Javellana vs executive secretary

Constitutional Law Political Question Validity of the 1973 Constitution Restriction to Judicial Power
In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973 Constitution. Javellana, a Filipino
and a registered voter sought to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from implementing the
said constitution. Javellana averred that the said constitution is void because the same was initiated by the
president. He argued that the President is w/o power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the
proposed constitution. Further, the election held to ratify such constitution is not a free election there being
intimidation and fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition.
HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC justices expressed the
view that they were concluded by the ascertainment made by the president of the Philippines, in the
exercise of his political prerogatives. Further, there being no competent evidence to show such fraud and
intimidation during the election, it is to be assumed that the people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973
Constitution. The question of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political question which was left to the
people in their sovereign capacity to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown such acquiescence.

JAVELLANA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. L-36142, March 31 1973, 50 SCRA 33
FACTS:
On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of
plebiscite cases, Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from
implementing any of the provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the present
1935 Constitution. This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified
and registered voter and as a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters
similarly situated. Javellana also alleged that the President had announced the immediate
implementation of the new constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including.
Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said
proposed constitution upon ground the that the President as Commander-in-Chief of the
AFP is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to approve
proposed constitution; without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of
the proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify the proposed constitution was not
a free election, hence null and void.

Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification ofProclamation No. 1102 and any
order, decree, and proclamationwhich have the same import and objective.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable or
political question, and therefore non-justiciable.
2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971Constitutional Convention has
been ratified validly conforming to the applicable constitutional and statutory
provisions.
3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without
valid ratification) by the people.
4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.
5. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention in
force.
HELD:
First. To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon whether
or not the said new constitution has been ratified in accordance with the requirements of
the 1935 Constitution. It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment
to the constitution should be settled applying the provisions of the constitution in force at
the time of the alleged ratification of the old constitution.
The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance with the
provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as jurisprudence here and in
the US (from whom we patterned our 1935 Constitution) shall show.
Second. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking
the qualifications and having the disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right
of suffrage.
The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the
Citizens assemblies void. Proceedings held in such Citizens Assemblies were
fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in Article V
Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since
there is no means by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be
separated or segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in the
Citizens Assemblies must be considered null and void.
Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void. Article XV of the 1935
Constitution envisages with the term "votes cast" choices made on ballots not orally or
by raising hands by the persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but natural and logical,
for, since the early years of the American regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot

System, with its major characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared and
furnished by the Government and secrecy in the voting, with the advantage of keeping
records that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the election
returns.
The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision of
COMELEC is void. The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place
without the intervention of the COMELEC and without complying with the provisions of the
Election Code of 1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree No. 73. The procedure
therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable means of checking the
accuracy of the returns filed by the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is another
patent violation of Article X of the 1935 Constitution which form part of the fundamental
scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the "free, orderly, and
honest" expression of the people's will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the
Citizens Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the same are claimed to have ratified the
revised Constitution.
Third. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of ratification. Article X of the 1935
Constitution places COMELEC the "exclusive" charge to the "the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," independently of the
Executive. But there is not even a certification by the COMELEC in support of the alleged
results of the citizens assemblies relied upon inProclamation No. 1102. Also, on January
17, 1973 neither the alleged president of the Federation of Provincial or City Barangays
nor the Department of Local Governments had certified to the President the alleged result
of the citizens' assemblies all over the Philippines. The citizens assemblies did not adopt
the proposed constitution. It is to my mind a matter of judicial knowledge that there have
been no such citizens assemblies in many parts of Manila and suburbs, not to say, also, in
other parts of the Philippines.
Fourth. The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices of the
Executive Department, in line withProclamation No. 1102, connote recognition of or
acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.
A department of the Government cannot recognize its own acts. Recognition normally
connotes the acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another. Individual acts of
recognition by members of Congress do not constitute congressional recognition, unless
the members have performed said acts in session duly assembled. This is a wellestablished principle of Administrative Law and of the Law of Public Officers. The
compliance by the people with the orders of martial law government does not constitute
acquiescence to the proposed Constitution. Neither does the Court prepared to declare
that the people's inaction as regards Proclamation No. 1102, and their compliance with a
number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or instructions, some or many of which have
admittedly had salutary effects, issued subsequently thereto, amounts to a ratification,
adoption or approval of said Proclamation No. 1102. The intimidation is there, and inaction

or obedience of the people, under these conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity
or acquiescence.
As regards the applicability to these cases of the "enrolled bill" rule, it is well to remember
that the same refers to a document certified to the President for his action under the
Constitution by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Reps, and attested
to by the respective Secretaries of both Houses, concerning legislative measures approved
by said Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of the President declaring the
results of a plebiscite on the proposed Constitution, an act which Article X of the 1935
Constitution denies the executive department of the Government.
In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case, petitions therein
should be given due course, there being more than prima facie showing that the proposed
Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution,
either strictly, substantially, or has been acquiesced in by the people or majority thereof;
that said proposed Constitution is not in force and effect; and that the 1935 Constitution is
still the Fundamental Law of the Land, without prejudice to the submission of said
proposed Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for its ratification or rejection in
accordance with Articles V, X and XV of the 1935 Constitution and the provisions of the
Revised Election Code in force at the time of such plebiscite.
Fifth. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; 4 members of
the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote
thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state
with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution;
and 2 members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the
Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the
result, there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.
Javellana vs. The Executive Secretary
The Facts:
Sequence of events that lead to the filing of the Plebiscite then Ratification Cases.
The Plebiscite Case
On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was
amended by Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention
to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines.
Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, approved
on August 24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to the
said Convention was held on November 10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention
began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971.

While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued
Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law.
On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines
issued Presidential Decree No. 73, "submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or
rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor," as well as setting the
plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January 15,
1973.
On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections,
the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said "respondents or
their agents from implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further
orders of the Court," upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree "has no
force and effect as law because the calling ... of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines
for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to
be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by
the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress ...," and "there is no proper submission to
the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom
of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of
the contents thereof."
On December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the
effects of Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed
Constitution.
On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the
ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was
taken until January 7, 1973, when General Order No. 20 was issued, directing "that the
plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15, 1978, be postponed until further notice."
Said General Order No. 20, moreover, "suspended in the meantime" the "order of
December 17, 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for
purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution."
Because of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite,
the Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned
cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held
were known or announced officially. Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935
Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on January 22, 1973, and since the
main objection to Presidential Decree No. 73 was that the President does not have the
legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress
unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite
by the President reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress
and the Commission on Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final

action on these cases.

"In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No. L-35948 filed an
"urgent motion," praying that said case be decided "as soon as possible, preferably not
later than January 15, 1973."
The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the Court issued a resolution
requiring the respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said "urgent motion" and
"manifestation," "not later than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973." Prior thereto, or on
January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, the petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 riled a
"supplemental motion for issuance of restraining order and inclusion of additional
respondents," praying:
"... that a restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent Commission on
Elections, as well as the Department of Local Governments and its head, Secretary Jose
Roo; the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado Estrella; the
National Ratification Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their
deputies, subordinates and substitutes, and all other officials and persons who may be
assigned such task, from collecting, certifying, and announcing and reporting to the
President or other officials concerned, the so-called Citizens' Assemblies referendum
results allegedly obtained when they were supposed to have met during the period
comprised between January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the two questions quoted in
paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion."
On the same date January 15, 1973 the Court passed a resolution requiring the
respondents in said case G.R. No. L-35948 to file "file an answer to the said motion not
later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16, 1973," and setting the motion for hearing "on
January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m." While the case was being heard, on the date last
mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on the writer of this opinion and
said that, upon instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was delivering to
him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the
President. Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall and announced to the Court,
the parties in G.R. No. L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing in connection therewith was still
going on and the public there present that the President had, according to information
conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that
morning.
The Ratification Case
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142 against the Executive
Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said
respondents "and their subordinates or agents from implementing any of the provisions of
the propose Constitution not found in the present Constitution" referring to that of 1935.
The petition therein, filed by Josue Javellana, as a "Filipino citizen, and a qualified and
registered voter" and as "a class suit, for himself, and in behalf of all citizens and voters

similarly situated," was amended on or about January 24, 1973. After reciting in substance
the facts set forth in the decision in the plebiscite cases, Javellana alleged that the
President had announced "the immediate implementation of the New Constitution, thru his
Cabinet, respondents including," and that the latter "are acting without, or in excess of
jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution" upon the ground: "that the
President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is without
authority to create the Citizens Assemblies"; that the same "are without power to approve
the proposed Constitution ..."; "that the President is without power to proclaim the
ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and "that the election held
to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void."
The Issue:
1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and
therefore non-justiciable, question?
2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified
validly (with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable
constitutional and statutory provisions?
3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid
ratification) by the people? (acquiesced - "permission" given by silence or passiveness.
Acceptance or agreement by keeping quiet or by not making objections.)
4. Are petitioners entitled to relief?
5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?
The Resolution:
Summary:
The court was severely divided on the following issues raised in the petition: but when the
crucial question of whether the petitioners are entitled to relief, six members of the court
(Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra) voted to dismiss the
petition. Concepcion, together Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, voted to grant
the relief being sought, thus upholding the 1973 Constitution.
Details:
1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political
and therefore non-justiciable, question?
On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the
issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political

question. Justices Makalintal and Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only
inferentially, in their discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote,
stating that "inasmuch as it is claimed there has been approval by the people, the Court
may inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually been such an approval,
and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the people's will,
but, in negative, the Court may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or
not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution been complied with." Justices Makasiar, Antonio,
Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue is political and "beyond
the ambit of judicial inquiry."
2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been
ratified validly (with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the
applicable constitutional and statutory provisions?
On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that the
Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in
accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one
way for ratification, i.e., "in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and
participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters.
Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973
Constitution has been validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light
of traditional concepts regarding the meaning and intent of said Article, the referendum in
the Citizens' Assemblies, specially in the manner the votes therein were cast, reported and
canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof. In view, however, of the fact that I have
no means of refusing to recognize as a judge that factually there was voting and that the
majority of the votes were for considering as approved the 1973 Constitution without the
necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am constrained to
hold that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodox legal sense, the people may be
deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part
required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its political aspect, which is
what counts most, after all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and, in
effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified."
Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that
under their view there has been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional
requirements for valid ratification.
3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without
valid ratification) by the people?
On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned
proposed Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court.
Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold

that "the people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution."

Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be
no free expression, and there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote
all over the Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution
under Martial Law. Justice Fernando states that "(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated
in some American decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the
ratification, a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the people must be
accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that such
doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the
difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of
debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law." 88
Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to
rule on the question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their
statement that "Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions
through the usual media vehicle restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the point
of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution."
4. Are petitioners entitled to relief?
On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal,
Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice
Makalintal and Castro so voted on the strength of their view that "(T)he effectivity of the
said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these
cases to resolve which considerations other than judicial, an therefore beyond the
competence of this Court, 90 are relevant and unavoidable." 91
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself
voted to deny respondents' motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions.
5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?
On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force:
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra
hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof;
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and
Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question
that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not
accepted the Constitution; and
Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the
Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result
that there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.
ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro,
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief
Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are
hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle

to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.

It is so ordered.
Case of People of the R.P. vs. Genosa
G.R.No. 135981 15January2004
FACTS OF THE CASE:
That Marivic Genosa, the Appellant on the 15November1995, attacked and wounded his
husband, which ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant she did not provoke
her husband when she got home that night it was her husband who began the
provocation. The Appellant said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and
she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact, The Appelant had to
be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and
hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.
The Appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at
least five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. The
Apellant said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was
because 'he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos.
The Appellant after being interviewed by specialists, has been shown to be suffering from
Battered Woman Syndrome.
The appellant with a plea of self defense admitted the killing of her husband, she was then
found guilty of Parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband
was attacked while asleep.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Can Marivic Genosa be granted the Justifying circumstance of Self-defense, and
can she be held liable for the aggravating circumstance of treachery?
No, Since self- defense since the existence of Battered woman syndrome, which the
appellant has been shown to be suffering in the relationship does not in itself establish the
legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in
the context of self-defense.
In the present case, however, according to the testimony of the appellant there was a
sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of the husband and her fatal
attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and
escape to their children's bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and
went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended
altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or
safety.

Without continuous aggression there can be no self-defense. And absence of

aggression does not warrant complete or incomplete self-defense.
No, There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the
defense that the offended party might make.
The circumstances must be shown as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be
deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of
evidence. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an
argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance,
because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated
aggression from the assailant.
In the present case, however it was not conclusively shown, that the appellant
intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her husband without any
risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it appears that
the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment when she
decided to kill her spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that she consciously and
deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in order to ensure
its execution, the doubt should be resolved in her favor.
HELD:
The conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However,
there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending
her commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
ADDENDUM:
When can BWS (Battered Woman Syndrome) as self defense be appreciated?
Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual
physical assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery
usually have a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious,
deadly attack before she can defend her life "would amount to sentencing her to 'murder
by installment.' Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous
battering episodes) prior to the defendant's use of deadly force must be
shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of
danger. Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be
appreciated.

People of the Philippines v. Leo Echegaray y Pilo

People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Leo Echegaray y Pilo, Defendant
Appellant
Per Curiam
Doctrine: Neither excessive fines nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
Date: February 7, 1997
Ponente: As it is a Per curiam decision, the court is acting collectively & anonymously.
Facts:

The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the
accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter.

The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was
already in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty
of death.

The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on

the sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the
alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. The motion was dismissed as
the SC found no substantial arguments on the said motion that can disturb the
verdict.

On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian

R. Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free
Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines. (FLAG)

A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of

accused-appellant aiming for the reversal of the death sentence.

In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues:
(1) mixed factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2)
alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal
question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.

Issue/s: WON the death penalty law (RA no. 7659) is unconstitutional
Held: No.
Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration & supplemental motion for
reconsideration are denied for lack of merit.

Ratio:

Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment as ruled by the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in Furman
v. Georgia. To state, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman, categorically
ruled that the death penalty is a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, is
misleading and inaccurate.

The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the
arbitrariness pervading the procedures by which the death penalty was
imposed on the accused by the sentencing jury. Thus, the defense theory in
Furman centered not so much on the nature of the death penalty as a
criminal sanction but on the discrimination against the black accused who is
meted out the death penalty by a white jury that is given the unconditional
discretion to determine whether or not to impose the death penalty.

Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and
unusual per se. While the U.S. Supreme Court nullified all discretionary death
penalty statutes in Furman, it did so because the discretion which these
statutes vested in the trial judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and
without any parameters, guidelines, or standards intended to lessen, if not
altogether eliminate, the intervention of personal biases, prejudices and
discriminatory acts on the part of the trial judges and sentencing juries.

accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman or

degrading punishment for the crime of rape mainly because the latter, unlike
murder, does not involve the taking of life.

In support of his contention, accused-appellant largely relies on the ruling of

the U.S. Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia:: "Rape is without doubt
deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral depravity and of the
injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with murder,
which does involve the unjustified taking of human life. Although it may be
accompanied by another crime, rape by definition does not include the death
of or even the serious injury to another person. The murderer kills; the rapist,
if no more than that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the murderer; for
the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over
and normally is not beyond repair. We have the abiding conviction that the
death penalty, which 'is unique in its severity and irrevocability' x x x is an
excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life"

The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two grounds:

first, that the public has manifested its rejection of the death penalty
as a proper punishment for the crime of rape through the willful

omission by the state legislatures to include rape in their new death

penalty statutes in the aftermath of Furman;

Phil. SC: Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this
could have any bearing on the Philippine experience and
in the context of our own culture.

second, that rape, while concededly a dastardly contemptuous

violation of a woman's spiritual integrity, physical privacy, and
psychological balance, does not involve the taking of life.

Phil. SC: we disagree with the court's predicate that the

gauge of whether or not a crime warrants the death
penalty or not, is the attendance of the circumstance of
death on the part of the victim. Such a premise is in fact
an ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive justice
of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth".

The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally promulgated, provided for the death
penalty in specified crimes under specific circumstances. As early as 1886, though,
capital punishment had entered our legal system through the old Penal Code, which
was a modified version of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.

Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason,
correspondence with the enemy during times of war, qualified piracy, parricide,
murder, infanticide, kidnapping, rape with homicide or with the use of deadly
weapon or by two or more persons resulting in insanity, robbery with homicide, and
arson resulting in death.

The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional
question of whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or
unusual punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against
cruel and unusual punishment

Harden v. Director of Prison- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel,

unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States
Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or
a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of
life.

People v. Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly
believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or
ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute books,
and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it

is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their
private opinions,"

Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty.
Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to
be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should
first be perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the death
penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be resorted
to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality
in society

what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice,
public order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the
penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the
death penalty for said crimes.

Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly violent

manner in which the same was committed or by the reason of its inherent
viciousness, shows a patent disregard and mockery of the law, public peace
and order, or public morals. It is an offense whose essential and inherent
viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and outrageous to a civilized society
and hence, shock the moral self of a people.

The right of a person is not only to live but to live a quality life, and this means that
the rest of society is obligated to respect his or her individual personality, the
integrity and the sanctity of his or her own physical body, and the value he or she
puts in his or her own spiritual, psychological, material and social preferences and
needs.

Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is
raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson
resulting in death, and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the
death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape,
parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention where the
victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were
inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a
minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive
arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to
death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.

SC: the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because:

the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that

have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely
destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from abject
poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined
and honest citizenry

they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim
and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the
safety of individuals and the survival of government, they must be
permanently prevented from doing so

People v. Cristobal: "Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of

another person. It does injury to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the
respect, freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which every person has a
right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is always an
intrinsically evil act xxx an outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the
victim but the society itself.

Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008
Facts: The brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, farmers from Bulacan who were
suspected of being members of the New Peoples Army, were forcibly taken from their
home, detained in various locations, and tortured by CAFGU and military units. After
several days in captivity, the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo recognized their abductors
as members of the armed forces led by General Jovito Palparan. They also learned that
they were being held in place for their brother, Bestre, a suspected leader of the
communist insurgents. While in captivity, they met other desaperacidos (including the
still-missing University of the Philippines students Karen Empeno and Sherlyn Cadapan)
who were also suspected of being communist insurgents and members of the NPA. After
eighteen months of restrained liberty, torture and other dehumanizing acts, the brothers
were able to escape and file a petition for the writ of amparo.
Issue: Whether or not the right to freedom from fear is or can be protected by existing
laws.
Held: Yes. The right to the security of person is not merely a textual hook in Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution. At its core is the immunity of ones person against
government intrusion. The right to security of person is freedom from fear, a guarantee
of bodily and psychological integrity and security.
To whom may the oppressed, the little ones, the desaperacidos, run to, if the Orwellian
sword of the State, wielded recklessly by the military or under the guise of police power, is
directed against them? The law thus gives the remedy of the writ of amparo, in addition to
the rights and liberties already protected by the Bill of Rights. Amparo, literally meaning
to protect, is borne out of the long history of Latin American and Philippine human rights
abusesoften perpetrated by the armed forces against farmers thought to be communist

insurgents, anarchists or brigands. The writ serves to both prevent and cure extralegal
killings, enforced disappearances, and threats thereof, giving the powerless a powerful
remedy to ensure their rights, liberties, and dignity.Amparo, a triumph of natural law that
has been embodied in positive law, gives voice to the preys of silent guns and prisoners
behind secret walls.

Lambino vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 174153

October 25, 2006

FACTS:
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their
initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act
No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least
twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three
per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election
registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Groups initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI
(Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII
entitled Transitory Provisions. These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system
to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative;

2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution; and
HELD:
1.

The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on

Direct Proposal by the People

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a peoples
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x
x x (Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended that the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment should be
ready and shown to the people before they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that before
they sign there is already a draft shown to them. The framers also envisioned that the people should sign
on the proposal itself because the proponents must prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.
The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition is that the
entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be
present.First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative
can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a
petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the
people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition only if the people sign on a petition that
contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures that the petition contained, or incorporated by
attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the people
signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet
after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006.

2.

A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. There is
no need to revisit this Courts ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or
reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to
revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the
Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.