DOCTRINE FOR REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION

OF INDIA

Project submitted to

DR. AZIM PATHAN

(Faculty: LEGAL METHOD)

Project submitted by
VIKAS GHRITLAHRE
(ECONOMIC, major)
Semester I
Roll no.168

HIDAYATULLAH NATIONAL LAW

UNIVERSITY
RAIPUR, C.G.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I feel myself highly exhilarated to work on this project involving DOCTRINE FOR
REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION OF INDIA. And I have tried my level best to throw
light upon his personality and achievements.
I take this opportunity to thank DR.AZIM PATHAN who had played the role of a central
character and always given me the courage and wisdom to shape my ideas in right direction.
Special thanks to the I.T. staff and library staff who have devoted their valuable time to give me
all sorts of suggestions, ideas and facilities regarding this topic.
Last but not the least I thank all the members of the H.N.L.U. and all others who have helped me
in the completion o this work.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research is based on secondary sources. Literature review has been done extensively in order
to make a comprehensive presentation. Books from the universitys library have been used.
Computer from the computer laboratory of the university has been used for the purpose. Articles
from journals and material available on internet have also been used.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT..2
2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY...3
3. INTRODUCTION..5
4. EQUALITY BEFORE LAW..6
5. PRESUMPTION THAT THE CLASSIFICATION REASONABLE...9
6. WHAT CLASSIFICATION IS REASONABLE..10
7. REASONABLE BASIS OF CLASSIFICATION.11
8. THE OLD DOCTRINE OF REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION..12
9. CLASSIFICATION OF SINGLE INDIVIDUAL AND HOE LEGISLATION. 14
10. EQUAL PROTECTION MAY BE DENIED BY PROEDURAL LAW AS WELL..14
11. OLD DOCTRINE vs. NEW DOCTRINE OF CLASSIFICATION.15
12. CONCLUSION.
13. BIBLIOGRAPHY.

INTRODUCTION
Article 14 of the Indian Constitution guarantees equality before the law and equal protection
of the laws. Whereas the reasonable classification test was being applied by the judiciary to test
the validity of any state action under Article 14, since1974 the new doctrine of arbitrariness has
been evolved1. According to this approach, any arbitrary state action is violative of Article 14.
While arbitrariness test has been applied often in case of executive actions, its application to
statutes is still ambiguous2.
In a recent article, Abhinav Chandrachud argues in favor of application of doctrine of
arbitrariness to legislations.3 He argues that the presumption of validity of statutes is acting as a
barrier from applying this doctrine to legislations.Chandrachud cites two decisions of the
Supreme Court to show that the arbitrariness test has been applied to invalidate legislations.4 To
remove the vagueness pervading the doctrine, Chandrachud makes a case for using the basic
structure doctrine as the objective standard to determine arbitrariness.
This essay presents a reply to Chandrachud; wherein we argue against the application of
arbitrariness doctrine to examine validity of statutes under Article 14.We argue that it is not the
presumption of constitutionality that acts as a handicap to the application of the doctrine of
arbitrariness to legislations. We contend that the arbitrariness doctrine lies outside Article 14,
virtually replacing the right to equality itself by not reading arbitrary in the sense of
discriminatory. We examine the application of reasonable classification doctrine by courts and
argue that even with respect to the two cases relied upon by Chandrachud, bringing the extraConstitutional test of arbitrariness is unnecessary. Even if one assumes that the arbitrariness
doctrine should be accepted, we put forth certain anomalies that may arise if basic structure
doctrine is used as an objective standard to define arbitrariness under Article 14. Thus, we
1 E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC
597; AjayHasia v. Khalid Mujib, AIR 1981 SC 487. Though the new doctrine is considered to have
evolved since the
1970s, its roots may be traced to the opinion of Bose, J. in State of West Bengal v. Ali Anwar Sarkar, AIR
1952

2 See Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Director, CBI, (2005) 2 SCC 317, where the question whether

arbitrariness andUnreasonableness are available as grounds to invalidate a legislation was referred to

a larger bench.

conclude that the arbitrariness doctrine as propounded by the Indian judiciary should not be used
to test the validity of legislations under Article 14.

EQUALITY BEFORE LAW

A constitution bench of the supreme court has declared in no uncertain term the equlity is a basic
feature of the constitution and although the emphasis in the earlier decision evolved around
discrimination and classification, the content of article 14 got expanded conceptually and has
recognized the principle to comprehend the doctrine of promissory estoppels non arbitrariness,
compliance with justice eschewing irrationality etc.
If there is no affectation of of avested right, the question of applicability of art 14 would not
arise3. Such an absolute proposition is inconsistent with the recognition by the supreme court in
or in many of its ite earlier judgments in relation to promissory estopple and legitimate
expectation which are not only much short of indefeasible right but were evolved to protect a
person from unfair or arbitrary exercise of power.4Moreover art 14 itself confers a vested
fundamental right and it is difficult to appreciate the logic behind the enunciation.
Art 14 bars discrimination and prohibits discriniminarty law. Art 14 is now proving as a bulwark
against any arbitrary or discriminatory state action. The horizon of equality as embodied in art 14
has been expanding as a result of the judicial pronouncements and art.14 has now come to have a
highly activist magnitude.
Art 14 an 15 read in the light of the preamble to the constitution reflect the thinking of our
constitution makers and prevent and discrimination based on religion or origin in the matter of
equal treatment or employment and to apply the same even in respect of a cooperative society.5
Two concepts are involved on art 14, viz, equality before law and equal protection of laws.
3 M. Nagaraj v union of India,(2006)8 scc212:AIR2007 SC 71
4 Food corporation of India v. kamdhenu cattle feed industries, AIR 1993 SC 1601 :
( 1993)1SCCC71.
6

The first ia a negative concept which ensures that there is no special privilege in favour of
any one, that all are equally subject to the ordinary law of the land that no person, whatever be
his rank or condition, is above the law. The is equivalent to the second corollary of the DICEAN
concept of the Rule of Law in Britain.6However, is not an absolute rule and there are a number of
exception to it, eg.., foreign diplomats enjoy immunity from the countrys judicial process art
361 extends immunity to the president of India and the state governor 7,public officer and judge
also enjoy some protection, and some special groups and interest, like the trade unions, have
been accorded special privileges by law.
The second concept, equal protection of law is positive in content. It does not mean that
identically the same law should apply to all people, that every law must have a universal
application within the country irrespective of differences of circumstances. Equal protection of
the laws does not postulate equal treatment of all persons without distinction. What it postulates
is the application of the same law alike and without discrimination to all people similarly
situated. It denotes equality of treatment in equal circumstance. It implies that among equal the
law should be equal and equally administered, that the like should be treated alike without
distinction of race, religion, wealth, social status or political influence.
Where a particular mode is prescribed ifor doing an act and there is no impediment in adopting
the procedure, the deviation to act in different manner which does not disclose any discernible
principle which is reasonable in itself shall be labeled as arbitrary. Every state action must be
informed by reason and it follow that an act uninformed by reason is per se arbitrary.
The Supreme Court has explained in Sri Srinivasa Theatre v. Govt.of Tamil Nadu, that the two
expressions equality before law and equal protection of law do not mean the same thing even if
there may be much common between them.Equality before law is a dynamic concepts having
faect is that there shall be no privileged person or class and that none shall be above law. Another
5 Zoroastrian coop. Housing Society Ltd v. District Registrar, coop. societies(urban),
(2005)5 SCC 632:AIR
6 WADE& PHILLIPS, CONST.&ADM.LAW87(1997).
7 Supra, Chs.III and VII
7

facet is the obligation upon the state to bring about, through the machinery of law meaningfully
only in an equal society.
Art14 provided positive and not negative equality. Hence any action or order contrary to law
does not any right upon any person for similar treatment. Thus unauthorized additional
construction and change of user of land cannot be claimed on the basis that the same had been
granted in order cases in contravention of law.8
Art 14 presercibes equality before law. But the fact remain that all person are not equal by
nature, attainment or circumstance, and, therefore, a mechanical equality before the law may
result in justice. Thus, the guarantee against the denial of equal protection of the law does not
mean that identically the same rule of law should be made applicable to all persons in spite of
difference in circumstance or condition.9The varying needs of different classes or sections of
people require differential and separate treatment. The legislation is required to deal with diverse
problems arising out of an infinite variety of human relations. It must, therefore, necessarily have
the power of making laws to attain particular objects and, for that purpose, of distinguishing,
selecting and classifying person and things upon which its law are to operate.
The principle of equality of law thus means not that same law should apply ti everyone but that a
law should deal alike with all in one class that there should be an equality of treatment under
equal circumstance. It means that equal should not be treated unlike and unlikes should not be
treated alike. Like should be treated alike10.

8 Vishal properties(p)LTD v. state of utter Pradesh,(2007)11 SCC172 :AIR2007SC

2924.
9 Chiranjeet lal v. union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41:1950 SCR 869.
10 Gauri Shankar v. State of utter Pradesh, (2009)4SCC 753(2009) 3 JT 202.
8

PRESUMPTION THAT THE CLASSIFICATION IS

REASONABLE
1.The presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment, since it must be
assumed that the legislation understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people ,
that ita law directed to problem made manifest by experience and its discrimination are based on
adequate grounds.
2. The presumption may be rebutted in certain cases by showing by that on the face of the
statute, there is no classification at all and no difference peculiar to any individual or class and is
not applicable to any other individual or class, and that the law hits only a particular individual or
class.
3. it is true that the presumption should always be that the legislation understand and correctly
appreciates the needs of its own people and that its discrimination are based on adequate
grounds, but to carry the presumption to the extent of holding that there must be some
undisclosed and unknown reason for subjecting certain individual or corporation to hostile and
discriminatory legislation is to make the protection clause a mere rope of sand, in no manner
restraining state action. Unless a just cause for the discrimination is put forth in the law itself, the
statute has to be declared unconstitutional. The just cause must be an objective factor having a
real and substantial relation to the object of the legislation. The statute itself must provide the
yardstick or measure for the grouping, instead of leaving it to the absolute discretion of the
9

executive while applying the law 11.but where the statute shows on the face of it that the
legislation made no attempt all to make a classification, but singled out a particular individual or
class without having any difference peculiar to that individual or class, the presumption of
reasonableness in favour of the legislation is instantly rebutted and the person challenging the
statute cannot be called upon to adduce further or external evidence to discharge his onus12

WHAT CLASSIFICATION IS REASONABLE

What art 14 prohibits is class legislation and not reasonable classification for the purposes of
legislation13.If legislation takes care to reasonably classify person for legislative purposes and if
it deal equally with all person belonging to a well defined class, it is not open to the charge of
denial of equal protection on the ground that the law does not apply to other person14.
In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled,
namely.

That classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguish person

or thing that are groups together from other left out of the group, and
That, that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by
the statute in question. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis
of classification and the object of the act under consideration.

11 State of west Bengal v. anwar ali,(1952)S.C.R 284 (335):RAMKRISHNA V

TENDOLKAR
12 Stase of Bombay v balsara,(1951)S.C.R.682(708);State of rajasthan v manohar,
(1954)S.C.R.1996.
13 Budhan v state of bihar, (1952)S.C.R.30
14 State of W.B v anwar ali (1952)S.C.R.284
10

a. Art 14 does not insist that legislative classification should be scientically perfect or
logically complete.15
b. The difference which will warrant a reasonable classification need not be great. What is
required is that it must be real and substantial and must bear some just and reasonable
relation to the object of the legislation.
When a law is challenged as denying equal protection, the question for
determination by the court is not whether it has resulted in inequality, but whether there is
some difference which bear a just and reasonable relation to the object of legislation.
Mere differentiation or inequality of treated does not per se amount to discrimination
within the inhibition of the equal protection clause. To attract the operation of the clause
it is necessary to show that the selection or differentiation is unreasonable.

REASONABLE BASIS OF CLASSIFICATION

It is not possible to exhaust the circumstances or criteria which may afford a reasonable basis for
classification in all cases. It depends on the objects of the legislation in view and whatever has a
reasonable relation to the object or purpose of the legislation is reasonable basis for classification
of the objects coming under the purview of the enactment.

a.

The basis of classification may be geographical, provided there is a nexus between the

territorial basis of the classification and the object sought to be achieved by the Act.
b. The justification for classification may be historical.
c. The classification may be according to difference in time.16
It is a matter exclusively for the legislation to decides from what date a (civil) law should be
given operation and the law cannot be challenged as discriminatory in not affecting prior
transaction, or pending proceeding if it applies generally to all persons coming within its

15 Kedar nath v. state of W.B.,(1954)S.C.R.404.

16 Ramjilal v. I.T. officer,(1951)S.C.R.127
11

ambit as from the date on which it become operative and if the criterion of time is not
adopted arbitrary.
d.Age may from rational basis of relation to the object of particular subject of legislation.
Thus, person who have not attained majority may be segregated from prisoners.
e.The classification may be based on the difference in the nature of the person,trade,calling or
occupation, which is sought to be regulated by the legislation,..e.g,admission to an a education
institution, censorship of cinematograph as distinguish from other media of expression; framing
rules for recruitment or promotion of public servant for the purpose of securing the requisite
standard of efficiency or fixing of different minimum wage for different industries,having regard
to their different economic and local condition or differentiation between licensed dealers and
certified and goldsmith for the purposes of gold control separate treatment of agriculturist
debtors in view of their backwardness in a state.
f. The reasonableness is to be judged with reference to the object of the legislation and moral
consideration of course, there may be cases where gross immorality of a measure may condemn
the legislation as arbitrary or irrational.

THE OLD DOCTRINE OF REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION

Although the doctrine of arbitrariness is extra-Constitutional, its application to legislations might
still be fruitful if it would serve some greater purpose, beyond what is being already served by
the existing doctrine of reasonable classification. An analysis of decisions shows that with regard
to statutes whose provisions are challenged as discriminatory or arbitrary, the judiciary is still
applying the old doctrine, even while sometimes claiming to have applied the new doctrine of
arbitrariness17. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell & Co.,34 the court categorically held
that no enactment can be struck down merely on the ground of unreasonableness. Where the
statute gives discretion to the executive to classify, the question does not hold much relevance
because in such cases, there is not much difference between the application of the old and new
17

Manchegowda v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1984 SC 1151; Karnataka STDC v. Karnataka STAT, (1986) 4SCC 421;
Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 160 (2009) D.L.T. 277.

12

doctrines18. Under both the doctrines, the Court examines whether the legislature has provided
enough guidance to prevent an arbitrary exercise of power by the administrator.

Two cases have been particularly relied upon by Chandrachud where legislations were
invalidated as violative of Article 14 on the application of arbitrariness doctrine. The first of
these cases is Maple Vishwanath v. State of Maharashtra19 where the court declared provisions of
the Bombay Rent Act as violative of Article 14 on the ground that the legislation had become
arbitrary with the passage of time. It is interesting to observe, however, that all
the precedents relied on by the court to reach this conclusion used the old
doctrine.20 these cases clearly state that passage of time may obliterate the
considerations of necessity and
Expediency, and the grounds which justified a classification may cease to be
valid. Hence, the old doctrine also allows for invalidating outdated legislation
on the ground of violation of Article 14.38 Another interesting aspect is that
even in this case, the court examined the object behind the legislation and
noticed how the provision is no longer in furtherance of the same.
The next case upon which Chandrachuds comment is based is Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union
of India21 where the requirement of deposit, by the borrower, of 75% of the amount claimed by
the secured creditor under the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and
Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 was held to be unreasonable, hence, violative of
Article 14. It is important to note that the concept of arbitrariness was applied here in the sense
of the statute being discriminatory, which must be distinguished from a case where a provision is
struck down as being arbitrary per se. The Court here observed the importance of provision of
18

[1996] 3 S.C.R. 721. See also Novartis AG v. Union of India, (2007) 4 M.L.J. 1153.

19

(1998) 2 SCC 1.

20

State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhopal Sugar Industries, [1964] 52 I.T.R. 443(SC);

21

AIR 2004 SC 2371.

13

appeal in a statute which enabled drastic measures to be taken against the borrower. The Court
held that in such a case, the conditions like the 75% deposit requirement, after the secured assets
of the borrower have already been taken over, made the remedy illusory. This is an inherent
infirmity leaning one-sidedly towards one party.The court also stated that in the absence of any
other grievance redressal mechanism, the provision for appeal was equivalent to filing a suit in
first instance. Hence, this is a case where an important remedy under the statute, providing for
grievance redressal and justice delivery mechanism, was itself one-sided and hence amounted to
an unequal remedy. The 75% condition was not struck down as merely being strict and
disproportional. The Court noted that certain provisions of the statute may also be a bit harsh for
some of the borrowers but on that ground the impugned provisions of the Act cannot be said to
be unconstitutional in view of the fact that the object of the Act is to achieve speedier recovery of
the duesto help in growth of economy. However, considering that the provision for appeal
failed to achieve its object of providing a reasonable protection to the borrower, it was struck
down.

CLASSIFICATION OF A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL AND HOC

LEGISLATION
A classification may be reasonable even though a single individual(or object) is treated as a class
by himself or itself, if there are some special circumstances or reason applicable to him or it
alone and not applicable to other22. Where a law is of general application, it cannot be challenged
as discriminatory merely because the object of its enactment was to benefit a particular
individual.
But even though it is permissible for the legislature to classify a single individual where he
possesses real and substantial feature different from other individuals in relation to the object of
22 Ramakrishna Dalmai v. Tendolkar, A 1958 S.C. 538; Govindlalji v. State of
Rajasthan,(1964)1S.C.R. 561(618);
14

the legislation in question. Art 14 would not tolerate any discriminatory legislation against a
single named individual or individual which simulates a bill of attainder, and no reasonable
classification appears on the face of the legislation nor is deducible from the surrounding
circumstances or matters of common knowledge.23

EQUAL PROTECTION MAY BE DENIED BY PROEDURAL

LAW AS WELL
The guarantee of equal protection applies against substantive as well as procedural laws. From
the standpoints of the later, it means that all litigants, who are similarly situated, are able to avail
themselves of the procedural rights for relief and for defence, without discrimination. Of course,
if the differences are of a minor unsubstantial character, which have not prejudiced the interest of
the person or person affected, there would not be a denial of equal protection.24
But a procedure different from that laid down by the ordinary law can be prescribed for a
particular class of persons if the discrimination is based upon a reasonable classification having
regard to the objective which the legislation has in view and the policy underlying it, or if the
offences to which the two procedures relate are different, or if the object and scope of the two
enactments are different,e.gthe one is a general act and the other is special act.

OLD DOCTRINE vs. NEW DOCTRINE OF

CLASSIFICATION
One of the main objectives of the legislative action and reform in the modern era is to enforce the
concept of equality and liberty. The legal conception of equality relates not to a uniform
treatment for all but equal treatment for those who are at an equal footing, under like
circumstances and conditions. However, the tough task lies in identifying the equals for this
purpose by reasonable classification. This classification may be society specific, culture specific,
23 Ramkrishna v. Tendolkar,(1959)S.C.R.279.
24 State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali, (1952)S.C.R.284.
15

nation specific or history specific. Hence, no strait jacket formula can be applied in this regard.
In India, initial developments in this regard lead to the formation of the classic nexus test, or the
old doctrine in 1952 which helped in identifying valid classifications for categorize equals.
Though used for a long time, gradually, this doctrine was found to be inadequate in some
respects by the legal scholars. Thus, starting from early 1970s began the development of a new
doctrine, hence considerably broadening the horizons for the application of Article 14. Further
developments saw the unfolding of new dimensions of Article 14, identifying reasonableness in
State action as the main objective of Article 14 and aiming at its widened scope. This essay aims
at a critical analysis of both the doctrines and deciding the most desirable course of advancement
in this regard for the judiciary.
THE NEXUS TEST
The Indian conception of equality as propounded in Article 14 of the Constitution combines the
British doctrine of rule of law as well as the equal protection of law clause in the
14th amendment of the US constitution. Not only the doctrines, but their interpretations have also
been approved by the Indian courts to give the true content to these doctrines. As such, the theory
of classification as evolved by the American Supreme Court has been applied by the Indian
Supreme Court from the initial times. On these lines, the old doctrine, or the nexus test was
enunciated by Das J. in the Anwar Ali Sarkar case. This test provided for two conditions to be
fulfilled for permissible classification the first being the basis of an intelligible differentia and the
other being the presence of a rational relation between the differentia and the object of the Act.
For instance, for a legislation of reservation for Scheduled castes, the rationale would be caste,
while the nexus is the welfare of such backward classes through educational support.

EMERGENCE OF NEW DOCTRINE

This rule has been followed in many cases since. But gradual application of this test also
surfaced many of its shortcomings. Although this test defined objective parameters of
classification, which ensured certainty and limited judicial activism, its scope was considered
inadequate in cases like those of lose discretion and excessive delegation of legislative
powers. Also, it dealt with inequality amongst two people or groups, ignoring individual
16

discrimination. Moreover, adherence to a fixed test in a dynamic concept like equality was
looked upon as limiting its scope. Thus, the early 1970s, with adherence to such ideas marked
the initial phase of a changing course in this regard. With some initial deviations by Bhagwati J.
in some cases, a new activist theory of equality was finally approved unanimously in Ajay Hasia
case. In subsequent cases while examining this principle of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness,
the court celebrated the widened ambit of Article 14 and identified it as a guarantee against
arbitrariness.

NEW DOCTRINE: CRITICISMS

The new doctrine proved very helpful in deciding cases of excessive discretion, special courts,
and other cases where arbitrariness was found inherent. Also, now for the application of Article
14 discrimination vis--vis others were not necessary. Arbitrary and unreasonable actions were
identified to be per-se discriminatory25. It also aided in tackling cases of establishment of special
courts with a more liberalized methodology. The new doctrine validated the establishment of
special courts and special treatment to certain cases therein, as long as the objective of special
treatment and the discretion exercised to choose such cases was justified to be reasonable.
Although this introduced a sense of broad scope and dynamism in Article 14, this was considered
very subjective and devoid of logic by critics like H.M. Seervai, who strongly counters the
argument that new doctrine does and old doctrine does not give full effect of to the guarantee of
equal protection of laws26. According to him the new doctrine hangs in the air and disregards the
true interpretation of Article 14. Seervai draws this conclusion from Ajay Hasia case where it
was stated that equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies27, and accuses the new doctrine
of disregarding the other enemies of equality. He also proposes that the new doctrine fails to
differentiate between violation of equality by law and by executive action. On the limited scope
of the old doctrine, he states that a doctrine effectively securing the objectives of equality is not
25

Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, AIR 1981 SC 722

26

Kesavanada Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461; Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299.

27I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2007 SC 861 at 891.

17

impractical, and as such should not be questioned. He also questions the subjective grounds and
certainty of the new doctrine and rules it out altogether as against the nexus test.

The above arguments in opposition of the new doctrine do not seem to hold much force. The new
doctrine does not disregard other forms of inequality, identifying that only arbitrary acts can
violate equality of a person. Rather, it aims at widening the existing scope of Article 14 by
adding arbitrary acts as one of its targets. It does not propose that all that violate equality are
arbitrary actions28. Rather, it proposes that arbitrary actions can also violate equality. Secondly,
the courts have drawn a clear distinction between the violation of equality by law and by
executive action. The court stated that the new doctrine strives to make inequality not impossible
but improbable, and where the inequality happens due to malfunctioning of the executive, action
will lie against the officials concerned, and not against the law itself. Thirdly, the grounds that
require the application of the new doctrine are not illogical, as it clearly states that all
discretionary acts are not arbitrary and violative of equality. The new doctrine here can be
considered as a broad extension of the nexus test, the only difference being that that here the
differentia has to be derived from the act itself by the court and if enough guidelines exist in the
legislation to help the court derive it, the legislation may be held valid and not otherwise. The
legislations on this basis can be divided into three divisions:

Where clear classification has been given in the legislation.

Where classification is not given in clear terms but can be derived from the given

guidelines, policy statement or preamble of the legislation.

Where classification is not given and the guidelines and policy statement is vague
enough to make discrimination inherently probable.

CONCLUSION
It is humbly submitted that, by and large the old doctrine of classification or nexus tests is more
satisfactory and must be retained because, on the basis of the old doctrine challenge to State
28

(1994) 6 SCC 360. In this case, provisions precluding legal proceedings in relation to disputed site where
theBabri Masjid stood were held to be violative of the principle of rule of law, a basic feature, and thus
Unconstitutional.

18

action as being violative of Article 14 can be successfully tackled by the courts in a large
majority of cases. It is only in the limited sphere of conferment of unbridled or too wide a
discretion on executive authorities to pick and choose persons or things for giving different
treatment that, the doctrine of classification has not yielded satisfactory results and resulted in
inconsistency in Supreme Court decisions. The new doctrine of equality, therefore, can be
usefully employed in plugging this loophole. On the contrary, if the theory of classification is
replaced by the new doctrine of equality viz. non arbitrariness, it would lead to highly
unsatisfactory results because shorn of its rhetoric the new doctrine is vague and uncertain.
Patanjali Sastri, C.J.'s warning may be usefully recalled here, that "dangerously wide and vague
language of equality clause to the concrete facts of life, a doctrinaire approach should be
avoided". The chief merit of the new doctrine is, that it has freed the Supreme Court of the
"shackles of the dogma of classification" in the limited sense that the Judges should not make
sustained efforts to find some basis of classification where none is perceptible from the language
of the Act. However, the new doctrine or test of non-arbitrariness does not evolve a more
satisfactory test than the nexus tests. Even Prof. P.K. Tripathi, a critic of nexus tests has
expressed his concern regarding the new development. He has observed that "arbitrariness by
Article 14 is the arbitrariness or unreasonableness in discriminating between one person and
another and if there is no discrimination, there is no arbitrariness in the sense of Article 14.

BIBILOGRAPHY
1. DR. R.K. BANGIA, LAW OF TORTS
2. USHA RAMACHADRAHAN "TORT LAW IN INDIA"
19

3. JAIN, M.P. (2006). Outlines of Indian Legal and Constitutional History (6th ed.).
Nagpur: Wadhwa & Co
4. BASU, DURGA DAS (2007).

WEBSITES
1.
2.
3.
4.

www.nalsarstudentlawreview.com/
Hanumant.com/LeadingCases15-4-16-4.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_14
www.caclubindia.com Experts LAW

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