 96, November 26, 1934.
22
SR.
MONTINOLA:
Para
una
aclaracin. All se dice "de padres
desconocidos". Los Cdigos actuales
consideran como filipino, es decir, me
refiero al Cdigo espaol, que
considera como espaoles a todos los
hijos de padres desconocidos nacidos
en territorio espaol, porque la
presuncin es que el hijo de padres
desconocidos es hijo de un espaol, y
de igual manera se podr aplicar eso
en Filipinas, de que un hijo de padre
desconocido y nacido en Filipinas se SR. RAFOLS: There is a need, because we
consideraque es filipino, de modo que are declaring the conditions of those who are
no hay necesidad...
going to be Filipinos.
SR. RAFOLS: Hay necesidad, porque SR. MONTINOLA: But that is how the law
estamos relatando las condiciones de is interpreted now, and so there is no need for
los que van a ser filipinos.
an amendment.
SR. MONTINOLA: Pero esa es la SR. RAFOLS: The amendment should read
intepretacin de la ley ahora, de thus: "The natural or illegitimate children of a
manera que no hay necesidad de la foreigner father and a Filipino mother not
enmienda.
recognized by the foreigner father, or the
children of unknown parents".
SR. RAFOLS: La enmienda debe
leerse de esta manera: "Los hijos xxx
naturales o ilegtimos de un padre
extranjero y de una madre filipina, no
reconocidos por aquel, o los hijos de SR. BUSLON: Mr. President, don t you
think it would be better to leave this matter to
padres desconocidos."
the hands of the Legislature? (original in
English)
xxx
xxx
SR. BUSLON: Mr. President, don t
you think it would be better to leave
this matter to the hands of the SR. ROXAS: Mr. Chairman, my humble
opinion is that these cases are very
Legislature? (original in English)
insignificant or rare for the Constitution to
make a reference to them. The principle is
xxx
recognized by international laws that the
children or the persons born in a country of
SR. ROXAS: Seor Presidente, mi unknown parents are children of that country,
opinin humilde es que stos son and it is not necessary to include in the
casos muy insignificantes y contados, Constitution a specific stipulation on the
para que la Constitucin necesite matter.
referirse a ellos. Por las leyes
23
xxx
THE PRESIDENT: The Table will submit the
amendment to voting. Those who agree with
the amendment will say Yes (A minority:
Yes). Those who do not agree will say No. (A
majority: No). The amendment is rejected.
xxx
EL PRESIDENTE: La Mesa someter
a votacin dicha enmienda. Los que
estn conformes con la misma, que
digan S. (Una minora: S). Los que
no lo estn, que digan No. (Una
mayora: No). Queda rechazada la
enmienda.
24
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 272 Phil. 147, 169 (1991).
Id. at 337.
Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 884-885 (2003).
Ibid., citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 272 Phil. 147 (1991).
25
intents may be seen in their debates and are thus material the framers and
approving authority of the Constitution are different; the framers in case of
the Constitution are not really the members of the 1934 Constitutional
Convention but the people whose assent gave life to the Constitution.94
Thus, even the debates that the respondent cites are not the most
authoritative source of the claimed intent on which her natural- born
citizenship is founded.
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution is clear in its terms in
listing who Filipino citizens are. To reiterate, it provided: The following
are citizens of the Philippines: . The listing that followed neither
included foundlings nor referred to children of unknown or indeterminable
parentage. The list also did not provide any presumption that the respondent
can claim. To now recognize these matters to be included within the terms
of the 1935 Constitution is for this Tribunal to undertake the unthinkable
act of re-writing the 1935 Constitution by including what is not there,
expressly or by implication. I, therefore, cannot join any conclusion that the
respondent is a natural-born citizen under the terms of the 1935 Constitution.
III. C. THE CLAIM OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
III.C.1 Our treaty obligations and international
customary law do not establish the respondent s
Philippine citizenship.
Separately from her claimed inclusion of foundlings under the terms
of the 1935 Constitution, the respondent argued that she is presumed to be a
citizen of the Philippines based on binding treaties and on the generally
accepted principles of international law.
The respondent cited in this regard the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child (UNCRC)95 and the International Convention on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)96 which are treaties that the Philippines
has signed and ratified. These treaties require signatory states to ensure
every child s right to acquire a nationality, and State-parties
94
95
96
CONSTITUTION, Article XVIII, Section 27. See also: Separate Opinion of CJ Reynato Puno,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 668-669 (2000).
Signed by the Philippines on 26 January 1990 ratified on 21 August 1990 and entered into force
on 2 September 1990, see United Nations Treaty Collection, available from
https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-11&chapter=4&lang=en
Signed by the Philippines on 19 December 1966, ratified on 23 October 1986 and entered into
force on 23 March 1976, see United Nations Treaty Collection, available from
https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?chapter=4&src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-4&lang=en
26
98
UNCRC, Article 7(2), 1577 (27531-27541) UN Treaty Series 3, 47 (1990), available from
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201577/v1577.pdf
See also ICCPR, Article 24(3), 999 (14657-14668) UN Treaty Series 171, 179 (1976), available
from https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20999/v999.pdf
Bayan Muna v. Romulo, 656 Phil. 246, 303 (2011)
27
In 1930, the Philippines was still a colony of the U.S. The existing
government then the Philippine Insular Government neither had the
power nor the authority to enter into foreign agreements, conventions, or
treaties. The administration of the Insular government was under the control
of the U.S. government; foreign relations of the Philippines, in particular,
were under the power and control of the U.S. President, subject to the
concurrence of the U.S. Congress.99
What could have been referred to in the constitutional debates
as the instrument that bound the Philippines internationally was the
1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions relating to Conflicts of
Nationality Laws.100 The Convention was the result of the September 22,
1924 resolution of the League of Nations whereby the member nations
recognized the need to settle, thru international agreement, questions relating
to the conflict of nationality laws in order to abolish all cases of both
statelessness and double nationality.101 The U.S. was not a signatory to the
Convention.
99
100
101
See: Sections 7, 9, 10, 84, and 86 of the Philippine Bill of 1902; Sections 6, 9, 10, 19(a), 21 and 23
of the Jones Law of 1916; and, Section 10 of the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934, which expressly
provides that [f]oreign affairs shall be under the direct supervision and control of the United
States.
See United Nations Treaty Collection, available from
https://treaties.un.org/pages/LONViewDetails.aspx?src=LON&id=512&chapter=30&lang=en
The 1930 Hague Convention was signed by forty (40) countries, namely: Australia, Belgium,
Brazil, Burma, Canada, China, India, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, United
Kingdom, Chile, Columbia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, France, Free City of
Danzig, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico,
Peru, Portugal, El Salvador, Spain, Switzerland, Union of South Africa, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia.
Of these 40 signatory-countries, only the following thirteen (13) countries have ratified the
Convention: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, China, India, Monaco, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Sweden, and United Kingdom. See UN Treaty Collection available from
https://treaties.un.org/pages/LONViewDetails.aspx?src=LON&id=512&chapter=30&lang=en#top
Under Article 14, Chapter IV of the Convention, [a] child whose parents are both unknown
shall have the nationality of the country of birth x x x [and] until the contrary is proved, [is]
presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in which it was found, available from
http://eudocitizenship.eu/InternationalDB/docs/Convention%20on%20certain%20questions%20relating%20t
o%20the%20conflict%20of%20nationality%20laws%20FULL%20TEXT.pdf
Article 14 only provides that the foundlings, or children whose parents are both unknown, shall
have the nationality of the country of birth. This shall have the nationality can be automatic,
i.e., they are automatically and at the moment of birth considered as nationals of the State; or, it
can also be subject to the procedures & requirements for acquiring nationality under the State's
nationality laws.
Likewise, the presumption under Article 14 that they are presumed to have been born on the
territory does not establish a natural-born citizen status. Note that the provision does not say
that foundlings are natural-born nationals or citizens, but only that they are presumed to have
been born on the territory. Thus, at most, it only establishes a presumption as to the
foundlings place of birth.
The interpretation that Article 14 establishes a presumption only as to the place of birth, not to a
natural-born citizen status, is clear when we read Article 14 with Article 1 of the Convention.
Article 1 provides that [i]t is for each State to determine under its own laws who are its
nationals. Thus, whether the foundling is the State s national or not and, assuming a national,
whether the foundling is natural-born or not, depends on what the State s nationality laws
provide.
28
103
U.S.
1940
Nationality
Act,
54
Stat.
1137,
1138,
available
from
http://library.uwb.edu/static/USimmigration/54%20stat%201137.pdf
For the same reason, the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, available from http://www.unhcr.org/3bbb286d8.html) cannot also
be claimed as a customary international law that should form part of the law. In this light, no
further discussion of this 1961 Convention appears necessary.
29
105
106
See: Chavez v. Gonzales, 569 Phil. 155, 195 (2008). See also: Separate Opinion of J. Puno in
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 454 Phil. 504, 577 (2003), citing P. Drost. Human Rights as Legal
Rights (1951) at 32-33.
M. Magallona. The Supreme Court and International Law: Problems and Approaches in
Philippine Practice 85 Philippine Law Journal 1, 2 (2010).
See: Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Lantion, 379 Phil. 165, 212-213 (2000).
30
are binding on them and requires them to perform their obligations in good
faith.107 This principle finds expression under Article 27 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties,108 which provides that A party may not
invoke the provisions of its internal law as a justification for its failure to
perform a treaty. 109
Thus, in the international plane, the Philippines cannot use its
domestic laws to evade compliance with its international obligations;
non-compliance would result in repercussions in its dealings with other
States.
On the other hand, under Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, a
treaty may be the subject of judicial review,110 and is thus characterized as
an instrument with the same force and effect as domestic law.111 From this
perspective, treaty provisions cannot prevail over, or contradict,
constitutional provisions;112 they can also be amended by domestic laws, as
they exist and operate at the same level as these laws.113
In the same manner that treaty obligations partake of the character of
domestic laws in the domestic plane, so do generally accepted principles of
international law. Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides
that these legal norms form part of the law of the land.
This
constitutional declaration situates in clear and definite terms the role of
generally accepted principles of international law in the hierarchy of
Philippine laws and in the Philippine legal system.
107
108
109
110
Ibid.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, available from
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf
Signed by the Philippines on May 23, 1969 and ratified on November 15, 1972. See United
Nations
Treaty
Collection,
available
from
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII1&chapter=23
&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en.
Section 5, (2)(a), Article VIII provides:
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
111
112
113
31
116
117
118
32
the belief that these norms embody obligations that these states, on their
own, are bound to perform. Also referred to as customary international law,
generally accepted principles of international law pertain to the collection of
international behavioral regularities that nations, over time, come to view as
binding on them as a matter of law.119
A legal norm requires the concurrence of two elements before it may
be considered as a generally accepted principle of international law: the
established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a
psychological element known as the opinio juris sive necessitatis (opinion
as to law or necessity).120 Implicit in the latter element is the belief that the
practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.
The most widely accepted statement of sources of international law
today is Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ), which provides that the ICJ shall apply international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law.121 The material sources of
custom include state practices, state legislation, international and national
judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international instruments, a
pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice of international organs, and
resolutions relating to legal questions in the United Nations General
Assembly.122
Sometimes referred to as evidence of international law, these sources
identify the substance and content of the obligations of states and are
indicative of the state practice and opinio juris requirements of international
law.
In the usual course, this process passes through the courts as they
render their decisions in cases. As part of a court s function of determining
the applicable law in cases before it (including the manner a law should be
read and applied), the court has to determine the existence of a generally
applied principle of international law in the cases confronting it, as well as
the question of whether and how it applies to the facts of the case.
To my mind, the process by which courts recognize the effectivity of
general principles of international law in the Philippines is akin or closely
similar to the process by which the Supreme Court creates jurisprudence.
Under the principle of stare decisis, courts apply the doctrines in the cases
the Supreme Court decides as judicial precedents in subsequent cases with
similar factual situations.123
119
120
121
122
123
Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014. See also Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, 621 Phil. 536,
600-605 (2009).
Supra Note 119 at 601.
Statute of the ICJ, Article 38(1)(b), available from http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/?p1=4&p2=2
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, supra Note 115 at
399.
Ting v. Velez-Ting, 601 Phil. 676, 687 (2009).
33
124
34
35
See: M. Dellinger. Something is Rotten in the State of Denmark: The Deprivation of Democratic
Rights by Nation States Not Recognizing Dual Citizenship 20 Journal of Transnational Law &
Policy 41, 61 (2010-2011).
36
126
Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law (1939), and
Republic Act No. 9139, otherwise known as the Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000.
37
(consistent with the 1935 jus sanguinis rule) but may acquire Philippine
citizenship only upon reaching 18 years of age.
If we were to recognize the immediate grant of Philippine citizenship
to foundlings (who under the 1935 Constitution and the Philippines
compliance with the treaties, would have to wait for their naturalization at
age 18 before they can acquire Philippine citizenship), then we necessarily
have to grant the same privilege to children born of Filipina mothers; we
cannot recognize immediate Philippine citizenship to those whose fathers
and mothers are unknown and yet deny the same treatment to those whose
mothers are Filipinas. Separately from the strong elements of discrimination
and unfairness, the latter approach would have contravened the clear text of
the 1935 Constitution. This is thus an interpretation that I can neither make
nor endorse.
III.C.3. The right to a nationality under the UDHR
does not require its signatories to automatically grant
citizenship to foundlings in its respective territories.
Neither does the Philippines participation as signatory to the
UDHR127 obligate it to automatically grant Philippine citizenship to
foundlings in its territory.
At the outset, allow me to point out that the UDHR is not a treaty that
directly creates legally binding obligations for its signatories.128 It is an
international document recognizing inalienable human rights, which
eventually led to the creation of several legally binding treaties, such as the
ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR).129 Thus, the Philippines is not legally obligated to comply
with the provisions of the UDHR per se. It signed the UDHR because it
recognizes the rights and values enumerated in the UDHR; this recognition
led it to sign both the ICCPR and the ICESCR.130
Indeed, international scholars have been increasingly using the
provisions in the UDHR to argue that the rights provided in the document
have reached the status of customary law. Assuming, however, that we were
to accord the right to nationality provided in the UDHR the status of a treaty
obligation or a generally accepted principle of international law, it still does
not require the Philippine government to automatically grant Philippine
citizenship to foundlings in its territory.
127
128
129
130
38
131
39
40
Philippine citizenship, and only strengthens the lack of intent (aside from a
lack of textual provision) to grant Philippine citizenship to foundlings.
This inherent irreconcilability of the respondent s desired
presumption with the 1935 Constitution renders futile any discussion of
whether this desired presumption has reached the status of a generally
accepted principle of international law applicable in the Philippines. We
cannot (and should not) adopt a presumption that contradicts the
fundamental law of the land, regardless of the status of observance it has
reached in the international plane.
I recognize of course that in the future, Congress may, by law, adopt
the respondent s desired presumption under the 1987 Constitution. A
presumption of Filipino parentage necessarily means a presumption of jus
sanguinis for foundlings.
But even if made, the presumption remains what it is a presumption
that must yield to the reality of actual parentage when such parentage
becomes known unless the child presumed to be Philippine citizen by
descent undertakes a confirmatory act independent of the presumption, such
as naturalization.
Note that the 1987 Constitution does not significantly change the jus
sanguinis rule under the 1935 Constitution. Currently, a natural-born
Filipino is one whose father or mother is a Philippine citizen at the time of
the child s birth. As in 1935, the current 1987 Constitution speaks of
parents who are actually Philippine citizens at the time of the child s birth;
how the parents acquired their own Philippine citizenship is beside the point
and is not a consideration for as long as this citizenship status is there at the
time of the child s birth.
A presumption of Filipino parentage cannot similarly apply or
extend to the character of being natural-born, as this character of
citizenship can only be based on actual reality; when the Constitution speaks
of natural-born, it cannot but refer to actual or natural, not presumed,
birth. A presumption of being natural-born is effectively a legal fiction that
the definition of the term natural-born under the Constitution and
the purposes this definition serves cannot accommodate.
To sum up, the respondent s argument based on a foundling s
presumed Filipino parentage under a claimed generally accepted principle of
international law, is legally objectionable under the 1935 Constitution and
cannot be used to recognize or grant natural-born Philippine citizenship.
41
The U.S. Supreme Court, in the case of United States v. Wong Kim
Ark,
while not directly addressing the import of the term as a requirement
for holding the Office of the President, traced the meaning of natural-born
citizenship in the context of the English common law on which the colonial
legal system was grounded.139 The ruling states:
138
134
135
136
137
138
139
42
This concept of citizenship is consistent with the common law jus soli
principle adopted by the British Monarchy and, subsequently, by the U.S.141
The U.S. Supreme Court in Wong Kim Ark delved into the English
common law to determine the citizenship status of a man born in California
to citizens of China. In 1894, Wong Kim Ark left the U.S. for a visit to
China, returning in 1895 only to be refused entry on the basis that he was not
a citizen of the U.S.142
The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that Wong Kim Ark was a U.S.
citizen, explaining that the fundamental principle of the common law with
regard to English nationality is birth within the allegiance. 143 This
principle meant that anyone born within the British dominions was deemed a
natural-born British subject, regardless of parentage.144 Following this
principle, anyone born within the U.S. was deemed a natural-born US
citizen. This is the jus soli principle.
Joseph Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the U.S.,145
explained the rationale for excluding foreigners from the Office of the
President in this manner:
[T]he general propriety of the exclusion of foreigners, in common cases,
will scarcely be doubted by any sound statesman. It cuts off all chances
for ambitious foreigners, who might otherwise be intriguing for the office;
and interposes a barrier against those corrupt interferences of foreign
140
141
142
143
144
145
Id. at 655.
J. Hein, supra Note 135 at 431.
U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, supra Note 138 at 651.
Id. at 655.
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized two exceptions that existed for this rule. First, any child born
to an alien enemy father engaged in hostile occupation of British territory was not a natural-born
British subject. Second, any child born to an alien father who was an ambassador or diplomat of a
foreign state was also excluded. See: C. Lohman. Presidential Eligibility: the Meaning of the
Natural-Born Citizen Clause 36 Gonzaga Law Review 349, 360 (2000-2001).
Volume II (1858).
43
But the adoption by the U.S. of the jus soli principle still yielded
exceptions as the natural-born citizen clause includes foreign-born children
of American citizens when such children are born outside of the U.S. as a
result of parental employment by the U.S. government.147 In a statute passed
by the First Congress of the U.S. (where twenty framers of the U.S.
Constitution were members) natural-born was defined to include all foreignborn children of American citizen parents.148
Thus, regardless whether the natural-born citizen clause is effective
under jus soli only or under a combined jus soli and jus sanguinis
application, the basis for the description of one class of citizens as naturalborn remains the same: a natural-born is expected to have inherent
allegiance, obedience and loyalty to the state or sovereign which grants him
such status in exchange for the protection the state or sovereign provides.149
The basic dichotomy underlying citizenship acquisition, based on the
rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court, is that there are only two modes of
acquiring citizenship: by birth and by naturalization.150 This means that if
one is not a U.S. citizen by birth (i.e., by being born within the U.S.), one
can only become a U.S. citizen through naturalization.
The U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 defines
naturalization as the conferring of nationality of a state upon a person
after birth, by any means whatsoever. 151 Naturalization may thus be
effected through the voluntary act of a person to undergo naturalization
proceedings or through the positive act of the state to grant citizenship by
law.152
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
Id. at 353-354.
C. Lohman, supra Note 144 at 352.
Id. at 369.
Wong Kim Ark describes allegiance as nothing more than the tie or duty of obedience of a
subject to the sovereign under whose protection he is; and allegiance by birth is that which
arises from being born within the dominions and under the protection of a particular
sovereign. Two things usually concur to create citizenship: First, birth locally within the
dominions of the sovereign; and, secondly, birth within the protection and obedience, or, in other
words, within the allegiance of the sovereign. That is, the party must be born within a place where
the sovereign is at the time in full possession and exercise of his power, and the party must also at
his birth derive protection from, and consequently owe obedience or allegiance to, the sovereign,
as such, de facto, [emphases supplied], supra Note 138 at 461.
J. Hein, supra Note 135 at 433, citing Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 165 (1964) (describing
two paths to citizenship: the native born path and the naturalized citizen path). "The Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution, in the declaration that "all persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
state wherein they reside,' contemplates two sources of citizenship, and only two: birth and
naturalization," U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, supra Note 138 at 702.
Section 101(a) (23), at US Citizenship and Immigration Services,
available from
http://www.uscis.gov/iframe/ilink/docView/SLB/HTML/SLB/act.html
Id. For example, Puerto Ricans are US citizens by statute and not because they are born in Puerto
Rico, a US territory, see J. Hein, supra Note 135 at 426.
44
158
159
160
161
Supra Note 1.
409 Phil. 633 (2001).
CONSTITUTION, Article IV, Section 2.
468 Phil. 421(2004).
Except those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority, who are deemed under the Constitution to be natural-born
citizens. See: Constitution, Article IV, Sections 1(3) and 2. Tecson v. Comelec, supra Note 156 at
724 (2004).
Id. at 463.
Id. at 463, citing B.V. Steenbergen (ed.), The Conditions of Citizenship (1994) at Introduction.
Ibid.
Id.
45
seen but its future and characterization may well be influenced by the
rapidly shrinking global village.162
Until these developments come, we have to live with a citizenship that
is personal in character and which signifies a more or less permanent
membership in a political community. It denotes possession within that
particular political community of full civil and political rights subject to
special limitations. Reciprocally, it imposes the duty of allegiance on the
political community. The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy
political rights, that is, the right to participate in government principally
through the right to vote, the right to hold public office, and the right to
petition the government for redress of grievances.163
Based on the rationale for the conferment of natural-born status to a
citizen (i.e., that a natural-born citizen inherently owes or harbors allegiance
to the state), the State grants privileges to the natural-born that are not
available to naturalized citizens. Thus, the Constitution reserves certain
elective and appointive positions in the Government only to natural-born
Filipinos.164 As early as 1935, the framers of the Constitution considered the
natural-born citizenship requirement to hold these positions to be a reflection
of their nationalistic spirit.165
The recognition of enhanced political privileges in the 1935
Constitution continues to the present 1987 Constitution and remains based
on the loyalty and obedience to the State that is inherent in the natural-born
citizen. This does not necessarily mean that a naturalized citizen owes less
allegiance to the state; it only means that the state gives a premium to the
allegiance of the natural-born because such allegiance is deemed
embedded in his or her person from birth. In contrast, a naturalized citizen
must prove through an oath that he or she owes allegiance to his or her
adopted state (among other stringent requirements for naturalization).
Otherwise stated, plain citizenship is the possession by members of a
political community, whether natural-born or naturalized, of specified civil
and political rights and duties. The state grants more of these civil and
political rights (as well as duties) to the natural-born citizen because of the
162
163
164
165
Id.
Go v. Republic, G.R. No. 202809, July 2, 2014, 729 SCRA 138.
Under the 1987 Constitution, only natural-born Filipinos can run as President, Vice President,
Senator and Member of the House of Representatives. Further, only natural-born Filipinos may be
appointed Justices of the Supreme Court, Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission,
Commission on Elections, Commission on Audit, and Commission on Human Rights and as
Ombudsman and his Deputies. See: CONSTITUTION, Article VII, Sections 2 and 3; Article VI,
Sections 3 and 6; Art. VIII, Section 7; Article IX (B) Section 1; Article IX (C), Section 1,
Paragraph 1; Article IX (D) Section 1, Paragraph 1; Article XI, Section 8; Art. XIII Section 17,
paragraph 2.
It was felt that, by virtue of the key positions of the President and the Vice-President in the
Philippine Government, every precaution should be taken to insure the fact the persons elected,
instead of being or developing to be mere instruments of foreign governments or foreign
groups, would be loyal to the country and to its people. See: J. Aruego. The Philippine
Constitution: Origins, Making, Meaning and Application, Vol. IV (1971) at 400-401.
46
recognition that, by reason of birth, he or she has stronger ties to the state
than the naturalized citizen.
Based on these historical and policy reasons and on the tenor of the
wording of the Constitution, a natural-born citizenship based solely on a
presumption is out of line. The middle ground of a natural-born citizenship
based on presumption does not exist: on the one end is natural-born
citizenship that refers to the involuntary acquisition of citizenship by
reason of birth; citizenship by presumption lies at the other end as it is
citizenship by inference and is thus a form of citizenship by naturalization.
III. D. SUCCEEDING DEVELOPMENTS AS BASIS
FOR CLAIM OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.
III.D.1. The respondent s subsequent adoption by
Filipino citizens, Fernando Poe, Jr. and Susan Roces,
did not confer Philippine citizenship on her.
The respondent s subsequent adoption by Philippine citizens
Fernando Poe, Jr. and Susan Roces did not confer Philippine citizenship on
her. Adoption is not among the modes of acquiring citizenship. Adoption
creates a civil tie between the adopter and the adoptee, but does not confer
upon the latter the political privilege of citizenship.166
The prevailing statutory law on adoption relevant to the respondent s
case is the Civil Code. The effects of adoption under its Article 341167
generally refer to the rights between the adopter and the adoptee. This
provision is supplemented by Section 5, Rule 99 of the 1964 Rules of Court,
which declares that the adopted child is
to all legal intents and purposes, the child of the petitioner or petitioners,
and that its surname is changed to that of the petitioner or petitioners. The
adopted person or child shall thereupon become the legal heir of his
parents by adoption
The view may be taken that an adopted child of his or her Filipino
father acquires Philippine citizenship pursuant to Article 341(1) of the Civil
Code in relation with Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution.
Since Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution does not distinguish,
the provision can be extended to cover birth and adoptive Filipino fathers,
166
167
Tecson v. Comelec, supra Note 156 at 481, citing Ching Leng v. Galang, G.R. No. L-11931,
October 1958; Therkelsen v. Republic, 120 Phil.1196 (1964).
Article 341. The adoption shall:
(1) Give to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child
of the adopter;
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents by nature;
(3) Make the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter;
(4) Entitle the adopted person to use the adopter's surname.
47
and the adopted child who becomes the legitimate child of the Filipino
has the right to be considered as a Philippine citizen.168
The principle behind our laws on citizenship, however, rejects this
view.
Philippine citizenship is acquired primarily through blood
relationship pursuant to the jus sanguinis principle. We have consistently
adopted the jus sanguinis principle,169 and exceptions to this have been
carefully limited by the Constitution and by relevant laws. 170 As is apparent
from the discussions above, the jus sanguinis principle cannot be broadened
so as to cover familial relations created through adoption.
The critical point to appreciate is that adoption creates only civil
rights and duties between the adoptive parents and the adopted child.171 It
only establishes a relationship between the adopter and the adopted,
and not between the State and the adopted. Thus, without any law
providing adoption as a means of acquiring citizenship, the adoption of a
child does not automatically vest in him the political rights and privileges of
his adoptive parents.172
As an aside, the question of the legality of the respondent s adoption
(in light of the petitioner s claim that the adoption was illegal) is not
material to the present petition and does not need to be discussed. This side
statement, however, does not in any way recognize the legality and
regularity of the documents submitted to support the petition for adoption in
so far as they claim that the respondent is a natural-born child of Fernando
Poe, Jr. and Susan Roces.
III.D.2. Government documents declaring or
recognizing the respondent s status as a Philippine
citizen carries no weight as evidence of her citizenship.
As the respondent did not acquire Philippine citizenship through the
means enumerated under the 1935 Constitution, her passport and birth
certificate (which both indicate that she is a Filipino) cannot be given weight
as evidence of her citizenship.
168
169
170
171
172
See E. Abaya. A Critical Study on the Effect of Adoption on Citizenship Status in the
Philippines 23 Philippine Law Journal 443, 447-448 (1942).
See: Spanish Civil Code, Article 17; Philippine Bill of 1902, Section 4; 1935 Constitution, Article
IV, Section 1; 1973 Constitution, Article III, Section 1; and, 1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section
1.
There are two exceptions under the 1935 Constitution: first, are those who are citizens of the
Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution (Article IV, Section 1[1]), and second,
are those who are born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of
[the] constitution, had been elected in public office (Article IV, Section 1[2]), see: E. Abaya, supra
Note 168 at 448.
See Ching Leng v. Galang, supra Note 166; Therkelsen v. Republic, supra Note 166 at 1196.
Ibid.
48
On its face, the amended Certificate of Live Birth that the respondent
presented173 had been issued because her adoptive mother (Susan Roces)
who served as the informant, declared that the respondent is a Philippine
citizen. This supportive claim, however, cannot be true given the
respondent s then existing and (now admitted) status as a foundling.
Based on the same reasoning, the BI s grant of the respondent s
Petition for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship cannot be given any
evidentiary weight as it was based on misrepresentations that the BI, for
some reason, negligently failed to consider.
In her RA 9225 petition, the respondent misrepresented that her
parents are Fernando Poe, Jr. and Susan Roces, and that she is a
Philippine citizen both of which are unwarranted statements.174
Section 4(d) of the Implementing Rules Governing Philippine
Citizenship under RA 9225 (BI Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05-002)
states that the applicant must indicate the name and citizenship of parents at
the time of the applicant s birth. The respondent indicated Fernando Poe,
Jr. and Susan Roces as her parents at the time she was born. This
representation is incorrect, as they are her adoptive parents, not her birth
parents.
The BI evaluation officer should have noticed that the respondent is
an adopted child and should have red-flagged this critical information
considering that adoption does not confer Philippine citizenship.
While the SET has no power to invalidate the grant of dual citizenship
through the BI under RA 9225, nothing legally stops the SET from
recognizing the patent irregularities in her application, and at least for
purposes of the present case, the consequences of these irregularities. The
mandatory character of the constitutional rule on citizenship demands
nothing less.
III.E. THE RESPONDENT S COMPLIANCE WITH
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RA 9225 DOES NOT VEST
IN HER THE STATUS OF A NATURAL-BORN
PHILIPPINE CITIZEN
RA 9225 is a statute aimed at allowing former natural-born citizens
who had lost their citizenship when they became naturalized citizens of
another country, to regain their Philippine citizenship.175 The law is
173
174
175
See: NSO Certificate of Live Birth, Registry No. 4175, Exhibit O for the petitioner, Exhibit
3 for the respondent.
See: Petition for Retention and/or Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship under RA 9225, Exhibit
C for the petitioner and Exhibit 7 for the respondent.
RA 9225, Section 3 states:
49
See also: 1934 Constitutional Convention, Vol. No. VI, Journal No. 96, November 26, 1934.
J. Aruego, supra Note 165 at 234.
1973 CONSTITUTION, Article III, Section 1.
CONSTITUTION, Article IV, Section 1.
50
citizens of the Philippines are those whose fathers or mothers are citizens
of the Philippines.
This change affected the concept of natural-born citizenship that the
1987 Constitution continued to impose as an eligibility requirement for
several public offices. Because of the removal of the distinction between
persons born to Filipino fathers and to Filipino mothers (and foreigner
fathers), the understanding of a natural-born citizen changed from having
been acquired by birth (i.e., by descent from a Filipino father) in 1935, to
being acquired from birth (by express definition in the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions which, in contrast with the 1935 rule, accept that even a child
of an alien father may be born already a Filipino).
Specifically, both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions provided a
definition of who a natural-born Filipino is, as follows:
A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship.180
51
every part given effect without duplication in meaning that would leave the
without having to perform clause with no consequence.184
To give real meaning to the requirement without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship, in accordance
with its role and purpose in the Constitution, the clause must necessarily
pertain to the added requirement of maintaining Philippine citizenship
(subsequently referred here as the maintenance portion ). This portion
requires that a Philippine citizen, after having acquired citizenship from
birth, must not subsequently lose or impair his or her citizenship in order to
continue enjoying natural-born status and the added political privileges this
status entails.
In plainer language and in the context of this case, a person born
already a Philippine citizen, must continue to hold on to his or her Philippine
citizenship as originally and naturally acquired, to be able to hold the public
offices reserved solely for natural-born Philippine citizens.
Another necessary consequence that proceeds from the concept of a
citizenship that attaches from birth and of a maintenance portion in the
constitutional definition is that once citizenship is lost by whatever means,
the attendant character or quality of this citizenship is likewise lost.
Renunciation of Philippine citizenship thus covers not only the citizenship
but also the character of being natural-born that goes with it.
Note in this regard that once a natural-born Philippine citizen
renounces his Philippine citizenship, he or she effectively becomes a
foreigner in the Philippines with no political right to participate in
Philippine politics and governance.
To re-acquire Philippine citizenship, that person, now a foreigner,
must undergo the process laid down by the law. That this process under RA
9225 is simpler than the process laid down for foreigners who had not been
born Philippine citizens, does not change the crucial fact that former naturalborn Philippine citizens have to comply with the requirements of RA 9225
to become Philippine citizens once again.
Thus, the character of the citizenship that the former natural-born
Philippine citizen acquires through RA 9225 is different from the
character of citizenship he or she had been born with. He or she now
184
November 22, 1993, 228 SCRA 129, 134, which held: it is a principle of legal hermeneutics that
in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case), care should be taken that every part
thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a
hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. x x x The rule is that a
construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently
inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and
harmonious whole.
Following the surplusage canon of interpretation, see: A. Scalia and B. Garner, supra Note 88 at
174 -179. See also: JMM Promotions and Management Inc. v. NLRC, supra Note 183 at 134.
52
53
Did the Committee take into account the fact that at the time of birth, all
he had was just an inchoate right to choose Philippine citizenship, and yet,
by subsequently choosing Philippine citizenship, it would appear that his
choice retroacted to the date of his birth so much so that under the
Gentleman's proposed amendment, he would be a natural-born citizen?
FR. BERNAS: But the difference between him and the natural-born
citizen who lost his status is that the natural-born who lost his status, lost it
voluntarily; whereas, this individual in the situation contemplated in
185
Section 1, paragraph 3 never had the chance to choose.
54
55
First, this provision does not explicitly provide that a former naturalborn Philippine citizen who re-acquires his Philippine citizenship shall also
regain his or her status as a natural-born citizen. What it simply provides is
the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Undeniably, the provision uses the word re-acquire for Philippine
citizens who became foreign citizens before RA 9225 took effect, while the
word retain is used for Filipinos who became naturalized foreign
citizens after RA 9225. Notwithstanding the difference in usages, the effect
of reacquisition and retention under RA 9225 is the same it enables
Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship to become Philippine
citizens once more through the RA 9225 expedited process.
Admittedly, the retention of Philippine citizenship may be interpreted
to mean that Filipinos who have acquired foreign citizenship after RA 9225
took effect on September 17, 2003, are deemed never to have lost their
Philippine citizenship. This may be construed from the plain meaning of the
word retain, as well as the law s statement of policy, which provides
that all Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act. 187
This interpretation, however, leads to an absurd situation, where
Philippine citizens who have renounced their Philippine citizenship in favor
of the citizenship in another country through naturalization, are still seen in
the eyes of Philippine law as Philippine citizens. In other words, what results
is a situation where both foreign law and the individual who avails of
citizenship under it, no longer recognize the individual s Philippine
citizenship, but Philippine law still insists on treating him or her as a
Philippine citizen.
The condition requiring the execution of an oath of allegiance does
not cure this situation, as it does not provide when the oath should be taken.
It even worsens the level of absurdity, as it would be almost impossible to
determine whether a person who had renounced his Philippine citizenship
would actually opt to eventually retain it by executing an oath of
allegiance to the Philippines.
The law abhors absurdity, and where statutes avail of more than one
interpretation, that which results into a patent absurdity shall be avoided.188
Additionally, an overly literal interpretation of a law shall be avoided under
the absurd results principle, a doctrine of statutory interpretation that
disregards the literal meaning of a law when it leads to absurd results that
187
188
RA 9225, Section 2.
See: Paras v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 123169, November 4, 1996, 264 SCRA 49, 55, citing People
v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163, 167.
56
Congress could not have intended, and which would result into conflict with
other parts of the legal system while also making the law incoherent.189
The more reasonable construction, which would create lesser selfcontradictions and incoherence in our citizenship laws, would be to interpret
the statement not to have lost their Philippine citizenship as pertaining to
the reacquisition of some of the civil and political rights accorded to
Filipinos, rather than to its literal import of not having lost their Philippine
citizenship at all. This phrase gains context when we look at the rigorous
requirements for naturalization under CA 63. Since natural-born Filipinos
who have been naturalized in another country no longer need to comply with
them to reacquire citizenship, then they are deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship in this limited sense.
Additionally, neither interpretation on retaining Philippine citizenship
helps the respondent s cause, as she became a naturalized U.S. citizen on
October 18, 2001, two years before RA 9225 took effect.
Second, nothing in RA 9225 explicitly grants former Philippine
citizens who reacquired their Philippine citizenship, the privileges reserved
for natural-born Philippine citizens.
A glaring gap in the RA 9225 grant of Philippine citizenship is the
omission to restore the privileges available only to natural-born Philippine
citizens. If at all, political and other rights might be restored but this is
possible only through further acts of renunciation that leaves RA 9225 selfcontradictory.
Separately from the potential absurd consequence discussed above,
note that under Section 5 of RA 9225, the grant of civil and political rights is
conditional. Under its Section 2, those seeking elective public office shall
meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws.and make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship.
Note additionally that the right to vote or be elected to any public
office cannot be extended to those who are candidates for, are holding public
office, or who are in the service of the armed forces of the country where
they are naturalized citizens.
These two conditions imply that RA 9225 admits of dual citizenships
although it does not say so in its express terms. To run for public office, the
Filipino with reacquired Philippine citizenship must renounce any other
foreign citizenship he or she holds. He or she cannot run for a Philippine
public office if he or she is running for or holding a public office, or is
189
See: V. Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism: Defining the Absurd Result Principle
in Statutory Interpretation, 44 American University Law Review 127.
57
serving in the armed forces of the other country where he or she is also a
citizen.
If these conditions obtain, how can the respondent seriously contend
that RA 9225 restores the status of natural-born and the privileges this
status carries?
This contention effectively maintains that a Philippine citizen with
reacquired citizenship is less than a full-fledged citizen in his political rights,
yet must be considered natural-born. It means, too, that the Philippine
citizen whose citizenship was reacquired under RA 9225, and who at the
same time is a citizen of a foreign country (i.e., a dual citizen), is still a
natural-born Philippine citizen but one who must perform an act to enjoy the
political right of running for or holding public office.
Respondent s position, it seems to me, is farthest from what the
Constitution means in defining the term natural-born and in allowing
only those with this quality of citizenship to run for the highest offices in the
land. Plain common sense dictates that a law should not be read to allow
this kind of contradiction within its terms or to allow a legal absurdity.
Lastly, reading Section 3 of RA 9225 to include the restoration of the
natural-born character of the lost citizenship would render the
constitutionality of the above-quoted Section 3 in doubt. Such reading and
interpretation, as a rule, should be avoided.190
III.E.2 The Supreme Court s ruling in Bengzon v. HRET
In Bengzon v. HRET,191 the Court found no grave abuse of discretion
in the HRET s decision not to disqualify a member of Congress despite
having been previously naturalized as a U.S. citizen. By doing so, the Court
effectively affirmed that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship includes
the reacquisition of the natural-born status.
This HRET decision, examined by the Court bearing in mind the
HRET s independence and sole jurisdiction over disqualifications of
members of the House of Representatives, does not (and should not) tie the
SET s hands to the ruling in Bengzon.
I say this in consideration of the following: (1) our own independent
and exclusive jurisdiction to determine contests involving disqualifications
of senators, (2) the relationship of the concept of stare decisis with the
hierarchy of courts, and (3) Bengzon s unconstitutional misapplication of
our laws on citizenship.
190
191
58
59
undertaking its duty to resolve all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of senators. In the absence of any constitutional limitation,
the SET s power within its sphere of authority is full, clear, and
complete.193
Thus, in the same way that jurisprudence has recognized the past
electoral commissions power to promulgate its own rules of procedure for
resolving contests assigned to it,194 the SET possesses (and exercises) the
power to promulgate its own rules regarding the election, returns, and
qualifications of senators. The Court itself confirmed that this is a necessary
and implied power attendant to its supremacy in exercising its constitutional
mandate.195
Additionally, no less than the Supreme Court has recognized the
electoral tribunal s independence from any branch of government.196 It is
not part of the judiciary; thus, its decisions cannot be appealed to and
corrected by the Court for errors of law or errors of fact.197
Of course, like any government agency or instrumentality, the
SET s actions are not totally immune from judicial review. The Supreme
Court can affirm or nullify the SET s acts through the expanded
jurisdiction that Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution defines.
The question when the Supreme Court so acts is not whether the SET
committed errors of law or errors of fact, but whether it committed acts of
grave abuse of discretion or acted outside its jurisdiction. As one case puts
it, the judgment rendered by the commission is beyond judicial interference,
except, "upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the
power as will constitute a denial of due process of law."198
But what kind of power does the SET actually exercise when it
resolves contests involving the election, returns, and qualifications of
senators? The text of Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution as well
as the history behind electoral tribunals for specific sets of public officials,
shows that they were intended to exercise adjudicative power no different in
character from judicial power, albeit in a limited degree, that the courts
exercise within the judicial branch of government.
First, the text of Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution is
similar to the text of Article VI, Section 4 of the 1935 Constitution,199 which
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
Id.
See Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, 650 Phil 326, 352-353 (2010), citing DefensorSantiago v. Guingona, Jr., supra Note 41 at 294 (1998); Robles v. HRET, 260 Phil. 831, 836-837
(1990).
Id.
See Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil 818, 829-833 (1948). See also Concurring
Opinion of J. Perfecto at 851.
See Robles v. HRET, supra Note 194 at 836-837.
Supra Note 196 at 829-833.
1935 CONSTITUTION, Article VI, Section 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of
three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen
by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest
60
Thus, even at its inception, the electoral tribunal has been envisioned
to step in, and determine the election, returns, and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly only when a contest is involved; in the same
manner that judicial power is exercised only when there is an actual case or
controversy involving legally enforceable rights.
I emphasize that electoral tribunals exercise adjudicative power no
different in character from judicial power in resolving the contests under
their jurisdiction, to highlight that the controversies brought to us are
decided based on grounds provided in the law and the facts established in a
case.
200
number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The
senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the
National Assembly.
1934 Constitutional Convention, Volume No. VI, Journal No. 100, December 4, 1934.
61
203
62
Note, however, that a SET decision does not create a binding judicial
precedent because its supreme power to adjudicate is limited to particular
issues, and because it is an independent organ that does not belong to the
judiciary. The power to create a binding judicial precedent belongs
exclusively to the Supreme Court.
To my mind, a clear legal error that contravenes the Constitution, such
as the situation that intervened in Bengzon v. HRET, is a strong compelling
reason not to apply its ruling in the present case. Thus, I urge my colleagues,
both in the SET and in the Court, to seriously reexamine the Bengzon ruling
and re-think its application to the present case.
This signifies that the HRET ruling could have been legally incorrect but was left untouched by
the Court because the error did not amount to a grave abuse of discretion, see Bengzon v. HRET,
supra Note 1 at 651-652, and Romy s Freight Service v. Castro, 523 Phil. 540, 546 (2006).
63
Section 2.
Otherwise known as An act providing for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by persons who
lost such citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the
United States, promulgated on June 18, 1960.
64
xxx
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed
forces of a foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or
the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign
country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his
Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or
offensive pact of alliance with the said foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine
territory with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines:
Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of
rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission, and
taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so
only in connection with his service to said foreign country: And
provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering
service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign
country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a)
or (b), shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election
of the Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service
to, or commission in, the armed forces of said foreign country.
Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign country, he
shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and
political rights as a Filipino citizen;
xxx
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the
Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary
pardon or amnesty has been granted; and
(7) In the case of a woman, upon her marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue
of the laws in force in her husband's country, she acquires his nationality.
[emphases supplied]
Thus, in the eyes of Philippine law, these people lost their Philippine
citizenship because of the overt acts they performed, and, hence, are no
longer Philippine citizens. The execution of an oath of allegiance is the
procedure through which they can regain their Philippine citizenship. That
they did not have to go through the tedious process of naturalization
65
66
For all the above reasons, solely for purposes of the present case, and
subject to the Supreme Court s exercise of its expanded power of judicial
review, I opt not to consider the application of the Bengzon ruling to the
present case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, I vote to GRANT the
petition for quo warranto against the respondent MARY GRACE POE
LLAMANZARES who should accordingly be declared ineligible for the
position of Senator that she now holds.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice