POLITICAL LAW PART VIII

ARTICLE VIII THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

1.

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such other

courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
a. What is judicial power?
Read: Badua vs. CBA, February 14, 1991
b. Restrictions to the exercise of judicial power
Political question doctrine
Read:
1) JAVELLANA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 50 SCRA 30
2) DE LA LLANA VS. ALBA, 112 SCRA 294
3) ALMARIO VS. ALBA, 127 SCRA 69 (When the question deals with the necessity,
expediency and wisdom of a particuar act, the same is political and not justiciable)
4. Read again ENRILE VS. JUDGE SALAZAR, June 5, 1990
b-1. Definition of political question
Read:
1. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333 Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom,
not the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or
validity of the contested act, the matter is definitely justiciable or non-political)
2.

Javellana vs. Exec. Secretary, 50 SCRA 30

3.

Tanada vs. Cuenco, 103 Phil. (Political questions are questions to be answered by the

people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority is vested to
the executive or legislative branch of the government).
4. Gonzales vs. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774 (When the crux of the problem deals with the validity of an
act, it is justifiable.
c. Cases on judicial power in general
1) LOPEZ VS. ROXAS, 17 SCRA 756
2) SANTIAGO VS. BAUTISTA, 32 SCRA 188
3) RADIOWEALTH VS. AGRACADA, 86 Phil. 429
4) NOBLEJAS VS. TEEHANKEE, 23 SCRA 405
5) LINA VS. PURISIMA, 82 SCRA 244
6) GARCIA VS. MACARAIG,39 SCRA 106
4.

Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the

jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over
cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
No law shall be passed reorganizing the judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its
members.
3. Section 3. The judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the judiciary may not
be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after
approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.
4. Section 4. (1) The Supreme

Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and 14 associate

justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of 3, 5 or seven members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or
law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, including those involving the
constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a
majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon.

(3) Cases or matters heard by a divisions hall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a
majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least 3 of such members. When the
required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or
principle of law laid down by the court en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except
by the court sitting en banc.
Read:
1) VARGAS VS. RILLORAZA, 80 Phil. 297
2) VIR-JEN SHIPPING VS. NLRC, 125 SCRA 577
3. JANDUSAY VS. CA, 172 SCRA 376
To be decided by the Supreme Court en banc
1.

Involving the constitutionality of any law, treaty, etc.;

2.

When there is conflict of the decisions of 2 or more divisions of the Supreme Court;

3.
latter;

When a case is referred to by the division to the banc and the same was accepted by the

4.

In death penalty cases;

1.

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1)
Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.
(2)

Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of

Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a)

All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive

agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is

in question;
(b)
All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto;

(c)

All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue;

(d)

All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher;

(e)

All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

(3)
Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require.
Such temporary assignment shall not exceed 6 months without the consent of the judge
concerned.
(4)

Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

(5)
Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading , practice , and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure
of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.
(6)

Appoint all officials and employees of the judiciary in accordance with the civil service

law.
(READ: Maniago vs. CA, 253 SCRA on the limitation of the Rulesnot to diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights.
a. What is the power of judicial review? What are its requisites?
DISOMANGCOP VS. HON. SIMEON DATUMANONG, 444 SCRA 203
Requisites for the exercise of judicial power.
The following are the requisites for the exercise of judicial power:
a.

There must be before the court a case calling for the exercise of judicial review;

b.

The question before the court must be ripe for judicial adjudication;

c.

The person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge;

d.

The question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity; and

e.

The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

Distinguish judicial power from judicial review.

Read:
1. Fernandez vs. Torres, 209 SCRA 677
1-a. Santos III vs. Northwest Airlines, 210 SCRA 256
1-c) ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION, 63 Phil. 139
2) DUMLAO VS. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392
3. NEPA VS. ONGPIN, 171 SCRA 657
4. Allied Broadcasting Center vs. Rep., Oct. 18, 1991
5. Lagamy vs. CA, 199 SCRA 501
a-1. Functions of Judicial Review
1)

legitimizing function

2)

checking function

3)

symbolic or educational function

Read:
aa. SALONGA VS. PANO, 134 SCRA 438
bb. JAVIER VS. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194
b. On personality to sue
Is there a difference as to the personality requirement if the law being questioned involves
disbursement of public funds and on the other hand, if it does not .
Standing to question the validity of an Executive Order which does not involve disbursement of
public funds; Requisites before the President may issue executive Orders in furtherance of police
power.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET AL. VS. SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, 482 SCRA 673
Ynares-Santiago, J
On December 12, 2002, President Arroyo issued EO 156 entitled PROVIDING FOR A
COMPREHENSIVE INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND DIRECTIONS FOR THE MOTOR VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAM AND ITS IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES.
Under Section 3.1 of the said EO, THE IMPORTATION INTO THE COUNTRY, INCLUSIVE OF
FREEPORT, OF ALL TYPES OF USED MOTOR VEHICLES IS PROHIBITED.
The private respondent, which has a business of importing all kinds of used motor vehicles
questioned the constitutionality of said EO.
I s s u e s:
1.

Does the private respondent have the personality to sue or to question the

constitutionality of EO 156?
2.

Does the President have the authority to promulgate EO to promote police power like in

this case?
3.

Is EO 156 constitutional?

Held:
1.

The private respondent has the personality to sue to question the constitutionality of an

administrative issuance because it will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement.
Respondents would suffer a direct injury if said EO will be implemented because in its Certificate
of Registration , it is allowed import/trade used motor vehicles and spare parts. Clearly, it would
suffer prejudice if importation of all motor vehicles, not only used cars will be prohibited.
2.
The President is authorized to issue an executive order provided it complies with the
following requisites:
a.

Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;

b.

It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;

c.

It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and

d.

It must be reasonable.

There is no question that no less than Art. VI, Section 28 [2] of the Constitution authorizes
Congress to in turn authorize the President by law, within specified limits, and subject to such
restrictions and limitations, to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas. Likewise, the Tariff
and Customs Code likewise delegates to the President similar powers.
3. Is the EO prohibiting the importation of all motor vehicles, not only used cars constitutional? In
this case, while the first two requisites are present, the 3 rd is not. This is so because it is not
within the powers of the President to prohibit the importation of other vehicles, not only cars,
even in the Freeport Zones like Subic which is allowed by RA 7227. The EO therefore is ultra
vires or beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the President because it tries to supplant
or modify the Constitution, its enabling statute and other existing laws.
The 4th requisite is not also present because the same is unreasonable since it likewise prohibit
the entry of used motor vehicles into the Freeport which is owed by law, RA 7227.
Read:
1) PASCUAL VS. SEC. OF PUBLIC WORKS, 110 Phil. 331
2) SANIDAD VS. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333
3) DUMLAO VS. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392
3-a. Read again NEPA VS. ONGPIN, 171 SCRA 57
4. Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, May 5, 1994
Read this very carefully because it changes the original concept of personality to sue when public
funds are involved or not.
2.

TATAD VS. GARCIA, April 6, 1995, 243 SCRA 436 (Even though no public funds are involved

and that petitioner is not directly injured by the contract, he has the personality to question the
same if it involves national interest)
3.
BUGNAY CONSTRUCTION VS. LARON, 170 SCRA 240 (If the contract is for local
consumption only, and that the petitioner is not directly injured by the said contract which does
not involve the disbursement of public funds, the petitioner has no personality to sue)
c.

May inferior courts also exercise the power of judicial review in the light of the

requirement of Section 4(2) of Article VIII?

Read: YNOT VS. IAC, March 20, 1987

d. Three views on the effects of declaration of unconstitutionality of a law

Read:
1) NORTON VS. SHELBY COUNTY, 118 US 425
2) SHEPPARD VS. BARREN, 194 US 553
3) DE AGBAYANI VS. PNB, 38 SCRA 429
4) REPUBLIC VS. HEREDA, 119 SCRA 411
5) REPUBLIC VS. CFI, 120 SCRA 151
e. Transfer of venue in criminal cases
Read:
1) PEOPLE VS. GUTIERREZ, 36 SCRA 172
2) PEOPLE VS. SOLA, 103 SCRA 393
3) PEOPLE VS. PILOTIN, 65 SCRA 635
f. Rule making power; note the limitations
Read:
1) BUSTOS VS. LUCERO, 81 Phil. 648
2) NUNEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 111 SCRA 433
g. On admission to the bar
Read: 1. IN RE CUNANAN, 94 Phil. 534
2. ZALDEVAR VS. GONZALES, Oct. 7, 1988 Re: Indefinite suspension imposed on
RAUL GONZALES)
g-1. May law students practice law before the courts? Requisites?
Read:

Circular No. 19, issued by the Supreme Court

on December 19, 1986

h. On the integration of the bar

Read:

IN RE EDILLON, 84 SCRA 554

6. Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof.
Read:

DE GUZMAN VS. PEOPLE, 119 SCRA 337

4.

Sections 7. (1) No person shall be appointed member of the Supreme Court or any lower

collegiate court unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. A member of the Supreme
Court must be at least 40 years of age, and must have been for 15 years or more a judge of a
lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
(2) The Congress shall

prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may

be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine
Bar.
(3) A member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity and
independence.
Section 8. A judicial and bar CouncilcompositionChief Justice, Secretary of Justice,
Representative of Congress, Integrated Bar, Professor of Law, retired justice and representative of
the private sector..
The regular membersterm of 4 yearsCommission on Appointments
Sec. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower court shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within 90 days from the
submission of the list.
a. Read:
1. UY vs. Judge Capulong, April 7, 1993
2. Court Administrator vs. Judge Gines

b. Read:
Exec. Order No.216, July 10, 1987, creating the Judicial and Bar council
8. Section 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and the associate justices of the Supreme Court,
and the judges of the lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their
salary shall not be decreased.
a. See Sec. 17, Art. XVIII
b. Read: 1) NITAFAN VS. COMMISSIONER, 152 SCRA 284
2) PERFECTO VS. MEER, 85 Phil. 552
3) ENDENCIA VS. DAVID, 93 Phil. 696
9. Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower court shall hold office
during good behavior until they reach the age of 70 years or become incapacitated to discharge
the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of
lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of majority of the members who actually took part
in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
Read:

1) OCAMPO VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, 51 O.G. 147

2) DE LA LLANA VS. ALBA, 112 SCRA 294

10. Section 12. The members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shall not
be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
Read:
1) GARCIA VS. MACARAIG, 39 SCRA 106
2) MANILA ELECTRIC VS. PASAY TRANSPORTATION, 57 Phil. 60
3) LOPEZ VS. ROXAS, 17 SCRA 756
4) IN RE: JUDGE RODOLFO MANZANO, October 5, 1988
11. Sections 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en
banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a member for
the writing o f the opinion o f the court. A certification to this effect signed by the CJ-Any

member who took no part or dissentedmust state the reason therefor. The same procedure in all
lower collegiate courts.
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due
course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.
Read:
1) AIR FRANCE VS. CARRASCOSO, 18 SCRA 155
2) VDA DE ESPIRITU VS. CFI, 47 SCRA 354
3) BUSCAYNO VS. ENRILE, 102 SCRA 7
4) MANGCA VS. COMELEC, 112 SCRA 273
5) VALLADOLID VS. INCIONG, 121 SCRA 205
6) NAPOLCOM VS. LOOD, 127 SCRA 757
7) NUNAL VS. CA, 169 SCRA 356
8)

Mangelen vs. CA, 215 SCRA 230

Requirement that the decision shall state clearly and distinctly state the law and the facts on
which it is based.
BEDRUZ VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, 484 SCRA 452
Carpio-Morales, J.
A trial courts omission to specify the offense committed, or the specific provision of the law
violated, is not in derogation of the constitutional requirement that every decision must clearly
and distinctly state the law and the facts on which it was based or the factual and legal bases
for the conclusions reached by the trial court as long as the legal basis can be inferred from the
discussion in the decision.

Further, the requirement that the decision shall state clearly and distinctly state the law and the
facts on which it is based applies only to a decision of a court of justice covered by Art. VIII of
the Constitution], not the Office of the Ombudsman.
GERMAN MACHINERIES CORPORATION VS. ENDAYA, 444 SCRA 329
When Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution shall be complied with by the courts.
Section 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
This constitutional provision applies only to cases submitted for decision, i.e., given due course
and after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, BUT NOT WHERE A
RESOLUTION IS ISSUED DENYING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION AND STATING THE LEGAL BASIS
THEREFOR like the petition raised are factual or there is no reversible error in the respondents
court decision, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
In this case , the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by the petitioner on
the grounds that the factual issues had already been passed upon by the NLRC, and since its
factual findings are in agreement with that of the Labor Arbiter, the same are binding and
conclusive upon the Court of Appeals. This complies with the constitutional requirement under
Section 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution
12. Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be
decided or resolved within 24 months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and unless
reduced by the Supreme Court, 12 months for all lower collegiate courts, and 3 months for all
other lower courts.
(2) A case shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
(4) Even after the lapse-the court shall still decide without further delay.
Section 16. The Supreme Court shall, within 30 days from the opening of each regular session of
the Congress, submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on the operations and
activities of the judiciary.
Read:
1) CORPUS VS. CA 98 SCRA 424
2) MALACORA VS. CA, 117 SCRA 435

3) MARCELINO VS. CRUZ, 121 SCRA 51

4) DE ROMA VS. CA, 152 SCRA 205
5) Administrative Circular No. 1, issued by the Supreme Court thru CHIEF JUSTICE CLAUDIO
TEEHANKEE on January 28, 1988, particularly par. 11 thereof.
13. Section 16

Bengzon vs Drilon
208 SCRA 133 Political Law Veto Power of the President
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were
repealed during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided
certain retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional
commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize retirement
benefits among government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill
(House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not give preferential treatment to
certain or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court
asking the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never
repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was one of those unpublished PDs which
were subject of the case of Taada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to
non publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then
readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill
(GAB) for 1992, Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices.
Congress however did the allotment in the following manner: Congress made an item
entitled: General Fund Adjustment; included therein are allotments to unavoidable
obligations in different brances of the government; among such obligations is the allotment
for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of
the retired justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is
already deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.

This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the
constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President was represented by then
Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General
Appropriations bill is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due
to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has
no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the
president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors
much less to the repeal of existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the
president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the
authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It
appears that in the same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the
others. This cannot be done. The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not
at all; the Executive must veto an entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this case, the
president did not veto the entire line item of the general adjustment fund. She merely vetoed
the portion which pertained to the pensions of the justices but did not veto the other items
covering obligations to the other departments of the government.

VARGAS VS RILLORAZA
Posted by kaye lee on 3:49 PM
G.R. No. L-1612 February 26 1948 [Composition of the Supreme Court, ]

FACTS:
Petitioner assails the validity of Sec. 14 of the The People's Court Act, Commonwealth Act
682, which provided that the President could designate Judges of First Instance, Judges-atlarge of First Instance or Cadastral Judges to sit as substitute Justices of the Supreme Court
in treason cases without them necessarily having to possess the required constitutional
qualifications of a regular Supreme Court Justice.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 14 of CA 682 is constitutional

RULING:
No. Sec. 14 of CA 582 is unconstitutional.

Article VIII, sections 4 and 5, of the Constitution do not admit any composition of the
Supreme Court other than the Chief Justice and Associate Justices therein mentioned
appointed as therein provided. And the infringement is enhanced and aggravated where a
majority of the members of the Court as in this case are replaced by judges of first
instance. It is distinctly another Supreme Court in addition to this. And the constitution
provides for only one Supreme Court.
Grounds for disqualification added by section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 to those
already existing at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and continued by it is not
only arbitrary and irrational but positively violative of the organic law.

Constitutional requirement (Art. VIII Sec 5) provides that the members of the Supreme Court
should be appointed by the President with the consent of the CoA, "Unless provided by law"
in Sec 4 cannot be construed to authorize any legislation which would alter the composition
of the Supreme Court, as determined by the Constitution.

However temporary or brief may be the participation of a judge designated under Sec. 14 of
PCA, there is no escaping the fact the he would be participating in the deliberations and acts
of the SC, as the appellate tribunal, and his vote would count as much as that any regular
Justice of the Court. "A temporary member" therefore would be a misnomer, as that position
is not contemplated by the Constitution, where Sec.4 of Art. VIII only provides A Chief Justice
and Associate Justices who have to be thus appointed and confirmed (Sec5).

Fortich vs Corona 398

SCRA 685
Posted on December 6, 2012

100 SCAD 781

298 SCRA 685
1998

The Office of the President modified its decision which had already become final
and executory.
FACTS:
On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President (OP) issued a win-win
Resolution which reopened case O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424. The said Resolution
substantially modified its March 29, 1996 Decision. The OP had long declared
the said Decision final & executory after the DARs Motion for Reconsideration
was denied for having been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
The SC then struck down as void the OPs act, it being in gross disregard of the
rules & basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.
The respondents contended in their instant motion that the win-win Resolution
of November 7, 1997 is not void since it seeks to correct an erroneous ruling,
hence, the March 29, 1996 decisioncould not as yet become final and
executory as to be beyond modification. They further explained that the DARs
failure to file their Motion for Reconsideration on time was excusable.
ISSUE:
Was the OPs modification of the Decision void or a valid exercise of its powers
and prerogatives?
1. Whether the DARs late filing of the Motion for Reconsideration is excusable.
2. Whether the respondents have shown a justifiable reason for the relaxation
of rules.
3. Whether the issue is a question of technicality.
HELD:
1.
No.
Sec.7 of Administrative Order No. 18, dated February 12, 1987, mandates
that decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall
become final after the lapse of 15 days from receipt of a copy
therof xxx unless a Motion for Reconsideration thereof is filed within such
period.
The respondents explanation that the DARs office procedure made it
impossibleto file its Motion for Reconsideration on time since the said decision
had to be referred to its different departments cannot be considered a valid

justification. While there is nothing wrong with such referral, the DAR must not
disregard the reglementary period fixed by law, rule or regulation.
The rules relating to reglementary period should not be made
subservient to the internal office procedure of an administrative body.
2.
No. The final & executory character of the OP Decision can no longer be
disturbed or substantially modified. Res judicata has set in and the adjudicated
affair should forever be put to rest.
Procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due
regard since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of
cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival
claims and in the administration of justice. TheConstitution guarantees that
all persons shall have a right to the speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies.
While a litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an
orderly & speedy administration of justice. The flexibility in the relaxation
of rules was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the
rules with impunity.
A liberal interpretation & application of the rules of procedure can only
be resorted to in proper cases and under justifiable causes and
circumstances.
3.
No. It is a question of substance & merit.
A decision/resolution/order of an administrative body, court or tribunal which is
declared void on the ground that the same was rendered Without or in Excess of
Jurisdiction, or with Grave Abuse of Discretion, is a mere technicality of law or
procedure. Jurisdiction is an essential and mandatory requirement before
a case or controversy can be acted on. Moreover, an act is still invalid if
done in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
In the instant case, several fatal violations of law were committed. These grave
breaches of law, rules & settled jurisprudence are clearly substantial, not of
technical nature.

When the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared final and executory, vested
rights were acquired by the petitioners, and all others who should be benefited
by the said Decision.
In the words of the learned Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in Videogram
Regulatory Board vs CA, et al., just as a losing party has the right to file an
appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative
right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case.

FORTICH vs. CORONA

289 SCRA 624, April 24, 1998

TOPIC: Finality of Judgement; Administrative Law

DOCTRINE: The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgements/resolutions

of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and
regulations; a resolution which substantially modifies a decision after it has attained finality
is utterly void. When an administrative agency's decision becomes final and executory and
no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said agency has lost
its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its decision.

FACTS:
On March 29, 1996, the Office of the President (OP) issued a decision converting a large
parcel of land from agricultural land to agro-industrial/institutional area. Because of this, a
group of farmer-beneficiaries staged a hunger strike in front of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) Compound in Quezon City in October 9, 1997. The strike generated a lot of
publicity and even a number of Presidential Candidates (for the upcoming 1998 elections)
intervened on behalf of the farmers.

Because of this blackmail, the OP re-opened the case and through Deputy Executive
Secretary Renato C. Corona issued the so-called, politically motivated, win-win resolution
on November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its 1996 decision after it had become final
and executory.

ISSUE: WON the win-win resolution, issued after the original decision had become final
and executory, had any legal effect.

HELD:
No; When the OP issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of March 29,
1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration
thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its
Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to
entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which
second motion became the basis of the assailed Win-Win Resolution. Section 7 of
Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate
that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of
March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed
in exceptionally meritorious cases, as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO
18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first motion
for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29,
1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the
case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had already become final
and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that
accord finality to administrative determinations.

The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or

quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The
noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all

lcp vs. comelec

LCP vs COMELEC
November 18, 2008
Facts:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities.
However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th
Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 which took effect on June 30, 2001. RA 9009
amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for
conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the
House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt
from the P100 million income requirements in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not
approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint
Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No.
29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to
approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed,
through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common
provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirements in RA 9009. On
December 22, 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the

cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on June 7, 2007. The cityhood
bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's
signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in
each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. Petitioners filed the
present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the
wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal
Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all
cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
Issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
Held:
1. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.
2. Yes. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th
Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th
Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the
income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the
level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even
have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the
classification criterion mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally related to
the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.
G.R. No. 161434

March 3, 2004

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.COMELEC, FPJ and VICTORINO X.
FORNIER,

G.R. No. 161634

March 3, 2004

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs.FPJ

G. R. No. 161824

March 3, 2004

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FPJ

Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poes disqualification in the presidential elections for having
allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poes) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a
natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition,

holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending
that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4,

paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding qualification of a candidate for the presidency
or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, refers to contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or
"Vice-President", of the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of "candidates" for
President or Vice-President before the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondents birth, provided
that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."

Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latters death certificate
was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that having died in
1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1980. In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzos
place of residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of residence prior his death, such that
Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in
1902. Being so, Lorenzos citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan---respondents father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son to Bessie, though an American citizen, was a Filipino
citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondents birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on
citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of
bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no
bearing on respondents citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced by the public
documents presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he
cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of
Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.

ecson vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004

DISCLAIMER: Contents herein are based on my consolidated research to other sources, please
refer to REFERENCES section.

FACTS:
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny
due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when
in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an
American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a
Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could
not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien
mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first,
Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie
Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly
only
a
year
after
the
birth
of
respondent.
Petitioners also questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in taking cognizance of and deciding
the citizenship issue affecting Fernando Poe Jr. They asserted that under Section 4(7), Article VII of
the 1987 Constituition, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the
basic issue of the case.

ISSUES:
1)
Whether
or
not
FPJ
is
a
natural
born
Filipino
citizen?
2) Whether or not the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the qualifications of presidential
candidates?

RULING:
1) It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen,
which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have
himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any
conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that
having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870,
when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of
residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his
place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse
Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if
acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to

hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
2) No. An examination of the phraseology in Rule 12, 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court on April 1992 categorically
speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for
President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action
against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such
context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a
registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number of votes
could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario. It is fair to
conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a
candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

Tecson vs. COMELEC , GR 16134 , March 3,

2004
FACTS: Petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in taking cognizance of and
deciding the citizenship issue affecting Fernando Poe Jr. They asserted that under Section 4(7) ,
Article VII of the 1987 Constituition, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue of the case.
ISSUE: As the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) , does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction
over the qualifications of presidential candidates?
RULING: No. An examination of the phraseology in Rule 12, 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court on April 1992 categorically
speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates"
for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an
action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In
Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest
number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election
scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph
7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the
qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

Lacson Vs. Perez Case Digest

Lacson Vs. Perez

357 SCRA 756 G.R. No. 147780

May 10, 2001

Facts: President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1,
2001 as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the
NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion were thereafter
effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an application
for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail
the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof.
Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the information against them were
filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved. They also contend that
they are allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being that hold
departure orders were issued against them.

Issue: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests and hold
departure orders allegedly effected by the same.

Held: President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly
the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents have declared that the
Justice Department and the police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the
courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in
suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not based
on Proc. No. 38. Petitioners prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at this time because
an individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,
providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing for the
period in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities,
otherwise the officer responsible for such may be penalized for the delay of the same. If the
detention should have no legal ground, the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention,
not prejudicial to claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither
assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders, nor were they expressing any intention to
leave the country in the near future. To declare the hold departure orders null and void ab initio must
be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners prayer for relief regarding
their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no complaints have been filed
against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is
to relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not subjected to.

Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier adverted
to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, are hereby

enjoined from arresting Petitioners without the required judicial warrants for all acts committed in
relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacaang.
Facts: On 01 May 2001, Gloria Arroyo, faced by an angry and violent mob armed with
deadly weapons assaulting and attempting to break into Malacaang, issued Proclamation No.
38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise
issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests
of several alleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion were thereafter effected. On 06
May 2001 she ordered the lifting of the declaration of a state of rebellion in Metro Manila.
Petitioners, Panfilo Lacson, Cezar Mancao and Michael Rey Aquino filed with an urgent
application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction and Miriam Santiago filed mandamus and/or review of the factual basis for the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, with prayer for a temporary
restraining order. The petitions assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by Gloria Arroyo
and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in
fact an in law.
Issue: Whether or not the Proclamation No 38 and General Order No 1 are constitutional.
Decision: Petitions are dismissed. The instant petitions have been rendered moot and
academic as Gloria Arroyo ordered the lifting of the declaration of a state of rebellion on 06
May 2001.
.R. No. 147780 (May 10, 2001)
FACTS:
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an angry mob assaulting and attempting to break into
Malacaang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region.
She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and
promoters of the rebellion were thereafter effected.
Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a state of rebellion, which allegedly gave a semblance
of legality to the arrests, four related petitions were filed before the Court assailing the declaration of a state of
rebellion by the President and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in
fact and in law.
1.
On May 6, 2001, the President ordered the lifting of the declaration of a state of rebellion in Metro Manila.
Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic.

2.
As to petitioners claim that the proclamation of a state of rebellion is being used by the authorities to justify
warrantless arrests, there are actually general instructions to law enforcement officers and military agencies to
implement Proclamation No. 38 and obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts. This means that preliminary
investigations will be conducted.
3.
Moreover, petitioners contention that they are under imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do
not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to
warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.
4.
Petitioners cannot ask the Court to direct the courts before whom the informations against the petitioners are
filed to desist from arraigning and proceeding with the trial of the case. Such relief is clearly premature considering
that as of this date, no complaints or charges have been filed against any of the petitioners for any crime.
5.
Hold departure orders issued against petitioners cannot be declared null and void since petitioners are not
directly assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders in their petition.
6.
Petitioner Defensor-Santiago has not shown that she is in imminent danger of being arrested without a
warrant. Hence, her petition of mandamus cannot be issued since such right to relief must be clear at the time of the
award.
7.
Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the Peoples Movement against Poverty (PMAP), argues that the declaration of a
state of rebellion is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers, being an encroachment on the domain of the
judiciary to interpret what took place on May 1. The Court disagreed since the President as the Commander-in-Chief
of all armed forces of the Philippines, may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
8.
As for petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), it is not a real party-in-interest. LDP has not
demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to
arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members and
supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion.
Even if instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, the Supreme Court does not have
jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition.
PETITIONS DISMISSED (However, petitioners cannot be arrested without the required judicial warrant for all acts
committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege)

Enrile v Senate Electoral Tribunal

Facts: On January 20, 1995, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel filed with the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET) an election protest against Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and other senatorial
candidates who won in the May 1995 senatorial elections.
On June 30, 1995, the petitioner, Sen. Enrile, filed his answer in counter-protest. Issues
having joined, the SET required the parties to submit the list of pilot precincts number
not more than 25% of the total precints involved.

On Aug. 21, 1997, SET held a press conference at the Supreme Court Session Hall
announcing the partial and tentative results of the revision of ballots in the pilot
precincts without resolving the protest. In the tabulation presented, the petitioners
name dropped to the 15th position in the senatorial race.
On September 24, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Partial Results in Sen.
Pimentels Protest and to Conduct Another Appreciation of Ballots in the Presence of All
Parties. Respondent and Sen. Coseteng filed separate comments alleging petitioners
motion is premature considering the SET has not resolved respondents election protest.
Nevertheless, the SET denied petitioners motion holding no sufficient basis to discard
the partial tabulation. The SET also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
A petition for Certiorari assailed for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
the resolution that denied petitioners Motion to Annul/Set Aside Partial Results in
Pimentels Protest and to conduct another Appreciation of Ballots in the Presence of All
Parties.

Issue: Whether or not there is still useful purpose that can serve in passing upon
merits of said petition.

Held: The Court finds the petition becoming moot and academic. The tenure of the
contested senatorial position subject to respondents protest expired on June 30, 1998.
The case became moot considering there is no more actual controversy between the
parties and has no useful purpose that can serve in passing upon any merit.
Where issues have become moot and academic, justiciable controversies are lost,
thereby rendering the resolution of no practical use or value.

The petition is dismissed.

Sanlakas vs. Exec Sec (2004)

Tinga, J.
FACTS: July 27, 2003-Oakwood mutiny -Pres GMA issued Proclamation no 47 declaring a "state of
rebellion" & General Order No. 4 directing AFP & PNP to supress the rebellion. -by evening, soldiers
agreed to return to barracks. GMA, however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion,
only doing so on August 1, 2003 thru Proc NO. 435.

Petitioners:
1. Sanlakas & PM; standing as "petitioners committed to assert, defend, protect, uphold, and promote the
rights, interests, and welfare of the people, especially the poor and marginalized classes and sectors of
Philippine society. Petitioners are committed to defend and assert human rights, including political and
civil rights, of the citizens freedom of speech and of expression under Section 4, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, as a vehicle to publicly ventilate their grievances and legitimate demands and to mobilize
public opinion to support the same; assert that S18, Art7 of the Consti does not require the declaration of
state of rebellion to call out AFP;assert further that there exists no factual basis for the declaration, mutiny
having ceased.
2. SJS; standing as "Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law profs & bar reviewers"; assert thatS18, Art7 of the
Consti does not require the declaration of the state of rebellion, declaration a "constitutional anomaly" that
misleads because "overzealous public officers, acting pursuant to such proclamation or general order, are
liable to violate the constitutional right of private citizens"; proclamation is a circumvention of the report
requirement under the same S18, Art7, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within
48 hours from the proclamation of martial law; presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise
of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President
3. members of House; standing as citizens and as Members of the House of Representatives whose
rights, powers and functions were allegedly affected by the declaration of a state of rebellion; the
declaration of a state of rebellion is a "superfluity," and is actually an exercise of emergency powers, such
exercise, it is contended, amounts to a usurpation of the power of Congress granted by S23 (2), Art6 of
the Constitution
4. Pimentel; standing as Senator; assails the subject presidential issuances as "an unwarranted, illegal
and abusive exercise of a martial law power that has no basis under the Constitution; petitioner fears that
the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of
warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion
Respondents: SolGen; petitions have been rendered moot by the lifitng of the proclamation; questions
standing of petitioners
ISSUES:
1. whether or not petitioners have standing
2. whether or not case has been rendered moot by the lifting of the proclamation 3. whether or not the
proclamation calling the state of rebellion is proper
RULING: 1. NOT EVERY PETITIONER. only members of the House and Sen Pimentel have standing.
Sanlakas & PM have no standing by analogy with LDP in Lacson v Perez" petitioner has not
demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify the resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person
not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that
its leaders, members, and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the
crime of rebellion." At best they seek for declaratory relief, which is not in the original jurisdiction of SC.
Even assuming that Sanlakas & PM are "people's organizations" in the language of Ss15-16, Art13 of the
Consti, they are still not endowed with standing for as inKilosbayan v Morato "These provisions have not
changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be,
may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional
questions, is limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of S5,Art8. This requirement lies at the
very heart of the judicial function." SJS, though alleging to be taxpayers, is not endowed with standing
since "A taxpayer may bring suit where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of
public funds derived from taxation.No such illegal disbursement is alleged." Court has ruled out the
doctrine of "transcendental importance" regarding constitutional questions in this particular case. Only

members of Congress, who's (?) powers as provided in the Consti on giving the Pres emergency powers
are allegedly being impaired, can question the legality of the proclamation of the state of rebellion.
2. YES. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to the determination
of "actual controversies." Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is "capable of
repetition yet evading review."19 The case at bar is one such case, since prior events (the May 1, 2001
incident when the Pres also declared a state of rebellion) prove that it can be repeated. 3. YES. S18, Art
7 grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of "graduated power[s]." From the most to
the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution
requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety
requires the exercise of such power. However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Zamora, "[t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is
that 'whenever it becomes necessary,' the President may call the armed forces 'to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.'"Nevertheless, it is equally true that S18, Art7 does not expressly
prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not
only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers. The ponencia then
traced the evolution of executive power in the US (Jackson and the South Carolina situation, Lincoln and
teh 'war powers', Cleveland in In re: Eugene Debs) in an effort to show that "the Commander-in-Chief
powers are broad enough as it is and become more so when taken together with the provision on
executive power and the presidential oath of office. Thus, the plenitude of the powers of the presidency
equips the occupant with the means to address exigencies or threats which undermine the very existence
of government or the integrity of the State." This, plus Marcos v Manglapus on residual powers, the Rev
Admin Code S4, Ch2, Bk3 on the executive power of the Pres to declare a certain status, argue towards
the validity of the proclamation. However, the Court maintains that the declaration is devoid of any legal
significance for being superflous. Also, the mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or
violate constitutionally protected rights. if a state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,61 then it is with more
reason that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about these conditions.
Apprehensions that the military and police authorities may resort to warrantless arrests are likewise
unfounded. In Lacson vs. Perez, supra, majority of the Court held that "[i]n quelling or suppressing the
rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as
provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,63 if the circumstances so warrant. The
warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a 'state of rebellion.'"64 In
other words, a person may be subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion whether or not
the President has declared a state of rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are
present. The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law
and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no illustration that
the President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law powers. Finally, Nor by any stretch
of the imagination can the declaration constitute an indirect exercise of emergency powers, which
exercise depends upon a grant of Congress pursuant to S23 (2), Art6 of the Constitution. The petitions do
not cite a specific instance where the President has attempted to or has exercised powers beyond her
powers as Chief Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and
in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commanderin-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by S1 & 18, Art7, as
opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.

SANLAKAS Vs. Executive Secretary Case Digest

SANLAKAS Vs. Executive Secretary

421 SCRA 656 G.R. No. 159085

February 3, 2004

Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men
of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have
seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and
declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the President,
Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the
Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went
back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and
General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of
Rebellion was issued.

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG
MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of
the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that
there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive
Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report
requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to
Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the
presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has
not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President MacapagalArroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the
power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo,
et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the
unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.

Issue:

Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?

Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?

Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The
President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive
powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces
and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine
whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse
of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the
President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as
there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities
have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the
Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the
armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief
powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article
VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The
fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there is
rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid
warrantless arrest is present.

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that
is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have
no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of
Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the
power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the
powers of that institution.

SALONGA vs PAO
APRIL 9, 2014 | KAAARINA

SALONGA vs PAO
G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985
Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and
liberty guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case
has been established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion
against him. Petitioner asks the Court to prohibit and prevent the respondents

from using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a
member of the democratic opposition in the Philippines.
The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the Metro
Manila area in the months of August, September and October of 1980. Victor
Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the bombing, implicated petitioner
Salonga as one of those responsible.
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a
Notice of Preliminary Investigation in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al.
(which included petitioner as a co-accused), stating that the preliminary
investigation of the above-entitled case has been set at 2:30 oclock p.m. on
December 12, 1980 and that petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of
the charge sheet and the supporting evidence within which to file his counterevidence. The petitioner states that up to the time martial law was lifted on
January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, he has not received
any copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting
evidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed
by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12 March 1981, charging Salonga, along with 39
other accused with the violation of RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and
PD 1736. On 15 October 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss
the charges against Salonga for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima
facie case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano (Presiding
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied
the motion. On 4 January 1982, he (Pano) issued a resolution ordering the filing
of an information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended,
against 40 people, including Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge dated 2
December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of the present petition for
certiorari. It is the contention of Salonga that no prima facie case has been
established by the prosecution to justify the filing of an information against him.
He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence
against him would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.
Issues: 1. Whether the above case still falls under an actual case

2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still deserves a decision
from the Supreme Court
Held: 1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on
the Courts judgment had been arrived at, and a draft ponencia was circulating
for concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985,
respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal
Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant to
instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and
decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused
in the information filed under the questioned resolution.
The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent
Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from circulating for concurrences and
signatures and to place it once again in the Courts crowded agenda for further
deliberations.
Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion
charges is concerned, this decision has been rendered moot and academic by
the action of the prosecution.
2. Yes. Despite the SCs dismissal of the petition due to the cases moot and
academic nature, it has on several occasions rendered elaborate decisions in
similar cases where mootness was clearly apparent.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating
bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.
In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:
The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal
from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity
on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of the
Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.

In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the
Philippines could validly be created through an executive order was mooted by
Presidential Decree No. 15, the Centers new charter pursuant to the Presidents
legislative powers under martial law. Nevertheless, the Court discussed the
constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of Filipino culture
for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), the fact that
the petition was moot and academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise of
its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions
ever printed in the Reports.