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Facts:
Congress enacted RA 7167 entitled An act adjusting the basic personal and
additional exemptions allowable to individuals for income tax purposes to the
poverty threshold level, amending for the purpose Sec.29 of the NIRC. The said act
was signed and approved by the President on Dec.19, 1991 and published on Jan.14,
1992 in Malaya, a newspaper of general circulation. Sec.3 of the said act states:
This act shall take effect upon its approval, while Sec.5 states: These
regulations shall take effect on compensation income from January 1, 1992.
Issue:
WON RA 7167 took effect upon its approval by the president on Dec.19, 1991 or on
Jan.30 1992, 15 days after its publication?
Held:
RA 7167 took effect on January 30, 1992 after 15 days of its publication. (Tanada
vs Tuvera) The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself which cannot in any
event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its previous
publication. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in
its discretion provide that the usual fifteen (15) day period shall be shortened or
extended.
Facts:
Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986
for acts committed before and after February 1986. Private respondent filed with a
Motion to Quash alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense;
(b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no
jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the criminal action or
liability has been extinguished. This was denied.
day
after
the
filing
original
information,
petition
for habeas
private
respondent
or
of
the
on
October
1986,
corpus for
and
his
co-accused
was
filed
which was dismissed on 16 October 1986 on the basis of the agreement of the parties
under which herein private respondent "will remain in legal custody and will face
trial before the court having custody over his person" and the warrants for the
arrest of his co-accused are deemed recalled and they shall be immediately released
but shall submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their person.
May 9, 1987 Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed that the
respondent is not entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a capital offense
under PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART. 135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President
issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and
1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code
as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now granted the bail,
which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall report to the
court once every two months within the first ten days of every period thereof.
Petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the
court to deny bail to and to allow it to present evidence in support thereof
considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with this
main condition of his bail. It was contended that:
The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from
detention when arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA)
He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;
He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and
presented a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;
The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false
address;
He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose
identity and address were also found to be false;
Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00
was offered and paid for his arrest.
This however was denied. Hence the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail.
Held:
Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime
is not a capital offense, therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence.
It is only when it is a capital offense that the right becomes discretionary.
However it was wrong for the Judge to change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K
without hearing the prosecution.
Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion
perpetua to the crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not
favorable to him.
Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeas
corpus). Agreements were made therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his
co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately,
with a condition that they will submit themselves in the jurisdiction of the court.
Said petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the security given for the release of a
person in custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We hereby rule that the
right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a
right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to
law,
to
public
order,
public
policy,
morals,
or
good
customs,
or
prejudicial
third
person
with
a
right
recognized
by
law.
Facts:
HELD:
Art. 8 of the Civil Code decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These
decisions, although in themselves not law, constitute evidence of what the laws
mean. The application or interpretation placed by the courts upon a law is part of
the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's
application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect. A new doctrine
abrogating an old rule operates prospectively and should not adversely affect those
favored by the old rule.
FACTS:
A criminal complaint for violation of BP 22 also known as the Bouncing Check Law
was filed against the petitioner after issuing a check on September 1, 1982 which
HELD:
It was opined that the interpretation of the Court constitutes a part of the law as
stated in Art 8 of the New Civil Code, thus, the Circulars earning the power of law
resulted from the cognizance of them by the Court as manifested by the Court
decisions prior to the ruling of the case at bar. The Court further held that,
although the Circulars have the power of law, Circular 12 can not be applied to the
case at bar as that would be tantamount to giving retroactive effect which is in
direct violation of the Circular itself and the Art 4 of the New Civil Code
mandating prospective application of the law. The Court resolved that the assailed
decisions of the inferior courts are reversed and set aside. Criminal prosecution
is dismissed with costs de oficio.
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not the term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited
to 365 days.
Held:
The term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365 days.
However, it is said to be unrealistic and if public interest demands a reversion to
the policy embodied in the revised administrative code, this may be done through
legislative process and not by judicial decree.
This is a petion for certiorari and prohibition to declare null and void the orders
of the Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, issued in criminal cases Federico
Quizon and Profitisa Quizon, dated July 11 and August 17, 1964, respectively,
denying petitioners' motion to quash the criminal complaints against them based on
the ground of prescription of the offense of serious oral defamation of which they
were charged, and to prohibit said court from proceeding further with the said
criminal cases, except to dismiss the same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
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FACTS:
On May 11, 1964, private respondent, Cecilia Sangalang, with the assistance of
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Eliodoro B. Guinto, who had conducted the preliminary
investigation, filed with respondent court two separate criminal complaints both for
serious oral defamation, the one against petitioner Federico Quizon and the other
petitioner Profitisa Quizon, committed on the same day, November 11, 1963.
Upon being called for arraignment, petitioner presented a written motion to quash
contending principally that the offense charged had already prescribed as of May 9,
1964. Stating the provision of Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense of
oral defamation prescribes in six months. Thus,
From Nov. 12
19
days
to 30, 1963
there were
December, 1963
31
days
had
January, 1964
31
days
had
February, 1964
29
days
had
March, 1964
31
days
had
April, 1964
30
days
had
From May 1 to
9 days
9, 1964 was a
matter of
1963 to May 9,
days
1964 were.
From Nov. 12 to
19
days
are
December
30
days
January
30
days
February
days
March 30
days
30
April
30
days
From May 1 to
11
11, 1964, there
days
are
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, in providing for the prescriptive period for oral
defamation, speaks of month, not of day, as the basic unit in reckoning the duration of
the prescription, when it says that "offenses of oral defamation ...
Article 13 of the new Civil Code says that "when the laws speak of ..., months,
..., it shall be understood that ... month ... of thirty days each ... It says
further that "If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the
number of days which they respectively have. Conformably to these legal provisions
and applying the same to the case at bar, the computation given by the public
prosecutor appears to be correct. The month of November was designated in the
complaint so it will be given the number of days it has in the calendar which is 30
days.
HELD:
In accordance with Article 13 of the new Civil Code the "month" mentioned in
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code should be one of 30 days, and since the period
of prescription commences to run from the day "on which the crime is discovered by
the offended party," it is logical to presume, therefore, that the Legislature in
enacting Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code meant or intended to mean that in the
computation of the period provided for therein, the first day is to be excluded and
the last one included, in accord with existing laws.
The pertinent provisions of Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code are as
follows:
Art. 90. Prescription of crimes. The offenses of oral defamation and slander by
deed shall prescribe in six months. Light offenses prescribe in two months.
Article 90 should be considered as the calendar month and not the 30-day month. It
is to be noted that no provision of the Revised Penal Code defines the length of
the Month. Article 7 of the old Civil Code provided that a month shall be
understood as containing 30 days; With the approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines
(R.A. No. 386), the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a
month is to be considered as the regular 30-day month (Article 13).
Hence, where the crime was committed on November 11, 1963, and the action was filed
exactly 180 days later, said action was filed on time.
FACTS: Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his death.
Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties, the
other, disposing of his Philippine properties. In both wills, his recognized
illegitimate children were not given anything. Texas has no conflicts rule (rule of
Private International Law) governing successional rights. Furthermore, under Texas
Law, there are no compulsory heirs and therefore no legitimes. The illegitimate
children opposed the wills on the ground that they have been deprived of their
legitimes (to which they would be entitled, if Philippine law were to apply).
HELD: Said children are NOT entitled to their legitimes for under Texas Law which
we must apply (because it is the national law of the deceased), there are no
legitimes. (See Art. 16, par. 2, Civil Code).
(2) The renvoi doctrine, applied in Testate Estate of Edward Christensen, Adolfo
Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, Jan. 31, 1963, cannot be applied. Said
doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and
a domiciliary of Texas at the time of his death. So that even assuming that Texas
has a conflicts of law rule providing that the law of the domicile should govern,
the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would
still refer to Texas law because the deceased was BOTH a citizen and a domiciliary
of Texas. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex
rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties
are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in
the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflicts of law rule
in Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. (Lim v. Collector, 36
Phil. 472; In re: Testate Estate of Suntay, 95 Phil. 500).
(3) The contention that the national law of the deceased (Art. 16, par. 2; Art.
1039) should be disregarded because of Art. 17, par. 3 which in effect states that
our prohibitive laws should not be rendered nugatory by foreign laws, is WRONG,
firstly because Art. 16, par. 2 and Art. 1039 are special provisions, while Art.
17, par. 3 is merely a general provision; and secondly, because Congress deleted
the phrase notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article
when it incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil
Code, while reproducing without substantial change, the second paragraph of Art. 10
of the old Civil Code as Art.16 in the new. It must have been its purpose to make
the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself, which must be
applied in testate and intestate successions. As further indication of this
legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees
that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent. It
is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in
our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals.
(4) It has been pointed out by the oppositor that the decedent executed two wills
one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from
this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that
such was the decedents intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it will
NOT ALTER the law, for as this Court rules in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870,
a provision in a foreigners will to the effect that his properties shall be
distributed in accordance with the Philippine law and not with his national law, is
illegal and void for his national law, in this regard, cannot be ignored.
Facts:
On
November
10,
1972,
private
respondent
Restituto
Tobias,
purchasing
agent
and
administrative
assistant
to
the
engineering
operations
detector tests yielded negative results; reports from Manila police investigators
and from the Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner are in favor of Tobias.
Petitioners filed with the Fiscals Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal
cases against private respondent Tobias, but were dismissed.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.
Held:
Yes. In the case at bar, SC invoked Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code
provided as follows:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.
While Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations
and for the maintenance of social order, Article 21 provides for the remedy on the
action for damages.
The Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant
circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they
invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be
indemnified: when Hendry told Tobias to just confess or else the company would file
a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail; his (Hendry) scornful
remarks about Filipinos ("You Filipinos cannot be trusted.) as well as against
Tobias (crook, and swindler); the writing of a letter to RETELCO stating that
Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty; and the filing of six
criminal cases by petitioners against private respondent. All these reveal that
petitioners are motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and
cause damage to private respondent. The imputation of guilt without basis and the
pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards
of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code and by such, it gives
Tobias the right to recover damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code.
Principles: Article 21 of the New Civil Code, "any person who wilfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." The afore-cited provisions on
human relations were intended to expand the concept of torts in this jurisdiction
by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes.
FACTS: Philamgen executed a bond, with defendant Rita Gueco Tapnio in favour of PNB
San Fernando Branch in the amount of P2,000 to guarantee the payment of Tapnios
account on said bank. In turn, to guarantee the payment of whatever amount the
bonding company would pay to the Philippine National Bank, both defendants executed
the indemnity agreement. Under the terms and conditions of this indemnity
agreement, whatever amount the plaintiff would pay would earn interest at the rate
of 12% per annum, plus attorney's fees in the amount of 15 % of the whole amount
due in case of court litigation.
It is not disputed that defendant was indebted to PNB San Fernando in the amount of
P2,000 plus accumulated interests. Despite the banks series of demands, Tapnio
failed to pay her debts. Defendant Rita Gueco Tapnio admitted all the foregoing
facts. She claims, however, when demand was made upon her by plaintiff for her to
pay her debt to the Bank, that she told the Plaintiff that she did not consider
herself to be indebted to the Bank at all because she had an agreement with one
Jacobo-Nazon whereby she had leased to the latter her unused export sugar quota for
the 1956-1957 agricultural year, consisting of 1,000 piculs at the rate of P2.80
per picul, or for a total of P2,800.00, which was already in excess of her
obligation guaranteed by plaintiff's bond.
This lease agreement, according to her, was with the knowledge of the bank. But the
Bank has placed obstacles to the consummation of the lease, and the delay caused by
said obstacles forced 'Nazon to rescind the lease contract. Thus, Rita Gueco Tapnio
filed her third-party complaint against the Bank to recover from the latter any and
all sums of money which may be adjudged against her and in favor of the plaitiff
plus moral damages, attorney's fees and costs.
At the time of the agreement, Mrs. Tapnio was indebted to the Philippine National
Bank at San Fernando, Pampanga. Her indebtedness was known as a crop loan and was
secured by a mortgage on her standing crop including her sugar quota allocation for
the agricultural year corresponding to said standing crop. This arrangement was
necessary in order that when Mrs. Tapnio harvests, the P.N.B., having a lien on the
crop, may effectively enforce collection against her. Her sugar cannot be exported
without sugar quota allotment Sometimes, however, a planter harvest less sugar than
her quota, so her excess quota is utilized by another who pays her for its use.
This is the arrangement entered into between Mrs. Tapnio and Mr. Tuazon regarding
the former's excess quota for 1956-1957.
Tuazon informed the bank that he be notified as to when the bank needs the money so
he can execute a promissory note. The manager of the San Fernando branch forwarded
his recommendation to VP JV Buenaventura and the Board of the PNB for approval of
the loan of Tapnio. The board recommended to increase the quota to P3.00 per piculs
not P2.00 to which Tuazon asked for reconsideration but the left the request
unacted considering that the prevailing price was P3.00 per picul.
Tuazon later wrote to the bank that he is rescinding the contract and thus leaving
Tacnio losing P2,800 which she could have received from Tuazon to pay for her
indebtedness to the bank.
Philamgen filed a collection case against Tapnio for the bond it paid to the PNB.
Tapnio in turn filed a third-party complaint against PNB on the ground that
Tapnios failure to pay was due to the fault or negligence of the Bank. PNB argued
that it was
not negligent because under its
charter and provisions of Corporation
Code, it is
authoprized
to approve
the rent of
P3.00 per piculs, it was guided
fixing the
rate
of
TC ruled that the rescission of the contract of Tuazon was due to the banks
unjustified refusal to approve said contract. CA affirmed the decision of the TC.
Hence this petition.
HELD: YES
It has been clearly shown that when the Branch Manager of petitioner required the
parties to raise the consideration of the lease from P2.50 to P2.80 per picul, or a
total of P2,800-00, they readily agreed. Hence, in his letter to the Branch Manager
of the Bank on August 10, 1956, Tuazon informed him that the minimum lease rental
of P2.80 per picul was acceptable to him and that he even offered to use the loan
secured by him from petitioner to pay in full the sum of P2,800.00 which was the
total consideration of the lease. This arrangement was not only satisfactory to the
Branch Manager but it was also approves by Vice-President J. V. Buenaventura of the
PNB. Under that arrangement, Rita Gueco Tapnio could have realized the amount of
P2,800.00, which was more than enough to pay the balance of her indebtedness to the
Bank which was secured by the bond of Philamgen.
There is no question that Tapnio's failure to utilize her sugar quota for the crop
year 1956-1957 was due to the disapproval of the lease by the Board of Directors of
petitioner. The issue, therefore, is whether or not petitioner is liable for the
damage caused.
"The fact that there were isolated transactions wherein the consideration for the
lease was P3.00 a picul", according to the trial court, "does not necessarily mean
that there are always ready takers of said price. " The unreasonableness of the
position adopted by the petitioner's Board of Directors is shown by the fact that
the difference between the amount of P2.80 per picul offered by Tuazon and the
P3.00 per picul demanded by the Board amounted only to a total sum of P200.00.
Considering that all the accounts of Rita Gueco Tapnio with the Bank were secured
by chattel mortgage on standing crops, assignment of leasehold rights and interests
on her properties, and surety bonds and that she had apparently "the means to pay
her obligation to the Bank, as shown by the fact that she has been granted several
sugar crop loans of the total value of almost P80,000.00 for the agricultural years
from 1952 to 1956", there was no reasonable basis for the Board of Directors of
petitioner to have rejected the lease agreement because of a measly sum of P200.00.
Certainly, it knew that the agricultural year was about to expire, that by its
disapproval of the lease private respondents would be unable to utilize the sugar
quota in question. In failing to observe the reasonable degree of care and
vigilance which the surrounding circumstances reasonably impose, petitioner is
consequently liable for the damages caused on private respondents. Under Article 21
of the New Civil Code, "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage." The afore-cited provisions on human relations were
intended to expand the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate
legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically provide in the statutes.
A corporation is civilly liable in the same manner as natural persons for torts,
because "generally speaking, the rules governing the liability of a principal or
master for a tort committed by an agent or servant are the same whether the
principal or master be a natural person or a corporation, and whether the servant
or agent be a natural or artificial person. All of the authorities agree that a
principal or master is liable for every tort which he expressly directs or
authorizes, and this is just as true of a corporation as of a natural person, A
corporation is liable, therefore, whenever a tortious act is committed by an
officer or agent under express direction or authority from the stockholders or
members acting as a body, or, generally, from the directors as the governing body."
Decision of CA is affirmed.
Principle: Art 26 of the NCC, every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbours and other persons
FACTS: Manuel Lagunzad had produced a film based on the life of Moises Padilla
Story. The film was based on the book written by Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr.
entitled, The Long Dark Night in Negros the rights of which was bought by
The book narrates the death of Moises Padilla, a mayoralty canididate under
Nacionalista Party [a minority party] against Gov Rafael Lacson of Liberal Party,
he and his men were tried and convicted in the People v Lacson, et al case. In the
book, Moises Padilla was portrayed a martyr.
Although the movie portrayed the public life of Mosises Padilla, there were scenes
which touch the private life of Moises and the mother Gonzalesa scene whom
Gonzales had relationship with Auring. Prior to the scheduled Premiere Showing of
the film, the half-sister of Moises called the petitioner expressing her objections
to some scenes and called the movie as exploitation of Moises life. In writing,
Gonzales demanded that the film be changed and some scenes be deleted. Since
Lagunzad had spent so much for the completion of the
film,
he agreed to
enter into
a licensing agreement with Gonzales.
In
the
agreement,
it
was
stipulated
that
Laginzad
will
pay
Gonzales
P20,000.00
which will be paid in three instalments but P5,000 will be advanced and 2 & % of
the gross income as royalty. For failure of Lagunzad to pay the agreed amount,
Gonzales brought a collection case against him.
Lagunzad averred that the contract be declared null and void on the ground that he
signed the agreement under duress since he was only forced to concede to the
agreement when Gonzales threatened him that she will call a press conference and
tell the media that the movie was inaccurate. Gonzales argued that the film pryed
the privacy of her family and as such Lagunzad is liable for damages.
The trial court ordered Lagunzad to pay. CA affirmed the trial courts decision.
HELD:
YES. The film was disrespectful to the dignity and privacy of the defendant.
Neither
do
we
agree
with
petitioner's
submission
that
the
Licensing
Agreement
is
null and void for lack of, or for having an illegal cause
or
consideration.
While
it
is
true
that
petitioner
had
purchased
the
rights
to
the
book
entitled
"The
Moises Padilla Story," that did not dispense with the need for prior consent and
authority from the deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said deceased's
life and in that of his mother and the members of his family. As held in Schuyler
v. Curtis, 14 "a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a deceased person
to protect his memory, but the privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to
protect their feelings and to prevent a violation of their own rights in the
character and memory of the deceased."
Petitioner's averment that private respondent did not have any property right over
the life of Moises Padilla since the latter was a public figure, is neither well
taken. Being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a
person's right to privacy. The right to invade a person's privacy to disseminate
public information does not extend to a fictional or novelized representation of a
person,
no
matter how public
a figure he or she may be. In the case at bar, while
it
is
true
that
petitioner
exerted
efforts
to
present
true-to-life
story
of
Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the film
because without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality.
We also find it difficult to sustain petitioner's posture that his consent to the
Licensing Agreement was procured thru duress, intimidation and undue influence
exerted on him by private respondent and her daughters at a time when he had
exhausted his financial resources, the premiere showing of the picture was
imminent, and "time was of the essence.
reluctantly. A contract is valid even though one of the parties entered into it
against his own wish and desires, or even against his better judgment.
In
legal
effect,
contracting
there
parties
is
no
exchanges
difference
one
between
condition
contract
wherein
for
another
because
one
of
he
the
looks
for
greater profit or gain
by reason
agreement wherein
one
of
the contracting parties agrees to accept the lesser of two disadvantages. In either
case, he makes a choice free and untramelled and must accordingly abide by it. The
Licensing Agreement has the force of law between the contracting parties and since
its provisions are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy (Art. 1306, Civil Code), petitioner Should comply with it in good
faith.
Facts:
Petitioner Hal McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company,
Petitioner Ayer Productions pty Ltd. (Ayer Productions), envisioned for commercial
viewing and for Philippine and international release the histolic peaceful struggle
of the Filipinos at EDSA (Epifanio de los Santos Avenue).
The proposed motion picture would be essentially a re-enact ment of the events that
made possible the EDSA revolution; it is designed to be viewed in a six-hour miniseries television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four (4)
fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary
footage as background.
Private respondent Enrile replied to a letter asking for permission to air the
movie that "[he] would not and will not approve of the use, appropriation,
reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of
his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for
advertising or commercial exploitation" and further advised petitioners that 'in
the production, airing, showing, distribution or exhibition of said or similar
film, no reference whatsoever (whether written, verbal or visual) should not be
made to [him] or any member of his family, much less to any matter purely personal
to them.
It appears that petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of private
respondent Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to
film the projected motion picture.
The trial court issued ex-parte a Temporary Restraining Order and set for hearing
the application for preliminary injunction.
Hal McElroy flied a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Petition for
Preliminary Injunction contending that the mini-series film would not involve the
private life of Juan Ponce Enrile nor that of his family and that a preliminary
injunction would amount to a prior restraint on their right of free expression.
Petitioner Ayer Productions also filed its own Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of
cause of action as the mini-series had not yet been completed.
Issue:
Whether or not the production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion
picture "The Four Day Revolution constitutes an unlawful intrusion upon private
respondent's "right of privacy."
Ruling:
No, the production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture
"The Four Day Revolution does not constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private
respondent's "right of privacy" due to the following reasons:
The subject mater, as set out in the synopsis provided by the petitioners and
quoted above, does not relate to the individual life and certainly not to the
private life of private respondent Ponce Enrile.
Unlike in Lagunzad, which concerned the life story of Moises Padilla necessarily
including at least his immediate family, what we have here is not a film biography,
more or less fictionalized, of private respondent Ponce Enrile. "The Four Day
Revolution" is not principally about, nor is it focused upon, the man Juan Ponce
Enrile' but it is compelled, if it is to be historical, to refer to the role played
by Juan Ponce Enrile in the precipitating and the constituent events of the change
of government in February 1986.
The extent of that intrusion, as this Court understands the synopsis of the
proposed film, may be generally described as such intrusion as is reasonably
necessary to keep that film a truthful historical account.
Private respondent does not claim that petitioners threatened to depict in "The
Four Day Revolution" any part of the private life of private respondent or that of
any member of his family.
At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public
concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place, private respondent was
what Profs. Prosser and Keeton have referred to as a "public figure:"
A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or
mode of living, or by adopting a profession
or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs,
and his character, has become a 'public personage.' He is, in other words, a
celebrity. Obviously to be included in this category are those who have achieved
some degree of reputation by appearing before the public, as in the case of an
actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other entertainment.
Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their tight to
privacy. Three reasons were given, more or less indiscriminately, in the decisions"
that they had sought publicity and consented to it, and so could not complaint when
they received it; that their personalities and their affairs has already public,
and could no longer be regarded as their own private business; and that the press
had a privilege, under the Constitution, to inform the public about those who have
become legitimate matters of public interest. On one or another of these grounds,
and sometimes all, it was held that there
Whether the "balancing of interests test" or the clear and present danger test" be
applied in respect of the instant Petitions, the Court believes that a different
conclusion must here be reached: The production and filming by petitioners of the
projected motion picture "The Four Day Revolution" does not, in the circumstances
of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of
privacy."
The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the
constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy may be
marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be
fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events. There must, in other
words, be no knowing or reckless disregard of truth in depicting the participation
of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution. There must, further, be no
presentation of the private life of the unwilling private respondent and certainly
no revelation of intimate or embarrassing personal facts. The proposed motion
picture should not enter into what Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera in Lagunzad
referred to as "matters of essentially private concern." To the extent that "The
Four Day Revolution" limits itself in portraying the participation of private
respondent in the EDSA Revolution to those events which are directly and reasonably
related to the public facts of the EDSA Revolution, the intrusion into private
respondent's privacy cannot be regarded as unreasonable and actionable. Such
portrayal may be carried out even
WHEREFORE, the Petitions for Certiorari are GRANTED DUE COURSE, and the Order dated
16 March 1988 of respondent trial court granting a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
is hereby SET ASIDE.
FACTS:
"Extinction of penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless
the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil might arise did not exist."
Prior to September 12, 1965, in Criminal Case No. 3219, plaintiff, Gaudencio T.
Mendoza, filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
charging the defendant, Maximo M. Alcala, with the crime of estafa predicated upon
a receipt. The court eventually acquitted Alcala of the offense charged with the
findings that prosecution has not proved beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant
had in fact represented to Gaudencio T. Mendoza that he had 100 cavans of palay
stored in his sister's bodega, which he offered to sell for P1,100.00.
The Court cannot believe that Gaudencio T. Mendoza would pay to the defendant the
sum of P1,100.00 on the mere representation of the defendant that the palay was in
the bodega of his sister, and on his request to pay him first as he was going to
Manila. In the first place, there is no showing why the defendant was in urgent
need of P1,100.00. Defendant also testified that he had no palay and had no land
from which to raise that palay, which matter should be known by Mendoza as they had
known each other for a long time and were even friends.
However, the Court does not expressly pass upon the defense that the receipt signed
by him arose from a usurious loan, as there is sufficient evidence to warrant a
finding that there had been no deceit or misrepresentation and that the receipt is
not what it purports to be. Any obligation which the defendant may have incurred in
favor of Gaudencio T. Mendoza is purely civil in character and not criminal.
On December 16, 1954, while said criminal case was still pending, the plaintiff
filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, the complaint by
which this case was initiated. That complaint was based on the very same receipt
upon which the criminal action was predicated, and in it plaintiff, after alleging
violation of the terms of said receipt, asked for judgment against the defendant
for the sum of P1,100.00, with legal interest from September 5, 1953 until full
payment plus P550.00 for damages, P300.00 for attorney's fees, and the costs of
suit. Defendant in his answer contented that effect that the transaction
referred
to in the complaint was a usurious loan in
the sum of P500.00, and that
the same
had already been paid in full, and filed for
counterclaim for damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant could still be prosecuted for the collection of
the amount stated in the said receipt after he had been acquitted by the Court on a
charge of estafa based on the said receipt.
RULING:
YES
The pertinent provisions of law are Article 29 of the new Civil Code and Rule 107,
Section 1, Subsection (d) of the Rules of Court. Article 29 of the new Civil Code
provides:
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages
for the same act or omission may be instituted. Upon motion of the defendant, the
court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the
complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the
court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be
inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground. A judgment of acquittal does not constitute a bar to a subsequent civil
action involving the same subject matter, even in regard to a civil action brought
against the defendant by the State, nor is it evidence of his innocence in such
action, and is not admissible in evidence to prove that he was not guilty of the
crime with which he was charged.
The declaration in the decision in Criminal Case No. 3219 to the effect that "any
obligation which the defendant may have incurred in favor of Gaudencio T. Mendoza
is purely civil in character, and not criminal," amounts to a reservation of the
civil
action
offended
in
party,
favor
of
Philippine
the
National
Bank
vs.
in said criminal
which
is fraud, the present action falls under the exception to the general rule and it
can be filed independently of the criminal action. (Article 33, new Civil Code;
Dianeta vs. Makasiar, 55 O.G. 10273; People vs. Balagtas, 51 O.G. 5714.)
FACTS:On October 22, 1969, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a three- way
vehicular accident occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway, Marilao, Bulacan, involving a
Mercedes Benz owned and driven by petitioner; a private jeep owned and driven by
respondent Rodolfo Salazar; and a gravel and sand truck owned by respondent
Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie Montoya. Two separate Informations for
Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed against Rodolfo Salazar
and Freddie Montoya. The action against the truck-driver Montoya was for causing
damage to the jeep owned by Salazar. The case against jeep-owner-driver Salazar was
for causing damage to the Mercedes Benz of petitioner. The trial Court finds the
accused Freddie Montoya GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of damage to
property thru reckless imprudence. On the other hand, accused Rodolfo Salazar is
hereby ACQUITTED from the offense charged with costs de oficio, and his bond is
ordered canceled. Thus, the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any
liability, civil and criminal, in view of its findings that the collision between
Salazar's jeep and petitioner's car was the result of the former having been bumped
from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Thereafter, another case was filed
against respondents jeep-owner-driver Salazar and Felino Timbol, the latter being
the owner of the gravel and sand truck driven by Montoya, for indentification for
the damages sustained by his car as a result of the collision involving their
vehicles.
Issue:
Whether or not the driver of the jeep(salazar) shall be held liable on damages
ensued to the vehicle of the petitioner after acquittal of the driver on the
criminal charged upon him.
Held: Jeep Owner driver Salazar was acquitted in Criminal Case. Considering that
the collision between the jeep driven by Rodolfo Salazar and the car owned and
driven by Edgardo Mendoza was the result of the hitting on the rear of the jeep by
the truck driven by Freddie Montoya, the accused Rodolfo Salazar cannot be held
able for the damages sustained by Edgardo Mendoza's car. The circumstances
attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion that petitioner had opted to
base his cause of action against jeep-owner-driver Salazar on culpa criminal and
not on culpa aquiliana. Noteworthy is the basis of the acquittal of jeep-ownerdriver Salazar in the criminal case where, "the fact from which the civil might
arise did not exist. " Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner's cause of action as
against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, the civil action must be held to have been extinguished as
well. And even if petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar
were not ex-delictu, the end result would be the same, it being clear from the
judgment
in
criminal
case
that
acquittal
was
not
based
the
upon
reasonable
doubt,
consequently,
for
damages
longer
Salazar's
a
can
civil
action
no
be
Facts:
Private respondent Romeo Arceno was charged with the crime of malversation of public
funds in the amount of P6,619.34 which he supposedly failed to produce or to make
proper accounting thereof after repeated demands. A decision was rendered acquitting
the accused due to insufficiency of evidence to establish his beyond reasonable
doubt.
After the acquittal, the Provincial Fiscal filed Civil Case No. V-3339 for the
recovery of the total sum of P13,790.71 which represented the accountability of
Arceo
due
to
his
failure
immediately
deposit
said
with
the
funds
said
funds
the
to
National
issue
official
Treasury,
and
receipts
instead
and
to
spent
or
disbursed
them without complying with the requirements applicable to disbursements
of public
funds, with intent to defraud the government.
A motion to dismissed was filed by the private respondent on the ground that
petitioner has no cause of action. This was granted by the public respondent.
Hence, this appeal. Petitioner maintains that the decision in the criminal case does
not contain any declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist.
Issue:
Whether or not the judgment rendered in the criminal case acquitting the accused is
a bar to the recovery of the petitioner of civil liability against the private
respondent.
Ruling:
No. The dispositive portion of the decision in the criminal case did not state that
the facts upon which his responsibility as an accountable officer is based were nonexistent.
The civil action barred by such a declaration is the civil liability arising from
the offense charged, which is the one impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
(Section 1, Rule 111, Rules of Court.) Such a declaration would not bar a civil
action filed against an accused who had been acquitted in the criminal case if the
criminal action is predicated on factual or legal considerations other than the
commission of the offense charged. A person may be acquitted of malversation where,
as in the case at bar, he could show that he did not misappropriate the public funds
in his possession, but he could be rendered liable to restore said
NOTES: This case explains the provision of Article 29 - where the judgment of
acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it
includes a declaration that the facts from which civil might arise did not exist.
Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil
cases, where the court expressly declares that the civil liability of the accused is
not criminal but only civil in nature.
FACTS:
Petitioners, in this case, were accused of grave coercion by Antonio Vergara and
his family for destroying their stall in the market. Petitioners which involved a
mayor and policemen contend that removal of complainants market stall was pursuant
to the enacted municipal ordinance which gives the town mayor the power to order
the clearance of market stall as it was considered nuisance per se. Lower court
found the petitioners guilty of grave coercion beyond reasonable doubt and imposed
the payment of actual, moral, compensatory and exemplary damages. Petitioners
appeal to the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals modified the lower courts
judgment acquitting the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion since the facts
showed that what they committed was not grave coercion but some other crime such as
malicious mischief or threat. However, Court of Appeals ordered them to pay the
actual damages. Petitioners filed a special civil action contending that their
acquittal as to criminal liability results to the extinguishment of civil
liability.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court erred in requiring petitioners to pay civil
indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them of the criminal charge
HELD:
What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy What Article 29 clearly
and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been
acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for
damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. The
Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a
separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement
that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering
damages.
FACTS:
Panghilason
was
charged
with
estafa
before
the
Circuit
Criminal
Court
of
Bacolod for issuing checks which were dishonored for lack of funds or that her
account with said bank had been closed and that she refused to make the necessary
deposit.
Respondent judge dismissed the case on the ground of prosecution's failure to establish her guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, and that if accused had any
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration praying "that the portion of the decision
regarding the civil liability of the accused be reconsidered."
MR was denied, notwithstanding admission of the accused of her obligation to pay the
specific amount to petitioner. Judge said, "this recovery of civil
liability is deemed included in the offense proved, but the question is not
indubitable because the accused was acquitted in all the four (4) informations she
was charged of."
Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus.
ISSUE: Whether or not civil liability of the accused is deemed absolved upon his
acquittal in criminal case.
"Court may acquit an accused on reasonable doubt and still order payment of civil
damages already proved in the same case without need for a separate civil action."
- Padilla v. Court of Appeals (129 SCRA 558)
Rationale of the rule: To require a separate civil action simply because the
accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary
duplication of litigation with all its attendant less of time, effort, and money on
the part of all concerned.
When presented for payment, the checks were dishonored because the drawers account
was already closed. Private respondent Roman Sua informed De Guzman and petitioner
about the dishonor but both failed to pay the value of the checks. Hence, four (4)
charges of estafa were filed against petitioner but consequently she was acquitted
for insufficiency of evidence but the court a quo did not rule on whether she could
be held civilly liable for the checks she indorsed to private respondent. On
appeal, the respondent court ordered petitioner to pay private respondent the
remaining P210, P150. After deducting the amount already collected by the latter as
civil indemnity in the criminal cases against De Guzman. Hence, this instant
petition.
Issue:
Can
petitioner
required
to
to
pay
be
civil
indemnity
private
respondent
after
trial
court
had
acquitted
her
of
criminal
charges?
Held: Yes. It is undisputed that the four (4) checks issued by De Guzman were
signed by petitioner at the back without any indication as to how she should be
bound thereby and, therefore, she is deemed to be an indorser thereof. The NIL
clearly provides Sec. 17. Construction where instrument is ambiguous. --- Where
the language of the instrument is ambiguous, or there are admissions therein, the
following
rules
of
construction
apply:
clear
in
what
(f)
Where
signature
is
so
placed
upon
the
instrument
that
it
is
not
capacity
the
person
making
the
same
intended
to
sign,
he
is
deemed
an
indorser.
x
x
x
The dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner did not erase her civil
liability since the dismissal was due to insufficiency of evidence and not from a
declaration from the court that the fact from which the civil action might arise
did not exist. An accused acquitted of estafa may nevertheless be held civilly
liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant. The accused should
be adjudged liable for the unpaid value of the checks signed by her in favor of the
complainant.
When presented for payment, the checks were dishonored because the drawers account
was already closed. Private respondent Roman Sua informed De Guzman and petitioner
about the dishonor but both failed to pay the value of the checks. Hence, four (4)
charges of estafa were filed against petitioner but consequently she was acquitted
for insufficiency of evidence but the court a quo did not rule on whether she could
be held civilly liable for the checks she indorsed to private respondent. On
appeal, the respondent court ordered petitioner to pay private respondent the
remaining P210, P150. After deducting the amount already collected by the latter as
civil indemnity in the criminal cases against De Guzman. Hence, this instant
petition.
Issue:
Can
petitioner
required
to
to
private
respondent
after
trial
court
had
acquitted
her
of
criminal
charges?
pay
be
civil
indemnity
Held: Yes. It is undisputed that the four (4) checks issued by De Guzman were
signed by petitioner at the back without any indication as to how she should be
bound thereby and, therefore, she is deemed to be an indorser thereof. The NIL
clearly provides Sec. 17. Construction where instrument is ambiguous. --- Where
the language of the instrument is ambiguous, or there are admissions therein, the
following
rules
of
construction
apply:
clear
in
what
(f)
Where
signature
is
so
placed
upon
the
instrument
that
it
is
not
capacity
the
person
making
the
same
intended
to
sign,
he
is
deemed
an
indorser.
x
x
x
The dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner did not erase her civil
liability since the dismissal was due to insufficiency of evidence and not from a
declaration from the court that the fact from which the civil action might arise
did not exist. An accused acquitted of estafa may nevertheless be held civilly
liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant. The accused should
be adjudged liable for the unpaid value of the checks signed by her in favor of the
complainant.
FACTS:
In Criminal Case No. 75-88 of the defunct Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar,
DR. EVA A. JAPZON is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death
of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. The complaining witness is the widow of the
deceased, Carmen L. Madeja. The information states that: "The offended party Carmen
L. Madeja reserving her right to file a separate civil action for damages."
The criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for
damages in Civil Case No. 141 of the same court. She alleged that her husband died
because of the gross negligence of Dr. Japzon.
The respondent judge granted the defendants motion to dismiss stating that Rule
111, New Rules of Court, the instant civil action may be instituted only after
final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.
ISSUE: Whether or not an independent civil action for damages may be instituted
pending the resolution of a criminal case for physical injuries.
RULING:
The general rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
recovery
of
civil
liability
arising
from
the
offense
charged
is
impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party
reserves
his right
to
institute
it
separately;
and
after
criminal
action
has
been
commenced,
no
civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted. The present articles
creates an exception to this rule when the offense is defamation, fraud, or
physical injuries, In these cases, a civil action may be filed independently of the
criminal action, even if there has been no reservation made by the injured party;
the law itself in this article makes such reservation; but the claimant is not
given the right to determine whether the civil action should be scheduled or
suspended until the criminal action has been terminated. The result of the civil
action is thus independent of the result of the civil action."
Facts:
Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used in
transporting employees of the Texas Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from Baguio City
proper to its plant site at the Export Processing Authority. In 1990, one of his
buses figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by private
respondent Alfredo Boado. As a result of the accident, a criminal case for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries against
petitioners driver, Herminio Andaya. A month later, a civil case for damages was
filed by private respondent Boado against petitioner Maniago. Petitioner moved for
the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case against him, citing the
pendency of the criminal case against his driver and because no reservation of the
right to bring it (civil case) separately had been made in the criminal case. But
the lower court denied petitioners motion on the ground that pursuant to the Civil
Code, the action could proceed independently of the criminal action.
Issue:
Held:
No. The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved
as required by Rule 111, 1, otherwise it should be dismissed. To begin with, 1
quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all
civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to
have been instituted with the criminal case. Such civil actions are not limited to
those which arise from the offense charged. In other words the right of the
injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether
arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil
Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal
action.
On the basis of Rule 111, 1-3, a civil action for the recovery of civil liability
is, as a general rule, impliedly instituted with the criminal action, except only
(1) when such action arising from the same act or omission, which is the subject of
the criminal action, is waived; (2) the right to bring it separately is reserved or
(3) such action has been instituted prior to the criminal action. Even if an action
has not been reserved or it was brought before the institution of the criminal
case, the acquittal of the accused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless
the acquittal is based on a finding that the act from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code.
FACTS:
The offended parties actually filed a complaint against petitioner Rafael Reyes
Trucking Corporation, as employer of driver Romeo Dunca y de Tumol, based on quasi
delict. The petitioner settled the claim of the heirs of Feliciano Balcita (the
driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident). The private respondents
opted to pursue the criminal action but did not withdraw the civil case quasi ex
delicto they filed against petitioner. On December 15, 1989, private respondents
withdrew the reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused and
manifested that they would prosecute the civil aspect ex delicto in the criminal
action. However, they did not withdraw the separate civil action based on quasi
delict against petitioner as employer arising from the same act or omission of the
accused driver.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner as owner of the truck involved in the accident be held
subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the offended parties in the criminal
action against the truck driver despite the filing of a separate civil action by
the offended parties against the employer of the truck driver.
Whether or not the Court award damages to the offended parties in the criminal case
despite the filing of a civil action against the employer of the truck driver; and
in amounts exceeding that alleged in the information for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide and damage to property.
RULING:
NO. NO.
In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between (1) an action to
enforce civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code; and (2) a separate action for quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. Once the choice is made, the injured party can not avail
himself of any other remedy because he may not recover damages twice for the same
negligent act or omission of the accused. This is the rule against double recovery.
In other words, "the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the
part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto, and civil
liability quasi delicto" either of which "may be enforced against the culprit,
subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party
can not recover damages under both types of liability.
In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a separate civil action
for damages against petitioner as employer of the accused, based on quasi delict,
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Here, the liability of the
employer for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct and primary,
subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the
employee. The enforcement of the judgment against the employer in an action based
on Article 2176 does not require the employee to be insolvent since the nature of
the liability of the employer with that of the employee, the two being statutorily
considered joint tortfeasors, is solidary.
The second, predicated on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that an
employer may be held subsidiarily civilly liable for a felony committed by his
employee in the discharge of his duty. This liability attaches when the employee is
convicted of a crime done in the performance of his work and is found to be
insolvent that renders him unable to properly respond to the civil liability
adjudged.
ISSUE NO. 1 :Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of the accused who has
been adjudged guilty in the criminal case for reckless imprudence, can not be held
subsidiarily liable because of the filing of the separate civil action based
on quasi delict against it. In view of the reservation to file, and the subsequent
filing of the civil action for recovery of civil liability, the same was not
instituted with the criminal action. Such separate civil action was for recovery of
damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, arising from the same act or omission
of the accused.
ISSUE NO. 2: With regard to the second issue, the award of damages in the criminal
case was improper because the civil action for the recovery of civil liability was
waived in the criminal action by the filing of a separate civil action against the
employer. As enunciated in Ramos vs. Gonong, "civil indemnity is not part of the
penalty for the crime committed." The only issue brought before the trial court in
the criminal action is whether accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol is guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. The action for recovery of
civil liability is not included therein, but is covered by the separate civil
action filed against the petitioner as employer of the accused truck-driver.
FACTS:
Abundio Merced filed a complaint for annulment of his second marriage with
Elizabeth Ceasar. The complaint alleges that defendant Elizabeth Ceasar and her
relatives forced, threatened and intimated him into signing an affidavit to the
effect that he and defendant had been living together as husband and wife for over
five years, which is not true; that this affidavit was used by defendant in
securing their marriage of exceptional character, without the need for marriage
license; that he was again forced, threatened and intimated by defendant and her
relatives into entering the marriage with her.
Abundio Merced filed a motion to hold to trial of said criminal case in abeyance
until final termination of Civil Case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the determination of the validity of the marriage in the
civil action for annulment is a prejudicial question insofar as the criminal action
for bigamy is concerned.
RULING:
YES. One of the essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto
of the contracting parties must be freely and voluntarily given. Without the
element of consent a marriage would be illegal and void. (Section 29, Act No. 3613,
otherwise known as the Marriage Law.) But the question of invalidity cannot
ordinarily be decided in the criminal action for bigamy but in a civil action for
annulment. Since the validity of the second marriage, subject of the action for
bigamy, cannot be determined in the criminal case and since prosecution for bigamy
does not lie unless the elements of the second marriage appear to exist, it is
necessary that a decision in a civil action to the effect that the second marriage
contains all the essentials of a marriage must first be secured.
The question of the validity of the second marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial
question, because determination of the validity of the second marriage is
determinable in the civil action and must precede the criminal action for bigamy.
FACTS:
Rolando Landicho was charged with the crime of Bigamy, for contracting second
marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia, being lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay. Fe
Lourdes Pasia, instituted the criminal case against Landicho, who in turn, filed a
third-party complaint, against the third-party defendant Elvira Makatangay, the
first spouse, praying that his marriage with the said third-party defendant be
declared null and void, on the ground that by means of threats, force and
intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her.
Landicho, moved to suspend the hearing of the criminal case pending the decision on
the question of the validity of the two marriages involved in the pending civil
suit, in which Judge Relova denied motion for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the existence of a civil suit for the annulment of marriage at the
instance of the second wife against petitioner, with the latter in turn filing a
third party complaint against the first spouse for the annulment of the first
marriage, constitutes a prejudicial question in a pending suit for bigamy against
him.
RULING:
NO.
The situation in this case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was
indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had
been contracted appeared to be indisputable. Then on March 15, 1963, it was the
second spouse, not petitioner who filed an action for nullity on the ground of
force, threats and intimidation. It was sometime later, on June 15, 1963, to be
precise, when petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party
complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be
declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. As was
correctly stressed in the answer of respondent Judge relying on Viada, parties to a
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only
competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the
validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second
marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
FACTS:
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in
1948 through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present
husband before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from
her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the
defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she
was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be
inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less
than two years later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied
by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to
the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three
met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus,
in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was
at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the
provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion. It is
the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this
action and award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted
certiorari.
ISSUE:
Did the Plaintiff have the right for damages in behalf of his unborn child?
HELD:
No. The fetus was not yet born and thus does not have civil personality. According
to Article 40, birth determines personality. In this case, the fetus does not yet
possess a personality to speak of because it was aborted in uterus. The child
should be born before the parents can seek any recovery for damages. Action for
pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to
the one injured. There could be no action for such damages that can be instituted on
behalf of the unborn child for the injuries it received because it lacked juridical
personality. The damages which the parents of an unborn child can recover are limited
to moral damages, in this case, for the act of the appellant Geluz to perform the
abortion. However, moral damages cannot also be recovered because the wife willingly
sought the abortion, and the husband did not further investigate on the causes of the
abortion. Furthermore, the husband did not seem to have taken interest in the
administrative and criminal cases against the appellant, but was more concerned in
obtaining from the doctor a large money payment.
FACTS:
Illustre Cabiliza was charged before the RTC of Legaspi with homicide and damage to
property through reckless imprudence because he had willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously driven the Izusu dump truck owned by Rufo Mauricio Construction. The
vehicle hit the Colt Gallant driven and owned by Judge Arsenio Solidum and directly
caused his untimely death.
Cabiliza filed a Notice of Appeal but his appeal did not pursue because he died. A
notice of death was filed by his counsel and on the same notice, Atty. Beltran
manifested Rufo Mauricios intention to proceed with the case on appeal pursuant to his
right as employer who is subsidiarily liable.
The lower court ordered the heirs of Cabiliza to appear and to substitute him as
appeallant for the civil aspect of the case. On motion of the heirs of the victim, the
court ordered a writ of execution. However, the writ was returned unsatisfied because
Cabiliza was found insolvent as manifested by the Certificate of Insolvency issued by
the Register of Deeds of Cagayan.
The victims widow filed a motion for the Issuance of a subsidiary writ of execution to
be enforced against the employer of Cabiliza, Rufo Mauricio and/or Rufo Mauricio
Construction Co. This was granted by the lower court and which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. Hence, Rufo filed an appeal to SC.
ISSUE:
W/N, the dismissal of criminal case against the accused wipes out not only the
employees primarily civil liability but also the employers subsidiary liability;
W/N, the petitioner can be condemned to pay the damages without the opportunity to
examine the witness;
RULING:
No. The death of the accused during the pendency of his appeal or before the judgment
of conviction( which became final and executory ) extinguished his criminal liability
to serve the imprisonment imposed and his pecuniary liability for fines, but not his
civil liability should the liability or obligation arise (not from a crime, for here,
no crime was committed, the accused not having been convicted by final judgment, and
therefore still regarded as innocent) but from a quasi-delict (See Arts. 2176 and 2177,
Civil Code), as in this case.
The liability of the employer here would not be subsidiary but solidary with his driver
(unless said employer can prove there was no negligence on his part at all, that is, if
he can prove due diligence in the selection and supervision of his driver).
Inasmuch as the employer (petitioner herein) was not a party in the criminal case, and
to grant him his day in court for the purpose of cross-examining the prosecution
witnesses on their testimonies on the driver's alleged negligence and the amount of
damages to which the heirs of the victim are entitled, as well as to introduce any
evidence or witnesses he may care to present in his defense, the hearing on the motion
to quash the subsidiary writ of execution must be reopened precisely for the purpose
adverted to hereinabove.
The decision of the appeallate court was however, SET aside and the case was remanded
to the trial court for hearing.
Facts:
Rogelio Bayotas was charged with raped and eventually convicted thereof on June 19,
1991.
SC
dismissed
the
criminal
aspect
of
the appeal
but
required
the
Sol
Gen
to
comment with regard to the civil liability arising from the commission of the offense
charged.
Sol Gen ruled that the death of the accused did not extinguish his civil liability, the
appeal should be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower
court
Counsel for the accused opposed arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of
conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes his civil liability
Ruling:
Yes.
The death of Bayotas extinguished his criminal and civil liabilities based solely on
the act complained of, i.e rape.
"The death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and
only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
The claim for civil liability survives nothwithstanding the death of the accused if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligations other than delict. Art. 1157 of
the CC enumerates these other sources:
Law
Contracts
Quasi-Contractsa
Quasi-delicts
In this case, the civil action may be pursued only by filing a separate civil
action against the estate of the accused depending on the source.
FACTS:
president of Mansion, four (4) postdated checks as payment for the nutri-wafer
biscuits before its delivery.
There were other four (4) postdated checks in the amount of P100,000.00 each,
issued by Ty Teck Suan with Siy Gui as co-signor.
Subsequently, Mansion Biscuit delivered the goods. However, the first four checks
were deposited, the same were dishonored for insufficient funds prompting Ang Cho
to inform Ty Teck of the dishonor and requested him for its replacement.
delivered 1,150 sacks of Australian flour to Mansion plus cash, which were applied
to the amount of the first postdated check that bounced
Ang Cho then sent Ty Teck a formal demand letter requesting him to make good the
dishonored checks within 5 days.
Thereafter, the second batch of checks was issued by Ty Teck and Siy Gui, but
This prompted Ang Cho to send a final demand letter and upon failure to
comply with it, he will then file an action against Ty Teck.
For failure of Ty Teck to comply, an Information was filed against him for
violation of BP Blg. 22; identical information was likewise filed against Siy Gui
as treasurer of Edward Ty Brothers Corp.
Both of them pleaded not guilty to the charges and thereafter filed a bond.
Notwithstanding the bond filed, the RTC issued an order of attachment on some of Ty
Tecks real properties, upon Ang Chos motion.
After the prosecution rested its case, Ty Teck filed a motion to dismiss by w
ay of demurrer to evidence, which later on Siy Gui adopted, on the ground that the
checks were issued as a mere guaranty for the payment of the goods delivered and as
replacement for the first batch of checks. This was opposed by the prosecution.
The RTC issued an order granting the motion to dismiss claiming that the
stare decisis in the cases already decided involving the same issue is where the
check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of an
obligation, whether pre-existing or not the drawer is not criminally liable for
either Estafa or Violation of BP Blg. 22, and found that Siy Guis liability had
not been established by the prosecution as it appeared that he had no personal
transactions with Ang Cho although he was a co-signatory in the second batch of
four checks
The prosecution then filed a motion for reconsideration and for clarification
withregard to their civil liabilities, which the RTC denied and held that they did
not incur any civil liability due to their acquittal.
Initially, Ang Cho filed a special civil action of certiorari with the CA to
question the order of the RTC setting aside the order of attachment, which the CA
annulled. But thereafter, he filed another appeal with the CA assailing the
decision of the RTC absolving Ty Teck and Siy Gui from civil liability in criminal
cases.
Pending appeal, Ty Teck died so his counsel filed a motion to dismiss but the CA
denied and ordered his substitution by his children.
The CA rendered a decision dismissing the appeal and held that the civil liab
ility sought to be enforced by Ang Cho was not the personal obligation of Ty Teck
but a contractual obligation of the Company, hence, Ang Cho should file a separate
civil action against it.
ISSUES:
W/N civil liability can be enforced against Ty Teck for non-payment of the goods
notwithstanding the fact that the contract was between the Company, on behalf of Ty
Teck, and Mansion.
Ang Chos Argument: When Ty Teck issued the worthless checks inducing Mansion to
deliver the goods, 2 civil liabilities arose, arising from crime (Art. 100, RPC)and
from tort or quasi-delict.
Ty Tecks Argument: They cannot be held liable for the Companys contractual
obligations and that Ang Cho should file a separate case against it.
TY TECK AND SIY GUI ARE NOT LIABLE FOR THE CIVIL LIABILITIES ARISING FROM THE
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION OF THE COMPANY THEY ARE REPRESENTING AS IT IS NOT THEIR
PERSONAL LIABILITY.
Assuming that plaintiff-appellant has basis for his quasi-delict claim, the same
must be addressed still against Edward Ty Brothers Corporation
for the established facts show that the post-dated checks were
appellee not in payment of his personal obligations but of the
Moreover the fraud allegedly committed by accused-appellee was
the contractual obligation, not an independent act which could
issued by accusedcorporation's.
merely incidental to
serve as a source of
o
In the case at bench, the acquittal of Ty Teck Suan and Siy Gui extinguished
both their criminal and civil liability as it is clear from the order acquitting
them that the issuance of the checks in question did not constitute a violation of
B.P. Blg. 22.Consequently, no civil liability arising from the alleged delict may
be awarded
Facts:
Felicita Masilang, aged 18, was the appellant's niece. After the appellant raped
her, he then conducted the girl to the house of his uncle, Agaton Santiago, who
later brought a protestant minister who conducted a ceremony to marry the appellant
and Felicita. The trial court found that the offense of rape had been committed, as
above stated, and the marriage ceremony was a mere ruse by which the appellant
hoped to escape from the criminal consequences of his act.
Held:
The manner in which the appellant dealt with the girl after the marriage, as well
as before, shows that he had no bona fide intention of making her his wife, and the
ceremony cannot be considered binding on her because of duress.
The marriage was therefore void for lack of essential consent, and it supplies no
impediment to the prosecution of the wrongdoer.
Affirmed.
FACTS:
Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on
two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge
Hernando Domagtoy on the grounds of gross misconduct, ineffiency in offce and
ignorance of the law.
It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja
on
September
that
the
marriage
merely
27,
groom
with
Ida
separated.
1994
has
despite
was
knowledge
subsisting
Penaranda
It
the
and
told
that
that
they
are
Ida left their conjugal home in Bukidnon and has not returned and been heard for
almost seven years. The said judge likewise solemnize marriage of Floriano Dadoy
Sumaylo
and
Gemma
G.
del
Rosario
outside
his
courts
jurisdiction
on
October
27,
1994. The judge holds his office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the said
wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50 km away.
HELD:
The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and bigamous
there being a subsisting marriage between Tagadan and Penaranda. Albeit, the latter
was gone for seven years and the spouse had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was dead, Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding as provided in the
Civil Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the latter only made the
written request where it should have been both parties as stated in Article 8 of
the Family Code. Their non-compliance did not invalidate their marriage however,
Domagtoy may be held administratively liable.
Fact appears that long before, and during the War of the Pacific, these two persons
lived together as wife and husband at Cabrera Street, Pasay City. They acquired
properties but had no children. In the early part of the liberation of Manila and
surrounding territory, Matea be came seriously ill. Knowing her critical condition,
two young ladies of legal age dedicated to the service of God, named Carmen
Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra visited and persuaded her to go to confession.
They fetched Father Gerardo Bautista, Catholic parish priest of Pasay. The latter,
upon learning that the penitent had been living with Felipe Apelan Felix without
benefit of marriage, asked both parties to ratify their union according to the
rites of his Church. Both agreed. Whereupon the priest heard the confession of the
bed-ridden old woman, gave her Holy Communion, administered the Sacrament of
Extreme Unction and then solemnized her marriage with Felipe Apelan Felix in
articulo mortis, Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra acting as sponsors or
witnesses. It was then January 29 or 30, 1945.
After a few months, Matea recovered from her sickness; but death was not to be
denied, and in January 1946, she was interred in Pasay, the same Fr. Bautista
performing the burial ceremonies.
On May 12, 1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria filed this complaint to
compel defendant to an accounting and to deliver the properties left by the
deceased. They are grandchildren of Adriana de la Cruz, sister of Matea, and claim
to be the only surviving forced heirs of the latter. Felipe Apelan Felix resisted
the action, setting up his rights as widower. They obtained favorable judgment in
the court of first instance, but on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed and
dismissed the complaint.
Their request for review here was given due course principally to consider the
legal question-which they amply discussed in their petition and printed brief
whether the events which took place in January 1945 constituted, in the eyes of the
law, a valid and binding marriage.
Does the failure to sign the "marriage certificate or contract" constitute a cause
for nullity?
Ruling:
The law permits in articulo mortis marriages, without marriage license; but it
requires the priest to make the affidavit and file it. Such affidavit contains the
data usually required for the issuance of a marriage license. The first practically
substitutes the latter. Now then, if a marriage celebrated without the license is
not voidable (under Act 3613) this marriage should not also be voidable for lack of
such affidavit.
In the first place, the Marriage Law itself, in sections 28, 29 and 30 enumerates
the causes for annulment of marriage. Failure to sign the marriage contract is not
one of them.
In
for
the
second
place,
bearing
in
mind
that
the
"essential
requisites
marriage
are the legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent"
(section 1),
the latter being manifested by the declaration of "the parties" "in the presence of
the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age that they
take each other as husband and wife" which in this case actually occurred
In the third place, the law, imposing on the priest the duty to furnish to the
parties copies of such marriage certificate (section 16) and punishing him for its
omission (section 41) implies his obligation to see that such "certificate" is
executed accordingly. Hence, it would not be fair to visit upon the wedded couple
in the form of annulment, Father Bautista's omission, if any, which apparently had
been caused by the prevailing disorder during the liberation of Manila and its
environs.
Facts:
It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the justice of the
peace, even admitting all that the witnesses for the defendant testified to, did
not constitute a legal marriage.Lower court ruled ruled in favor of the defendant
Angel Tan that Tan and Martinez were married on Sept. 25, 1907. Evidence supporting
this were: document signed by plaintiff, testimony of defendant that he and
plaintiff appeared before the justice of peace along with their witnesses (by
Ballori and Esmero), testimony of Esmero that he, the defendant, plaintiff and
Ballori appeared before the justice of peace and signed the document, the testimony
of Ballori who also testified to the same effect, and the testimony of the bailiff
of court that defendant, appellant, justice of peace and two witnesses were all
present during the ceremony.
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were married on the 25th day of
September, 1907, before the justice of the peace
Held:
The judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of the complaint is
affirmed.
The petition signed the plaintiff and defendant contained a positive statement that
they had mutually agreed to be married and they asked the justice of the peace to
solemnize the marriage. The document signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and
the justice of the peace, stated that they ratified under oath, before the justice,
the contents of the petition and that witnesses of the marriage were produced. A
mortgage took place as shown by the certificate of the justice of the peace, signed
by both contracting parties, which certificates gives rise to the presumption that
the officer authorized the marriage in due form, the parties before the justice of
the peace declaring that they took each other as husband and wife, unless the
contrary is proved, such presumption being corroborated in this case by the
admission of the woman to the effect that she had contracted the marriage certified
to in the document signed by her, which admission can only mean the parties
mutually agreed to unite in marriage when they appeared and signed the said
document which so states before the justice of the peace who authorized the same.
It was proven that both the plaintiff and the defendant were able to read and write
the Spanish language, and that they knew the contents of the document which they
signed; and under the circumstances in this particular case were satisfied, and so
hold, that what took place before the justice of the peace on this occasion
amounted to a legal marriage.
FACTS:
Leouel, a member of the Army, met Julia in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they got
married. The couple latter lived with Julias parents. Julia gave birth to a son in
1987. Their marriage, however, was marred by the frequent interference of Julias
parent as averred by Leouel. The couple also occasionally quarrels about as to,
among other things, when should they start living independently from Julias
parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse despite Leouels
opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk and she promised to return
home in 1989. She never went home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be
in the US due to a military training. During his stay, he desperately tried to
locate his wife but to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife
come home, filed to nullify their marriage due to Julias psychological incapacity.
Leouel asserted that due to Julias failure to return home or at least communicate
with him even with all his effort constitutes psychological incapacity. Julia
attacked the complaint and she said that it is Leouel who is incompetent. The
prosecutor ascertained that there is no collusion between the two. Leouels
petition is however denied by the lower and appellate court.
HELD: Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not define
the term psychological incapacity, which is adopted from the Catholic Canon Law.
But basing it on the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, the
provision in PI, adopted with less specificity than expected, has been designed to
allow some resiliency in its application. The FCRC did not give any examples of PI
for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the FCRC would like the judge to
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings
of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive
effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. The term psychological
incapacity defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an
infinite variety.
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but
must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. PI should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68), include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PI to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The SC
also notes that PI must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable
or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
In
the
Leouel
case
at
stands
bar,
although
aggrieved,
his
his
wife
is not
petition
must
be
PI
clearly shown
by the factual
settings
presented.
settings
do
The
not
factual
come
close
to
to
the
standard
required
to decree a nullity of marriage.
The Torrens title for the property (Transfer Certificate No. 25289 of the Register
of Deeds for Quezon City) was issued on February 1, 1944, in the name of "Joaquin
Lipana married to Isidra Gomez." On July 20, 1958 Isidra Gomez died intestate and
childless, and survived only by her sisters as the nearest relatives. On August 7,
1961 Ofelia Gomez, judicial administratrix of her estate, commenced the present
suit, praying for the forfeiture of the husband's share in the Cubao property in
favor of the said estate.
The trial court, ruling that the second marriage was void ab initio and that the
husband was the one who gave cause for its nullity, applied the aforequoted
provision and declared his interest in the disputed property forfeited in favor of
the estate of the deceased second wife.
HELD: The controlling statute is Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature, the
Marriage Law which became effective on December 4, 1929 and was in force when the
two marriages were celebrated. The pertinent provisions are as follows:
SEC. 29. Illegal Marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than
such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless;
The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive,
or the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage so
contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent
court.
SEC. 30. Annullable marriages. A marriage may be annulled for any of the
following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(b) That the former husband or wife of either was living and the marriage with such
former husband or wife was then in force;
SEC. 31. Time for filing action for decree of nullity. The action to obtain a
decree of nullity of marriage, for causes mentioned in the preceding section, must
be commenced within the periods and by the parties as follows:
(b) For causes mentioned in subdivision (b); by either party during the life of the
other, or by the former husband or wife.
The appellant, relying on Section 30(b) quoted above, maintains that his marriage
to Isidra Gomez was valid and could be annulled only in an action for that purpose,
which in the light of Section 31 could be filed only by either party thereto,
during the lifetime of the other, or by the former spouse.
by
any
person
with
any
person
during
the
lifetime
of
the
first
spouse
of
such
person
other
than
such
first
spouse
shall
be
illegal
and
void
from
its
performance." This is the general rule, to which the only exceptions are those
mentioned in subsections (a) and (b) of the same provision.
There is no suggestion here that the defendant's 1930 marriage to Maria Loreto
Ancino had been annulled or dissolved when he married Isidra Gomez in 1935, and
there is no proof that he did so under the conditions envisioned in sub-section
(b). The burden is on the party invoking the exception to prove that he comes under
it; and the defendant has not discharged that burden at all, no evidence whatsoever
having been adduced by him at the trial. Indeed, he contracted the second marriage
less than seven years after the first, and he has not shown that his first wife was
then generally considered dead or was believed by him to be so.
Facts:
Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and
gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility on the early stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency
to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his
dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances.
Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner
thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to
Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple is
separated-in-fact for more than three years.
Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence
as
he
1991,
appeared
the
only
during
the
pre-trial
conference.
On
14
May
trial
to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in
toto the RTCs decision. Hence, the present recourse.
Issue:
Held:
The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee
intended to liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws on personal and
family rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and
behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards
the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well
as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal
objectives of marriage; where said conduct, observed and considered as a whole,
tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of
marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage.
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity,
existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by
The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the
most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the
plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or
clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and
clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at
the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or
medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the
essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family
Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as
regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order
the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed
decision; concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina
subsists and remains valid.
36.
FACTS:
Private respondent Gina Lao and petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi were married at the Manila
Cathedral on May 22, 1988. Contrary to Ginas expectations that the newlyweds were
to enjoy making love or having sexual intercourse with each other, the defendant
just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to
sleep. No sexual intercourse occurred during their first night, second, third and
fourth night.
From May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, they slept together in the same room and on
the same bed but during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them.
A case was then filed to declare the annulment of the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Gina alleged that Chi Ming was impotent, a closet
homosexual and that she had observed him using an eyebrow and sometimes the
cleansing cream of his mother.
The parties submitted themselves to physical examination and it was revealed that
Gina was still a virgin. Chi Ming was also found to be capable of erection.
Defendant admitted that no sexual contact was ever made but according to him, he
did not want the marriage annulled because he loves her very much.
After the trial, the trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage void ab
initio. On appeal, CA affirmed. Hence, Chi Ming Tsoi elevated the matter before SC.
ISSUE:
HELD: Yes!
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with
his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is To
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment
of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage.
In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to
fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe
mutual
therefor
is
love,
actually
respect
the
and
fidelity.
spontaneous,
(Art.
mutual
68,
affection
Family
Code),
between
the
husband
sanction
and
wife
and not any legal mandate or court order. Love is useless unless it is shared with
to
say
could
not
have
cared
less.
This
is
so
because
an
ungiven
self
is
an
unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is
sexual
gift
intimacy
and
which
brings
participation
in
spouses
the
wholeness
mystery
and
of
oneness.
creation.
It
Sexual
is
intimacy
function
is
which
enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.
37. CHOA VS. BELDIA GR. NO. 120582, MAY 17, 1999
Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent were married on March 15, 1981. Out of this
union, two children were born, Cheryl Lynne and Albryan.
In 1991, petitioner Leni Choa initiated a case for concubinage against her husband,
Alfonso Choa, in the MTCC, Bacolod City, docketed as Criminal Case NO. 49106.
In March 1994, when the promulgation of the decision was about to take place,
Alfonso filed with the RTC, Bacolod City, a complaint for annulment of marriage
based on psychological incapacity. Thus, Alfonso filed with the MTCC a motion in an
order dated March 23, 1994. His motion for reconsideration having been likewise
denied, on June 22, 1994, he filed with the RTC, Bacolod City, a petition for
certiorari with injunction against the trial court. On July 13, 1994, the RTC
issued a restraining order, and denied Leni Choa's motion for intervention.
The case went to trial with respondent husband presenting his evidence in chief.
After his last witness testified, he submitted his Formal Offer of Exhibits.
Instead of offering any objection to it, petitioner wife filed a Motion to Dismiss
(Demurrer to Evidence). The RTC denied petitioners Demurrer to Evidence and held
that [respondent] established a quantum of evidence that the [petitioner] must
controvert.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife could not get
along with each other. The testimony of respondent husband basically complains
about three aspects of petitioners (wifes) personality; namely, her alleged (1)
lack of attention to their children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an
Issue:
proven.
Ruling:
The prejudicial question is the issue raised in the civil case for declaration of
nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. Under this article, a marriage was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the marital obligations of marriage. True enough, the nullity of
marriage between petitioner and private respondent brings about two things: One,
there is no marriage at all; Two, there is no ground to convict Alfonso Choa of
concubinage because one element of the crime is not attendant, that is, the man
must be married at the time of its commission.
of
the
wife
has
not
been
satisfactorily
In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his
wife could not get along with each other. There was absolutely no showing of the
gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their
marital union.
Facts:
Delia Domingo filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
Roberto Domingo, on the ground that, unknown to her, he was previously married at
the time of their marriage. She prays that their marriage be declared null and void
and, as a consequence, to declare that she is the exclusive owner of all properties
she acquired during the marriage and to recover them from him.
Roberto moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the marriage being void ab
initio, the petition for declaration of nullity is unnecessary citing People v.
Aragon and People v. Mendoza. Roberto claims that declaration of nullity is
necessary under Article 40 of the Family Code is only for the purpose of
remarriage. The lower court denied the motion. CA affirmed the denial. Hence, this
petition
Issues:
Whether
or
not
herein
petition
is
the
proper
remedy
of
private
respondent
HELD:
to
2) Yes. When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final
judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and
the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings." Private respondent's ultimate prayer
for separation of property will simply be one of the necessary consequences of the
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. The Family Code has
FACTS:
ISSUE:
and
may
be
HELD:
Civil Code,
of the
fact that at
the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband
constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage. (Art. 85, par. (4) in
relation to Art. 86, par. (3).
In this case, it was alleged that defendant (wife) was only four months pregnant
and was naturally plump or fat, therefore, plaintiff (husband) would not be
expected to know by merely looking at her that she was pregnant at the time of
their marriage.
FACTS:
Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953. Palaroan filed an action
for annulment of the marriage in 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained
through force and intimidation. The complaint was dismissed and upheld the
counterclaim
was
being
negotiated,
Fernando
divulged
to
her
that
several
months
his.
According
constituted
fraud
to
in
her,
the
obtaining
non-divulgement
her
consent.
to
She
her
of
prayed
such
for
the
pre-marital
annulment
secret
of
her
ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital
HELD:
The concealment of a husbands pre-marital relationship with another woman was not
one of those enumerated that would constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it
is
further
excluded
misrepresentation
annul a marriage.
or
by
deceit
the
as
to..
last
paragraph
chastity
shall
providing
give
ground
that
for
no
an
other
action
to
Hence, the case at bar does not constitute fraud and therefore
Facts:
On April 26, 1962, petitioner Romulo Tolentino filed a suit for annulment of his
marriage to private respondent Helen Villanueva, alleging that his consent was
obtained through fraud because immediately after the marriage celebration, he
discovered that private respondent was pregnant despite the fact that he had no
sexual relations with her prior to the marriage ceremony; and that they did not
live as husband and wife as immediately after the marriage celebration.
Despite the fact that she was served with summons and copy of the complaint, Helen
failed to file a responsive pleading, for which reason petitioner filed on June 13,
1962 a motion to declare her in default and to set the date for the presentation of
his evidence.
In an order dated June 28, 1962, respondent Judge declared private respondent in
default, but, pursuant to the provision of Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of
determine
parties,
whether
collusion
directing
the
exists
between
City
Fiscal to submit his report within sixty (60) days from receipt thereof.
Assistant
City
Fiscal
Rafael
A.
Jose,
assigned
to
the
case,
issued
subpoena to
other
annulment
documents
case
on
in
connection
August
27,
1962
with
the
at
Issue:
Held:
Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the
rendition of a decision in suits for annulment of marriage and legal separation
"In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there
is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to
take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated."
The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and rules is predicated on the fact
that the institutions of marriage and of the family are sacred and therefore are as
much the concern of the State as of the spouses; because the State and the public
have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social
institutions against desecration by collusion between the parties or by fabricated
evidence. The prohibition against annulling a marriage based on the stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment or by non-appearance of the defendant stresses
the fact that marriage is more than a mere contract between the parties; and for
this reason, when the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to
direct the prosecuting officer to intervene for the State in order to preserve the
integrity and sanctity of the marital bonds.
Facts:
Gloria Jocson commenced an action for the annulment of her marriage to Ricardo
Robles on the ground that it was a bigamous marriage.
Herein plaintiff asked for moral and exemplary damages and alleged that during
their cohabitation, she was subjected to physical abuse. On the otherhand,
defendant also assailed the validity of the marriage and argued that he was
compelled by force, threat and intimidation by the parents of the plaintiff.
Defendant then filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that no genuine
issue of facts are involved in the case. To support this argument, defendant
presented affidavits executed by herein plaintiffs father and brother. On the date
set by the court, both parties did not appear in court.
The defendants motion was denied by the lower court on the ground that before
judgment can be had on the nullity of the marriage, proof that a previous marriage
was validly subsisting. In addition, the court found an indication that there was
collusion between the parties so as to get a declaration of nullity of marriage.
Hence this appeal by the defendant.
Issue:
Whether or not the affidavits are sufficient to render judgment and declaration of
nullity of marriage?
Held:
The higher court ruled that the Court of Domestic Relations correctly denied the
motion for summary judgment in view of the first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, that expressly prohibit the rendition of a
decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment. The affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically
amount to these methods not countenanced by the Civil Code.
In 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner claiming that petitioner's
business in Ermita, Manila is a conjugal property of the parties, and asking that
petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private
respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is
barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court
wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community
property" as of June 11, 1982.
The lower court denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the property
involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in
the case. Thus, this petition.
Held: Yes, the divorce is valid. It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by
the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada has released private
respondent from the marriage based on the standards of American law, under which
divorce dissolves the marriage.
To maintain that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et.
seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. Petitioner should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
Facts:
On October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce was issued by the Nevada Court. On
September 13, 1954, Escano married an American Russel Leo Moran in Nevada. She now
lives with him in California and by him, has begotten children. She acquired
American citizenship on August 8, 1958. On July 30, 1955, Tenchavez filed a
complaint for legal separation and damages against VE and her parents in the CFICebu.
Tenchavez poses the novel theory that Mamerto and Mina Escao are undeserving of an
award for damages because they are guilty of contributory negligence in failing to
take up proper and timely measures to dissuade their daughter Vicenta from leaving
her husband Tenchavez obtaining a foreign divorce and marrying another man (Moran).
This theory cannot be considered: first, because this was not raised in the court
below; second, there is no evidence to support it; third, it contradicts
plaintiff's previous theory of alienation of affections in that contributory
negligence involves an omission to perform an act while alienation of affection
involves the performance of a positive act.
Issues:
WON at the the time Escano was still a Filipino citizen when the divorce decree was
issued.
WON the award of moral damages against Escao may be given to Tenchavez on the
grounds of her refusal to perform her wifely duties, her denial of consortium, and
desertion of her husband.
Held:
1. YES
At the time the divorce decree was issued, Escano like her husband, was still a
Filipino citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law under Art. 15 of the NCC.
Philippine law, under the NCC then now in force, does not admit absolute divorce
but only provides for legal separation.
For Phil. courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees bet. Filipino citizens would
be a patent violation of the declared policy of the State, especially in view of
the 3rd par. of Art. 17, NCC. Moreover, recognition would give rise to scandalous
discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens to the detriment of those members of
our society whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute
divorce outside the Phils.
Therefore, a foreign divorce bet. Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the
effectivity of the NCC, is not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction.
2. YES
The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her divorce, for grounds not countenanced
by our law, which was hers at the time) constitute a wilful infliction of injury
upon plaintiff's feelings in a manner "contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy" (Civ. Code, Art. 21) for which Article 2219 (10) authorizes an award of
moral damages.
But economic sanctions are not held in our law to be incompatible with the respect
accorded to individual liberty in civil cases. Thus, a consort who unjustifiably
deserts the conjugal abode can be denied support (Art. 178, Civil Code of the
Phil.). And where the wealth of the deserting spouse renders this remedy illusory,
there is no cogent reason why the court may not award damage as it may in cases of
breach of other obligations to do intuitu personae even if in private relations
physical coercion be barred under the old maxim "Nemo potest precise cogi and
factum".
Facts:
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919. After the birth
of their only child, the husband left his wife and was gone for three years without
writing to her or sending her support. While the husband was away, the wife began
to live with Marcelo Ramos. When husband returned, he filed a charge of adultery
which resulted in a conviction and a sentencing. When the sentence was completed,
wife begged the husband to take her back but he refused. Abandoned a second time,
the wife fled back to Ramos. Husband, knowing that his wife reverted to her lover,
did not do anything to assert his rights and left for the states. He returned to
the Philippines seven years later and presented a second charge of adultery.
Issue: WON the second charge of adultery can be a ground for legal separation.
Held/Ratio:
No. The husband was only assuming a mere pose of an offended spouse. He consented
to the adulterous relations of his wife and Ramos and is thus, therefore barred
from instituting any criminal proceeding. Even if he was still in a foreign
country, he would have still been able to take action against the accused but since
he didnt take this option, it showed a considerable lack of genuine interest as
the offended party.
Facts:
Bugayong was a serviceman of the US Navy. He was married on 1949 to Ginez while on
furlough leave. Before he reported back to duty, they made arrangements as to where
the wife would stay. In July 1951, the husband received letters informing him of
his wifes infidelities. In Aug. 1952, he sought his wife and after finding her,
they lived together as husband and wife for two nights and one day. The night
after, they continued to live together but the next day, when he questioned her
about her illicit affairs, she deserted him. He took this as confirmation of her
infidelities. On November, he filed a complaint for legal separation. The court
ordered the dismissal of the action based on wifes motion to dismiss. He appealed
but the CA furthered the case, since it constituted questions of law, to the SC.
Issue:
WON the copulation which transpired after the husband knew about his wifes alleged
infidelities can be considered an act of condonation.
Held/Ratio:
Facts:
Matubis and Praxedes got married on 1943. The couple agreed to live separately on
1944. On April, 1948, the spouses entered into anagreement stating that both
relinquishtheir rights over each other as husband and wife, that both are free to
marry again, and that wife is no longer entitled to support. In Jan. 1955, the
husband cohabited with another woman and had a child with her. On April 1956, wife
alleged abandonment and concubinage subsequently filing a petition for legal
separation. RTC held that the acts constituted concubinage but dismissed the
complaint on the ground of prescription. Plaintiff appealed.
Issue:
WON there was consent of the wife to her husbands concubinage.
Held/Ratio:
Yes. As seen in the agreement, there was an express condonation and consent granted
to the husband.
Having consented, the wife cannot claim legal separation and is undeserving of the
courts sympathy.
The petition was also filed after the prescriptive period. She came to know the
situation in Jan. 1955 but only instituted the complaint on April. 1956 more than
a year later.
Facts:
In Sept. 1962, family driver told Elena Contreras that her husband Macaraig was
living with another woman. She ailed to verify the rumor from her husband. In April
1963, she heard rumors that her husband was seen with another woman who was
pregnant. In May of the same year she once more failed to ascertain the veracity of
the allegations because she was afraid that it would precipitate a quarrel and
drive him away. However she finally found out about her husbands mistress and the
birth of the latters child. In December 1963, wife finally met with her husband
and pleaded him to give up his mistress and return to the conjugal home, assuring
him that all would be forgiven. He declined. In the same month, she filed suit for
legal separation but the case was dismissed because prescription had, according to
the court, already taken place from Sept. 1962 when she had found out about her
husbands illicit relationship from the family driver. The CA dismissed the
complaint because of prescription.
Issue:
WON the period of prescription is counted from Sept. 1962 or from December 1963.
Held/Ratio:
December 1963. This was the only time when she became truly cognizant of her
husbands infidelity. Hearsay information would not have been legally sufficient as
a basis for legal separation.
FACTS:
Petitioner Lucy Samosa- Ramos filed for legal separation on the ground of
concubinage on the part of respondent Clement Ramos. She also sought for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injuction for the return of her
paraphernal exclusive porperty. The hearing on the motion was opposed by respondent
Ramos alleging that if the motion for P.I. were heard, the prospect of
reconciliation of the spouses would become even dim. Respondent Judge Vamonte,
thereafter, granted respondent Ramos to suspend the hearing of the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, Article 103 of the New Civil Code prohibiting the hearing for an
action for legal separation before the lapse of six months from filing of the
petition, would likewise preclude the court from acting on the petition for
preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to such suit.
RULING:
No.
The court where the action is pending according to Article 103 is to remain
passive. It must let the parties alone in the meanwhile. It is precluded from
hearing the suit. There is then some plausibility for the view of the lower court
that an ancillary motion such as one for preliminary mandatory injunction is not to
be acted on. If it were otherwise, there would be a failure to abide by the literal
language of such codal provision; that the law, however, remains cognizant of the
need in certain cases for judicial power to assert itself is discernible from what
is set forth in the following article.
It reads thus: "After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouse
shall be entitled to live separately from each other and manage their respective
property.
The
husband
shall
continue
to
manage
the
conjugal
partnership
property
but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to
manage said
property,
in which case the administrator shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian
and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital except in
accordance with the orders of the court." 2 There would appear to be then a
recognition that the question of management of their respective property need not
be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An administrator may even be
appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The
absolute limitation from which the court suffers under the preceding article is
thereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile be heard. There is justification
then for the petitioner's insistence that her motion for preliminary mandatory
injunction should not be ignored by the lower court. There is all the more reason
for this response from respondent Judge, considering that the husband whom she
accused of concubinage and an attempt against her life would in the meanwhile
continue in the management of what she claimed to be her paraphernal property, an
assertion that was not specifically denied by him.
What was held by this Court in Araneta v. Concepcion, 3 thus possesses relevance:
"It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein Article 103 (Civil
Code) is evidently intended as a cooling off period to make possible a
reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of their grievances against each
other in court may only fan their already inflamed passions against one another,
and the lawmaker has imposed the period to give them opportunity for dispassionate
reflection. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative
policy, does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the
determination of the custody of the children and alimony and support pendente lite
according to the circumstance ... The law expressly enjoins that these should be
determined by the court according to the circumstances. If these are ignored or the
courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank injustice may be caused." 4 At any
rate, from the time of the issuance of the order complained of on August 4, 1971,
more
than
six
months
certainly
had
elapsed.
Thus
there
can
be
no
more
impediment
for
the lower court acting on the motion of petitioner for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction.
50.
ARANETA VS. CONCEPCION
99 PHIL 709
FACTS:
Petitioner filed action against his wife for legal sep ground: adultery
Defendant
filed
an
omnibus
petition
to
secure
custody
of
their
three
minor
children, a monthly support of P5000 for herself and said children and the return
of her passport to enjoin plaintiff from ordering his hirelings from harassing and
molesting her as well as pay for attorneys fees
3) Plaintiff denied misconduct imputed to him and alleging that defendant has
abandoned the childrenconjugal properties were worth only P80,000 - contends
defendant is not entitled to the custody of the children as she has abandoned them
and had committed adultery, that by her conduct she had become unfit to educate her
children, being unstable in her emotions and unable to give the children to love,
respect and care of a true mother and w/o means to educate them
CFI: granted custody of the children to defendant and a monthly allowance of P2300
for support for her and the children, P300 for a house and P2000 as attorneys
fees; reconsideration denied
DECISION OF SC; Writ prayed for is ISSUED and the respondent judge or whosoever
takes his place is ordered to proceed on the question of custody and support
pendent elite in accordance with this opinion. The ocurts order fixing the alimony
and requiring payment is REVERSED
RATIO:
main reason given by judge for refusing plaintiffs request that evidence be
allowed to be introduced: art 103 of CC6 months allowancecooling off period
it may be noted that since 6 mos have elapsed since the filing of the petition may
not be allowedreasons for granting the preliminary injunction should be given tat
the scope of the art cited may be explained
but this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy does not
have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the
custody of children and alimony and support pendent elite according to the
circumstances
the law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to
the circumstances, if these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual
facts, rank in justice may be caused
allegations
of
adultery
letter
of
authenticity
as
evidenceabandonment
of
the rule is that all the provisions of the law even if apparently contradictory,
should be allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them if necessary
thus determination of custody and alimony should be given effect and force provided
it does not go to the extent of violating the policy of the cooling off period
evidence not affecting the cause of the separation, like the actual custody of
children, the means conducive to their welfare and convenience during the pendency
of the case, these should be allowed that the court may determine which is best for
their custody.
FACTS:
January 18, 1958: Manuel J. C. Reyes and Celia Ilustre-Reyes got married.
March 10, 1976: Manuel attacked Celia by fist blows, bumping her head against the
cement floor, pushing her down the 13-flight stairs, hitting her in the abdomen
that floored her half unconscious.
May 26, 1976: She returned to get her overnight bag. Manuel demanded that she get out
but she ignored him. Hence, he doused her with grape juice, kicked her, attempted to hit
her with a steel tray but was stopped by her driver.
June 3, 1976: Celia filed the following petitions against Manuel: (1) Action for support pendente
lite; (2) Legal separation for the attempt to kill her.
Contentions of Manuel: Celia committed adultery with her physician. She is thus not
entitled to support and if she was, the assigned amount of P4000 by the Court was
excessive.
HELD: Yes.
Adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support BUT only if proven. In
fact, adultery is a good defense and if properly proved and sustained will defeat
the action. BUT it must be established by competent evidence and not merely
alleged. During hearing of the application for support pendente lite and for legal
separation, Manuel did not present any evidence to prove his allegation. YET Celia
asked for support pending litigation from their conjugal partnership and not
necessarily from Manuels private funds.
As to the determination of amount, Celia was unemployed and without funds. All
their conjugal properties, including corporations where Manuel is President,
Manager and Treasurer, are in the possession of Manuel.
iv. That these companies have entered into multi-million contracts in projects of
the Ministry of Public Highways
The amount was reduced from P5000 since their children are in the custody of
Manuel. In determining the amount to be awarded as support pendente lite, it is not
necessary to go fully into the merits of the case. It is sufficient that the court
ascertain the kind and amount of evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable it
to justly resolve the application, in view of the merely provisional character of
the resolution to be entered. mere affidavits or other documentary evidence
appearing in the record may satisfy the court to pass upon the application for
support pendente lite.
FACTS:
August 18, 1953: Camen Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against
Eufeimo S. Eufemio, alleging:
September 21, 1934: Civil Marriage September 30, 1934: Canon Marriage
No children
Lapuz found out Eufemio was cohabiting with Go Hiok on or about March 1949
Prayed for issuance of legal partnership and that Eufemio should be deprived
of his share of the conjugal partnership of profits
Eufemios answer:
During pendency of case, Lapuz died in a vehicular accident (May 31, 1969)
June 26, 1969: Counsel for Lapuz moved to substitute the deceased by her
father, Macario
July 29, 1969: Court dismissed the case - Carmen Lapuzs cause of action has
not survived
Did not act on the motion for substitution
- Eufemio
acquiesced
dismissal
of
said
in
the
counterclaims
by
praying
for
the
affirmance
order
that
of
the
dismissed
not
only
the
petition
for
legal separation but also his counterclaim to declare the EufemioLapuz marriage to be null and void ab initio.
ISSUE:
WON death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal
separation, abate the action? If it does,
WON abatement also applies if the action involves property rights?
HELD:
(1) YES,
- action for legal separation is purely personal (1) made by innocent spouse
(2) can still stop proceedings if they reconcile
- the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself
(2) YES
solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they cannot
survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree
Art 106 of civil code provides for rights and disabilities that, by the very
terms of the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the
spouses thus cannot be transferred to anyone after their death
rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the
decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so
that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in
expectation.
enumeration
of
the
actions
that
survive
for
or
against
administrators
in
Section 1, Rule 87, of the Revised Rules of Court do not enumerate actions
for legal separation or for annulment of marriage
- even actions of bigamy, when one has died all actions cease.
* the action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one
of the parties involved questions of property are now carried out not in
nullity of marriage proceedings but intestate proceedings.
April 25, 1972: Mejias filed a complaint for recognition and support against
Macadangdang
ISSUES:
Whether or not the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate issue
of the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw;
Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child
without giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be
heard.
HELD:
1. YES
The birth of Rolando came more than one hundred eighty 180 days following
the celebration of the said marriage and before 300 days following the alleged
separation between
conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of Mejias and Anahaw.
Rolando was born on October 30, 1967. Between March, 1967 and October 30, 1967,
the time difference is clearly 7 months. The baby Rolando could have been born
prematurely. But such is not the case. Respondent underwent a normal nine-month
pregnancy.
Physical impossibility:
2. NO. Art. 256 provides that the child is presumed legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy.
Art. 257: adultery on the part of the wife, in itself, cannot destroy the
presumption of legitimacy of her child, because it is still possible that the
child is that of the husband
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife
FACTS:
Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo were married in 1910 and have lived
together as manand wife until July 4, 1920 when the wife went away from their
common home with the intention of living separate from her husband. Marianos
efforts to induce her to resume marital relations were all in vain. Thereafter,
Mariano initiated an action to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and
live with him as a dutiful wife. Dolores averred by way of defense and crosscomplaint that she had been compelled to leave because of the cruel treatment of
her husband. She in turn prayed that a decree of separation be declared and the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership as well as permanent separate maintenance.
The trial judge, upon consideration
of the evidence before him, reached the conclusion that the husband was more
to blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished
sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the
permanent breaking off of marital relations with him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts can compel one of the spouses to cohabit
with each other.
HELD: NO.
It is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel
one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of
course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for
restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction
the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to
compel the restitution of the purely personal rights of consortium.
At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to
live under the same roof; and the experience of these countries where the court of justice
have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the
practice is extremely questionable. We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo
in this case is entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the
wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint;
though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has
presented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return. Therefore,
reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to the original complaint and the
cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the
marital home without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to
return. The plaintiff is absolved from the cross-complaint, without special pronouncement
as to costs of either instance.
Facts:
Chua Ching Beng and Pilar Atilano were married on May 1951 in Zamboanga City.
After their marriage, they went to Manila and live with Chua's parents. In
October 1951, the couple went to Zamboanga to visit Pilars parents. Chua
returned toManila with the understanding that Pilar would follow him, but she
did not.
In 1953, Pilar filed a complaint for support against Chua alleging that they
have been living separately for two years due to constant fights and Chua's
inability to provide a home for themselves apart from his parents.
Chua
his
stated
wife
only
she
that
he
was
willing to
support
but
if
lives
in Manilawith
him.
He
establish
was
also
willing
to
conjugal
dwelling
separate from
his parents.
Chua filed a petition electing to fulfill his obligation as thus fixed by the
court by receiving and maintaining Pilar at his residence in Pasay, which
was, apart, from that of his parents and that if the Pilar refuses, he will
not be compelled to remitallowance to her in Zamboanga.
Issue:
Whether or not Pilar is entitled to support when she refused to live with
Chua
Held:
The court found that while the wife strongly wanted to be separated from the
husband, the husband was open to fix the problem, acknowledging his obligation to
support her and even expressing his willingness to abide by her wishes to have a
conjugal dwelling apart from his parents, although this might be financially
taxing for him to sustain. The defendant acknowledges that the Art. 111, CC
imposes on the husband the responsibility of maintaining and supporting his wide
and family but he insists that under Art.
209,
CC
he
is
given
the
option
to
fulfill
either
said
by
duty
paying
the allowance as
fixed
by
the Court
or by
receiving
maintaining
and
the
person entitled thereto in his house. He has thus elected to perform his
obligation by the second means allowed by the law. The law affords moral and
legal obstacle as aground to compel husband to provide separate maintenance
for the wife. However, misunderstanding with in-laws is not a valid moral and
legal obstacle. Art. 110 does not preclude the husband from fixing the
conjugal residence at the patriarchal home, nor is it against any recognized
norm of morality.
Although the husband and the wife are, obliged to live together, observe mutual
respect and fidelity and render mutual help and assistance (Art. 109),
and
that
the
wife
is
entitled
to
be
supported,
our
laws
contain
no provision compelling the wife to
live with her husband where even without
legal
justification
she
establishes
her
residence
apart
from
that
provided
for by the former, yet and in such event We would see no plausible reason why
she should be allowed any support from the husband.
Judgment was modified. Chua was given the option of supporting his wife at
their conjugal dwelling apart from the home of his parents, and should Pilar
refuse to abide by the terms, then Chua would be relieved from the obligation
of giving any support.
FACTS:
On the same day but before their marriage ceremony, Melchor Solomon made a
donation to Alejandria Feliciano to the effect that if the latter will die
before him, one half of all his properties and those acquired by them will
be given to those who have reared Alejandria. Alejandria Feliciano, whose
father went to Hawaii to seek his fortune and who until now resides there,
had been left to her father's friend named Estanislao Serrano who took care
of and raised her from the age 12 until she reached womanhood. Less than nine
HELD:
None.
The
donation
could
not
be
regarded
as
nuptias for
a
the
donation
reason
propter
that
though
it
was
executed
before
the
marriage,
it
was not made in consideration of the marriage and, what is more important,
that the donation was not made to one or both of the (marriage) contracting
parties, but to a third person.
Manresa, in his commentary on Article 1327 of the Civil Code says the
following:
Donations excluded are those (1) made in favor of the spouses after the
celebration
of
but
marriage;
not
other
the
in
(2)
executed
consideration
in
of
favor
the
of
the
marriage;
future
and
spouses
(3) granted
to
persons
than
spouses
even
though
they
may
be
founded
on
the
marriage (6
M. 232).
When Agata Tait (AT) died in 1936, her husband George Tait Sr. (GT), lived in
common-law relationship with Maria Tait to whom he donated land to in1974. George
died in 1977 and Maria died in 1988. The following year, Emilie Sumbad (ES) and
Beatrice Tait (BT)sought an action for quieting of title, nullification of the
deed of sale, and recovery of possession of damages by virtue of being compulsory
heirs of GTs first marriage to AT. They allege that Maria sold the lots included
in the property to Okoren, et. al., despite warning the respondents that Maria
was not the real owner of the property. Okoren et. al., private respondents in
the case, bought the property anyway on the strength of a Tax Declaration and
claim that since the issuance of said Tax Declaration was made thirty years after
the death of AT, Maria,
GTs second wife, did not need the consent of her GT or his heirs for the
sale. They also claim that the action is barred bylaches.RTC rendered
Issues/Held/Ratio:
(1) it was a forgery crafted by one Raquel Tait, proof of such was eyewitness testimony of one Shirley Eillenger who claims that she saw Raquel and
her male board mates forge the signatures of GT and MT in a span of thirty
minutes. ->Aside from the impossibility of accomplishment, such allegations
were not proven by handwriting experts which the petitioners failed to make
use of.
(2) it was not executed as a public instrument because the deputy clerk of
court notarized it instead of the duly authorized notary public -> deputy
clerk of court was authorized by virtue of Sec. 21 of the Administrative Code
of 1917.
(3) it contravened Art. 133 of the CC (now Art. 87 of the FC) which states
that donations made during the marriage shall be void, which also includes
common-law relationships as decided in the earlier case of Matabuena v.
Cervantes). -> There is no sufficient evidence on record to prove that GT and
MT were in fact married, or if they were, when the marriage took place. There
is no evidence as to the time the deed of donation was executed in 1974 that
GT and Maria were still continuing their common-law relationship. BTs
testimony merely states that in 1941,Maria became their stepmother and does
not conclusively prove that in1974, GT and Maria were married. Lacking
evidence to prove the contrary, the family code provision cannot apply.
Facts:
Cornelia Matabuena, being the sole sister and nearest and nearest relative to
Felix, questioned the validity of the donation claiming that the ban on
donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law
relationship. She had the land declared on her name and paid the estate and
inheritance taxes thereon on virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication
executed by her in 1962. On 23 November 1965, the lower court upheld the
validity of the donation as it was made before Cervantes marriage to the
donor. Hence, the appeal.
Issue: Whether the Article 133 of the civil code apply to donations between
live-in partners.
Held: While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation
between the spouses during the marriage, policy considerations of the most
exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same
prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship, as it is contrary to
public policy. The law prohibits donations in favor of the other consort and
his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence
upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in ancient law. Whatever omission
may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must
be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. It is a principle of
statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a
part of it as what is written. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in
such codal provision would not be attained.
The Supreme Court (1) reversed the 23 November 1965 decision of the lower
court; (2) declared the questioned donation void and recognized the rights of
plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property; and (3)
remanded the case to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in
accordance with the current decision; without pronouncement as to costs.
Facts:
On June 1919, spouses Juan Lambino and Maxima Barroso made a donation propter
nuptias of certain lands in a private document in favor of their son Alejo
and his soon-to-be-wife Fortunata Solis, in consideration of their upcoming
marriage. One condition of the donation is that in case one of the donees
dies, half of the lands thus donated would revert to the donors while the
surviving donee would retain the other half. On the same month, Alejo and
Fortunata got married and immediately thereafter the donors delivered the
possession of the donated lands to them. A month later, Alejo died. In the
same year, Juan also died. After Juans death, Maxima recovered possession of
the donated lands. Surviving donee, Fortunata filed an action against
Maxima(surviving donor) et al and demanded:(1)the execution of the proper
deed of donation according to law,(2)transferring one-half of the donated
property, and(3)to proceed to the partition of the donated property and its
fruits The lower court granted the plaintiffs prayer, basing its judgment on
article 1279 of the Civil Code. It ordered the defendants to execute a deed
of donation in favor of Fortunata, valid in form to transfer to her the legal
title to the part of the donated lands assigned to her in the original
donation.
Issue:
Held:
No.
Donation proper nuptias here was no tvalid because it was made in a private
instrument. This donation must be governed by the rules on Donation. Real
Property may be valid, it must be made in the public instrument. (Formal
Validity) The only exceptions to this rule are onerous and remuneratory
donations, insofar as they do not exceed the value of the charge imposed,
which are then governed by the rules on contracts, and those which are to
take effect upon the donors death, which are governed by the rules
established for testamentary succession. Marriage in DPN is rather a
resolutory condition which presupposes the existence of the obligation which
may be resolved or revoked, and it is not a condition necessary for the birth
of the obligation.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1917, the parents of Alejandro Lagua donated two lots to him in
consideration of his marriage to petitioner Bonifacia Mateo. The marriage was
celebrated on May 15, 1917 and thereafter the couple took possession of the
lots, but the certificates of title remained in the donors name.
In 1923, Alejandro died, leaving behind his widow Bonifacia with their infant
daughter, who lived with the father-in-law Cipriano Lagua who in turn
undertook to farm on the donated lots. At first, Cipriano gave to Bonifacia
the share from the lots harvests, but in 1926 he refused to deliver to
petitioner the said share, which reason prompted her to initiate an action
and won for her possession of the lots plus damages.
On July 31, 1941, Cipriano executed a deed of sale of the said lots in favor
of his younger son, herein respondent Gervacio. Petitioner learned of this
only in 1956 when Cipriano stopped giving to petitioner her share to the
harvest. A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued under respondents
name by the Registry of Deeds (ROD) of Pangasinan.
The CFI of Pangasinan declared the TCT issued to respondent null and void and
ordered cancelled by the ROD, and for respondent to vacate and deliver the lots
to petitioner. In 1957, Gervacio and Cipriano filed with the CFI for the
annulment of the donation of the two lots. While the case was pending, Cipriano
died in 1958. It was dismissed for prescription, having been filed after the
lapse of 41 years. When appealed, the CA in 1966 held that the donation to
Alejandro of the two lots with the combined area of 11,888 sq. m. exceeded by
494.75 sq. m. his legitime and the disposable portion that Cipriano could have
freely given by will, and to the same extent prejudiced the legitime of
Ciprianos other heir, Gervacio. The donation was thus declared inofficious and
herein petitioners were ordered to reconvey to Gervacio a portion of 494.75 sq.
m. from any convenient part of the lots.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly reduced the donation
propter nuptias for being inofficious.
HELD:
Decision
of
CA
based
on
unsupported
assumptions
set
aside;
trial
courts
order of dismissal sustained.
Before
the
the
legal
share
due
to
compulsory
heir
may
be
reached,
net
estate
of
the
decedent
must
be
ascertained,
by
deducting
all
payable
obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased
at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be
added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitimes of the
compulsory heirs can be established, and only thereafter can it be
ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.
Article 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at
the death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and
charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will.
To the value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all
donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made
them.
Facts:
1954 Amailia Plata purchased land
1958 sold the property to Celso Saldana but he resold it ot her seven
months after when she was already married to Gaudencio Begosa
Amalia and Gaudencion failed to pay mortgage and the land was then sold to
Cesarea and husband Gregorio. They then
sued Gaudencio Begosa alone for illegal detainer which was granted
However, Amalia resisted all efforts ejecting her from the party since she is
claiming that land was her own paraphernal property and not conjugal property
ISSUE: WON Amalia is bound by the detainer judgment against Gaudencio Begosa
HELD: NO
Thus since Cesarea and Gregorio were also aware that property was paraphernal
as clearly stated in land records, illegal detainer judgment against the
husband alone doesnt affect the paraphernal property of Amalia.
Thus she had a right to ignore the judgment of eviction against her husband.
Facts:
In a criminal case for murder under CFI Zambales, Epifanio Fularon was
convicted and sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P2, 000.00
To satisfy said indemnity, a writ of execution was issued and the sheriff levied
upon four parcels of land belonging to the conjugal partnership of Epifanio
Fularon and Gliceria Rosete. The parcels of land were sold at public auction but
there was an unsatisfied balance. Gliceria was able to redeem two
out of the four parcels of land during the public auction. However, to
satisfy the remaining balance of the indemnity, the sheriff levied upon the
two parcels of land which were redeemed by Gliceria.
restrain
a writ of
requisite
put up
The dissolution of the injunction enabled the sheriff to carry out the sale as
originally scheduled and the property was sold to one Raymundo de Jesus. Gliceria
sought for the declaration of the sale by the sheriff null and void.
The lower court declared the sale null and void on the strength of the ruling
laid down in the case of Lichauco vs. Olegario.
The question to be decided is whether the sale made by the sheriff of the two
parcels of land which were redeemed by Gliceria Rosete in the exercise of her
right of redemption is valid it appearing that they formed part of the four
parcels of land belonging to the conjugal partnership which were originally sold
to satisfy the same judgment of indemnity awarded in the criminal case.
Issue: Since it appears that plaintiff redeemed the two parcels of land in
question with money obtained by her from her father, has the property become
paraphernal and as such is beyond the reach of further execution?
Held:
We are of the opinion that the question should be answered in the affirmative
for the following reasons:
(a) Gliceria Rosete, the wife, redeemed the property, not in behalf of her
husband, but as successor in interest in the whole or part of the property, it
being then conjugal. The term "successor in interest" appearing in subdivision
(a), Section 25, Rule 39, includes, according to Chief Justice Moran, "one who
succeeds to the interest of the debtor by operation of law" or "the wife as
regards her husband's homestead by reason of the fact that some portion of her
husband's title passes to her (Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. 1,
pp. 841-842); and (b) a property is deemed to belong exclusively to the wife (1)
when acquired by her by-right of redemption, and
(2) with money belonging exclusively to her (Article 1396, old Civil Code).
The interest which a wife has in conjugal property in this jurisdiction may
be likened to that of a wife in a homestead in American jurisdiction. That
interest is known as "inchoate right of dower", or a "contingent interest."
By virtue of this inchoate right, a wife has a right of redemption of a
homestead as successor in interest of her husband.
The property in question has therefore become the exclusive property of the
plaintiff. She has acquired it by right of redemption as successor in
interest of her husband. It has ceased to be the property of the judgment
debtor. It can no longer therefore be the subject of execution under a
judgment exclusively affecting the personal liability of the latter. The
conclusion reached by the lower court on this matter is therefore not
warranted by law.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified as follows: the sale of the two
parcels of land executed by the sheriff on May 9, 1950 in favor of Raymundo de
Jesus for P970 is hereby declared null and void, and the deed of repurchase
executed by the sheriff in favor of the plaintiff on March 8, 1950
Facts:
Upon the death of Marcelo, his children and grandchildren from the first wife
filed a complaint for partition and accounting against Macaria in CFI
Bulacan. CFI Bulacan declared the property to be the exclusive paraphernal
property of Macaria and CA affirmed.
The heirs of Marcelo contended that they should have a share to the fishpond
because it was acquired during the marriage of Marcelo and Macaria, hence
conjugal.
CA found that the fishpond was purchased with the exclusive funds of Macaria,
who was known to be a woman of means even before she married Marcelo. It was
also established that Marcelo could not have afforded the property who was
only earning a meager income as provincial treasurer.
The initial payment was established to come out from Macarias exclusively
private funds. The finding of the CA is that Gonzales owed this particular
indebtedness to Macaria Pasco alone, and in the absence of proof that the
husband authorized her to use community funds therefor, the appellate Court's
finding cannot be disturbed by us. Whether the evidence adverted to should be
credited is for the Court of Appeals to decide.
Although the other two installments were paid by loans which were guaranteed
by mortgage on paraphernal property of Macaria, it was shown that the loans
have been made to Marcelo and Macaria as joint borrowers. The loans thus
became obligations of the conjugal partnership of both debtor spouses, and
the money loaned is logically conjugal property. While the securing mortgage
is on the wife's paraphernalia the mortgage is a purely accessory obligation
that the lenders could, waive if they so chose, without affecting the
principal debt which was owned by the conjugal partnership, and which the
creditors could enforce exclusively against the latter it they so desired.
As the litigated fishpond was purchased partly with paraphernal funds and
partly with money of the conjugal partnership, justice requires that the
property be held to belong to both patrimonies in common, in proportion to
Facts:
On October 23, 1964, the spouse Rafael Zulueta and Telly Albert Zulueta
In any event, plaintiff testified that, having found the need to relieve
himself, he went to the mens comfort room at the terminal building, but
found it full of soldiers, in view of which he walked down the beach some 100
yards away.
Meanwhile, the flight was called and when the passengers had boarded the
plane, plaintiffs absence was noticed. The take-off was, accordingly,
delayed and a search for him was conducted by Mrs. Zulueta, Miss Zulueta and
other persons. Minutes later, plaintiff was seen walking back from the beach
towards the terminal. Heading towards the ramp of the plane, plaintiff
remarked, You people almost made me miss your flight. You have a defective
announcing system and I was not paged.
In the claim for damages, Mrs. Zulueta filed a motion alleging that she had, for
more than two (2) years, been actually living separately from her husband,
plaintiff Rafael Zulueta, and that she had decided to settle separately with
PANAM through compromise agreement and had reached a full and complete settlement
of all her differences with said defendant, and praying accordingly, that this
case be dismissed insofar as she is concerned, Required to comment on said
motion, PANAM expressed no objection thereto.
Upon the other hand, plaintiff prayed that the motion be denied, upon the
ground that the case at bar is one for damages for breach of a contract of
carriage, owing to the off-loading of plaintiff Rafael Zulueta, the husband
and administrator of the conjugal partnership, with the funds of which the
PANAM had been paid under said contract; that the action was filed
by the plaintiffs as a family and the lower court had awarded damages to them
as such family; that, although PANAM had questioned the award of damages, it
had not raised the question whether the lower court should have specified
what portion of the award should go to each plaintiff; that although Mr. and
Mrs. Zulueta had, for sometime, been living separately, this has been without
judicial approval; that Mrs. Zulueta may not, therefore, bind the conjugal
partnership or settle this case separately; and that the sum given by PANAM
to Mrs. Zulueta is believed to be P50,000, which is less than 3-1/2% of the
award appealed from, thereby indicating the advisability of denying her
motion to dismiss, for her own protection.
Issue:
Whether or not Mrs. Zuluetas compromise agreement with PAN AM would bind the
conjugal partnership and whether the payment she received is effective.
Ruling:
No, Mrs. Zuluetas compromise agreement with PAN AM would not bind the
conjugal partnership but the payment of P50, 000 she received is effective.
Indeed, (t)he wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the
husbands consent, except in cases provided by law, and it has not been
shown that this is one of the cases so provided.
Article 113 of our Civil Code, pursuant to which (t)he husband must be
joined in all suits by or against the wife, except: (2) If they have in
fact been separated for at least one year relied upon by PANAM does
not warrant the conclusion drawn therefrom by the latter.
Obviously the suit contemplated in subdivision (2) of said Article 113 is one
in which the wife is the real party either plaintiff or defendant in
interest, and, in which, without being so, the hush must be joined as a
party, by reason only of his relation of affinity with her. Said provision
cannot possibly apply to a case, like the one at bar, in which the husband is
the main party in interest, both as the person principally grieved and as
administrator of the conjugal partnership.
It is true that the law favors and encourages the settlement of litigations
by compromise agreement between the contending parties, but, it certainly
does not favor a settlement with one of the spouses, both of whom are
plaintiffs or defendants in a common cause, such as the defense of the rights
of the conjugal partnership, when the effect, even if indirect, of the
compromise is to jeopardize "the solidarity of the family" which the law
seeks to protect by creating an additional cause for the misunderstanding
that had arisen between such spouses during the litigation, and thus
rendering more difficult a reconciliation between them.
Facts:
Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife entered into a a lease and conditional sale
agreement over a house and lot. At that time, Daniel Jovellanos was married
Leonor
Dizon
died
consequently.
Then
Daniel
married
private
respondent
Annette with whom he begot two children. The daughter from the 1st marriage
Mercy Jovellanos married Gil Martinez and at the behest of Daniel Jovellanos,
With
the
lease
amounts
having
been
paid,
Philamlife
executed
to
Daniel
Jovellanos a deed of absolute sale and, on the next day, the latter donated
to herein petitioners all his rights, title and interests over the lot and
bungalow thereon. In 1985, Daniel died.
Private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos claimed in the lower court that the
aforestated property was acquired by her deceased husband while their
marriage was still subsisting and which forms part of the conjugal
partnership of the second marriage. Petitioners contend that the property,
were acquired by their parents during the existence of the first marriage
under their lease and conditional sale agreement with Philamlife of September
2, 1955.
Issue:
WON the house and lot pertains to the second marriage? YES
Held:
The conditional sale agreement in said contract is, therefore, also in the nature
of a contract to sell, as contradistinguished from a contract of sale. In a
contract to sell or a conditional sale, ownership is not transferred upon
delivery of the property but upon full payment of the purchase price. Generally,
ownership is transferred upon delivery, but even if delivered, the ownership may
still be with the seller until full payment of the price is made, if there is
stipulation to this effect. The stipulation is usually known as a pactum
reservati dominii, or contractual reservation of title, and is common in sales on
the installment plan. Compliance with the stipulated payments is a suspensive
condition. The failure of which prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey
title from acquiring binding force.
Daniel consequently acquired ownership thereof only upon full payment of the
said amount hence, although he had been in possession of the premises since
September 2, 1955, it was only on January 8, 1975 that Philamlife executed
the deed of absolute sale thereof in his favor.
Daniel Jovellanos did not enjoy the full attributes of ownership until the
execution of the deed of sale in his favor. The law recognizes in the owner
the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than
NB: But since it pertained to the second wife, she is still liable to pay the
corresponding
reimbursements
to
the
petitioners
who
helped
pay
for
the
amortization of the house and lot. Remember Article 118 of the Family Code on
property
bought
on
installments,
where
ownership
is
vested
during
the
Facts:
1960: Not satisfied with the judgment, LOZANO appealed to the CA who
dismissed appeal because it was not filed on time.
Record of the case was then remanded to the court a quo and a writ of
execution was issued.
Aug. 18, 1960: a levy on a parcel of land in the name of Nieves Lozano was
made. A notice of a sale at a public auction was also made and scheduled for
Sept. 16, 1960.
However, Lozano had made a partial payment by then and asked for an
adjournment of the sale to October 26.
During this time, her husband died. She then prayed for a restraining order
on the sale of the lot for sale being her paraphernal property. She also
prayed that her liability be then fixed at of the amount awarded in the
judgment.
June 28, 1961: trial court grants the motion of Nieves Lozano. The sale on
her property was allowed to proceed to satisdy her liability which is only
half now from the original. (from P3,500.07 to P1,750.04)
Issues/Held/Ratio:
1. W/N the decision of the trial court last 1959 could still be questioned.
NO. SC states that a decision that is final and executory can no longer be
amended or corrected by the court except for clerical errors or mistakes.
JOINT. General rule is that when a judgment does not order the defendants to
pay jointly and severally (as in this case), none of them may be compelled to
satisfy the judgment in full.
3. W/N the judgment debt could be satisfied from the proceeds of the
properties sold at the public auction.
The ownership remains the same until the value is paid but payment can only
be demanded in the liquidation of the partnership. Since there was no
liquidation yet in the conjugal partnership of Nieves and Pascual, her
exclusive property cannot be made to answer for the liability of the other
defendant. While they may both use the building constructed in paraphernal
land, ownership is still with her until liquidation of partnership pays for
it.
Facts:
Spouses Juliano and Eulalia Flias donated Lot No. 107 to their daughter,
Felisa Felias (ivate respondent) on March 31, 1928.
On March 26, 1941, trial court held that in a case against respondents
husband, Simeon Sawamoto, he had to pay Texas Company (Phil.) Inc. a sum of
661.94 plus legal interest and attorneys fees. A writ of execution was
issued to the provincial sheriff who levied upon Lot NO. 107 togther with the
improvements and a small parcel of coconut land and sold these at a public
auction to Texas Company now Caltex (Phil.) Inc. Provincial Sheriff executed
a final deed of sale which was duly recorded on a TCT. Felias filed an action
declaring herself the owner of the 2 parcels of land.
The court decided that the sale of Lot No. 107 is null and void and the sale
of the coconut land is not and rightfully belongs to Caltex. Both parties
appealed and CA declared that Lot No. 107 belongs to Felisa and ordered the
Register of Deeds to cancel the entry of the levy, the ertificate of sale and
the deed of sale by the sheriff. Caltex is still the exclusive owner of the
small parcel of coconut land.
Issue:
What is the status and ownership of Lot No. 107 of the cadastral survey of
the City of Agusan at the time it was levied upon and later sold by the
sheriff?
Held:
It exclusively belongs to Felisa Feias.
Art. 1404 (2): Buildings constructed during the marriage on land belonging to
one of the spouse shall also belong to the partnership, but the value of the
land shall be paid to the spouse owning the same.
Art 158n (2): Buildings constructed at the expense of the partnership during
the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses, also pertain to the
partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who
owns the same.
However, the building was already there even before the lot was donated to
Felisa. Therefore, Art. 1404 should not apply. Felisa exclusively owns both
the land and the building upon it. This being her own means that it is not
subject to the obligations of her husband. Furthermore, the building was
destroyed at the time of the sale by the Sheriff which means that the said
house included in the deeds executed were no longer in existence.
Facts:
After hearing the parties, the court approved the said partition which
provides that half of the conjugal property shall belong to the widow and the
other half shall belong to the deceased, which will constitute the
inheritance to be divided accordingly.
As what the law provides, 2/3 of the remaining half shall be given as the
legitime of the children and the remaining 1/3 shall remain as the free
portion where the widow shall be accorded 1/6 of the remaining portion as
usufruct.
The widow then raised the question as regards the manner of determining the
portion of the inheritance which pertains to the widow in usufruct and the 2
children inheriting with her.
Issue:
Held:
Under Article 834 of the Civil Code provides that "any widower or widow who,
on the death of his or her spouse, is not be entitled or should be so by the
fault of the deceased, shall be entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to
that corresponding by way of legitime to each of the legitimate children or
descendants who have not received any betterment."
Sanchez Roman, in solving the legal problems that might arise the
interpretation of article 834 of the Civil Code, among other things, says:
For the foregoing, the judgment appealed from must be, as it is hereby,
modified in that the portion pertaining to the widow in usufruct consists of
(2) whether or not the sale of the lot together with the house and
improvements thereon was valid under the circumstances surrounding the
transaction.
HELD: (1) Yes, a correct interpretation of Art 158 yields that both the land
and the building belong to the conjugal partnership but the conjugal
partnership is indebted to the husband for the value of the land. The spouse
owning the lot becomes a creditor of the conjugal partnership for the value
of the lot, which value would be reimbursed at the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership. Fernando could not have alienated the house lot to
Corazon since Mercedes had not given her consent to said sale.
(2) No, the contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to morals
and public policy. The sale was made by a husband in favor of a concubine
after he had abandoned his family and left the conjugal home where his wife
and children lived and from whence they derived their support. The sale was
Facts:
Vicente
Garcia,
guarantors,
an
together
signed
indemnity
agreement
binding
themselves
solidarily
liable to indemnify
Luzon
Surety
Co Inc
and
all
against any
damages, costs
with
Ladislao
Chavez
and
Ramon
Lacson,
as
and and other expenses which the petitioner may sustain or incur in
consequence of having become guarantor upon said bond, to pay interest at the
rate of 12% per annum, computed and compounded quarterly until fully paid;
and to pay 15% of the amount involved in any litigation or other matters
growing out of or connected therewith for attorney's fees.
On April 27, 1956, PNB filed a complaint against Ladislao Chavez and Luzon
Surety Co. to recover the amount of PhP4,577.95, in interest, attorneys fees
and other costs.
On September 17, 1958, a judgment was rendered ordering Chavez and Luzon
Surety Co. to pay PNB in solidarity. The same decision likewise ordered the
third party defendants Chavez, Garcia and Lacson to pay Luzon Surety Co. the
amount to be paid to PNB.
On July 30, 1960, a writ of execution was issued against Garcia to satisfy
the claim of the petitioner. A writ of garnishment was soon issued levying
and garnishing the sugar quedans of the Garcia spouses from their sugar
plantation.
Spouses Garcia filed a suit for injunction and the trial court ruled in favor
of them.
Issue:
WON the CPG could be liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband
to accommodate a third party in favor of a surety agreement
Held:
Ratio Decidendi:
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the
cases where she may legally bind the partnership; (2) Arrears or income due,
during the marriage, from obligations which constitute a charge upon property of
either spouse or of the partnership; (3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation
made during the marriage upon the separate property of either the husband or the
wife; major repairs shall not be charged to the partnership; (4) Major or minor
repairs upon the conjugal partnership property; (5) The maintenance of the family
and the education of the children of both husband and wife, and of legitimate
children of one of the spouses;
accepted, is too remote and fanciful to come within the express terms of the
provision.
Facts:
A debt was contracted when one Damaso Perez bought leather materials from
Hormoso for his shoe manufacturing business. On February 1959, Hormoso filed
suit against Perez and one Gregorio Sumbong for the recovery of unpaid
purchases in t he amount of P17,309.44. On April, 1960, the petition was
granted by the presiding judge (Lantin, respondent) and thus ordered Perez
and Sumbong to fulfill their pecuniary obligation. They appealed but they
were dismissed. They brought the action to the SC but it was also dismissed.
Hormoso moved for the execution of judgment and this was granted on
The Sheriff levied the shares ofcommon stock of Perez from Republic Bank but
Perez urged to stay the execution alleging that the levy was excessive and unjust
because he only owed P17,309.44 but the shares levied were worth P357,000.
Sheriff was thus stopped from auctioning the shares pending resolution of Perezs
new motion. But after respondent Judge Lantin denied both the appeal and the stay
of execution, the sheriff again served a notice for auctioning the shares. This
was subsequently cancelled by the CA pending hearing of another petition filed by
Perez on October 5. CA resolved that the levy was indeed excessive but regardless
sustained that such should be paid.
Sheriff again published a notice of action but time auctioning only 210
shares of stock.
execution was lifted, however, the wife filed another motion for
recall/lifting of writ of execution granted on August 15, 1961 on the same
grounds enunciated in italics in this paragraph. Lantin denied the motion.
This paved the way for the sheriff to, once more, give notice of the action
and execute the sale.
What followed after this was a series of delaying tactics, which finally
ended with Damaso Perez filing an urgent motion for reconsideration using now
his wifes reasons (see italics in paragraph above) and at the same time
offered instead of his shares of stocks, the dividends of such amounting to
P19,000. Sheriff was then stopped for the fifth time but the motion was still
denied. After the sheriff scheduled the auction for the sixth time, the
present petition was now filed which alleged that grave abuse of discretion
was committed in not recalling the writ of execution (ordering the levy of
210 shares of stock which were deemed conjugal and thus not answerable to
personal obligations made by the husband).
Issue/Held/Ratio:
WON levied shares are conjugal and thus liable for debt of the husband,
Perez.
No. Perez is estopped from claiming that said shares were conjugal because in the
case where he challenged it as being excessive and unjust, he had given
the impression that such stocks were exclusive. This is further confirmed by
the fact that the said stocks were registered in his name alone. Wife is also
barred by judgment made on husband because she stands in privity with him.
She cannot feign ignorance to justify a lapse of seventeen months in
questioning the legality of the levy made on the stocks.
They claim that Art. 160 of the CC is applicable but no proof was presented
that such stocks were acquired during the marriage. No evidence was adduced
as to when the shares of stock were acquired.
Conceding that they were acquired during the marriage and is conjugal, it
must be shown that the partnership is not liable for the judgment debt. No
evidence pointing to this was presented.
Petition dismissed. Treble costs are assessed against the petitioners, which
shall be paid by their counsel.
74. AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVT CO. VS. CA 286 SCRA 272
Facts:
Phil. Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50.3M loan from AIDC. VP Cheng, for
further security of the credit line, included himself jointly/severally
liabile to PBMs indebtedness by virtue of security agreements.
PBM failed to pay the loan. AIDC filed a case against PBM and Cheng for the
money. Court rendered judgment in favor of AIDC and ordered PBM and Cheng to
pay the P50.3M with interests.
While decision was being appealed, AIDC moved for a writ of execution. Upon
placement of P8M bond, the writ was issued. Sheriff notified and scheduled
the sale of 3 conjugal properties of Cheng.
This subsequently led Cheng to file a suit of injunction against the Sheriff,
enjoining him from enforcing orders against the conjugal property since these
were not answerable to the loan.
The loan not benefiting the conjugal partnership, payment of such should not
come from the conjugal property. The lower court issued the TRO. AIDC filed a
petition for certiorari in CA which issued a TRO on the lower courts initial
TRO, paving the way for the scheduled sale of Chengs property.
The auction took place and AIDC, being the only bidder, was issued the
certificate of sale. However, after deciding the issue, the same CA which
issued the second TRO, resolved to uphold the lower courts decision. AIDC
then filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the issue was now moot and
academic since the sale was already consummated. Respondents however averred
that a third-party was now questioning the sale and thus a different legal
situation was presented.
Lower court denied AIDCs motion to dismiss and after trial declared the sale
null and void. The CA affirmed the decision. After a motion of
reconsideration was denied, AIDC filed
Issues/Held/Ratio:
(1) WON CA erred in ruling that the obligation incurred by Cheng did not
redound to the benefit of the family.
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract (he directly
received the money and services to be used for his own business/profession), that
contract falls under the term debts and obligations for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. Here, no actual benefit may be proven. AIDC claims that
the benefits Chengs family would reasonably anticipate were the following: (i)
employment of Cheng would be prolonged, (ii) shares of stock of members of
Chengs family would appreciate if PBM could be rehabilitated through the loan
obtained, (ii) Chengs prestige in PBM would be enhanced and
his career would be boosted should PBM survive because of the loan. However
these are not benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the CC. It cannot be a
by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself. The above-enumerated alleged
benefits are not only incidental but also speculative.
No. The money received/services rendered redounded to benefit of PBM and the
husband merely acted as a guarantor. The contract by itself cannot be
considered as falling within the context of Art. 161.
FACTS:
On Oct. 31, 1989, Honorio Carlos issued a check worth $25k, in the name of
Pura Vallejo, against his personal account in Bankers Trust. It was allegedly a
loan to his daughter Maria Theresa and her husband Manuel Abelardo for the
purchadse of a house and lot from Vallejo in order to help them in their married
life. Vallejo issued an acknowledgement receipt. The failure of the spouses to
pay led Honorio to formally demand the payment. Maria Theresa acknowledged their
debt to her father but claimed that it was payable on a staggered basis. Despite
this acknowledgement and the evidence of Honorios Banks Trust Check (the one
paid to Vallejo) and his formal demand, Manuel denied the nature of the money as
a loan. He claimed, instead, that the amount given was his share in income from
Honorios business, H. L.
ISSUE: WON conjugal property should pay for the loan of 25, 000 even when
acknowledgement was not signed by husband
HELD: YES
- Art 121 of FCC conjugal partnership is liable for (1) debts and
obligations that benefit the conjugal partnership of gains made by both the
spouses or one of them but with the consent of the other (2) debts and
obligations that are without consent f one of the spouse but their family has
benefited.
Evidence here shows that family did benefit since they used the loan to buy
the house which became their conjugal home.
FACTS:
cia,
of
conjugal
the
separation
of
partnership
property
against
her wife, Consolacion Manzano. He alleged that they have been living
separately from each other since 1948 and that upon their separation, her
wife assumed the complete management and administration of the conjugal
partnership property and fictitiously transferred or alienated a majority of
said property in favor of third persons. He alleged further that her wife
failed and refused to turn over and deliver to him his rightful share and
participation in the conjugal partnership property and its fruits.
ISSUE:
HELD:
No. The Civil Codes (both old and new) require that separation of property
shall not prevail unless expressly stipulated in marriage settlements before
the union is solemnized or by formal judicial decree during the existence of
the marriage (Article 190, new Civil Code; Article 1432, old Code).
In the system established by the Code, the wife does not administer the conjugal
partnership unless with the consent of the husband, or by decree of court and
under its supervision (Arts. 168, 196) "with such limitations as they (the
courts) may deem advisable" (Art. 197 in relation to Article 196). Legally,
therefore, the wife can not mismanage the conjugal partnership property or
affairs, unless the husband or the courts tolerate it.
In the event of such maladministration by the wife (and disregarding the case
of judicial authorization to have the wife manage the partnership, since such
a case is not involved), the remedy of the husband does not lie in a judicial
separation of property but in revoking the power granted to the wife and
resume the administration of the community property and the conduct of the
affairs of the conjugal partnership. He may enforce his right of possession
and control of the conjugal property against his wife (Perkins vs. Perkins,
57 Phil., 205) and seek such ancillary remedies as may be required by the
circumstances, even to the extent of annulling or rescinding any unauthorized
alienations or incumbrances, upon proper action filed for that purpose. For
this reason, the articles above quoted contemplate exclusively the remedies
available to the wife (who is not the legal administrator of the partnership)
against the abuses of her husband because normally only the latter can commit
such abuses.
FACTS:
1980, Prima Partosa-Jo filed two complaints against Jose Jo for a)judicial
separation of conjugal property and b) complaint for support for her and
their daughter Monina
29 Nov 1983: Negros Oriental RTC rendered judgment in favor of Prima but
failed to include judgment on judicial separation of property in the
dispositive portion
Prima elevated this to CA, CA affirmed judgment on support but dismissed petition
for separation of property for lack merit saying that it was not allowed as their
separation was due to their agreement rather and not because
of abandonment
ISSUES:
W/N the decision of RTC can be questioned given that it is final and
executory
HELD/RATIO:
o all the properties in question are considered properties of Jose Jo, the
defendant is subject to separation of property.
The RTC held that they were legally married and that the properties were
acquired during coverture although they were in the name of a dummy (Chinese
national kasi)
Prima submits that their agreement was not to be separated but for her to
temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy
and that he would visit and support her. But when she returned to their house
in Dumaguete in 1942, he refused to accept her.
She is entitled to separation of property on ground of abandonment.
- Court ordered for division between the two half/half. It should include
properties such as those which were registered in the name of other persons
in violation of the anti-dummy law.
The past has caught up with the private respondent. After his extramarital
flings and a succession of illegitimate children, he must now make an
accounting to his lawful wife of the properties he denied her despite his
promise to her of his eternal love and care.
Facts:
March 12, 1963 Carmen filed a complaint for custody of children as well as
support in Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila
*Before it pushed through though they reached a settlement where the two
eldest kids would go to petitioner Alfonso and the youngest would stay with
Carmen
May 7, 1963 respondent filed a motion for the custody of all children be
given to her in JDRC since she said she only entered into agreement to gain
custody of her younger children and thus should be given custody of the older
ones as well who are all below 7 years old.
- NCC Art 363 - "No mother shall be separated from her child under seven
years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure."
*Older children at that time were 5 and 6 so agreement should have been
declared null and void since no compelling reasons were stated otherwise
*However the children are now 11 and 10 and thus The 11 year old may choose
which parent they want to live with (sec. 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court,
as long as above ten) already 1968
*Court may also award custody to who they deem more fit through evidence.
Art 356 of the NCC - Every child:
However even if custody should have been null and void, the rest of the
agreement is valid with respect to the separation of property of the spouses
FACTS :
Among the properties left is a Forbes Park house, petitioner offers varying
versions. In the verified petition before this Court, petitioner avers "that the
construction of said North Forbes Park property was
undertaken
jointly
by
petitioner
and
the
deceased,
petitioner
even contributing her
own
exclusive funds
therefor."
This is a
reproduction
... the house now standing at North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal."
10
11
ISSUE:
HELD:
or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership." .
But stock must be taken of the fact that the creation of the civil
relationship envisaged in Article 144 is circumscribed by conditions, the
existence of which must first be shown before rights provided thereunder may
be
deemed
condition
to
that
be
accrue.
13
One
such
is
there
must
the
petitioner
during
cohabitation,
really
17
Facts:
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales (both deceased) lived as husband and wife
in Davao, out of this common law marriage, they had 6 children (petitioners).
1903 when they started living together
1919 when they married in church and when 1st wife died. 1953- husband
remarried, when 2nd wife sold the land.
1961 when children discovered sale
Plaintiffs are currently praying for the annulment of the documents of sale
over particular lands that were sold to private respondent couple by their
fathers 2nd wife. They allege that common properties belonged to their
parents who acquired the lands during their lifetime and through their joint
effort and capital. Sales of land by their father were done without their
knowledge and consent and only after their mother, Regina had died in 1953.
Children discovered sale in 1961.
Respondent spouses insist that they are buyers in good faith and they
believed that the Melbourne was the sole owner of the parcels of land.
Respondent spouses insist that they are buyers in good faith and they
believed that the Melbourne was the sole owner of the parcels of land.
Melbourne and Maxey started living together in 1903. That same year, the
children allege that they got married in the military fashion. They
acquired properties in 1911 and 1912. They got married in 1919. Regina died
sometime in 1919, soon after the church marriage.
Issue:
Held:
NO. The CFI and the CA were correct in rejecting this since the Act No. 3613
a.k.a. the Revised Marriage Law was approved much later (Dec. 4, 1929). It
could not apply to a 1903 marriage.
2. W/N common law spouses, prior to marriage, share conjugal property over
lands acquired in 1912.
Held:
RTC: applied Art. 144 that states that in common law marriages, the property
acquired by both through work, industry, wages, salaries are governed by the
rules of co-ownership.
CA: Ruled otherwise, they believed that the land was exclusive property of
Melbourne Maxey. Art. 144 should not have applied because the Regina did not
contribute to the acquisition of the profit. She had no income of her own.
SC: YES. Art. 144 of the Civil Code should apply there being no showing that
vested rights would be impaired or prejudiced through its application.
Art. 144 may be retroactively applied, they do not prejudice or impair any
vested or acquired right.
Prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code on August 30, 1950, the
formation of an informal civil partnership between a man and wife not legally
married and their corresponding right to an equal share in properties
acquired through their joint efforts and industry during cohabitation was
recognized through decisions of this Court.
Under this new code, it is believed that even if it is only the man who
works, there is still a 50-50 sharing of property acquired during their
cohabitation together.
The woman runs the household: "in the Filipino family, the wife holds the
purse, husbands hand over their pay checks and get an allowance in return
and the wife manages the affairs of the household. . . . (Dean Cortes)
In the Philippines, the best man is the woman." (Gov-Gen Leonard Wood)
Ruling:
Facts:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married January 5, 1971 and thereafter
were blessed with five children. On June 22, 1992, Valdez sought the
declaration of nullity of marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
The trial court granted the petition, thereby declaring their marriage null
and void on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity. Their children
Stella and Joaquin were placed in the custody of their mother and the older
children chose which parent they want to stay with. The petitioner and
respondent are also directed to start proceedings in the liquidation of their
property as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code and to comply to
Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code.
will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their
"family home" and all their properties for that matter in equal shares.
Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are
psychological incapacitated.
Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code
should govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is
declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the
psychological incapacity of the spouses.
Issue:
Whether or not the property regime should be based Article 147 or on Articles
50, 51 and 52 as contended by Valdez.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause
thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on
co-ownership (Art 147 Family Code). Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A
party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.
FACTS:
Article 40
In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan Nicdao Carino. He had 2 children
with her. In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan
Yee Carino. In 1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden
and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage
with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4.
Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect
a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of
money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that
her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage
b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and
void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as certified by the local
civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the previous
marriage on SPO4s funeral.
HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence
of a valid marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise
null and void for the same has been solemnized without the judicial
declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under
Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of
a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the
The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a
policeman for their marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to
properties, money etc owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall
belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the
full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise
void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each other for there
were no impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage
license; in their situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147
of the FC which provides that everything they earned during their
cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party
this includes salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the
fact that the other may not have contributed at all.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
WON a final judgment of the Court of Appeals in an action for damages may be
satisfied by way of execution of a family home constituted under the Family
Code.
HELD:
YES.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not
constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the
Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article
153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after
its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap
year).
Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment
aforecited No. The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment
arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976
and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court
on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution
provided in the Family Code.
Facts:
On 9/24/90 Vicentes sis and nephew Victoria (priv resps) Benitez Lirio and
Feodor Benitez Aguilar filed @ RTC for issuance of letter of admin for
Aguilar, saying that Vicente had no legal heirs since Marissa Benitez Badua
was never a related by blood and not legally adopted therefore not a legal
heir.
On 11/2/90 Marissa opposed saying that shes sole heir and shes capable of
managing estate. She presented the ff evids:
daughter
Issue: WON Marissa is a biological child of Vicente and Isabel and WON TC
misapplied FC 166 and 170
Held:
brother Dr. Nilo Chipongian, saying that shes been married already for
10 years but at age 36 was not yet pregnant and so she was even brought to
the attention of Dr. Manahan who was a well known ob-gyne. Many other people
(neighbors) corroborated this point that Iabel never became pregnant. Had she
been, it would have been noticed by people around her.
she was born in the Benitez household in Nagcarlan when she would have been
born in the hospital and in the skillful hands of Dr. Manahan who was the obgyne of her putative mother.
FACTS:
On October 15, 1986, an action for compulsory recognition and support was
brought before court, by respondent Alarito (Clarito) Agbulos against
Bienvenido Rodriguez, petitioner herein
At the trial, the plaintiff presented his mother, Felicitas Agbulos Haber, as
first witness.
In the course of her direct examination, she was asked by counsel to reveal
the identity of the plaintiff's father but the defendant's counsel raised a
timely objection which the court sustained.
The petitioner now comes to this court questioning the act of the lower court
in sustaining the objection
Contentions:
Petitioner:
Felicitas
Agbulos
Haber
should
not
be
allowed
to
reveal
the
name
of
the
father
of
private
respondent
because
such
revelation
was
prohibited
by
Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Said Article provided:
"When the father or the mother makes the recognition separately, he or she
shall not reveal the name of the person with whom he or she had the child;
neither shall he or she state any circumstance whereby the other party may be
indentified."
Respondent:
HELD:
Yes.
REASON 1:
Rule: the testimony of the mother may be used to prove paternity IF the
father does not object.
In the case at bench, petitioner timely objected to the calling of the mother
of private respondent to the witness stand to name petitioner as the father
of said respondent.
REASON2:
Articles 276, 277, 278, 279 and 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines were
repealed by the Family Code, which now allows the establishment of
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children (Art. 175).
'(1) The record of birth appearing in the Civil Register or a final judgment;
or
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
'(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child;
or
'(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a,
266a, 267a)'"
Of interest is that Article 172 of the Family Code adopts the rule in Article
283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the filiation may be proven by "any
evidence or proof that the defendant is his father."
Facts:
Held/Ratio:
FACTS:
Plaintiff Leouel Santos married defendant Julia Bedia on September 20, 1986.
On May 18 1988, Julia left for the U.S. She did not communicate with Leouel
and did not return to the country. In 1991, Leoul filed with the RTC of Negros
Oriental, a complaint for voiding the marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines. The RTC dismissed the complaint and the CA affirmed
the dismissal.
ISSUE:
Does the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate
with him, for more than five years constitute psychological incapacity?
RULING:
No, the failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with her husband
Leouel for more than five years does not constitute psychological incapacity.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated.
Facts:
Since her childhood, she had not known much less remembered her real father
Pablo Vicencio, and her known father had been and still is Ernesto Yu. Despite
of which she had been using the family name Vicencio in her school and other
activities. In view of such situation, confusion arose as to her
parentage
and
she had
been
subjected
to inquiries
why
as
she
is
using
Vicencio
her family
name,
both
by
her
classmates
and
their
neighbors,
causing
her
extreme
embarrassment.
Her
step-father
had
been
consulted
about
the petition and had given his consent thereto.
Held:
faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of
name was for a fraudulent purpose, or that the change of name would prejudice
public interest.
Private respondent asserts that her case falls under one of the justifiable
grounds aforecited. She says that confusion has arisen as to her parentage
because ever since childhood, Ernesto Yu has acted as her father, assuming
duties of rearing, caring and supporting her. Since she is known in society as
the daughter of Ernesto Yu, she claims that she has been subjected to
inquiries regarding her use of a different surname, causing her much
humiliation and embarrassment.
The Solicitor General however argues that there is no proper and reasonable
cause to warrant private respondents change of surname. Such change might
even cause confusion and give rise to legal complications due to the fact
that
private
(2)
respondents
step-father
has
two
children
with
her
mother.
In the event
may
even
claim
daughter. In
his
memorandum, the
Solicitor
General,
that Ernesto
Yu
has
no
opines
inheritance
rights
as
legitimate
Facts:
From the denial by the respondent Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila, in its special proceeding H-00237, of her petition for change of name,
Teresita Llaneta has come to this Court on appeal by certiorari.
Teresita's mother, one Atanacia Llaneta, was once married to Serafin Ferrer
with whom she had but one child named Victoriano Ferrer. In 1942 Serafin
Ferrer died, and about four years later Atanacia had relations with another
man out of which Teresita was born. Teresita lived with Atanacia's mother-inlaw, Victoria vda. de Ferrer.
Teresita was raised using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealings and
throughout her schooling. When she was about twenty years old, she applied for
a copy of her birth certificate in Irosin, Sorsogon as she was required
On the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname Llaneta, instead of
Ferrer which she had been using since she acquired reason, would cause untold
difficulties and confusion, Teresita petitioned the court below on March 18,
1969 for change of her name from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer.
After trial duly had, the respondent judge denied her petition; hence the
present recourse.
Issue:
Whether or not it is proper that her name be changed from Teresita Llaneta to
Teresita Llaneta Ferrer on the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname
Llaneta, instead of Ferrer which she had been using since she acquired reason,
would cause untold difficulties and confusion.
Ruling:
Yes, it is proper that her name be changed from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita
Llaneta Ferrer on the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname Llaneta,
instead of Ferrer which she had been using since she acquired reason, would
cause untold difficulties and confusion.
The principle that change of name that would give the false impression of
family relationship is not allowed remains valid but only to the extent that
the proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or
future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the
community in general. In the case at bar, however, the late Serafin Ferrer's
widowed mother, Victoria, and his two remaining brothers, Nehemias and Ruben,
One thing, however, is beyond cavil: those living who possess the right of
action to prevent the surname Ferrer from being smeared are proud to share it
with her.
FACTS:
Appellant
Silva
Australia
during
such
It
however,
was
married
to
time.
was
only
after
May
1945,
when
he
was
sent
back
to
US
for
medical
treatments
of
his
battle
wounds,
did
divorce
Aussie.
To
add,
on
May
9,
1948,
with
he
contracted
another
marriage
he
one
Priscilla
Isabel
of
co-
HELD:
RATIO:
(1) Yes, if appellant revealed his true situation, appellee would never have
agreed to be with appellant. Esthers loss of employment in the Girl Scouts
Davao Council was ultimately a result of Silvas deception and she should be
indemnified therefor. His concealment of his real status was not mere dolo but
actual fraud. He should then stand solely liable for any & all damages arising
therefrom.
Moreover, Esther acted in good faith since Slva formerly introduced her as
Mrs. Silva, sent her letters thus addressed which implied authority to use his
name.
(2) Yes. In the face of evidence, it is safe to conclude that no marriage had
really taken place. It is not proper for Esther to continue representing
herself as the wife of Saturnino considering that at the time, he was still
married to Priscilla Isabel. And as per Art 370 CC, a married woman is
authorized to use husbands surname, impliedly, it also excludes others from
doing likewise.
Facts:
Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, a minor, through her mother and natural
guardian, Corazon Adolfo Calderdon, filed a petition in the Court of First
Instance of Davao, praying that her name "Gertrudes Josefina del Prado" be
changed to "Getrudes Josefina Calderon." It is alleged in the petition that
the petitioner is an illegitimate child, out of a bigamous marriage contracted
by Manuel del Prado with Corazon Adolfo; that the surname "Del Prado" which
the petitioner carries is a stigma of illegitimacy, by reason of which she has
become the subject of unfair comments; that the surname which the petitioner
carries would constitute a handicap in her life in later years, and would give
cause for constant irritation in her social relations with other people; that
petitioner is living with her mother who is now married to Engineer Romeo C.
Calderon; and that it is the desire of the
petitioner
to
have
her
is
surname
the
changed from
"Del
Prado"
to
"Calderon
"which
surname
of
her
then
foster
father,
the
husband
of
her
mother.
granted
the
petition
and
ordered
petitioner
the
change
of
the
name
of
the
from
"Gertrudes
Josefina,
Calderon."
del
Prado,"
to
"Gertrudes
Josefina
The
court
Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in granting the petition for a
change of name, based upon "proper and reasonable cause" redounding to the
best interest of the child
Held: The court says, "In the opinion of the Court the reasons adduced by the
petitioner are valid and will redound to the best interests of said minor who
after all is not at fault to have come to this world as an illegitimate
child." A petition to change the name of an infant, as in this case, should be
granted only where to do so is clearly for the best interest of the child.
When the mother of the petitioner filed the instant petition she had in mind
what she believed was for the best interest of her child considering that her
husband Romeo C. Calderon is the one supporting the child and that he is
agreeable to the child's using his surname. The court further states that
"While it is true that the Code provides that a natural child by legal fiction
as the petitioner herein shall principally enjoy the surname of the father,
yet, this does not mean that such child is prohibited by law, from taking
another surname with the latters consent and for justifiable reasons." The
purpose of the law in allowing a change of name, as contemplated by the
provisions of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, is to give a person an
opportunity to improve his personality and to promote his interests. The
Solicitor General expresses an apprehension that because the petitioner here
is of tender age, who cannot as yet understand and appreciate the value of the
change of her name, may be prejudiced in her rights under the law. This
apprehension
is
dispelled
by
the
pronouncement
this
Court,
of
speaking
...
name
as
But
change
of
authorized
Rule
103
under
does
not
by
therefrom;
family rights and duties where none before was existing. It does not alter
one's legal capacity, civil status, or citizenship. What is altered is only
the name, which is that word or combination of words by which a person is
distinguished from others and which he bears as a label or appellation for the
convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or
dealing with him (38 Am. Jur.
596).
(In
Re
Petition
for
Change
of
Name
of
Joselito
Yu,
Juan
S.
FACTS:
Zosima Naldoza was married to Dionesio Divinagracia. They begot two children
named Dionesio Jr. and Bombi Roberto. Zosima's husband left her after she
confronted him with his previous marriage with another woman. He never
returned to the conjugal abode. He allegedly swindled Cong. Maglana in the sum
of 50,000.00 pesos and one Galagar in the sum of 10,000.00 pesos, also Eloy
Gallentes and other persons.
The classmates of Dionesio Jr. and Bombi Roberto allegedly teased them about
their father being a swindler. Two criminal cases for estafa were filed in
court against their father.
ISSUE:
HELD:
No, the two minors are not allowed to discontinue using their father's surname
and their mother's surname instead.
Mother's desire to change her children's surname should not be the sole
consideration for the change. Also, eliminating father's surname by the minor
children merely because their father is an alleged swindler is not sufficient
justification for change of surname. To allow the change of surname would
cause confusion as to the minors parentage and might create the impression
that the minors are illegitimate.
Article 364 of the Civil Code states that legitimate and legitimated children
shall principally use the surname of the father. The minors Dionesio Jr. and
Bombi Roberto, who are presumably legitimate, are supposed to bear principally
the surname Divinagracia, their father's surname. Rule 103, Section 5, Rules
of Court states, the change of name is allowed only when there are proper and
reasonable cases for such change.
Facts:
- Dec 10, 1933 petitioner married Lourdes Lukban but left after a fight.
Never came back in 20 years.
FACTS:
- Between the night of November 30, and the early morning of December 1, 1961,
Demetrio Pepito, a crew member of m/v P. Aboitiz, disappeared therefrom while
said vessel was on voyage.
Dec. 26, 1961 Aboitiz Shipping Corp received from Vivencia Pepito a letter
dated Dec. 21, stating that it is being notified that one of its employees was
reported missing while m/v P. Aboitiz was navigating. The letter states that
it is believed that Demetrio is already dead.
Jan. 12, 1962 Vivencia filed with the Regional Office of Dept of Labor (DoL)
a notice and claim for compensation, asking for death benefits.
Feb. 16, 1962 Aboitiz sent to the DoL its own version: Pepito disappeared
while off duty, and when the vessel was near Bucas Grande Island while the
ship was in navigation on a calm sea and good weather. We do not know if he
purposely jumped and swam ashore
- March 21, 1962 - without hearing, the Regional Administrator issued an award
for death benefits to respondents, planted upon the ground that the right to
compensation of the claimant has not been controverted by respondent within
the period provided for by law. The report states that Demetrio was found
missing on Dec. 1, 1961.
RATIO:
Aboitizs controversion (feb.16) was made beyond the periods set forth in the
law and the rules and regulations of the Workmens Compensation
the
notice
and
claim
for
compensation
simply
says
that
while
the
vessel
was
navigating,
the
herein
deceased
was
lost
or
reported
missing.
This
claim was filed on January 12, 1962, or barely 42 days after the event took
place. At that time, no presumption existed that Demetrio Pepito was dead.
The boat was not lost. This opens up a number of possibilities. Because
nothing is certain. Nobody knows what has happened to him.
As applied to the case before us, the mere failure to controvert the statement
that Demetrio Pepito is believed to be dead or deceased because
he was lost or was reported missing, does not import an admission that the
man is actually dead, but that he was just lost or missing.
Requiring Aboitiz to pay for death benefits violates its right to due process.
The Commission, to justify the award, refers to an investigation
report made 42 days after the incident by one Morales, a constabulary agent to
the effect that no one knew what happened to Demetrio Pepito because he
disappeared at midnight on a rough sea (big waves). But this report does not
prove death, it just confirms the fact of disappearance. Moreover, it was not
presented in any hearing, hence, it is a mere hearsay.
- At this point, more than 4 years has already elapsed, hence, the
disappearance could come within the coverage of art. 391, of CC: ART. 391. The
following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of
estate among the heirs: (3) A person who has been in danger of death under
other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four years.
Hence,
the
records
of
the
case
are
returned
to
the
Workmens
Compensation
Facts:
Capt. Julio J. Lucero, Jr. was appointed as captain of the ship EASTERN
MINICON of eastern shipping lines and under the contract, his employment was
good for one (1) round trip only, i.e., the contract would automatically
terminate upon arrival of the vessel at the Port of Manila, unless renewed. It
was further agreed that part of the captain's salary, while abroad, should be
paid to Mrs. Josephine Lucero, his wife, in Manila .
On February 16 1980, while the vessel was enroute from Hong Kong to Manila,
Captain Lucero sent three distress messages to the company stating that due to
the violent weather, their voyage is at peril. Subsequently, his last message
was for his entire crew to abandon ship.
The company then notified the coast guard and the latter conducted a search,
but to no avail.
The insurers then informed the company about the loss of the vessel. Eastern
Shipping then paid the death benefits to the heirs of the crew, however the
widow of Capt. Lucero refused to accept the benefits.
Mrs. Lucero then filed a complaint for payment of the accrued salary of her
husband which the company stopped paying on March 1980. She then alleged that
because the contract of her husband was on a voyage-to-voyage basis, the
company should pay her for her husbands salary until the ill fated vessel
returned to the port of Manila.
The company refused to pay. The National seamen board upheld the complaint and
the decision was affirmed by the NLRC
Held:
The NLRC based its judgment on Art 391 regarding the presumption of death at
sea. They argue that it was too early to presume that Mr. Lucero has died
because under the law, four (4) years have not yet passed.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the
division of the estate among the heirs: (1) A person on board a vessel lost
during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard
of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;...
The Supreme Court ruled however that a preponderance of evidence from the
telegraph messages and the fact that the vessel was not heard of again show
that it can be logically inferred that the vessel has sunk and the crew
perished. As the Court said in Joaquin vs. Navarro 4 "Where there are facts,
known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the
presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence
controls."
Hence the decision of the NLRC is reversed; however, death benefits should be
paid.
FACTS: Erlinda Reynoso prayed for the declaration of the absence of her
husband Roberto L. Reyes alleging that her husband had been absent from their
conjugal dwelling since April 1962 and since then had not been heard from and
his whereabouts unknown. The petition further alleged that her husband left
neither will nor any property in his name or any debts.
properties during their marriage and that they have no outstanding obligation
in favor of anyone; that her only purpose in filing the petition is to
establish the absence of her husband, invoking the provisions of Rule 107 of
the New Rules of Court and Article 384 of the Civil Code. After hearing the
Court a quo dismissed the petition on the ground that since Roberto L. Reyes
left no properties there was no necessity to declare him judicially an
absentee.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a need for the judicial declaration of absence
spouse for any purpose other than the protection of the interest or property
of the absentee.
HELD:
The
need
to
properties
have
which
person
have
judicially
to
be
by
the
declared
an
absentee
is
when
he
has
taken
cared
of
or
by
administered
representative
appointed
Court
384,
of
(Article
the
absentee
separation
of
is
Civil
Code);
asking
property
the
spouse
191,
Civil
for
(Article
Considering that neither the petition alleges, nor the evidence shows, that
Roberto L. Reyes has any rights, interest or property in the Philippines,
there is no point in judicially declaring him an absentee as the primordial
purpose of the declaration is to provide for an administrator of the property
of the absentee.
FACTS:
The Solicitor General opposed the petition alleging that petition for
cancellation and/or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Article
412 of the New Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,
contemplates a summary proceeding and correction of clerical errors.
substantial
civil
suit
changes
registry
is
filed,
in
record
the
may
evidence
be
is
allowed
if
proper
submitted,
notice
were
given
and
publication
of
Local Civil Registry of Cebu filed the motion to dismiss the petition since
corrections are not merely clerical but substantial. Lower court denied the
motion to dismiss. Oppositor-appellant Republic of the Philippines appealed by
way of petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
HELD:
No. This Court adheres to the principle that substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding.
Article 412 of the New Civil Code speaks of a summary proceeding for
correction of entries in the civil registry that refer to mere clerical errors
such as mispelled names, occupation of parents, etc.
However, if the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts
have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has
been thoroughly weighed and considered, the suit or proceeding is appropriate.
Moreover, if all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition
for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if
filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer
be described as "summary". There can be no doubt that when an opposition to
the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or
claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected
and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become
adversary proceedings.
The Court is of the opinion that the petition filed by the respondent in the
lower court by way of a special proceeding for cancellation and/or correction
of entries in the civil register with the requisite notice and publication and
the recorded proceedings that actually took place thereafter could very well
be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action.
FACTS:
Kumala
citizen,
Salim
Wing,
married
to
petitioner
Wing
herein,
Siong,
47
years
Muslim
woman
old,
Chinese
and
Filipino
citizen.
The
couple
have been married for almost ten (10) years now and that during
this
length
of time, they have six (6) children; and all these children are living and
none had died. The third child, Bio Heong, whose sex is sought to be corrected
in this petition, was born in Tulay, Jolo, Sulu. The couple had all their
children registered with the Immigration Office as aliens but that in the case
of Bio Heong, their third female child, a mistake as to her sex was committed
in the issuance of the child's certificate of live birth after the child, Bio
Heong was delivered from the womb of its mother, petitioner herein assisted by
the attending nurse, Hadji Kimjiok Donesa, who due to a confusion created by
other deliveries she attended the same day when Bio Heong was also delivered,
instructed Andami Labbay, her clerk, to prepare the Certificate of Live Birth
of the newly born child, Bio Heong, and dictated the entries to be filled up
in said document. This erroneous document was then filed with the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of Jolo, Sulu, without the attending nurse nor the
parents of the child having discovered its mistake before registration. The
couple had not discovered the mistake because both had no formal schooling and
does not read nor understand English. However, when the couple wanted to
register their child, Bio Heong, with the Immigration Office in Jolo, Sulu,
the error or mistake in the child's certificate of live birth was discovered
by the Immigration Office. Despite the discovery, the couple had the child,
Bio Heong, registered in the Immigration Office with the data used as
appearing in said certificate of live birth without correction. However, the
Immigration Officer advised the couple to see a lawyer to have the mistake
corrected.
ISSUE:
HELD:
YES. Considering the publication made, the appearance of the parties concerned
either personally or through their competent representatives and the
presentation of the evidence during the hearing, this petition is not summary
in nature, but it is undoubtedly an appropriate proceeding, where the matter
proved was threshed out in a regular trial on the merits. The persuasive
quality of the decision is thus apparent. No effort was spared to ascertain
the truth of the matter. What is clearly discernible is that an error was
committed and all that the Court did in accordance with law was to have it
corrected. It would be unwarranted under the circumstances, to reverse such a
decision. It must be affirmed.
1. Its conformity to the settled rule first set forth in the leading case of
Ty
Kong
Tin
v.
the
Philippines,
The
matter
was
the
Republic
1954
therein
of
decision,
is
quite
clear.
involved
citizenship
not
only
of
the
petitioner
involved.
petition
If
is
error
then
order
in
the
purpose
merely
to
of
correct
the
a
the
court
may
issue
an
order
that
the
error
or
clerical
mistake
2. Nor would it be the first time that a procedure of this character did
suffice for the correction of an error in the records of the Civil Registrar.
In Malicden v.
Republic
16
this
Court
held
that
testimonial
evidence
may
override
an
FACTS:
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari assailing the validity of the
judgment of the lower court. It was shown that she was married to the private
respondent
and
they
had
three
kids.
While
her
husband
was
studying
and
working
abroad,
he
cohabited
with
another
woman.
This
prompted
her
to
file
for separation and alimony against her husband. Her husband in return filed a
divorce case against her in Swiss Courts, contending that their marriage was
void for absence of valid marriage certificate. The Swiss Court held in favor
of the private respondent. Subsequently the Private Respondent filed a
petition for the cancellation of the marriage certificate in the Philippines.
The trial court granted his petition and denied Petitioners appeal. The
Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari in the CA, but the
latter denied the same. She filed this petition with the Supreme Court to
assail the validity of CAs decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring the marriage null and void?
HELD: