Progress

New School
On a Lineage of the Idea of Progress

Author(s): HANS BLUMENBERG and E. B. Ashton
Source: Social Research, Vol. 41, No. 1 (SPRING 1974), pp. 5-27
Published by: New School
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40970167
Accessed: 18-10-2015 02:03 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
New School is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Social Research.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 131.111.243.147 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 02:03:07 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
On a Lineage
of the Idea of /
/ BY HANS BLUMENBERG
Progress
A he originof the idea of progressis a theme that has already
spawnedcompetinggenealogies,and thiscompetitioncannot be
attributedsolelyto different
methodsand sources. When we are
dealing with the parentageof a conceptionthat involvesstrong
value judgments,sidelightsfall not only on the possibilitiesof
its extractionbut on all the disciplinesconcerned. Thus the
classical philologieshave claimed in behalf of theirrealm that
the idea of progresswas already a propertyof Antiquityand
needed only to be disinterredby the Renaissance. The modern
philologiesjoined the fraywith the assertionthat the idea had
first
ofmodernauthors
appearedas thatof theaestheticsuperiority
to ancientones- to Romanicists,in otherwords,in the Querelle
des anciens et des modernes. And in the philosophyof history
thedogmaofsecularizationhad the thoughtof progressarise from
the fundamentalChristiannotionsof eschatology,
fromthe stress
on
the
one
on
the
and
future
itscomingsalvationand,
laid,
hand,
on the otherhand, on Providenceas the encompassingrationalization of the accidental elementsof history. In this fashion
theologywas ex post factoassignedthe functionof administering
the worldlymillenniumof the Modern Age, a partialrestitution
ofwhatit wascomingto missas theadministratrix
of transcendent
promises.
In view of theserivalrieswe cannot but wonderwhetherthe
questionthatled to such varyingresultshas been posed withsufficient precision. Vague analogies will not do here. Not even
the attitudeof an obviouslyfuture-oriented
expectationimplies
of this expectationin the mode of progress. We
fulfillment
SOCIAL RESEARCH
maygrantthatno historicalepoch can claim supremeand definitive qualityfor its products,but this admissionas such means
no morethanthe open possibilitythat theirquality may be surpassed,now or in the future.
Time and Achievement
There is one test,at a minimum,thatmustbe met by whatever
we call a rudimentary
formof the idea of progress:it must containa coordinativerelationbetweenthe quantum of timeand the
qualityof achievement. Progressas the formof the course of
historyrequires an assumptionof identity,since it excludes a
formofthatcoursein whichtheprocessof experienceand thought
startsafreshwitheveryindividualand everygenerationmakes a
break with the one before. Unquestionably,therefore,one of
the earlymeans of representingprogressis the comparisonbetweenthe course of historyand that of an individual life. In
thiscomparison,of course,the rationalityof the structureis overlaid with the biological-schema of a quality that declines once
it has reached maturity. It is thus significantthat Fontenelle
abandonsthe completeanalogyand disregardsold age and death,
thephasesof lifepastthestateof maturity.
The findingof particularfactualstepsof progressis not necessarilytiedto theconceptionor-applicationof the idea. If it were,
we wouldhaveplentyto do gatheringevidenceof suchsteps. The
idea of progressconsists,rather,in the assertionof a universalor
epochal link between theoretical,practical,or technologicalactions,a link thatlies in the continuumof time and restson the
basis of time.
It is when the mere quantityof distancein time becomes the
chiefpremiseof new possibilitiesthat the rationalityof the idea
of progresstakessuccinctform. It may be said, of course,that
such pure presentations
are the typicalexpressionsof late stages
in the unfoldingof an idea; but I doubt that this applies to
THE IDEA OF PROGRESS
conceptsreferringto the inner logic of particularprocessesand

structures.Hence I proceedfromthe thesisthatthe conception
of progressmustfirsthave evolvedwhere the existenceof such a
logical tie between time quantum and achievementquality is
unmistakable. There must be a complex of achievements,
each
of whichcould not have been producedat all timesby a special
effort
or a strokeof genius. When we ask ourselvesin whatfield
this condition is objectivelyfulfilled,we do not need to know
historicalsourcesto come up withastronomy.
In this science there are cognitionswhich the most intense
empiricaland mathematicalexertioncould not have achievedat
all timesbecause theypresupposea timebasis forthe comparison
ofdata,a basis thatcan be determinedin relationto observational
exactitude. The time thathas passed since the handingdown of
our earliestdata becomesa premiseof thetheoreticalachievement.
This elementary
stateof factstellsus thatthestructure
of progress
constitutesan irreversibleconceptual contextof points in time
thatcannot be alteredat will. What appears in the contextof
progressis preciselytherebyqualifiedas thatwhichis not possible
at all times.
It is a well known historicalfact that the increasingdistance
in time from the astronomicalstandard achievementsof late
Antiquityhad offensiveconsequences. One was the growing
confusionof the calendar with its consequencesforthe determination of holidays,necessitatingever new interventions;
another
was uncertainty
about the calculationsof astrologyand theresult- indispensableup to the
concern
whetherthis institution
ing
- could be relied upon. When Coperdaysof the Roman pontiff
dedicationof his work,spoke of the astronicus,in the prefatory
nomical confusionsthat had given him the idea to reformthe
planetarysystem,he could count on beinglistenedto withunderstandingby the papal addressee. The extentof the confusion
was a functionof time- namely,of the increasinglyprevalent
imprcisionsof the Ptolemaic system. Initially,the experience
of the link between time and cognitionis a negativeone; but
SOCIAL RESEARCH
this negativityproved to be merelythe reverseof a potential

positivity:of the chance that the long-accumulatedimprecision
mightbe morepreciselydefined.
The astronomy
and philosophyof Antiquityhad laid down two
of moand uniformity
qualitiesforthe firmament:
immutability
tion. It mustbe said thatthesefixationshad reduced empirical
attentionand depreciatedthe accuracyof observations. In retrocan only be
spect,thatdubious immutabilityof the firmament
describedas a resultof trustin too shorta span of experience,a
precipitateexpressionof the factthatall changesoccurringin the
skyare veryslow, beneath our thresholdof perception. From
thestandpoint
ofnaturaloptics,and of theexactnessof the instrumentsthat were available for many thousandsof years, what
happensin the skyis nothing;only verylong time framesallow
us to assumevalue changeslarge enough to cross the threshold
of theempiricalparameters.These timeframesbear no relation
to the human life span. Hence the need to found and preserve
a "professional"traditionby laying down the resultsof every
generation,not just forthe next,but forthosecomingcenturies
later. This very point- mankind's learning to conceive itself
as an actornotonlyin space (as in theorganizationof astronomical
and physicalobservationssince the eighteenthcentury,for instance)but in time- is the crux if "progress"is to be made comand
prehensibleas a structureof action that is time-conditioned
thusnecessarilytranscendingthe individual life span.
Hipparchus: The Data Base
We mightthinkthat the search for the origin of the idea of
progressmust take us to some point where progresshas been
postulatedas a possible futurecourse of history,if not indeed
draftedas a bold program. Here too, however,it turnsout that
the thoughtcame later. Men began to thinkof progressas the
actual, historicallyrealized progresswas uncovered and found

to be conditionedby time. Moreover,this could happen only
because a professionalsuspicionhad risen in an ancient brain:
the suspicionthata comparisonof observeddata mightsomeday
be of interest. The star catalogue of Hipparchus is the oldest
- an astoundingone,
evidence we have of such an expectation
giventhe premisesof Antiquity.
Even in Antiquitymen wonderedat the motivationof Hipparchusand explained it by a spectacularcelestialevent. It may
- that a
be a legend which Pliny tells in his Naturalis historia
new star,appearingin the constellationScorpio in the year 134
b.c., had caused Hipparchusto compile his catalogue- but even
if not true,it was well invented. For the strikingchange in the
skywas bound to suggestto the ancientastronomerthat others,
equally at odds withthe metaphysicalassuranceof immutability,
mightonly have thus far escaped the observers'attention. The
catalogue,said to have listed 1,022starsaccordingto positionand
was laid downas an instrument
forfuturecomparisons.
brightness,
The standardsof accuracywhichHipparchusimposedon himself
may have led him to his most importantdiscovery,that of the
shiftin the annual recurrenceof the positionsof fixed stars.
Havingabandonedtheimmutableuniverseof fixedstars,one now
had to give up thestrictly
periodicalsiderealyearas well. In any
withmetaphysical
case,thesedisappointments
reliabilityawakened
interestin the long time span and its providentialexploitation
by means of a workwhose intentcould be realized only by enit to tradition.
trusting
Hipparchus was a Bithynianwho made his observationsat
Rhodos about the middle of the second centuryb.c. For poshe needed the
terity,and perhapseven for his contemporaries,
strongest
argumentto justifyhis catalogueof fixedstars,an enterprisewhoselogicand intentran plainlycounterto the traditional
convictionsof the special, eternalnature of celestial bodies. A
new starappearingin the skycould be one of the signsso often
10
SOCIAL RESEARCH
said to have servedto legitimizehistoricevents. Here both the

doubt and the methodused to testthe particularity
of the object
wereset in motionby theobject itself.
Surprisingly,
Pliny considersthis firstdiscoveryof any change
in the firmament
of fixedstarsas proofof the Stoic dogma of a
kinship between stars and men, of the souls as particles of
of thisturnis to integratetheresearch
celestialmatter. The effect
projectof Hipparchuswiththephilosophicalconcernwithhuman
nature. If we read it more fromthe viewpointof the historyof
makes the project of Hipparchus a
science, the interpretation
preparatory
stepfortherationalaxiom of thehomogeneousnature
of the universe;the "badly" changeableterrestrial
realityproves
to be a particularization
thatis at least not negative. Pliny tells
us thatchangesin the new starwere seen on the veryday of its
appearance,causing Hipparchus to ask whetherthingsof that
sortmightnot be occurringmore often(anne hoc saepius fieret).
Moved by thisquestion- and thisis Pliny'smostrevealingphrase
- Hipparchusdared somethingthatwould be brazen even fora
god, namely,countingthe starsforposterity(ideoque ausus rem
etiam deo inprobam,adnumerareposterisStellas),listingthem
of his own inventionto determine
byname,and usinginstruments
everystar'spositionand magnitude. It would thusbe easyto tell
whethera stardisappearedor a new one appeared,whetherthere
was anychangeat all in theirpositions,and whethertheirbrightness increasedor diminished. The seeming magnitudeswere
probably included in the catalogue on the assumption that
changesin distancealong the axis of observationwere also discoverableby comparison. Hipparchushad produceda cognosci- couched by Pliny
ble contextof timelessastronomicalresearch
in the formulathathe had bequeathed heaven as a legacyto all
men,so to speak,if onlyone were foundto take possessionof it.1
Hipparchuswas beyonddoubt the most importantastronomer
of AntiquitybeforePtolemy. This is whyhis image,blurredin
1 Pliny,Naturalishistoria,II, 95: . . . celo in hereditatecunctisrelicto,si
earncaperei,inventus
esset.
quisquam,qui cretionem
11
any case, strikessome historiansof scienceas the more dimmed

byhis rejectionof theheliocentricworldsystemwhichAristarchus
of Samoshad proposed;it offendsthemthathe preservedthegeocentricsystem,rather,by introducingtheepicyclesthatcame into
such ill repute afterPtolemy. Yet Hipparchus seems to have
on the verygroundsthat the time was
rejectedheliocentricism
not yet ripe for a satisfactory
planetarytheory,and he did not
considerit ripe because of his faithin the growthof materialsof
observationand in their increasingaccuracy. His constructive
reservewould thusbe linkedas an insightwithhis hope forthe
establishment
of a methodicaltraditionoverlong periodsof time.
His conservatism
resemblesthe much later one of Tycho Brahe,
who contradictedCopernicus,systematically
compromisedhis sysand
at
the
same
time
and stressedthe
enhanced
tem,
uniquely
precisionof the observationalactivitywhose resultswere later
to be utilizedby Kepler forthe decisivestep of progressin the
theoryof the planets. Both the quantityand the quality of the
observationscompiled by Hipparchus permitthe inferencethat
he regardedthe constructive
problemsof the planetarysystemas
empiricallysoluble if observationaldata were gatheredand comparedon a precisebasisand oversufficiently
long periodsof time.2
If in thisrespectHipparchus the geographerdid not proceed
fromthe astronomer,
thisseemsto have been due
any differently
to comparablereasons. The failureforwhichhe is chided- not
usingthegeographicaldata yieldedbythe conquestsof Alexander
- seems
the Great to drafta total pictureof the earth'ssurface
2 A. Rehm, "Hipparchos von Nikaia," in Pauly-Wissowa Real-Encyclopadie der
Vol. VIII (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1913), cols.
classischen Altertumswissenschaft,
1666-1681: "It was from tested observational materials only that Hipparchus
would allow conclusions to be drawn. For science this may not have been a
blessing; for in all cases in which his own observationsdid not help him further,
his distrustof any promotion of science by hypothesesnot yet susceptible of exact
theories
proof led him to an unhealthy conservatism,i.e., to holding fast to older
even if their foundation was no better, or worse, than that of newer hypotheses.
Thus Hipparchus mistrustedthe progress which geography had made due to the
of
conquests of Alexander, and thus he bears the main guilt for the preservation
the geocentricsystem" (cols. 1672-1673).
12
SOCIAL RESEARCH
to rest on his assumptionthat this broadened knowledgepermittedfurther

accretions,
surprisingor methodicallygained,to be
expectedof the future. There is an obvious analogybetweenhis
refusalto agree with a new planetarytheoryand his failureto
remapthe earth: Hipparchus,on the basis of his theoreticalconto a distantfuture.3A compariviction,had to assignthesetasks
son ofhis geographicalresultswiththoseof Ptolemyshowsindeed
a pictureall but completelyunchangedover thecenturies. Geographyrequirednot just an organizationof data in time; it called
primarilyfor their organizationin space. But under Roman
dominancethe premiseof that- an intereston the part of the
sole powerthatremainedcapable of it- was lacking.
One aspectof the fitnessof astronomyto pave the way forthe
idea of progresshas so far been ignored here. To Antiquity,
was not a sciencebut a technicalskill. This made an
astronomy
inevitableinsighteasier to apply to it: that human skills are
constantlyimproved,that time becomes to them, in Aristotle's
words,an "inventorand aide." Linking the "arts" with pure
theorywas only rarelypossible in Antiquityand still verydifficult in the incipientModernAge, mainlyforthe reason thatthe
theoreticalideal- the conclusiverepresentation
of human cognition by the greatachievementof one man, and the assuranceof
lastingscholasticauthorityto this man- stood in the way. The
factthatastronomybelonged to the educational canon of "free
arts" was to fosterits factualstagnationin the Middle Ages; in
the case of Hipparchus,on the other hand, it looks more as if
the idea of consciouslyplanned progresshad been facilitatedby
astronomy'sexclusion frompure theory. In this realm there
could be no authoritiesunlessthe bad exampleof the administrators of pure theory,the philosophicalschools,came to prevail.
And indeedthatis whathappenedafterPtolemy.
This state of factsmakes us reflectonce again whetherthe
legend of the new star- which already expresseslack of unders Ibid., cols. 1677-1678.
13
- does not call

standingforHipparchusand his possiblehorizons
forsome demythologizing.Soberlyconsidered,the factslook as
base
follows:Hipparchusbecamethe founderof a future-oriented
of astronomicaltraditionbecause he was the firstto experience
reapingthe fruitsof such a tradition,howeverplanlesslyit might
have come about. He could not have discoveredthe precession
of the equinoxes, the retrogradeshift of the seasonal points
along the ecliptic,if some fewpositionaldata fromthe beginning
of the thirdcenturyb.c. had not been available to him. The
value of the precession,given by Hipparchusas two degreesin
about 150 years,was canonizedby Ptolemy(withthe remarkthat
it had since become "more assured") at the round figureof one
of falsedata,
degreeper century. There is a historyof the effects
effects
based on acceptancedue to trustin the originalpregnancy
of dita althougha greateraccuracywould have been methodically
possible. The effectof Ptolemy'sround figurewas, so to speak,
to make the centuryvalue "cosmically"evident.
In his reporton the Hipparchiandiscoveryof the precessionof
the equinoxes, Ptolemysays that fixed stars remain worthyof
their name because their positionsrelative to one another are
immutable;only the motion of theirsphere,of the spherewith
which theycircle as though ingrownin it, must no longer be
describedas regular. Since the irregularity
is a summativevalue
of the shiftof the equinoxes, the accuracyof its determination
depends on our distance in time from the acquisition of the
earliestdata. Ptolemystressesthat only a fairlyshorttime had
elapsed since the firstnotations,which had been neither very
reliable nor detailed. In otherwords,the firstdata- forwhich
the names of Aristyllusand Timocharis are given- differfrom
thoseof Hipparchuspreciselyin thattheywerenot leftaccording
to plan for the purpose of futurecomparison. Thus, in regard
to longerperiodsof time,Hipparchushad been obliged to content
himselfwith mere suppositions. But in the meantime,from
Ptolemy'sstandpoint,the resultshad become more assured because the comparisonrestedon a greaterdistance in time, and
14
SOCIAL RESEARCH
because Hipparchus'sdata had been handed down in full detail

(metapases exergasias).4
Here Ptolemynames the two premisesof organizingprogress
in astronomy:a distance in time that sufficesfor summingup
valueslyingbeneaththethresholdofobservationalexactitude,and
methodicalcare in handing down a data base to generations
to come.
Seneca: The Comet Problem

Anotherproblem,one on which the early Modern Age was
goingto testthepossibilityof progressas theconquestof primeval
fears,was thatof comets. Accessto theirproblematicshad been
blocked by Aristotle,who pronouncedcometsatmosthoroughly
phericphenomena,denyingany kind of empiricallydiscoverable
legalityto theirappearanceand theircourses. The astronomers
of Antiquity,Hipparchus included, ignored the phenomenon
as outsidetheirjurisdiction;as faras theheavenlyheraldsofdoom
wereconcerned,thereseemedto be no progressbeyondcometomancy, except perhaps for the advice of Epicurus to insulate
celestialphenomenaagainstall formsofwonder,fear,and expectation. The more astoundingis the tracton cometswhichSeneca
contributedin the firstcenturya.D., as Book VII of his Naturales
qiiaestiones.
To Seneca, man's susceptibilityto a concern with comets is
part of his Stoic pathology:we take no notice of phenomenaas
4 Ptolemy,
VII, 1. See VII, 2: "But thatthesphereof fixed
Syntaxismathematica,
starsis also movingquite peculiarlyin the directionoppositeto the revolution
of the universe. . . this is made evidentto us chieflyby the fact that in past
timesthe same starsdo not maintainthe same distancesfromthe solstitialand
equinoctialpointsas nowadaysbut are foundfartherand farthereast of those
points,dependingon the lengthof time that has passed" (translatedfromthe
Germanof K. Manitius,Handbuchder Astronomie
[Leipzig:B. G. Teubner,1963],
II, 12).
15
long as theydo not disturb the world order (haec tarnennon

adnotamus,quamdiu ordo servatur). Time playsa crucialrole in
clarifyingthe appearance of comets; if theywere bodies of the
same sort as the stars theywould manifestthis nature by the
periodicityof theirappearance. Seneca recognizesthatan exact
recordof cometappearancesover long periodsof time would be
needed to disprove their atmosphericnature: Necessarium est
autemveteresortuscometarnmhaberecollectos. In Seneca'sdays
thispremisewas beyondfulfillment;
not even the Egyptians,the
fontsof all otherastronomicalwisdom,had laid foundationsfor
a theoryof comets. The choice of methodis here visiblydependent on a theoreticalanticipation,withoutwhich the long-time
observationaltraditioncannotcome about at all. This anticipation consistsin the mere suppositionthat the comet'smovement
mightbe regularand tied to a fixedcourse. What is thus transferredto comets is the assumptionof regularitythat has long
been successfully
confirmedregardingthe moon and the planets:
quia non est Ulisperturbati^et impotenscursus,ad cometasidem
trans
feramus.
The next step in the argumentis a minorone for the philosopherof Antiquity:if thecometsare starsand have fixedcourses,
thesecoursesmustbe finite,circular,and resultingin a periodic
returnof identical bodies. It must not be forgottenthat the
planetsknownin Antiquityhad relativelyshortperiodsof revolution, and that reckoningwith the far longer periodicitiesof
comets was bound to mean a vast expansion of the systemof
regularlymoved celestialbodies. The mostimportantinference
here is the lengthof timerequiredforthe astronomicalresearch
that might eventuallyclarifythis bewilderingsubject. Why,
writesSeneca,does it amaze us thatstrictlaws governingthisvery
rare mundane spectaclecannot be drawn up yet, that we still
do not know how comets come and go, if their returnoccurs
onlyafterimmenseintervals? But a timewill come when all of
this,now hidden, is broughtto lightby the diligenceof longer
periods. One man's life is too shortforso muchresearch. Some
16
SOCIAL RESEARCH
day somebodywill plot the coursesof the comets,will show why

theydeviate fromthe level of the zodiac, will demonstratetheir
natureand theirsize. Seneca tells us to be contentwith what
has so farbeen achieved,to leave posterityits shareof truth.5
This textstandsout not merelyas theone treatiseon thecomet
problemthathas been preservedfromAntiquity;its outstanding
featuresare the quality of the problem'sdiscussionand, above
all, the premiseof progressfor its solution. At the same time,
consideringwhat futile effortsto remove this cause of human
confusionwere made as late as the eighteenthcentury,we must
point out that Seneca's clear vision in dealing with it had no
consequences. It served neither to spur the developmentof
methods of comet researchnor to lessen the fear of comets.
Seneca's own pupil, Nero, was notoriouslyaddicted to cometomancy. The mysteriouslack of progresseven where it was so
clearlyindicatedis not peculiar to the complex of the Middle
Ages,supposedto have been the only "dark" ones.
Hipparchusand Seneca presentus with two kinds of findings,
both leading to the result that astronomicalprogressis necessarilyconditionedby time. One is thatthe magnitudeof certain
data is beneath the thresholdof currentobservation;the other,
thatcertainphenomenarecurafterverylong periods. This was
- not just because both seemed to be cases of shaking
surprising
a long-unquestioned
cosmic legality,but also because thesefacts
to serve
obligedman to admitto somethinglike his own unfitness
as a theoreticalauthority. Neitherhis life span nor his physical
to meetthedemandswhichhis objectsmade
organizationsufficed
on him. Now, thedecisivediscoverywas thattheseconstitutional
of an empirical
defectscould be compensatedby the construction
s Seneca,Naturalesquaestiones,VII, 25, 3-7: quid ergo miramurcometas,tarn
rarummundispectaculum
, nondurntenerilegibuscertisnee initiaillorumfinesque
notescere,
quorumex ingentibusintervallisrecursusest? . . . veniettempus,quo
ista, quae nunc latent,in lucem dies extrahatet longiorisaevi diligentiu;ad
tantorumaetas una non sufficit
. . . erit qui demonstret
inquisitionem
aliquando,
in quibus cometaepartibuscurrant,cur tarnseductia ceteriserrent,quanti qualesquesint.
17
link acrosstime. In this discoverylies the rudimentof the idea

of progress.
A premiseof thiskind of compensation,of course,is the ability
to do, or to put up with,somethingwhichAntiquityhad never
reckonedwith in its appraisal of man's chances to possess the
- namely,having to wait. It is preciselyin envisioning
truth
Antiquity'sincapacityto conceive the idea of progressthat the
positiveside of this incapacitybecomes clear: it consistsin the
refusalto admit thatanythingvital to man mightnot alwaysbe
presentand possible,and in therelatedrefusalto turnthe present
intoa meansforthefuture. HeinrichHeine once arguedagainst
theconceptof progressby citingthe humanewill thatthe present
keep its value, that it not be viewed as a mere means, nor the
futureas its end.6 The ancientideal of theoryrestson the conceptionof realityas theevidenceof themoment;it has no dimension of time. It was not until a late date that men recognized
how contradictory
it is to exalt the exemplaryobject of that
theory,the starrysky,and yet to presupposetime for the techniques of its exact representation.And it is this contradiction
that forcedthem to leave the base of that conceptionof reality
and to make a preliminarydraftof anotherone: of immanent
as the implicationof the idea of progress.
consistency
The gistof progresslies not in a continuityof actions; it lies
in thecontinuity
of the timewhicha traditionneeds to pass them
on. This is whythe act of establishingthiscontextmustbe realized not as a relic only,but as a future-oriented
communication.
The proceduresby whichthe data base has been establishedmust
be included in the tradition;the limit value here is unity of
"method." We must tryto visualize how Christianobserversof
the astronomicalreformsof the midsixteenthcenturymarveled,
or oughtto have marveled,at a comparisonwiththe expectations
harboredforthe distantfutureby the astronomers
of Antiquity,
6 Heinrich Heine, Verschiedenartige
Geschichtsauffassung
(1833), in Smtliche
editedby Klaus Briegleb(Munich:Hanser,1968-71),III, 22.
Schriften,
18
SOCIAL RESEARCH
and at the way theseexpectationswere now borne out. For it

is preciselythis sweepingapproach to the future,this breadth
of the temporalhorizon,thatwas absent fromthe medievalconsciousnesseven where apocalypticexpectationsor fearsdid not
narrowit down to an immediateconcernwith salvation.
It has been said over and over- withoutbecomingany more
true for that reason- that the modern conception of progress
"secularized"the biblical Christianeschatologyas the basic form
of a future-oriented
confidencein salvation. I will not go here
intothequestionhow doubtfulthisis, and whatburdensof proof
it entails.7 It might,however,be correctto say that the idea of
progressdoes bear on the suppressionof the eschatologicalexpectationsor fearsin one respect,namely,insofaras it includes a
senseof "largetimeconsumption"and thecorresponding
requirementofa largemarginoftime- a marginin whichone generation
more or less matterslittle, and in which every generation's
factualrelationto the stateof the overall processseemsto justify
the factthattimeand again it has "not yet" attaineda definitive
status,indeed not even an egregiousone.
Copernicus: The Perfectionof Astronomy
The suspicionthat the world's past was too shorta period of
humanexperienceto achieve the cognitionthatis possibleabout
thisworld,thatstill more time and an assuredfurtherexistence
of the world were needed for the purpose- this suspicioncould
not touchthe Middle Ages. Even in Copernicuswe do not find
it again- or perhaps,fromthe point of view of immanentastronomical history,not any more. Copernicusviewed himselfas
the futureof the astronomyof Antiquity,not as the founderof
a new relationto the future. For all the timeit takes,the theory
of the universestruckhim as a finitetaskendingwith him. He
7 Hans Blumenberg,
Die Legitimittder Neuzeit (Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp,1966),
pp. 9-74.
19
held on firmlyto the astronomicalpostulateof visibility,and so

it did not occur to him thatafterthe fixationof the outermost
heavens it was neithernecessarynor useful to cling to a closed
oftheoutermostsphere. But thismeantthatwiththe
corporeality
planetarysystemcorrected,and with the various movementsof
our Earth ascertained,nothingin the finiteuniversewould remain withheldfromman. To Copernicus,the great insertion
betweenthe end of Antiquityand his own presentday sufficed
to meet the time condition of astronomy. While recognizing
himselfas a beneficiary
of the timethathad passedsince Ptolemy,
he gives no sign of sharing the ancient astronomers'sense of
a vast futuretimeas a continuingastronomicalneed. The concept of progressin astronomyis there,but it is the conceptof a
progressthat has been concluded.
one mightdescribethe end of the Middle
With thisreservation
Ages as marked preciselyby Copernicus's explicit resumption
of a thoughtfirstentertainedby Hipparchus and utilized by
Seneca and Ptolemy:that progressdepends upon time. In the
proem to Book I of De revolutionibushe talks about the difficulties into which astronomyis broughtby its dependence on
time (nisi cum tempore). The movementsof the starsand the
revolutionsof the planetsmightbe assignedcertainvalues and
brought to conclusive knowledge (ad perfectamnotitiam) if
enoughtimehad gone by formanyobservationsto be made and
fromhand to hand, as it were (per manus
passedon to posterity
trader
etur posteritati). To Ptolemy this degree of perfection
had not been attainableas yet; forall his admirablecompetence
and diligence,he had lacked the premiseof a sufficiently
long
tradition. Only four centuries or somewhat more had been
available to him as a base of data. Even so, he could be said to
have almost perfectedastronomy(totam hanc artem pene consummaverit). Of course, the little word "almost" in the text
promptlyprovesto be a respectfulhyperbolevis--visthe great
authority,for most of Ptolemy'swork is found to be not in
accordancewith the conclusionshe should have drawn fromthe
20
SOCIAL RESEARCH
traditionat his disposal.8 Also, movementsnot yet known to

Ptolemyhad been discoveredin the meantime.
The differencesin fixingthe length of the year strikingly
a theoreticalsituationthathad caused manyto doubt
exemplified
whetherreliable calculations about it could be made at all;
yet the passage of time had clarifiedit. Copernicus looked on
his own positionas a nearlyoptimal distancein time fromthe
base ofAntiquity. He cited thisto justifyhis deviationsfromthe
ancientauthors; in this discipline,he said, theyhad to be not
so much permanentauthoritiesas foundersof the possibilities
perceivedin his own presenttime. He who deviates fromthe
ancientsalwaysdoes thistoo on premisescreatedby the ancients
(ipsorumlicet muere).
Looking back on Copernicus from the standpointof those
living fivecenturieslater,we see in him the man who put an
end to the long stagnationof astronomyand launched it on an
age of steadyand acceleratingprogress. But he did not have the
idea of thisprogressas a processyet to come, yet to begin. We
findit hard to graspthatCopernicusheld himselfto be near the
conclusionof his disciplinebecause he regardedthe premiseof
a distancein time long enough to acquire all relevantdata as
fulfilled. He formulatedthe general law of astronomy'sdependenceon timewithoutsuspectingthatit applied as an equally
enduringimpulse to his posterity:"We have the more means
coming to the aid of our science the greater the distance in
time (quanto maiori temporisintervallo)that separatesus from
the foundersof this science, with whose observationswe can
compareour own."
The conclusionhe drew,thatunder thisconditionthe perfection of the astronomicalart mustbe a finitetask in a surveyable
historictimeframe,was probablydue to the premiseslaid down
as an anthropocentric-teleological
world formulain the prefatory
s NicholasCopernicus,
De revolutionibus,
1, Proem:videmustarnenpleraquenon
convenireUs,quae traditionem
eius sequi debeant.
21
dedicationof his work.9 While man is no longer the centerof

the physicalsystem,he remains the point of referenceof its
rationaltransparency,
keepingall sidesof the systemwithinreach
of his organs. What mightbe called thesuperhumanor inhuman
aspectof our modernconceptionsof space and timewas alien to
Copernicus;his universeextendedjust so farbeyond the 20,000
earthdiametersit had been held to measuresince Antiquityas
necessaryto explain the failureof fixedstarsto show a parallax.
It took the discoveryof the finitespeed of light,more than a
centuryafterCopernicus,to catch up with the speculativeexcessesand also to require time spans in which the cosmogonical,
geological,and biologicalevolutionscould filltheirneeds of time.
Here it cannotbe our purposeto cull fromCopernicus'swork
the formulaswhichhad a lastingeffectand seem only to call for
generalizationto expressthe idea of progressas a formof the
the descentof this concept
course of history. In demonstrating
we are not primarilyconcernedwith programmaticstatements;
our interestis in astronomy'sparadigmaticfunctionregarding
the dependenceof knowledgeon time. What Copernicus said
about this in his Commentariolus,in the letteragainstWerner,
and in various passagesof De revolutionibuscan only be taken
to indicate how clear it had become in dealing with specific
astronomicalproblemsthattimeis a conditionof knowledge,and
in what measurethe schematicsof this stateof facthad become
transferable.Above all, it was in his 1524 opinion on the astronomerJohannWerner'stracton the eighthspherethatCopernicus
showedhis determination
to defendthe reliabilityof the observationaldata handeddown by Ptolemy. This was not a humanistic
in its historic
attitude; it was astronomy'sself-preservation
identityand, above all, in its abilityto function. If the ancient
data wereimpeachable,astronomy
in the age of Copernicuscould
much less
not have been understoodas capable of progressing,
of being perfected.
o Hans Blumenberg,
Die kopernikanische
Wende (Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp,1965),
pp. 41-99.
22
SOCIAL
RESEARCH
The programmatic thought of making an entirely fresh start

with the process of cognition, of questioning all that had gone
before and thus really recommencing progress- a thought that
would seem so plausible to a Bacon and a Descartes- had to be
far from the astronomer'smind for a simple reason: he could not
affordit without abandoning the premises of his own cognitive
state. It should not be forgottenthat even those program makers
of the new beginning reckoned only with short terms for their
projected future. Descartes believed at firstthat he might perfect
physics in his lifetime,so as to go on to definitive medicine and
ethics. Nor did Bacon think of the recovery of paradise as
being hundreds, if not thousands of years in the future; a thorough
inventoryand utilization of all given experiences seemed more
important to him than gathering, or waiting for, new ones. As
Copernicus judged the state of astronomy,it was an act of selfpreservation for it to allow no one to touch the tradition of
Antiquity, the base of astronomy's progress and possible perfection. In the letter against Werner he wrote this about the
dependence of any theory of the firmamenton the achievements
of the ancient mathematicians:
If we wish to have such a theorywe must follow the direction
they took and must hold on strictlyto their observations,bequeathed to us like a legacy. If any man holds the contrary
in this
opinion, if he thinks the ancients are not trustworthy
respect,the portals of the astronomical art will assuredly be
closed to him.10
Copernicus ignored two essentials of the idea of progress and
did not even prepare for them, because on his premises they
seemed dispensable. One of these elements is the identity of the
historic subject, or quasi-subject, which in historymight be presented as having acted as one and borne its experiences with it.
The other is the methodical preparation of the future and its
appraisal as the space of more and more possible discoveries and
10EdwardRosen,ed., Three CopernicanTreatises,3d ed. (New York: Octagon
Rooks,1959),pp. 93-106.
THE
IDEA
OF PROGRESS
23
new achievements. For furtherprogress in this respect we have

to look to the self-definitionof a post-Copernican astronomical
evolution, an evolution leading beyond Copernicus. The first
man who- still in Copernicus's own century- considered him
not an end but the beginning of new possibilities, the firstwho
tried to define his own historic position as post-Copernican, was
Giordano Bruno.
Bruno and Galilei: Infinite Worlds

He did not see things with the eyes of Copernicus, nor with
the eyes of Ptolemy, Bruno had the spokesman for his own views
say in his dialogue La cena de le ceneri; where factual judgments
or conclusions to be drawn from facts were concerned, he was
seeing with his own eyes. The observations on which the conclusions rested had to be credited to Ptolemy and Copernicus and
other able astronomers; adding light to light in the course of
time (successivamente a tempi e tempi giongendo lume a lume),
they had given us sufficientpremises for a theory which only
the diligence of many lifetimes could bring into being.11 Bruno
likened the observing and calculating astronomers to interpreters
who do nothing but translate words from one language into the
other. This, he said, is how the astronomer deals with his data,
transferringthem across the generations,while philosophers penetrate deeper into the translation's meaning.
What this means to the post-Copernican is that Copernicus had
given us the text but had not understood it. And if we consider
the historyof the effectsof Copernicanism we have to say Bruno
was right: what Copernicus took for the last great correction on
the object proved to be only the starting point of astronomy's
expansion in the depth dimension of its object, forCopernicus had
overlooked the fact that he no longer required a fixed final
11GiordanoBruno,La cena de le ceneri,in Le opere italiane,edited by Paolo
de Lagarde(Gottinga:Dieterich,1888),I, 123.
24
SOCIAL
RESEARCH
sphere. Giordano Bruno's speculation about infinite worlds

moves in the consequences of this superfluity. He had one figure
in his dialogue say that Copernicus must not be judged by
things whose accomplishment was beyond him; after all, he had
been no more than the dawn that precedes the sunrise of true
philosophy- by which Bruno meant none other than his own.
He thought that by destroyingthe ultimate sphere he had broken
through the limitations of human experience, or at least of the
human imagination.
In Bruno's dialogue there is the figureof the pedant, Prudenzio,
a precursorof Galilei's Simplicio, who will not be carried away by
the pathos of speculation. He has to have it demonstrated to him
that the cosmic liberation of reason is a process that has long
been under way even though it could not be noticed. It is in old
age (and Antiquity) that wisdom resides (Ne l'antiquit la
sapienza), Prudenzio quotes from the Book of Job and must let
himself be complemented from the source: Prudence comes with
the years (. . . in molti anni la prudenza). What is meant here,
it soon turns out, is that the validity of Antiquity is no static
headstart. Its function is that of a point of departure: "If you
had rightly understood what you are saying, it would be clear
to you that the consequence of your principle is the very opposite
of what you are thinking. It is that we are older and have more
time behind us than our predecessors" (que noi siamo pi vecchi
et habbiamo pi lungha et che nostri predecessori). This
reversal of the phrases of Antiquity and Modern Age into those
of youth and age as the natural sequence of accruing experience
and knowledge, appears at firstto be merely one of the paradoxes
that are part of Bruno's style. The comparison of historical time
with the ages of man is by no means new, but in conjunction
with the historyof cosmology it is unusual. Copernicus did not
know more than the ancient astronomers,but he was able to see
more since 1849 years had passed between Eudoxos and him.
Those living at any present time have the advantage of the
longest past, the largest base of time for their experience.
THE
IDEA
OF PROGRESS
25
It is not enough that time has passed, however, else the

Copernican lesson must have sunk in by now, almost half a
centuryafter the reformer. Bruno wrestles with the phrasing of
a twofoldempirical lack that had become notable in this ineffectuality of Copernicus, a lack of identity in time and of originality
in the present:
But that some of those who came afterhim have been no wiser
than theones beforehim,and thatthebulk of our contemporaries
has learned nothing- this is because the formerdid not live the
yearsof thoseothersand the latterdo not live them,and because
both actually live the years of their own life like lifeless men.
Evidently it is not enough to take the metaphors of the ages
of man in historic time at face value and to postulate the identity
of the subject of total experience- not unless this historic subject
may simultaneously, and paradoxically, be conceived as ageless
and permanently capable of the full freshness of genuine perception. The difficultiesof progress make themselves known:
it rests upon the favorable possibility of not having constantly
to start afresh, and yet it is kept in motion by the capacity o'
constantly,suspiciously overturning the stock of knowledge we
bear with us.

For Galilei the time condition of theoretical progress comes to
be something like a formula of caution, if not indeed of mere
cunning. The Copernican claim to have definitively balanced
the books of astronomy is taken back into the reservation that
much, infinitelymuch remains yet to be done here for the human
mind; its surmisescan never be wholly translated into certainties.
The work being done with the telescope was not a bad argument
for this formula.
When Galilei had finished his dialogue on the world systems
(Dialogo dei massimi sistemi) the censor obliged him to qualify
a line of reasoning he had mistakenly believed to be especially
persuasive: the inference of a real movement of the earth from
the theory of the tides. He was ordered to add the express
reservation that the possibilities of divine omnipotence were too
26
SOCIAL RESEARCH
manifoldforthe human intellectto proveany one theoryto the

exclusion of all others. Galilei accepted the required clause,
thoughgiving new offenseby assigningit to the intellectually
feeblestcharacterin his dialogue. As faras Copernicanismwas
concerned,however,the clause did somethingtotallyunexpected.
In the dialogue Galilei had Salviati give a veryclever reply:
it is preciselybecause we must neitherclaim nor hope to see
throughthe real nature of the work of God's hands, he says,
that this trulyadmirable formulaleaves us the possibilityof
furtherstudyingthe structureof the universe. The general
reservation
thusbecomestheoppositeof a formulaof resignation;
the grantof permissionto explore nature despite the admitted
futilityof the enterpriseis what keeps the human mind from
flaggingor failingin agilityand alertness. Recognitionof the
reservation
opens a space of motion,while everystandstillimplies
a definitive
claim and thusmustnow seem virtuallysuspect. We
mustnot statethat the Copernicandoctrineis true,but forthis
very reason we may continue our intensiveresearchinto the
objects it refersto. Progressis merelythe by-productof this
in whichwe
effort
enforceduncertainty,
and of thecorresponding
refuseto admitto ourselvesthatit is as futileas it is declaredto be.
The motive behind the theoreticalmotion makes it accidental
thatit mightbecome progressand
and, at bottom,contradictory
mightengenderprogress. Potentially,Galilei's progressappears
as a surrogateof the claim of truthlodged by Copernicus.
Galilei possessedas yet no conceptionof gravity. His view
of the laws governingthe planets' motion round the sun came
froman analogywith pendulums,conceivedas suspendedfrom
the sun. The partial systemof Earth with its moon must then
be viewedlike a pendulumwhoselengthis changeable,depending
on whetherthe moon standsnear the sun or far fromit. To
Galilei's mind it followednecessarily,accordingto the law of
the pendulum,thatthe earth'sannual movementround the sun
could not be regular. In the dialogue on the world systemshe
could not have
had Sagredoprotestthatthisinferredirregularity
THE
IDEA
OF PROGRESS
27
escaped observation by astronomers,yet nothing of the kind had

been perceived. Salviati's answer is a wide-ranging histrica
survey of astronomy from the viewpoint of the time that need:
to be expended on its various problems.
Here, in contradistinction to everything that could be found
in Copernicus's and Bruno's writings,not only was the past seen
as a necessary time frame for astronomy but the future was
expressly included. Galilei was reckoning not only with the
known and still unsettled questions of astronomy, but with
unknown problems that had yet to manifest themselves as such.12
Not until that moment was the motion of progress recognizable
as consisting in the production of problems by the solution of
problems. Copernicus could never dream of this aspect; conclusivelydisposing of a problem was what he considered the "normal"
formof scientificachievement.
The consciousness we found in Copernicus, that a great deal
of time was needed to perfect astronomy, turned into the consciousness that a great deal of time would still be needed to do
no more than put astronomy- and any other theoretical, technological, and practical process- in possession of its problems.
Perfection ceased to be the point.
Translated by E. B. Ashton
!2 Galileo Galilei, Dialogo dei massimi sistemi,in Opere, edited by Seb.
Timpanaro(Milan and Rome: Rizzoli, 1936),I, 593-594: . . . dico che bench
l'astronomia nel corso di molti secoli abbia fatto gran progressi.. . . non per
ella sin qui arrivata a segno tale, che moltissimi cose non restino indecise, e
forseancora molValtreocculte.

Progress

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Progress

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

New School

On a Lineage of the Idea of Progress

THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

conceptsreferringto the inner logic of particularprocessesand

this negativityproved to be merelythe reverseof a potential

THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

actual, historicallyrealized progresswas uncovered and found

said to have servedto legitimizehistoricevents. Here both the

THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

any case, strikessome historiansof scienceas the more dimmed

to rest on his assumptionthat this broadened knowledgepermittedfurther

THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

- does not call

because Hipparchus'sdata had been handed down in full detail

Seneca: The Comet Problem

THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

long as theydo not disturb the world order (haec tarnennon

day somebodywill plot the coursesof the comets,will show why

THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

link acrosstime. In this discoverylies the rudimentof the idea

and at the way theseexpectationswere now borne out. For it

THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

held on firmlyto the astronomicalpostulateof visibility,and so

traditionat his disposal.8 Also, movementsnot yet known to

THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

dedicationof his work.9 While man is no longer the centerof

The programmatic thought of making an entirely fresh start

new achievements. For furtherprogress in this respect we have

Bruno and Galilei: Infinite Worlds

sphere. Giordano Bruno's speculation about infinite worlds

It is not enough that time has passed, however, else the

bear with us.

manifoldforthe human intellectto proveany one theoryto the

escaped observation by astronomers,yet nothing of the kind had

Potrebbero piacerti anche