Sec 44, Rule 130

G.R. No. 191972, January 26, 2015

HENRY ONG LAY HIN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS (2ND DIVISION), HON.
GABRIEL T. INGLES, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC BRANCH 58, CEBU CITY,
AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Doctrine: The registry return card is the official . . . record evidencing service by mail. It
carries the presumption that it was prepared in the course of official duties that have been
regularly performed [and, therefore,] it is presumed to be accurate, unless proven otherwise[.]
Facts:
On February 8, 2000, the RTC of Cebu City convicted petitioner Henry Ong Lay Hin and
Leo Obsioma, Jr. of the crime of estafa punishable under the Revised Penal Code. A motion for
reconsideration of said decision was denied and the case had been further elevated to the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals nevertheless affirmed the trial courts ruling thereby
remanding the case to the latter for execution. It was only after the lapse of six years when
petitioner Ong was arrested in Pasay City and to which, he filed with the Supreme Court a
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with application for preliminary and/or
mandatory injunction alleging that he did not receive notice of the denial of his appeal and if
fault be attributed, such may be blamed upon his counsels negligence to inform him of the same
thereby denying him of his right to due process. The People of the Philippines commented that
the registry return card corresponding to the copy of the Court of Appeals Resolution sent to
Ongs former counsel indicated that his counsel received the resolution on April 29, 2003.
Failure therefore by the petitioner to appeal within the reglementary period rendered the
judgment against him final and executory.
Issue: Whether the registry return card sent to Ongs former counsel served as valid notice of
denial of petitioners appeal.
Ruling:
Yes. The registry return card sent to Ongs former counsel is valid and binding with
the petitioner.
The registry return card is the official . . . record evidencing service by mail. It carries
the presumption that it was prepared in the course of official duties that have been regularly
performed [and, therefore,] it is presumed to be accurate, unless proven otherwise[.]
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2011-015291

Petitioner failed to rebut this presumption.

The affidavits of petitioners wife and mother-in-law, Mary Ann Ong and Nila Mapilit, stating
that petitioners former counsel told them that the law office never received a copy of the
Resolution, are inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay. Moreover, contrary to petitioners
false claim, his former counsel had notice that the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for
Reconsideration as early as April 21, 2004 when his counsel received a copy of the trial courts
Order directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest against petitioner.
With petitioner failing to rebut this presumption, it must be presumed that his former counsel
received a copy of the Resolution on April 29, 2003 as indicated in the registry return card. The
15-day period to appeal commenced from this date. Since petitioner did not file an Appeal within
15 days from April 29, 2003, the Decision became final and executory on May 15, 2003.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the Entry of
Judgment, which declared petitioners conviction final and executory as of May 15, 2003. Under
Rule 51, Section 10 of the Rules of Court on Judgment, if no appeal or motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution
shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date when the
judgment or final resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry.
As for the trial court, it likewise did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the arrest warrant
against petitioner and ordering his commitment to the Cebu City Jail. Since the Court of Appeals
had already issued the Entry of Judgment and had remanded to the trial court the original records
of the case, it became the trial courts duty to execute the judgment.

Prepared by:
Domingo, Roxanne G.
2011-015291

Section 44, Rule 130

G.R. No. 207635, February 18, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANTE DELA PEA1 AND
DENNIS DELIMA,Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Doctrine: Verily, the report of a government forensic chemist regarding a recovered prohibited
drug enjoys the presumption of regularity as to its preparation. Being an official record made in
the performance of FC Sahaguns official duty, the entries in Chemistry Report No. D-663-2008
are prima facie evidence of the facts they state. Dela Pea and Delima failed to overcome with
competent evidence the positive findings for shabu of the contents of the subject sachets as
contained in Chemistry Report No. D-663-2008.
Facts:
Intelligence Officer 1 (IO1) Kintanar of the PDEA, upon receipt of a report from a
confidential informant that Dela Pena was selling shabu in Barangay Sawang Calero, Cebu City,
instructed OJT Steven Balles to conduct a surveillance and when the report was confirmed by the
latter, a team of PDEA officers were formed to conduct a buy-bust operation against Dela Pena.
IO1 Kintanar acted as the poseur-buyer and when the sale of illegal drug has finally been
consummated, Dela Pena, together with Delima (who, while the transaction was going on, also
offered a sachet of shabu to IO1 Kintanar) was arrested. The pieces of evidence, properly sealed
and marked, obtained from the accused-appellants were then personally handed by IO1 Kintanar
to Forensic Chemist Rendielyn L. Sahagun of the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office 7,
Cebu City. FC Sahagun then confirmed that the sachets containing white crystalline were
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Accused-appellants Dante Dela Pena and Dennis
Delima were charged with three informations before the Regional Trial Court of said place and
upon which, after a thorough trial, finally convicted the former with violation of Sections 5 and
11 of RA 9165 while the latter, of violation of Section 11 of the same law. Upon appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the ruling of the trial court by lowering the penalty
imposed.
Issue: Whether the prosecution effectively established the elements of the crime charged in the
informations thereby properly convicting accused-appellants.

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Domingo, Roxanne G.
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Ruling:
Yes, the prosecution effectively established the elements of the crime charged.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of a charge for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under
Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 are: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and
the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
On the other hand, the elements of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drug are: (a) the
accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited or dangerous
drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the drug.
All the elements of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu, a dangerous drug,
were clearly proven by the prosecution through the credible testimony of IO1 Kintanar. The
identity of the parties to the sale transaction (Dela Pea and IO1 Kintanar) involving the subject
sachet of shabu worth P300.00 and the consummation of the sale were duly established by IO1
Kintanar. IO1 Kintanars testimony likewise established the illegal possession of sachets
of shabu by Dela Pea and Delima. No ill-motive was shown by the defense for IO1 Kintanar to
unjustly implicate Dela Pea and Delima in the present cases. Where there is no evidence that
the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, like IO1 Kintanar in
the present case, the presumption is that he was not actuated and his testimony is entitled to full
faith and credit.
xxx
The contents of the plastic sachet sold by Dela Pea to IO1 Kintanar and the four sachets found
in the formers possession, as well as, the single sachet seized from Delima, all tested positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug, upon the laboratory examination
conducted by FC Sahagun. Her findings are contained in Chemistry Report No. D-663-2008, the
genuineness and due execution of which was admitted by the defense. Verily, the report of a
government forensic chemist regarding a recovered prohibited drug enjoys the presumption of
regularity as to its preparation. Being an official record made in the performance of FC
Sahaguns official duty, the entries in Chemistry Report No. D-663-2008 are prima
facie evidence of the facts they state. Dela Pea and Delima failed to overcome with competent
evidence the positive findings for shabu of the contents of the subject sachets as contained in
Chemistry Report No. D-663-2008.

Prepared by:
Domingo, Roxanne G.
2011-015291

Section 44, Rule 130

G.R. No. 188464, July 29, 2015
ALBERTO J. RAZA, Petitioner, v. DAIKOKU ELECTRONICS PHILS., INC. AND
MAMORU ONO,Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Doctrine: Official duties in this case, of a post office employee are presumed to be regularly
performed, unless there is an assertion otherwise and the one so asserting rebuts such with
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.39 In addition, the stamps and
marks made by the postal worker are considered entries in the regular course of duty which are
considered accurate unless proven otherwise.
Facts:
Petitioner Alberto Raza was hired by respondent Daikoku Electronic Phil., Inc. as a driver
and who was eventually assigned for the companys president Mamoru Ono. On a certain date,
after Raza drove home Ono to the latters condominium unit in Makati City, the former, without
asking for permission, used the car in going home so the records of the security guards show that
it was not parked at the condos parking lot. This incident led to an investigation of Razas
misconduct and it was found out that there were 31 instances of the same wrongdoing on his part
thereby prompting the management to dismiss him. Raza filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
with the Labor Arbiter and the latter ruled in his favour but the same was overturned by the
NLRC and Court of Appeals on motion and appeal, respectively. Raza, in a petition for review
on certiorari before the Supreme Court maintains that the motion for reconsideration filed by
respondents with the NLRC after the tribunal initially dismissed their appeal was filed out of
time as there was allegedly a certification from the postmaster that the latters office was without
any clear record of mailing. He however admits that the envelopes sent to the NLRC and his
counsel all indicate through stamps and handwritten markings that the mailing date was October
21, 2005 which was the deadline for the filing of said motion.
Issue: As to procedural matters, whether the respondents' Motion for Reconsideration dated
October 21, 2005 was submitted on time with the NLRC.
Ruling:
Yes, respondents motion for reconsideration dated October 21, 2005 was submitted
on time with the NLRC.
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Domingo, Roxanne G.
2011-015291

At any rate, this Court finds nothing out of the ordinary nor irregular in the mailing of the
motion of respondents as would put in doubt the timeliness of its filing. The mailing of the
motion was done on the deadline for the filing and service of such, which was October 21, 2005,
as indicated by the post office on the envelopes as well as in the registry receipts sent to the
NLRC. Thus, the motion is considered filed on that date and the filing was on time. Petitioner
does not dispute but even admits the fact that the envelopes and registry receipts bear that date.
The rule is that whenever the filing of a motion or pleading is not done personally, the date of
mailing (by registered mail), as indicated by the post office on the envelope or the registry
receipt, is considered as the date of filing. The fact that the post office indicated October 21,
2005 on the envelope and receipts as the mailing date, as examined first-hand by the NLRC
based on its records, entitles respondents to the presumption that the motion was indeed mailed
on said date. Official duties in this case, of a post office employee are presumed to be
regularly performed, unless there is an assertion otherwise and the one so asserting rebuts such
with affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. In addition, the stamps and
marks made by the postal worker are considered entries in the regular course of duty which are
considered accurate unless proven otherwise.

Prepared by:
Domingo, Roxanne G.
2011-015291

Section 40 and 41, Rule 130

G.R. No. 212336, July 15, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARSENIO D. MISA III, AccusedAppellant.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Doctrine: Under Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, it is inferred that the victim's birth
certificate is the best evidence of her age. We are guided by the guidelines set in People v. Pruna
in appreciating age as an element of the crime or as an aggravating or qualifying circumstance:
xxx
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of
the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting
pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she
is less than 18 years old.
xxx
Facts:
It was well-established by the prosecution before the trial court that when the victim
AAA was raped by accused-appellant, the former was only 8 years of age thereby convicting the
latter with the crime of statutory rape in relation to violation of RA 7610. However on appeal, the
Court of Appeals noticed that while the prosecution presented AAAs birth certificate as Exhibit
H in its formal offer of exhibits, no such document was surrendered by the prosecution to the
trial court thereby prompting the appellate court to require the Clerk of Court of RTC to submit
said exhibit. The Court Interpreter, in an affidavit, alluded that the said exhibit was never
attached to the prosecutions formal offer. In its decision, the Court of Appeals stated that while it
agreed with the trial court that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA, he could only
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be found guilty of simple rape because AAAs minority was not proven in evidence in accord
with jurisprudence.
Issue: Whether accused-appellant could only be charged of simple rape instead of statutory rape
in relation to violation of RA 7610 because of the absence of AAAs Certificate of Live Birth to
the prosecutions formal offer.
Ruling:
Accused-appellant can only be charged of simple rape.
This Court has held that for minority to be considered as an element of a crime or a
qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape, it must not only be alleged in the Information, but it
must also be established with moral certainty. Under Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, it is
inferred that the victim's birth certificate is the best evidence of her age. We are guided by the
guidelines set in People v. Pruna in appreciating age as an element of the crime or as an
aggravating or qualifying circumstance:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true
copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to
prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's
mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended
party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the
following circumstances:
a.
b.
c.

If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 7 years old;
If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 12 years old;
If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's
mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided
that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of
the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
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6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim. (Citations
omitted)
Absent AAA's certificate of live birth and other means by which her age as alleged in the
Information could have been ascertained beyond doubt, this Court is constrained to agree with
the CA and deem the crime committed as simple rape.

Prepared by:
Domingo, Roxanne G.
2011-015291

Section 42, Rule 130

G.R. No.179535

June 9, 2014

JOSE ESPINELI a.k.a. DANILO ESPINELI, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Doctrine: Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part on the
competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to
produce. However, while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another
person given for the purpose of establishing the truth of the fact asserted in the statement is
clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement on the record is
merely to establish the fact that the statement, or the tenor of such statement, was made.
Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when what is relevant is the fact that such
statement has been made, the hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be shown. As a
matter of fact, evidence as to the making of the statement is not secondary but primary, for the
statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or is circumstantially relevant as to the existence of
such a fact. This is known as the doctrine of independently relevant statements.
Facts:
In the early evening of December 15, 1996, Alberto Berbon y Downie, a 49-year old
Senior Desk Coordinator of the radio station DZMM, was shot in the head and different parts of
the body in front of his house in Imus, Cavite. Meanwhile, the group of Atty. Orly Dizon of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) arrested and took into custody one Romeo Reyes for the
crime of Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon. Reyes confided to the group of Atty. Dizon that
he was willing to give vital information regarding the Berbon case. In due course, NBI Agent
Dave Seguinal interviewed Reyes and reduced the latters statement into writing whereby Reyes
claimed that on December 15, 1996, he saw petitioner and Sotero Paredes board a red car while
armed with a .45 caliber firearm and armalite respectively; and that petitioner told Paredes that
ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon. Subsequently, Reyes was released upon
posting bail but was never again heard of. During trial, NBI Agent Seguinal testified on these
facts. The trial court convicted petitioner and others of the crime of murder considering the
aggravating circumstance of night time and abuse of authority which was modified by the Court
of Appeals to homicide.
Issue: Whether the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable
doubt since it was only the NBI Agent who testified on the fact that Reyes saw the accused on
the date of Berbons assault.
Prepared by:
Domingo, Roxanne G.
2011-015291

Ruling:
The prosecution was able to prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt
through the circumstantial evidence that assisted the case.
NBI Agent Segunial testified that he had investigated Reyes and reduced the latters
statement into writing declaring, among others, that in the morning of December 15, 1996, he
(Reyes) overheard petitioner telling Sotero "Ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon"
and saw them armed with .45 caliber pistol and an armalite, respectively, before boarding a red
car. The CA gave weight to Reyes sworn statement in this wise:
The probative value of Romeo Reyess sworn statement as to the words spoken by appellant to
his co-accused Sotero Paredes in the morning of December 15, 1996 cannot be disputed. x x x
xxx
The hearsay evidence rule as provided under Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. A witness can
testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived
from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.
Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part on the competency and
credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce. However,
while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person given for the
purpose of establishing the truth of the fact asserted in the statement is clearly hearsay evidence,
it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement on the record is merely to establish the fact
that the statement, or the tenor of such statement, was made. Regardless of the truth or falsity of
a statement, when what is relevant is the fact that such statement has been made, the hearsay rule
does not apply and the statement may be shown. As a matter of fact, evidence as to the making of
the statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue
or is circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. This is known as the doctrine of
independently relevant statements.
In the present case, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial that while he was investigating Reyes,
the latter confided to him that he (Reyes) heard petitioner telling Sotero "Ayaw ko nang abutin pa
ng bukas yang si Berbon" and that he saw the two (petitioner and Sotero) armed with a .45
caliber pistol and an armalite, respectively, before boarding a red car, cannot be regarded as
hearsay evidence. This is considering that NBI Agent Segunials testimony was not presented to
prove the truth of such statement but only for the purpose of establishing that on February 10,
1997, Reyes executed a sworn statement containing such narration of facts. This is clear from the
offer of the witness oral testimony. Moreover, NBI Agent Segunial himself candidly admitted
that he is incompetent to testify on the truthfulness of Reyes statement. Verily then, what the
prosecution sought to be admitted was the fact that Reyes made such narration of facts in his
sworn statement and not necessarily to prove the truth thereof. Thus, the testimony of NBI Agent
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Segunial is in the nature of an independently relevant statement where what is relevant is the fact
that Reyes made such statement and the truth and falsity thereof is immaterial. In such a case, the
statement of the witness is admissible as evidence and the hearsay rule does not apply. xxx

Prepared by:
Domingo, Roxanne G.
2011-015291

Section 44, Rule 130

G.R. No. 181459

June 9, 2014

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,

vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Doctrine: xxx the certification issued by the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany,
dated March 27, 2002, explicitly states that NORD/LB is owned by the State of Lower Saxony,
Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, and serves as a regional bank for the said
states which offers support in the public sector financing xxx
Given that the same was issued by the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in
the regular performance of their official functions, and the due execution and authenticity thereof
was not disputed when it was presented in trial, the same may be admitted as proof of the facts
stated therein. Further, it is worthy to note that the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany
was in the best position to confirm such information, being the representative of the Federal
Republic of Germany here in the Philippines.
Facts:
On two different dates, respondent MERALCO obtained a loan from Norddeutsche
Landesbank Girozentrale (NORD/LB) Singapore branch in the amounts of USD120,000,000.00
and USD100,000,000.00 respectively. Under the loan agreements, the income received by
NORD/LB, by way of MERALCOs interest payments, shall be paid in full without deductions,
as the latter bears the obligation of paying/remitting to the BIR the corresponding 10% final
withholding tax which has been faithfully complied with by the same. However, sometime in
2001, respondent MERALCO discovered that NORD/LB Singapore Branch is a foreign
government-owned financing institution of Germany thereby rendering the same exempt from
tax pursuant to Section 32)B)(7)(a) of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code, as amended. On
October 7, 2003, the BIR issued Ruling No. DA-342-2003 declaring that the interest payments
made to NORD/LB is exempt from the 10% final withholding tax thereby prompting
MERALCO to ask for refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate. The BIR refused to make the
necessary refund.
Issue: Whether respondent MERALCO is entitled to a tax refund/credit relative to its payment of
final withholding taxes on interest payments made to NORD/LB from January 1999 to
September 2003.

Prepared by:
Domingo, Roxanne G.
2011-015291

Ruling:
Yes, MERALCO is entitled to a tax refund but only to the amount of THIRTYNINE
MILLION THREE HUNDRED FIFTY-NINE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTYFOUR PESOS & SEVENTY-NINE CENTAVOS (P39,359,254.79) representing the final
withholding taxes erroneously paid and remitted for the period December 2002 to
September 2003. Petitioners claim in the amount of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-FOUR
MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED TWENTY-SIX
PESOS & SIXTY-FIVE CENTAVOS (P224,760,926.65) representing erroneously paid and
remitted final income taxes for the period January 1999 to July 2002 is denied on the
ground of prescription.
First, as correctly decided by the CTA En Banc, the certification issued by the Embassy
of the Federal Republic of Germany, dated March 27, 2002, explicitly states that NORD/LB is
owned by the State of Lower Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, and
serves as a regional bank for the said states which offers support in the public sector financing, to
wit:
x x x.
Regarding your letter dated March 1, 2002, I can confirm the following:
NORD/LB is owned by the State (Land)of Lower Saxony to the extent of 40%, by the States of
[Saxony-]Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania to the extent of 10% each. The Lower
Saxony Savings Bank and Central Savings Bank Association have a share of [26.66%]. The
Savings Bank Association Saxony-Anhalt and the Savings Bank Association MecklenburgWestern Pomerania have a share of [6.66%] each.
As the regional bank for Lower Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and MecklenburgWestern Pomerania,
NORD/LB offers support in public sector financing. It fulfills as Girozentrale the function of a
central bank for the savings bank in these three states (Lander).
xxx
Given that the same was issued by the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in the
regular performance of their official functions, and the due execution and authenticity thereof
was not disputed when it was presented in trial, the same may be admitted as proof of the facts
stated therein. Further, it is worthy to note that the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany
was in the best position to confirm such information, being the representative of the Federal
Republic of Germany here in the Philippines.

Prepared by:
Domingo, Roxanne G.
2011-015291

Section 42, Rule 130

G.R. No. 196735

May 5, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DANILO FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS VICTOR MEDALLA, CHRISTOPHER SOLIVA,
WARREN L. ZINGAPAN, and ROBERT MICHAEL BELTRAN ALVIR, Accusedappellants.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Doctrine: As a general rule, "[a] witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, x x x." All other kinds of
testimony are hearsay and are inadmissible as evidence. The Rules of Court, however, provide
several exceptions to the general rule, and one of which is when the evidence is part of res
gestae, thus:
Section 42. Part of res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a starting occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances
thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an
equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of
the res gestae.
In People v. Rodrigo Salafranca, this court has previously discussed the admissibility of
testimony taken as part of res gestae, stating that:
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence
as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal
act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had
time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.
Facts:
On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7) members of the
Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of
the University of the Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked men
carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required
hospitalization but unfortunately, one of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries. The
victims who survived the attack reported the incident to the NBI four days after the same took
place. After the filing of the criminal information for murder, the trial court convicted the
accused-appellants of the same. After an automatic review with the Court of Appeals, the case
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was elevated to the Supreme Court wherein one of the contentions of the accused-appellants in
order to obtain a reversal of the judgment is the fact that the testimonies of the UP Diliman
Police and bystanders in the area when the incident took place constitutes part of res gestae and
therefore must be considered contrary to the victims statements.
Issue: Whether the testimonies of the UP Diliman Police and the bystanders who saw the rumble
should be given credence so as to overturn the positive identification of the surviving victims.
Ruling:
Evidence as part of the res gestae may be admissible but have little persuasive value
in this case.
According to the testimony of U.P. Police Officer Salvador, when he arrived at the scene,
he interviewed the bystanders who all told him that they could not recognize the attackers since
they were all masked. This, it is argued, could be evidence that could be given as part of the res
gestae.
As a general rule, "[a] witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, x x x." All other kinds of
testimony are hearsay and are inadmissible as evidence. The Rules of Court, however, provide
several exceptions to the general rule, and one of which is when the evidence is part of res
gestae, thus:
Section 42. Part of res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a starting occurrence
is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances
thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an
equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of
the res gestae.
In People v. Rodrigo Salafranca, this court has previously discussed the admissibility of
testimony taken as part of res gestae, stating that:
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence
as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal
act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had
time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.
xxxx
The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the undersigned
incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such
act." In a general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that
grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and
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Domingo, Roxanne G.
2011-015291

contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and
fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by
either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or
immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the
statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement
of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to
fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae
is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or
connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part
of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or
purpose to manufacture testimony.
There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school
campus is a startling occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders were made
immediately after the startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as evidence given in res
gestae.
In People v. Albarido, however, this court has stated that "in accord to ordinary human
experience:"
x x x persons who witness an event perceive the same from their respective points of reference.
Therefore, almost always, they have different accounts of how it happened. Certainly, we cannot
expect the testimony of witnesses to a crime to be consistent in all aspects because different
persons have different impressions and recollections of the same incident. x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
The statements made by the bystanders, although admissible, have little persuasive value
since the bystanders could have seen the events transpiring at different vantage points and at
different points in time. Even Frisco Capilo, one of the bystanders at the time of the attack,
testified that the attackers had their masks on at first, but later on, some remained masked and
some were unmasked.
When the bystanders' testimonies are weighed against those of the victims who witnessed
the entirety of the incident from beginning to end at close range, the former become merely
corroborative of the fact that an attack occurred. Their account of the incident, therefore, must be
given considerably less weight than that of the victims.

Prepared by:
Domingo, Roxanne G.
2011-015291

Section 42, Rule 130

G.R. No. 198022

April 7, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
SONNY GATARIN y CABALLERO @ "JAY-R" and EDUARDO QUISAYAS, Accused,
EDUARDO QUISAYAS, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Doctrine: Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the
main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with
the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of
evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation, is
so interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded
as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or
purpose to manufacture testimony.
Facts:
On November 3, 2004 at 8 oclock in the evening, Umali (one of the prosecutions
witnesses) was riding a bicycle on his way home when he saw the victim Januario being mauled
by two persons opposite Doms Studio in Poblacion, Mabini, Batangas. On the same night, SPO3
Mendoza and PO1 Coronel were on board their patrol vehicle performing their routine patrol
duty when they met two men running at a fast speed and whom they chased to no avail. Later on,
as they continued patrolling the area, they saw Januario lying on the street wounded at the same
spot where Umali found him. The two policemen immediately took Januario inside the vehicle to
bring him to the Zigzag Hospital. While inside the vehicle, SPO3 Mendoza asked Januario who
hurt him to which the latter answered that it was Jay-R and his uncle who stabbed him. The
trial court convicted accused-appellant of the crime of robbery with homicide, which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
1. Whether the statement made by Januario to SPO3 Mendoza can be considered as a dying
declaration or only part of res gestae.
2. Whether the crime charged against accused-appellant must be upheld.

Prepared by:
Domingo, Roxanne G.
2011-015291

Ruling:
1. The statement made by Januario to SPO3 Mendoza should only be considered as
part of res gestae.
xxx even if Januarios utterances could not be appreciated as a dying declaration, his
statements may still be appreciated as part of the res gestae. Res gestae refers to the
circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to
illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as
to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence
as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation, is so
interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be
regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any
premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.
The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur
herein. When Januario gave the identity of the assailants to SPO3 Mendoza, he was
referring to a startling occurrence which is the stabbing by appellant and his co-accused.
At that time, Januario and the witness were in the vehicle that would bring him to the
hospital, and thus, had no time to contrive his identification of the assailant. His utterance
about appellant and his co-accused having stabbed him, in answer to the question of
SPO3 Mendoza, was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence.
Definitely, the statement is relevant because it identified the accused as the authors of the
crime. Verily, the killing of Januario, perpetrated by appellant, is adequately proven by
the prosecution.
2. The crime of robbery with homicide as charged in the information should not be
upheld. Instead, the crime of murder properly suits the case.
It is, therefore, clear from the foregoing that the evidence presented to prove the robbery
aspect of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, does not show that robbery
actually took place. The prosecution did not convincingly establish the corpus delicti of the
crime of robbery.
xxx In this case, the element of taking, as well as the existence of the money alleged to
have been lost and stolen by appellant, was not adequately established. We find no sufficient
evidence to show either the amount of money stolen, or if any amount was in fact stolen from
Januario. Even if we consider Januarios dying declaration, the same pertains only to the
stabbing incident and not to the alleged robbery.
From the evidence presented, we find that as alleged in the information, abuse of superior
strength attended the commission of the crime, and thus, qualifies the offense to murder.
Abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces
between the victim and the aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength notoriously
advantageous for the aggressor which the latter selected or took advantage of in the
commission of the crime.
Prepared by:
Domingo, Roxanne G.
2011-015291

Section 44, Rule 130

G.R. No. 201011

January 27, 2014

THERESITA, JUAN, ASUNCION, PATROCINIA, RICARDO, and GLORIA, all

surnamed DIMAGUILA,Petitioners,
vs.
JOSE and SONIA A. MONTEIRO, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Doctrine: As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides
that entries in official records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in
official records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of
requiring the official's attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the
course of his duty. The document's trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of
performance of official duty.
Facts:
A residential house and lot located at Gat. Tayaw St., Liliw, Laguna, was originally
owned by one Maria Ignacio Buenseda, now deceased. The said property had long been
partitioned equally between her two sons, Perfecto and Vitaliano Dimaguila through a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition, with its southern-half portion assigned to Perfecto and the northern halfportion to Vitaliano. Perfecto was survived by his three children Esperanza, Leandro, and Pedro,
who had further divided the southern-half portion equally among themselves, with their
respective shares measuring 81.13 square meters each or 1/3 each. The heirs of Pedro, with the
concurrence of the heirs of Esperanza and Leandro, sold their share to respondent spouses
Monteiro through a Bilihan ng Lahat Naming Karapatan (Bilihan). The first complaint filed by
spouses Monteiro is a Partition of the said property but was later on amended to recovery of
possession of a portion of the subject property occupied by the petitioners herein since it was
admitted by the latter in their answer that there had already been an extra-judicial partition of the
subject property as early as 1945. During the trial, Crisostomo Arves, an employee from the
Office of the Municipal Assessor, presented a certified true copy of the cadastral map of Liliw
and a list of claimants/owners; and Dominga Tolentino, a record officer of the DENR, testified
that as part of her duties, she certifies and safekeeps the records of the surveyed land, including
cadastral maps of the region.
Issue: Whether or not the statements made by the employee of the Municipal Assessor and
record officer of the DENR constitute hearsay evidence, hence inadmissible?
Prepared by:
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2011-015291

Ruling:
As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides
that entries in official records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in
official records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of
requiring the official's attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the
course of his duty. The document's trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of
performance of official duty.
Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked
to execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. It is, therefore, clear that the
cadastral map and the corresponding list of claimants qualify as entries in official records as they
were prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay
rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

Prepared by:
Domingo, Roxanne G.
2011-015291

Sections 40-41, Rule 130

GR. No. 212924

July 29, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

-versusENRIQUE GALVEZ, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Doctrine:
As to the age of the victim as a component of the qualifying circumstance, the case of
People v. Flores laid down the following guidelines on how to prove the age of the offended
party:
xxx
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims
mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less that 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
xxx
Facts:
On four different dates, the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim AAA
who positively identified the former as her uncle and perpetrator of the crime. The Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City convicted the accused of four counts of sexual abuse under RA 7610 and
four counts of rape punishable under the Revised Penal Code. The Court of Appeals, upon
appeal, affirmed with modifications the ruling of the trial court. The CA ruled that accusedappellant can only be convicted of the crime of qualified rape on the ground that he may not be
subjected to criminal liability twice for both sexual abuse under Sec. 5(b) Article III, RA 7610
and rape under Article 335 of the RPC for the same act.
Issue: Whether accused-appellants conviction of the crime of qualified rape is proper.
Prepared by:
Domingo, Roxanne G.
2011-015291

Ruling:
No, accused-appellant should only be convicted of simple rape because the
qualifying circumstance of the victim being below 18 years of age coupled with the fact that
the offender is a relative of said victim has not been fully established.
With respect to the element that makes the offense qualified rape, that is, the minority of
the victim coupled with the fact that the accused is related to her within the third civil degree, it
bears stressing that both minority and the third degree relationship must be established.
As to the age of the victim as a component of the qualifying circumstance, the case of
People v. Flores laid down the following guidelines on how to prove the age of the offended
party:
1.
The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified
true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2.
In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as
baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice
to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or
a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the
victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony will suffice
provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The
failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken
against him.
In People v. Ortega, we explained how to resolve this doubt in the victims age:
x x x Given the doubt as to AAAs exact age, the RTC properly convicted
Ortega only of simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua.
In People v. Alvarado, we did not apply the death penalty because
the victims age was not satisfactorily established, thus:
Prepared by:
Domingo, Roxanne G.
2011-015291

We agree, however, that accused-appellant should not

have been meted the death penalty on the ground that the
age of complainant was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt. The information alleged that, on July 26, 1997, the
date of the rape, Arlene was 14 years old. In her testimony,
Arlene stated that she was 14 years old at the time of the
incident. Accused-appellant confirmed this during the
presentation of the defense evidence, but Lonelisa
Alvarado, complainants mother, testified that Arlene was
born on November 23, 1983, which would mean she was
only 13 years old on the date of the commission of the
crime. No other evidence was ever presented, such as her
certificate of live birth or any other document, to prove
Arlenes exact age at the time of the crime. As minority is
a qualifying circumstance, it must be proved with equal
certainty and clearness as the crime itself. There must
be independent evidence proving the age of the victim,
other than the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
and the absence of denial by accused-appellant. Since
there is doubt as to Arlenes exact age, accused
appellant must be held guilty of simple rape only and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
xxx
It must likewise be remembered that the minority of the victim must concur with the
second component which is the third degree relationship between the victim and the offender. As
to such second component of the qualifying circumstance, People v. Libo-on teaches:
It is well-settled that this attendant circumstance, as well as the other
circumstances introduced by Republic Act Nos. 7659 and 8493 are in the nature
of qualifying circumstances. These attendant circumstances are not ordinary
aggravating circumstances which merely increase the period of the penalty.
Rather, these are special qualifying circumstances which must be specifically
pleaded or alleged with certainty in the information; otherwise, the death
penalty cannot be imposed. In this regard, we have previously held that if the
offender is merely a relation not a parent, ascendant, step-parent, or guardian or
common-law spouse of the mother of the victim it must be alleged in the
information that he is a relative by consanguinity or affinity (as the case may be)
within the third civil degree.
Thus, in the instant case, the allegation that accused-appellant is the uncle of private
complainant is not specific enough to satisfy the special qualifying circumstance of
relationship. The relationship by consanguinity or affinity between appellant and complainant
Prepared by:
Domingo, Roxanne G.
2011-015291

was not alleged in the information in this case. Even if it were so alleged, it was still necessary
to specifically allege that such relationship was within the third civil degree.
(Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Since the Informations contained only a statement that the accused appellant was the
uncle of AAA without stating that they were relatives within the third civil degree, the qualifying
circumstance of relationship cannot likewise be appreciated in the case at bar.

Prepared by:
Domingo, Roxanne G.
2011-015291

Section 42, Rule 130

GR. No. 214453

June 17, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

-versusBERNABE P. PALANAS alias ABE, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE,J.:
Doctrine: Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the
main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with
the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of
evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is
so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to
be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any
premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.
Facts:
In the morning of March 26, 2006, SPO2 Borre took his five month old grandson outside
his residence at Block 14, Kenneth Street corner Eusebio Avenue, Pasig City. PO3 Leopoldo
Zapanta, who slept at SPO2 Borres residence, was watching television when four successive
gunshots rang out. PO3 Zapanta looked through the open door of SPO2 Borres house and saw
two armed men with .38 caliber revolvers standing a meter away from SPO2 Borre. He saw
accused-appellant Palanas deliver the fourth shot to SPO2 Borre but he could not identify the
other shooter who is, at the time of the filing of the information against Palanas was still at large.
After the two assailants fled on a motorcycle, SPO2 Borre was immediately brought to the Pasig
City General Hospital who, on the way to the said hospital, made a statement that the one who
shot him was Abe, Aspog, or Abe Palanas referring to his neighbour, Palanas. The RTC
convicted Palanas of the crime of murder which was affirmed with modifications by the Court of
Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not Palanass conviction for the crime of murder should be upheld.
Whether the statement made by Palanas before his death should be considered as a dying
declaration or part of res gestae?
Ruling:
Yes, Palanass conviction for the crime of murder should be upheld. Moreover, the
statement made by Palanas before his death may be considered both as a dying declaration
and part of res gestae.

Prepared by:
Domingo, Roxanne G.
2011-015291

For a dying declaration to constitute an exception to the hearsay evidence rule, four (4)
conditions must concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarants death; (b) that at the time the declaration was made, the
declarant is conscious ofhis impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and
(d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the
declarant is the victim. On the other hand, a statement to be deemed to form part of the res
gestae, and thus, constitute another exception to the rule on hearsay evidence, requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.
In the case at bar, SPO2 Borres statements constitute a dying declaration, given that they
pertained to the cause and circumstances of his death and taking into consideration the number
and severity of his wounds, it may be reasonably presumed that he uttered the same under a fixed
belief that his own death was already imminent. This declaration is considered evidence of the
highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death
would make a careless and false accusation. Verily, because the declaration was made in
extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every motive of falsehood is silenced
and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth, the law deems
this as a situation so solemn and awful as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed
by an oath administered in court.
In the same vein, SPO2 Borres statements may likewise be deemed to form part of the
res gestae. Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the
main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with
the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of
evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is
so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to
be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any
premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. In this case, SPO2 Borres statements refer
to a startling occurrence, i.e., him being shot by Palanas and his companion. While on his way to
the hospital, SPO2 Borre had no time to contrive the identification of his assailants. Hence, his
utterance was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. Definitely,
such statement is relevant because it identified Palanas as one of the authors of the crime.
Therefore, the killing of SPO2 Borre, perpetrated by Palanas, is adequately proven by the
prosecution.

Prepared by:
Domingo, Roxanne G.
2011-015291