Descartes Dreams

Philosophy and Political Thought Paper 1

In his first meditation, Descartes questions the nature of knowledge, asking if we can
know anything for certain. He argues that our senses can be deceived, and therefore we
cannot trust them. In order to understand what we know for certain, he creates the concept of
defective nature doubt. Through this, he hopes to understand what is undeniably and
unequivocally true. He says that there is no way to know for sure if we are dreaming or
awake (or indeed mad) since we do not realize we are dreaming when we are asleep. Given
the potential uncertainty he demonstrates, he then attempts to find certain truth through his
arguments based on clear and distinct perception and attempts to tackle any objections that
might be raised to his arguments.
Descartes begins by analysing the nature of dreams, saying that despite the fantastic
nature of his dreams, everything he sees has some basis in reality. The visions which come
in sleep are like paintings, which must have been fashioned on the likeness of things that are
real, and hence that at least these general kinds of things eyes, head, hands and the body as
a whole are things which are not imaginary but are real and exist. (Descartes, 1996, p. 13)
Thus, everything we imagine comes from some initial impression- an established reality that
we observe in the world. Even in our dreams, therefore, there must be some reality. He
illustrates this by saying that even when painters try to create sirens and satyrs with the
most extraordinary bodies, they cannot give them natures which are new in all respects; they
simply jumble up the limbs of different animals. (Descartes, 1996, p. 13) Thus, his premise
is essentially that dreams are based (in part at least) on what we perceive when we are
awake. While dreams may appear completely made up, the fundamental elements of what
we dream will remain grounded in reality.
By comparing the composite nature of the observational sciences to dreams,
Descartes concludes that physics, astronomy, medicine, and all other disciplines which
depend on the study of composite things are doubtful, while arithmetic, geometry and other
subjects of this kind, which deal only with the simplest and most general things, regardless
of whether they really exist in nature or not, contain something certain and indubitable.
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(Descartes, 1996, p. 14) Descartes asserts that things which are abstract and can be
conceptualized without any information from the senses are clear and distinct. He shows in
his later meditations that these thoughts are clear and distinct due to the benevolence of God
(thus eliminating any potential defective nature doubt). As Descartes explains, it seems
impossible that such transparent truths should incur any suspicion of being false. (Descartes,
1996, p. 14) Essentially he says that our dreams are a twisted sense of reality, where
everything that we perceive with the senses may be twisted around by our mind (perhaps by
the subconscious). Despite this, however, there are some things that we perceive to be clear
and distinct, because they do not rely on our uncertain senses for validation or verification.
Our senses, as he demonstrates by saying, sometimes towers which looked round from a
distance appeared square close up. (Descartes, 1996, p. 53)These are the abstract, yet
fundamental concepts upon which our reasoning is based. Since they are not subject to the
senses, they remain true even in our dreams. He emphasises this point in the Fifth
Meditation, when he says, Even though I might be dreaming, if there is anything which is
evident to my intellect, then it is wholly true (Descartes, 1996, p. 14). Anything more
complex than these fundamental concepts, however, which are based on our observation and
interaction with the world around us, may be called into doubt such as the aforementioned
studies of physics, astronomy or even biology.
An objector claims that we cannot trust what we perceive because we believe our
dreams to be certain despite incoherencies. He says, things (seem) clear and certain to you
while you were dreaming, but afterwards you (discover) that they that they were doubtful
or false (Descartes, 1996, p. 66). He then asks If things which are ridiculous or absurd
sometimes appear certain, even utterly certain to people who are asleep or insane, then why
should not things which are certain, even utterly certain, appear false and doubtful?
(Descartes, 1996, p. 66) However, the objector does not fully understand Descartes
argument, as Descartes is quick to point out himself, and thus makes a mistake in his
argumentation. The objector refers to all ideas that appear certain as one, without drawing
the distinction that Descartes did between ideas that are generated through the intellect (i.e.
ideas that are clear and distinct) and ideas that are generated due to information received by
the senses. Descartes clearly mentions in his premise that the senses can be fooled and thus
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the information that we receive from them cannot be trusted in his first meditation.
Moreover, ideas that clearly and distinctly perceived due to their being generated through
the intellect are always true, even in dreams. This is something that the objector clearly fails
to recognise.
Descartes says that it requires some care to make a proper distinction between what
is clearly and distinctly perceived and what merely seems or appears to be. (Descartes, 1996,
p. 67) While this is a fair criticism of the objectors argument, Descartes doesnt draw clear
guidelines on what can be clearly and distinctly perceived in his response, and leaves it to the
reader to understand that the implied cases of what can be clearly or distinctly perceived are
those things that we can imagine and rationalise in our heads without any sort of sensory
information.
A problem with Descartes argument is the fact that in his premise, he assumes that
we perceive dreams in exactly the same way as reality and then attempts to disprove this. In
a dream, it is impossible to know that one is dreaming therefore, we accept whatever we
conceptualise in our dream to be real. However, when we are awake, we are far more
sceptical of our observations, and the only time one can be sceptical of what one sees is when
one is awake. Thus, it seems fallacious to start off with an argument that likens dreams or
madness (where one is incapable of exercising complete discretion of ones mental faculties)
to when one is awake.
While this has little effect on the conclusion of Descartes overall argument, it affects
the quality of his argument, as he is essentially arguing against a straw man. Moreover, his
argument in this case is dependent on the presence of a benevolent God. It is Gods
benevolence that allows Descartes to perceive that there is no defective nature doubt for
abstract ideas which are generated purely through the intellect and are independent of the
senses. His argument in this case might be made by not depending on the existence of God.

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Bibliography
Descartes, R. (1996). Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections from the Objections and
Replies. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

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