Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 50 (2015) 804809

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/rser

Failure mode and effect analysis for photovoltaic systems

Alessandra Colli n
Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, 11973 NY, USA

art ic l e i nf o

a b s t r a c t

Article history:
Received 18 May 2014
Received in revised form
27 March 2015
Accepted 2 May 2015
Available online 31 May 2015

Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is an inductive and conservative system reliability analysis
approach, here applied to photovoltaic system. A system is a complex combination of components and
sub-components, where technical and disciplinary interfaces apply in their mutual interactions. FMEA
processes the individual analysis of each system's sub-component with the task to identify the various
failure modes affecting each part, along with causes and consequences for the part itself and the entire
system. In the proposed analysis the system's component and sub-components have been identied
from the design of the Northeast Solar Energy Research Center (NSERC) photovoltaic research array
located at Brookhaven National Laboratory's (BNL). The complete FMEA analysis is presented, along with
the applied ranking scales and nal results. The approach is discussed in its benets and limitations, the
latter mainly identied in the limited amount of open source information concerning failure probabilities for the photovoltaic system parts.
& 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords:
FMEA
Photovoltaic systems
Reliability

Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. The FMEA process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. The system model and its components . . .
4. The available data and the scoring system.
5. The FMEA table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

1. Introduction
Electric utilities and grid operators face major challenges from
an accelerated evolution towards an extensive integration of
variable renewable energy sources into the electric power grid,
such as solar photovoltaic (PV). The integration of such a variable
energy source into the existing, sometimes weak or overloaded,
electric grid requires an adequate risk-informed decision making
approach. The ideal grid integration design for PV systems should
optimize the mutual benets between the grid and the PV system
itself; this has to take into consideration the PV source variability,
availability, reliability, as well as the stability of the electric grid.
The aim is to reduce or promptly intervene with outages and

Tel.: 1 631 344.2666.

E-mail address: alessandra.colli@gmail.com

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2015.05.056
1364-0321/& 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

804
805
805
806
807
807
809

impairments affecting the PV system, to improve the condence

in this renewable energy source.
So far, the most of the photovoltaic-related reliability analysis has
focused on modules [1] and balance of system (BOS) separately [2].
Only in recent years the shift of focus to grid integration has required
considering the entire system. The purpose of this paper is to present
and discuss the complete results of a failure modes and effects analysis
(FMEA) developed for a PV system [3]. To the author's knowledge,
there are no complete and detailed FMEA analyses for PV systems
including risk ranking information published to date. This work
represents part of the background investigations needed to develop
a probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) for PV systems [4], to investigate
safety-related and energy-production-related risks. For this reason, the
FMEA has been preferred to other methods, such as Taguchi [5,6].
The system under analysis is a simplied model having all
the principal components and sub-components as from the design
of the Brookhaven National Laboratory's (BNL) Northeast Solar
Energy Research Center (NSERC) research array. The analysis aims

A. Colli / Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 50 (2015) 804809

805

to identify the failure modes affecting the system's sub-components

and to list possible causes and effects.
Despite the approach is now common for PV applications, FMEA
analyses have been performed in other renewable energy areas,
such as wind energy [7,8].

2. The FMEA process

Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is an established semiqualitative reliability engineering approach to systematically evaluating system design on a component-by-component basis to identify
failure modes and their effects on system function and other system
components. It can support fault tolerant design, testability, safety,
logistic support and related functions. This bottom-up technique has
been an essential tool for industries such as the aerospace and automobile industries, the semiconductor industry [9], and the nuclear
industry [10,11]. Government agencies (such as the Air Force and the
Navy) require that an FMEA is performed on their systems to ensure
safety as well as reliability. The automotive industry has adopted the
use of FMEA to support the design and manufacturing/assembly of
automobiles.
Kumamoto and Henley [12] recommend several uses for the
FMEA:
1) Identication of critical components for fail-safe design,
failure-rate reduction or damage containment.
2) Identication of components requiring particularly stringent
quality control.
3) Formulation of special requirements to be included in specications for suppliers.
4) Formulation of special procedures, safeguards, protective
equipment, monitoring or warning systems.
5) Distribution of project funds across these areas.
Although there are various types of FMEA (design, manufacturing process, equipment, system) and for different applications
(hardware to software), the principal aim of this approach is to
support the early identication of potential problems and address
them before accidents happen.
The FMEA presented in this work has the task to identify failure
modes along with possible causes and effects for a grid-connected
PV plant. The FMEA process followed along this study is shown by
the block diagram in Fig. 1. It requires to identify the system
model, its components, sub-components, requirements, descriptions, and, when useful, also functional diagrams. Failure modes
are investigated at the system's sub-component level, according to
the desired level of depth in the analysis. For each failure mode a
severity (S), occurrence (O) and detection (D) rating is dened and
rated according to subjectively dened scales, based on available
information and supported by expert opinion and evaluation. The
rating system involves expert opinion and a level of subjectivity
which is typical of rating systems based on a scales dened by
the user.
The combination of the three ratings denes an overall risk
measure, the risk priority number (RPN), which indicates the
relevance of each failure mode in affecting the PV system.
Villacourt [13] describes this approach in relation to the semiconductor industry. The RPN is calculated for each failure mode
according to the following equation [5,6, 13, 14]:
RPN S  O  D

A high RPN is a critical indicator for corrective action considerations

on identied sub-components. The RPN simplies the computation
of the criticality number adopted in the failure mode effect and
criticality analysis (FMECA) by requiring only the probability of

Fig. 1. Block diagram representing the FMEA process followed along this study.

failure (occurrence) and the severity classication; however, the

RPN extends the criticality number approach by incorporating the
detection likelihood rating. This is crucial in evaluating PV systems
since system downtime directly leads to power supply interruption
and nancial losses when energy purchase agreements or feed-in
tariffs are in place. Thus, quick, efcient detection of failures is critical, and the RPN is implemented such that the detection of failures
is a conscious goal of the FMEA application.
The FMEA is a systematic, inductive, and conservative technique for failure analysis and it is here performed ahead of the
development of more complex system-level methods such as fault
trees (FT) and event trees (ET) analysis, combined into the
probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). In further research developments
at BNL, we will use the FMEA primarily as an investigation to
support the development of a PRA model and identify elements
and failures to be represented in the PRA in relation to the rest of
the system. A fundamental difference between the FMEA and PRA
is actually that the former is focusing on individual components,
while the latter is modeling the interactions between components
in the entire system, thus providing a holistic overview.

3. The system model and its components

To perform the FMEA analysis, the PV system will be represented by a simplied model reporting all the components as by
design. Fig. 2 shows the simplied model used for the FMEA and
based on the BNL's NSERC photovoltaic research array conguration. The diagram shows that the system is mainly built in 3 blocks:
(i) source system, (ii) string combiner, and (iii) power conditioning
system.
The NSERC array design is in real much more complex than the
simplied model shown in Fig. 2, which has the only purpose of
identifying the sub-components to consider in the FMEA. In its
present development the NSERC array reaches a rated power of
518 kWp and includes a total of 1672 PV modules, rated 310 Wp
each. The modules are arranged in strings of 19 modules each.
Combiner boxes merge 11 strings to reach the input of a single
inverter's module. The 3 plant inverters are actually modular, and
allow the independent management of each set of 11 strings. All

806

A. Colli / Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 50 (2015) 804809

Fig. 2. The simplied PV system diagram showing the components and sub-components considered in the analysis.

the inverter outputs nally merge into a 1MVA transformer to

reach a second step-up transformer at the network interconnection point. The plant is grid-connected to the electric grid of BNL
and operated independently by the laboratory. The need for
independence from the utility in terms of plant management is
required by the recongurable characteristic of the plant to meet
various research needs in the eld of grid integration and smart
grids. An additional purpose of the array is to evaluate the PV
module's performance and degradation in the specic Northeast
US climate conditions.
However, the FMEA approach looks at the failure modes of the
single components and is less interested in the combinations of
them. The interest in the complexity of the design comes up when
the combined system analysis is performed, which is the case the
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) approach.
The performed analysis includes all the plant components up to
the grid interconnection point: PV modules and their rack support
structures, DC subsystem with string combiner, and power conditioning system with inverter and transformer. From the perspective of the FMEA development, it is important to know the
details at the level of the sub-components. Table 1 lists the system
components and the associated sub-components. Functional diagrams have been consulted when more complex elements are
considered, such as the case of the inverter or the transformer.

4. The available data and the scoring system

The qualitative aspects of the FMEA analysis, including the
identication of failure modes, causes and consequences, are
based on a large amount of literature easily available in the area
of PV reliability and degradation studies, as well as studies on the
electric components. The major problems encountered along the
development are actually related to the quantitative information,
namely failure rates or failure probabilities, and they are: (i) the
lack of PV specic open-source databases or data collections of
quantitative information on failures of specic sub-components
and (ii) the sometime outdated quantitative information reported
in available databases for electric elements. Assuming that we
should not expect extreme variation in the failure rates reported

Table 1
Component and sub-components of the PV system.
Component

PV module

Sub-component

Module
Junction box/bypass diode
Connectors
Encapsulantion
Rack
Rack structure
Grounding/lightning
protection system
Cable
Aerial cables
Underground cables
String
Fuse
combiner
Disconnect
Power
Reverse polarity diode
conditioning Fuse
Breaker
Inverter
Disconnect
Transformer
Protective relays
a
b

Failure rate (failures per

unit-hour)
1.35E-06a
6.77E-07a
4.51E-07 a
4.06E-06 a
2.44E-05 a
1.62E-05 a
1.05E-06b
7.00E-07 b
2.17E-07 b
6.96E-07 b
2.26E-07 a
2.17E-07 b
4.00E-07 b
1.75E-04 a
6.96E-07 b
4.22E-07 b
2.28E-07 b

Value extrapolated by elaboration of the data available in Ref. [15].

Value from Ref. [13].

by specic databases or report for electric sub-components (such

as [7]), the rst limitation specied above has been the most
difcult to overcome. PV operation and maintenance companies
are not prone to release their data, thus the quantitative information on the failures of PV specic components has been based on a
single publication in the PV reliability eld reporting failure
statistics [15]. Table 1 shows the failure rates, expressed in failures
per unit hour, considered for each sub-components.
The scoring system for the failure modes has been developed on
and adapted to the available data and information, expressing both
quantitative values and subjective evaluations from expert opinions,
as typical in this kind of approach. Tables 24 show the ranking
criteria developed respectively for the severity, the occurrence and
the detection ratings. Each ranking system follows a scale from 1 to 5.
In all the three cases 1 denotes the best situation, while 5 is associated to the worst situation. The scales have been implemented on
the basis of [9], following 5 basic criteria. However, differently from

A. Colli / Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 50 (2015) 804809

807

Table 2
Severity ranking criteria.
Rank

Description

1
2
3
4

Minor failure/degradation, hardly detected, no inuence on the system performance

Failure/degradation will be detected by plant owner/operator and/or will cause slight deterioration of parts or system performance
Failure/degradation will be detected by plant owner/operator, will create dissatisfaction, and/or will cause deterioration of parts or system performance
Failure/degradation will be easily detected by plant owner/operator, will create high dissatisfaction, and/or will cause extended deterioration of parts and system
relevant non-functionality/loss of performance
Failure/degradation will result in non-operation of the system or severe loss of performance

Table 3
Occurrence ranking criteria.
Rank

Description

1
2
3
4
5

Unlikely failure rate per unit-hour in the order of E-7

Remote probability failure rate per unit-hour in the order of E-6
Occasional probability failure rate per unit-hour in the order of E-5
Moderate probability failure rate per unit-hour in the order of E-4
High probability failure rate per unit-hour in the order of E-3 and E-2

Table 4
Detection ranking criteria.
Rank

Description

1
2
3
4
5

Almost certain that the problem will be detected (chance 81100%)

High probability that the problem will be detected (chance 6180%)
Moderate probability that the problem will be detected (chance 4160%)
Low probability that the problem will be detected (chance 2140%)
None/minimal probability that the problem will be detected (chance 020%)

[9], the numerical scale has been set 1 to 5 instead of 1 to 10; this
because the additional sensitivity given by a range of scoring values
for a selected single criterion has not been considered necessary in
this work, given the limitations already expressed on the quantitative
data available. Consequently, the RPN values are ranked on a scale
between 1 and 125; also in this case, the smaller the RPN the better,
the larger the worse.

5. The FMEA table

The details of the FMEA analysis are shown in Table 5. Potential
failure modes, causes, effects and ratings up to the overall risk
priority number are listed for each sub-component of the system.
The identication of causes has been performed by looking to
the PV system in a holistic way and trying to expand the view to
possible uncommon events, based on the outcome of discussions
with different experts.
The potential effects have been focused on the fundamental
purposes of this analysis, which involve: (i) security of electricity
supply (energy output), (ii) technical damages and (iii) human
safety.
The risk priority numbers show three major contributors to the
PV system reliability: in rst place the inverter, and the grounding/
lightning protection system; in a second position the modules,
intended as active components, such as cells and contacts.
However, it is interesting to notice that even components with
low risk priority number could present a high detection rating
value, which indicates a minimal probability that the problem can
be detected during normal operation. This calls for the importance
of a regular maintenance routine, to avoid unexpected problems
when less wanted. In this framework, an existing extension of this

FMEA work has been done in collaboration with George Washington University [16]. The work points at the use of a surprise index
(SI). The surprise index is based on the information score of the
failure mode probability. By weighting the risk priority by the
failure mode's information score, we are increasing the inuence
of extremely unlikely, yet extremely catastrophic, events in risk
management decision contexts. This also decreases the amount of
prominence placed on relatively likely events in the decision
context. Thus, if an increasing RPN indicates a higher priority for
redundancy investments, the SI should be used to prioritize the
development of contingency plans [16].

6. Conclusions
The application of the FMEA approach has been discussed and
demonstrated for PV systems. The methodology proved the inverter
and the ground system of the PV eld to show the highest values of
the RPN, calculated according to Eq. (1). This is in line with what
reported in existing literature [15] and with the experience personally discussed with some PV plant operators. However, the FMEA
shows also the importance of maintenance activities for the early
detection of some hidden failure modes that could not affect
immediately the plant, but could degenerate into a system problem
if not promptly handled.
Despite the use of FMEA and risk analysis techniques in the PV
industry [17], the lack of publically available FMEA analysis for PV
systems makes it difcult to validate the results. Interactions with
industry, working groups and researchers in the PV eld have been
used to support the development and understand the proper level
of details to be considered for a meaningful evaluation in respect
to the available numerical information. Future analyses along with

808

A. Colli / Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 50 (2015) 804809

Table 5
FMEA table.
Potential failure
mode

Potential causes

Module (active components cells and contacts)

Loss of electric
Shorts, arcs, open contacts.
function
High series resistance, low shunt resistance, aging,
Impairment of
shading, soiling.
electric
function
Junction box/bypass diode
Open contacts
Disconnections, improper installation, corrosion
Short, arc in
Damaged insulation, aging, animals, lightning
contacts
Poor contact/
Material defects, oxidation, aging
intermittent
Shorted diode
Material defects, aging, thermal stress, mechanical
(end-to-end)
stress, electrical stress, material contamination,
processing anomaly
Open diode
Very high resistance, material defects
Parameter change Material defects, aging, continuous thermal stress
in diode
Connectors
Open
Poor contact/
intermittent
Short
Encapsulation
Loss of air
tightness

Rack structure
Loss of
conguration

Damage, disconnection, animals, vandalism, strong

wind, pulled cables
Corrosion, improper installation, lightning damage
Damages, improper installation, disconnections,
animals, vandalism

Potential effects

Severity
rating

Occurrence
rating

Detection
rating

Risk
priority
number

No energy output, safety, re

30

Reduced energy output, hot spot damage

32

No energy output
No energy output, safety, thermal
damages, re
Reduced energy output, no energy output,
thermal damage
Reduced energy output, loss of module
power, overcurrent

5
5

1
1

3
2

15
10

16

16

Reduced energy output, thermal damages 3

in module, re, safety
Reduced energy output, improper
3
intervention. loss of module power,
overcurrent

15

15

No energy output

10

Reduced energy output, no energy output, 5

thermal damage
No energy output, safety, thermal
4
damages, re

20

20

20

12

18

Safety, module damage, reduced energy

output.

48

No energy output, safety

20

No energy output, safety, re

20

Reduced energy output, thermal damages 3

24

No energy output, safety

10

No energy output, safety, re

10

Reduced energy output, thermal damages 3

12

Excessive increase of current in the

system, overheating, safety, arcs, re
Excessive increase of current in the
system, overheating, safety, arcs, re
No energy output

16

16

10

No energy output

No disconnection, safety, re, arcs

16

No protection against reverse currents

No energy output
Activation with different variable range

5
3

1
1

1
5

5
15

Bad lamination, high voltage stress, hot spots, high cell/ Humidity/water/contaminant entrance,
increased degradation, reduced energy
module temperature, corrosive effects in the module
structure, aging, damage from frame distortion, cleaning output, no energy output
actions, extreme wind, snow load, vandalism, animals,
lightning, earthquake, accidental impacts

Improper installation, damages, extreme weather

conditions, excessive thermal expansion/contraction,
earthquake
Brackets
Strong wind, improper installation, earthquake,
detachment
accidental impacts
Grounding/lightning protection system
Open or
Corrosion, improper installation, lightning, mechanical
ineffective
damage, too high resistance
Aerial cables
Open
Faulty cabling, material aging, animals, vandalism,
extreme weather conditions, earthquake
Short, arc
Cracks/ruptures on cables, insulation failure, aging,
animals
Excessive wear
Improper system design
Underground cables
Open
Faulty cabling, material aging, animals, vandalism,
extreme weather conditions, earthquake
Short, arc
Cracks/ruptures on cables, insulation failure, aging,
animals
Excessive wear
Improper system design
Fuse
Fails to open
Bad system conguration, construction defect,
mechanical defects, improper maintenance
Slow to open
Bad system conguration, construction defect,
mechanical defects, improper maintenance
Premature open
Bad system conguration, construction defect,
mechanical defects, improper maintenance
Disconnect
Open without
Bad system conguration, construction defect,
stimuli
mechanical defects, improper maintenance
Does not open
Faulty switch, damages to structural parts, ashover/arc,
improper maintenance, aging
Reverse polarity diode
Short (end-toMaterial defects, aging, thermal stress, mechanical
end)
stress, electrical stress, contamination, processing
anomaly
Open
Very high resistance, material defects
Parameter change Material defects, aging, continuous thermal stress
Breaker

Front glass breakage, cell damages, frame

distortion, reduced energy output, no
energy output, safety
Unstable conguration, loss of modules

A. Colli / Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 50 (2015) 804809

809

Table 5 (continued )
Potential failure
mode

Open without
stimuli
Does not open
Inverter
Fails to transfer

Degraded output
Open

Potential causes

Potential effects

Severity
rating

Occurrence
rating

Detection
rating

16

No energy output

20

Reduced energy output

Transformer
No energy output

48

12

Bad system conguration, construction defect,

No energy output
mechanical defects, improper maintenance
Faulty switch, damages to structural parts, ashover/arc, No disconnection, safety, re, arcs
improper maintenance, aging
Contact damage, card/board problem, software failure
(within working conditions), ventilation obstruction,
extreme weather conditions, vandalism.
MPPT unbalance, extreme weather conditions

Extreme weather conditions (including lightning),

ooding, earthquake, explosion, exposure to nonelectric re/burning, shorting, aging
Short
Insulation breakdown, damages to structural parts,
Reduced energy output, no energy output,
water/particles in oil, transient overvoltage disturbance, safety, re
continuous overvoltage, shorting, lack of protective
device, improper maintenance, aging
Parameter change Failure of tap changer, damages to structural parts,
Loss of efciency, improper energy output
improper maintenance, aging
Protective relays
Fails to trip
Inadequate protective device, improper setting of
Loss of protection resulting in electrical/
protective device, improper maintenance, aging
structural damages with reduced energy
output, no energy output, safety, re,
explosion
Spurious trip
Bad system conguration, corrosion, aging, lack of
No energy output
maintenance or improper maintenance
Short
Inadequate protective device, improper setting of
Loss of protection resulting in electrical/
protective device, improper maintenance, aging
structural damages with reduced energy
output, no energy output, safety, re,
explosion

the access to system information and data for a statistically relevant time span for the system operation could provide the validation of the results. This is a rst attempt to provide a complete
FMEA analysis for PV systems and it required a substantial work in
collecting information. However, despite the limitations given by
the lack of validation of the results with published work, the work
has highlighted a large set of failure modes along with causes and
effects that will feed a probabilistic risk analysis for safety-related
and production-related issues.
The application of traditional reliability, hazard analysis and
risk analysis techniques into new environments, such as PV, are
possible [18] and desirable for reliability improvements and riskinformed decision making.
References
[1] Review of Failures of Photovoltaic Modules, IEA-PVPS T13 report; 2014, http://
www.isfh.de/institut_solarforschung/les/iea_t13_review_of_failures_of_pv_
modules_nal.pdf.
[2] Flicker, J., Kaplar, R., Marinella, M., Granata, J., PV inverter performance and
reliability: what is the role of the bus capacitor? In: Proceedings of the IEEE
38th photovoltaic specialists conference (PVSC), volume 2, 2012.
[3] Colli, A., An FMEA analysis for photovoltaic systems: assessing different
system congurations to support reliability studies introduction to PRA
analysis for PV systems. In: Proceedings of society for risk analysis annual
meeting. San Francisco, CA; 2012.
[4] Colli, A., Extending performance and evaluating risks of PV systems failure
using a fault tree and event tree approach: analysis of the possible application.
In: Proceedings of the 38th IEEE photovoltaic specialist conference. Austin TX;
2012.
[5] Su C-T, Lin H-C, Teng P-W, Yang T. Improving the reliability of electronic paper
display using FMEA and Taguchi methods: a case study. Microelectron Reliab
2014;54:136977.

Risk
priority
number

[6] Mariajayaprakash A, Senthilvelan T. Failure detection and optimization of

sugar mill boiler using FMEA and Taguchi method. Eng Fail Anal
2013;30:1726.
[7] Arabian-Hoseynabadi H, Oraee H, Tavner PJ. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
(FMEA) for wind turbines. Electr Power Energy Syst 2010;32:81724.
[8] Shaee M, Dinmohammadi F. An FMEA-based risk assessment approach for
wind turbine systems: a comparative study of onshore and offshore. Energies
2014;7:61942.
[9] Villacourt, M., Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA): a guide for continuous improvement for the semiconductor equipment industry. SEMATECH,
Austin, TX, Technology Transfer #92020963B-ENG; 1992.
[10] Vesely, W.E., Goldberg, F.F., Roberts, N.H., Haasl, D.F., Fault tree handbook,
NUREG-0492, 1981.
[11] Betancourt, L., Birla, S., Gassino, J., Regnier, P., Suitability of fault modes and
effects analysis for regulatory assurance of complex logic in digital instrumentation and control systems, NUREG/IA-0254, 2011.
[12] Kumamoto H, Henley EJ. Probabilistic risk assessment and management for
engineers and scientists. 2nd ed.. NY: IEEE Press; 1996.
[13] Power systems reliability subcommittee of the power systems engineering
committee, IEEE industry applications society, IEEE Std. 493-2007 recommended practice for the design of reliable industrial and commercial power
systems, IEEE-SA standards board, New York, NY, IEEE 493-2007.
[14] olc M. Applying of Method FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) in the
logistics process. Advanced Research in Scientic Areas, Section 12, Industrial
and Civil Engineering 2012:190611.
[15] Golnas A. PV system reliability: an operator's perspective. IEEE J Photovolt
2013;3(1):41621.
[16] Francis R, Colli A. Information-based reliability weighting for failure mode
prioritization in photovoltaic (PV) module design. Honolulu, Hawaii: Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management PSAM 12; .
[17] Ramu, G., Overview of the proposed PV quality management system. In: Solar
power international workshops. NREL, Golden, Colorado, 2014. http://www.
nrel.gov/pv/performance_reliability/pdfs/2014_spi_wkshp_ramu.pdf.
[18] Colli A, Serbanescu D, Ale B. PRA-type study adapted to the multi-crystalline
silicon photovoltaic cells manufacture process. In: al ME, editor. Safety,
reliability and risk analysis: theory, methods and applications. London: Taylor
and Francis Group; 2008.