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about their significance to the generation of the effect we are studying in a particularp
olitical system.
Political behavior takes place in organized society, that is, in a situation in which men are in
a state of interaction, as opposed to having random contact. For people in random contact,
behavior is infinitely variable and, hence, unpredictable. People in interaction behave in the
context of shared expectations about what can legitimately be done in any given situation.
For these people in interactign, the variability of behavior patterns is limited so that
behavior can be predicted to some extent. The congeries of standard-ized expectations that
are the basis of the predictability of behavior are called "roles." To say that people are in
interaction as opposed to random contact is to say that they act out roles to some degree.
The congeries of standardized expectations that govern political be-havior are known as
"political roles." The network of political roles in a given society forms that society's
political structure. If we think of political roles in terms of their function in controlling the
flow of transactions and communications among political actors, we may refer to political
structure as the system of political exchanges.
The concepts of political role and political structure need further clarification. We have said
that roles are congeries of expectations about how actors behave in a given situation. It is
well to note that these expectations are very rarely precise in the sense that people in
interaction know exactly what the role occupant must do in a given situation. Role
expectations are generally vague-so much so that it is often quite easy to agree that a role
has been fulfilled by two or more different sets of acts. It would be more accurate to think
of role expectations not so much as a definition of legitimate behavior but as a delimitation
of available behavior options. In short, role expecta-tions amount to delineations of the
variability of political behavior rather than specifications of how to act. Thus, the network
of political role expectations, or the political structure, constitutes a system of channels or
obstacles that control the flow of political exchanges (that is, the transactions and
communications) between political actors, preventing political exchanges from fluctuating
be-yond certain limits and giving them a general regularity without making them perfectly
predictable.
Political structure may thus be called the "pattern of the flow of political exchanges."
Political stability is the regularity of the flow of political ex-changes. The more regular the
flow of political exchanges, the more stability. Alternatively, we might say that there is
political stability to the extent that members of society restrict themselves to the behavior
patterns that fall within the limits imposed by political role expecta-tions. Any act that
deviates from these limits is an instance of political instability.
To determine the extent of political stability of a polity we must be able systematically to
identify both regularities and irregularities in the flow of political exchanges. Political
behavior or act or exchange is regular if it does not violate the system (or pattern) of
political exchanges; it is irregular if it violates that pattern.
The phrase "violates the system of political exchanges" is some-what ambiguous, however.
Whose expectations? The question arises because it is possible for some members of
society to disagree over the expectations of a given role or set of roles. Such disagreement
may occur on account of lack of information or differences in under-standing or
interpretation. It may also occur as a result of differences in values and ideological
commitments. This is why it is necessary to specify that the role expectations that serve as
the standard for judging whether a form of political behavior is irregular or regular is the
most authoritative definition of role expectations that the society has-namely, its laws and
conventions, and particularly the former
Regular exchanges do not violate the laws of the society, irregular exchanges do. We are
not assuming that it is always clear whether or not a form of behavior violates the law. Such
an assumption is unnecessary. For our purposes it is enough that when it becomes an issue
whether an act has violated the law or not, the issue can be resolved by appeal to the courts
or whatever institution the society uses for compulsory arbitration.
The main reason for using law and custom as the arbiters of role expectations is that the
two constitute the system of sanctions that gives political structure its particular character.
Once the group evolves a customary or legitimate way of doing things, this way tends to
persist because of the inconvenience or the cost to the individual of going against it. To say
that custom exists is to say that behavior is "structured," that there are sanctions against
some patterns of be-havior. In other words, there are role expectations. The legal system or
the institution for binding arbitration of the group or society has the same effect as custom.
It limits the variability of behavior in given situations by authoritatively defining what we
ought to do (obligations), what we may do (rights), and what we can do (powers). Since the
legal system monopolizes the function of authori-tatively deciding when infringements of
proper behavior have oc-curred, it is the very kernel of political structure. In light of these
remarks, it should be clear that our choice of criterion for resolving conflicting claims is not
an assertion that constituted authority is always right, or even that its claims ought to be
given priority, but rather a recognition of the fact that the dominance of a particular system
of laws and conventions gives the historical polity its particu-lar structure.
Problems and Possibilities of Measurement
When we call a form of political behavior stabilizing or destabilizing, we are describing its
relation to a specific political structure or to a specific pattern of political exchanges. A
form of behavior that is destabilizing in relation to one political structure may well be
stabiliz-ing in relation to another. To put it somewhat differently, no political exchange is
intrinsically regular or irregular as such. Political ex-changes are regular or irregular in
relation to specific political struc-tures. Therefore, to measure political stability we must
hold the political structure constant momentarily. But if we must do this to take our
measurements, how do we go about studying stability over time? How do we arrive at
statements such as, "Polity X or Y was highly stable over period P"? And what do such
statements mean?
Suppose we want to find out the extent to which a polity was stable over a period of fifty
years. Our problem is that in order to measure stability we must hold the political structure
constant; yet the political structure may have changed in the course of the fifty years. We
might settle for holding constant the political structure as it existed at some point in year
one. Then, further, we may now use this particular structure which we are holding constant
as the criterion for distin-guishing between regular and irregular exchanges for the entire
fifty-year period. But such a procedure would be misleading. To illustrate, imagine that a
revolution took place in year five and drastically changed the system of political exchanges.
By measuring stability against a single base system of exchanges from year one, we may
obtain an entirely false picture of the extent of political stability during the period; for
measurement of political stability for the period would not have taken account of the
changes of political structure that have transformed some regular exchanges into irregular
ones and some irregular exchanges into regular ones.
How, then, are we to take account of the changes of political structure when we study
political stability over time? Our solution is to "pluralize" the base system of political
exchanges. That means that we take measurement in as many different points in time as
possible. To the extent that we can do this, we take account of changes in the political
structure. For example, in the case of the polity whose stability we want to assess over a
period of fifty years, it will be better to choose two base systems of political exchanges, say
one in year one and one in year twenty-five, instead of using only one base system. It will
be better still to reduce the intervals between the base systems of exchanges. Thus, ten-year
intervals are prefer-able to twenty, and five-year intervals to ten, and so on. In short, the
denser the base series, the more accurate our assessment will be.
If we did not pluralize our base system of political exchanges, we would not be taking
account of the fact that polities change all the time, and that not all political change is
destabilizing. By holding on rigidly to one base system of political exchanges, we will
invariably find that our criterion of regularity will diverge from that of the polity we are
studying. It is pertinent to recall that we had suggested that the basis for distinguishing
between regular and irregular political exchanges is the laws and customs of the polity,
particularly the former. The operational definition of irregular political exchange is what
the law forbids, and the operational definition of regular politi-cal exchange is what the law
does not expressly forbid. And, of course, the relevant law is the law of the polity whose
political structure is being studied. Thus, if in studying political stability over a period of
time we fail to maximize the density of our base system of political exchange to take
account of the polity's changing criterion of regularity and irregularity, our measurement
will be inaccurate.
There is one remaining question about the pluralization of the base system of exchanges. To
pose this question we must first distinguish between two types of irregularity in political
exchanges. One is the irregulare xchange which is simply counted as an irregularityw hen it
occurs, with the system of political exchanges remaining such that, the next time it occurs,
it is again treated as an irregularity. This type of irregularity is called nonadaptive deviance.
The other kind of irregularity is the one that becomes legitimate, modifying the system of
political exchanges and the rules of the polity so that the next time it occurs it is no longer
regarded as an irregularity, but rather as a regular pattern of political exchange. This type of
irregularity is called adaptive deviance. It may be objected that the process of using a dense
series of systems of exchanges to measure political stability over time gives too much
weight to nonadaptive, and too little to adaptive, deviance. For by this method nonadaptive
deviance is coded as irregularity whenever it occurs, whereas adaptive deviance soon
begins to count as regularity.
The objection is irrelevant. If nonadaptive deviance is always coded as irregularity, that is
as it should be. Our aim (when we measure political stability over time) is to discover to
what extent the flow of political exchanges of the political population was regular in that
time period. As long as any irregularity does not become legitimated or regularized, it is
properly coded as an irregularity whenever it occurs. Thus, it is really not a matter of
overweighting nonadaptive deviance, but one of giving it its proper significance. It should
be noted also that the pluralization of the base system of political exchanges for measuring
stability over time does not give less weight to adaptive deviance than it should. When
irregularity occurs (assume that this is the irregularity that will later become adaptive
deviance), it is coded as such until the political structure and the rules of the polity are
modified in such a way that this irregular pattern of exchange can no longer be
accommodated under the category of irregular exchanges.
We have been referring to polities as having more or less political stability. But this is rather
vague. It is necessary to find some way of talking of political stability in terms of
quantities. We might score, say, one unit for every incidence of irregularity, or perhaps
differenti ate between irregularitiesa ccording to a scale of importance,s coring more units
for some irregularities than for others. By this procedure the total number of units that the
polity scores will be a quantitative expression of changes in its degree of political stability.
While a series of such readings taken for a given polity at given time intervals will tell us
whether the polity's political stability is increasing or decreasing, and by how much, it will
not really tell us the degree to which there is political stability. And it is virtually useless for
the purposes of a vigorous comparative study of the political stability of political systems.
If political stability is the regularity of the flow of political ex-changes, then the level of
political stability should be expressed quantitatively as a proportion: the ratio of regular
exchanges to the totality of political exchanges. This is more easily said than done. The
problem is how to get additive data from the concept of political exchanges. We can count
manifest violations of the pattern of politi-cal exchanges to give us the nominator of our
fraction. How about the denominator? How do we assign a quantity to the totality of
political exchanges? While acts that violate the pattern of political exchanges stand out in
fairly clear relief, the other exchanges meet and merge in a confusing manner. To derive a
quantity for total political exchanges, we have to make some phenomenally crude
distinctions between political exchanges.
An entirely satisfactory solution to this problem is difficult to conceive. It would appear
that we have to settle for an oblique and crude measure of political stability. Instead of
measuring the level of political stability as a ratio of irregular exchanges to the totality of
political exchanges, we could measure it as a ratio of political actors who violate the pattern
of political exchanges to the totality of political actors. This measurementi s not as
arbitrarya s it seems. Let us examine some of the objections against this procedure. One is
that political actors who are not explicitly violating the pattern of political exchanges may
not necessarily be engaged in political behavior or, at any rate, may not necessarily be
behaving in a manner that "sup-ports" (actively) the pattern of political exchanges. The
strength of this objection is weakened by the fact that regular political exchanges are a
residual category. We must note that to refrain from violating the pattern of political
exchanges is to behave in a manner that is positively associated with the persistence of that
pattern of political exchanges. From this point of view it would. be quite legitimate to
include all political actors who are not violating the pattern of politi-cal exchanges in the
denominator of our fraction.
The second objection is that, although violations are ultimately the act of individuals, the
number of violations of the pattern of political exchanges does not necessarily coincide
with the number of political actors, because one person can commit many violations. The
impli-cation is that by adding the number of violators and using this sum as the nominator,
we underplay the level of political instability. This objection is not so serious when we
remember the significance of a point we made earlier-that to measure political stability we
have to freeze the political structure temporarily. When we do so, the picture we obtain
does not show us the process of political exchanges as such, but rather a political
population caught between postures of conformity and deviance.
Third, according to conventional usage, the political actor may be an organization rather
than a person. Thus, counting political actors may give a totally false picture of the
distribution of the members of the society between conformity and deviance. The objection
is valid; but it is easily met by reducing political actors to biological persons for the purpose
of measuring political stability.
In the fourth place, we cannot simply count political actors on either side of the law,
because measurement of political stability has to reflect the fact that, just as some political
exchanges are more important, so are some political actors more important than others.
This view is quite mistaken. It is based on a misunderstanding of what political stability is.
When we measure political stability, we are simply measuring the incidence of conformity
or violation in regard to a given pattern of political exchanges. It is rather like watching
traffic to determine the incidence of traffic violations. However, if we wanted to transform
our measurements into some formula for predicting changes in the level of political
stability, some weighting would be necessary. We would want to convert our readings of
political stability into a statement about the balance of political forces. We would want to
know not only who or how many are conforming to, or violating, the pattern of political
exchanges, but also the relative political influence of these two classes of the politi-cal
population. Obviously, the ability of any group of political actors to cause changes in the
propensity to conform to the system of political exchanges will vary with their influence
rather than with their number. Be that as it may, we must keep apart questions of
measurement and those of prediction and explanation. When we measure political stability,
we are only determining the distribution of a given political population between two
patterns of manifest behav-ior.
To summarize, we measure political instability in the following way:
Merits of Definition
What are the merits of the definition of political stability suggested here? First, our
definition avoids the presumption that some political acts are intrinsically or universally
destabilizing. Among the political acts that are usually given that status are political
assassinations, coups d'etat, and frequent changes of the executive of the state. The
presumption is misleading. A form of behavior that is stabilizing relative to one political
structure or pattern of political exchanges may be destabilizing relative to another. If we
have a political system in which the law requires that elections must be held every five
years, we may describe an occasion when the leaders in power refused to obey this law and
continued to exercise power as an instance of political instability. The refusal of the leaders
in office to seek mandate at the appropriate time is a disruption of the political struc-ture.
On the other hand, if there is a political system in which inheritance is the only legitimate
form of succession, the substitution of succession by election can be politically
destabilizing, depending on how the new mode of succession is introduced.
The point is elementary. But it is necessary that it be emphasized because contemporary
writings on political stability invariably reflect no consciousness of it. The general trend in
writings on political stability is to designate some forms of political behavior, such as
frequent changes of government, as instances of political instability. As a rule they reflect
no awareness of the fact that, in calling these forms of behavior destabilizing, we are
describing their relationship to a particular pattern of political exchanges. Similarly, in
compara-tive studies of political instability, some forms of behavior designated as instances
of political instability are quantified and used as a basis for comparing the political stability
of different political systems. There is no recognition of the fact that such a procedure will
be legitimate only if we can assume that all polities, or at least all the polities being
compared, have exactly the same political structure. Our definition of political stability
avoids this elementary but signifi-cant error.
Second, the definition offered here avoids the confusion of politi-cal instability with
political change and political stability with ab-sence of political change. If political stability
is the regularity of the flow of political exchanges, then it is compatible with any amount of
change as long as the change occurs in accordance with established role expectations-that
is, as long as it does not violate established expectations about whether the type of change
in question ought to occur and, if so, how it is to be brought about. Political change
becomes destabilizing only when it violates the pattern of political exchanges. The
distinction between change that is compatible with political stability and change that is
destabilizing is made according to the same criteria that we use for sorting out irregular
political exchanges.
The measurements of political stability must reflect our conscious-ness of the difference
between lack of change and political stability. In particular, when we want to measure
political stability over time, we must avoid the presumption that the political structure or
the pattern of political exchanges remains constant over that period. For these reasons, we
have suggested the pluralization of the base sys-tems of political exchanges. The procedure
ensures that we do not interpret all political change as political instability.
While there is nothing profound in all this, writings on political stability somehow manage
to neglect these simple but important points. To be sure, one does not usually find the
assertion that political stability is the same as lack of change. But such an assertion is, in
fact, implicit in many of our more influential treatments of political stability. Consider the
studies that bring longevity into the definition of political stability, such as S. M. Lipset's
Political Man. Once we build the idea of longevity into our notion of political stability, we
are already confusing stability with lack of change. Such conception of stability amounts to
rejection of the idea that change in itself is not an instance or a manifestation of instability.
The confu-sion of change with instability nurtures the popular notion that mod-ernization is
destabilizing, that "developing" nations are highly un-stable. We would be far less
impressed by the political instability of "developing" nations if we were to remember that
the fact that a political structure or part of it is changing considerably tells us nothing about
its political stability.
Third, this definition is relatively free from the error of making statements about levels of
political stability without seriously taking into account the totality of political exchanges. It
will be readily conceded that, when we talk of political stability, it is political structures or
patterns of political exchanges whose stability is at issue. But the way we discuss and
measure political stability rarely reflects such awareness. The usual method of measuring
political stability is to look at the incidence of certain kinds of political acts, such as coups
d'etat, political violence, constitutional crisis, corrup-tions in high office, assassination of
political leaders, and civil dis-obedience. These phenomena are treated as if they had to be
destabil-izing for all political systems. But that is only one of the dangers of this procedure.
The procedure raises yet another question: Why consider these particularp olitical acts or
phenomenaa nd not others?
One has only to raise this question to see how illegitimate this procedure is. Could it be that
these acts are chosen because they exhaust the class of destabilizing acts? Obviously not.
The choice of these acts or phenomena may be defended by saying that they are more
important instances or manifestations of political instability than are others. This position,
too, will require elaborate theoretical justi-fication. What can "important" mean in this
context? Important "for" political stability? But that cannot be. For the implication would
be that political instability is something other than these phenomena. Such implication is
incompatible with the use of these phenomena as measures of political instability, although
it is of course not incompatible with their use for predicting changes in the level of political
stability. Could it be that they are important in the sense of representing a larger quantity of
political instability than other phenomena? That cannot be because measurement of
political stability is the determination of the relative frequency of a certain pattern of
manifest political behavior.
Another difficulty with this procedure is that when destabilizing acts are limited to a few
that are supposedly "important," the ones we select tend to be associated with political
behavior on the level of elites. An examination of factors that are conventionally regarded
as manifestations of political instability-such as coup d'etat, consti-tutional crisis, frequent
changes of regime, electoral violence, politi-cal assassinations, abuse of high office-shows
that they are indeed primarily political interactions associated with elites.
What elites do or what happens to them is very important for understanding a political
system; and there are many good reasons for giving special attention to interactions
associated with elites. If, for instance, we want to predict how far the level of political
stability will change in future, we must pay special attention to the propensi-ties and
patterns of interaction of elites, since it is axiomatic that the political system is most likely
to change in the direction of their wishes and propensities. To put it more concretely, in a
political system in which assassinations and automobile thefts are irregular political
exchanges, the assassination of the prime minister is certain to lead to more disruptions of
the pattern of political exchanges than the theft of an automobile. The measurement of
political stability does not, however, call for special attention to what elites do or what
happens to them, because the level of political stability is the inci-dence of the pattern of
political exchanges. Thus, the assassination of the prime minister is an instance of violation,
just as the theft of the automobile is. For the purposes of measurement of political instability, both acts have the same status, regardless of the strong probability that the assassination
is more likely to lead to further violations of the system of political exchanges. Since we
are measuring the incidence of a manifest pattern of behavior at a point in time, this
probability is irrelevant. If the assassination leads to other violations of the pattern of
exchanges, these will naturally be considered when we take another reading at the time they
occur.
We have now seen some of the difficulties of designating certain acts as the manifestations
of political instability and of measuring political instability according to the incidence of
these acts. Inasmuch as this conception and measurement of political instability have determined much of our conventional beliefs about the phenomenon of political stability, we
must reexamine these beliefs. We are entirely too sure that some political systems are more
stable than others. The belief that the Western democracies are highly stable is very strong.
Few people are not convinced that the industrialized countries are more stable than the
"underdeveloped" countries. If we look at the totality of the political exchange, the validity
of these beliefs is not so evident. Once we grant that phenomena such as coups d'etat are
only some of the manifestations of political instability, then we cannot conclude that polity
A is less stable than polity B just because such phenomena occur more frequently in A. In
any case, this type of comparison is problematic because that which destabilizes one political structure may not necessarily destabilize another.
We must reexamine more fundamentally the belief that there is a problem of political
instability. The belief rests on a fuzzy conception and inadequate measurements of the
phenomenon of political instabil-ity. Is a palace revolt of the military in Ghana, or the
collapse of another coalition government in France really significant as political total
political population? Why are we so concerned about the prob-lem of political instability in
the face of the array of forces which brutally curb the propensity to disrupt the political
structure in con-temporary society?
Not surprisingly, the main biases in contemporary scholarship on political stability happen
to be the types of biases that political elites would have-the confusion of change with
instability, the tendency to reduce politics to elite interactions, the tendency to exaggerate
the "problem" of political stability. The scholarship on political stability reflects-less subtly
than usual-the class consciousness of contem-porary political science.
Un intento de definir la estabilidad poltica debe comenzar por aclarar los conceptos de la
poltica y la estructura poltica. El comportamiento poltico es cualquier acto por cualquier
miembro de una sociedad que afecta a la distribucin del poder de decisin para que la
sociedad . El comportamiento poltico es ubicuo. Los miembros de la sociedad se comporta
polticamente en la medida , en la obediencia o desobediencia a las leyes de la sociedad ,
apoyan o socavan el sistema de estratificacin poder. La obediencia a la ley constituye el
comportamiento poltico , tanto como lo hace presente a las elecciones . Porque, si la
intencin o no, el efecto de la obediencia a la ley es defender la autoridad de aquellos que
toman las decisiones acerca de lo que debe ser la ley , y la forma en que se ha de aplicar .
Para mantener esta autoridad es para ayudar en el mantenimiento de los aspectos de la
distribucin del poder para tomar decisiones en la sociedad. Del mismo modo, todas las
violacines de la ley constituyen el comportamiento poltico ; cada violacin de la ley es ,
ipso facto, un desafo a la autoridad constituida. Es una amenaza para el mantenimiento del
modelo actual de distribucin del poder de tomar decisiones para la sociedad. Si la
incidencia de violacines de la ley sigue en aumento , la autoridad poltica se atrofia con el
tiempo , esto es axiomtico .
Tenemos claro que no hemos definido la poltica en el sentido usual de la demarcacin de
los actos particulares de carcter poltico de los que no lo son. Tampoco tenemos la
intencin de ofrecer una definicin, porque es engaoso para delinear la poltica de esa
manera. Estrictamente hablando , no hay acto humano , incluso tan sencillo como usar el
pelo largo , es intrnsecamente no poltico . Esto es as porque la " politicalness " de un acto
no es una cualidad inherente a ese acto sino una caracterizacin de la misma de acuerdo con
( 1 ) el contexto en el que se estudia , y ( 2 ) el contexto en el cual ocurre. Para ilustrar , no
consideraramos normalmente el pelo largo una forma de comportamiento poltico. Sin
embargo, un dspota puritana puede decidir que este acto corrompe y por consiguiente el
comando a todos que se cort el pelo corto. Supongamos que poco despus de ese decreto
se ha publicado un amplio e intenso , todos los hombres invitados por el dspota a una
ceremonia de estado llegan con el pelo largo. En estas circunstancias , nos legtimamente
concluir que estos hombres estaban cometiendo un acto muy valiente de la desobediencia
poltica.
Es ms exacto para definir la poltica en trminos de un efecto , es decir , la alteracin o el
mantenimiento de los patrones de la distribucin del poder de tomar decisiones para la
sociedad. De esta manera , se llega a una definicin de la " poltica" que nos obliga a
asumir que todo el comportamiento humano es potencialmente poltico. La objecin podra
ser que si se supone que todo lo que los miembros de la sociedad hacer es potencialmente
poltico , la definicin de poltica es demasiado incluyente y por lo tanto intil . Creemos
que tal objecin se basa en un error. Nuestra definicin puede no ser lo suficientemente
precisas , pero eso no se debe a que no excluye ninguna ct particulara como intrinsicallyn
onpolitical . La definicin de la poltica no es un problema de hacer declaraciones sobre las
diferencias intrnsecas entre los actos particulares , sino ms bien uno de la especificacin
de un efecto particular . Si est claro lo que es este efecto , entonces la poltica se define ,
sea cual sea la variedad de los actos particulares que pueden estar asociados con este
efecto . Todo lo anterior no quiere decir que , en el estudio de la conducta poltica que no
tenemos que hacer distinciones entre los actos de los miembros de la sociedad. Nosotros de
hecho hacemos distinciones , sino que se basan en la prominencia de los actos particulares
al efecto . Partimos del efecto y trabajar hacia atrs a los actos , que se dan un papel en el
anlisis de acuerdo con nuestros supuestos acerca de su importancia en la generacin del
sociedad estn en desacuerdo sobre las expectativas de un rol o conjunto de roles dado. Este
desacuerdo se puede producir a causa de la falta de informacin o las diferencias en la
comprensin o interpretacin. Tambin puede ocurrir como resultado de las diferencias en
los valores y compromisos ideolgicos . Por esta razn, es necesario precisar que las
expectativas de los roles que sirven como el estndar para juzgar si una forma de
comportamiento poltico es irregular o regular es la definicin ms autorizada de las
expectativas del rol que la sociedad tiene , es decir , sus leyes y convenios , y
particularmente en la primera
Intercambios regulares no violan las leyes de la sociedad , los intercambios irregulares
hacen. Nosotros no estamos asumiendo que siempre est claro si es o no una forma de
comportamiento contrario a la ley . Tal suposicin es innecesaria. Para nuestros propsitos,
es suficiente como para que cuando se convierte en un problema si un acto ha violado la ley
o no, el problema se puede resolver mediante la apelacin a los tribunales o cualquier
institucin de la sociedad utiliza el arbitraje obligatorio .
La razn principal para el uso de la ley y la costumbre como los rbitros de las expectativas
de rol es que los dos constituyen el sistema de sanciones que le da estructura poltica de su
carcter particular. Una vez que el grupo evoluciona de manera consuetudinaria o legtima
de hacer las cosas , de esta manera tiende a persistir debido a las molestias o el costo para el
individuo de ir en contra de ella . Decir que existe la costumbre es decir que el
comportamiento es " estructurado ", que existan sanciones contra algunos patrones de
comporta-miento . En otras palabras, existen expectativas de rol . El sistema legal o la
institucin de arbitraje vinculante del grupo o de la sociedad tiene el mismo efecto que
personalizado. Limita la variabilidad de comportamiento en determinadas situaciones ,
definiendo con autoridad lo que debemos hacer (obligaciones) , lo que podemos hacer
(derechos) , y lo que podemos hacer ( poderes) . Dado que el sistema legal monopoliza la
funcin de autori- cuantitativamente decidir cuando las infracciones de la conducta
apropiada tienen -oc INCURRIDOS , es el ncleo de la estructura poltica . A la luz de estas
observaciones , debe quedar claro que nuestra eleccin del criterio para resolver las
demandas en conflicto no es una afirmacin de que constituye la autoridad siempre tiene la
razn , o incluso que sus alegaciones se debe dar prioridad , sino ms bien un
reconocimiento del hecho de que el predominio de un sistema particular de leyes y
convenciones da la poltica histrica de su estructura particu- lar .
Problemas y Posibilidades de medicin
Cuando llamamos a una forma de comportamiento poltico estabilizador o
desestabilizador , que estamos describiendo su relacin con una estructura poltica
especfica o un patrn especfico de los intercambios polticos . Una forma de
comportamiento que est desestabilizando en relacin con una estructura poltica bien
puede estar en relacin con otro - estabilizadora . Para decirlo de manera algo diferente , no
hay intercambio poltico es intrnsecamente regular o irregular como tal. Intercambios
polticos son regulares o irregulares en relacin con las estructuras polticas especficas. Por
lo tanto , para medir la estabilidad poltica debemos mantener la constante de estructura
poltica momentneamente. Pero si tenemos que hacerlo para tomar nuestras medidas ,
cmo hacemos para estudiar la estabilidad a travs del tiempo ? Cmo se llega a
afirmaciones tales como : " Polity X o Y era muy estable en el periodo P "? Y qu
significan esas declaraciones ?
Supongamos que queremos saber el grado en que un sistema de gobierno se mantuvo
estable durante un perodo de cincuenta aos. Nuestro problema es que con el fin de medir
de la clase poltica para que la prxima vez que ocurre que ya no se considera como una
irregularidad , sino ms bien como un patrn regular de intercambio poltico . Este tipo de
irregularidad se llama desviacin de adaptacin. Se puede objetar que el proceso de
utilizacin de una serie densa de los sistemas de intercambios para medir la estabilidad
poltica en el tiempo da demasiado peso a no adaptativa , y demasiado poco para
adaptacin, la desviacin. Porque por este mtodo desviacin no adaptativa se codifica
como irregularidad siempre que se produzca , mientras que la desviacin adaptativa pronto
comienza a contar como la regularidad.
La objecin es irrelevante. Si la desviacin no adaptativa siempre se codifica como
irregularidad, que es como debe ser. Nuestro objetivo (cuando se mide la estabilidad
poltica en el tiempo) es descubrir en qu medida el flujo de los intercambios polticos de la
poblacin poltica era habitual en ese perodo de tiempo . Mientras alguna irregularidad no
se convierta legitimado o regularizado , se codifica correctamente como una irregularidad
siempre que se produzca . Por lo tanto , en realidad no es una cuestin de sobreponderar
desviacin no adaptativa , pero uno de los que le da su propio significado . Cabe sealar
tambin que la pluralizacin del sistema de base de los intercambios polticos para medir la
estabilidad en el tiempo no le da menos importancia a la desviacin de adaptacin de lo que
debera . Cuando la irregularidad se produce (suponiendo que esta es la irregularidad que
ms tarde se convertir en la desviacin de adaptacin) , se codifica como tal hasta que la
estructura poltica y las reglas de la organizacin poltica se modifican de tal manera que
este patrn irregular de cambio ya no se puede acomodar en la categora de los
intercambios irregulares.
Hemos estado hablando de entidades polticas que tienen ms o menos la estabilidad
poltica. Pero esto es ms bien vaga . Es necesario encontrar la manera de hablar de la
estabilidad poltica en trminos de cantidades . Podramos anotar , por ejemplo, una unidad
por cada incidencia de irregularidad, o quizs diferenciacin comieron entre irregularitiesa
egn una escala de importancia , S extraccin de muestras ms unidades para algunas
irregularidades que para otros. Por este procedimiento el nmero total de unidades que las
puntuaciones Polity sern una expresin cuantitativa de los cambios en su grado de
estabilidad poltica . Si bien una serie de tales lecturas tomadas por un sistema de gobierno
dado a intervalos de tiempo dados nos dir si la estabilidad poltica del sistema de gobierno
est aumentando o disminuyendo , y en qu medida , no va realmente decirnos el grado en
que haya estabilidad poltica. Y es prcticamente intil para los fines de un estudio
comparativo vigoroso de la estabilidad poltica de los sistemas polticos.
Si la estabilidad poltica es la regularidad del flujo de intercambios polticos , entonces el
nivel de estabilidad poltica debe expresarse cuantitativamente como una proporcin : la
proporcin de los intercambios regulares a la totalidad de los intercambios polticos . Esto
es ms fcil decirlo que hacerlo . El problema es cmo conseguir los datos de aditivos del
concepto de intercambios polticos . Podemos contar violacines manifiestos de la pauta de
los intercambios polti-cos para darnos el denominador de nuestra fraccin. Qu te parece
el denominador ? Cmo nos asignamos una cantidad a la totalidad de los intercambios
polticos ? Si bien los actos que violan el patrn de los intercambios polticos destacan en
relieve bastante claro , las otras centrales se encuentran y se funden de una manera confusa.
Para derivar una cantidad para los intercambios polticos totales, lo que tenemos que hacer
algunas distinciones fenomenalmente crudo entre los intercambios polticos .
Una solucin totalmente satisfactoria a este problema es difcil de concebir. Parece que nos
tenemos que conformar con una medida oblicua y el crudo de la estabilidad poltica . En
Mritos de Definicin
Cules son los mritos de la definicin de la estabilidad poltica que aqu se sugieren ? En
primer lugar, nuestra definicin evita la presuncin de que algunos actos son
intrnsecamente polticos o universalmente desestabilizador. Entre los actos polticos que se
dan por lo general que el estado son los asesinatos polticos , golpes de estado , y los
cambios frecuentes del ejecutivo del estado . La presuncin es engaoso. Una forma de
comportamiento que se estabiliza con respecto a una estructura o patrn de intercambios
polticos poltica puede desestabilizar en relacin a otro . Si tenemos un sistema poltico en
el que la ley exige que las elecciones deben celebrarse cada cinco aos, podemos describir
una ocasin en que los lderes en el poder se negaron a obedecer a esta ley y continuaron
ejerciendo el poder como una instancia de la inestabilidad poltica. La negativa de los
lderes en la oficina a buscar mandato en el momento oportuno es una alteracin de la
estructura poltica. Por otra parte, si hay un sistema poltico en el que la herencia es la nica
forma legtima de sucesin, la sustitucin de la sucesin por la eleccin puede ser
polticamente desestabilizadora , dependiendo de cmo se introduce el nuevo modo de
sucesin.
El punto es elemental. Pero es necesario que se destac porque los escritos contemporneos
sobre la estabilidad poltica , invariablemente reflejan ninguna conciencia de ello. La
tendencia general en los escritos de la estabilidad poltica es designar algunas formas de
comportamiento poltico , como cambios frecuentes de gobierno , como los casos de
inestabilidad poltica. Por regla general, reflejan ninguna conciencia del hecho de que , al
llamar a estas formas de comportamiento desestabilizador , que estamos describiendo su
relacin con un patrn particular de intercambios polticos . Del mismo modo, en los
estudios comparativos de la inestabilidad poltica , algunas formas de comportamiento
designados como casos de inestabilidad poltica , se cuantifican y se utilizan como base
para la comparacin de la estabilidad poltica de los diferentes sistemas polticos. No hay
reconocimiento del hecho de que tal procedimiento ser legtima slo si podemos asumir
que todas las organizaciones polticas , o al menos todas las entidades polticas que se estn
comparando , tienen exactamente la misma estructura poltica. Nuestra definicin de la
estabilidad poltica evita este error elemental, pero significativo .
En segundo lugar, la definicin que aqu se ofrece se evita la confusin de la inestabilidad
poltico con el cambio poltico y la estabilidad poltica , con ausencia de un cambio
poltico. Si la estabilidad poltica es la regularidad del flujo de los intercambios polticos ,
entonces es compatible con cualquier cantidad de cambios , siempre y cuando el cambio se
produce de acuerdo con el papel establecido expectativas , es decir , siempre y cuando no
viole las expectativas establecidas acerca de si el tipo de cambio en cuestin debe
producirse y, de ser as, cmo es que podran introducirse . El cambio poltico se convierte
en desestabilizador slo cuando viola el patrn de los intercambios polticos . La distincin
entre el cambio que sea compatible con la estabilidad poltica y el cambio que est
desestabilizando se realiza de acuerdo a los mismos criterios que utilizamos para clasificar