TORTS AND DAMAGES

PCGPINEDA,RN,MAN 2014

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is

another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for

demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also

the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-

for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,

quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children

(1902a)

who live in their company.

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or

preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil

incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in

liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the

their company.

plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise

omission of the defendant. (n)

are likewise responsible for damages caused by their

Art. 2178. The provisions of Articles 1172 to 1174 are also

employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are

applicable to a quasi-delict. (n)

employed or on the occasion of their functions.

Quasi-delict arising from obligations:

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their

Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the

employees and household helpers acting within the scope of

performance of every kind of obligation is also

their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged

demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the

in any business or industry.

courts, according to the circumstances. (1103)

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a

special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by

Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists

the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which

in the omission of that diligence which is required by the

case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.

nature of the obligation and corresponds with the

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades

circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the

shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students

place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions

or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the

persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the

If the law or contract does not state the diligence which

diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

is to be observed in the performance, that which is

(1903a)

expected of a good father of a family shall be required.

Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his

(1104a)

dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he

has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. (1904)

Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law,

Art. 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no

or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when

parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be

the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of

answerable with his own property in an action against him

risk, no person shall be responsible for those events

where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. (n)

which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,

Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make

were inevitable. (1105a)

use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may

Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the

cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility

immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover

shall cease only in case the damage should come from force

damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the

majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered

immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the

damage. (1905)

defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover

Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily

damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be

liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle,

awarded. (n)

could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the

misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was

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PCGPINEDA,RN,MAN 2014

negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless driving or

(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of

violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next

infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable to

preceding two months.

the place. (1908)

If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of

Art. 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles

Article 2180 are applicable. (n)

should be the result of any defect in the construction

Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed

mentioned in Article 1723, the third person suffering damages

that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at

may proceed only against the engineer or architect or

the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.

contractor in accordance with said article, within the period

(n)

therein fixed. (1909)

Art. 2186. Every owner of a motor vehicle shall file with the

Art. 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part

proper government office a bond executed by a government-

thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or

controlled corporation or office, to answer for damages to third

falling from the same. (1910)

persons. The amount of the bond and other terms shall be fixed

Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are

by the competent public official. (n)

liable for quasi-delict is solidary. (n)

Art. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks,

toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or
injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used,
although no contractual relation exists between them and the
consumers. (n)
Art. 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on

TORT
An unlawful violation of private right, not created by
contract, and which gives rise to an action for damages.
It is an act or omission producing an injury to another,
without any previous existing lawful relation of which the said
act or omission may be said to be a natural outgrowth or
incident.

the part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his
possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as
firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof
is indispensable in his occupation or business. (n)

Classes of Torts:
A. Negligent Torts
B. Intentional Torts
C. Strict Liability

Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for

damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by
reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,

I.

TORT VS QUASI DELICT

public buildings, and other public works under their control or

supervision. (n)
Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is
responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial

DULAY VS CA
G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995
Lesson Applicable: Quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)
FACTS:

collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.

December

(1907)

argument, Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at Big

Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages

Bang Sa Alabang carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay

7,

1988:

Due

to

heated

caused:
(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken

Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay,

care of with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive

in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children filed

substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate

an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela for wanton and

place;

reckless discharge of the firearm and Safeguard Investigation

(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or

property;
(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes,
if not caused by force majeure;

and Security Co., Inc., (Safeguard) and/or Superguard Security

Corp. (Superguard) as employers for negligence having failed to
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury
Superguard:
Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his
duties, and was committed with deliberate intent (dolo),

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PCGPINEDA,RN,MAN 2014

the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the

act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not

Revised Penal Code, which states:

Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. Every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.

extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the

Civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses

under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

criminal act charged has not happened or has not been

committed by the accused
It is enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela
shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that the
shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either

CA Affirmed RTC: dismising the case of Dulay

SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer

ISSUE: W/N Superguard and Safeguard commited an actionable

and responsible for his acts.

breach and can be civilly liable even if Benigno Torzuela is already

II. QUASI DELICT AND CONTRACT

being prosecuted for homicide

AIR FRANCE VS CARRASCOSO

HELD: YES. Petition for Review is Granted. remanded to RTC for

FACTS:

trial on the merits

Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal
action is instituted, the civilaction for the recovery of civil
liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action , reserves his right to
institute it separately or institutesthe civil action prior to the
criminal

action

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the

Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same
act or omission of the accused
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no
justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the
Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Wellentrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts
committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary
and intentional.
Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not
only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
character; whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and
found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is
not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary
Extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule
111, refers exclusively tocivil liability founded on Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same

In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos

were tourists en route to Rome from Manila. Carrascoso was
issued a first class round trip ticket by Air France. But during a
stop-over in Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager of Air
France to vacate his seat because a white man allegedly has a
better right than him. Carrascoso protested but when things
got heated and upon advise of other Filipinos on board,
Carrascoso gave up his seat and was transferred to the planes
tourist class.
After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the
Philippines, he sued Air France for damages for the
embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court, Carrascoso
testified, among others, that he when he was forced to take the
tourist class, he went to the planes pantry where he was
approached by a plane purser who told him that he noted in
the planes journal the following:
First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class
against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene
The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The
trial court eventually awarded damages in favor of Carrascoso.
This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA.
It avers that the issuance of a first class ticket to Carrascoso was
not an assurance that he will be seated in first class because
allegedly in truth and in fact, that was not the true intent
between the parties.
Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascosos
testimony regarding the note made by the purser because the
said note was never presented in court.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on
what basis.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not the testimony of Carrasoso regarding
the note which was not presented in court is admissible in
evidence.
HELD 1: Yes. It appears that Air Frances liability is based on
culpa-contractual and on culpa aquiliana.
Culpa Contractual
There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and
Carrascoso. There was a contract to furnish Carrasocoso a first
class passage; Second, That said contract was breached when
Air France failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok;

TORTS AND DAMAGES

and Third, that there was bad faith when Air Frances employee
compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation
berth after he was already, seated and to take a seat in the
tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience,
embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social
humiliation, resulting in moral damages.
The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air Frances claim
that the issuance of a first class ticket to a passenger is not an
assurance that he will be given a first class seat. Such claim is
simply incredible.
Culpa Aquiliana
Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage
between Air France and Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act
based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not contract merely for
transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carriers
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against
personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses
from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives
the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Air Frances
contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The
stress of Carrascosos action is placed upon his wrongful
expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the Air France
a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
HELD: 2: Yes. The testimony of Carrascoso must be admitted
based on res gestae. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but
the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come
within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such
testimony is admissible. Besides, when the dialogue between
Carrascoso and the purser happened, the impact of the
startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The
excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this
environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. The
utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was
spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster
incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus
escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the
res gestae.

VILORIA VS CONTINENTAL AIRLINES

FACTS
Fernando agreed to buy airline tickets on board CAI after
Margaret Mager of Holiday Travel (HT) agency informed him
that there were no available seats at Amtrak. Subsequently,
Fernando requested Mager to reschedule their flight. Mager
informed him that flights to Newark, New Jersey, USA via CAI
were fully booked and offered the alternative flight via Frontier
Air. Since alternative flight would be more costly and would
mean traveling by night, Fernando opted to request for a
refund. Mager denied his request as said tickets were nonrefundable. When Fernando saw an Amtrak station nearby, he
made inquiries and was told that there were seats available
anytime. Fernando confronted Mager with the Amtrak tickets,
telling her that she had misled them into buying CAI tickets by
misrepresenting that Amtrak was already fully booked.

PCGPINEDA,RN,MAN 2014
Fernando reiterated his demand for a refund but Mager denied
it. Fernando sent a letter to CAI demanding a refund.
Continental Micronesia denied his request and advised him
that he may take said tickets to any CAI ticketing location for reissuance of new tickets. When Fernando went to CAIs ticketing
office to have the tickets replaced by a single round trip ticket
to Los Angeles under his name, he was informed that Lourdes
ticket was non-transferable, thus, cannot be used for the
purchase of a ticket in his favor. Sps. Viloria filed a complaint
against CAI. CAI interposed, among other things, that it should
not be liable for Magers acts because she was not a CAI
employee. Citing Articles 1868 and 1869 of the Civil Code, RTCAntipolo City ruled that Mager was CAIs agent, hence, bound
by her bad faith and misrepresentation. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals (CA) reversed RTC-Antipolo Citys decision and ruled
that CAI cannot be held liable for Magers act in the absence of
any proof that a principal-agent relationship existed between
CAI and HT, as the contract was not an agency but that of a sale.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not a principal-agent relationship existed between
CAI andHoliday Travel; and assuming that an agency
relationship existed betweenthe two, would CAI be bound by
the acts of HTs agents and employees suchas Mager?
HELD
Yes. SC ruled that there was principal-agent relationship
because all the elements of an agency existed between CAI and
HT. The first and second elements were present as CAI did not
deny that it concluded an agreement with HT, whereby the
latter would enter into contracts of carriage with third persons
on CAIs behalf. The third element was present as it was
undisputed that HT merely acted in a representative capacity
and it was CAI and not HT who was bound by the contracts of
carriage entered into by the latter on its behalf. The fourth
element was also present considering that CAI had not made
any allegation that HT exceeded the authority that was granted
to it. In fact, CAI consistently maintained validity of the
contracts of carriage that HT executed with Sps. Viloria and that
Mager was not guilty of fraudulentmisrepresentation.SC, as
early as 1970, had already formulated the guidelines that would
aid in differentiating the two contracts. In Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Constantino, SC extrapolated that the
primordial differentiating consideration between the two
contracts is the transfer of ownership or title over the property
subject of the contract. In an agency, the principal retains
ownership and control over the property and the agent merely
acts on the principals behalf and under his instructions in
furtherance of the objectives for which the agency was
established. On the other hand, the contract is clearly a sale if
the parties intended that the delivery of the property will effect
a relinquishment of title, control and ownership in such a way
that the recipient may do with the property as he pleases. That
the principal is bound by all the obligations contracted by the
agent within the scope of the authority granted to him is clearly
provided under Article 1910 of the Civil Code and this

TORTS AND DAMAGES

constitutes the very notion of agency. As to the subsequent
issue on whether or not CAI would be bound by the acts of HTs
agents, SC mentioned that an examination of its
pronouncements in China Air Lines, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, et
al. [264 Phil15 (1990)] will reveal that an airline company is not
completely exonerated from any liability for the tort committed
by its agents employees. A prior determination of the nature
of the passengers cause of action is necessary. If the
passengers cause of action against the airline company is
premised on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict for a tort
committed by the employee of the airline companys agent,
there must be an independent showing that the airline
company was at fault or negligent or has contributed to the
negligence or tortuous conduct committed by the employee of
its agent. The mere fact that the employee of the airline
companys agent has committed a tort is not sufficient to hold
the airline company liable. There is no vinculum juris between
the airline company and its agents employees and the
contractual relationship between the airline company and its
agent does not operate to create a juridical tie between the
airline company and its agents employees. Article 2180 of the
Civil Code does not make the principal vicariously liable for the
tort committed by its agents employees and the principalagency relationship per se does not make the principal a party
to such tort; hence, the need to prove the principals own fault
or negligence. On the other hand, if the passengers cause of
action for damages against the airline company is based on
contractual breach or culpa contractual, it is not necessary that
there be evidence of the airline companys fault or negligence.
As SC stated in China Air Lines , "in an action based on a breach
of contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does not have to
prove that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent. All
that he has to prove is the existence of the contract and the fact
of its non-performance by the carrier. "SC denied the petition
NEGLIGENCE
The omission of that degree of diligence which is required
by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the
circumstances of persons, time and place. (Article 1173
Civil Code)

PCGPINEDA,RN,MAN 2014
The 3 kinds of negligence furnish separate, distinct, and
independent bases of liability or causes of action.
A single act or omission may give rise to two or more
causes of action.

Culpa Contractual
The foundation of the
liability
of
the
defendant
is the contract
In breach of contract
committed through
the negligence of
employee,
the
employer
cannot
erase his primary and
direct liability by
invoking exercise of
diligence of a good
father of a family in
the selection and
supervision of the
employee.

Culpa Aquiliana
Only involves private
concern
The Civil Code by
means of indemnification
merely
repairs the damage
Includes all acts in
which any kind of
fault or negligence
intervenes

Liability is direct and

primary in quasidelict

Culpa Aquiliana
It is a separate source
of
obligation
independent
of
contract
In quasi-delict the
presumptive
responsibility for the
negligence of his
servants can be
rebutted by proof of
the exercise of due
care in their selection
and supervision.

Crime
Affect the public
interest
The Revised Penal
Code punishes or
corrects criminal act
Punished only if there
is a penal law clearly
covering them
Liability
of
the
employer of the
actor-employee
is
subsidiary in crimes

Kinds of Negligence:
1. Culpa Contractual (contractual negligence)
Governed by CC provisions on Obligations and Contracts,
particularly Arts. 1170 to 1174 of the Civil Code.

QUASI-DELICT
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the
damage done. (Article 2176 Civil Code)

2. Culpa Aquiliana (quasi-delict)

Essential Requisites for a quasi-delictual action:
Governed mainly by Art. 2176 of the Civil Code
3. Culpa Criminal (criminal negligence)
Governed by Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
NOTES:

1.
Act or omission constituting fault or negligence;
2.
Damage caused by the said act or omission; and
3.
Causal relation between the damage and the act or
omission.
Tests of Negligence

TORTS AND DAMAGES

1.

2.

Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use

the reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same situation?
If not then he is guilty of negligence.
Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration,
foresee harm as a result of the course pursued?
If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions
to guard against harm.

NOTES:
Negligence is a conduct - the determination of the
existence of negligence is concerned with what the
defendant did or did not do
The state of mind of the actor is not important; good
faith or use of sound judgment is immaterial. The
existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment
but by the behavior of the actor in the situation
before him. (Picart vs. Smith)
Negligence is a conduct that creates an undue risk of
harm to others.
The determination of negligence is a question of foresight
on the part of the actor FORESEABILITY.
Even if a particular injury was not foreseeable, the
risk is still foreseeable if possibility of injury is
foreseeable.
Forseeability involves the question of PROBABILITY,
that is, the existence of some real likelihood of some
damage and the likelihood is of such appreciable
weight reasonably to induce, action to avoid it.
Calculation of Risk
Interests are to be balanced only in the sense that the
purposes of the actor, the nature of his act and the harm
that may result from action or inaction are elements to be
considered.
Circumstances to consider in determining negligence: (PESTGAP)
1.
2.
3.

Time
Place
Emergency
Emergency rule

GENERAL RULE: An individual who suddenly finds

himself in a situation of danger and is required to act
without much time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger is not
guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a
better solution.
EXCEPTION: When the emergency was brought by
the individuals own negligence. (Valenzuela vs. CA
253 SCRA 303).
4.

Gravity of Harm to be avoided

PCGPINEDA,RN,MAN 2014
5.

Alternative Course of Action

If the alternative presented to the actor is too costly, the

harm that may result may be still be considered
unforeseeable to a reasonable man.
6.
7.

Social value or utility of activity

Person exposed to the risk

Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the

omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows
bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2,
shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be
observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good
father of a family shall be required. (1104a)
G.R. No. L-4977

March 22, 1910

DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE MANILA ELECTRIC

RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent time as a cabin
boy at sea; he was also able to learn some principles
of mechanical engineering and mechanical drawing from his
dads office (his dad was a mechanical engineer); he was also
employed as a mechanical draftsman earning P2.50 a day all
said, Taylor was mature well beyond his age.
One day in 1905, he and another boy entered into the
premises of Manila Electric power plant where they found 2030 blasting caps which they took home. In an effort to explode
the said caps, Taylor experimented until he succeeded in
opening the caps and then he lighted it using a match which
resulted to the explosion of the caps causing severe injuries to
his companion and to Taylor losing one eye.
Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that because the company
left the caps exposed to children, they are liable for damages
due to the companys negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for damages.
HELD: No. The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as
follows:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant
personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond,
was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the
negligence and the damage.
In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been
negligent in disposing off the caps which they used for the

TORTS AND DAMAGES

power plant, and that said caps caused damages to Taylor.
However, the causal connection between the companys
negligence and the injuries sustained by Taylor is absent. It is
in fact the direct acts of Taylor which led to the explosion of
the caps as he even, in various experiments and in multiple
attempts, tried to explode the caps. It is from said acts that led
to the explosion and hence the injuries.
Taylor at the time of the accident was well-grown youth of
15, more mature both mentally and physically than the
average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was
able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days
after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses
throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take
care. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that he
well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he
was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him
in his attempt to produce an explosion admit of no other
explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of
electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or
a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought
about by the applications of a match to the contents of the
cap, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can
there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to
anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous.
The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which
comes to him through his own fault, and that he cannot
demand reparation therefor from another.

Jarco Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA

325Facts:
FACTS
Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvels
Department Store, Makati City. Petitioners Leonardo Kong,
Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the stores branch manager,
operations manager, and supervisor, respectively. Private
respondents are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar
(Zhieneth).
In the afternoon of 9 May 1983, Criselda and Zhieneth were at
the 2nd floor of Syvels Department Store, Makati City. Criselda
was signing her credit card slip at the payment and verification
counter when she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud
thud. She looked behind her. She then saw Zhieneth on the
floor crushed by bulk of the stores gift-wrapping
counter/structure. Although shocked, Criselda was quick to ask
the assistance of the people around in lifting the counter and
retrieving Zhieneth from the floor.
Zhieneth was rushed to the hospital. She lived through the
operation but lost her ability to speak. She then died two weeks
later due to the injuries she sustained.
Respondents
demanded
the
reimbursement
of
hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses
they incurred from the petitioners. The petitioners refused
to pay. Thus, respondents filed a civil case to recover

PCGPINEDA,RN,MAN 2014
P157522.86 as actual damages,P300,000.00 as moral damages
and P20,000.00 in attorneys fees.
In their defense, petitioners claimed that Criselda was
negligent for allowing her daughter to freely roam around the
Department Store. They also claimed that Zhieneth was guilty
of contributory negligence by climbing onto the counter which
later fell on her causing her untimely death.
Respondents on the other hand claim that Criselda was not
guilty of negligence as it was natural for her to leave Criselda
when she was signing her credit card slip. They argue that
Zhieneth is not presumed to be guilty of contributory
negligence as she was only 6 years old at that time and that her
dying declaration as testified to by the doctor was that the
counter just fell on her without her climbing onto it.
Respondents also argue that the structure should have been
nailed to the floor to prevent incidents like this.
As to the claim that the counter should have been nailed, they
claim that it was unnecessary as it had been in existence for
many years without incident. Further, petitioners claim that the
criminal case for simple negligence filed against them has been
dismissed and that a verdict of acquittal issued in their favour.
Trial court dismissed the complaint but the Court of Appeals
reversed.
Issue: WON petitioners may be held liable for the death of
Zhieneth.
Held:
YES. An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no
fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is a fortuitous
circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without
any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through
human agency, an event which under the circumstances is
unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.
While negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or
the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man
would not do. Negligence is the failure to observe, for
the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of
care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. The test of
is: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty
of negligence.
Zhieneths dying statement before being rushed to into the
operating room that she did not do anything but merely
approached the counter forms part of the
res gestae in accordance with Section 42 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. It is axiomatic that matters relating to
declarations of pain or suffering and statements made to

TORTS AND DAMAGES

a physician are generally considered declarations and
admissions.
Further, the negligence of the petitioners was proven by the
testimony of their employees who testified that the counter
was heavy, shaky and could collapse at anytime. It was verified
that the counter was not nailed which further aggravated the
counters instability. Worse, such condition was brought to the
attention of the store supervisor but no action was taken to
address it. Verily, such shows a blatant failure to exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family.

PCGPINEDA,RN,MAN 2014
measures in place: they had a male nurse, six lifeguards, ring
buoys, toy roof, towing line, saving kit and a resuscitator. There
is also a sanitary inspector who is in charge of a clinic
established for the benefit of the patrons. Defendant has also
on display in a conspicuous place certain rules and regulations
governing the use of the pools, one of which prohibits the
swimming in the pool alone or without any attendant. Although
defendant does not maintain a full- time physician in the
swimming pool compound, it has however a nurse and a
sanitary inspector ready to administer injections or operate the
oxygen resuscitator if the need should arise

Both Criselda and Zhieneth are not guilty of contributory

negligence. Zhieneth, a 6year old enjoys the presumption that
she is incapable of committing contributory negligence.
Petitioners failed to rebut such presumption. Further, Criselda
was not guilty of contributory negligence as it was only natural
for her to let go of Zhieneth to sign her credit card slip.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirmed

No. Metropolitan is not negligent

Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District | Bautista Angelo

L-7644 August 29, 1958 |
FACTS
Metropolitan owns 3 swimming pools at its filters in Balara,
Quezon
City
It charges the public a certain fee if such wanted to use its
pools
Dominador Ong, 14 years of age, son of petitioners, went to
the
pools
along
with
his
2
brothers
He stayed in the shallow pool, but then he told his brothers
that he would get something to drink. His brothers left him and
went
to
the
Deep
pool
Around 4pm that day, a bather reported that one person was
swimming
to
long
under
water
Upon hearing this, the lifeguard on duty dove into the pool to
retrieve Ongs lifeless body. Applying first aid, the lifeguard
tried
to
revive
the
boy.
Soon after, male nurse Armando Rule came to render
assistance, followed by sanitary inspector Iluminado Vicente
who, after being called by phone from the clinic by one of the
security guards, boarded a jeep carrying with him the
resuscitator and a medicine kit, and upon arriving he injected
the boy with camphorated oil. After the injection, Vicente left
on a jeep in order to fetch Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the
Philippines. Meanwhile, Abao continued the artificial manual
respiration, and when this failed to revive him, they applied the
resuscitator until the two oxygen tanks were exhausted
Investigation was concluded and the cause of death is
asphyxia
by
submersion
in
water
(pagkalunod)
The parents of Ong bring this action for damages against
Metropolitan, alleging negligence on the selection and
supervision of its employees and if not negligent, they had the
last
clear
chance
to
revive
Ong.
It is to be noted that Metropolitan had complete safety

W/N Metropolitan is liable to the Ongs for its negligence

W/N the last clear chance doctrine may be invoked in this case
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

Metropolitan has taken all necessary precautions to avoid

danger to the lives of its patrons. It has been shown that the
swimming pools of appellee are provided with a ring buoy, toy
roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine
kit. The bottom of the pools is painted with black colors so as to
insure clear visibility. There is on display in a conspicuous place
within the area certain rules and regulations governing the use
of the pools. Appellee employs six lifeguards who are all trained
as they had taken a course for that purpose and were issued
certificates of proficiency. These lifeguards work on schedule
prepared by their chief and arranged in such a way as to have
two guards at a time on duty to look after the safety of the
bathers. There is a male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a
clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator. And there are security
guards who are available always in case of emergency.
The record also shows that when the body of minor Ong was
retrieved from the bottom of the pool, the employees of
appellee did everything possible to bring him back to life. When
they found that the pulse of the boy was abnormal, the
inspector immediately injected him with camphorated oil.
When the manual artificial respiration proved ineffective they
applied the oxygen resuscitator until its contents were
exhausted. And while all these efforts were being made, they
sent for Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines who
however came late because upon examining the body found
him to be already dead. All of the foregoing shows that appellee
has done what is humanly possible under the circumstances to
restore life to minor Ong and for that reason it is unfair to hold
it liable for his death The Last Clear Chance Doctrine is
inapplicable
in
this
case
The record does not show how minor Ong came into the big
swimming pool. The only thing the record discloses is that
minor Ong informed his elder brothers that he was going to the
locker room to drink a bottle of coke but that from that time on
nobody knew what happened to him until his lifeless body was
retrieved. The doctrine of last clear chance simply means that
the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for
the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided

TORTS AND DAMAGES

injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his
negligence
Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big
swimming pool and it being apparent that he went there
without any companion in violation of one of the
regulations of appellee as regards the use of the pools, and it
appearing
that
lifeguard
Abao responded to the call for help as soon as his attention
was called to it and immediately after retrieving the body all
efforts at the disposal of appellee had been put into play in
order to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room
for the application of the doctrine now invoked by appellants
to impute liability to appellee.
CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
et al.
FACTS:
Ernest Simke is a naturalized Filipino citizen and the Honorary
Consul General of Israel in the Philippines. One afternoon, he,
with several other persons, went to the Manila International
Airport to meet his future son-in-law. He and his group
proceeded to the viewing deck or terrace of the airport. While
walking on the terrace, Simke slipped over an elevation about
four (4) inches high at the far end of the terrace. He fell on his
back and broke his thigh bone. The next day, he was operated.
CFI rendered in Simkes favor prompting petitioner to appeal to
the Court of Appeals. The latter affirmed the trial court's
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was negligent on the part of Civil
Aeronautics.
HELD:
Yes. The inclination itself is an architectural anomaly for it is
neither a ramp because a ramp is an inclined surface in such a
way that it will prevent people or pedestrians from sliding. But
if, it is a step then it will not serve its purpose, for pedestrian
purposes.
The legal foundation of CAA's liability for quasi-delict can be
found in Article 2176 of the Civil Code. As the CAA knew of the
existence of the dangerous elevation which it claims though,
was made precisely in accordance with the plans and
specifications of the building for proper drainage of the open
terrace, its failure to have it repaired or altered in order to
eliminate the existing hazard constitutes such negligence as to
warrant a finding of liability based on quasi-delict upon CAA.
Contributory negligence under Article 2179 of the Civil Code
contemplates a negligent act or omission on the part of the
plaintiff, which although not the proximate cause of his injury,
contributed to his own damage, the proximate cause of the
plaintiffs own injury being the defendant's lack of due care. In
the instant case, no contributory negligence can be imputed to
the private respondent, considering the following test
formulated in the early case of Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809

PCGPINEDA,RN,MAN 2014
(1918):The test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use
that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
man would have used in the same situation
? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect
adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary
conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman law. The
existence of the negligence in a given case is not determined by
reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation
before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence
and prudence and determines liability by that. The question as
to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a
given situation must of course be always determined in the light
of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the
particular case. Abstract speculations cannot be here of much
value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable mengovern their conduct by the circumstances which are before
them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to
be omniscient of the future.
Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is
something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a
prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as
a result of the course actually pursued' If so, it was the duty of
the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the
suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to exist. Simke could not have
reasonably foreseen the harm that would befall him,
considering the attendant factual circumstances. Even if he had
been looking where he was going, the step in question could
not easily be noticed because of its construction. As the trial
court found: In connection with the incident testified to, a
sketch, shows a section of the floorings oil which plaintiff had
tripped, this sketch reveals two pavements adjoining each
other, one being elevated by four and one-fourth inches than
the other. From the architectural standpoint the higher,
pavement is a step. However, unlike a step commonly seen
around, the edge of the elevated pavement slanted outward as
one walks to one interior of the terrace. The length of the
inclination between the edges of the two pavements is three
inches. Obviously, plaintiff had stepped on the inclination
because had his foot landed on the lower pavement he would
not have lost his balance. The same sketch shows that both
pavements including the inclined portion are tiled in red
cement, the lines of the tilings are continuous. It would
therefore be difficult for pedestrian to see the inclination
especially where there are plenty of persons in the terrace as
was the situation when plaintiff fell down. There was no
warning sign to direct one's attention to the change in the
elevation of the floorings. Wherefore, decision of lower court is
affirmed.