Ramirez v.

Aglubay
G.R. No. L-24006 November 25, 1967
JOSEFINA JUANA DE DIOS RAMIREZ MARCAIDA, petitionerappellant,
vs.
LEONCIO V. AGLUBAT, in his capacity as Deputy Local Civil
Registrar of Manila, respondent-appellee.
Facts:
Refusal of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila to record an Escritura de
Adopcion executed in Madrid, Spain, is now challenged before this
Court on appeal by registrant-adoptee from a judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Manila confirmatory of such refusal.
The disputed deed of adoption had its inception, thus: Prior to October
21, 1958, proceedings for adoption were started before the Court of
First Instance of Madrid, Spain by Maria Garnier Garreau, then 84
years of age, adopting Josefina Juana de Dios Ramirez Marcaida, 55
years, a citizen of the Philippines. Both were residents of Madrid,
Spain. On that date, October 21, 1958, the court granted the
application for adoption and gave the necessary judicial authority,
once the judgment becomes final, to execute the corresponding
adoption document. In compliance, on November 29, 1958, the
notarial document of adoption which embodies the court order of
adoption whereunder Maria Garnier Garreau formally adopted
petitioner, was executed in Madrid.
In conformity with our law, this escritura de adopcion was, on
December 10, 1953, authenticated by Emilio S. Martinez, Philippine
Vice Consul, Philippine Embassy, Madrid, who issued the
corresponding certificate of authentication.1
The document of adoption was filed in the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila on January 15, 1959. The Registrar, however,
refused to register that document upon the ground that under
Philippine law, adoption can only be had through judicial proceeding.
And since the notarial document of adoption is not a judicial
proceeding, it is not entitled to registration.
Issue:
Is the trial court correct in concluding that what is registrable is only
adoption obtained through a judgment rendered by a Philippine court?
Ruling:

Private international law offers no obstacle to recognition of foreign

adoption. This rests on the principle that the status of adoption,
created by the law of a State having jurisdiction to create it, will be
given the same effect in another state as is given by the latter state to
the status of adoption when created by its own law. It is quite obvious
then that the status of adoption, once created under the proper foreign
law, will be recognized in this country, except where public policy or
the interests of its inhabitants forbid its enforcement and demand the
substitution of the lex fori. At any rate, whatever may be the effect of
adoption, the rights of the State and adoptee and other persons
interested are fully safeguarded by Article 15 of our Civil Code which,
in terms explicit, provides that: "Laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad."
An adoption created under the law of a foreign country is entitled to
registration in the corresponding civil register of the Philippines. It is to
be understood, however, that the effects of such adoption shall be
governed by the laws of this country.

Republic vs Claude A. Miller and Jumrus E. Miller

G.R. No. 125932. April 21, 1999
Facts: On July 29, 1988, Spouses Miller, both American citizens, filed
with the RTC, Angeles City a verified petition to adopt Michael Magno
Madayag, a Filipino child, under the provision of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code which allows aliens to adopt. The natural parents
executed affidavits giving their irrevocable consent to the adoption
and the DSWD recommended approval of the petition on the basis of
its evaluation. On May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered decision
granting the petition for adoption.
On August 3, 1998, the Family Code became effective, prohibiting the
adoption of a Filipino child by aliens.
The Solicitor General appealed to the granting of the petition for
adoption by the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not aliens may be allowed to adopt a Filipino child when
the petition for adoption was filed prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code prohibiting the same.
Held:
Yes. An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition,
acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent
enactment of a new law disqualifying him.
The enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, will not
impair the right of respondents who are aliens to adopt a Filipino child
because the right has become vested at the time of filing of the
petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force. A
vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not
depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. Vested rights
include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a
demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the
right has vested.
As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and
substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was
filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes

of the case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by

the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.
Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it
attaches cannot be ousted by a subsequent happenings or events,
although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from
attaching in the first instance.
Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the
effectivity of the Family code, although denied the right to adopt under
Art. 184 of said Code, may continue with his petition under the law
prevailing before the Family Code.
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and
welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are
designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection
of society and family in the person of the adopter, as well as childless
couples or persons to experience the joy of parenthood and give them
legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of
their natural parent instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be
sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.

ELLIS V. REPUBLIC (1963)

*******
[ G. R. No. L-16922, April 30, 1963 ]
IN RE: ADOPTION OF CHILD BAPTIZED UNDER THE NAME OF
ROSE. MARVIN G. ELLIS AND GLORIA C. ELLIS, PETITIONERS,
VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR AND
APPELLANT.
FACTS:
Petitioner Marvin G. Ellis, a native of San Francisco, California, is 28
years of age. On September 8, 1949, he married Gloria C. Ellis in
Banger, Maine, United States. Both are citizens of the United States.
Baby Rose was born on September 26, 1959 at the Caloocan
Maternity Hospital. Four or five days later, the mother of Rose left her
with the Heart of Mary Villa&mdashan institution for unwed mothers
and their babiesstating that she (the mother) could not take care of
Rose without bringing disgrace upon her (the mother's) family.
Being without issue, on November 22, 1959, Mr. and Mrs. Ellis filed a
petition with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for the adoption
of the aforementioned baby. At the time of the hearing of the petition
on. January 14, I960, petitioner Marvin G. Ellis and his wife had been
in the Philippines for three (3) years, he being assigned thereto as
staff sergeant in the United States Air Force Base, in Angeles,
Pampanga, where both lived at that time. They had been in the
Philippines before, or, to be exact, in 1953.
ISSUE:
Whether or not being permanent residents in the Philippines,
petitioners are qualified to adopt Baby Rose.
RULING:
No.
Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, provides that:
"The following cannot adopt:

"(4) Non-resident aliens;"

*******
This legal provision is too clear to require interpretation. No matter
how much we may sympathize with the plight of Baby Rose and with
the good intentions of petitioners herein, the law leaves us no choice
but to apply its explicit terms, which unqualifiedly deny to petitioners
the power to adopt anybody in the Philippines.
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in
rem, which no court may entertain, unless it has jurisdiction, not only
over tho subject matter of the case and over the parties, but, also,
over the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that
of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory
that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by
the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction
over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines,
but not over the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners.
Inasmuch s petitioners herein are not domiciled in the Philippines,
and, hence, non-resident alienswe cannot assume and exercise
jurisdiction over their status, under either the nationality theory or the
domiciliary theory. ln any event, whether the above-quoted provision
of said Art. 335 is predicated upon lack of jurisdiction over the, res, or
merely affects the cause of action, we have no authority to grant the
relief prayed for by petitioners it.

Tenchavez vs Escano
FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino
Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with
Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before
Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a
culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered in
the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their matchmaker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with
Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where she and
Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their
vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicentas parents.
However after translating the said letter to Vicentas dad , he
disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her
parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and
when it was approved she left for the United States and filed a
complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and
issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then
sought for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu.
Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has
begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958.
Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he
alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and

binding upon courts of the Philippines.

HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts
cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce

between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil

Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens
who can afford divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous
relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds
for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of
Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A foreign
divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to
recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in
the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce
decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as
follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree
of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiffappellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and
attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee,
Mamerto Escao and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena
Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

Van Dorn vs Romillo

139 SCRA 139
FACTS:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent,
Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979.
They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children.
They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried,
this time with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed
on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioners business in Ermita Manila,
the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed
therein that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the business
and he be declared as the administrator of the said property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and
private respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where
petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over
conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the
court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to
respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She should not be
discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be
served.

PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR AND GEILING et al

G.R. No. 80116
June 30, 1989
FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in
Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, such
connubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce
proceeding against Pilapil in Germany. The Local Court, Federal
Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground
of failure of marriage of the spouses.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree,
Geiling filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of
Manila alleging in one that, while still married to said Geiling, Pilapil
had an affair with a certain William Chia. The Assistant Fiscal, after
the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the
cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, upon
review, the respondent city fiscal Victor approved a resolution
directing the filing of 2 complaint for adultery against the petitioner.
The case entitled PP Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia was assigned
to the court presided by the respondent judge Ibay-Somera.
A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by
the respondent. Pilapil filed this special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking the annulment of the
order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.
As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus
presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time
of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.
ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the
complaint for adultery, considering that it was done after obtaining a
divorce decree?

HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioners MTQ

is SET ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction. The TRO issued in this case is hereby made
permanent.
NO
Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be
prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the
offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering
consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not
merely a formal, requirement.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to
institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have
the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the
filing of the criminal action. This is a logical consequence since the
raison detre of said provision of law would be absent where the
supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged
offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.
Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the
commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds
between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing
at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the
latter.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted.
Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons Under the
same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no
longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence
the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended
spouse at the time he filed suit.

Republic vs Orbecido
Posted by kaye lee on 9:15 AM

472 SCRA 114, GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005 [Article 26;Divorce]

FACTS:
Orbecido and Villanueva were married and had two children. Wife
went to US to work and later became a US citizen. Thereafter he
learned from his son that his wife obtained divorce and married
another man. Orbecido filed a petition for authority to remarry under
the Article 26 (2) of the Family Code. RTC Zamboanga del Sur
granted his petition. The SolGen's motion for reconsideration was
denied. Orbecido filed a petition for review of certiorari on the
Decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 (2).
RULING:
Yes. Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
The reckoning point is not their citizenship at the time of celebration
of marriage, but their citizenship at the time the divorce decree is
obtained abroad by alien spouse capacitating him/her to remarry.

However, Orbecido is barred from remarrying because he did not

present competent evidence showing his wife had obtained a divorce
decree and had remarried.

CORPUZ vs. STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL G.R. No.
186571 August 11, 2010

HELD:
Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a direct appeal from
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City. Petitioner
Gerbert R. Corpus is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married
respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas but subsequently left for
Canada due to work and other professional commitments. When he
returned to the Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas was
already romantically involved with another man. This brought about
the filing of a petition for divorce by Corpuz in Canada which was
eventually granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada.
A month later, the divorce decree took effect. Two years later, Corpuz
has fallen in love with another Filipina and wished to marry her. He
went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian
divorce decree of his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However,
despite the registration, an official of National Statistics Office
informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the
Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of the
Canadian divorce by a competent judicial court in view of NSO
Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of dissolution
of marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the petition
reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree because he is a naturalized
Canadian citizen. It was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the
proper party who can institute an action under the principle of Article
26 of the Family Code which capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry
in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
grants aliens like Corpuz the right to institute a petition for judicial
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that

clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this
jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens
with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient
basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC.In other words, the
unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition
the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign
divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the
aliens national law have been duly proven according to our rules of
evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to
oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive
evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to
state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our
laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once
recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties,
as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas and Sol Gen G.R. No. 186571, 11 August
2010

The Pasig City Civil Registry acted out of line when it registered the
foreign decree of divorce on the petitioner and respondents marriage
certificate without judicial order recognizing the said decree. The
registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial
recognition is void.

Nature of the Case: Direct Appeal from RTC decision, a petition for
review on certiorari

The petition for review on certiorari is granted, the RTC decision is

reversed and Court ordered t6he remand of the case to the trial court
for further proceedings in light of the ruling.

Facts:
Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who acquired
Canadian citizenship through naturalization. He was married to the
respondent but was shocked of the infidelity on the part of his wife. He
went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was granted.
Desirous to marry another woman he now loved, he registered the
divorce decree in the Civil Registry Office and was informed that the
foreign decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court. Petitioner filed for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC where
respondent failed to submit any response. The RTC denied the
petition on the basis that the petitioner lacked locus standi. Thus, this
case was filed before the Court.
Issues: WON the second paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends to
aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction fro the recognition
of a foreign divorce decree.
Decision:
The alien spouse cannot claim under the second
paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code because the substantive right
it establishes is in favour of the Filipino spouse. Only the Filipino
spouse can invoke the second par of Art 26 of the Family Code.
The unavailability of the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family
Code to aliens does not necessarily strip the petitioner of legal interest
to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree.
The petitioner, being a naturalized Canadian citizen now, is clothed by
the presumptive evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree
with conformity to aliens national law.

Case Digest: Roehr v. Rodriguez

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married private
respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in
Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14,
1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born
Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine.
Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the
Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC). Wolfgang filed a motion to dismiss,
but it was denied.

The Supreme Court goes further to say that the court can modify or
alter a judgment even after the same has become executory
whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and
inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or
requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment
has become final and executory and when it becomes imperative in
the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.
2nd issue: W/N Judge Salonga's act was valid when she assumed
and retained jurisdiction as regards child custody and support.
Ruling: Yes.

Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of

First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese. Said decree also provides that
the parental custody of the children should be vested to Wolfgang.
Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a
divorce decree had already been promulgated, and said motion was
granted by Public Respondent RTC Judge Salonga.
Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that
the case proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody
of children and the distribution of the properties between her and
Wolfgang. Judge Salonga partially set aside her previous order for
the purpose of tackling the issues of support and custody of their
children.
1st Issue: W/N Judge Salonga was correct in granting a partial motion
for reconsideration.
Ruling: Yes.
A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet
attained finality, as in the case at bar.

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other

countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction. But the legal effects
thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be
determined by our courts.
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign
judgment, such as the award of custody to Wolfgang by the German
court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had
been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule
39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure).
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was
given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court
so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with
regard to the rights of Wolfgang to have parental custody of their two
children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to
what was the extent of Carmens participation in the proceedings in
the German court, the records remain unclear.
Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of
the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing
to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and
education mindful of the best interests of the children.

MARCOS V. MARCOS

Facts
Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they
had five children. Alleging that the husband failed to provide material
support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage for
psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null and
void under Art. 36 which was however reversed by CA.
Issues
Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the
respondent by a physician is a requirement for a declaration of
psychological incapacity.
Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show
psychological incapacity.
Held
Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of a
marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented.
There is no requirement, however that the respondent be examined
by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such
declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that
respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may
have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his
acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his
part. There is absolutely no showing that his defects were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he
had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more
than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently
drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the
family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only

to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally

important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable,
especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. In sum,
this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of
the petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurabilty and for
her failure to observe the guidelines as outline in Republic v. CA and
Molina.

Facts:
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J.
Paras in Bindoy, Negros Oriental. They begot four (4) children,
namely: Raoul (deceased), Cindy Rose (deceased), Dahlia, and
Reuel. Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993,Rosa
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Dumaguete City,
a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo,under Article 36
of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 10613. She alleged
that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential
obligations of marriage as shown by the following circumstances: (a)
he dissipated her business assets and forged her signature in one
mortgage transaction; (b) he lived with a concubine and sired a child
with her; (c) he did not give financial support to his children; and (d)
he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father.
She met Justo in 1961 in Bindoy. She was then a student of San
Carlos University, Cebu City. He courted her, frequently spending time
at her "Botica." Eventually, in1964 convinced that he loved her, she
agreed to marry him. Their wedding was considered one of the "most
celebrated" marriages in Bindoy. Sometime in 1975, their daughter
Cindy Rose was afflicted with leukemia. It was her family who paid for
her medication. Also, in 1984, their son Raoul was electrocuted while
Justo was in their rest house with his "barkadas." He did not heed her
earlier advice to bring Raoul in the rest house as the latter has the
habit of climbing the rooftop. To cope with the death of the children,
the entire family went to the United States. However, after three
months, Justo abandoned them and left for the Philippines. Upon her
return to the Philippines, she was shocked to find her "Botica" and
other businesses heavy in debt and he disposed without her consent
a conjugal piece of land. At other times, he permitted the municipal
government to take gasoline from their gas station free of charge. His
act of maintaining a mistress and siring an illegitimate child was the
last straw that prompted her to file the present case. She found that
after leaving their conjugal house in 1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn
Ching. Their cohabitation resulted in the birth of a baby girl, Cyndee
Rose, obviously named after her (Rosa) and Justos deceased
daughter Cindy Rose Paras.
He also denied forging her signature in one mortgage transaction. He
maintained that he did not dispose of a conjugal property and that he
and Rosa personally signed the renewal of a sugar crop loan before
the banks authorized employee. He did not abandon his family in the
United States. For his part, he was granted only three (3) months

leave as municipal mayor of Bindoy, thus, he immediately returned to

the Philippines. He spent for his childrens education. At first, he
resented supporting them because he was just starting his law
practice and besides, their conjugal assets were more than enough to
provide for their needs. He admitted though that there were times he
failed to give them financial support because of his lack of income.
What caused the inevitable family break-out was Rosas act of
embarrassing him during his birthday celebration in 1987. She did not
prepare food for the guests. When confronted, she retorted that she
has nothing to do with his birthday. This convinced him of her lack of
concern. This was further aggravated when she denied his request for
engine oil when his vehicle broke down in a mountainous and NPAinfested area. As to the charge of concubine, he alleged that Jocelyn
Ching is not his mistress, but her secretary in his Law Office. She was
impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain Grelle Leccioness. Cyndee
Rose Ching Leccioness is not his daughter.
After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision
upholding the validity of the marriage. It found that: (a) Justo did not
abandon the conjugal home as he was forced to leave after Rosa
posted guards at the gates of their house; (b) the conjugal assets
were sufficient to support the family needs, thus, there was no need
for Justo to shell out his limited salary; and (c) the charge of infidelity
is unsubstantiated. The RTC observed that the relationship between
the parties started well, negating the existence of psychological
incapacity on either party at the time of the celebration of their
marriage. And lastly, it ruled that there appeared to be a collusion
between them as both sought the declaration of nullity of their
marriage.
On October 18, 2000, this Court rendered its Decision finding him
guilty of falsifying Rosas signature in bank documents, immorality,
and abandonment of his family. He was suspended from the practice
of law, thus: the respondent is suspended from the practice of law for
SIX (6) MONTHS on the charge of falsifying his wifes signature in
bank documents and other related loan instruments; and for ONE (1)
YEAR from the practice of law on the charges of immorality and
abandonment of his own family, the penalties to be served
simultaneously. Let notice of this Decision be spread in respondents
record as an attorney, and notice of the same served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned. On December
8, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in the

present case, holding that "the evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls
short of the standards required by law to decree a nullity of marriage."
It ruled that Justos alleged defects or idiosyncrasies "were sufficiently
explained by the evidence," Rosa contends that this Courts factual
findings in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment are conclusive on the present
case. Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in rendering contrary
factual findings. Also, she argues that she filed the instant complaint
sometime in May, 1993
Issues:
1) Whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are
conclusive on the present case;
2) Whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert
testimony on the root cause of Justos alleged psychological
incapacity is necessary; and
3) Whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological
incapacity on the part of Justo
Held:
1) A reading of the Court of Appeals Decision shows that she has no
reason to feel aggrieved. In fact, the appellate court even assumed
that her charges "are true," but concluded that they are insufficient to
declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Justo's alleged infidelity, failure to support his family and alleged
abandonment of their family home are true, such traits are at best
indicators that he is unfit to become an ideal husband and father.
However, by themselves, these grounds are insufficient to declare the
marriage void due to an incurable psychological incapacity. These
grounds, we must emphasize, do not manifest that he was truly in

cognitive of the basic marital covenants that he must assume and

discharge as a married person. While they may manifest the "gravity"
of his alleged psychological incapacity, they do not necessarily show
incurability, such that while his acts violated the covenants of
marriage, they do not necessarily show that such acts show an
irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity which prevents
him from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in the future.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, were mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known
the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given
by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologist
\3) ART. 36. A marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b)
juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability