SALES vs SANDIGANBAYAN

right to due process.

FACTS:

Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not

intended to usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a
casual affair. The officer conducting the same investigates or
inquires into the facts concerning the commission of the crime
with the end in view of determining whether or not an
information may be prepared against the accused. Indeed,
preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal
of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the
accused must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the
trial court may not be bound as a matter of law to order an
acquittal. A preliminary investigation has been called a judicial
inquiry. It is a judicial proceeding. An act becomes a judicial
proceeding when there is an opportunity to be heard and for
the production of and weighing of evidence, and a decision is
rendered thereon.

> Petitioner, the incumbent town mayor, fatally shot the former
mayor and his political rival after a heated altercation between
them. After the shooting incident, petitioner surrendered and
placed himself under the custody of the municipal police.
> Private respondent Thelma Benemerito, wife of the victim,
filed a criminal complaint for Murder against petitioner.
> Judge Calvan then conducted a preliminary examination of
the witnesses and found the existence of probable cause, and
thereafter issued warrant for the arrest of petitioner with no
bail recommended.
> Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Court of
Appeals alleging that: 1.] the order and warrant of arrest for
which petitioner was detained is null and void for being issued
by respondent judge who was disqualified by law from acting
on the case by reason of his affinity to private respondent
Thelma Benemerito; and 2.] the preliminary examination by
respondent judge was so illegally and irregularly conducted as
to oust the said judge of jurisdiction over the case.
> Appellate court granted the petition for habeas corpus and
ordered the release of petitioner from detention subject to the
outcome of the proper preliminary investigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman followed the proper
procedure in conducting a preliminary investigation?
RULING:
NO. The purpose of a preliminary investigation or a
previous inquiry of some kind, before an accused person is
placed on trial, is to secure the innocent against hasty,
malicious and oppressive prosecution and to protect him from
an open and public accusation of a crime, from the trouble,
expenses and anxiety of a public trial. It is also intended to
protect the state from having to conduct useless and
expensive trials. While the right is statutory rather than
constitutional in its fundament, it is a component part of due
process in criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary
investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a
criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or
some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is
a substantive right. To deny the accused claim to a preliminary
investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure of his

We hold that the proper procedure in the conduct of the

preliminary investigation was not followed, for the following
reasons:
First, the records show that the supposed preliminary
investigation was conducted in installments by at least three
(3) different investigating officers, none of whom completed
the preliminary investigation. There was not one continuous
proceeding but rather a case of passing the buck, so to speak,
the last one being the Ombudsman hurriedly throwing the
buck to the Sandiganbayan.
Second, the charge against herein petitioner is Murder, a nonbailable offense. The gravity of the offense alone, not to
mention the fact that the principal accused is an incumbent
mayor whose imprisonment during the pendency of the case
would deprive his constituents of their duly-elected municipal
executive, should have merited a deeper and more thorough
preliminary investigation.
Third, a person under preliminary investigation by the
Ombudsman is entitled to file a motion for reconsideration of
the adverse resolution. This right is provided for in the very
Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman.
The filing of a motion for reconsideration is an integral part of
the preliminary investigation proper. There is no dispute that
the Information was filed without first affording petitioneraccused his right to file a motion for reconsideration. The
denial thereof is tantamount to a denial of the right itself to a
preliminary investigation. This fact alone already renders
preliminary investigation conducted in this case incomplete.

Stated differently, while the task of conducting a preliminary

investigation is assigned either to an inferior court magistrate
or to a prosecutor, only a judge may issue a warrant of arrest.
When the preliminary investigation is conducted by an
investigating prosecutor, in this case the Ombudsman, the
determination of probable cause by the investigating
prosecutor cannot serve as the sole basis for the issuance by
the court of a warrant of arrest. This is because the court with
whom the information is filed is tasked to make its own
independent determination of probable cause for the issuance
of the warrant of arrest.
Clearly delineated the features of this constitutional mandate,
viz: 1.] The determination of probable cause is a function of
the judge; it is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to
ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this
determination; 2.] The preliminary inquiry made by a
prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assists him in
making the determination of probable cause.

BAYTAN vs COMELEC
FACTS:
> Petitioners were on their way to register for the May 1998
elections when they met the newly elected Barangay Captain
and in Barangay 18 and led petitioners to register.
> They wondered why the registrants in this precinct looked
unfamiliar to them. This prompted petitioners to return to the
registration center to study the precinct map of Barangay 18.
They then realized that their residence is situated within the
jurisdiction of Barangay 28. Thus, petitioners proceeded to
Barangay 28 and registered anew.
> Subsequently, petitioners sent a to COMELEC requested for
advice on how to cancel their previous registration and
explained the reason and circumstances of their second
registration and expressed their intention to redress the error.
> Provincial Election Supervisor recommended filing an
information for double registration against petitioners affirmed
by the COMELEC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC en banc committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in recommending the prosecution of petitioners for double
registration despite clear and convincing evidence on record
that they had no intention of committing said election offense?
RULING:
NO. The grant by the Constitution to the COMELEC
of the power to investigate and prosecute election offenses is
intended to enable the COMELEC to assure the people of
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. This
grant is an adjunct to the COMELECs constitutional duty to
enforce and administer all election laws.
SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. [ELECTION CODE] (5) Any
person who, being a registered voter, registers anew
without filing an application for cancellation of his
previous registration.
Petitioners lose sight of the fact that the assailed resolutions
were issued in the preliminary investigation stage. A
preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial and is
only the means to discover who may be charged with a

crime, its function being merely to determine probable cause.

All that is required in the preliminary investigation is the
determination of probable cause to justify the holding of
petitioners for trial.
By definition, probable cause is a reasonable ground of
presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded, such a
state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a
person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or
entertain an honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so. The
term does not mean `actual or positive cause nor does it
import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not
require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act
or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the
prosecution in support of the charge.
There is no question that petitioners registered twice on
different days and in different precincts without canceling their
previous registration. Aside from this, the COMELEC found
certain circumstances prevailing in the case sufficient to
warrant the finding of probable cause.
The COMELEC also pointed out that since double
registration is malum prohibitum, petitioners claim of lack
of intent to violate the law is inconsequential. Neither did
the COMELEC consider petitioners letter as an application to
cancel their previous registration. The COMELEC explained
that this letter was sent after their second registration was
accomplished and after the election officer had already
reported their act of double registration to a higher official.
All told, a reasonably prudent man would readily conclude that
there exists probable cause to hold petitioners for trial for the
offense of double registration.
Moreover, petitioners claims of honest mistake, good faith
and substantial compliance with the Election Codes
requirement of cancellation of previous registration are
matters of defense best ventilated in the trial proper
rather than at the preliminary investigation. The
established rule is that a preliminary investigation is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties
evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence only as
may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been
committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof.

It is also well-settled that the finding of probable cause in the

prosecution of election offenses rests in the COMELECs
sound discretion. The COMELEC exercises the constitutional
authority to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute
cases for violation of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices.
Generally, the Court will not interfere with such finding of the
COMELEC absent a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion. This principle emanates from the COMELECs
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all
election offenses punishable under the election laws and to
prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by
law.

PADERANGA vs DRILON
FACTS:
> An information for multiple murder was filed in the RTC and
Only Felipe Galarion was tried and found guilty as charged. The
rest of the accused remained at large. Felipe Galarion, however,
escaped from detention and has not been apprehended since
then.
> In an amended information, Felizardo Roxas, "Fely Roxas" and
"Lolong Roxas," was included as a co-accused. Roxas retained
petitioner Paderanga as his counsel.
> Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to dismiss, to Quash the
Warrant of Arrest but denied this omnibus motion and directed the
City Prosecutor "to conduct another preliminary investigation or
reinvestigation in order to grant the accused all the opportunity to
adduce whatever evidence he has in support of his defense."
> In the course of the preliminary investigation, Roxas implicated
herein petitioner in the commission of the crime charged.
> The City Prosecutor inhibited himself from further conducting
the preliminary investigation and respondent State Prosecutor
Henrick F. Gingoyon, who was designated to continue with the
conduct of the preliminary investigation against petitioner, directed
the amendment of the previously amended information to include
and implead herein petitioner as one of the accused therein.
> Petitioner filed a Petition for Review but was denied by the DOJ.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the preliminary investigation as to him
was not complete and that no prima facie evidence or probable
cause to justify his inclusion in the second amended information?

RULING:
Preliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial, and it is
often the only means of discovering the persons who may be
reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to
prepare his complaint. It is not a trial of the case on the
merits and has no purpose except that of determining
whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty, and it
does not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy.
The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound
discretion of the fiscal. He has the quasi-judicial discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court.
Hence, the general rule is that an injunction will not be granted to
restrain a criminal prosecution. [Brocka, et al. vs. Enrile, et al.]
cites several exceptions to the rule, to wit:

a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the

accused;
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to
avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice;
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of
authority;
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, or ordinance;
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the
lust for vengeance; and
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused
and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.
A careful analysis of the circumstances show that the same does
not fall under any of the aforesaid exceptions.
Firstly, it will be noted that petitioner had already filed his counteraffidavit, pursuant to the subpoena issued to him. We hold that
this is sufficient compliance with the procedural requirement of the
Rules of Court, specifically Section 3(b) of Rule 112 thereof.
Secondly, the veracity and credibility of the witnesses and their
testimonies are matters of defense best addressed to the trial
court for its appreciation and evaluation.
Thirdly, the right of petitioner to ask clarificatory questions is not
absolute. The fiscal has the discretion to determine whether or not
he will propound these questions to the parties or witnesses
concerned. As clearly provided for under Section 3(e), Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court.
Lastly, "the proper forum before which absence of preliminary
investigation should be ventilated is the Court of First Instance of
a preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the
court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. It could even
be waived. Indeed, it is frequently waived. These are matters to
be inquired into by the trail court not an appellate court."
It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary
investigation has no right to cross-examine the witnesses which
the complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the
right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence
submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing
to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their
witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but without
the right to examine or cross-examine.

GO vs CA

FACTS:
> Eldon Maguan was driving his car in a one way street and
started travelling in the opposite or "wrong" direction.
> Petitioners and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other.
Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and shot Maguan
inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and left the
scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to
take down petitioner's car plate number.
> Petitioner presented himself before Police Station to verify
news reports that he was being hunted by the police.
> An eyewitness to the shooting positively identified petitioner
as the gunman, and the police promptly filed a complaint for
frustrated homicide.
> While the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before
an information could be filed in court, the victim, Eldon
Maguan, died of his gunshot wounds; instead of filing an
information for frustrated homicide, filed an information for
murder before the RTC.
> Prosecutor certified that no preliminary investigation had
been conducted because the accused did not execute and
sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code.
> Counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus
motion for immediate release and proper preliminary
investigation, alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner
was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been
conducted before the information was filed.
> Trial court issued an Order granting leave to conduct
preliminary investigation but respondent judge recalled such
order resulting to filing of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
to SC but it was remanded to CA; CA denied the motions and
trial for criminal case commenced.
> Petition for review on certiorari was filed before this court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner had effectively waived
his right to preliminary investigation?
RULING:
NO. If the case has been filed in court without a
preliminary investigation having been first conducted, the
accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the
filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with
the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner

prescribed in this Rule, is also not applicable. Indeed,

petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into San
Juan Police Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in
fact placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities. He
did not state that he was "surrendering" himself, in all
probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he
had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a
crime. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated
homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have
immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to
determine whether there was probable cause for charging
petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as
noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous
supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and
required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a
preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for
petitioner was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that
right should have been accorded him without any conditions.
Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested, with or
without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith
subject only to his appearing at the preliminary investigation.
We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to
a preliminary investigation. While that right is statutory rather
than constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been
established by statute, it is a component part of due process in
criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary investigation
conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal
offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some
other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a
substantive right. The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably
exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to
speak of expense; the right to an opportunity to avoid a
process painful to any one save, perhaps, to hardened
criminals, is a valuable right. To deny petitioner's claim to a
preliminary investigation would be to deprive him the full
measure of his right to due process.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED
to conduct forthwith a preliminary investigation of the charge of
murder against petitioner Go, and to complete such
preliminary investigation.

ALLADO vs DIOKNO
FACTS:
> Petitioners are alumni of the College of Law, UP, are
partners of the Law Firm of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado,
they have been accused of the heinous crime of kidnapping
with murder by the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission
(PACC) and ordered arrested without bail by respondent
judge.
> Sworn statement of Security Guard Umbal, implicating them
as the brains behind the alleged kidnapping and slaying of one
Eugen Alexander Van Twest, a German national.
> A day after Umbal executed his extrajudicial confession, the
operatives of the PACC, armed with a search warrant
separately raided the two (2) dwellings of Santiago.
> After evaluating the pieces of evidence gathered by PACC
operatives, a case for illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition, carnapping, kidnapping for ransom with murder,
and usurpation of authority was charged.
> SPO2 Bato, confessing participation in the abduction and
slaying of Van Twest and implicating petitioners Allado and
Mendoza, however, before petitioners could refute Bato's
counter-affidavit, he moved to suppress it on the ground that it
was extracted through intimidation and duress.
> Petitioners filed petition holding that respondent judge acted
with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction in
"whimsically holding that there is probable cause against
petitioners without determining the admissibility of the
evidence against petitioners and without even stating the basis
of his findings.
> On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General argues
that the determination of probable cause is a function of the
judge who is merely required to personally appreciate certain
facts to convince him that the accused probably committed the
crime charged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a probable cause existed and
sufficient enough for the arrest of the petitioners?
RULING:
NO. Probable cause is a reasonable ground of
presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded,
such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as
would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to
believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a
thing is so. The term does not mean "actual and positive

cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based

on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable
cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it
is it believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes
the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception
of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.
Accordingly, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must
satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted there is
sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof.
The PACC relies heavily on the sworn statement of Security
Guard Umbal who supposedly confessed his participation in
the alleged kidnapping and murder of Van Twest. For one,
there is serious doubt on Van Twest's reported death since the
corpus delicti has not been established, nor have his remains
been recovered. There is not even any insinuation that earnest
efforts were exerted to recover traces of his remains from the
scene of the alleged cremation.
Clearly, probable cause may not be established simply by
showing that a trial judge subjectively believes that he has
good grounds for his action. Good faith is not enough. If
subjective good faith alone were the test, the constitutional
protection would be demeaned and the people would be
"secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects" only in
the fallible discretion of the judge. On the contrary, the
probable cause test is an objective one, for in order that there
be probable cause the facts and circumstances must be such
as would warrant a belief by a reasonably discreet and
prudent man that the accused is guilty of the crime which has
just been committed. This, as we said, is the standard. Hence,
if upon the filing of the information in court the trial judge, after
reviewing the information and the documents attached thereto,
finds that no probable cause exists must either call for the
complainant and the witnesses themselves or simply dismiss
the case. There is no reason to hold the accused for trial
and further expose him to an open and public accusation
of the crime when no probable cause exists.
In the case at bench, the undue haste in the filing of the
information and the inordinate interest of the government
cannot be ignored. From the gathering of evidence until the
termination of the preliminary investigation, it appears that the
state prosecutors were overly eager to file the case and
secure a warrant for the arrest of the accused without bail and
their consequent detention. Umbal's sworn statement is laden
with inconsistencies and improbabilities.

Indeed, the task of ridding society of criminals and misfits and

sending them to jail in the hope that they will in the future
reform and be productive members of the community rests
both on the judiciousness of judges and the prudence of
prosecutors. And, whether it is a preliminary investigation by
the prosecutor, which ascertains if the respondent should be
held for trial, or a preliminary inquiry by the trial judge which
determines if an arrest warrant should issue, the bottomline is
that there is a standard in the determination of the existence of
probable cause, i.e., there should be facts and circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a prudent and
cautious man to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime
with which he is charged. Judges and prosecutors are not off
on a frolic of their own, but rather engaged in a delicate legal
duty defined by law and jurisprudence.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure
the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public
accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and
anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from
useless and expensive trial. The right to a preliminary
investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would
be to transgress constitutional due process. However, in
order to satisfy the due process clause it is not enough that
the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of
making sure that the transgressor shall not escape with
impunity. A preliminary investigation serves not only for the
purposes of the State. More importantly, it is a part of the
guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all
who live in the country. It is therefore imperative upon the
fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused
from the pain of going thru a trial once it is ascertained that
the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or
that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to
the guilt of the accused.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is
GRANTED. The temporary restraining order we issued in
favor of petitioners is made permanent. The warrant of arrest
issued against them is SET ASIDE and respondent Judge
Roberto C. Diokno is ENJOINED from proceeding any further
against herein petitioners.

DOROMAL vs SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
> Special Prosecution Officer (Tanodbayan), conducted a
preliminary investigation of the charge against the petitioner,
Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of PCGG, forviolation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in connection
with his shareholdings and position as president and director of
the Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC);
subsequently, filed in the Sandiganbayan an information against
the petitioner.
> The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this
Court questioning the jurisdiction of the "Tanodbayan" to file the
information without the approval of the Ombudsman. Court
annulled the information.
> Upon the annulment of the information against the petitioner,
the Special Prosecutor sought clearance from the Ombudsman
and new information was filed.
the above-named accused [Doromal] a public officer,
being then a Commissioner of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government, did then and there
wilfully and unlawfully, participate in a business through
the Doromal International Trading Corporation, a family
corporation of which he is the President, and which
company participated in the biddings conducted by the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the
National Manpower & Youth Council, which act or
participation is prohibited by law and the constitution.
> Petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash" the information for being:
(a) invalid because there had been no preliminary investigation;
(b) facts alleged do not constitute the offense charged.
> Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash.
> The petitioner contends that as the preliminary investigation that
was conducted prior to the filing of the original information was
nullified, another preliminary investigation should have been
conducted before the new information was filed against him. Such
denial violates his right to due process and constitutes a ground
to quash the information.
> Public respondent argues that another preliminary investigation
is unnecessary because both old and new informations involve
the same subject matter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a new preliminary investigation is
needed and can be afforded to the petitioner?

RULING:
YES. A new preliminary investigation of the charge
against the petitioner is in order not only because the first was
a nullity but also because the accused demands it as his right.
Moreover, the charge against him had been changed, as
directed by the Ombudsman.
The petitioner's right to a preliminary investigation of the new
charge is secured to him by the following provisions of Rule
112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
However, before the filing of such complaint or
information, the person arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation by a proper officer.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted, the accused
may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the
filing of the information, ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in
his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule.
That right of the accused is "a substantial one." Its denial over
his opposition is a "prejudicial error, in that it subjects the
accused to the loss of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law".
The Solicitor General's argument that the right to a preliminary
investigation may be waived and was in fact waived by the
petitioner, impliedly admits that the right exists. Since the
right belongs to the accused, he alone may waive it. If he
demands it, the State may not withhold it.
However, as the absence of a preliminary investigation is not a
ground to quash the complaint or information, the proceedings
upon such information in the Sandiganbayan should be held in
abeyance and the case should be remanded to the office of
the Ombudsman for him or the Special Prosecutor to conduct
a preliminary investigation.
The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the
court's jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they impair the
validity of the information or otherwise render it defective; but,
if there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants,
before entering their plea, invite the attention of the court to
their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information
should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it
or remand the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary
investigation may be conducted.

WEBB vs DE LEON

and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of

guilt.

VELASCO vs CASACLANG

FACTS:

The need to find probable cause is dictated by the Bill of Rights

which protects "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature". An arrest without a probable cause is an unreasonable
seizure of a person, and violates the privacy of persons which
ought not to be intruded by the State. Probable cause to warrant
arrest is not an opaque concept in our jurisdiction. Continuing
accretions of case law reiterate that they are facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by
the person sought to be arrested. Other jurisdictions utilize the
term man of reasonable caution or the term ordinarily prudent and
cautious man. The terms are legally synonymous and their
reference is not to a person with training in the law such as a
prosecutor or a judge but to the average man on the street. It
ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the
average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to
the calibrations of our technical rules of evidence of which his
knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common
sense of which all reasonable men have an abundance.

FACTS:

National Bureau of Investigation filed with the DOJ a lettercomplaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian,
Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other persons with the crime of Rape and
Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita NicolasVizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home.
Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Asst
Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the
preliminary investigation.
Petitioners: fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause.
They assail the credibility of Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and
uncorroborated due to her inconsistencies between her April 28,
1995 and May 22, 1995 sown statements. They criticize the
procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine
witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.
Charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and respondent
Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them
without conducting the required preliminary examination.
Complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due
process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation.
They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their
preliminary investigation.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the DOJ Panel gravely abuse its discretion in
holding that there is probable cause to charge accused with crime
of rape and homicide?
(2) Whether or not the respondent judges de Leon and Tolentino
gravely abuse their discretion when they failed to conduct a
preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against
the accused?
(3) Whether or not the DOJ Panel deny them their constitutional
right to due process during their preliminary investigation?
RULINGS:
(1) NO. Valid determination -- A probable cause needs only to rest
on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause
need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt,
neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt

Applying these basic norms, we are not prepared to rule that the
DOJ Panel gravely abused its discretion when it found probable
cause against the petitioners.
(2) NO. Valid arrest -- In arrest cases, there must be a probable
cause that a crime has been committed and that the person
arrested committed it. An arrest without a probable cause is an
unreasonable seizure of a person, and violates the privacy of
persons which ought not to be intruded by the State. Probable
cause to warrant arrest is not an opaque concept in our
jurisdiction.
Section 6 of Rule 112 provides that upon filing of an
information, the RTC may issue a warrant for the accused.
Clearly then, our laws repudiate the submission that respondent
judges should have conducted searching examination of
witnesses before issuing warrants of arrest against them.
(3) NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners
were given all the opportunities to be heard. The records will
show that the DOJ Panel did not conduct the preliminary
investigation with indecent haste. Petitioners were given fair
opportunity to prove lack of probable cause against them.
The DOJ Panel precisely requested the parties to adduce more
evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence
submitted more fully.

> COA Audit Examiners conducted a special audit of selected

transactions of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
Logistics Command, covering the period from January 1988 to
May 1989.
> The same audit examiners filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman a Joint Affidavit-Complaint deploring the
aforesaid transactions dubbed as anomalous and highly
irregular.
> Respondent Deputy Ombudsman, without a word from the
COA, issued an Order stating that petitioner was being
charged with a violation of Section 3, subparagraphs (e) and
(g) of R.A. 3019.
> Petitioner interposed a Motion To Quash theorizing that the
complaint and its annexes did not charge an offense. Without
any opposition from COA, the respondent Deputy
Ombudsman denied petitioners Motion to Quash. With the
denial of her unopposed Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner
found her way to this Court via the instant Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Deputy Ombudsman
to conduct preliminary investigation has the authority to
conduct preliminary investigation?
RULING:
YES. Under Section 2, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure, as amended:
The following may conduct preliminary investigation:
(a) Provincial or city fiscals and their assistants;
(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts;
(c) National and Regional state prosecutors; and
(d) Such other officers as may be authorized by law.
On the other hand, Section 15, paragraph (1) of R.A. 6770,
otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act , provides:
The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions, and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by

any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office, or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has a
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such
cases.
In light of the aforequoted provisions of law in point, it is
beyond cavil that the Ombudsman and his Deputies are,
within legal contemplation, other officers authorized by
law to conduct preliminary investigation.
Under the present Constitution, the Special Prosecutor...is a
mere subordinate of the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) and can
investigate and prosecute cases only upon the latters
authority or order... Even his original power to issue
subpoena, which he still claims under Section 10 (d) of PD
1630, is now deemed transferred to the Ombudsman, who
may, however, retain it in the Special Prosecutor in connection
with the cases he is ordered to investigate.
So also, Section 3 of Administrative Order No. 07, otherwise
known as The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, published in the May 1, 1990 issue of Manila
Bulletin, states that:
Preliminary investigation may be conducted by any of the
following:
1) Ombudsman Investigators;
2) Special Prosecuting Officers;
3) Deputized Prosecutors;
4) Investigating Officials authorized by law to conduct
preliminary investigation;
5) Lawyers in the government service, so designated by the
Ombudsman.
The propriety of endowing the Ombudsman with wide latitude
of ministerial and discretionary powers emanates from the
vitality and importance of his constitutional duty and function to protect the people from inefficiency, red tape,
mismanagement,
fraud,
and
corruption
in
the
government.

BALGOS vs SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
> Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3(c) of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practice Act, as amended, in an information that was
filed with the Sandiganbayan by the Special Prosecutor which
was approved by the Deputy Tanodbayan, after a preliminary
investigation.
> Petitioners filed a motion for reinvestigation in the
Tanodbayan. The same was granted.
> After conducting the reinvestigation, the Tanodbayan issued
an order to withdraw the Information filed in Criminal Case as
soon as possible in the interest of justice.
> Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to
withdraw the information against petitioners. This was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in denying
the motion to withdraw the information?
RULING:
NO. In the case of Crespo vs. Mogul, this Court laid
down the ground rules and the parameters pertaining to the
direction and control of the prosecution of a criminal action by
the fiscal or government prosecutor as provided for in the rules
in relation to the jurisdiction of the competent courts over such
cases. We ruled that while the public prosecutor has the
sole direction and control in the prosecution of offenses,
once the complaint or information is filed in court, the
court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case and all
subsequent actions that may be taken by the public
prosecutor in relation to the disposition of the case must
be subject to the approval of the said court.
In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case
may be conducted by the public prosecutor, the
permission or consent of the court must be secured. And
if after such reinvestigation the prosecution finds a
cogent basis to withdraw the information or otherwise
cause the dismissal of the case, such proposed course of

action must be addressed to the sound discretion of the

court.
The only instance when the appellate court should stay the
hand of the trial court in such cases is when it is shown that
the trial court acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its
jurisdiction or otherwise committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to such lack or excess of jurisdiction.

ALONZO vs CONCEPCION
FACTS:
> Jose Alonzo filed a complaint for murder against Salamat,
Rances, Santos, SPO4 Alonzo and a certain Isidro Atienza. A
preliminary investigation was conducted by the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor where Jose Alonzo and his four
witnesses testified. Upon review of the records, it was
recommended that Salamat be charged with murder as
principal, and Santos and Rances as accessories. With regard
to SPO4 Alonzo and Isidro Atienza, the prosecutor found that
no sufficient evidence was adduced to establish their
conspiracy for the murder of Pedrito.
> The court for interest of justice that should be given the
victim in this case and prosecute all the persons against whom
probable cause exists as principals in this case of murder, the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan is hereby
directed to amend the information, so as to include all the
aforenamed persons as accused in this case, all as principals,
within five (5) days from notice hereof.
> SPO4 Alonzo filed his Motion for Reconsideration 7 to the
Order, on the ground that the court had no authority to review
and reverse the resolution of the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor or to find probable cause against a respondent for
the purpose of amending the Information. SPO4 Alonzo
averred that the prosecutors resolution can only be reviewed
by the Department of Justice.
> SPO4 Alonzo filed a verified affidavit-complaint against
Judge for: a) gross ignorance of the law; b) violation of Section
2, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution; c) abuse of authority
under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court; d) knowingly
rendering an unjust order; e) conduct unbecoming of a judge;
and f) oppression and partiality.
> The OCA recommended that the complaint be dismissed on
the ground that the Order and the acts complained of were
done by respondent in his judicial capacity and were not
actuated by bad faith, dishonesty or similar motive. In addition,
the proper remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
and not an administrative complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the responded judge is guilty of the
following accusations?

RULING:
YES. The Court cannot follow the recommendation of
the OCA. Respondent clearly erred when he rendered the
assailed Order. The rules set the proper procedure for the
investigation of complaints and designate the prosecutor to
conduct the preliminary investigation. The function of a
preliminary investigation is to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and the respondent is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. It is through the
conduct of a preliminary investigation that the prosecutor
determines the existence of a prima facie case that would
warrant the prosecution of a case. As a rule, courts cannot
interfere with the prosecutor's discretion and control of
the criminal prosecution. The reason for placing the
criminal prosecution under the direction and control of
the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded
prosecution by private persons. However, while prosecuting
officers have the authority to prosecute persons shown to be
guilty of a crime, they have equally the legal duty not to
prosecute when after an investigation, the evidence adduced
is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Judges
should not unduly interfere with the exercise of the power
to prosecute on the part of fiscals.
We understand respondents zeal in trying to uphold the ends
of justice. However, respondent overlooked the fact that
there is a remedy where a prosecutor errs in not charging
a person in an Information. The recourse is to appeal to
the Secretary of Justice. By ordering the prosecutor to
include complainant, Rances and Santos as principals in
the Information, respondent arrogated unto himself the
executive power of supervision and control over public
prosecutors. His conduct is not only unbecoming of a
judge; more importantly, it transgresses our Constitution.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Judge Crisanto C.
Concepcion is found liable for conduct unbecoming of a judge
and is REPRIMANDED. He is sternly warned that a repetition
of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.

RODIL vs GARCIA
FACTS:
> Petitioner was charged of murder and that of counsel wanted to
recall the prosecution to enable to cross-examine them for
"clarificatory and amplificatory matters" but denied by the
respondent judge that led to this proceeding for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction.
> Such a comment was submitted on behalf of respondent by the
Solicitor General seeking the dismissal of the petition on the
ground that the right to cross-examine in a preliminary
investigation is not a right granted an accused and that the
exercise of discretion by respondent Judge.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the counsel for petitioner could recall
witnesses for the prosecution for the purpose of asking
clarificatory questions?
RULING:
NO. Under the present state of the law, it cannot be said
that the right to cross-examine is guaranteed an accused at the
stage of preliminary investigation. That leaves the question of the
alleged grave abuse of discretion in that he refused to allow
counsel for petitioner during the stage of preliminary investigation
proper to recall prosecution witnesses so that counsel could
cross-examine them on "clarificatory and amplificatory matters."
As set forth earlier, the accused is not by law entitled to such a
right.
An accused is not entitled to cross-examine the witnesses
presented against him in the preliminary investigation before his
arrest, this being a matter that depends on the sound discretion of
the Judge or investigating officer concerned. Petitioner-appellant's
attempt to draw a parallel between the refusal of the judge to
allow her to cross-examine prosecution's witnesses, with the
permission granted to the latter as against the defense witnesses,
assumes the existence of a vested right of which petitionerappellant had been deprived. In being denied confrontation of the
prosecution witnesses, she was not deprived of any right but was
merely refused the exercise of a privilege. With the ruling on the
question for bail, counsel for petitioner, as above intimated, would
be able to attain the objective which was denied him when he was
not allowed to recall the prosecution witnesses. To follow the

language of Abrera, petitioner as the accused "was not deprived

of any right but was merely refused the exercise of a privilege."

LEVISTE vs ALAMEDA
FACTS:
> Petitioner was, by Information charged with homicide for the
death of Rafael de las Alas before the RTC presided by Judge
Elmo Alameda. Petitioner who was placed under police
custody while confined at the Makati Medical Center.
> The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the
conformity of the public prosecutor, an Urgent Omnibus
Motion, for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the
public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to
conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense.
RTC granted.
> Petitioner assailed these orders via certiorari and prohibition
before the Court of Appeals but was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not in cases when an accused is arrested
without a warrant, the remedy of preliminary investigation
belongs only to the accused.
RULING:
NO. The Court holds that the private complainant can
move for reinvestigation.
All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
public prosecutor The private complainant in a criminal case is
merely a witness and not a party to the case and cannot, by
himself, ask for the reinvestigation of the case after the
information had been filed in court, the proper party for that
being the public prosecutor who has the control of the
prosecution of the case. Thus, in cases where the private
complainant is allowed to intervene by counsel in the
criminal action, and is granted the authority to prosecute,
the private complainant, by counsel and with the
conformity of the public prosecutor, can file a motion for
reinvestigation.
In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case
may be conducted by the public prosecutor, the
permission or consent of the court must be secured. If

after such re-investigation the prosecution finds a cogent basis

to withdraw the information or otherwise cause the dismissal
of the case, such proposed course of action may be taken but
shall likewise be addressed to the sound discretion of the
court.
Once the trial court grants the prosecutions motion for
reinvestigation, the former is deemed to have deferred to the
authority of the prosecutorial arm of the Government. Having
brought the case back to the drawing board, the prosecution is
thus equipped with discretion wide and far reaching
regarding the disposition thereof, subject to the trial courts
approval of the resulting proposed course of action.
------------------ o O o --------------------Inquest is defined as an informal and summary investigation
conducted by a public prosecutor in criminal cases involving
persons arrested and detained without the benefit of a warrant of
arrest issued by the court for the purpose of determining whether
said persons should remain under custody and correspondingly
be charged in court.
BEFORE THE FILING OF COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IN
COURT, the private complainant may proceed in coordinating
with the arresting officer and the inquest officer during the latters
conduct of inquest. Meanwhile, the arrested person has the option
to avail of a 15-day preliminary investigation, provided he duly
signs a waiver of any objection against delay in his delivery to the
proper judicial authorities under Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code. For obvious reasons, this remedy is not available to the
private complainant since he cannot waive what he does not
have. The benefit of the provisions of Article 125, which requires
the filing of a complaint or information with the proper judicial
authorities within the applicable period,1[32] belongs to the
arrested person.
In cases subject of inquest, therefore, the private party should first
avail of a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation, if any, before
elevating the matter to the DOJ Secretary.
In case the inquest proceedings yield no probable cause, the
private complainant may pursue the case through the regular
course of a preliminary investigation.
ONCE A COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IS FILED IN COURT,
the rules yet provide the accused with another opportunity to ask
for a preliminary investigation within five days from the time he
learns of its filing. The Rules of Court and the New Rules on
Inquest are silent, however, on whether the private complainant

could invoke, as respondent heirs of the victim did in the present

case, a similar right to ask for a reinvestigation.

DIMATULLAC vs VILLON
FACTS:
> Complaint for Murder was filed before the MCTC against
private respondents.
> After conducting a preliminary examination in the form of
searching questions and answers, and finding probable cause,
MCTC issued warrants for the arrest of the accused.
> Court finding reasonable ground to believe that the crime of
murder had been committed and that the accused were
probably guilty thereof.
On or about November 2, 2005 all the accused under
the leadership of Mayor Santiago Yabut went to the
house of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac. Some of the
accused positioned themselves around the house
while the others stood by the truck and the mayor
stayed in the truck with the body guard. Accused Billy
YAbut, Kati YAbut & Franncisco Yambao went inside
the house strongly suggested to go down to see the
mayor outside and ask for sorry. As Dimatulac went
down to the house and he was shot to kill as a
consequence he died.
> The assistant prosecutor found that the Yabuts were in
company with one another that the offense committed was
only homicide not murder and hereby subject to bail for each
of the accused.
> Treachery therefore could not be appreciated and the crime
reasonably believe[d] to have been committed is Homicide as
no circumstance would qualify the killing to murder. The herein
petitioner appealed the resolution to the Secretary of Justice.
Pending appeal to the DOJ, Judge Roura hastily set the case
for arraignment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not arraignment to lesser penalty of
homicide is proper while the case is pending in the DOJ
subject for Review?
RULING:
In the case it is not proper. Indubitably then, there was on the
part of the public prosecution, indecent haste in the filing of

information of homicide, he should have ask the petitioner as

regards to the status of the appeal or warned them that the
DOJ would not decide the appeal within the certain period. It is
indubitable that petitioner had the right to appeal to the
Secretary of Justice. Section 4 of Rule 112 of the rules of court
provides that If upon petition by the proper party the secretary
of Justice reverses the resolution of the provincial or city fiscal
or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the fiscal concerned to
file the corresponding information without conducting any
preliminary investigation to investigate or to dismiss or move
for the dismissal of the complaint or information. There is
nothing that forecloses the power of authority of the secretary
of justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal
cases despite information already having been filed in court.
The secretary of justice is only enjoined to refrain far as
practicable from entertaining a petition for review or
appeal from action of the prosecutor once the complaint
or information is filed in court. In Any case, the grant of a
motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the
secretary of justice reverses an appealed resolution, is subject
to the discretion of the court. We do not hesitate to rule that
court committed grave abuse of discretion in rushing the
arraignment of the Yabuts on the assailed information for
homicide. The DOJ could have, even if belatedly, joined
cause with petitioners to set aside arraignment. So must it
be where the arraignment and plea of not guilty are void.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga is
DIRECTED to comply with the order of the Secretary of
Justice by forthwith filing with the trial court the amended
information for murder.

Whether or not the propriety of the petition for certiorari under

Rule 65 availed of by public respondent Agent De Jemil to
assail the resolutions of the Office of the Secretary of Justice?

TY vs NBI
FACTS:
> Petitioners are stockholders of Omni Gas Corporation
(Omni); The case all started when JGAC Law Offices sent a
letter to the NBI requesting, on behalf of their clients for the
surveillance, investigation, and apprehension of persons or
establishments engaged in alleged illegal trading of petroleum
products and underfilling of branded LPG cylinders in violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 33.
> The NBIs test-buy yielded positive results for violations of
BP 33, refilling branded LPG cylinders without authority; and
under delivery or under filling of LPG cylinders.
> On the same day of the filing of the application for search
warrants. The NBI served the warrants the next day resulting
in the seizure of several items from Omnis premises.
> Assistant City Prosecutor, finding probable cause to charge
petitioners with violations of pertinent sections of BP 33.
Debunking petitioners contention that the branded LPG
cylinders are already owned by consumers who are free to do
with them as they please, the law is clear that the stamped
markings on the LPG cylinders show who are the real owners
thereof and they cannot be refilled sans authority from
Pilipinas Shell, Petron or Total, as the case may be.
> Petitioners appealed to the Office of the Secretary of Justice.
Reversing and setting aside the Joint Resolution of the Office
of the Chief State Prosecutor, being an isolated case, it ruled
that there was no showing of a clear pattern of deliberate
underfilling.
> A petition for certiorari was filed (by public respondent Agent
De Jemil) to CA under Rule 65 and reinstated the resolutions
of the Office of the Secretary of Justice. CA found strong
probable violation of refilling of another companys or firms
cylinders without such companys or firms written
authorization.
ISSUE:

RULING:
YES. For one, while it is the consistent principle in
this jurisdiction that the determination of probable cause
is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor and,
ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice, who may direct the
filing of the corresponding information or move for the
dismissal of the case; such determination is subject to
judicial review where it is established that grave abuse of
discretion tainted the determination.
For another, there is no question that the Secretary of Justice
is an alter ego of the President who may opt to exercise or not
to exercise his or her power of review over the formers
determination in criminal investigation cases. As aptly noted by
Agent De Jemil, the determination of probable cause by the
Secretary of Justice is, under the doctrine of qualified political
agency, presumably that of the Chief Executive unless
disapproved or reprobated by the latter.
The findings of the Justice Secretary
through a petition for certiorari under
the allegation that he acted with
discretion. This remedy is available
party.

may be reviewed
Rule 65 based on
grave abuse of
to the aggrieved

It is thus clear that Agent De Jemil, the aggrieved party in the

assailed resolutions of the Office of the Secretary of Justice,
availed of and pursued the proper legal remedy of a judicial
review through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in
assailing the latters finding of lack of probable cause on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion.