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FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO ENACT
PENAL LAWS
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs .THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO
ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR., JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE
MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA
III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA,
MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE
FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN, PERCIVAL BRIGOLA,
PAUL ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL
ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, and RONAN DE GUZMAN; FIDELITO DIZON vs.PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES; GERARDA H. VILLA vs.MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA
II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA,
JR., and ANSELMO ADRIANO
G.R. No. 151258; G.R. No. 154954; G.R. No. 155101; G.R. Nos. 178057 &
178080,
February 1, 2012, CJ. Sereno
Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this case
the general condemnation of a hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe
a fundamental principle in our criminal justice system. No act constitutes a crime
unless it is made so by law. Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Even if an act is
viewed by a large section of the populace as immoral or injurious, it cannot be
considered a crime, absent any law prohibiting its commission. Had the Anti-Hazing
Law been in effect then, these five accused fraternity members would have all been
convicted of the crime of hazing punishable by reclusion perpetua (life
imprisonment). The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean,
however, that the accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal
liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by
means of fault (culpa).
Facts:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila
University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris
Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar Bogs Asuncion, Samuel Sam
Belleza, Bienvenido Bien Marquez III, Roberto Francis Bert Navera, Geronimo Randy
Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo Lenny Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members
of the Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all
proceeded to Rufos Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house
of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect
during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be physical
beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled
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to last for three days. After their briefing, they were brought to the Almeda
Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats
and insults from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and
walked towards the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans
delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional
forms of Aquilan initiation rites. These rites included the Indian Run, which required
the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering
blows to the neophytes; the Bicol Express, which obliged the neophytes to sit on the
floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans
walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the Rounds, in which the neophytes were
held at the back of their pants by the auxiliaries (the Aquilans charged with the duty
of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were
being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two
Aquilans; and the Auxies Privilege Round, in which the auxiliaries were given the
opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the
neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived their
first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day 9 February 1991 the neophytes were
made to present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required
to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles. Whenever they would give
a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the
Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them
physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner
of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the
initiation for the day officially ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito
Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened.
The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the
insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The
fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to
paddling and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle
blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The
neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After
their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be
carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was
officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the
carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys
shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these
rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that
Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They
removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm.
When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was
pronounced dead on arrival.
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Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35
Aquilans. Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were
jointly tried. On the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in
Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to
be resolved first.
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No.
C-38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or on
29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine
accused commenced anew.
On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520) set aside the finding of
conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified
the criminal liability of each of the accused according to individual
participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the following
Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the
charge against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy
trial. Meanwhile, on different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial
court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca,
and Adriano. On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 &
90153 reversed the trial courts Orders and dismissed the criminal case against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to
speedy trial
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were
individually brought before this Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the accuseds initial acts of inflicting physical pain on the
neophytes were attended by animus iniuriandi amounting to a felonious act
punishable under the Revised Penal Code, thereby making it subject to Article 4(1)
thereof.
Ruling:
No. Lenny died during Aquilas fraternity initiation rites. The night before the
commencement of the rites, they were briefed on what to expect. They were told
that there would be physical beatings, that the whole event would last for three
days, and that they could quit anytime. On their first night, they were subjected to
traditional initiation rites, including the Indian Run, Bicol Express, Rounds, and the
Auxies Privilege Round. The beatings were predominantly directed at the neophytes
arms and legs.

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In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to present
comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and
recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles. Late in the afternoon, they were once again
subjected to traditional initiation rituals. When the rituals were officially reopened
on the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, the neophytes were subjected to another
traditional ritual paddling by the fraternity.
During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the neophytes.
The auxiliaries protected the neophytes by functioning as human barriers and
shielding them from those who were designated to inflict physical and psychological
pain on the initiates. It was their regular duty to stop foul or excessive physical
blows; to help the neophytes to pump their legs in order that their blood would
circulate; to facilitate a rest interval after every physical activity or round; to serve
food and water; to tell jokes; to coach the initiates; and to give them whatever they
needed.
These rituals were performed with Lennys consent. A few days before the
rites, he asked both his parents for permission to join the Aquila Fraternity. His
father knew that Lenny would go through an initiation process and would be gone
for three days
Even after going through Aquilas grueling traditional rituals during the first
day, Lenny continued his participation and finished the second day of initiation.
Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof
showing clear malicious intent, the Court ruled that the specific animus
iniuriandi was not present in this case. Even if the specific acts of punching, kicking,
paddling, and other modes of inflicting physical pain were done voluntarily, freely,
and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements of freedom and intelligence in
the felony of physical injuries, the fundamental ingredient of criminal intent was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, all that was proven was that the
acts were done pursuant to tradition. Although the additional rounds on the second
night were held upon the insistence of Villareal and Dizon, the initiations were
officially reopened with the consent of the head of the initiation rites; and the
accused fraternity members still participated in the rituals, including the paddling,
which were performed pursuant to tradition. Other than the paddle, no other
weapon was used to inflict injuries on Lenny. The targeted body parts were
predominantly the legs and the arms. The designation of roles, including the role of
auxiliaries, which were assigned for the specific purpose of lending assistance to
and taking care of the neophytes during the initiation rites, further belied the
presence of malicious intent. All those who wished to join the fraternity went
through the same process of traditional initiation; there is no proof that Lenny Villa
was specifically targeted or given a different treatment. The Congress itself
recognized that hazing is uniquely different from common crimes. The totality of the
circumstances must therefore be taken into consideration.
The underlying context and motive in which the infliction of physical injuries
was rooted may also be determined by Lennys continued participation in the
initiation and consent to the method used even after the first day.
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For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to
rule against the trial courts finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on
Lenny Villa, there being no proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of
malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as required in mala in
se cases, considering the contextual background of his death, the unique nature of
hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that
the accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The
Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault
(culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results
from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have been
prevented, or at least mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity accused Dizon
and Villareal restrained themselves from insisting on reopening the initiation rites.
Although this point did not matter in the end, as records would show that the other
fraternity members participated in the reopened initiation rites having in mind the
concept of seniority in fraternities the implication of the presence of alumni should
be seen as a point of review in future legislation. The Court noted that some of the
fraternity members were intoxicated during Lennys initiation rites. In this light, the
Court submits to Congress, for legislative consideration, the amendment of the AntiHazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or
alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would
increase the applicable penalties.
It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly or unwittingly impose the
misery of hazing and employ appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There
must be a better way to establish kinship. A neophyte admitted that he joined the
fraternity to have more friends and to avail himself of the benefits it offered, such as
tips during bar examinations. Another initiate did not give up, because he feared
being looked down upon as a quitter, and because he felt he did not have a
choice. Thus, for Lenny Villa and the other neophytes, joining the Aquila Fraternity
entailed a leap in the dark. By giving consent under the circumstances, they left
their fates in the hands of the fraternity members. Unfortunately, the hands to
which lives were entrusted were barbaric as they were reckless.
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide shall cover only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had
the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect then, these five accused fraternity members
would have all been convicted of the crime of hazing punishable by reclusion
perpetua (life imprisonment). Since there was no law prohibiting the act of hazing
when Lenny died, the Court ruled according to existing laws at the time of his death.
The CA found that the prosecution failed to prove, beyond reasonable doubt,
Victorino et al.s individual participation in the infliction of physical injuries upon
Lenny Villa. As to accused Villareal, his criminal liability was totally extinguished by
the fact of his death, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.

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Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted without prejudice to the
applicability of the Anti-Hazing Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the
modification of criminal liability from slight physical injuries to reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide shall apply only with respect to accused
Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
FELONIES
CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNEL VILLALBA AND RANDY
VILLALBA
G.R. No. 207629, October 22, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Jurisprudence requires that conspiracy must be proven as the crime itself.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not
rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the conduct of the
parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the
commission of the offense. It is not necessary to show that two or more persons
met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an
unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out. The
rule is that conviction is proper upon proof that the accused acted in concert, each
of them doing his part to fulfill the common design to kill the victim. There is no
clear evidence that accused-appellants had a common design to kill Maximillian. To
recall, Maximillian's group and accused-appellants' group completely met by
chance that fateful early morning of April 29, 2006 near Gaisano Mall. They did not
know each other before this meeting. The events swiftly happened, in a matter of
minutes, from the meeting of the two groups, to Maximillian's insulting remark to
Jenny, to the scuffle between Maximillian and accused-appellant Arnel, and to
accused-appellant Arnel's stabbing of Maximillian. The scuffle between Maximillian
and accused-appellant Arnel broke out because the former tried to grab the latter's
arm. It was at this point that prosecution witnesses saw accused-appellant Randy
block Maximillian's way and hold Maximillian's hand/s. Josephine testified that
accused-appellant Randy held only Maximillian's left hand, and Frederick narrated
that accused-appellant Randy held both of Maximillian's hands; but neither of these
witnesses was able to describe the extent that Maximillian's ability to defend
himself or flee was impaired by accused-appellant Randy's hold on his hand/s.
Given the circumstances, the Court has serious doubts that accused-appellant
Randy so acted to ensure that accused-appellant Arnel would be able to stab and
kill Maximillian. It is completely reasonable and plausible that accused-appellant
Randy was merely stepping in to stop Maximillian from further attacking his cousin
accused-appellant Arnel. There was no proof that accused-appellant Randy had
prior knowledge that accused-appellant Arnel carried a sharp weapon with him or
that accused-appellant Arnel intended to stab Maximillian.
Facts:

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Maximillian, a college instructor, attended a farewell party for his students in
Butuan City on the night of April 28, 2006. Maximillian was accompanied by his wife
Josephine and their friends Frederick, Homer, and Homer's wife Marilou. Around 2:30
in the morning of April 29, 2006, Josephine begged Maximillian that they already go
home. Maximillian still did not want to leave, but Josephine insisted. Angry,
Maximillian rushed out of the restaurant and headed towards the direction of the
Gaisano Mall in Butuan City. Josephine asked Frederick to catch up with Maximillian.
Josephine, Homer, and Marilou then trailed about 10 meters behind Maximillian and
Frederick.
When they turned at the corner, Maximillian and Frederick chanced upon
accused-appellants and their girlfriends, Maximillian's group and accusedappellants' group did not know each other prior to the early morning of April 29,
2006. Maximillian suddenly ordered accused-appellants to wear their shirts, and
then asked accused-appellant Arnel, "How much is that?" referring to accusedappellant Arnel's girlfriend. Frederick intervened and told accused-appellant Arnel,
"Brod, don't mind him. He is a little bit drunk." Accused-appellant Arnel replied,
"That was nothing, Kuya." However, Maximillian and accused-appellant Arnel
continued to stare at each other. Moments later, Maximillian tried to get hold of
accused-appellant Arnel's left arm but the latter was able to wave away
Maximillian's hand. Accused-appellant Randy blocked Maximillian's way and held
Maximillian's hand/s as accused-appellant Arnel hit Maximillian on the chest and
abdomen. At this point, it appeared to eyewitnesses Frederick, Josephine, and
Homer that Maximillian was just being boxed by accused-appellant Arnel. Frederick
tried to break the scuffle, as Josephine and Flomer, who were only five meters away,
came running to help. Accused-appellants stepped back and then ran away.
Despite telling Josephine that he was stabbed, Maximillian still chased
accused-appellants, with Frederick and Homer at his heels. Stones were thrown their
way but none of them were hit. All of a sudden, Maximillian fell to the ground.
Josephine checked Maximillian's body yet found no blood or wound. Assuming that
Maximillian was simply drunk and in pain because of the fist fight, Josephine, with
the help of Frederick and Homer, brought Maximillian home on board a motorized
"trisikad." During the ride home, Maximillian was unconscious but snoring heavily.
However, when they were already at their house, Josephine felt that Maximillian had
no more pulse and his eyes had turned white. Josephine, again with Frederick and
Homer, rushed Maximillian to Manuel J. Santos Hospital.
Maximillian was later pronounced dead.
Accused-appellants were charged for the crime of murder. Both the RTC and
CA convicted the accused. Hence this appeal.
Accused-appellant Arnel asserts that he cannot be adjudged criminally liable
for the resulting death of Maximillian as he only stabbed Maximillian in self-defense.
Accused-appellant also argues that treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify the
killing of Maximillian to murder, as even the prosecution admits that provocation
and aggression came from Maximillian and that an altercation between accusedappellant Arnel and Maximillian preceded the stabbing.
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Issue:
Whether or not the trial court, affirmed by the appellate court, is correct in
convicting the accused Arnel and Randy Vilalalba.
Ruling:
No. The Court, after a meticulous review of the records of the case, finds
bases to downgrade accused-appellant Arnel's crime from murder to homicide and
to absolve accused-appellant Randy of any criminal liability for Maximillian's death.
At the outset, the Court bears in mind the following pronouncement in People
v. Gerolaga.In this Decision, this Court emphasizes the need to review the facts and
details of appealed cases with meticulous, laser-like precision. While, as a rule, the
findings of fact of trial courts are accorded great respect by appellate tribunals, still,
the latter must wade through the mass of evidence in order to ensure that the trial
court did not overlook or misapprehend little details that could spell the innocence
of the accused, or at least mitigate their guilt. This is but consistent with the
doctrine that all doubts must be resolved in their favor. Indeed, it is far better to set
free a thousand guilty persons than to unjustly punish an innocent one.
Nonetheless, accused-appellant Randy's presence at the time and place of
Maximillian's stabbing does not necessarily mean that the former should bear
criminal liability for the latter's death, as the Court will subsequently discuss herein.
The Information charged accused-appellants with Maximillian's murder, alleging that
accused-appellants, acting in conspiracy with each other, and with abuse of superior
strength, treachery, and/or evident premeditation, stabbed Maximillian with an
icepick.
Jurisprudence requires that conspiracy must be proven as the crime itself.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not
rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the conduct of the parties
indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of
the offense. It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and
entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or
the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out. The rule is that
conviction is proper upon proof that the accused acted in concert, each of them
doing his part to fulfill the common design to kill the victim. There is no clear
evidence that accused-appellants had a common design to kill Maximillian. To recall,
Maximillian's group and accused-appellants' group completely met by chance that
fateful early morning of April 29, 2006 near Gaisano Mall. They did not know each
other before this meeting. The events swiftly happened, in a matter of minutes,
from the meeting of the two groups, to Maximillian's insulting remark to Jenny, to
the scuffle between Maximillian and accused-appellant Arnel, and to accusedappellant Arnel's stabbing of Maximillian. The scuffle between Maximillian and
accused-appellant Arnel broke out because the former tried to grab the latter's arm.
It was at this point that prosecution witnesses saw accused-appellant Randy block
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Maximillian's way and hold Maximillian's hand/s. Josephine testified that accusedappellant Randy held only Maximillian's left hand, and Frederick narrated that
accused-appellant Randy held both of Maximillian's hands; but neither of these
witnesses was able to describe the extent that Maximillian's ability to defend
himself or flee was impaired by accused-appellant Randy's hold on his hand/s. Given
the circumstances, the Court has serious doubts that accused-appellant Randy so
acted to ensure that accused-appellant Arnel would be able to stab and kill
Maximillian. It is completely reasonable and plausible that accused-appellant Randy
was merely stepping in to stop Maximillian from further attacking his cousin
accused-appellant Arnel. There was no proof that accused-appellant Randy had prior
knowledge that accused-appellant Arnel carried a sharp weapon with him or that
accused-appellant Arnel intended to stab Maximillian. For his part, accusedappellant Arnel admitted stabbing Maximillian but asserted that he used only a
barbecue stick which he found in the area. A barbecue stick, with a sharp end, could
cause a puncture wound consistent with that which killed Maximillian. That accusedappellant Arnel used a barbecue stick he found in the area as weapon shows that he
acted instantaneously and spontaneously in stabbing Maximillian, thus, further
negating the possibility that he conspired with accused-appellant Randy to commit
the stabbing.
This Court has held that the suddenness of the attack, the infliction of
the wound from behind the victim, the vulnerable position of the victim at
the time the attack was made, or the fact that the victim was unarmed, do
not by themselves render the attack as treacherous. This is of particular
significance in a case of an instantaneous attack made by the accused whereby he
gained an advantageous position over the victim when the latter accidentally fell
and was rendered defenseless. The means employed for the commission of
the crime or the mode of attack must be shown to have been consciously
or deliberately adopted by the accused to insure the consummation of the
crime and at the same time eliminate or reduce the risk of retaliation from
the intended victim. For the rules on treachery to apply, the sudden attack
must have been preconceived by the accused, unexpected by the victim,
and without provocation on the part of the latter. Treachery is never
presumed. Like the rules on conspiracy, it is required that the manner of attack
must be shown to have been attended by treachery as conclusively as the crime
itself.
The elements of treachery are wanting in this case. At the risk of sounding
repetitive, the Court once more emphasizes the swiftness of the events that took
place on April 29, 2006 when Maximillian's group unexpectedly came upon accusedappellants' group. The tension and physical violence between Maximillian and
accused-appellant Arnel quickly escalated from a verbal exchange, to a physical
scuffle, and then to the stabbing of Maximillian by accused-appellant Arnel.
Accused-appellant Arnel merely found a barbecue stick in the area which he used to
stab Maximillian. The barbecue stick could hardly be a weapon of choice and
accused-appellant Arnel obviously used it only in desperation. Moreover, it cannot
be said that Maximillian did not expect at all some form of attack from accusedappellant Arnel. Maximillian provoked accused-appellant Arnel by making a crude
remark about the latter's girlfriend, then grabbing accused-appellant Arnel's arm,
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and taunting accused-appellant Arnel if he was brave. It would appear that
Maximillian was, in fact, spoiling for a fight. In addition, as the Court previously
observed herein, it cannot simply assume in the absence of proof that accusedappellant Randy held Maximillian's hand/s to prevent the latter from retaliating as
accused-appellant Arnel stabbed Maximillian. Accused-appellant Randy could just as
well be holding Maximillian's hand/s to stop Maximillian from further attacking
accused-appellant Arnel during the scuffle. Lastly, the Court is unconvinced that
accused-appellant Arnel took advantage of Maximillian's drunken state. No clear
and convincing evidence has been presented to show the degree of Maximillian's
intoxication or if it had even affected his strength and intelligence.

ANGELITA CRUZ BENITO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


GR. No. 204644, February 11, 2015, J. Leonen
Conspiracy must be proven with evidence that can convince a trial court of
its existence beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, when the co-accused stated in open
court that her fellow co-accused had no participation in the crime of estafa, such
statement was an admission against her interest. The statement negated the
alleged common design or purposeof conspiracy between her and Benito. It
alsomeans that she admitted that her companions acts can never be attributed to
her.
Facts:
Rebecca Agbulos (Agbulos) and Angelita Cruz Benito (Benito) were charged
with estafa punished under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
Abadilla knew Agbulos and Benito through Abadillas friend, Pamintuan.
Pamintuan introduced Agbulos to Abadilla as a jeweler. Abadilla and Agbulos
entered into several transactions for the sale of jewelry, with Agbulos going to
Abadillas residence.
Agbulos received pieces of jewelry from Abadilla. They agreed that Agbulos
would return the pieces of jewelry in the afternoon should Agbulos fail to sell them.
Agbulos then issued Abadilla acheck for the value of the jewelry received.
Abadilla deposited the checks Agbulos issued to her, and all were dishonored
by reason of closed account. Abadilla then tried to locate Agbulos, but Agbulos
could no longer be found.
After several months, Abadilla learned from Agbulos sister-in-law that the
latter received pawn tickets from a friend. Abadilla, through her friend Pamintuan,
obtained from Agbulos sister-in-law pawn tickets issued by E. Ochoa Pawnshop.
Appearing on the pawn tickets was the name Linda Chua.
Abadilla went to E. Ochoa Pawnshop to verify the items described in the pawn
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tickets. She learned that the items pawned were among the piecesof jewelry she
turned over to Agbulos, specifically, a mens diamond ring and a set of diamond ring
and earrings. She also learned from Diloria, the pawnshop appraiser, that the Linda
Chua who pawned her jewelry was Benito.
Benito denied that she was the Linda Chua who pawned Abadillas jewelry.
According to her, she was at the house of Agbulos mother, working as a cook and
taking care of Agbulos children. She denied being with Agbulos when the latter
transacted with Abadilla and that she only knew of Abadilla when the latter looked
for Agbulos.
Agbulos supported the testimony of her co-accused Benito, statingthat the
latter had no participation in her transactions with Abadilla. Agbulos likewise
denied that Benito accompanied her to Abadillas residence whenever she received
jewelry from Abadilla.
The Regional Trial Court found that the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt that Agbulos and Benito conspired to commit estafa.
Benito appealed before the Court of Appeals, maintaining that she had
nothing to do with Agbulos transaction with Abadilla. Nevertheless, the Court of
Appeals sustained the finding that Benito was the Linda Chua who pawned
Abadillas jewelry as testified to by the pawnshop appraiser, Diloria.
Issue:
Whether Angelita Cruz Benito conspired with Rebecca Agbulos in committing
estafa punished under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling:
No, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt Benitos
conspiracy with Agbulos to commit estafa.
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, a conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. Proof of conspiracy may be direct or circumstantial. So long as
the evidence presented show a common desig nor purpose to commit the crime,
all of the accused shall be held equally liable as co-principals even if one or more of
them did not participate in all the details of the execution of the crime.
As testified to by Abadilla, only Agbulos received the pieces of jewelry from
her, and Benito was merely present during the negotiation.
Even assuming that Benito accompanied Agbulos in going to Abadillas
residence, this does not prove that Benito received any jewelryfrom Abadilla. As the
helper of Agbulos brother, Benito may have accompanied Agbulos on her
employers order. Mere presence at the scene of the crime is not by itself indicative
of conspiracy between the accused.
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Interestingly, Agbulos testified that the transaction was only between her and
Abadilla. She alone issued security for the jewelry, namely, the dishonored checks
and the spurious certificate of title. Agbulos even declared in open court that Benito
had no participation in the case at bench.
Agbulos statement was an admission against her interest. The statement
negated the alleged common design or purpose between her and Benito and
would lead to her beingsolely liable for the crime. It also means that she admitted
that her companions acts can never be attributed to her.
There is no proof of Benito's direct participation in the commission of the
crime charged. Neither is there proof beyond reasonable doubt of her conspiracy
with Agbulos. The presumption of innocence holds in favor of Benito.
CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERWIN LALOG, ROOSEVELT CONCEPCION,
EDWIN RAMIREZ, and RICKY LITADA
G.R. No. 196753, April 21, 2014, J. Del Castillo
To avail of self-defense as a justifying circumstance so as not to incur any
criminal liability, it must be proved with certainty by satisfactory and convincing
evidence which excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the
person invoking it. It cannot be entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by
any separate competent evidence but is also doubtful. Thus, the claim of an
accused that he stabbed the victim at the back portion of the latters body (Lumbar
area) while the former was lying down is not only uncorroborated by any other
evidence but it is improbable and contrary to the physical evidence especially when
the vicitm was lying on the ground while the accused was on top and at the same
time choking him, making the plea of self-defense dubious.
Facts:
On September 29, 1999 at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, Ryan Gain
[Gain], Roswel Mercado [Mercado], Rex Rey [Rey] and Jayson Manzo [Manzo] were
strolling at the Municipal Park of Poblacion, Municipality of Pinamalayan, Oriental
Mindoro, when they were blocked by four (4) persons, namely Erwin Lalog [Lalog],
Roosevelt Concepcion [Concepcion], Edwin Ramirez [Ramirez] and Ricky Litada
[Litada]. alog angrily talked to Gain, but Mercado intervened and apologized to the
group of Lalog.
Later, Gain and Mercado went down the stairs of the park locally known as
the "RAINBOW[.]" Mercado was walking ahead of Gain by six (6) arms length when
he looked back, he saw Gain being ganged upon by the group of the respondents
held both the hands of Gain, while Lalog stabbed Gain. Fearing for his life, Mercado
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immediately fled the scene. Sensing that the assailants had left the scene, Mercado
approached Gain and brought him to the hospital but it was already too late for he
was declared dead on arrival.
On the other hand, Lalog admitted stabbing Gain in self-defense, while the
other respondents denied their participation in the stabbing incident, claiming that
the three of them were in a drinking session during the stabbing incident.
An Information was filed charging appellants Lalog, Concepcion, Ramirez, and
Litada with the crime of murder. The RTC ruled against the respondents. Aggrieved,
appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, the appellate court affirmed
in full the Decision of the trial court.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents are guilty of the crime of murder.
Ruling:
Yes, they are.
The alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of Mercado that initially, the
respondents attacked the victim at the place known in the locality as the "rainbow"
but later recanted and stated that the stabbing occurred on the ground near the
"rainbow", deserves no consideration. Whether the victim was stabbed at the
"rainbow" or near the "rainbow" is inconsequential. What is important is the fact
that Mercado unwaveringly testified that he saw appellants gang up on the victim,
render him immobile, and then stab him at the back several times.
Moreover, the claim of self-defense by Lalog, is of no moment. To avail of selfdefense as a justifying circumstance so as not to incur any criminal liability, it must
be proved with certainty by satisfactory and convincing evidence which excludes
any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it. It cannot be
entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent
evidence but is also doubtful. If the accused fails to discharge the burden of proof,
his conviction, shall of necessity follow on the basis of his admission of the killing.
The claim of Lalog that he stabbed Gain at the back portion of the latters
body (Lumbar area) while the former was lying down is not only uncorroborated by
any other evidence but it is improbable and contrary to the physical evidence
because how could Lalog stab Gains back when the former was lying on the ground
while the latter was on top and at the same time choking him. The testimony of
prosecution witness Mercado that Gain was stabbed at his back by Lalog while both
his hands were being held by the other appellants is more logical, believable and
[in] consonance with the physical evidence. Gain could not have been easily
stabbed at his back if his hands were not being held considering that Gain is much
taller and bigger in built than the accused particularly Lalog unless Gain just simply
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let his back (lumbar area) be stabbed without any resistance or struggle on his part
which is impossible under any state of circumstances.
Furthermore, the number of wounds sustained by Gain is indicative of Lalogs
desire to kill the former and not really defend himself because not a single moment
of the incident was his life and limb being endangered which is the essence of selfdefense. The fact that the decease Gain was not armed all the more negates selfdefense.
Finally, contrary to respondents argument, the qualifying circumstance of
treachery was clearly proved. We agree with the trial courts observation that
appellants attacked Gain in a treacherous manner. They held Gains arms, rendered
him immobile and then thrust the knife into his body several times.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNALDO BOSITO Y CHAVENIA
G.R. No. 209346, January 12, 2015, J. Carpio
Self-defense, to be successfully invoked, must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of
the person invoking it. Bosito failed to present adequate evidence to prove
otherwise. Thus, his claim of self-defense cannot stand.
Facts:
Bosito was charged in an Information for murder. The prosecution alleged
that Bonaobra arrived at the house of his sister Rosemarie at around noon of 11
June 2007. After 30 minutes, Bosito arrived at Rosemaries house. Bosito stood
beside Bonaobra and watched a card game being played by other guests. At around
1:00 in the afternoon, without warning, Bosito hacked Bonaobra with a bolo as the
victim was trying to sit. He tried to crawl away but Bosito hacked him again and hit
him in the leg. Bosito then positioned himself behind Bonaobra and hacked him in
the head two more times. Although already mortally wounded, Bonaobra still
managed to stand up and run away.
After Bonaobras escape, Adonis picked up a wooden post from the ground
and told Bosito to stop. However, Bosito waved his bolo and told Adonis not to come
near him. Later, Adonis saw Bonaobra being boarded on a boat and found out that
Bonaobra was taken to a hospital. Later on, Bonaobra died of aspiration pneumonia
due to sustained multiple hack wounds.
For the defense, Bosito testified that while on their way to the rice field, he
and his sister Analisa passed by the house of Rosemarie Bongon where Adonis was
having a drinking spree with his brothers, Juan and Arnold, and Bonaobra. The group
called on Bosito to join them and when he approached them, Adonis struck him with
a piece of wood, hitting his wrist as he parried the blow. While still holding the piece
of wood, Bonaobra, together with Juan and Arnold, who were all drunk and holding
bladed weapons surrounded Bosito. Just as Bonaobra was about to stab him, Bosito
immediately pulled out his bolo and hacked the victim. Analisa testified that she and
her brother Bosito were on their way to the rice field when they passed by
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Bonaobra, Adonis, Juan and Arnold on a drinking spree at Rosemaries house. Adonis
invited Bosito for a drink which the latter refused. Bonaobra then pushed Bosito and
struck Bosito with a bolo four times but Bosito evaded these thrusts.
The RTC found Bosito guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
The CA affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC. The CA stated that
Bositos plea of self-defense has been rebutted by the positive and categorical
testimony of prosecution witness Adonis who had convincingly established that the
unlawful aggression emanated from Bosito and not from the victim. The CA added
that the trial court correctly accorded credence to Adonis whose testimony it found
spontaneous, straightforward, candid and evincing credence and belief. Further, the
CA ruled out the presence of ill-motive on the part of Adonis to falsely implicate his
uncle. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the Bosito is guilty of the offense charged
Ruling:
The Court agreed with the RTC and the CA in ruling that the prosecution fully
established Bositos guilt for the crime of murder beyond reasonable doubt. Adonis
positively identified Bosito as the person who hacked Bonaobra and caused his
death. Considering that Adonis and Bosito were blood relatives, Adonis was candid,
straightforward, spontaneous and firm in his narration of the events.
In his Appellants Brief, Bosito admitted hacking Bosito although in selfdefense. By invoking self-defense, appellant admits killing the victim and the
constitutional presumption of innocence is effectively waived. Bosito claims that
the unlawful aggression consisted of Bonaobras group ganging up on him and
attempting to stab him with a knife. However, aside from Bositos self-serving
testimony, the defense did not present any witness to corroborate his testimony
that Bonaobra pulled a knife and tried to stab him. Likewise, Bosito failed to present
the knife which he said he grabbed during the tussle and kept in his possession.
Next, the means employed by Bosito to prevent or repel the supposed unlawful
aggression was beyond reasonably necessary. As correctly found by the trial and
appellate courts, the number, nature, and gravity of the wounds sustained by
Bonaobra reveal a determined effort to kill and contradict Bositos claim of selfdefense. The prosecutions evidence shows that Bonaobra sustained and died from
multiple hack wounds. The records show that after Bonaobra received the first blow
to his head, which proved to be the most fatal, Bosito still continued to thrust
his bolo to the victim three more times. Clearly, the means utilized was not
reasonable under the circumstances.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENJAMIN CASAS Y VINTULAN
G.R. No. 212565, February 25, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
The accused failed to prove any unlawful aggression on the part of either Joel
or Eligio, which is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of selfPage 15 of 466

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defense to obtain. As case law puts it, there can be no self-defense unless the
victim committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to selfdefense. As shown by the records, it was Casas who was actually the aggressor, as
he was the one who wielded a knife, brought it to bear on Eligio, then on Joel as he
lay prostrate, and again on Eligio as he was fleeing. Being the party initiating the
attack, and overbearing with a deadly weapon, Casas cannot successfully claim that
there was unlawful aggression. Verily, for unlawful aggression to be appreciated,
there must be an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger
thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude,as against the one
claiming self-defense. Evidently, the contrary happened in this case.
However, the Court disagrees that the accused should be convicted of the
crime of Murder with respect to the death of Joel, considering the prosecutions
failure to prove the existence of treachery. In order to appreciate treachery, the
victim must not have known the peril he was exposed to at the moment of the
attack. Should it appear, however, that the victim was forewarned of the danger he
was in, and, instead of fleeing from it he met it and was killed as a result, then the
qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be appreciated.
In this case, Joel knew that Casas was armed with a knife and had just used
the same on Eligio. Joel elected to intervene, and even armed himself with a
bamboo pole. Accordingly, it is rather obvious that Joel was aware of the danger to
his life. Further, acting in the heat of the moment, and there being no showing that
no appreciable interval of time had elapsed from Joels mishap to his stabbing so as
to allow for the assailants careful reflection, it does not equally appear that Casas
deliberately adopted means in order to ensure that Joel had no opportunity to
defend himself or retaliate. Evidently, this lack of deliberation on the part of Casas,
as well as Joels obvious awareness of the danger to his life, prompts this Court to
discount treachery as a qualifying circumstance.
Facts:
Two (2) criminal Informations were filed before the RTC charging Casas of the
Murder of Joel Tabiley Gulla (Joel) and the Frustrated Murder of Eligio Ruiz y
Ricardo(Eligio). During arraignment, Casas entered a plea of not guilty. After which,
joint trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution alleges that on December 24, 2007, Casas, accompanied by
a certain Ron-Ron (Ron-Ron), went to a certain taho factory located in San Juan
City, looking for a certain Jesus. Failing to find the person he was looking for, Casas
brandished a knife and stuck it into a pail used for making taho. Consequently,
Eligio, an employee of the taho factory, confronted Casas, saying to the latter,
Benjie [(referring to Casas)], bakit ang yabang mo? Kung hindi mo makita ang
kalaban mo, dapat hanapin mo na lang. Casas replied Gusto mo ito? (referring to
his knife). Eligio told Casas to get rid of the knife, which the latter gave to Ron-Ron.
Eligio and Casas then had a fistfight. During the ensuing melee, Casas took the
knife from Ron-Ron and stabbed Eligio twice while the latter was fleeing. Casas,
during his continued pursuit of Eligio, then ran into Joel, who, for his part, tried to
help Eligio with the use of a bamboo pole. However, Joel slipped, fell face first on
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the floor, and was prostrate. There and then, Casas stabbed him twice, the first
blow entering his back and exiting at the front of his torso, and the second blow
hitting the left side of his abdomen. Casas managed to overtake Eligio, and stabbed
him again on the stomach. Fearing that Casas would kill him, Eligio grabbed a
plastic stool and hit Casas on the head with it, forcing the latter to drop the knife
and cease the attack. PO1 Silverio R. Fuentes (PO1 Fuentes) claimed that he was
riding his motorcycle on the date of the incident when he met PO3 Eduardo Fronda
(PO3 Fronda) who asked for assistance as the latter saw a bloodied male. The two
immediately proceeded towards the victim, who turned out to be Casas, and asked
him what happened. The latter replied that he had just stabbed someone. After
confirming that there was indeed a stabbing incident nearby, PO1 Fuentes and PO3
Fronda arrested Casas.
After the prosecution rested its case, Casas filed a demurrer to evidence on
the basis of the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, which the RTC denied. After the demurrers denial, the defense changed
its theory as Casas admitted that he stabbed both Joel and Eligio but interposed
self-defense to justify his actions. RTC convicted Casas of Murder and Attempted
Homicide. On appeal, CA affirmed the RTCs conviction of Casas. Aggrieved, Casas
filed the instant appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Casass conviction for the crimes of Murder and Attempted
Homicide should be upheld.
Ruling:
The appeal is partly meritorious.
After a careful review of the records, the Court is satisfied that the RTC, as
affirmed by the CA, correctly pronounced that the above-mentioned requirements
were not present in this case. It is significant to point out that upon invoking the
justifying circumstance of self-defense, Casas assumed the burden of proving the
justification of his act with clear and convincing evidence. This is because his having
admitted the killing required him to rely on the strength of his own evidence, not on
the weakness of the prosecutions evidence, which, even if it were weak, could not
be disbelieved in view of his admission.
Preliminarily, Casas failed to prove any unlawful aggression on the part of
either Joel or Eligio, which is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance
of self-defense to obtain. As case law puts it, there can be no self-defense unless the
victim committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to selfdefense. As shown by the records, it was Casas who was actually the aggressor, as
he was the one who wielded a knife, brought it to bear on Eligio, then on Joel as he
lay prostrate, and again on Eligio as he was fleeing. Being the party initiating the
attack, and overbearing with a deadly weapon, Casas cannot successfully claim that
there was unlawful aggression. Verily, for unlawful aggression to be appreciated,
there must be an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger

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thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude,as against the one
claiming self-defense. Evidently, the contrary happened in this case.
Thus, given that the core element of unlawful aggression was not proven,
Casass claim of self-defense falters and his criminal liability stands.
This notwithstanding, the Court, however, disagrees that Casas should be
convicted of the crime of Murder with respect to the incidents in Crim. Case No.
136842, i.e., the death of Joel, considering the prosecutions failure to prove the
existence of treachery. The Court expounds.
The elements of Murder that the prosecution must establish are: (a) that a
person was killed; (b) that the accused killed him or her; (c) that the killing was
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the
RPC; and (d) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
Among the qualifying circumstances thus enumerated in Article 248 is
treachery. Under Article 14 of the RPC, [t]here is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms
in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. In other words, to appreciate treachery, it must be shown that: (a) the
means of execution employed gives the victim no opportunity to defend himself or
retaliate; and (b) the methods of execution were deliberately or consciously
adopted; indeed, treachery cannot be presumed, it must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence.
In People v. Se, the Court explained that the essence of treachery is the
sudden, unexpected, and unforeseen attack on the victim, without the slightest
provocation on the latters part. The victim must not have known the peril he was
exposed to at the moment of the attack. Should it appear, however, that the victim
was forewarned of the danger he was in, and, instead of fleeing from it he met it
and was killed as a result, then the qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be
appreciated.
In People v. Discalsota, the Court held that treachery cannot be appreciated
in instances when the victim had the opportunity to flee or defend himself.
In this case, the records show that a fistfight ensued between Eligio and
Casas. Joel, seeing that Casas had stabbed Eligio, wanted to help the latter by using
a bamboo pole but slipped and fell. As he was lying prostrate on the floor, Casas
delivered the blows that ended Joels life. Under these circumstances, it is the
Courts observation that Joel was fully aware of the danger posed in assisting Eligio.
He knew that Casas was armed with a knife and had just used the same on Eligio.
Joel elected to intervene, and even armed himself with a bamboo pole. Accordingly,
it is rather obvious that Joel was aware of the danger to his life. Further, acting in
the heat of the moment, and there being no showing that no appreciable interval of
time had elapsed from Joels mishap to his stabbing so as to allow for the assailants
careful reflection, it does not equally appear that Casas deliberately adopted means
in order to ensure that Joel had no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate.
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Palpably, Casas just happened to stab Joel as the latter had just slipped on the floor
when the former caught up with him (Joel). Evidently, this lack of deliberation on the
part of Casas, as well as Joels obvious awareness of the danger to his life, prompts
this Court to discount treachery as a qualifying circumstance.
Thus, insofar as the incidents in Crim. Case No. 136842 go, the Court
downgrades the conviction to the crime of Homicide. In consequence, Casas is
instead meted with the penalty of imprisonment with an indeterminate period of six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with all the concomitant accessory penalties,
for the Homicide of Joel.
SHERWIN DELA CRUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.
G.R. No. 189405, November 19, 2014, J. Peralta
The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. Other than Dela Cruzs
testimony, the defense did not adduce evidence to show that Jeffrey
condescendingly responded to Dela Cruzs questions or initiated the confrontation
before the shooting incident; that Jeffrey pulled a gun from his chair and tried to
shoot petitioner but failed an assault which may have caused Dela Cruz to fear
for his life. Even assuming that the aggression with use of the gun initially came
from the victim, the fact remains that it ceased when the gun was wrested away by
the accused from the victim. It is settled that when unlawful aggression ceases, the
defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise,
retaliation and not self-defense is committed .A person making a defense has no
more right to attack an aggressor when the unlawful aggression has ceased.
Facts:
On January 1, 2005, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, Sherwin Dela Cruz (Dela
Cruz) went to the office of Sykes Asia Inc. located at the 25th Floor of Robinsons
Summit Center, Ayala Avenue, Makati City. When Dela Cruz was already inside the
building, he went to the work station of the deceased victim, Jeffrey Wernher L.
Gonzales (Jeffrey), who, by the configuration of the eye witness Antonette
Managbanags sketch, was seated fronting his computer terminal, with his back
towards the aisle.
As Dela Cruz approached Jeffrey from the back, Dela Cruz was already
holding a gun pointed at the back of Jeffreys head. At the last second, Jeffrey
managed to deflect the hand of Dela Cruz holding the gun, and a short struggle for
the possession of the gun ensued thereafter. Dela Cruz won the struggle and
remained in possession of the said gun. Dela Cruz then pointed the gun at Jeffreys
face, pulled the trigger four (4) times, the fourth shot finally discharging the bullet
that hit Jeffrey in the forehead, eventually killing him. Finally, after shooting Jeffrey,
Dela Cruz fled the office.

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Dela Cruz authored the death of the deceased-victim, Jeffrey. But he raised
self-defense to exculpate him from the criminal liability for Homicide.
Issue:
Whether or not the elements of self-defense exist to exculpate Dela Cruz
from the criminal liability for Homicide
Ruling:
No, Dela Cruzs defense is sorely wanting.
The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. In other words, there must have
been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused,
who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing
reasonable means to resist the attack.
Considering that self-defense totally exonerates the accused from any
criminal liability, it is well settled that when he invokes the same, it becomes
incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed
acted in defense of himself. The burden of proving that the killing was justified and
that he incurred no criminal liability therefor shifts upon him. As such, he must rely
on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution for,
even if the prosecution evidence is weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused
himself has admitted the killing.
First, the evidence on record does not support Dela Cruzs contention that
unlawful aggression was employed by the deceased-victim, Jeffrey, against him.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes
actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger not merely threatening and
intimidating action. There is aggression, only when the one attacked faces real and
immediate threat to his life. The peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and
actual, not merely speculative. In the case at bar, other than Dela Cruzs testimony,
the defense did not adduce evidence to show that Jeffrey condescendingly
responded to Dela Cruzs questions or initiated the confrontation before the
shooting incident; that Jeffrey pulled a gun from his chair and tried to shoot Dela
Cruz but failed an assault which may have caused Dela Cruz to fear for his life.
Even assuming arguendo that the gun originated from Jeffrey and an
altercation transpired, and therefore, danger may have in fact existed, the
imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment Dela Cruz disarmed
Jeffrey by wresting the gun from the latter. After Dela Cruz had successfully seized
it, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would have
necessitated the need to kill Jeffrey. As aptly observed by the RTC, Dela Cruz had
every opportunity to run away from the scene and seek help but refused to do so.

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In this case, accused and the victim grappled for possession of the gun. Dela
Cruz admitted that he wrested the gun from the victim. From that point in time until
Jeffrey shouted "guard, guard", then took the fire extinguisher, there was no
unlawful aggression coming from the victim. Dela Cruz had the opportunity to run
away. Therefore, even assuming that the aggression with use of the gun initially
came from Jeffrey, the fact remains that it ceased when the gun was wrested away
by Dela Cruz from the Jeffrey. It is settled that when unlawful aggression ceases, the
defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise,
retaliation and not self-defense is committed. A person making a defense has no
more right to attack an aggressor when the unlawful aggression has ceased.
Thus, when an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one
who resorts to self-defense has no right to kill or even wound the former aggressor.
To be sure, when the present victim no longer persisted in his purpose or action to
the extent that the object of his attack was no longer in peril, there was no more
unlawful aggression that would warrant legal self-defense on the part of the
offender. Undoubtedly, Dela Cruz went beyond the call of self-preservation when he
proceeded to inflict excessive, atrocious and fatal injuries on Jeffrey, even when the
allegedly unlawful aggression had already ceased.
Given that the criteria of unlawful aggression is indubitably absent in the
instant case, the severe wounds inflicted by Dela Cruz upon Jeffrey was
unwarranted and, therefore, cannot be considered a justifying circumstance under
pertinent laws and jurisprudence.
Second. Even assuming that the unlawful aggression emanated from the
deceased victim, Jeffrey, the means employed by Dela Cruz was not reasonably
commensurate to the nature and extent of the alleged attack, which he sought to
avert.
Even assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim, Dela Cruz likewise failed to prove that the means he employed to repel
Homer's punch was reasonable. The means employed by the person invoking selfdefense contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the
defense. Dela Cruz claimed that the victim punched him and was trying to get
something from his waist, so he (accused-appellant) stabbed the victim with his
hunting knife. His act of immediately stabbing Homer and inflicting a wound on a
vital part of the victim's body was unreasonable and unnecessary considering that,
as alleged by Dela Cruz himself, the victim used his bare fist in throwing a punch at
him.
Indeed, the means employed by a person resorting to self-defense must be
rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. The opposite was,
however, employed by Dela Cruz.
In view of the foregoing, the Court found it illogical to discuss further the third
element of self-defense since it is recognized that unlawful aggression is a condition
sine qua non for upholding the justifying circumstance of self-defense. If there is
nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of self-defense will have no
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basis. Hence, there is no basis to entertain Dela Cruzs argument that a privileged
mitigating circumstance of self-defense is applicable in this case, because unless
the victim has committed unlawful aggression against the other, there can be no
self-defense, complete or incomplete, on the part of the latter.
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES vs. FLORO BUBAN BARCELA
G.R. No. 208760, April 23, 2014, J. Mendoza
The special qualifying circumstance such as the minority of the victim and
relationship with the offender must be alleged in the criminal complaint or
information and must be proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself.
Although it was shown during the trial that Barcela was the common law spouse or
live-in partner of the mother of victims AAA and BBB, this fact would not alter the
crimes in their qualified form inasmuch as the two separate informations did not
specifically allege such relationship as aqualifying circumstance. Otherwise, he
would be deprived of his right to be informed of the charge lodged against him. The
relationship alleged in the information is different from that actually proven.
Facts:
AAA and BBB are sisters who were living, along with Floro Barcela, their
mother, grandmother and sister in a two-storey house where all of the family
members sleep together in one room in San Pedro, Laguna, because the other
rooms were being rented to other people. Flor Barcelo is the common law husband
of AAA and BBBs mother.
AAA was seven years old when Flor Barcelo, her stepfather, committed the
despicable by sexually abusing her. Based on her testimony, she was lying on the
floor sleeping one early morning, when she was awakened and noticed that her
stepfather lifted her clothes and removed her shorts. Barcelo then placed his hand
on his organ as AAA lay still with her hands on the floor shocked by what was
happening. Barcelo successfully inserted his penis inside AAAs vagina.
Her elder sister BBB, who was then 14 years old, also suffered the same
horrible fate. In addition, BBB also saw her stepfather molesting her sister AAA. BBB
also testified prior to being raped, Barcelo had been regularly touching her private
private organ.
AAA informed her mother, grandmother and her sister BBB of what happened
to her. On the other hand, BBB informed her classmate, teacher and school principal
the grim experience she and her sister underwent in the hands of her stepfather.
Hence, Barcela was charged with qualified rape.
The trial court found that Barcela was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
qualified rape.

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Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in convicting Barcela of the offense of qualified
rape
Ruling:
Yes.
In the crime of rape, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her
relationship with the offender is a special qualifying circumstance and raises the
penalty to the supreme penalty of death. It is essential that this circumstance must
be alleged in the criminal complaint or information and must be proved conclusively
and indubitably as the crime itself; otherwise, the crime shall be considered simple
rape warranting the imposition of thelower penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The prosecution failed to prove the allegation in the informationthat Barcela
was the step-father of AAA at the time of the commission of the crime. It bears
stressing that a stepfather-stepdaughter relationship presupposes a legitimate
relationship, which in this case is the valid marriage between Barcela and the
natural mother of AAA (also of BBB),and the best evidence to prove the same is the
marriage contract.
Although it was shown during the trial that Barcela was the common law
spouse or live-in partner of the mother of victims AAA and BBB, this fact would not
alter the crimes in their qualified form inasmuch as the two separate informations
did not specifically allege such relationship as a qualifying circumstance. Otherwise,
he would be deprived of his right to be informed of the charge lodged against him.
The relationship alleged in the information is different from that actually proven.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MATIMANAY WATAMAMA a.k.a. AKMAD
SALIPADA, TENG MIDTIMBANG
G.R. No. 188710, June 2, 2014, J. Sereno
Without any evidence to appreciate the aggravating circumstance of
treachery in the killing of Calim, respondent can only be held liable as principal for
the crime of homicide. For treachery to be considered, it must be present and seen
by the witness right at the inception of the attack. Where no particulars are known
as to how the killing began, the perpetration of an attack with treachery cannot be
presumed. Furthermore, Watamamas theory of mistaken identity is not persuasive;
witnesses need not know the names of the assailants, as long as they recognize the
latters faces.
Facts:
Matimanay Watamama and his co-accused Teng Midtimbang were charged
under an Information for murder. Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.
Midtimbang remained at large as of the date of promulgation of the RTC Decision.

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The evidence for the prosecution states that around eight in the morning on
26 October 1998, Francisco Arobo, Jr., Calim, and five other farmers were at the
farm of Ali Samad located in Sitio Matingao, Malapag, Carmen, Cotabato. They were
ploughing the unplanted area, while Samad was tending his corn plants. Arobo was
five meters ahead of Calim when the former heard gunfire coming from behind.
Arobo immediately looked to the rear and saw Midtimbang and Watamama firing
gar and rifles at Calim, who was then slumped near his plow. Midtimbang and
Watamama were positioned ten meters apart and five meters obliquely behind
Calim. Because of the successive gunshots, Arobo and the rest of their group
scampered to take cover in the shrubbery, while Samad ran towards the nipa hut at
the other side of the farm where his children were staying. Watamama and
Midtimbang also fired at Samad, but he was not hit. Thereafter, the two fled. Samad
then reported the incident to a barangay kagawad. The postmortem examination by
the local municipal health officer showed that Calim sustained multiple gunshot
wounds in the head, chest, right and left thighs, and right elbow.
The version of the defense was that Watamama was simply mistaken for Teng
Midtimbang because of their physical and facial resemblances. Watamama claimed
that his real name was Akmad Salipada, not Matimanay Watamama. Allegedly, on
that fateful morning of 26 October 1998, he was at their house in Sitio Maitum. He
had just eaten breakfast with his wife, Guianila Salipada, when they heard seven
gunshots. Guianila peeped through their window and Teng Midtimbang and Ali
Sampo Midtimbang passed by their house. The two were carrying rifles. Guianila
asked them where they had come from, and they supposedly told her that they
came from the house of Calim and that they shot him because he had stolen a
carabao.
Zaid Tayuan, a detention prisoner, testified for the defense. The gist of his
testimony was that he had witnessed the Midtimbang brothers kill Calim, and that
Watamama was nowhere in the vicinity of the crime. He claimed that he was about
six meters from the Midtimbang brothers when they shot Calim to death. The RTC
found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. The CA
affirmed appellants conviction for the crime of murder in view of the presence of
treachery but ruled that evident premeditation was not sufficiently proven by the
prosecution. It modified the damages awarded by the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not Watamama was correctly convicted of the crime of murder
Ruling:
No, conviction of murder is not proper.
The Court finds Watamama guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide,
rather than murder, as the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish treachery in
the killing of Calim. For the charge of murder to prosper, the prosecution must prove
the following: (1) the offender killed the victim, and (2) the killing was done through
treachery, or by any of the five other qualifying circumstances, duly alleged in the
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Information. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons by employing means, methods or forms that tend directly and
especially to ensure its execution without risk to the offender arising from the
defense that the offended party might make. The mere suddenness of the attack
does not amount to treachery.
The Court agrees with Watamama. For treachery to be considered, it must be
present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack. Where no
particulars are known as to how the killing began, the perpetration of an attack with
treachery cannot be presumed. Circumstances that qualify criminal responsibility
cannot rest on mere conjecture, no matter how reasonable or probable, but must be
based on facts of unquestionable existence. These circumstances must be proved
as indubitably as the crime itself.
It cannot be simply assumed that at its inception, Calim was unable to parry
the attack, as he was caught unaware. Both Arobo and Samad admitted that they
did not see how the attack commenced, and that it was the initial gunfire that
caught their attention. Thus, it cannot be said with certainty that the victim was
engrossed in his farm work when he was initially attacked. Neither can it be
conclusively said that there was no chance or opportunity for Calim to defend
himself from aggression. However, the Court is persuaded by Watamamas theory of
mistaken identity. Witnesses need not know the names of the assailants, as long as
they recognize the latters faces. What is imperative is that, on the basis of their
personal knowledge, the witnesses are positive as to the physical identification of
the perpetrators, as obtained in this case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNY LIKIRAN alias Loloy
G.R. No. 201858, June 4, 2014, J. Reyes
Jenny stabbed the victim out of the blue during town festivities. A sudden
attack which is not preconceived by the accused belies the holding of treachery.
When the victim is merely a bystander in an altercation, when suddenly the
accused stabs him, absent any other qualifying circumstance, the accused is only
liable for homicide.
Facts:
Here are the facts as stated by the prosecutions witnesses.
On March 19, 2000, in Brgy. Bugca-on, Bukidnon, during the eve of the Town
Fiesta, Celso Daganon (another witness) and Rolando Sareno Sr. (victim) were
outside the dance area when they heard a commotion. This commotion was cause
by Jerome Likiran, the brother of the accused, Jenny Likiran who punched Prescado
Mercado (one of the prosecutions witnesses) in the mouth.
Afterwards, Jerome approached Sareno, armed with a short firearm, and shot
Sareno several times. Jenny likewise, stabbed Sareno on the back with a hunting
knife. Daganon saw the incident first-hand as he was only thee (3) meters away
from Sareno. Dagangon was able to bring Sareno to the hospital only after Jerome
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and the accused-appellant left, but Sareno was already dead at that point. Sareno
suffered multiple gunshot wounds and a stab wound at the left scapular area.
Jenny Likiran, however, denied any involvement in the crime. While he
admitted that he was at the dance, he did not go outside when the commotion
happened. He and Jerome stayed within the area where the sound machine was
located and they only heard the gunshots outside. Several witnesses were given by
Likiran attesting to the same. Furthermore, Jenny also asserted that the information
charged him of murder committed by attacking, assaulting, stabbing and shooting
Sareno, thereby causing his instantaneous death. The accused-appellant argued
that the evidence on record established that Sareno was in fact shot by some other
person.
The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish the accusedappellants culpability. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC sustaining
the conviction and the existence of treachery but denied the existence of
conspiracy.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Jenny may be held liable for the death of Sareno despite
the infliction of gunshot wounds by his brother, Jerome
2. Whether or not treachery is present in this case
Ruling:
1. Yes. He can still be held liable for the death of Sareno.
The pre-trial agreement issued by the RTC states that one of the matters
stipulated upon and admitted by the prosecution and the defense was that the
Certificate of Death issued by Dr. Cidric Dael (Dr. Dael) of the Bukidnon Provincial
Hospital and reviewed by the Rural Health Physician of Malaybalay City "is admitted
as proof of fact and cause of death due to multiple stab wound scapular area.
In this case, while it appears that the pre-trial agreement was signed only by
the prosecution and defense counsel, the same may nevertheless be admitted
given that the defense failed to object to its admission. Moreover, a death
certificate issued by a municipal health officer in the regular performance of his
duty is prima facie evidence of the cause of death of the victim.
More importantly, Jenny is criminally liable for the natural and logical
consequence resulting from his act of stabbing Sareno. It may be that he was not
the shooter, it is nevertheless true that the stab wound he inflicted on Sareno
contributed to the latters death.
2. No. Treachery is not present.
Treachery is not present when the killing is not premeditated, or where the
sudden attack is not preconceived and deliberately adopted, but is just triggered by
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a sudden infuriation on the part of the accused as a result of a provocative act of
the victim, or when the killing is done at the spur of the moment.
In this case, the testimony of the prosecution witnesses all point to the fact
that the shooting and stabbing of Sareno was actually a spur of the moment
incident, a result of the brawl that happened during the barrio dance. The
prosecution failed to show that the accused-appellant and his brother Jerome
deliberately planned the means by which they would harm Sareno. In fact, what was
revealed by the prosecution evidence was that Sareno was an innocent bystander
who unfortunately became a target of the accused-appellant and Jeromes rampage.
Consequently, the accused-appellant should be liable only for the lesser crime of
Homicide.
MIGUEL CIRERA y USTELO, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 181843, July 14, 2014, J. Leonen
Treachery as a qualifying circumstance must be deliberately sought to ensure
the safety of the accused from the defensive acts of the victim. The
unexpectedness of an attack cannot be the sole basis of a finding of treachery even
if the attack was intended to kill another as long as the victims position was merely
accidental. A finding of the existence of treachery should be based on clear and
convincing evidence. Such evidence must be as conclusive as the fact of killing
itself. In this case, no evidence was presented to show that petitioner consciously
adopted or reflected on the means, method, or form of attack to secure his unfair
advantage.
Facts:
Romeo Austria testified that at around 8:30 a.m. on April 20, 2000, he was
playing a lucky nine game at a wake on Araneta Avenue, Quezon City. Miguel
arrived, asking money from Austria so he could buy liquor. In response, Austria
asked Miguel "to keep quiet." Gerardo Naval "arrived and asked [Austria] to go
home. There was an exchange of words between Naval and Miguel. Austria "stood
up [and] felt that he was stabbed." As he ran home, he noticed Miguel "armed with
a knife, this time chasing Naval. Austria was "hospitalized . . . and was . . . confined
for more than a month."
Gerardo Naval testified that Miguel was irked when he asked Austria to go
home. After he and Miguel had an exchange of words, he "felt a hard blow on his
back. Naval retaliated. However, he ran away when he saw Miguel holding a knife.
Miguel chased Naval who fell on the ground. When Naval saw that Miguel was
"about to stab him again, he hit [Miguel] with a bench" and left him lying on the
ground, unable to stand. According to Naval, "he did not see the [knife] land on his
back." Naval was also confined at the hospital but only for six (6) days.
Dr. Carlos Angeles testified that "he treated [Austria] for [the] stab wound at
[his] back." He declared that Austria could have died without an emergency
operation. According to him, "a long and sharp instrument, probably a knife," could

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have been used to stab the victim. Dr. Arnold Angeles, Navals doctor, testified that
"continuous blood loss" could have caused Navals death.
In its decision, the Regional Trial Court found Miguel guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) counts of frustrated murder, finding that Miguel caused the stab
wounds of private complainants. Naval and Austria were able to positively identify
him and describe how they obtained their injuries.
Miguels acts were not attended by evident premeditation as ruled by the trial
court. However, there was treachery on Miguels end, considering the length of time
it took private complainants to realize that they were stabbed. This, according to
the Regional Trial Court, was a method or form that tended to insure the execution
of an act without risk from the offended partys defense.
Miguel appealed the Regional Trial Courts decision to the Court of Appeals,
raising as issue the credibility of the prosecutions witnesses. In a decision, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of the trial court that there was
treachery in this case because" the attack was so sudden and unexpected that "selfdefense was not possible.
Miguels motion for reconsideration was denied in the Court of Appeals
resolution promulgated on February 18, 2008.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not there was treachery.
Ruling:
No, there was no treachery in this case.
The requisites of treachery are:
1

The employment of means, method, or manner of execution which will ensure


the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliating acts on the part of
the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to
retaliate; and

Deliberate or conscious adoption of such means, method, or manner of


execution.

A finding of the existence of treachery should be based on "clear and


convincing evidence." Such evidence must be as conclusive as the fact of killing
itself. Its existence "cannot be presumed." As with the finding of guilt of the

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accused, "[a]ny doubt as to [its] existence . . . [should] be resolved in favor of the
accused.
The unexpectedness of an attack cannot be the sole basis of a finding of
treachery even if the attack was intended to kill another as long as the victims
position was merely accidental. The means adopted must have been a result of a
determination to ensure success in committing the crime.
In this case, no evidence was presented to show that Miguel consciously
adopted or reflected on the means, method, or form of attack to secure his unfair
advantage.
The attack might "have been done on impulse [or] as a reaction to an actual
or imagined provocation offered by the victim." In this case, Miguel was not only
dismissed by Austria when he approached him for money. There was also an
altercation between him and Naval. The provocation might have been enough to
entice Miguel to action and attack private complainants.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VIRGILIO AMORA y VISCARRA
G.R. No. 190322, November 26, 2014, J. Del Castillo
The accused who was charged and convicted with the crime of murder
contends that the trial court and the CA erred in appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. The SC ruled that the appellants sudden attack on the
victim amply demonstrates that treachery was employed in the commission of the
crime. It further held that It is of no consequence that appellant was in front of the
victim when he thrust the knife to his torso for even a frontal attack could be
treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim who would be in no
position to repel the attack or avoid it.
Facts:
Appellant Amora, in this case, was charged with murder defined and
penalized under Art. 248 of the RPC. Upon arraignment, Amora entered a plea of not
guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, pre-trial and trial on the merits followed.
During the trial, the witnesses for the prosecution testified that on September
12, 2004 at around 5:45 p.m., Anselmo, Aurelio and the victim Romeo were walking
on their way to Sampol Market in San Jose Del Monte City. As they were making
their way to the market, they saw Amora in his store. Suddenly, Amora rushed
towards them and stabbed Romeo twice, one on the chest and another on the
abdomen. Romeo fell to the ground while Amora quickly ran away from the scene.
Appellant Amora on the other hand contended that on September 12, 2004,
at around 5:45 p.m., he was working as a construction worker in a site 8 to 9
kilometers away from his residence. He alleged that he does not know Romeo and
that the only reason he could think of why he is being falsely accused was that he
turned down Anselmos request to buy shabu.

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The RTC rendered a decision convicting Amora of the crime of murder. It
found that the stabbing of Romeo was attended by the qualifying circumstance of
treachery as it was sudden and unexpected such that Romeo was unable to react or
defend himself from the attack. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower courts erred in appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of treachery.
Ruling:
No, it did not.
Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the RPC provides that [t]here is treachery when
the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. Thus in order for the qualifying circumstance of
treachery to be appreciated, the following requisites must be shown: (1) the
employment of means, method, or manner of execution would ensure the safety of
the malefactor from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim, no opportunity
being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate, and (2) the means,
method, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the
offender. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and
in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.
In this case, the appellants sudden attack on Romeo amply demonstrates
that treachery was employed in the commission of the crime. The eyewitnesses
were all consistent in declaring that the appellant in such a swift motion stabbed
Romeo such that the latter had no opportunity to defend himself or to fight back.
The deliberate swiftness of the attack significantly diminished the risk to himself
that may be caused by the retaliation of the victim.
It is of no consequence that appellant was in front of Romeo when he thrust
the knife to his torso. Records show that appellant initially came from behind and
then attacked Romeo from the front. In any event, [e]ven a frontal attack could be
treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim who would be in no
position to repel the attack or avoid it, as in this case.
Undoubtedly, the RTC and CA correctly held that the crime committed was
murder under Article 248 of the RPC by reason of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery.
GARY FANTASTICO AND ROLANDO VILLANUEVA vs. ELPIDIO MALICSE, SR.
AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 190912, January 12, 2015, J. Peralta
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Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of
superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or
taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The fact that there were
two persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was
committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative
strength of the aggressors and the victim. The evidence must establish that the
assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to
use this advantage. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use
excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person
attacked. The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the age,
size, and strength of the parties.
Facts:
On the afternoon of June 27, 1993, Elpidio Malicse, Sr. was outside the house
of his sister Isabelita Iguiron in Pandacan, Manila when all of a sudden, he heard
Isabelita's son, Winston, throwing invectives at him. Thus, Elpidio confronted
Isabelita but she also cursed him, which prompted the former to slap the latter. On
that occasion, Elpidio was under the influence of alcohol. The Barangay Chairman
heard what transpired and went to the place where the commotion was taking place
in order to pacify those who were involved. Elpidio was eventually persuaded to go
home. On his way there, he passed by the house of Kagawad Andy Antonio and
requested the latter to accompany him, but was instead told to go back home,
leaving Elpidio to proceed alone.
Upon reaching Isabelita's house, Elpidio saw the former's son, Titus Iguiron
and her son-in-law Gary Fantastico and asked the two where he can find their
parents. Titus and Gary responded, putang ina mo, and kulit mo, lumayas ka,
punyeta ka. In his anger, Elpidio kicked the door open and saw Isabelita's elder
son, Salvador Iguiron Salvador behind the door holding a rattan stick or arnis.
Salvador hit Elpidio on the right side of his head that forced the latter to bow his
head but Salvador delivered a second blow that hit Elpidio on the right eyebrow.
Gary hit Elpidio on the right side of his head with a tomahawk axe when the latter
was about to go out of the house. Elpidio tried to defend himself but was unable to
take the tomahawk axe from Gary. Elpidio walked away from Titus but Gary, still
armed with the tomahawk axe and Salvador, with his arnis, including Titus, chased
him.
Roland Villanueva, without any warning, hit Elpidio on the back of his head
with a lead pipe which caused the latter to fall on the ground. Elpidio begged his
assailants to stop, but to no avail. Salvador hit him countless times on his thighs,
legs and knees using the rattan stick. While he was simultaneously being beaten up
by Salvador, Titus, Gary, Rolly, Nestor, Eugene and Tommy, he tried to cover his
face with his arm. Gary hit him with the tomahawk axe on his right leg, between the
knees and the ankle of his leg, which caused the fracture on his legs and knees.

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Thereafter, a certain Mang Gil tried to break them off but Titus and Gary
shouted at him: Huwag makialam, away ng mag-anak ito and the two continued
to maul Elpidio. The people who witnessed the incident shouted maawa na kayo
but they only stopped battering him when a bystander fainted because of the
incident. Elpidio then pretended to be dead. It was then that concerned neighbors
approached him and rushed him to the emergency room of the Philippine General
Hospital.
A case for Attempted Murder was filed against Salvador Iguiron, Titus Malicse
Iguiron, Saligan Malicse Iguiron, Tommy Ballesteros, Nestor Ballesteros, Eugene
Surigao and petitioners Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva. The trial court
issued a decision which acquitted Titus Iguiron, Saligan Iguiron and Tommy
Ballesteros but found Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for Attempted Murder. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of
the trial court. Hence, this petition for review on certiorati under Rule 45. It is the
contention of the petitioners that the Information filed against them was defective
because it did not state all the elements of the crime charged.
Issue:
Whether or not the Information was defective
Ruling:
A close reading of the Information would show the contrary. The Information
partly reads:
x x x but the said accused did not perform all the acts of the execution
which should have produced the crime of murder, as a consequence,
by reason of causes other than their own spontaneous desistance, that
is, the injuries inflicted upon Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de Leon are not
necessarily mortal.
The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows: (a) The
offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts; (b) He
does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony; (c) The
offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance; (d) The nonperformance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his
spontaneous desistance. From the above-quoted portion of the Information, it is
clear that all the elements of the crime of attempted murder has been included.
Petitioners question the inclusion of the phrase not necessarily mortal in
the allegations in the Information. According to them, the inclusion of that phrase
means that there is an absence of an intent to kill on their part. Intent to kill is a
state of mind that the courts can discern only through external manifestations, i.e.,
acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and immediately
thereafter. The Court considered the following factors to determine the presence of
an intent to kill: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and
number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors
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before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the
circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the
accused. All of these, were proven during the trial.
Petitioners also claim that the prosecution was not able to prove the presence
of treachery or any other qualifying circumstance.In this particular case, there was
no treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. From the facts proven by
the prosecution, the incident was spontaneous, thus, the second element of
treachery is wanting. However, the trial is correct in appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The trial court was correct when it
ruled: But it was a lopsided attack as the victim was unarmed, while his attackers
were all armed (rattan stick, tomahawk and lead pipe). And the victim was also
drunk. This establishes the element of abuse of superior strength. The suddenness
of the blow inflicted by Salvador on Elpidio when he entered the premises show that
the former was ready to hit the victim and was waiting for him to enter. It afforded
Elpidio no means to defend himself. And Salvador consciously adopted the said
actuation. He hit Elpidio twice on the head. Treachery is present in this case and
must be considered an aggravating circumstance against Salvador Iguiron.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANIEL VILLA MATIBAG y DE @ "DANI"
"DANILO,"
G.R. No. 206381, March 25, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe

In convicted the accused of the crime of murder, the RTC appreciated the use
of firearm as an special aggravating circumstance. The Supreme Court affirmed
such ruling by citing Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1866, as amended by Republic
Act No. (RA) 8294, which treats the unauthorized use of a licensed firearm in the
commission of the crimes of homicide or murder as a special aggravating
circumstance.

Facts:

In an Amended Information dated May 5, 2005, Matibag was charged with the
crime of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), as amended. Matibag entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment.
After the termination of the pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.
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The prosecution asserted that at around 8:40 in the evening of March 27,
2005, Enrico Clar de Jesus Duhan, who just came from a meeting with the other
officers of the homeowners association of Twin Villa Subdivision, was walking along
Iron Street in Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City when Matibag confronted
Duhan, and asked, ano bang pinagsasasabi mo? Duhan replied wala, and
without warning, Matibag delivered a fist blow hitting Duhan on the left cheek and
causing him to teeter backwards. Matibag then pulled out his gun and shot Duhan,
who fell face-first on the pavement. While Duhan remained in that position, Matibag
shot him several more times.

In his defense, Matibag alleged that on said date, he was at the despedida
party of his neighbor when Duhan arrived together with the other officers of the
homeowners association. Wanting to settle a previous misunderstanding, Matibag
approached Duhan and extended his hand as a gesture of reconciliation. However,
Duhan pushed it away and said, putang ina mo, ang yabang mo, thereby
provoking Matibag to punch him in the face. Matibag saw Duhan pull something
from his waist and fearing that it was a gun and Duhan was about to retaliate,
Matibag immediately drew his own gun, shot Duhan, and hurriedly left the place. In
a Decision dated August 1, 2008, the RTC convicted Matibag as charged. In a
Decision dated September 13, 2012, the CA affirmed Matibags conviction in toto.
Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

Whether the illegal use of firearm be appreciated as special aggravating


circumstance in the crime of murder

Ruling:

Yes.

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The RTC and CA held, the special aggravating circumstance of use of


unlicensed firearm, which was duly alleged in the Information, should be
appreciated in the imposition of penalty. Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1866, as
amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 8294, treats the unauthorized use of a licensed
firearm in the commission of the crimes of homicide or murder as a special
aggravating circumstance:
Section 1. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows: Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale,
Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or
Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. x x x. x x x x If homicide or murder is committed with the use
of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Further, under Section 5 of RA 8294, the scope of the term unlicensed
firearm has already been expanded as follows:
Sec. 5. Coverage of the Term Unlicensed Firearm. The term
unlicensed firearm shall include: 1. firearms with expired license; or 2.
unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the commission of the crime.
(Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, when Matibag killed Duhan with his firearm, the use thereof was
unauthorized under the purview of RA 8294 and is equally appreciated as a special
aggravating circumstance. As a result, the imposition of the maximum penalty of
death, which is reduced to reclusion perpetua in light of RA 9346, stands proper. To
this, the Court adds that Matibag is not eligible for parole.

PENALTIES
APPLICATION
REYNALDO S. MARIANO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 178145, July 7, 2014, J. Bersamin
The CA modified the felony committed by Mariano from frustrated homicide
to reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries. The court ruled that CA
incorrectly considered the Mariano's act as a grave felony had it been intentional,

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and should not have imposed the penalty at arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its medium period. Instead, the accused's act that caused
the serious physical injuries, had it been intentional, would be a less grave
felony under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code.
Facts:
Mariano drove his pick-up truck at a fast speed in order to overtake the jeep
of Ferdinand. In so attempting to overtake, he unavoidably hit Ferdinand, causing
the latters injuries.
RTC convicted Mariano of frustrated homicide and sentenced him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of three (3) years and four (4) months of Prision Correccional
as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum. On
appeal, the CA modified the felony committed by Mariano from frustrated homicide
to reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries and was sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year, seven (7) months and eleven (11) days
ofprision correccional, as maximum.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender can be
appreciated in favor of the accused
2. Whether or not CA erred in imposing the penalty for reckless imprudence
resulting in serious physical injuries
Ruling:
1. No.
To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more
than a mere negligence in the operation of the motor vehicle, but a willful and
wanton disregard of the consequences is required.
Paragraph 5 of Article 365, Revised Penal Code, expressly states that in the
imposition of the penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without
regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.
The rationale of the law, according to People v. Medroso, Jr.:
x x x can be found in the fact that in quasi-offenses penalized under Article
365, the carelessness, imprudence or negligence which characterizes the
wrongful act may vary from one situation to another, in nature, extent, and
resulting consequences, and in order that there may be a fair and just
application of the penalty, the courts must have ample discretion in its
imposition, without being bound by what the Court may call the
mathematical formula provided for in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.
On the basis of this particular provision, the trial court was not bound to
apply paragraph 5 of Article 64 in the instant case even if appellant had two

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mitigating circumstances in his favor with no aggravating circumstance to
offset them
2. Yes
Verily, anyone judicially declared guilty of any crime must be duly punished in
accordance with the law defining the crime and prescribing the punishment.
Injustice would always result to the offender should the penalty exceed that allowed
by the law. The imposition of the correct penalty on the offender is the essence of
due process of law.
The penalty for the offender guilty of reckless imprudence is based on the
gravity of the resulting injuries had his act been intentional. Thus, Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code stipulates that had the act been intentional, and would
constitute a grave felony, the offender shall suffer arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted
a less grave felony, arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be
imposed; and if it would have constituted alight felony, arresto menor in its
maximum period shall be imposed. Pursuant to Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code,
a grave felony is that to which the law attaches the capital punishment or a penalty
that in any of its periods is afflictive in accordance with Article 25 of the Revised
Penal Code; a less grave felony is that which the law punishes with a penalty that
is correctional in its maximum period in accordance with Article 25 of the Revised
Penal Code; and a light felony is an infraction of law for the commission of which a
penalty of either arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both is provided.
The Revised Penal Code classifies the felony of serious physical injuries based
on the gravity of the physical injuries, to wit:
Article 263. Serious physical injuries. Any person who shall wound, beat, or
assault another, shall be guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries and
shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision mayor, if in consequence of the physical injuries
inflicted, the injured person shall become insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind;
xxx
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if
in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have
become deformed, or shall have lost any other part of his body, or shall have
lost the use thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for the
performance of the work in which he as habitually engaged for a period of
more than ninety days; xxx
The CA found that Ferdinand had sustained multiple facial injuries, a fracture
of the inferior part of the right orbital wall, and subdural hemorrhage secondary to
severe head trauma; that he had become stuporous and disoriented as to time,
place and person. It was also on record that he had testified at the trial that he was
unable to attend to his general merchandise store for three months due to
temporary amnesia; and that he had required the attendance of caregivers and a
masseur until October 31, 1999.

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With Ferdinand not becoming insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind, his
physical injuries did not fall under Article 263, 1, supra. Consequently, the CA
incorrectly considered the petitioners act as a grave felony had it been intentional,
and should not have imposed the penalty at arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its medium period. Instead, the petitioners act that caused
the serious physical injuries, had it been intentional, would be a less grave
felony under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, because Ferdinands physical
injuries were those under Article 263, 3, supra, for having incapacitated him from
the performance of the work in which he was habitually engaged in for more than
90 days.
Conformably with Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty
is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which ranges from one to four
months. As earlier mentioned, the rules in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code are
not applicable in reckless imprudence, and considering further that the maximum
term of imprisonment would not exceed one year, rendering the Indeterminate
Sentence Law inapplicable, the Court holds that the straight penalty of two months
of arresto mayor was the correct penalty for the petitioner.
MANOLITO GIL ZAFRA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 176317, July 23, 2014, J. Bersamin
At any rate, even if it were assumed that the findings by the CA warranted
his being guilty only of malversation through negligence, the Court would not be
barred from holding him liable for the intentional crime of malversation of public
funds through falsification of public documents because his appealing the
convictions kept the door ajar for an increase in his liability. It is axiomatic that by
appealing he waived the constitutional protection against double jeopardy, leaving
him open to being convicted of whatever crimes the Court would ultimately
conclude from the records to have been actually committed by him within the terms
of the allegations in the informations under which he had been arraigned.
Facts:
Appellant Manolito Gil Z. Zafra (Zafra) was the only Revenue Collection Agent
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Revenue District 3, in San Fernando, La
Union from 1993 to 1995.
Among his duties was to receive tax payments for which BIR Form 25.24 or
the revenue official receipts (ROR) were issued. The original of the ROR was then
given to the taxpayer while a copy thereof was retained by the collection officer.
Every month, Zafra submitted BIR Form 12.31 of the Monthly Report of Collections
(MRC) indicating the numbers of the issued RORs, date of collection, name of
taxpayer, the amount collected and the kind of tax paid. The original copy of the
MRC with the attached triplicate copy of the issued RORs was submitted to the
Regional Office of the Commission on Audit (COA).
In July 1995, an audit team was tasked to audit the cash and non-cash
accountabilities of Zafra. The audit team reviewed several documents including
CARs furnished by the Assessment Division of the BIR and the triplicate copies of
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the RORs attached to the MRCs submitted by appellant to COA. The audit team
likewise requested and was given copies of the RORs issued to the San Fernando, La
Union branch of the Philippine National Bank (PNB).
The audit team found that comparison of the entries in said documents
revealed that the data pertaining to 18 RORs vary with respect to the name of the
taxpayer, the kind of tax paid, the amount of tax and the date of payment. Of
particular concern to the audit team were the lesser amounts of taxes reported in
appellants MRCs and the attached RORs compared to the amount reflected in the
CARs and PNBs RORs.
In sum, although the RORs bear the same serial numbers, the total amount
reflected in the CARs and PNBs 12 copies of RORs is Php 615,493.93, while only
Php1,342.00 was reported as tax collections in the RORs triplicate copies submitted
by appellant to COA and in his MRCs, or a discrepancy of Php 614,151.93, Thus, the
audit team sent to Zafra a demand letter requiring him to restitute the total amount
of Php 614,151.93. Zafra ignored the letter, thus, prompting the institution of the
present criminal action.
RTC convicted the Zafra for 18 counts of malversation of public funds and
imposed corresponding penalties therein respectively. In its consolidated decision
of, the RTC pegged the maximum terms within the minimum periods of the
penalties prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. It also fixed the
indeterminate sentences on some counts despite the maximum of the imposable
penalties being reclusion perpetua. RTC likewise omitted in its order for the
restitution of the amount so malversed.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the trial court, affirmed by the appellate court, is correct in
convicting Zafra of an intentional felony of malversation of public funds and not of
malversation through negligence.
2. Whether or not the penalties imposed are correct.
Ruling:
1. Yes. The trial court, affirmed by the appellate court, was correct in not
convicting Zafra of an intentional felony of malversation of public funds.
The findings of fact of the RTC were affirmed by the CA. Hence, Zafra was
correctly convicted of the crimes charged because such findings of fact by the trial
court, being affirmed by the CA as the intermediate reviewing tribunal, are now
binding and conclusive on the Court. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the
prosecution sufficiently established that Zafra had been the forger of the falsified
and tampered public documents, and that the falsifications of the public documents
had been necessary to commit the malversations of the collected taxes.
Notably, there is a big disparity between the amount covered by BIR Form No.
25.24 issued to the taxpayer, and the amount for the same receipt number
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appearing in the Monthly Collection Reports indicating the falsification resorted to
by the accused in the official reports he filed, thereby remitting less than what was
collected from taxpayers concerned, resulting to the loss of revenue for the
government as unearthed by the auditors.
Zafra relies on this passage of the RTCs ruling to buttress his contention that
he should be found guilty of malversation through negligence. His reliance is grossly
misplaced, however, because the RTC did not thereby pronounce that he had been
merely negligent. The passage was nothing but a brief forensic discourse on the
legal consequence if his defense were favorably considered, and was not the basis
for finding him guilty. To attach any undue significance to such discourse is to divert
attention away from the firmness of the finding of guilt. It cannot be denied, indeed,
that the RTC did not give any weight to his position.
As can be seen, both lower courts unanimously concluded that the States
evidence established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for malversation of public
funds through falsification of public documents. Their unanimity rested on findings
of fact that are now binding on the Court after he did not bring to our attention any
fact or circumstance that either lower court had not properly appreciated and
considered and which, if so considered, could alter the outcome in his favor.
At any rate, even if it were assumed that the findings by the CA warranted his
being guilty only of malversation through negligence, the Court would not be barred
from holding him liable for the intentional crime of malversation of public funds
through falsification of public documents because his appealing the convictions kept
the door ajar for an increase in his liability. It is axiomatic that by appealing he
waived the constitutional protection against double jeopardy, leaving him open to
being convicted of whatever crimes the Court would ultimately conclude from the
records to have been actually committed by him within the terms of the allegations
in the informations under which he had been arraigned.
1

No. The penalties imposed are correct.

Yet, there is a need to correct the penalties imposed on Zafra. He was duly
convicted of 18 counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public
documents, all complex crimes. Pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
the penalty for each count is that prescribed on the more serious offense, to be
imposed in its maximum period.
Falsification of a public document by a public officer is penalized with prisin
mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000.00.Prisin mayor has duration of six years
and one day to 12 years of imprisonment.In contrast, the penalty for malversation
ranges from prisin correccional in its medium and maximum periods depending on
the amount misappropriated, and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed
or to the total value of the property embezzled.
To determine the maximum periods of the penalties to be imposed on Zafra,
therefore, the Court must be guided by the following rules, namely: (1) the penalties
provided under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code constitute degrees and (2)
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considering that the penalties provided under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
are not composed of three periods, the time included in the penalty prescribed
should be divided into three equal portions, which each portion forming one period,
pursuant to Article 65 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, the penalties prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code should be divided into three periods, with the maximum period being the
penalty properly imposable on each count, except in any instance where the penalty
for falsification would be greater than such penalties for malversation.
.
To illustrate, the count involving the largest amount misappropriated by the
Zafra totaling P75,489.76 merited the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusionperpetua, and a fine of P75,489.76. Obviously, the penalty is that
prescribed for malversation of public funds, the more serious offense.
In its consolidated decision of February 17, 2004, the RTC erred in pegging
the maximum terms within the minimum periods of the penalties prescribed under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. It committed another error by fixing
indeterminate sentences on some counts despite the maximum of the imposable
penalties being reclusion perpetua. There is even one completely incorrect
indeterminate sentence. And, as earlier noted, the penalty for falsification under
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code was applicable in Criminal Case No. 4635
involving P4,869.00 due to its being the higher penalty.
One more omission by the CA and the RTC concerned a matter of law. This
refers to their failure to decree in favor of the Government the return of the
amounts criminally misappropriated by Zafra. That he was already sentenced to pay
the fine in each count was an element of the penalties imposed under the Revised
Penal Code, and was not the same thing as finding him civilly liable for restitution,
which the RTC and the CA should have included in the judgment. Indeed, as the
Court emphasized in Bacolod v. People, it was imperative that the courts prescribe
the proper penalties when convicting the accused, and determine the civil liability
to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to
recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery.
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLANDO BARAGA y ARCILLA
G.R. No. 208781, June 4, 2014, J. Reyes
Baraga allegedly raped his own daughter 2 times and committed acts of
lasciviousness twice. He was convicted by both the RTC and the CA. The decisions
differ as to the penalty imposable. The Court reconciled the different impositions by
stating that in applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the crime as alleged in the
criminal complaint must be followed. The Court cannot interchange the law
applicable just on the basis of the victims age. The fact that the victim is beyond
12 years old when the act of lasciviousness occurred, such fact does not exclude it
from the application of the Anti-Child Abuse Law.

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Facts:
Rolando Baraga was charged with 3 counts of acts of lasciviousness and 2
counts of rape, committed upon the person of his daughter, AAA, who was then still
a minor. Upon arraignment, Baraga pled not guilty to the crimes charged. After pretrial conference, a joint trial on the merits ensued.
Rolando Baraga, and the mother of AAA were no longer living together.
Baraga committed his initial acts of lasciviousness, 11 days before AAA turned 12.
On said date, AAA was at their house when Baraga sat beside her and touched her
vagina. AAA relayed her ordeal to her grandmother who then confronted Baraga
about the incident.
On the night of August 8, 2007, while AAA and her siblings were sleeping,
Baraga approached AAA, held her thigh, and touched her vagina. He then brought
her to a corner of the room where he removed AAAs shorts and made her sit on his
lap. Baraga then inserted his penis into AAAs vagina.
On August 19, 2007, while AAA was at home, Baraga again touched AAAs
vagina. She then relayed to her uncle what her father did to her. The matter was
subsequently reported to the Women and Children Protection Desk of the Las Pias
City Police Station. Upon medical examination by the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory, it was discovered that AAAs hymen had a "shallow healed
laceration," which evidences a blunt force penetrating trauma on AAAs hymen.
Baraga denied the allegations against him, asserting that he never touched
AAAs vagina nor had carnal knowledge of her. He claimed that he could not have
committed the charges against him during the said dates as he was then busy with
his work.
On April 26, 2011, the RTC rendered a Consolidated Decision, which found
Baraga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of acts of lasciviousness
under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 in Criminal Case Nos. 07-0685 and 070864 and two (2) counts of rape.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs disquisition albeit with a modification on
the penalty imposed. As regards the charge of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal
Case No. 07-0685, inasmuch as AAA was already 12 years old when the acts were
committed by Baraga, the CA, imposed the penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum.
On the charge of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 07-0864, since
AAA was merely 11 years old at the time Baraga committed the acts alleged
therein, the CA meted the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from
thirteen (13) years, nine (9) months, and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to sixteen (16) years, five (5) months, and ten (10) days of reclusion
temporal.
Issue:
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Whether or not the CA erred in the imposition of the penalty of imprisonment
Ruling:
Yes. The CA erred in imposing the penalty of imprisonment based on Art. 336
of the Revised Penal Code instead of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 also
known as the Anti-Child Abuse Law.
Under Section 5, Article III, of R.A. No. 7610, the offender shall be punished
with the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.
However, when the victim of the sexual abuse is under 12 years old, the imposable
penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period.
In Criminal Case No. 07-0864, since AAA was only 11 years old when the
lascivious conduct alleged therein was committed by Baraga, the imposable
penalty, as aptly pointed out by the CA, is reclusion temporal in its medium period,
that is from fourteen(14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and taking
the alternative circumstance of relationship as an aggravating circumstance, the CA
did not err in imposing upon Baraga the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from thirteen (13) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, five (5) months and ten (10) days of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 07-0685, the Court finds that the CA erred in applying
the provisions of Article 336 of the RPC. The CA applied Article 336 of the RPC on
the sole ground that AAA was already 12 years old at the time the lascivious
conduct alleged therein was perpetrated by Baraga. It bears stressing that the
Information in Criminal Case No. 07-0685 specifically charged Baraga for violation of
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. Thus, the CA should have applied the
provisions of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, and imposed upon Baraga the
prescribed penalty therein for sexual abuse.
The penalty for sexual abuse performed on a child under 18 years old but
over 12 years old under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 is reclusion temporal in its
medium period to reclusion perpetua. The Court likewise considers the alternative
circumstance of relationship against Baraga as an aggravating circumstance. Since
there is an aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty
shall be applied in its maximum period, i.e., reclusion perpetua.
PROBATION LAW
NEIL E. SUYAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE CHIEF PROBATION
AND PAROLE OFFICER, DAGUPAN CITY
G.R. No. 189644, July 02, 2014, C.J. Sereno
Suyan has been apprehended twice for drug possession while on probation.
The court held that as probation is a mere discretionary grant, Suyan was bound to
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observe full obedience to the terms and conditions pertaining to the probation order
or run the risk of revocation of this privilege. The Court's discretion to grant
probation is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society and only
incidentally for the benefit of the accused. Having the power to grant probation, it
follows that the trial court also has the power to order its revocation in a proper
case and under appropriate circumstances.
Facts:
On 22 November 1995, Suyan was convicted for violating Section 16, Article
III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425 for which he was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of six (6) years of prision correccional and to pay the costs. On even date, he filed
his application for probation. The RTC issued a Probation Order covering a period of
six (6) years.
While on probation, Suyan was arrested on two occasions, for violating
Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425. Atty. Navarro, then the Chief Probation and
Parole Officer of Dagupan City, filed a Motion to Revoke Probation which was
granted by the RTC. Atty. Navarro alleged that Suyan has been apprehended twice
for drug possession while on probation. The former further alleged that Suyan was
considered a recidivist, whose commission of other offenses while on probation was
a serious violation of the terms thereof.
On a petition under Rule 65, Suyan argued that he was denied due process as
he was not furnished with a copy of the Motion to Revoke; and when the motion was
heard, he was not represented by his counsel of record. The CA granted the petition
by annulling the revocation of Suyan's probation.
In compliance with the CA Decision, the RTC conducted a hearing on the
Motion to Revoke. However, instead of rebutting the allegations mentioned in the
Violation Report, Suyan merely questioned the absence of such a report when his
probation was first revoked.
The RTC found that Suyan had violated the conditions of his probation and
thus, ordered that his probation be revoked. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether the probation was validly revoked.
Ruling:
Yes. On the procedural grounds, the Court does not subscribe to his
contention that his right to due process was violated after the RTC had already
conducted a full-blown trial on the Motion to Revoke, in compliance with the
directive of the CA. Based on record, he had ample opportunity to refute the
allegations contained in the Violation Report.

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The essence of due process is that a party is afforded a reasonable
opportunity to be heard in support of his case; what the law abhors and prohibits is
the absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard. When the party seeking due
process was in fact given several opportunities to be heard and to air his side, but it
was by his own fault or choice that he squandered these chances, then his cry for
due process must fail.
On substantive grounds, the Court believes that there was sufficient
justification for the revocation of his probation. Suyan does not deny the fact that he
has been convicted, and that he has served out his sentence for another offense
while on probation. Consequently, his commission of another offense is a direct
violation of Condition No. 9 of his Probation Order, and the effects are clearly
outlined in Section 11 of the Probation Law.
Section 11 of the Probation Law provides that the commission of another
offense shall render the probation order ineffective. Section 11 states:
Sec. 11. Effectivity of Probation Order. - A probation order shall take effect
upon its issuance, at which time the court shall inform the offender of the
consequences thereof and explain that upon his failure to comply with any of the
conditions prescribed in the said order or his commission of another offense, he
shall serve the penalty imposed for the offense under which he was placed on
probation.
As probation is a mere discretionary grant, Suyan was bound to observe full
obedience to the terms and conditions pertaining to the probation order or run the
risk of revocation of this privilege. Regrettably, Suyan wasted the opportunity
granted him by the RTC to remain outside prison bars, and must now suffer the
consequences of his violation. The Court's discretion to grant probation is to be
exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society and only incidentally for the
benefit of the accused. Having the power to grant probation, it follows that the trial
court also has the power to order its revocation in a proper case and under
appropriate circumstances.
MODIFICATION AND EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENJIE CONSORTE y FRANCO
G.R. No. 194068, November 26, 2014, J. Reyes
The criminal and civil liability ex delicto of a person convicted for murder who
moved for reconsideration of his conviction and died pending resolution, will be
extinguished.
Facts:
Accused-appellant Consorte was found guilty by the RTC for the murder of
Elizabeth Palmar. The CA and the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Consorte
moved for reconsideration of the SCs decision; however he died in prison while his
motion was pending.
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Issues:
Did Consortes death extinguish his criminal and civil liability?
Ruling:
In People v. Brillantes, the Court, citing People v. Bayotas, clarified that Death
of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the
offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
In the case at bar, Consorte died before final judgment, as in fact, his motion
for reconsideration is still pending resolution by the Court. As such, it therefore
becomes necessary for us to declare his criminal liability as well as his civil liability
ex delicto to have been extinguished by his death prior to final judgment.
PRESCRIPTION OF CRIME
RAMON A. SYHUNLIONG vs. TERESITA D. RIVERA
G.R. No. 200148, June 4, 2014, J. Reyes.
Rivera was resigned from work. However, her separation pay and other
benefits were withheld. She sent several text messages to the account manager of
her former company. The President of the said company instituted a criminal action
for libel due to the contents of the text messages. Rivera alleged that libel can no
longer prosper due to prescription. "Although the general rule is that the defense of
prescription is not available unless expressly set up in the lower court, as in that
case it is presumed to have been waived and cannot be taken advantage of
thereafter, yet this rule is not always of absolute application in criminal cases, such
as that in which prescription of the crime is expressly provided by law, for the State
not having then the right to prosecute, or continue prosecuting, nor to punish, or
continue punishing, the offense, or to continue holding the defendant subject to its
action through the imposition of the penalty, the court must so declare.
Facts:
Syhunliong is the President of BANFF Realty and Development Corporation
(BANFF). On the other hand, Rivera used to be the Accounting Manager of BANFF.
She was hired in September of 2002 with a monthly salary of Php 30,000.00. About
three years after, River tendered her resignation to be effective on February 3,
2006. However, Rivera actually continued working for BANFF until March of the
same year to complete the turn-over of papers under her custody to Jennifer
Lumapas (Lumapas), who succeeded her.
Sometime in April of 2006, Rivera called Lumapas to request for the payment
of her remaining salaries, benefits and incentives. Lumapas informed Rivera that
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her benefits would be paid, but the check representing her salaries was still
unsigned, and her incentives were put on hold by Syhunliong.
On April 6, 2006, at around 11:55 a.m., Rivera sent the following text
message to one of BANFFs official cellular phones held by Lumapas:
I am expecting that[.] [G]rabe talagasufferings ko dyan hanggang pagkuha
ng last pay ko. I dont deserve this [because] I did my job when I [was] still there.
God bless ras. [S]ana yung pagsimba niya, alam niya real meaning.
Minutes later, Rivera once again texted another message, which reads:
Kailangan release niya lahat [nang] makukuha ko diyan including incentive
up to the last date na nandyan ako para di na kami abot sa labor.
Rivera filed before the National Labor Relations Commission a complaint
against Syhunliong for underpaid salaries, 13th to 16th month and incentive pay,
gratuities and tax refund in the total sum of Php 698,150.48. On April 16, 2007,
pending the resolution of the aforecited labor case, Syhunliong instituted against
Rivera a complaint for libel, the origin of the instant petition.
Rivera filed a Motion to Quash. She argued that the text message, which was
the subject of the libel complaint, merely reflected the undue stress she had
suffered due to the delay in the release of her unpaid salaries, benefits and
incentives. Rivera entered a plea of not guilty, during arraignment.
On December 4, 2008, the RTC issued an Order denying Riveras Motion to
Quash. Rivera challenged the orders issued by the RTC through a Petition for
Certiorari filed before the CA. CA rendered a decision directing the dismissal of the
information for libel filed against Rivera.
Syhunliong argues that Rivera may not validly question the denial of her
motion to quash before the CA after voluntarily allowing herself to be arraigned
even during the pendency of such motion to quash. Moreover, also refutes the CAs
finding that the facts charged in the information did not constitute the crime of libel.
The text message was apparently an indictment of his personality and character
since it portrayed him as a hypocrite.
Lastly, Syhunliong invokes People v. Judge Gomez which enunciated the
doctrine that in a libel case, the privileged nature of a communication is not a
ground for a motion to quash, but is merely a matter of defense to be proven during
the trial.
On the other hand, Rivera alleges that the RTC no longer had jurisdiction to
take cognizance of Syhunliongs complaint. The text message was sent on April 6,
2006. Per Syhunliongs narration in the instant petition, his complaint was filed on
August 18, 2007, beyond the one year prescriptive period for instituting actions for
libel provided for in Articles 90 and 91 of the RPC.

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Issues:
1. Whether or not prescription has set in
2. Whether or not the text messages falls within the ambit of privilege
communication
Ruling:
1. Yes, prescription has set in.
There is no reason why the Court should deny Zafra the benefits accruing
from the liberal construction of prescriptive laws on criminal statutes. Prescription
emanates from the liberality of the State. x x x Any doubt on this matter must be
resolved in favor of the grantee thereof, the accused.
In the case at bar, it is extant in the records that Syhunliong filed his
complaint against Rivera more than one year after the allegedly libelous message
was sent to Lumapas. Whether the date of the filing of the complaint is April 16,
2007 or August 18, 2007, it would not alter the fact that its institution was made
beyond the prescriptive period provided for in Article 90 of the RPC. The Court finds
no persuasive reason why Rivera should be deprived of the benefits accruing from
the prescription of the crime ascribed to her.
Although the general rule is that the defense of prescription is not available
unless expressly set up in the lower court, as in that case it is presumed to have
been waived and cannot be taken advantage of thereafter, yet this rule is not
always of absolute application in criminal cases, such as that in which prescription
of the crime is expressly provided by law, for the State not having then the right to
prosecute, or continue prosecuting, nor to punish, or continue punishing, the
offense, or to continue holding the defendant subject to its action through the
imposition of the penalty, the court must so declare.
In sum, even if the Court were to sustain Syhunliongs stance that Rivera
availed of the wrong remedy when she resorted to filing a petition for certiorari
before the CA to assail the RTC orders denying the motion to quash, the result would
only prove circuitous. Even if the trial proceeds and an adverse decision is rendered
against Rivera, she can appeal the same, but the CA and this Court would still be
compelled to order the dismissal of the information on account of prescription of the
crime.
2. Yes, the text message falls within the ambit of privilege communication.
The rule on privileged communication means that a communication made in
good faith on any subject matter in which the communicator has an interest, or
concerning which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a
corresponding duty.
In the case at bar, it was Lumapas who informed Rivera of either the delay or
denial of the latter's claims for payment of salaries, benefits and incentives by
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Syhunliong. Rivera expressed through the subject text message her grievances to
Lumapas. At that time, Lumapas was the best person, who could help expedite the
release of Rivera's claims.
Prescinding from the above, the Court thus finds no error in the CA' s
declaration that Rivera's text message falls within the ambit of a qualified privileged
communication since she "was speaking in response to duty [to protect her own
interest] and not out of an intent to injure the reputation" of Syhunliong. Besides,
"[t]here was no unnecessary publicity of the message beyond [that] of conveying it
to the party concerned."
CIVIL LIABILITY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MA. HARLETA VELASCO y BRIONES,
MARICAR B. INOVERO, MARISSA DIALA, and BERNA M. PAULINO
G.R. No. 195668, June 25, 2014, J. Bersamin
Considering that the crime of illegal recruitment, when it involves the
transfer of funds from the victims to the accused, is inherently in fraud of the
former, civil liability should include the return of the amounts paid as placement,
training and processing fees. Hence, Inovero and her co-accused were liable to
indemnify the complainants for all the sums paid. The nature of the obligation of
the co-conspirators in the commission of the crime requires solidarity, and each
debtor may be compelled to pay the entire obligation. As a co-conspirator, then,
Inoveros civil liability was similar to that of a joint tortfeasor under the rules of the
civil law.
Facts:
Novesa Baful testified that she went to Harvel International Talent
Management and Promotion ("HARVEL") at Unit 509 Cityland Condominium, Makati
City upon learning that recruitment for caregivers to Japan was on-going there. She
allegedly met Inovero, Velasco, and Diala, and saw Inovero conducting a briefing on
the applicants. She also testified that Diala, the alleged talent manager, directed
her to submit certain documents, and to pay placement and processing fees. Diala
also advised her to undergo physical examination. Baful was promised deployment
within two (2) to three (3) months. She likewise testified that Inovero briefed her
and her co-applicants on what to wear on the day of their departure. However, she
was never deployed.
Danilo Brizuela, another complainant, likewise attended an orientation
conducted by Inovero at which time, he and his batchmates were advised what
clothes to wear on the day of their departure. He was assured of deployment on the
first week of June 2003, however, on the eve of his supposed "pre-departure
orientation seminar," Paulino texted him that the seminar was cancelled because
Inovero, who had the applicants money, did not show up. He testified that he was

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not deployed. Neither was his money returned, as promised. Brizuela testified that
Inovero was the one who conducted the orientation, and represented to all the
applicants that most of the time, she was in the Japanese Embassy expediting the
applicants visa.
Rosanna Aguirre, the third complainant, was informed by Diala that Inovero
was one of the owners of HARVEL and Velasco was its President. Despite her
undergoing medical examination and several training seminars, she was however
not deployed to Japan. Worse, she found out that HARVEL was not licensed to recruit
workers. The same thing happened to complainant Annaliza Amoyo and Teresa
Marbella.
Mildred Versoza, a Labor and Employment Officer at the POEA Licensing
Branch, testified that she prepared a Certification certifying that neither HARVEL nor
Inovero was authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment as per records
at their office.
Inovero, Velasco, Diala and Paulino were charged with Illegal recruitment in
large scale. Only Inovero was arrested and prosecuted, the other accused having
remained at large. The RTC rendered judgment convicting Inovero of illegal
recruitment committed in large scale. CA affirmed. However, both the RTC and CA
did not adjudicate Inoveros personal liability for them in their judgments.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the civil liability should be made part of the judgment by
the RTC and the CA even if the complainants did not appeal;
2. Whether or not Inoveros liability is solidary
Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court, being the ultimate reviewing tribunal, has not only the
authority but also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice. It is,
indeed, a basic tenet of our criminal law that every person criminally liable is also
civilly liable. Civil liability includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and
indemnification for consequential damages. To enforce the civil liability, the Rules of
Court has deemed to be instituted with the criminal action the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged unless the offended party
waives the civil action, or reserves the right to institute the civil action separately,
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Considering that the crime
of illegal recruitment, when it involves the transfer of funds from the victims to the
accused, is inherently in fraud of the former, civil liability should include the return
of the amounts paid as placement, training and processing fees. Hence, Inovero and
her co-accused were liable to indemnify the complainants for all the sums paid.
That the civil liability should be made part of the judgment by the RTC and
the CA was not disputable. The Court pointed out in Bacolod v. People that it was
"imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the
accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there
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has been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its
recovery," because:
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their
express mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to have the
judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense
constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused
in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the
penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by
his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended
party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil
action has been reserved or waived." Their disregard compels the Court to act lest
the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses
Cogtas did not themselves seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no
hindrance to this action because the Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not
only the authority but also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and
justice.
2. Yes. The nature of the obligation of the co-conspirators in the commission
of the crime requires solidarity, and each debtor may be compelled to pay the entire
obligation. As a co-conspirator, then, Inoveros civil liability was similar to that of a
joint tortfeasor under the rules of the civil law. Joint tortfeasors are those who
command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or
abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their
benefit. They are also referred to as those who act together in committing wrong or
whose acts, if independent of each other, unite in causing a single injury. Under
Article 2194 of the Civil Code, joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable for the resulting
damage. In other words, joint tortfeasors are each liable as principals, to the same
extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act
themselves. As regards the extent of their respective liabilities, the Court expressed
in Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals: Where several causes
producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the
injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the
causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons
although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was
more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not same.

BOOK II, RPC AND SPECIAL LAWS


CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
RESISTANCE AND DISOBEDIENCE TO A PERSON IN AUTHORITY OR AGENTS
OF SUCH PERSON
EDMUND SYDECO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 202692, November 12, 2014, J. Velasco

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The two key elements of resistance and serious disobedience punished under
Art. 151 of the RPC are: (1) That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the
performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender; and (2) That the
offender resists or seriously disobeys such person or his agent. There can be no
quibble that P/Insp. Aguilar and his apprehending team are persons in authority or
agents of a person in authority manning a legal checkpoint. But surely Sydecos act
of exercising ones right against unreasonable searches to be conducted in the
middle of the night cannot, in context, be equated to disobedience let alone
resisting a lawful order in contemplation of Art. 151 of the RPC.
Facts:
P/Insp. Manuel Aguilar (Aguilar), SPO4 Bodino, PO3 Benedict Cruz III and
another officer were manning a checkpoint when, from about twenty (20) meters
away, they spotted a swerving red Ford Ranger pick-up driven by petitioner Sydeco.
The team members flagged the vehicle down and asked Sydeco to alight from the
vehicle so he could take a rest at the police station situated nearby, before he
resumes driving. Sydeco who the policemen claimed was smelling of liquor, denied
being drunk and insisted he could manage to drive. Then in a raised voice, Sydeco
started talking rudely to the policemen and in fact yelled at P/Insp. Aguilar blurting:
Pg ina mo, bakit mo ako hinuhuli. At that remark, P/Insp. Aguilar, who earlier
pointed out to Sydeco that his team had seen him swerving and driving under the
influence of liquor, proceeded to arrest Sydeco who put up resistance. Despite
Sydecos efforts to parry the hold on him, the police eventually succeeded in
subduing him who was then brought to the Ospital ng Maynila where he was
examined and found to be under the influence of alcohol. Sydeco was then turned
over to the Malate Police Station for investigation.
Issue:
Whether or not Sydeco is guilty of violation of Art. 151 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Ruling:
No.
Going over the records, it is fairly clear that what triggered the
confrontational stand-off between the police team, on one hand, and Sydeco on the
other, was the latters refusal to get off of the vehicle for a body and vehicle search
juxtaposed by his insistence on a plain view search only. Sydecos twin gestures
cannot plausibly be considered as resisting a lawful order. He may have sounded
boorish or spoken crudely at that time, but none of this would make him a criminal.
It remains to stress that the Sydeco has not, when flagged down, committed a crime
or performed an overt act warranting a reasonable inference of criminal activity. He
did not try to avoid the road block established. He came to a full stop when so
required to stop. The two key elements of resistance and serious disobedience
punished under Art. 151 of the RPC are: (1) That a person in authority or his agent is
engaged in the performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender;
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and (2) That the offender resists or seriously disobeys such person or his agent.
There can be no quibble that P/Insp. Aguilar and his apprehending team are persons
in authority or agents of a person in authority manning a legal checkpoint. But
surely Sydecos act of exercising ones right against unreasonable searches to be
conducted in the middle of the night cannot, in context, be equated to disobedience
let alone resisting a lawful order in contemplation of Art. 151 of the RPC. As has
often been said, albeit expressed differently and under dissimilar circumstances, the
vitality of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees, but in the courage of the
people to assert and use them whenever they are ignored or worse infringed.
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS (R.A. 8294)
ARNULFO A.K.A. ARNOLD JACABAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 184355, March 23, 2015, J. Peralta
Once the prosecution evidence indubitably points to possession without the
requisite authority or license, coupled with animus possidendi or intent to possess
on the part of the accused, conviction for violation of the said law must follow.
Animus possidendi is a state of mind, the presence or determination of which is
largely dependent on attendant events in each case. It may be inferred from the
prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding
circumstances.
Here, the prosecution had proved the essential elements of the crime
charged under PD 1866 as amended by R.A. No. 8294. The existence of the seized
firearm and the ammunitions was established through the testimony of PO3 Sarte.
There was an inventory of the items seized which was made in the presence of the
petitioner and the three barangay tanods who all voluntarily signed the inventory
receipt. PO3 Sarte identified all the seized items in open court.
Facts:
In July 1999, police operatives armed with a search warrant went to the house
of the Accused-appellant Jacaban and there recovered numerous firearms and
ammunitions. The search was attended by three (3) barangay tanods and the
confiscated items were duly docu-mented. Later, a certification coming from the
firearms and explosives office of the PNP showed that Jacaban was not authorized to
possess the confiscated dangerous items. Upon his indict-ment, Jacaban asserted
that he was framed-up by the police and as disclosed by his sister, who stood as a
witness, he merely observed the search conducted at the house of his uncle.
The RTC found Jacaban guilty of violating PD 1866, as amended by R.A. No.
8294, consi-dering that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the
crime charged. The CA agreed with the RTCs conclusion that the elements of the
crime charged were duly proved by the prosecution. Anent Jacabans claim of the
alleged discrepancy in the testimony of PO3 Sarte on the time the raid was
conducted, the CA found the same to be minor and did not damage the essential
integrity of the prosecutions evidence in its material whole.

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Issue:
Whether or not Accused-appellant Jacaban is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of illegal possession of firearms.
Ruling:
YES, Accused-appellant Jacaban is guilty of the crime charged.
[Jacaban] argues that the RTC decision finding him guilty is premised on its
erroneous conclusion that he is the owner the house where the unlicensed firearms
and ammunitions were found. He reiterated his claim that there was discrepancy in
the testimony of PO3 Sarte as to the time the raid was conducted.
As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As such, [the Court is] not duty-bound to analyze and
weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below
This rule, however, is not without exceptions. However, [Jacaban] failed to show that
his case falls under any of the exceptions.
The essential elements in the prosecution for the crime of illegal possession
of firearms and ammunitions are: (1) the existence of subject firearm; and, (2) the
fact that the accused who possessed or owned the same does not have the
corresponding license for it. The unvarying rule is that ownership is not an essential
element of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. What the law requires is
merely possession, which includes not only actual physical possession, but also
constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to ones control and
management.
Once the prosecution evidence indubitably points to possession without the
requisite authority or license, coupled with animus possidendi or intent to possess
on the part of the accused, conviction for violation of the said law must follow.
Animus possidendi is a state of mind, the presence or determination of which is
largely dependent on attendant events in each case. It may be inferred from the
prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding
circumstances.
Here, the prosecution had proved the essential elements of the crime
charged under PD 1866 as amended by R.A. No. 8294. The existence of the seized
firearm and the ammunitions was established through the testimony of PO3 Sarte.
There was an inventory of the items seized which was made in the presence of the
petitioner and the three barangay tanods who all voluntarily signed the inventory
receipt. PO3 Sarte identified all the seized items in open court.
It was convincingly proved that [Jacaban] had constructive possession of the
gun and the ammunitions, coupled with the intent to possess the same. [Jacaban's]
act of immediately rushing from the living room to the room where SPO2 Abellana
found a calibre .45 and grappled with the latter for the possession of the gun proved
that the gun was under his control and management. He also had the animus
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possidendi or intent to possess the gun when he tried to wrest it from SPO2
Abellana.
[Jacaban's] lack of authority to possess the firearm was established by the
testimony of Police Officer IV Sultan, Chief Clerk of the Firearms and Explosive
Division of the PNP-Visayas (FED-PNP- Visayas) that [he] is not licensed to possess
any kind of firearm or ammunition based on the FED-PNP master list.
Anent [Jacaban's] argument that the house where the firearm was found was
not owned by him is not persuasive. xxx. For one, the alleged owner of the
house did not testify. He was allegedly suffering from hypertension. The defense,
however, did not file a motion to take his deposition.
Even assuming that petitioner is not the owner of the house where the items
were recovered, the ownership of the house is not an essential element of the crime
under PD 1866 as amended. xxx.
[Jacaban] likewise questions the discrepancies in the testimony of prosecution
witness [Sarte]. [He] contends that PO3 Sarte could not even testify correctly as to
the time the raid was conducted.
It bears stressing that minor discrepancies might be found in her testimony,
but this does not damage the essential integrity of the evidence in its material
whole, nor should it reflect adversely on the witness' credibility as it erases
suspicion that the same was perjured. Here, prior testimony of PO3 Sarte as to the
time of the raid is considered only a trivial matter which is not even enough to
destroy or discredit her credibility. xxx. The record likewise does not reveal that PO3
Sarte was actuated by ill-motive in so testifying against [Jacaban]. Thus, when there
is nothing to indicate that a witness was actuated by improper motives, her positive
declarations on the witness stand, made under solemn oath, deserve full faith and
credence.
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
FALSIFICATION BY PUBLIC OFFICER
VENANCIO M. SEVILLA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 194390, August 13, 2014, J. Reyes
Sevillas claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him was violated when the Sandiganbayan
convicted him of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents,
when the Information only charged the intentional felony of falsification of public
documents, is untenable. Reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public
documents is an offense that is necessarily included in the willful act of falsification
of public documents, the latter being the greater offense. While a criminal negligent
act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, but a distinct crime in itself,
designated as a quasi-offense, in [the RPC], it may however be said that a
conviction for the former can be had under an information exclusively charging the
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commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser
offense.
Facts:
Sevilla, a former councilor of Malabon City, was charged with falsification of
public docu-ment, penalized under Art. 171 of the RPC. That on or about 02 July
2001 in the City of Malabon, Sevilla, a public officer, being then a member of the
Sangguniang Panlunsod of Malabon City, having been elected a councilor thereof,
taking advantage of his official position and committing the offense in relation to
duty, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously make a false statement
in a narration of facts, the truth of which he is legally bound to disclose, by stating
in his Personal Data Sheet, an official document, which he submitted to the Office of
the Secretariat, Malabon City Council and, in answer to Question No. 25 therein, he
stated that no criminal case is pending against him, when in fact, as the accused
fully well knew, he is an accused in Criminal Case No. 6718-97 for Assault upon an
Agent of a Person in Authority, pending before the MeTC of Malabon City.
Upon arraignment, Sevilla entered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits
ensued thereafter. Based on the same set of facts, an administrative complaint, was
likewise filed against Sevilla. The Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) found Sevilla
administratively liable for dishonesty and falsification of official document and
dismissed him from the service. The Court in the Resolution affirmed the findings of
the OMB as regards Sevillas administrative liability. Sevilla admitted that he indeed
marked the box corresponding to the no answer vis--vis the question on whether
he has any pending criminal case. However, he averred that he did not intend to
falsify his PDS. He claimed that it was Editha Mendoza a member of his staff, who
actually prepared his PDS.
According to Sevilla, since he did not have an office yet, he just stayed in his
house, he was informed by Mendoza that he needs to accomplish his PDS and
submit the same to the Personnel Office of the City of Malabon before five oclock
that afternoon. He then instructed Mendoza to copy the entries in the previous copy
of his PDS which he filed with the personnel office. After the PDS was filled up and
delivered to him by Mendoza, Sevilla claims that he just signed the same without
checking the veracity of the entries therein. That he failed to notice that, in answer
to the question of whether he has any pending criminal case, Mendoza checked the
box corresponding to the no answer. The defense presented the testimony of
Edilberto G. Torres, a former City Councilor. Torres testified that Sevilla was not yet
given an office space in the Malabon City Hall on July 2, 2001; that when the
members of Sevillas staff would then need to use the typewriter, they would just
use the typewriter inside Torres office. Torres further claimed that he saw Mendoza
preparing the PDS of Sevilla, the latter having used the typewriter in his office.
The Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision,
of Public Documents through Reckless
Sandiganbayan opined that Sevilla cannot be
document under Art. 171(4)10 of the RPC since

finding Sevilla guilty of Falsification


Imprudence. Nevertheless, the
convicted of falsification of public
he did not act with malicious intent

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to falsify the aforementioned entry in his PDS. The reckless signing of the PDS
without verifying the data therein makes him criminally liable for his act.
Before the Court, Sevilla claims that the Information that was filed against
him specifically charged him with the commission of an intentional felony, under
Art. 171(4) of the RPC. Thus, he could not be convicted of falsification of public
document through reckless imprudence under Art. 365 of the RPC, which is a
culpable felony, lest his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him be violated.
Issue:
Whether or not Sevilla can be convicted of the felony of falsification of public
document through reckless imprudence notwithstanding that the charge against
him in the Information was for the intentional felony of falsification of public
document under Art. 171(4) of the RPC.
Ruling:
Yes, Sevilla can be convicted.
At the outset, it bears stressing that the Sandiganbayans designation of the
felony suppo-sedly committed by Sevilla is inaccurate. The Sandiganbayan
convicted Sevilla of reckless impru-dence, punished under Art. 365 of the RPC,
which resulted into the falsification of a public document. However, the
Sandiganbayan designated the felony committed as falsification of public document
through reckless imprudence. The foregoing designation implies that reckless
impru-dence is not a crime in itself but simply a modality of committing it. Quasioffenses under Art. 365 of the RPC are distinct and separate crimes and not a mere
modality in the commission of a crime.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are
distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of
our penal laws, is nothing new. In truth, criminal negligence in [the RPC] is treated
as a mere quasi-offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. Thus, the
proper designation of the felony should be reckless imprudence resulting to
falsification of public documents and not falsification of public documents through
reckless imprudence. The rules on variance between allegation and proof are laid
down under Secs. 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, in case of
variance between the allegation and proof, a defendant may be convicted of the
offense proved when the offense charged is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved.
There is no dispute that a variance exists between the offense alleged
against Sevilla and that proved by the prosecution. Parenthetically, the question
that has to be resolved then is whether reckless imprudence resulting to falsification
of public document is necessarily included in the intentional felony of falsification of
public document under Art. 171(4) of the RPC. While a criminal negligent act is not
a simple modality of a willful crime, but a distinct crime in itself, designated as a
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quasi-offense, in [the RPC], it may however be said that a conviction for the former
can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful
offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense.
Thus, Sevillas claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him was violated when the Sandiganbayan
convicted him of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents,
when the Information only charged the intentional felony of falsification of public
documents, is untenable. To stress, reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of
public documents is an offense that is necessarily included in the willful act of
falsification of public documents, the latter being the greater offense. As such, he
can be convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public
documents notwithstanding that the Information only charged the willful act of
falsification of public documents.
GOVERNOR ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, JR. vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
LEONARDO B. ROMAN, ROMEO L. MENDIOLA, PASTOR P. VICHUACO,
AURORA J. TIAMBENG, AND NUMERIANO G. MEDINA
G.R. No. 197567, November 19, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
The absence of such allotment not only renders invalid the release of funds
therefor but also taints the legality of the projects appropriation as well as the
Provinces contract with a contractor.
Facts:
Herein petitioner Enrique T. Garcia, Jr., incumbent Provincial Governor of
Bataan, before the Ombudsman, against respondents former Governor Leonardo B.
Roman, former Executive Assistant Romeo L. Mendiola, former Provincial Treasurer
Pastor P. Vichuaco, former Budget Officer Aurora J. Tiambeng, and incumbent
Provincial Accountant Numeriano G. Medina (Medina), charging them with
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents under Article
217 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Section 3,
paragraphs (a) and (e) of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also
charged were incumbent Provincial Engineer Amelia R. De Pano, Assistant Provincial
Engineer Angelito A. Rodriguez, Engineer Noel G. Jimenez, and Architect Bernardo T.
Capistrano, as well as Noel Valdecaas, the owner and manager of V.F. Construction.
It was alleged that Roman, being the Provincial Governor at that time,
entered into a contract with V.F. Construction, as represented by Valdecaas, for the
construction of a mini-theater at the Bataan State College - Abucay Campus. As
approved with a certification for completion and receipts issued by V.F. Construction
show that it received the payments for the project.
Notwithstanding the various documents attesting to the projects supposed
completion, as well as the disbursement of funds in payment therefor, Garcia
Romans successor as Governor authorized the inspection of the project sometime
in August 2004 and discovered that while its construction was indeed commenced,
it remained unfinished.
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The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict De Pano, Rodriguez, Jimenez,
and Capistrano for the crime of Falsification of Public Documents by making it
appear through the aforesaid Certification and Accomplishment Report that the
project had already been completed when the same was only partially constructed.
On the other hand, the Ombudsman cleared respondents from liability on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence, reasoning that mere signature on a voucher or
certification is not enough to establish any conspiracy among them which would
warrant their conviction.
Dissatisfied, Garcia moved for reconsideration, citing the Commission on
Audits Audit Observation Memorandum, which stated that the project had no
source of funds, thus rendering the contract therefor void and the payments made
therefor illegal. Still it was denied, thus, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in dismissing
all the criminal charges against respondents for lack of probable cause?
Ruling:
Yes, the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in dismissing charges for
lack of probable cause.
The elements of the crime of Violation of Section 3 (e), RA 3019 are as
follows: a) the offender must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial,
or official functions; b) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and c) his action caused any undue injury to
any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
Considering the findings contained in the CoA Memo, which the Ombudsman,
however, disregarded, it is quite clear that all the foregoing elements are, in all
reasonable likelihood, present with respect to respondents participation in this
case.
Respondents, who were all public officers at the time of the alleged
commission of the crime particularly, as provincial officials of Bataan discharging
administrative functions (first element) apparently acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or, at the very least, gross inexcusable negligence when they
issued the pertinent documents and certifications that led to the diversion of public
funds to a project that had no proper allotment, i.e., the mini-theater project
(second element).
The absence of such allotment not only renders invalid the release of funds
therefor but also taints the legality of the projects appropriation as well as the
Provinces contract with V.F. Construction.

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Considering that the illegal diversion of public funds for the mini-theater
project would undermine the execution of other projects legitimately supported by
proper allotments, it is quite obvious that undue injury on the part of the Province
and its residents would be caused. Likewise, considering that V.F. Construction had
already received full payment for a project that had yet to be completed, it also
appears that a private party was given unwarranted benefits by respondents in the
discharge of their functions (third element).
FALSIFICATION BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL
RENATO M. DAVID vs. EDITHA A. AGBAY AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015, J. Villarama
Falsification of documents under par. 1, Art. 172 in relation to Art. 171 of the
RPC refers to falsification by a private individual, or a public officer or employee
who did not take advantage of his official position, of public, private, or commercial
documents. In the case at bar, David made the untruthful statement in the
Miscellaneous Lease Application, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at
the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian
citizen. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of
public document under Art. 172, par. 1.
Facts:
Renato David migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by
naturalization. Upon their retirement, David and his wife returned to the Philippines.
They purchased a 600-square meter lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria,
Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, they came
to know that the portion where they built their house is public land and part of the
salvage zone.
David filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land
with the DENR. In the said application, David indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that David, a Canadian
citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code against the David. Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship
under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 on October 11, 2007.
In his defense, David averred that at the time he filed his application, he had
intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had been assured by a
CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a Filipino.
The OCP found a probable cause to indict David for violation of Art. 172 of
the RPC and recommended the filing of the corresponding information in court.
David challenged the said resolution in a petition for review he filed before the DOJ.
The CENRO issued an order rejecting Davids MLA. It ruled that petitioners
subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA
which was void ab initio.
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In the meantime, the petition for review filed by David was denied by the
DOJ which held that the presence of the elements of the crime of falsification of
public document suffices to warrant indictment of the petitioner notwithstanding the
absence of any proof that he gained or intended to injure a third person in
committing the act of falsification. Consequently, an information for Falsification of
Public Document was filed before the MTC and a warrant of arrest was issued
against David.
Before his arrest, David filed an Urgent Motion for Re-Determination of
Probable Cause in the MTC. MTC ruled that since the crime for which David was
charged was alleged and admitted to have been committed before he had reacquired his Philippine citizenship, it does not have jurisdiction over the person of
the accused.
David elevated the case to the RTC, arguing that jurisdiction over the
person of an accused cannot be a pre-condition for the re-determination of probable
cause by the court that issues a warrant of arrest. He further contended that the
MTC disregarded the legal fiction that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who had
been naturalized in another country re-acquires his citizenship under R.A. 9225, his
Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not to have been lost on account of said
naturalization.
Issues:
1. Whether or not David may be indicted for falsification for representing
himself as a Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent
re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No.
9225.
2. Whether or not MTC properly denied petitioners motion for redetermination of probable cause on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the accused.
Ruling:
1. Yes, David was correctly indicted and prosecuted for violating Art. 172 of
the RPC.
Falsification of documents under [par. 1, Art. 172 in relation to Art. 171 of the
RPC] refers to falsification by a private individual, or a public officer or employee
who did not take advantage of his official position, of public, private, or commercial
documents. The elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Art. 172
of the RPC are:
1) that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee
who did not take advantage of his official position;
2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article
171 of the RPC; and

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3) that the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial
document.
David made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he
is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was
then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was
naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those
ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 six months later, the falsification
was already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as
his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding
probable cause for falsification of public document under Art. 172, par. 1.
2. NO, the trial court erred in invoking lack of jurisdiction in denying the
motion.
The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of David as ground
for denying petitioners motion for re-determination of probable cause, as the
motion was filed prior to his arrest. However, custody of the law is not required for
the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail. In Miranda vs.
Tuliao, which involved a motion to quash warrant of arrest, this Court discussed the
distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person, and held
that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived when he files any
pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special
jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Thus, in
arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired
by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement,
through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago vs. Vasquez:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to
the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings
requiring the exercise of the courts jurisdiction there over, appearing
for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail,
since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the
accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the
accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his
arrest or voluntary surrender.
The Courts pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody
of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the
court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of
other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor
constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender,
while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or
voluntary appearance. One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject
to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by
virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the
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other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and
yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody
after his trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on
the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to
become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over
the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns
bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed
to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the aforecited case
of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
To recapitulate what the Court has discussed so far, in criminal cases,
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when
he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes
the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.
Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke
the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person
nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the
court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.
Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for redetermination of probable cause, the MTC clearly erred in stating that it lacked
jurisdiction over his person. Notwithstanding such erroneous ground stated in the
MTCs order, the RTC correctly ruled that no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the MTC in denying the said motion for lack of merit.
CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM AND OTHER PROHIBITED DRUGS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARCO ALEJANDRO
G.R. No. 205227, April 7, 2014, J. Villarama Jr.
Firmly established in our jurisprudence is the rule that in the prosecution for
illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following essential elements must be proven:
(1) that the transaction or sale took place (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug
was presented as evidence and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified.
Implicit in all these is the need for proof that the transaction or sale actually took
place, coupled with the presentation in court of the confiscated prohibited or
regulated drug as evidence. What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of
dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is proof of the concurrence of all the
elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and the consideration and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor.
Facts:

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Confidential Informant (CI) went to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) Regional Office 4A (CALABARZON) at Camp Vicente Lim in Calamba City,
Laguna. The CI informed Regional Director that he was able to set up a deal with a
certain Aida who directed him to look for a buyer of 100 grams of shabu for the
price of P360, 000.
Immediately, Police Chief Inspector Bargamento organized the team
composed of eleven police officers and made the proper coordination with PDEA.
During the briefing, SPO1 Cariaso was designated as poseur-buyer while SPO1
Platon will be his back- up arresting officer. Four pieces of five hundred peso (P500)
bills were then prepared and marked by SPO1 Cariaso. Prior to these preparations,
the CI had contacted Aida through her cell phone and arranged the 2:00 p.m.
meeting/sale transaction the following day.
The next day, at around 12:00 noon, the team accompanied by the CI
boarded two service vehicles and proceeded to the target area. As agreed during
the briefing, SPO1 Platon positioned himself in a spot where he could see SPO1
Cariaso. The other police officers posted themselves where they could see SPO1
Platon as the latter will wait for a missed call from SPO1 Cariaso . The CI
introduced SPO1 Cariaso with Aida then left. Aida asked SPO1 Cariaso where the
money is and he opened his belt bag to show her the money. SPO1 Cariaso in turn
asked her where the shabu is and she replied that he should wait for Alejandro
(appellant). SPO1 Cariaso and the woman then went inside the Revo and waited for
Alejandro. After about five minutes, a Toyota Vios arrived and parked in frontof the
Revo. The woman told SPO1 Cariaso that the driver of the Vios was Alejandro.
Alejandro alighted from the Vios and went inside the Revo. The woman
introduced Alejandro to SPO1 Cariaso as the buyer. After Alejandro ascertained that
SPO1 Cariaso had the money with him, he went down and got something from the
Vios. When Alejandro returned, he was carrying an item wrapped in newspaper.
Inside the Revo, Alejandro uncovered the item and SPO1 Cariaso saw a transparent
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance which appellant handed to
him. Alejandro then demanded for the money. SPO1 Cariaso gave Alejandro the belt
bag containing the marked bills and boodle money and quickly pressed the call key
of his cell phone, the pre-arranged signal for the team that the sale had been
consummated.
As planned, SPO1 Cariaso arrested Alejandro and the woman (Aida) who
was later identified as Imelda G. Solema. Meanwhile, SPO1 Platon arrested the
woman passenger in the Vios who was later identified as Jenny del Rosario.
The seized plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance was marked
by SPO1 Cariaso with his initials and signed it at the bottom. SPO1 Cariaso also
recovered the marked P500 bills and boodle money from appellant. The three
accused and the confiscated items were brought to the PDEA Regional Office in
Camp Vicente Lim
Subsequently, Appellant Marco P. Alejandro (Alejandro) along with Imelda G.
Solema and Jenny V. del Rosario, were charged with violation of Section 5, Article II
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of R.A. No. 9165 in an information. When arraigned, all three accused pleaded not
guilty. Upon demurrer to evidence filed by accused Jenny del Rosario, the trial court
rendered judgment acquitting her of the crime charged considering that her mere
presence in the car used by appellant is not indicative of conspiracy in the sale of
illegal drugs
RTC convicted Alejandro and Solema. The RTC found that the police officers
complied with all the requirements in conducting a buy-bust operation, and that
their testimonies were spontaneous, straightforward and consistent on all material
points. Convinced that Alejandro and his co-accused Imelda Solema had conspired
in selling shabu, the RTC noted that it was the latter who called- up the former about
the offer of the poseur-buyer SPO1 Cariaso to buy shabu. Alejandro thus brought the
pack of shabu to be sold to SPO1 Cariaso, unaware of the entrapment plan of the
police officers. CA later on appeal upheld their conviction.
Alejandro argues that there is no proof beyond reasonable doubt that a sale
transaction of illegal drugs took place as there appeared to be no prior meeting or
conversation between SPO1 Cariaso and Alejandro, and hence they could not have
agreed on a price certain for a specified weight of drugs to be sold. It stressed that
from the prosecutions narration of facts, the basis of the meeting between the
poseur-buyer and Aida was the arrangement made by the CI for the sale of shabu
hence, there was already an agreement for the sale of 100 grams of shabu for the
amount of P360,000.00
Issue:
Whether or not there was a consummated illegal sale of dangerous drugs in
contemplation of Article II, Sec. 5 of RA 9165 that warrants conviction.
Ruling:
The appeal lacks merit.
Yes, there was a consummated illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Clearly, all the
elements of the crime were established by both the oral and object evidence
presented in court.
Firmly established in our jurisprudence is the rule that in the prosecution for
illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following essential elements must be proven: (1)
that the transaction or sale took place (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was
presented as evidence and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified. Implicit in
all these is the need for proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of the confiscated prohibited or regulated
drug as evidence.
What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buybust operation is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit:

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(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
The above elements were satisfactorily established by the prosecution.
Poseur-buyer SPO1 Cariaso identified appellant as the seller of shabu. While the
police officers were initially unaware of the identity of Alejandro, as their CI had only
informed them about Alejandros co-accused, Aida (Imelda Solema) with whom
the CI had set up a drug deal for 100 grams of shabu for the price of P360, 000.00,
presence at the buy-bust scene, and his act of delivering the shabu directly to SPO1
Cariaso clearly identified him as the seller who himself demanded and received the
payment
from SPO1 Cariaso after giving the shabu to the latter. Alejandros arrival at the
house of Imelda Solema at the appointed time of the sale transaction arranged the
previous day by the CI, and with Imelda Solema informing SPO1 Cariaso that they
should wait for Alejandro after SPO1 Cariaso asked for the shabu, were clear
indications that they acted in coordination and conspiracy to effect the sale of
shabu to a buyer brought by the CI and who turned out to be a police officer
detailed with the PDEA. SPO1 Cariaso placed his initials and date of buy-bust on the
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance sold to him by Alejandro. After
Forensic Chemical Officer Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr. conducted a chemical analysis of the
said specimen, the result yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a dangerous drug. The same specimen was presented in court as evidence
after it was properly identified by SPO1 Cariaso and Pol. Insp. Apostol, Jr. to be
the same substance handed by Alejandro to SPO1 Cariaso and examined by Pol.
Insp. Apostol, Jr.
It is settled that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they enjoy the
presumption of having performed their duties in a regular manner, unless, of
course, there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-motive on their part or
deviation from the regular performance of their duties. Since no proof of such ill
motive on the part of the PDEA buy-bust team was adduced by Alejandro, the RTC
and CA did not err in giving full faith and credence to the prosecutions account of
the buy-bust operation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GERRY YABLE y USMAN
G.R. No. 200358, April 7, 2014, J. Perez
The fact that the marking on the seized item was done at the police station,
and not at alleged crime scene, did not compromise the integrity of the seized
evidence. As ruled by this Court in Marquez v. People, the phrase marking upon
immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or
office of the apprehending team. What is important is that the seized item marked
at the police station is identified as the same item produced in court. As correctly
ruled by the CA, the prosecution was able to establish the integrity of corpus delicti
and the unbroken chain of custody. PO1 Vargas identified in open court the sachet
of shabu that was offered in evidence against Gerry as the same one she seized
from the latter and marked immediately thereafter in the presence of the police
investigator. Furthermore, this Court has consistently ruled that even in instances
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where the arresting officers failed to take a photograph of the seized drugs as
required under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such procedural lapse is not fatal and
will not render the items seized inadmissible in evidence. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence
of the accused.
Facts:
Accused Gerry Yable (Gerry) was apprehended in an entrapment operation on
account of the tip given by the confidential informer. It appears however that that
no physical inventory or photograph was conducted at the crime scene or in his
presence. Instead, the marking of the confiscated drug was done in front of the
investigator at the police precinct. Thereafter an information was filed against Gerry
before RTC for violation of Sec. 5, Article II of RA 9165.
The trial court rendered a Decision finding Gerry guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense charged which was later affirmed by the CA.
Gerry submits that the trial court and the CA failed to consider the procedural
flaws committed by the arresting officers in the seizure and custody of drugs as
embodied in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II, R.A. No. 9165 and further alleges
that no physical inventory or photograph was conducted at the crime scene or in his
presence. Instead, the marking of the confiscated drug was done in front of the
investigator at the police precinct. Such lapses on the part of the apprehending
officers raises doubt on whether the shabu submitted for laboratory examination
and subsequently presented in court as evidence, was the same one confiscated
from Gerry.
Isuue:
Whether or not trial court gravely erred in convicting the Gerry despite the
prosecutions failure to establish the chain of custody of the alleged confiscated
drug
Ruling:
The appeal is bereft of merit. Clearly, the rule authorizes substantial
compliance with the procedure to establish a chain of custody, as long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item is properly preserved by the
apprehending In People v. Pringas, the Court recognized that the strict compliance
with the requirements of Section 21 may not always be possible under field
conditions the police operates under varied conditions, and cannot at all times
attend to all the niceties of the procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence.
Moreover, the fact that the marking on the seized item was done at the police
station, and not at alleged crime scene, did not compromise the integrity of the
seized evidence. As ruled by this Court in Marquez v. People, the phrase marking
upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police
station or office of the apprehending team. What is important is that the seized item
marked at the police station is identified as the same item produced in court.

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As correctly ruled by the CA, the prosecution was able to establish the
integrity of corpus delicti and the unbroken chain of custody. PO1 Vargas identified
in open court the sachet of shabu that was offered in evidence against Gerry as the
same one she seized from the latter and marked immediately thereafter in the
presence of the police investigator
At the pretrial conference, both the prosecution and defense stipulated on the
findings of the chemist or laboratory examination report. The report on the
laboratory examination showed that the marking PV042705 was indicated on the
seized item. Such marking, as testified by the police investigator, was made by PO1
Vargas in his presence at the time the evidence was turned over to him. This
admission of the parties completed the chain of custody of the seized item.
Furthermore, this Court has consistently ruled that even in instances where
the arresting officers failed to take a photograph of the seized drugs as required
under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such procedural lapse is not fatal and will not
render the items seized inadmissible in evidence. What is of utmost importance is
the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the
same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. In other words, to be admissible in evidence, the prosecution must be able
to present through records or testimony, the whereabouts of the dangerous drugs
from the time these were seized from the accused by the arresting officers turnedover to the investigating officer forwarded to the laboratory for determination of
their composition and up to the time these are offered in evidence. For as long as
the chain of custody remains unbroken, as in this case, even though the procedural
requirements provided for in Section 21 of R.A. No.9165 was not faithfully observed,
the guilt of the accused will not be affected.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SUKARNO JUNAIDE Y AGGA
G.R. No. 193856, April 21, 2014, J. Abad
When there is variation of the supposed marked item from the one actually
presented in court for identification, the Court shall conclude that there may have
been switching of evidence in the selling charge. Guilt in that charge has not,
therefore, been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
This is true as in a prosecution for the sale and possession of the prohibited
drugs known as shabu, the State does not only carry the heavy burden of proving
the elements of the offense. It also bears the obligation to prove the corpus delicti,
failing in which the State would not have proved the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. And, to prove the corpus delicti, it is indispensable for the
prosecution to show that the dangerous drugs subject of the sale and examined in
the police laboratory are the same drugs presented in court as evidence.
Facts:
It may be recalled that the prosecution witnesses in this case testified that on
November 25, 2004 the Zamboanga Drug Enforcement Unit received a tip that
respondent Sukarno Junaide was selling prohibited drugs at Lower Calarian,
Zamboanga City. The police unit formed a buybust team with SPO1 Roberto Roca
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as poseurbuyer. It then went to the place mentioned. As the informant and SPO1
Roca saw accused Junaide standing near a store, they approached him. The
informant told Junaide that his companion wanted to buy P100.00 worth of shabu.
Accused Junaide took a sachet from his pocket and handed it to SPO1 Roca
who in turn gave him a marked P100.00 bill. The police officer then signaled the
rest of the police team to come. When SPO1 Roca let it known that he was a police
officer, Junaide tried to flee but the police stopped him. SPO1 Amado Mirasol, Jr.
searched and found four sachets of suspected shabu and the marked money on
Junaide.
Subsequently, the police brought accused Junaide to the police station where
SPO1 Mirasol marked the four sachets seized from him and turned these over to the
case investigator, SPO1 Federico Lindo, Jr. The latter then turned over the seized
items to the police crime laboratory. The sachet Junaide sold was found to contain
0.0101 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu; the other sachets
contained a total of 0.0235 gram.
The Public Prosecutor charged accused Junaide before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Zamboanga City with (1) illegal sale of shabu in violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) 91651 in Criminal Case 5601 (21215) and (2) illegal
possession of shabu in violation of Section 11, Article II of the same law in Criminal
Case 5602 (21216).
The RTC found accused Junaide guilty of both charges. The Court of Appeals
(CA) rendered judgment affirming the RTC Decision in toto.
Junaide filed a motion for reconsideration pleading for re-examination of the
Courts finding that the police officers involved substantially complied with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
R.A. 9165.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Junaide could be held liable of the crime of illegal
sale of shabu despite the fact that the required procedure of Section 21, Article II of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 9165 was not substantially
complied with
Ruling:
No, Junaide could only be held guilty of the crime of illegal possession but not
of illegal sale of shabu.
In a prosecution for the sale and possession of the prohibited drugs known as
shabu, the State does not only carry the heavy burden of proving the elements of
the offense. It also bears the obligation to prove the corpus delicti, failing in which
the State would not have proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

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And, to prove the corpus delicti, it is indispensable for the prosecution to
show that the dangerous drugs subject of the sale and examined in the police
laboratory are the same drugs presented in court as evidence. The first stage in the
chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or related items. Marking is the
affixing of the initials or other identifying signs on the seized items by the arresting
officer or the poseurbuyer. This must be done in the presence of the accused
shortly after arrest.
Here, compliance with the requirement of marking is not clear. SPO1 Roca
testified that he marked the plastic sachet of shabu that he bought with his initials
RR but when the supposed sachet was presented to him in court for identification,
it instead carried the marking RR1. This may be just a mistake but he denied
having made a mistake and admitted that the RR1 marking could have been
made by just anybody.
SPO1 Roca may have truly marked the item of shabu he seized from accused
Sukarno as RR which he insisted he did. Someone else, therefore, replaced the
item by another one, now marked as RR1. Indeed, Roca has not ruled out the
possibility that the latter marking on the shabu item presented in court may have
been made by someone else. This leads the Court to conclude that there may have
been switching of evidence in the selling charge. Guilt in that charge has not,
therefore, been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARLON ABETONG y ENDRADO
G.R. No. 209785, June 4, 2014, J. Velasco, Jr.
The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in
the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into
evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe
how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in
the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in
which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. Thus, if the prosecution failed to
present the testimony of a police inspector who had the only keys to the evidence
locker where the sachet of shabu, the unbroken chain of custody was not
established and the accused must be acquitted.
Facts:
An information was filed with the RTC, charging accused-appellant Marlon
Abetong with a violation of Section 5, R.A. 9165 for illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
For the prosecution, PO3 Perez testified that he conducted a buy-bust operation on
August 22, 2003 to purchase illegal drugs from accused-appellant Marlon Abetong.
After Abetong handed PO3 Pereza sachet of a white crystalline substance, the latter
introduced himself as a police officer and signaled his back up to arrest Abetong and
his three companions. The suspects attempted to flee but their plans were foiled by
the timely arrival of the other policemen. They were then brought to the police
station where their arrest and the list of the items confiscated from them were
entered in the police blotter. From their arrest until the items seized were
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transmitted to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, the pieces of
evidence were allegedly under PO3 Perezs custody. In his testimony, PO3 Perez
stated that he kept the items inside the evidence locker in the Drug Enforcement
Unit Office, to which only Inspector Lorilla has a key.
On August 25, 2013, PO3 Perez brought the sachet containing crystalline
substance and the tooter to the PNP Crime Laboratory for testing. The items were
received by Inspector Augustina Ompoy (Inspector Ompoy), the Forensic Chemical
Officer the PNP Crime. Inspector Ompoy testified that after she received the pieces
of evidence, she performed the necessary examinations them. The tests revealed
that the white crystalline substance was positive for shabu.
Abetong argued that he was illegally arrested. He was at home, sweeping the
floor when suddenly, a male person entered the open door and held him by his
pants. When Abetong asked what his fault was, the man answered to just go with
him. The person was in civvies, fair skinned and tall; he did not introduce himself.
Abetong was handcuffed while they were at the foot-walk and searched, but nothing
was recovered from him except his money P9.00.Hewas made to board a vehicle
at Aguinaldo; three handcuffed persons were inside. All four were brought to BAC-Up
2 and placed in a cell. Abetong was not informed of the cause of his arrest; no drugs
were presented to him. He knew of the charge Violation of Section 5, R.A. 9165
only during arraignment in court.
The RTC convicted Abetong, and the CA affirmed the RTC.
Issue:
Did the prosecution fail to establish an unbroken chain of custody?
Ruling:
The petition is granted.
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily
identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their
composition and nature. And the risk of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to
an exhibit of this nature is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has
physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar
to people in their daily lives. As a reasonable measure, in authenticating narcotic
specimens, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects
which are readily identifiable must be applieda more exacting standard that
entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render
it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been
contaminated or tampered with.
The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in
the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into
evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe
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how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in
the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in
which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of it.
In the case at bar, the failure of Inspector Lorilla to testify is fatal to the
prosecutions case. To recall, only PO3 Perez and Inspector Ompoy testified against
Abetong. During his testimony, PO3 Perez admitted that he put the confiscated item
in the evidence locker on August 22, 2003 for safekeeping and subsequently
brought them to Inspector Ompoy at the crime laboratory on August 25,
2003. During this three-day interval, the items were allegedly kept inside the
evidence locker to which only Inspector Lorilla has the key.
It is evident from this sequence of events that during the interim, Inspector
Lorilla constructively acquired custody over the seized items. As the lone key holder
and consequentially a link in the chain, Inspector Lorillas testimony became
indispensable in proving the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
Only he could have testified that from August 22 to 25, 2003 no one else obtained
the key from him for purposes of removing the items from their receptacle. Only he
could have enlightened the courts on what safety mechanisms have been installed
in order to preserve the integrity of the evidence acquired while inside the locker.
Absent his testimony, therefore, it cannot be plausibly claimed that the chain of
custody has sufficiently been established. To be sure, PO3 Perez did not even testify
that he was assigned to safeguard the evidence locker for the said duration; only
that he was the one who put it in and three days later took them out of the locker
room before bringing them to the crime laboratory.
Requiring the key holders testimony is especially significant in this case in
view of the law enforcers failure to deliver the confiscated items to the crime
laboratory within 24 hours, as required under Sec. 21 of RA 9165. While the delay in
itself is not fatal to the prosecutions case as it may be excused based on a
justifiable ground, it exposes the items seized to a higher probability of being
handled by even more personnel and, consequently, to a higher risk of tampering or
alteration. Thus, the testimony of the key holder becomes necessary to attest to the
fact that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated evidence have been
preserved.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NENITA GAMATA y VALDEZ
G.R. No. 205202, June 9, 2014, J. Reyes
Illegal sale of prohibited drugs is consummated at the moment the buyer
receives the drug from the seller. In a buy-bust operation, the crime is
consummated when the police officer makes an offer to buy that is accepted by the
accused, and there is an ensuing exchange between them involving the delivery of
the dangerous drugs to the police officer.

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In order to successfully prosecute the offense, proof beyond reasonable
doubt of two elements must be satisfied by the prosecution, viz: (a) the identity of
the buyer and the seller, the identity of the object and the consideration of the sale;
and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and of the payment for the thing.
As correctly ruled by the courts a quo in this case, the presence of both
requisites was clearly established by the testimony of the poseur-buyer himself,
PO2 Aseboque, who positively testified that the illegal sale took place when he gave
theP500.00 marked money to the accused-appellant in exchange for the shabu.
Facts:
Nenita Gamata y Valdez (Gamata) was charged by Regional Trial Court (RTC)
and Court of Appeals (CA) of the violation of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002 wherein she pleaded Not Guilty. Gamata, not being lawfully authorized by
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, give away,
distribute and deliver to another, zero point zero three [0.03] gram of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride which is a dangerous drug, in exchange of
Php.500.00 pesos.
During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Police Officer 2
RenieAseboque (PO2 Aseboque), Noel Pulido (Pulido) and Juan Siborboro, Jr., both
operatives of the Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC), and Police Inspector
May Andrea Bonifacio (P/Insp. Bonifacio), Forensic Chemist of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory. The aforementioned parties narrated that on July 25,
2006, an information was received by Senior Inspector Joefel Felongco Siason
(S/Insp. Siason) of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force
(SAIDSOTF), Makati City, from a confidential asset of the MADAC that rampant
illegal drug peddling in Laperal Compound, Barangay Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City
was being carried out by the accused-appellant, Jun Gamata (Jun), Toto Madera and
Totoy Pajayjay. Apparently, their names are also included in the watch list of the
MADAC.
A team composed of SAIDSOTF police officers and MADAC operatives was
formed to conduct a buy-bust operation against the said subjects. PO2 Aseboque
was designated as the poseur-buyer while the rest of the team members were
assigned to be his back-up. The operation was coordinated with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) under Pre-Coordination Sheet Control Number MMRO072506-0212 duly acknowledged to have been received by PO1 Nemencio V.
Domingo of the PDEA. One piece of a 500.00 bill was also marked for use in the
operation.
At around 4:30 p.m., the team, together with the confidential informant,
proceeded to the subject area. The team members positioned themselves in spots
where they can monitor the possible transaction. Meanwhile, PO2 Aseboque and the
informant walked towards Laperal Compound and thereupon noticed a woman clad
in white t-shirt and maong pants. The informant identified her to PO2 Aseboque as
the accused-appellant.
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The two of them then approached the accused-appellant whom PO2
Aseboque queried as to the whereabouts of Jun. In response, the accused-appellant
said that Jun was not around and that "kami nandito lang, bakit kukuha ba kayo?"
PO2 Aseboque comprehended her response as the street language used in the
dealing of dangerous drugs and that she actually meant that she was selling shabu
if they wanted to buy one. PO2 Aseboque repeated his query to which the accusedappellant replied, "Wag niyong hintayin si Jun, ako meron." PO2 Aseboque took her
response as a confirmation that she was indeed selling shabu. He then asked her if
she had 500.00 worth of shabu.
Gamata took out one plastic sachet from her right pocket and handed it over
to PO2 Aseboque who in turn examined its contents and thereafter handed the buybust money to Gamata. As she was placing the money inside her pocket, PO2
Aseboque made the pre-arranged signal to his buy-bust team mates by lighting a
cigarette.
Upon seeing MADAC operative Pulido rushing towards the scene, PO2
Aseboque held the accused-appellant and introduced himself as a police officer. He
directed her to empty the contents of her pockets but she refused. This prompted
PO2 Aseboque to order Pulido to dig into the accused-appellants pockets. Pulido
complied and discovered three more pieces of transparent plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substance suspected as shabu along with the buy-bust money and
120.00 of the accused-appellants personal money.
Gamata was then informed of her constitutional rights while the sachet she
sold to PO2 Aseboque was immediately marked by the latter with his initials "REA"
while those recovered by Pulido were marked with "REA-1", "REA-2", and "REA-3". At
the crime scene, PO2 Aseboque also prepared an Acknowledgment Receipt 7which
he and the arresting team signed.
Gamata and the seized evidence were subsequently brought to the Makati
SAIDSOTF office where they were turned over to PO2 Rafael Castillo (PO2 Castillo)
for investigation, interrogation and proper disposition. At the same office, PO2
Aseboque executed an Affidavit of Arrest and a Supplemental Affidavit.
She then refuted all of the above occurrences and has her own version of the
said event.
RTC sustained the prosecutions version and held that the pieces of evidence
submitted established the presence of the elements of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs. Gamatas denial and alibi were rejected for being unsubstantiated. Her
imputations of frame-up to the police officers were likewise found uncorroborated by
convincing proof and thus overthrown by the presumption of regularity attached to
the performance of the police officers official duties.
The RTC found Gamata guilty of violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.CA
affirmed RTCs decision.

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Issue:
Whether or not Gamata is guilty of violating violating Section 5, Article II of
RA 9165
Ruling:
Gamata is guilty of violating violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.
The Court finds no reversible error imputable to the appellate court and the
trial court in finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu
defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
Illegal sale of prohibited drugs is consummated at the moment the buyer
receives the drug from the seller. In a buy-bust operation, the crime is
consummated when the police officer makes an offer to buy that is accepted by the
accused, and there is an ensuing exchange between them involving the delivery of
the dangerous drugs to the police officer. In order to successfully prosecute the
offense, proof beyond reasonable doubt of two elements must be satisfied by the
prosecution, viz: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the identity of the
object and the consideration of the sale; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and of
the payment for the thing.
As correctly ruled by the courts a quo, the presence of both requisites was
clearly established by the testimony of the poseur-buyer himself, PO2 Aseboque,
who positively testified that the illegal sale took place when he gave theP500.00
marked money to the accused-appellant in exchange for the shabu.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LARRY MENDOZA y ESTRADA
G.R. No. 192432, June 23, 2014, J. Bersamin
To discharge its duty of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the Prosecution must prove the corpus delicti. The Prosecution
does not comply with the indispensable requirement of proving the violation of
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 when the dangerous drugs are missing but also
when there are substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized dangerous
drugs
Facts:
Policemen Arnel Diocena and Alfredo DG Lim testified that on September 29,
2007, they received reports that an alias Larry was selling shabu at St. Claire
Street, Barangay Calumpang, Binangonan, Rizal. They organized a buy-bust
operation where Diocena acted as the poseur buyer while Lim served as back-up.
They proceeded to the target area with their asset at around 10:45 p.m. There
Diocena and the asset waited in the corner on their motorcycle while Lim and the
other cops positioned themselves in the perimeter. The asset texted Larry and they
waited for him to arrive. Later, Larry arrived and told them, Pasensya na at ngayon
lang dumating ang mga items. Larry then asked them how much they were buying
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and Diocena told P500.00 worth. Larry took out two plastic sachets of shabu and
gave it to Diocena who gave him a marked P500 bill. Diocena lit the left signal light
of his motorcycle to signal Lim and the other cops that the deal was done. They
then arrested Larry who turned out to be the accused. After frisking him, they
recovered another sachet of shabu from him. Diocena marked the items. These
were sent to the police crime lab for forensic testing where they tested positive for
0.03, 0.01 and 0.01 grams for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu
respectively. LEM-1 and LEM-2 were made the basis of the pushing charge while
LEM-3 the one for possession."
Issue:
Whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violations of
Section 5 and Section 11 of RA No. 9165
Ruling:
No, he is not.
The State did not satisfactorily explain substantial lapses committed by the
buy-bust team in the chain of custody; hence, the guilt of the accused for the crime
charged was not established beyond reasonable doubt. The presentation of the
dangerous drugs as evidence in court is material if not indispensable in every
prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. As such, the identity of the
dangerous drugs should be established beyond doubt by showing that the
dangerous drugs offered in court were the same substances bought during the buybust operation. This rigorous requirement, known under RA No. 9165 as the chain of
custody, performs the function of ensuring that unnecessary doubts concerning the
identity of the evidence are removed.
To discharge its duty of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, therefore, the Prosecution must prove the corpus delicti. That
proof is vital to a judgment of conviction. On the other hand, the Prosecution does
not comply with the indispensable requirement of proving the violation of Section 5
of Republic Act No. 9165 when the dangerous drugs are missing but also when there
are substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs that raise
doubts about the authenticity of the evidence presented in court.
An examination of the records reveals that the buy-bust team did not observe
the statutory procedures on preserving the chain of custody. To start with, the State
did not show the presence during the seizure and confiscation of the contraband, as
well as during the physical inventory and photographing of the contraband, of the
representatives from the media or the Department of Justice, or of any elected
public official. Such presence was precisely necessary to insulate the apprehension
and incrimination proceedings from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMIE ORTEGA y KALBI, a.k.a AY-AY
G.R. No. 207392, July 2, 2014, J. Perez

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A buy-bust operation was conducted wherein accused was caught selling
illegal drugs. The accused argued that there was there was lack of inventory, and
the marking of the items was not done in his presence, a representative of media,
the Department of Justice and an elected official. The Court affirmed his conviction
and ruled that substantial compliance with the legal requirements on the handling
of the seized item is sufficient. Such procedural lapse is not fatal and will not
render the items seized inadmissible in evidence. What is of utmost importance is
the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the
same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
Facts:
A confidential informant tipped the Zamboanga City Police Office, Anti-Illegal
Drugs Special Operations Task Force: Tumba Droga that a married couple named Ayay and Lenlen were selling shabu in their residence.
A team was formed to conduct a buy-bust operation and PO2 Jaafar Jambiran
was tasked to act as the poseur-buyer, with PO3 Alvin Ajuji as his immediate backup. Five others were included in the team to serve as perimeter security.
Upon arriving PO2 Jambiran and the informant walked towards Ramies
house. The informant pointed to Ramie, who was then seated on a bench outside.
The informant asked him, in Tausug dialect, if he has stuff or shabu since PO2
Jambiran wanted to purchase some of the stuff. He replied by asking how much is
he buying, to which informant answered P200.00. PO2 Jambiran gave the marked
twoP100.00 bills in exchange for two plastic sachets of shabu, which Ramie took
from his right pocket.
PO2 Jambiran scrutinized the items sold to him and then executed the prearranged signal of removing his hat. PO3 Ajuji rushed to the scene while PO2
Jambiran grabbed Ramies hand and introduced himself as a policeman.
PO2 Jambiran informed him of his constitutional rights and the fact the he
violated R.A. No. 9165. After handcuffing Ramie, PO3 Ajuji conducted a body search
on him and found two P100.00 bills inside his right pocket. Using her cellphone,
PO2 Hilda Montuno took pictures of Ramie and his wife Len-len (who was acquitted
since evidence against her was inadmissible for being a product of an invalid
search) before bringing them to the Police Office.
PO2 Jambiran turned over to the investigator, PO3 Allan M. Benasing, two
plastic sachets of shabu taken from Ramie, which he consequently marked with
initials JJ. PO3 Ajuji turned over the marked money and the two other plastic
sachets of shabu taken from Len-len, which he also successively marked with his
initials AA. PO2 Montuno also turned over the photographs. These were all
received pursuant to Complaint Assignment Sheet No. 1894.
Upon receiving all the evidence, PO3 Benasing also placed his initials AB.
PO3 Benasing then prepared a request for laboratory examination for the plastic
sachets, personally forwarded the request to the Crime Laboratory Office and these
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were received by the duty Police Non-Commissioned Officer thereat by placing the
stamp of the said office at the same day.
Police Senior Inspector Melvin Ledesma Manuel, a forensic chemist of the PNP
Crime Laboratory examined the contents of the plastic sachets and issued report
which yielded positive findings for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. It was
co-signed by Police Chief Inspector Constante Sunio Sonido.
Both the trial court and appellate court found him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal sale of drugs.
Issue:
Whether or not the chain of custody was broken
Ruling:
No, the Court ruled that it was not and convicted Ramie.
The Court held that all elements of illegal sale of drugs were present. The
prosecutions evidence positively identified the buyer as PO2 Jambiran and the
seller as Ramie. Likewise, the two sachets of shabu as the object of the sale and the
P200.00 as consideration were presented. Finally, the delivery of the shabu sold and
its payment were clearly testified to by prosecution witnesses.
Ramie alleged that there was lack of inventory and the marking of the items
was not done in his presence, a representative of media, the Department of Justice
and an elected official. Further, he averred that the confiscated items were only
examined two days after it was submitted for laboratory examination. Such failure
casts doubt on the validity of his arrest and the identity of shabu allegedly seized
and confiscated from him.
Although ideally the prosecution should offer a perfect chain of custody in the
handling of evidence, substantial compliance with the legal requirements on the
handling of the seized item is sufficient. Even if the arresting officers failed to
strictly comply with the requirements under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such
procedural lapse is not fatal and will not render the items seized inadmissible in
evidence.
What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In this case, the Court ruled
that the prosecution has clearly shown that the chain of custody has been
unbroken.
Even if there was no categorical statement on the part of the prosecution
witnesses that a physical inventory was prepared, it was testified on that the
Complaint/Assignment sheet prepared by PO2 Jambiran and the police report
prepared by PO3 Benasing reflected the details of items seized. Likewise, PSI
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Manuel was able to explain why the plastic sachets turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory were examined by him only two days after these were delivered.
JAIME D. DELA CRUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014, C.J. Sereno
A person apprehended or arrested who are to be subject of confirmatory drug
test cannot literally mean any person apprehended or arrested for any crime. The
phrase must be read in context and understood in consonance with R.A. 9165.
Section 15 comprehends persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed
under Article II of the law. In this case, the accused appellant was arrested in the
alleged act of extortion, hence, the drug test conducted to him despite his objection
is rendered illegal and is therefore inadmissible. Since the drug test was the only
basis for his conviction, the Court ordered the acquittal of the accused.
Facts:
Petitioner Jaime D. Dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15, Article
II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002 in an Information dated 14 February 2006. When arraigned, petitioner Jaime,
assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The evidence of the prosecution reveals that Dela Cruz was apprehended for
the crime of Extortion. After apprehension, the accused was brought to the forensic
laboratory of the NBI-CEVRO where forensic examination was done by forensic
chemist Rommel Paglinawan. Jaime was required to submit his urine for drug
testing. It later yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs as
indicated in the confirmatory test result labelled as Toxicology (Dangerous Drugs)
Report No. 2006-TDD-2402 dated 16 February 2006. On the basis of which, the
accused was charged with the violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No.
(R.A.) 9165, or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The defense presented Dela Cruz as the lone witness. He denied the charges
and testified that while eating at the said Jollibee branch, he was arrested allegedly
for extortion by NBI agents. When he was at the NBI Office, he was required to
extract urine for drug examination, but he refused saying he wanted it to be done
by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the NBI. His
request was, however, denied. He also requested to be allowed to call his lawyer
prior to the taking of his urine sample, to no avail.
RTC Cebu found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. His conviction
was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether the drug test conducted upon Dela Cruz is legal
Ruling:

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No. A person apprehended or arrested cannot literally mean any person
apprehended or arrested for any crime. The phrase must be read in context and
understood in consonance with R.A. 9165. Section 15 comprehends persons
arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under Article II of the law.
Accordingly, a drug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended or
arrested for, among others, the importation, sale, trading, administration,
dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation, manufacture and
possession of dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential
chemicals; possession thereof during parties, social gatherings or meetings; being
employees and visitors of a den, dive or resort; maintenance of a den, dive or
resort; illegal chemical diversion of controlled precursors and essential
chemicals; manufacture or delivery or possession of equipment, instrument,
apparatus, and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals; possession of dangerous drugs during parties,
social gatherings or meetings; unnecessary or unlawful prescription thereof;
cultivation or culture of plants classified as dangerous drugs or are sources
thereof;and maintenance and keeping of original records of transactions on
dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals.
To make the provision applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for
any crime not listed under Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning.
Moreover, making the phrase a person apprehended or arrested in Section 15
applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under
R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all
persons apprehended or arrested for any crime.
In this case, Dela Cruz was arrested in the alleged act of extortion, hence, the
drug test conducted to him despite his objection is rendered illegal and is therefore
inadmissible. Since the drug test was the only basis for his conviction, the Court
ordered the acquittal of Dela Cruz.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARCELINO VITERBO y REALUBIT and
RONALD VITERBO y REALUBIT
G.R. No. 203434, July 23, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that
the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. In context, this
would ideally include testimony about every link in the chain, from the seizure of
the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that
everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession,
the condition in which it was received, and the condition in which it was delivered to
the next link in the chain.
While non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements will not
automatically render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, this is
true only when (a) there is a justifiable ground for such noncompliance, and (b) the
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integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. Hence,
any divergence from the prescribed procedure must be justified and should not
affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items.
A punctilious examination of the records in this case shows that the
prosecution failed to establish the identity of the substance allegedly confiscated
from the accused-appellants, militating against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Facts:
A confidential informant (CI) reported to the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Regional Office V
that there were persons peddling illegal drugs in Albay. Immediately, Police Senior
Inspector Dennis Vargas (PS/Insp. Vargas), a member of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), formed a team composed of six (6) police officers to
conduct a buy-bust operation. Senior Police Officer 4 Fernando Cardona (SPO4
Cardona) of the CIDG was designated as the poseur-buyer, while Police Officer 2
Leonardo Garcia (PO2 Garcia) and Police Officer 2Emerito Zamora (PO2 Zamora)
were assigned as arresting officers.
A 500-peso bill was marked with the initials "NL" which was then given to
SPO4 Cardona.
Together with the CI, the buy-bust team proceeded to the target. SPO4
Cardona and the CI were tasked to negotiate with them, while the rest of the buybust team strategically positioned themselves nearby to observe the transaction.
Upon meeting the accused-appellants, the CI introduced SPO4 Cardona, who
expressed interest in buying shabu worth 500.00. As SPO4 Cardona handed the
marked money to Marcelino, the latter told his brother, Ronald, who was standing
beside him, to give the shabu to SPO4 Cardona. Ronald then reached inside his
pocket and produced two (2) transparent plastic sachets allegedly containing shabu
which he gave to SPO4 Cardona who, upon receipt thereof, executed the prearranged signal by scratching his head. Thereupon, PO2 Garcia and PO2 Zamora
immediately rushed in, apprehended accused-appellants and apprised them of their
constitutional rights. SPO4 Cardona kept the two (2) sachets in his possession and,
together with the rest of the buy-bust team, brought accused-appellants, the
marked money, and the plastic sachets to the PDEA Office
At the PDEA Office, SPO4 Cardona marked the plastic sachets while PS/Insp.
Vargas prepared the request for laboratory examination of the substances found in
the plastic sachets. SPO4 Cardona and another policeman brought the laboratory
request and the plastic sachets to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office, but
since no chemist was available that evening, they returned to the PDEA Office. The
following day, the plastic sachets together with the laboratory request were brought
by another policeman to the same crime laboratory for examination.
Upon qualitative examination, Police Inspector Josephine Macura Clemen
(P/Insp. Clemen), a forensic chemist, found that the contents yielded positive results
for methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu.
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A complaint was filed against the accused-appellants for drug pushing. RTC
convicted them and was affirmed by CA.
Issue:
Whether or not accused appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165
Ruling:
No, they are not guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165, the following elements must concur: (a) the identities of the
buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment for it. As the dangerous drug itself forms an integral and key part
of the corpus delicti of the crime, it is therefore essential that the identity of the
prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the prosecution
must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous
drug, from the moment it was seized from the accused up to the time it was
presented in court as proof of the corpus delicti.
As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that
the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. In context, this
would ideally include testimony about every link in the chain, from the seizure of
the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that
everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the
condition in which it was received, and the condition in which it was delivered to the
next link in the chain.
The chain of custody requirement "ensures that unnecessary doubts
respecting the identity of the evidence are minimized if not altogether removed." In
relation thereto, Section 21(1), Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure on the
chain of custody of confiscated, seized, or surrendered dangerous drugs.
While non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements will not
automatically render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, this is
true only when (a) there is a justifiable ground for such noncompliance, and (b) the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. Hence,
any divergence from the prescribed procedure must be justified and should not
affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items.
A punctilious examination of the records in this case shows that the
prosecution failed to establish the identity of the substance allegedly confiscated

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from the accused-appellants, militating against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
SPO4 Cardona, the poseur-buyer who transacted with accused- appellants,
testified that he kept in his possession and custody the two (2) plastic sachets
containing the illegal substance from the time they were confiscated up to the time
that he marked them in the PDEA Office. Together with a companion, he brought the
confiscated items as well as the laboratory request to the PNP Regional Crime
Laboratory Office. However, he was unable to deliver the confiscated items and the
laboratory request because he was informed that there was no chemist to conduct
the examination at the time. As such, he decided to return to the PDEA Office,
bringing with him the items and the laboratory request. The following day, someone
else delivered the confiscated items and the laboratory request to the crime
laboratory.
It is clear that the confiscated items changed hands before they were
delivered to the crime laboratory, i.e., from SPO4 Cardona to "Captain Vargas" who,
unfortunately, did not testify in this case in order to shed light on what happened to
the seized items when they were turned over to his possession, or at the very least,
to clarify if he was the person who successfully delivered the plastic sachets
together with the laboratory request to the crime laboratory. His testimony in this
regard is significant, considering that the laboratory request, on its lower left
portion, reflects that it was delivered by a certain "PO2 Zamora" who, the Court
notes, was likewise not presented in court to explain his role in the chain of custody
of the seized items. What was established, instead, was that the seized items and
the laboratory request were received by the clerk of the crime laboratory, who
turned them over to P/Insp. Clemen, the forensic chemist who performed the
qualitative examination on the substances.
However, the records are devoid of evidence to indicate the PDEA
member/agent who specifically delivered the items to her. Clearly, while the
custodial link began and ended with SPO4 Cardona, there were substantial gaps in
the chain of custody of the seized items, particularly the events that transpired from
the time the items left the hands of SPO4 Cardona and turned over to the
possession of "Captain Vargas," as well as the identity of the PDEA agent who
brought them together with the laboratory request to Garcia, the receiving clerk of
the crime laboratory, in the morning of the following day.
While the laboratory request was prepared and signed by PS/Insp. Vargas,
whom the Court reasonably presumes to be the same "Captain Vargas" referred to
in SPO4 Cardonas testimony, there is dearth of evidence showing that he was the
same person who brought the items to Garcia, taking into consideration the fact
that the laboratory request accompanying the items was signed/delivered by "PO2
Zamora." These are crucial missing links in this case which should have been clearly
accounted for in order to establish the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items.
The prosecutions case is further weakened by the fact that the seized items
were delivered not on the same day of the buy-bust operation, but only the
following day. To the Courts mind, the considerable amount of time that had
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transpired from the conduct of the buy-bust operation until the same were brought
for laboratory examination, especially when viewed together with the abovementioned considerations, figures into a gaping hiatus in the chain of custody of the
said items, which is extremely fatal to the cause of the prosecution.
Thus, in the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that there exists
reasonable doubt on the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items,
necessitating therefor strict compliance with the provisions of Section 21, Article II
of RA 9165.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PETER FANG y GAMBOA a.k.a. "Fritz
G.R. No. 199874, July 23, 2014, J. Jose Portugal Perez
In every prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be
sufficiently proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
Indeed, all these elements were duly established. Pertinently, it is the preservation
of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items which must be proven to
establish the corpus delicti. The mere fact that the drugs obtained were more, had
no bearing on the crime charged. This is because liability under Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165 is without regard to the quantity of the drugs seized. The
prosecution herein was able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the
said illegal drugs. The concurrence of all elements of the illegal sale of shabu was
proven by the prosecution
Facts:
Acting on a tip from an informant that a certain "Fritz" and "Kaday" were
selling shabu at the Slaughter Compound, Police Chief Inspector Pacatiw of the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Baguio City formed a buy-bust
composed of PO2 Lubos as poseur-buyer, a certain SPO4 Lucas from Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency and a certain PO1 Lacangan from the CIDG, who acted as
back-ups. PO2 Lubos and SPO4 Lucas brought the buy-bust money and a piece of
Five Hundred Peso bill, to the Fiscals office for authentication.
Then the buy-bust team proceeded to the Slaughter Compound. Upon
reaching the area, PO2 Lubos and the informant went to the house where the
alleged illegal drug activity was taking place. Other members of the buy-bust team
were positioned in the area. The informant knocked on the door and a certain Fritz,
who was later identified as appellant Peter Fang, and Kaday, who was later
identified as appellants son, Jefferson Fang (Jefferson), came out of the house. Peter
talked to the informant.
Thereafter, the informant and Peter approached PO2 Lubos, and asked the
latter how much will he get. PO2 Lubos answered "limampiso lang," which means
Five Hundred Pesos. Latter asked about the money prompting PO2 Lubos to bring
out the Five Hundred Peso bill and hand it to Peter. In turn, Peter brought out 2 small
sachets of shabu and gave it to PO2 Lubos. After examining the same, PO2 Lubos
made the pre-arranged signal of removing his cap. The back-up police operatives
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emerged and arrested Peter, and SPO4 Lucas frisked Peter and was able to recover
the buy-bust money and another sachet of shabu from his pocket.
Police Chief Inspector Pacatiw frisked Jefferson and recovered two sachets of
marijuana. After informing the accused of their constitutional rights, they were
placed under arrest and brought to the CAR-CIDG. The confiscated sachets of shabu
were marked and an inventory of the seized items was made.
RTC rendered a Joint Judgment finding Peter in violation of Section 5, Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165. Jefferson was acquitted for illegal possession of shabu and
marijuana, respectively which the CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not Peter is liable for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165
Ruling:
Yes, Peter is liable for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
In every prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be
sufficiently proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
Indeed, all these elements were duly established. Peter was caught in flagrante
delicto selling shabu through a buy-bust operation conducted by members of the
CIDG in Baguio City.
The result of the laboratory examination, as testified to by the forensic
chemist, confirmed the presence of methamphetamine hydrochlorideon the white
crystalline substance inside the plastic sachet confiscated from appellant. The
delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the
marked money successfully consummated the buy-bust transaction. This was
further corroborated by the presentation of the marked money in evidence. Peter
asserts that the standard procedures for the custody and disposition of the
confiscated drugs as provided in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not
complied with. Peter argues that the physical inventory of the seized items was not
conducted in the place where the seizure had taken place.
Pertinently, it is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items which must be proven to establish the corpus delicti. The mere fact
that the drugs obtained were more, had no bearing on the crime charged. This is
because liability under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 is without regard to the
quantity of the drugs seized.
The prosecution was able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of
the said illegal drugs. The concurrence of all elements of the illegal sale of shabu
was proven by the prosecution. Moreover, the rule is that inconsistencies in the
testimony of witnesses, when referring only to minor details and collateral matters,
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do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight
of their testimony. Such minor inconsistencies even enhance their veracity as the
variances erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.
The chain of custody does not appear to have been broken. The recovery and
handling of the seized drugs were satisfactorily established. As correctly found by
the appellate court, "no break whatsoever in the chain of custody of the prohibited
drugs occurred. The testimonial, documentary, and object evidence presented by
the prosecution established every link in the custody of the prohibited drugs. This
leads to no other conclusion than that the specimen examined by the forensic
chemist, which tested positive for shabu, and which were presented as evidence
during the trial, were the ones taken from accused-appellant during the buy-bust
operation."
Peters defense, which is predicated on a bare denial, deserves scant
consideration in light of the positive testimonies of the police officers. The defense
of frame-up or denial in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence
because of the presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular
performance of their official duties. Bare denials of appellant cannot prevail over the
positive testimonies of the three police officers. Moreover, there is no evidence of
any improper motive on the part of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust
operation to falsely testify against appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. REYMAN ENDAYA y LAIG
G.R. No. 205741, July 23, 2014, J. Perez
To secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the following essential
elements must be established: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the
object of the sale, and the consideration for the sale; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material in the prosecution of an
illegal sale of dangerous drugs is proof that the transaction or sale actually took
place, coupled with the presentation of the corpus delicti in court as evidence.
The commission of illegal sale merely requires the consummation of the
selling transaction, which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from
the seller. As long as a police officer or civilian asset went through the operation as
a buyer, whose offer was accepted by the appellant, followed by the delivery of the
dangerous drugs to the former, the crime is already consummated. In the case at
bar, the prosecution has amply proven all the elements of the drug sale with moral
certainty.
The records show that appellant was arrested in a legitimate buy-bust
operation conducted after a week of surveillance. The police officers comprising the
buy-bust team positively identified appellant as the one who sold the plastic sachet
of shabu to their civilian asset who, in turn, handed the marked money to appellant.

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Both the sachet of shabuand the marked money were presented as evidence in
court.
Facts:
Police operatives, acting on a report from a barangay official that Endaya is
involved in illegal drug activities, conducted surveillance operations on him. A team,
composed of SPO4 MorielBenedicto (SPO4 Benedicto), SPO3 Nestor Babadilla (SPO3
Babadilla) and PO2 Edwin Chavez (PO2 Chavez), was formed to perform a buy-bust
operation against appellant. A civilian asset, armed with five (5) pieces ofP100.00
bills as marked money, acted as poseur-buyer.
On board a car, the police operatives and the civilian asset proceeded to the
place of operation. Endaya subsequently arrived and approached the civilian asset,
who was standing in front of the beer house. The two talked for a while, after which,
the police operatives saw the civilian asset hand the marked money to appellant
who, in turn, handed something to the former which later turned out to be a plastic
sachet containing shabu.
After receiving the plastic sachet from Endaya, the civilian asset made the
pre-arranged signal of touching his head to signify that the transaction had been
completed. The police officers then immediately approached Endaya, introduced
themselves as police officers and informed him that he is under arrest for selling
shabu. Appellant was informed of his constitutional rights in Tagalog and then
frisked by SPO3 Babadilla and PO2 Chavez for any deadly weapon.
During this body search, SPO3 Babadilla recovered the marked money from
Endaya. Meanwhile, the shabu subject of the sale between Endaya and the civilian
asset was handed by the latter to PO2 Chavez. The shabu subject of the buy-bust
operation, on the other hand, was marked by PO2 Chavez by writing the same
figure "8" on the sachet but he added a distinctive mark by burning the edges of the
plastic sachet to distinguish it from the other eight sachets confiscated from
appellant.
The team thereafter conducted an inventory of the items seized from Endaya
in the latters presence. A photograph of Endaya and the seized items, together
with the aforementioned witnesses was taken at the police station. Finally, a letter
request for laboratory examination, together with the marked sachets, was
transmitted to the Philippine National Police crime laboratory. The qualitative
examination conducted on the specimens yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

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RTC convicted Endaya of the offenses charged in these cases for violation of
Section 5 (paragraph 1) and Section 11 (paragraph 3), both of Article II of Republic
Act 9165 which was affirmed by CA.
Issue:
Whether or not Endaya is guilty for violation of Section 5 (paragraph 1) and
Section 11 (paragraph 3), both of Article II of Republic Act 9165
Ruling:
Yes, Endaya is guilty for violation of Section 5 (paragraph 1) and Section 11
(paragraph 3), both of Article II of Republic Act 9165
To secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the following essential
elements must be established: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the
object of the sale, and the consideration for the sale; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material in the prosecution of an illegal
sale of dangerous drugs is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation of the corpus delicti in court as evidence.
The commission of illegal sale merely requires the consummation of the
selling transaction, which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from
the seller. As long as a police officer or civilian asset went through the operation as
a buyer, whose offer was accepted by the appellant, followed by the delivery of the
dangerous drugs to the former, the crime is already consummated. In the case at
bar, the prosecution has amply proven all the elements of the drug sale with moral
certainty.
The records show that Endaya was arrested in a legitimate buy-bust
operation conducted after a week of surveillance. The police officers comprising the
buy-bust team positively identified appellant as the one who sold the plastic sachet
of shabu to their civilian asset who, in turn, handed the marked money to Endaya.
Both the sachet of shabu and the marked money were presented as evidence in
court.
For the successful prosecution of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, the following requisites must concur: (a) the accused was in possession of an
item or object that is identified to be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (b) such
possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the drug.
The foregoing elements were likewise convincingly established herein. When
the police operatives bodily searched Endaya for his wallet at the police station,

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they found eight(8) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance which,
upon laboratory examination, turned out to be shabu.
To ascertain that the illegal drugs presented in court are the ones actually
seized from the accused, the prosecution must show that: (a) the prescribed
procedure under Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 has been complied with or
falls within the saving clause provided in Section 21(a), Article II of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165; and (b) there was an
unbroken link in the chain of custody with respect to the confiscated items. Section
21, Article II of R.A. 9165 embodies the procedural safeguards intended to counter
or prevent possible police abuses in cases of buy-bust operations.
Compliance with the foregoing provisions, "especially the required physical
inventory and photograph of the seized drugs in the presence of the accused, the
media, and responsible government functionaries, would be clear evidence that the
police had carried out a legitimate buy-bust operation."
The records of this case clearly show that the foregoing requirements were
complied with.
As mandated by the above-quoted provision of law, the apprehending team
conducted a physical inventory of the drugs confiscated from Endaya, as evidenced
by the "Receipt for Property Seized" which was signed by representatives from the
municipal trial court, a non-governmental organization, the media, and three locally
elected public officials, as proof that they were present when the inventory was
carried out.
Likewise, a photograph of the Endaya, together with the items seized from
him, and with the aforementioned representatives from the public and private
sector as witnesses, was taken at the police station. The physical inventory and
taking of the photograph were done after the confiscated items were marked by
PO2 Chavez. Finally, within 24 hours from the time the plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance were taken from Endaya, the same were forwarded to
the regional crime laboratory office for qualitative examination where the
specimens tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
In view of the foregoing, the allegation of Endaya that the apprehending
officers failed to comply with the mandates of Section 21, particularly paragraph 1,
of R.A. No. 9165 has no basis. In addition to this, jurisprudence states that "the
phrase marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at the
nearest police station or office of the apprehending team." Hence, the fact that the
seized plastic sachets were marked at the police station only does not deviate from
the elements required in the preservation of the integrity of the seized drugs.

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In any case, contrary to Endayas claim, strict compliance with Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165 is not necessary" as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team
Indeed, this Court has, in many cases held that "while the chain of custody
should ideally be perfect, in reality it is not, as it is almost always impossible to
obtain an unbroken chain. The most important factor is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused."
It is essential for the prosecution to prove that the prohibited drug
confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in
court as exhibit. Its identity must be established with unwavering exactitude for it to
lead to a finding of guilt." That the substances which were sent to the crime
laboratory and examined by the forensic chemical officer and found to be shabu
were the very same substances which the police officers seized from appellant is
proven
Finally, in order to prove the unbroken chain of custody of the prohibited
drugs confiscated from appellant, the respective testimonies of SPO4 Benedicto and
PO2 Chavez establish that the plastic sachet subject of the illegal sale was handed
over by the civilian asset acting as poseur buyer to PO2 Chavez while still at the
crime scene.
PO2 Chavez continued to be in possession of the same until they reached the
police station where he accomplished the marking thereof. The eight sachets of
shabu in the wallet of appellant, on the other hand, which were found by PO2
Chavez after bodily searching the former at the police station, were likewise marked
by PO2 Chavez. Once marked, the items were turned over to the police investigator
and thereafter, a letter-request together with the marked sachets was forwarded to
the crime laboratory for examination where the substances inside the plastic
sachets tested positive for shabu. These sachets, with their identifying marks still
intact, were then presented in court.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANUELITA AMPATUAN y GONZALES, et


al.
G.R. No. 188707, July 30, 2014, J. Perez
The elements necessary for the prosecution of the illegal sale of drugs are as
follows: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor. The
prosecution, to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, must present in evidence the
corpus delicti of the case. The corpus delicti is the seized illegal drugs. This Court is
convinced that the prosecution has sufficiently discharged its burden to establish
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the elements in the illegal sale of shabu. The prosecution was able to establish the
(1) identity of accused-appellants as the sellers, and the buyer, Dujon; and (2) the
object of the transaction, which is the jumbo sachet of shabu, weighing 46.4490
grams; and the delivery of the sold illegal shabu to Dujon, the poseur-buyer.
Facts:
Police officers apprehended Edward Dujon (Dujon) for violation of R.A. No.
9165, which resulted to his detention. While in detention, Dujon approached Police
Chief Inspector Wilkins Villanueva (Chief P/Insp. Villanueva) to give information on
the alleged drug activity of accused-appellant Manuelita and her groupas one of his
suppliers of shabu.To verify Dujons claim, Chief P/Insp. Villanueva ordered Dujon to
contact Manuelita. When Dujon was able to talk to Manuelita, he ordered shabuand
asked that it be delivered to him.
Subsequently, Manuelita texted Dujon that she and her men, accusedappellants Mastor and Warren, were already waiting for him near Dimsum Diner. At
around nine oclock in the morning, Dujon and Manuelitas convoy arrived at
Jogues. Dujon, after getting a room, went to Room No. 3 together with Manuelitas
group. After a few minutes in Room No. 3, they were informed to move to Room No.
2. In Room No. 2, Dujon asked Manuelita to wait for his assistant. Manuelita then
took out the headscarf she was clasping, opened it, and handed the jumbo sachet
with crystalline substance over to Dujon.
Meanwhile, when Dujon failed to update the PDEA as previously planned, PO1
Anthony Alpiz (PO1 Alpiz) peered through a window of Room No. 2. According to PO1
Alpiz, he clearly saw Manuelita hand Dujon the jumbo sachet with crystalline
substance. Upon seeing that the jumbo sachet with crystalline substance was in
Dujons possession, PO1 Alpiz, followed by other PDEA operatives, rushed into Room
No. 2.After reading accused-appellants their constitutional rights, the PDEA
operatives handcuffed them.
Issue:
1. Whether or not accused-appellants Mastor and Warren are liable for illegal
sale of shabu.
2. Whether or not Dujon is disqualified as principal witness against Mastor
and Warren.
Ruling:
1. Yes. The elements necessary for the prosecution of the illegal sale of drugs are as
follows: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor. The
prosecution, to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, must present in evidence the
corpus delicti of the case. The corpus delicti is the seized illegal drugs. This Court is
convinced that the prosecution has sufficiently discharged its burden to establish
the elements in the illegal sale of shabu. The prosecution was able to establish the
(1) identity of accused-appellants as the sellers, and the buyer, Dujon; and (2) the
object of the transaction, which is the jumbo sachet of shabu, weighing 46.4490
grams; and the delivery of the sold illegal shabu to Dujon, the poseur-buyer.
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Relative to the required proof of an unbroken chain of custody of the seized
illegal shabu and shabu paraphernalia, the parties agreed to stipulate on the
relevant testimony of the witnesses, the request for laboratory examination,
machine copy blotter, inventory, photographs, and affidavits, all attesting to the
fulfillment of the requirement. Indeed, the defense never raised as defense any
break in the chain of custody of the seized shabu and drug paraphernalia.
2. No. The qualification and credibility of Dujon as a principal witness cannot be
assailed. The law has specifically provided for the immunity of informants from
prosecution and punishment. Section 33, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 provides:
Section 33.Immunity from Prosecution and Punishment. Notwithstanding the
provisions of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and
the provisions of Republic Act No. 6981 or the Witness Protection, Security and
Benefit Act of 1991, any person who has violated Sections 7, 11, 12, 14, 15, and 19,
Article II of this Act, who voluntarily gives information about any violation of
Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 13, and 16, Article II of this Act as well as any violation of the
offenses mentioned if committed by a drug syndicate, or any information leading to
the whereabouts, identitiesand arrest of all or any of the members thereof; and who
willingly testifies against such persons as described above, shall be exempted from
prosecution or punishment for the offense with reference to which his/her
information of testimony were given, and may plead or prove the giving of such
information and testimony in bar of such prosecution: Provided,That the following
conditions concur:
(1) The information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of the
persons described above;
(2) Such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State;
(3) Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its material
points;
(4) the informant or witness has notbeen previously convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude, except when there is no other direct evidence
available for the State other than the information and testimony of said
informant or witness; and
(5) The informant or witness shall strictly and faithfully comply without delay,
any condition or undertaking, reduced into writing, lawfully imposed by the
State as further consideration for the grant of immunity from prosecution and
punishment.
Provided, further, That this immunity may be enjoyed by such informant or
witness who does not appear to be most guilty for the offense with reference to
which his/her information or testimony were given: Provided, finally, That there is no
direct evidence available for the State except for the information and testimony of
the said informant or witness.
The allegation that Dujon is engaged in illegal sale, indeed even the fact that
Dujon is a detainee charged with violation of the law is not a disqualification from
immunity since such is not equivalent to a previous "conviction of a crime involving
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moral turpitude."Dujon, having all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications under the law, is eligible for immunity from prosecution. While
Dujon was part of the entrapment, the sale and possession of dangerous drugs were
proven solely by Dujons testimony but largely and importantly by the testimony of
the apprehending authorities and by the admitted documents.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MIKE STEVE y BASMAN and RASHID
MANGTOMA y NONI
G.R. No. 204911, August 6, 2014, J. Perez
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC and convicted the
accused for the violation of RA 9165. The Basman and Mangtoma contend that they
cannot be convicted of the crime charged due to the failure to the procedure of the
chain of custody rule. The Supreme Court ruled that failure to strictly comply with
the prescribed procedures in the inventory of seized drugs does not render the
arrest of the accused-appellants illegal or the item seized/confiscated from them
inadmissible. The essential thing to consider is "the preservation of the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused."
Facts:
The respondents Basman and Mangtoma were charged with a criminal
complaint for the violation of Section 5 of RA 9165. A drug buy-bust operation was
planned by the police officers and subsequently, the respondents were arrested.
The Regional Trial Court convicted the respondents and found them guilty for the
crime charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, the
current petition.
The accused-appellants contended that there were glaring inconsistencies
with the testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses pertaining to the conduct of the
buy-bust operation, and the manner of the alleged consummation of saleof
dangerous drug; thatthere were procedural lapses on the part of the buy-bust team
to comply with Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165, which accordingly failed to secure the
evidence related to the arrests, and to protect the chain ofcustody; and that
ultimately, the prosecution miserably failed to prove the accused-appellants guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents should be acquitted for failure to comply with
the chain of custody procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and
ruled that the respondents are guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the commission
of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

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This Court has time and again adopted the chain of custody rule, a method of
authenticating evidence which requires that the admission of an exhibit be
precededby evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what the proponent claims it to be. This would include testimony about every link in
the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in
evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe
how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in
the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in
which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.
However, as correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, failure to strictly
comply with the prescribed procedures in the inventory of seized drugs does not
render the arrest of the accused-appellants illegal or the item seized/confiscated
from them inadmissible. The essential thing to consider is "the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused." Hence:
From the point of view of jurisprudence, the court are not beating any new
path by holding that the failure to undertake the required photography and
immediate marking of seized items may be excused by the unique circumstances of
a case. In People v. Resurreccion, the court already stated that "marking upon
immediate confiscation" does not exclude the possibility that marking can be at the
police station or office of the apprehending team. In the cases of People v. Rusiana,
People v. Hernandez, and People v. Gum-Oyen, the apprehending team marked the
confiscated items at the police station and not at the place of seizure. Nevertheless,
the court sustained the conviction because the evidence showed that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the items seized had been preserved. To reiterate what the
Court have held in past cases, the Court is not always looking for the strict step-bystep adherence to the procedural requirements; what is important is to ensure the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these
would determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. The court succinctly
explained this in People v. Del Monte when the Court held:
The Court would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21 of said law,
particularly the making of the inventory and the photographing of the drugs
confiscated and/or seized, will not render the drugs inadmissible in evidence. Under
Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to
be inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is
no such law or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary
weight that will [be] accorded (to) it by the courts. x xx
The Court does not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule
that will bring about the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs
due to non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue
therefore, if there is non-compliance with said section, is not of admissibility, but of
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weight evidentiary merit or probative value to be given the evidence. The
weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances
obtaining in each case.
From the testimonies of the police officers in the case at bench, the
prosecution established that they had custody of the drug seized from the accusedappellants from the moment they were arrested, during the time they were
transported to the police station, and up to the time the seized prohibited drug was
submitted to the crime laboratory for examination. As regards to the handling of the
seized drug, there are no conflicting testimonies or glaring inconsistencies that
would cast doubt on the integrity thereof as evidence presented and scrutinized in
court. It is therefore safe to conclude that, to the unprejudiced mind, the
testimonies show without a doubt that the evidence seized from the accusedappellants at the time of the buy-bust operation was the same one tested,
introduced, and testified to in court. This fact was further bolstered by the
stipulations entered into between the parties as to the testimony of Forensic
Chemist Bonifacio. Needless to say, the integrity of the evidence against accusedappellants was indeed preserved.
By way of resume, although this Court finds that the police officers did not
strictly comply with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, such
noncompliance did not affect the evidentiary weight of the drug seized from the
accused-appellants because the chain of custody of the evidence was shown to be
unbroken under the circumstances of the case. Similarly, Section 86 of R.A. No.
9165 is silent as to the consequence of failure to comply therewith; hence, the same
shall not be considered as a sole ground to make an arrest without the participation
of the PDEA illegal or evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible.
Note that the subject drug confiscated from the accused-appellants was properly
accounted for and forthrightly submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for its
extensive examination. Consequently, considering the pieces of evidence presented
by the prosecution, the mere denial of and the allegation of a frame-up by accusedappellants should fail. As correctly pointed out by the appellate court, the defense
of frame-up in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence to overcome the
presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular performance of
their official duties. On the other hand, courts generally view the defense of denial
with disfavor due to the facility with which an accused can concoct it to suit his or
her defense. As evidence that is both negative and self-serving, this defense cannot
attain more credibility than the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who testify
clearly, providing thereby positive evidence on the various aspects of the crime
committed.
Again, findings of fact of the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses are
accorded great weight and respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension
of facts, and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered
from such findings. The rationale behind this rule is that the trial court is in a better
position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying during trial. This rule finds an
even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the CA. This
Court does not find any convincing reason to depart from the ruling of the trial
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court, which was affirmed by the appellate court. Thus, the court affirms the
assailed Decision of the appellate court and uphold the conviction of both accusedappellants.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO HOLGADO y DELA CRUZ, et al.
G.R. No. 207992, August 11, 2014, J. Leonen
By failing to establish identity of corpus delicti, non-compliance with Section
21 indicates a failure to establish an element of the offense of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs. It follows that this non-compliance suffices as a ground for
acquittal. The integrity of three (3) of the four (4) links (i.e., seizure and marking,
turnover by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer, and turnover by
the investigating officer to the forensic chemist) has been cast in doubt. This doubt
must be resolved in favor of accused-appellants Holgado. Law enforcers should not
trifle with the legal requirement to ensure integrity in the chain of custody of seized
dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia. This is especially true when only a
miniscule amount of dangerous drugs is alleged to have been taken from the
accused.
Facts:
Accused-appellants Roberto Holgado y Dela Cruz (Holgado) and Antonio
Misarez y Zaraga (Misarez) were charged in an information for violating Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165. In the evening of January 17, 2007, police operatives went to
No. 17, C. Raymundo Street for the buy-bust operation. PO1 Philip Aure, acting as
poseur-buyer and accompanied by the police informant, approached Holgado who
was then part of a drinking session with two (2) companions. Holgado asked the
informant if he was buying drugs while at the same time offering him a drink. The
informant accepted the drink and introduced PO1 Aure as a drug user. PO1 Aure
then handed Holgado two (2) marked one hundred peso bills.
Holgado called Misarez.
After some time, co-accused Antonio Misarez
stepped out of the restroom and asked who was buying drugs. PO1 Aure and the
informant answered, Kami. Misarez then handed a plastic sachet containing a
white crystalline substance to PO1 Aure. PO1 Aure examined the sachets contents
and took out his cellphone. This was the pre-arranged signal to the other police
operatives that the sale of drugs had been consummated.
PO3 Abuyme prepared an inventory of the seized items. Specifically with
respect to the plastic sachet which was the basis of the charge of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, PO1 Aure supposedly marked the plastic sachet handed to him by
Misarez with RH-PA11 at the site of the buy-bust operation.
After trial, the RTC found Holgado and Misarez guilty of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs (i.e., violating Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165). The Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTCs decision convicting Holgado and Misarez.
Issue:

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Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish compliance with the
requisites of Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165
Ruling:
No, the SC declared that accused-appellants Roberto Holgado y Dela Cruz
and Antonio Misarez y Zaraga should be acquitted for failure of the prosecution to
prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On corpus delicti, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, as amended by
Republic Act No. 10640, provides for the custody and disposition of confiscated,
seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia. The failure to comply
with Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 implies a concomitant failure on
the part of the prosecution to establish the identity of the corpus delicti. It produces
doubts as to the origins of the seized paraphernalia.
Compliance with the chain of custody requirement provided by Section 21,
therefore, ensures the integrity of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs
and/or drug paraphernalia in four (4) respects: first, the nature of the substances or
items seized; second, the quantity (e.g., weight) of the substances or items seized;
third, the relation of the substances or items seized to the incident allegedly causing
their seizure; and fourth, the relation of the substances or items seized to the
person/s alleged to have been in possession of or peddling them. Compliance with
this requirement forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating, or tampering
of evidence in any manner.
By failing to establish identity of corpus delicti, non-compliance with Section
21 indicates a failure to establish an element of the offense of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs. It follows that this non-compliance suffices as a ground for
acquittal.
While the buy-bust operation team allegedly conducted an inventory of the
seized items, it is unclear if this inventory was limited to those seized pursuant to
the enforcement of the search warrant (i.e., after the conduct of the buy-bust
operation) or was inclusive of whatever items seized during the buy-bust operation.
In any case, this inventory was discredited as Holgado was acquitted by the
Regional Trial Court of the charge of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia
because the inventory was found to be unreliable vis-a-vis the testimony of PO2
Castulo. The paraphernalia to which PO2 Castulo testified to in court were different
from those indicated in the inventory supposedly made when the search warrant
was enforced.
There have been claims to the effect that the search warrant was enforced
in coordination with a barangay official and in the presence of some media
people. However, this barangay official and these media people have neither
been identified nor presented as witnesses. In any case, even if it were to be
granted that these individuals took part in the events that transpired in the evening
of January 17, 2007, their participation was alleged to have been only with respect
to the enforcement of the search warrant. It did not extend to the physical
inventory and taking of photographs of the seized items arising from the buy-bust
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operation, as required by Section 21. For that matter, it was not even shown that
photographs of the sachet marked as RH-PA were taken. Per his own testimony,
PO1 Aure himself doubted if any photograph was taken.
In sum, the integrity of three (3) of the four (4) links enumerated in People v.
Nandi (i.e., seizure and marking, turnover by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer, and turnover by the investigating officer to the forensic
chemist) has been cast in doubt. As in Nandi, this doubt must be resolved in favor
of accused-appellants Holgado.
It is true that Section 21(1), as amended, now includes a proviso to the effect
that noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and
custody over said items. However, the prosecution has not shown that when the
buy-bust operation was allegedly conducted on January 17, 2007 and the sachet
was supposedly seized and marked, there were justifiable grounds for dispensing
with compliance with Section 21. Rather, it merely insisted on its self-serving
assertion that the integrity of the seized sachet has nevertheless been, supposedly,
preserved. The omission became more glaring considering that the prosecution
asserted that the events of January 17, 2007 entailed a carefully planned operation,
engendered by reports of drug-related activities along C. Raymundo Street. This
planning even led to the application for and issuance of a search warrant.
Apart from the officers glaring non-compliance with Section 21, two (2)
circumstances are worth underscoring in this case. First, the shabu supposedly
seized amounted to five (5) centigrams (0.05 gram). This quantity is so miniscule it
amounts to only about 2.5% of the weight of a five-centavo coin (1.9 grams) or a
one-centavo coin (2.0 grams). Second, Holgado and Misarez were acquitted by the
Regional Trial Court of all other charges (i.e., for possession of dangerous drugs and
for possession of drug paraphernalia).
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUSTY BALA
G.R. No. 203048, August 13, 2014, J. Perez
In every prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be
sufficiently proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. All
these elements were duly established. Appellant was caught in flagrante delicto
selling shabu through a buy bust operation conducted by members of the Malabon
Drug Enforcement Unit. The poseur-buyer, PO1 Fernandez, positively testified that
the sale took place and appellant was one of the authors of the illegal sale of drugs.
Facts:
This case is an offshoot of G.R. No. 1523513, following a buy-bust operation,
appellant Bala and Mala were charged with a violation of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended.

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The RTC rendered a decision convicting both appellant and Mala of the crime
charged. The Supreme Court in G.R. No. 152351 affirmed the conviction only of
Mala, appellants co-accused in this case.
The factual antecedents, as narrated by prosecution witnesses, have been
summarized in G.R. No. 152351 as follows:
On 4 April 2001, a confidential informant came to the office of the Drug
Enforcement Group, Malabon Police Station. He reported that a transaction with two
Muslims for the sale of 200 grams of shabu in the amount of P130,000 would take
place in his house. Acting on this information, the police formed a buy-bust team
composed of PO1 Joel Fernandez [PO1 Fernandez] as poseur-buyer, SPO2 Armando
Isidto [SPO2 Isidto], SPO2 Manolito Manalo, and other policemen. PO1 Fernandez
was then given "boodle money" consisting of fake P1,000 bills, which were wrapped
in a plastic bag.
Fernandez and the confidential informant were inside the latters house when
Bala and Mala arrived. The informant introduced Fernandez to the two as the buyer
of shabu. When Mala asked for the money, Fernandez showed to him the boodle
money contained in a plastic bag. The former gave to the latter the suspected
shabu wrapped with a yellow transparent plastic bag. As Mala was counting the
money, he noticed it to be fake. The appellants then talked with each other in
Muslim and instantly grabbed the suspected shabu from Fernandez.
The confidential went out of the house and gave the signal to the other
policemen, Isidto and Manalo entered the house just as Fernandez was drawing his
gun. Isidto confiscated the suspected shabu from Mala, and the boodle money from
Bala. The shabu was sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination, which
yielded positive result for methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
Appellant Jamil Mala denied the accusation against him and his co-appellant.
He claimed that he was engaged in the selling of VCDs. One time, four persons in
civilian clothes frisked him and told him to undress. They then handcuffed him along
with his companion Rusty Bala. Two of the armed men went out of the house and
later returned with two plastic bags. When appellant Mala learned of the charges
against him and Bala, he asked his wife to file charges against the arresting officers.
But his wife instead returned home to their home province.
Appellant Rusty Bala was no longer called to testify because his lawyer
allegedly "had a hard time communicating with him"; and he appeared somewhat
mentally deficient and would only corroborate Malas testimony.
The RTC rendered an Amended Decision finding appellant guilty of the crime
of drug pushing under Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, penalized with
reclusion perpetua. The trial court did not give credit to appellants defense of
denial and frame-up.

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The Court of Appeals affirmed appellants conviction in toto. It also dismissed
appellants claim of frame-up and denial as insufficient. Bala appealed his
conviction before this Court.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant Bala is also guilty of the crime charged
Ruling:
Yes, appellant Bala is also guilty of the illegal sale of shabu since their acts
constitute conspiracy.
In every prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be
sufficiently proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
All these elements were duly established. Appellant was caught in flagrante
delicto selling shabu through a buy bust operation conducted by members of the
Malabon Drug Enforcement Unit. The poseur-buyer, PO1 Fernandez, positively
testified that the sale took place and appellant was one of the authors of the illegal
sale of drugs.
It can be gleaned that appellant acted in common concert with his coaccused in the illegal sale of shabu. They were both present during the entire
transaction. Their acts clearly demonstrate the presence of conspiracy. To be a
conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not
even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed
by the others in the execution of the conspiracy.
Bala assails his conviction despite the apprehending officers failure to
preserve the evidentiary value of the seized items.
Section 1 of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, as
amended by Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990, provides that all prohibited and
regulated drugs shall be physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of
the accused who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof, to wit:
Section 1. All prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses
and articles specially designed for the use thereof when unlawfully
used or found in the possession of any person not authorized to have
control and disposition of the same, or when found secreted or
abandoned, shall be seized or confiscated by any national, provincial or
local law enforcement agency. Any apprehending team having initial
custody and control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia, should
immediately after seizure or confiscation, have the same physically
inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused, if there
be any, and/or his representative, who shall be required to sign the
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copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. Thereafter, the
seized drugs and paraphernalia shall be immediately brought to a
properly equipped government laboratory for a qualitative and
quantitative examination.
The apprehending team shall: (a) within forty-eight (48) hours
from the seizure inform the Dangerous Drugs Board by telegram of
said seizure, the nature and quantity thereof, and who has present
custody of the same, and (b) submit to the Board a copy of the mission
investigation report within fifteen (15) days from completion of the
investigation.
This rule is now incorporated as Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 that
repealed Republic Act No. 6425.
The alleged procedural infirmity pointed out by Bala does not prove fatal to
the prosecutions case.
In People v. De Los Reyes, a case which also involved an objection regarding
the non-compliance with the chain of custody rule, the Court held that:
The failure of the arresting police officers to comply with said DDB Regulation
No. 3, Series of 1979 is a matter strictly between the Dangerous Drugs Board and
the arresting officers and is totally irrelevant to the prosecution of the criminal case
for the reason that the commission of the crime of illegal sale of a prohibited drug is
considered consummated once the sale or transaction is established x x x and the
prosecution thereof is not undermined by the failure of the arresting officers to
comply with the regulations of the Dangerous Drugs Board.
In People v. Del Monte, this Court held that what is of utmost importance is
the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as
the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. It is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items which must be proven to establish the corpus delicti.
Balas defenses, which are predicated on denial and frame-up, are invariably
viewed with disfavor because such defenses can easily be fabricated and are
common ploy in prosecutions for the illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs.
They deserve scant consideration in light of the positive testimonies of the police
officers.
In fine, it has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt that Bala
sold shabu. Section 15, Article III, in relation to Section 20(3) of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, states:
Sec. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation
and Distribution of Regulated Drugs.- The penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized
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by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any
regulated drug. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act
to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a
regulated drug involved in any offense under this Section be the
proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum
penalty herein provided shall be imposed.
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the
Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime.- The penalties for offenses under
Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16
of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved
is in any of the following quantities:
1. 40 grams or more of opium;
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more of shabuor methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of Indian hempor marijuana;
6. 50 grams or more of marijuanaresin or marijuanaresin oil;
7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrocholoride; or
8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far
beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by
the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public consultations/hearings
conducted for the purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities,
the penalty shall range from prision correccionalto reclusion perpetua
depending upon the quantity.
In the instant case, Bala was found to have sold to the poseurbuyer a total of
211.6 grams of shabu, which amount is more than the minimum of 200 grams
required by the law for the imposition of reclusion perpetua to death.
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code mandates that when the law prescribes a
penalty composed of two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty shall
be applied. Thus, in this case, considering that no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances attended the Balas violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and the fine of P1,000,000.00.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO BALAQUIOT y BALDERAMA
G.R. No. 206366, August 13, 2014, J. Perez
Coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement before police
authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation. While it is true that Section 8615 of
Republic Act No. 9165 requires the National Bureau of Investigation, PNP and the
Bureau of Customs to maintain "close coordination with the PDEA on all drug
related matters," the provision does not, make PDEAs participation a condition sine
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qua non for every buy-bust operation. A buy-bust is just a form of an in flagrante
arrest sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of the Court, which police
authorities may rightfully resort to in apprehending violators of Republic Act No.
9165 in support of the PDEA. A buy-bust operation is not invalidated by mere noncoordination with the PDEA. The conduct of the buy-bust operation was already
established by the testimonies of PO3 Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman who were the
very participants of such operation. Balderamas qualm regarding the absence of
coordination between the Camiling PNP and the PDEA is also immaterial.
Facts:
On 11 June 2008, Eduardo Balaquiot y Balderama (Balaquiot) was arrested
during a buy bust operation performed by officers of the PNP in Camiling, Tarlac. He
was charged with the offense of illegal sale of shabu under an Information filed
before the RTC of Tarlac.
During trial, the prosecution presented, the following object evidence:
1 heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.049 grams of white
crystalline substance; dated "11 June 2008" and marked with "JSE-EBB," and
Chemistry Report D-184-085.
It is supplemented by the testimonies of Police Officer Jay Espiritu (PO3
Espiritu), Special Police Officer Noli Daraman (SPO1 Daraman) and police chemist
Jebie Timario (Mr. Timario).
PO3 Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman were the police officers who conducted the
buy-bust operation that led to the arrest of Balaquiot. Their testimonies recounted
the following events:
On 11 June 2008, PO3 Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman engaged in a buy-bust
operation against Balderama after receiving confirmation from the Chief Intelligence
Officer (CIO) of the Camiling PNP that he was involved in the peddling of shabu. PO3
Espiritu met with the Balaquiot outside the latters residence. While, SPO1 Daraman
hid behind a tree about 10-20 meters from where PO3 Espiritu and Balderama were
standing.
PO3 Espiritu was able to successfully purchase one (1) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet. In exchange, PO3 Espiritu handed a previously marked
P500 bill. After the transaction, PO3 Espiritu arrest Balderama. SPO1 Daraman, who
was able to witness the exchange, emerged from his hiding place and aided in the
arrest.
PO3 Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman retrieved from Balaquiot the marked P500
bill; call the barangay officials to witness the inventory of the plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance and the marked money. Photographs of the
plastic sachet, the marked bill were also taken.

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They brought Balaquiot and the items to the Camiling PNP station. The plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance were then dated "11 June 2008" and
marked with "JSE-EBB"the initials of both PO3 Espiritu and the appellant.
On 12 June 2008, PO3 Espiritu and SPO1 forwarded to the PNP Crime
Laboratory the plastic sachet, now dated "11 June 2008" and marked "JSE-EBB,"
along with a request for laboratory examination.
Mr. Timario, is a police chemist for the Camiling PNP and the one who
conducted laboratory examination on the contents of the plastic sachet. He is also
the signatory of Chemistry Report D-184-08 and he was able to confirm the
contents of the plastic sachet as positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu.
The defense, relied on the testimonies of Balaquiot and his brother, Exequil
Balaquiot (Exequil). Balaquiot denied being caught, in flagrante, selling shabu and
claimed that he was merely a victim of a police frame-up. Exequil corroborated the
denial of his brother.
RTC rendered a decision finding Balaquiot guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense of illegal sale of shabu under Section 512 of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. RTC gave full faith and credence to the testimonies of
PO3 Espiritu, SPO1 Daraman and Mr. Timario. RTC sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. The CA affirmed the
RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the surrounding circumstances destroy the credibility of the
prosecution story that the Camiling PNP really undertook a genuine buy bust
operation that will lend trustworthiness to Balaquiots version that he was merely a
victim of a frame-up
Ruling:
We deny the appeal.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals did not err in giving full faith and credence
to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. The circumstances cited by the
Balaquiot does not at all destroy its credibility.
The conduct of the buy-bust operation was already established by the
testimonies of PO3 Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman who were the very participants of
such operation. Balaquiots qualm regarding the absence of coordination between
the Camiling PNP and the PDEA is also immaterial. In People v. Roa, this Court ruled
that prior coordination with the PDEA is not a condition sine qua non for the validity
of every entrapment operation conducted by police authorities:

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Coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement before police
authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation. While it is true that Section 8615 of
Republic Act No. 9165 requires the National Bureau of Investigation, PNP and the
Bureau of Customs to maintain "close coordination with the PDEA on all drug related
matters," the provision does not, make PDEAs participation a condition sine qua
non for every buy-bust operation. A buy-bust is just a form of an in flagrante arrest
sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of the Court, which police authorities
may rightfully resort to in apprehending violators of Republic Act No. 9165 in
support of the PDEA. A buy-bust operation is not invalidated by mere noncoordination with the PDEA.
The assertion that the Camiling PNP could have just applied for a search
warrant instead of conducting a buy-bust operation is irrelevant to the issue of
whether a legitimate buy-bust operation was undertaken. The decision whether to
apply for a search warrant or to conduct instead a buy-bust operation on any given
case is a matter rightfully addressed to the sound discretion of the police officers.
Police officers have the right to choose which legal means or processes are best
suited, given the circumstances, in accomplishing the task they are called upon to
perform.
Balaquiot is left with only his denial to fend off the serious accusations
against him. Such denial cannot overcome the weight traditionally accorded to
affirmative testimonies by police officers with unsullied credibility. The RTC and the
CA were, correct in giving full faith and credit to the open court narrations of PO3
Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARISSA MARCELO
G.R. No. 181541, August 18, 2014, J. Del Castillo
In a prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must concur:
"(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. x x x What is material in
a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or
sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti"
or the illicit drug in evidence. In this case, the prosecution successfully proved the
existence of all the essential elements of the illegal sale of shabu.
Facts:
On August 4, 2003, an Information charging Marcelo with violation of Section
5, Article II of RA 9165, otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002," as amended, was filed in the RTC of Sorsogon City.
The prosecution presented Police Inspector Perfecto Rabulan (P/Insp.
Rabulan), Police Officer 2 Freddie Salvatierra (PO2 Salvatierra), Police Inspector
Josephine M. Clemen (P/Insp. Clemen),Police Officer 2 Russan Jimenez (PO2 Jimenez)

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and Barangay Chairperson Elsa Arbitria (Arbitria) as witnesses. From their
testimonies, the following facts emerged:
Tarog informed P/Insp. Rabulan that Marcelo would arrive at his rented unit in
Visitors Inn,, Donsol, Sorsogon to deliver and sell shabu. P/Insp. Rabulan formed a
buy-bust team and requested Tarog to participate in the operation.
On July 31, 2003, at 10 p.m., Tarog told P/Insp. Rabulan of Marcelo's
impending arrival. Tarog was instructed to act as poseur-buyer and was given
marked money.
On August 1, 2003 at 6 p.m., Marcelo arrived at the Visitors Inn. The buybust team waited in front of the inn until Tarog signal for the buy-bust team to enter
and proceed to his unit. They saw Marcelo sitting on a couch with her back turned to
the door as she was giving shabu to Tarog who was in turn handing to her the
marked money. The police officers thus immediately entered the unit. PO2
Salvatierra took the shabu from Tarog and handed it to P/Insp. Rabulan, while the
latter took the buy-bust money.
Arbitria, baranggay chairperson, entered the room and saw Marcelo sitting on
a couch with a sachet containing white crystalline substance beside her. After being
asked why she was in the premises, appellant answered that she was collecting a
debt. PO2 Jimenez conducted a body search on appellant in the comfort room and in
the presence of Arbitria, but no prohibited drug was recovered in her possession.
Neither did the search on her wallet yield any illegal substance.
The buy-bust team photographed the shabu and money and brought her to
the police station for investigation. A day later, P/Insp. Rabulan brought Marcelo and
the specimen confiscated from her to the Crime Laboratory for examination. The
specimen, which weighed 2.3234 grams, tested positive for shabu.
Marcelo averred that there was no buy-bust operation conducted against her
and that she was just a victim of a frame-up.
The RTC rendered a Decision convicting Marcelo for violation of Section 5,
Article II of RA9165, as amended. The RTC was convinced that the prosecutions
evidence established the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt since (1)
appellant was positively identified by the police officers in open court as the seller
of 2.3234 grams of shabu, and (2) the delivery of the shabu to the poseur-buyer as
well as the appellants receipt of the marked money were attested to by the
prosecution witnesses.
Marcelos denial and alibi cannot prevail over the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. Besides, no improper motive can be attributed to the police
officers in imputing the crime to the appellant. Hence, their testimonies are worthy
of belief coming as it does from law enforcers who are presumed to have regularly
performed their duties.
The CA affirmed the RTCs ruling in its Decision. Hence, this appeal.
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Issues:
Whether or not the court a quo erred in finding Marcelo guilty with the crime
charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the offense beyond
reasonable doubt
Ruling:
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Elements for the Prosecution of Illegal Sale of Shabu.
In a prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must concur:
"(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material in a
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or
sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti"
or the illicit drug in evidence.
In this case, the prosecution successfully proved the existence of all the
essential elements of the illegal sale of shabu. Marcelo was positively identified by
the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation as the person who sold the
shabu presented in court. P/Insp. Rabulan testified that Tarog, their informant acting
as a buyer, purchased the shabu from her during a legitimate buy-bust operation.
He narrated the circumstances leading to the consummation of the sale of the
shabu and the arrest of Marcelo.
The Court finds no reason to doubt the credibility of the said witnesses and
their testimonies. The RTC, as sustained by the CA, found that the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses were direct and definite. Their testimonies were consistent on
relevant matters with each other and the exhibits that were formally offered in
evidence.
The Presentation of the Poseur-Buyer is not Indispensable.
Marcelos insistence that the failure to present the poseur-buyer is fatal to the
prosecution fails to impress. "The relevant information acquired by the poseurbuyer was equally known to the police officers who gave evidence for the
prosecution at the trial. They all took part in the planning and implementation of the
buy-bust operation, and all were direct witnesses to the actual sale of the shabu,
her arrest immediately thereafter, and the recovery from her of the marked money.
The testimony of the poseur-buyer was not indispensable or necessary; it would
have been corroborative at best. His testimony can be dispensed with since the
illicit transaction was actually witnessed and adequately proved by the prosecution
witnesses.
The Entrapment Established the Illicit Sale of Shabu

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Marcelo's contention that there was no direct link between her, the marked
money and shabu again fails to impress. In an entrapment operation, the
prosecution must establish the poseur-buyers receipt of the shabu from appellant
and present the same in court. The eyewitness testimonies of P/Insp. Rabulan and
PO2 Salvatierra are sufficient to prove the actual exchange of the marked money
and the plastic sachet of shabu between the poseur-buyer and appellant. These
objects were presented in evidence during the trial. The existence of the illicit sale
is therefore evident.
A Warrant of Arrest was not Necessary
Marcelos argument that her warrantless arrest was not valid is untenable.
The Court emphasizes that the prosecution proved that appellant was apprehended
after she exchanged the shabu in her possession for the marked money of the
poseur buyer. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, the police officers were not
only authorized but were even duty-bound to arrest her even without a warrant.
There was no Evidence of Denial and Frame-up.
Marcelos defenses of denial and frame-up do not deserve credence. Denial
cannot prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses. On the other
hand, frame-up is viewed with disfavor since it can easily be fabricated and is a
common ploy in prosecution for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Law. For this
defense to prosper, it must be proved with clear and convincing evidence. There
must also be evidence that the police officers were inspired by improper motive.
Besides, Marcelo should have filed the proper charges against the police
officers if she was indeed the victim of a frame-up. The failure to file administrative
or criminal charges against them substantiates the conclusion that the defense of
frame-up was a mere concoction.
In the absence of evidence that the prosecution witnesses were impelled by
improper motive to testify falsely, appellant failed to overturn the presumption that
the arresting officers regularly performed their duties. There is, therefore, no basis
to suspect the veracity of their statements.
The Proper Penalty
The Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by
the CA, that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu, as
defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. Under this law, the
penalty for the unauthorized sale of shabu, regardless of its quantity and purity, is
life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00.
However, with the enactment of RA 9346, only life imprisonment and fine shall be
imposed. Moreover, appellant is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 2 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RONALDO BAYAN y NERI
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G.R. No. 200987, August 20, 2014, J. Perez
A buy-bust operation was conducted by police operatives based on a tip. The
accused alleges that the prosecution failed to proof that the money presented
during trial is the money he allegedly received in exchange for drugs. The Court
ruled that the failure to present the buy-bust money is not fatal to the prosecutions
cause. It is not indispensable in drug cases since it is merely corroborative
evidence, and the absence thereof does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the
prosecution provided the sale of dangerous drugs is adequately proven and the
drug subject of the transaction is presented before the court. Neither law nor
jurisprudence requires the presentation of any money used in the buy-bust
operation.
Facts:
Police operatives from the Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU) of the
Novaliches Police Station received a tip from a confidential informant that a certain
Ronaldo Bayan and Irene Bayan (Irene) were engaged in illegal drug trade in
Barangay Capri, Novaliches, Quezon City. The leader formed a buy-bust team which
then conducted surveillance in Brgy. Capri. PO2 Mendoza was assigned as the
poseur-buyer. At about 7:40 p.m. of the same day, the team proceeded to the target
place. PO2 Mendoza, as poseur-buyer went to the house of Ronaldo Bayan. When
Ronaldo opened the door, the informant introduced PO2 Mendoza to appellant as
the buyer of shabu. Ronaldos live-in partner, Irene, was likewise present. PO2
Mendoza readily gave the 100-peso bill to Ronaldo in exchange for the small plastic
sachet containing shabu. Immediately after the exchange, PO2 Mendoza introduced
himself as a police officer and arrested appellant. Irene meanwhile tried to escape
but PO3 de Guzman was able to arrest her. PO3 de Guzman recovered from Irenes
possession dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a newspaper. Ronaldo and Irene were
brought to the police station where PO2 Mendoza put his markings "EM" on the
plastic sachet he received from appellant. Thereafter, they brought the plastic
sachet to the crime laboratory which tested positive for shabu.
In their defense, both Ronaldo and Irene denied the charges against them.
They alleged that while walking to the market, suddenly five (5) armed men frisked,
handcuffed and brought them to the police station where they were coerced
through violence to sign certain documents. Later that night, they were brought to
the prosecutors office for inquest without the assistance of a counsel.
The RTC convicted both Ronaldo and Irene for violations of R.A. 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. On appeal with the CA, only Ronaldos
conviction was sustained. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish that Ronaldo is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt
Ruling:
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Yes, the prosecution was able to establish that Ronaldo is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
Jurisprudence dictates that minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility
of the witness. The Court has held that "discrepancies and inconsistencies in the
testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details, and not in actuality touching
upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair their credibility. Testimonies of
witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and relevant details
concerning the principal occurrence.
Failure to present the buy-bust money is not fatal to the prosecutions cause.
It is not indispensable in drug cases since it is merely corroborative evidence, and
the absence thereof does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution
provided the sale of dangerous drugs is adequately proven and the drug subject of
the transaction is presented before the court. Neither law nor jurisprudence requires
the presentation of any money used in the buy-bust operation.
In every prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be
sufficiently proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
Indeed, all these elements were duly established.
Furthermore, the prosecution was able to preserve the integrity and
evidentiary value of the said illegal drugs. The prosecution was able to sufficiently
establish the following circumstances showing an unbroken chain of custody over
the shabu that was seized from Bayan: (1) P02 Mendoza, who acted as the poseurbuyer during the buy-bust operation, was the one who received the transparent
plastic sachet containing shabu from the Ronaldo; (2) the said transparent plastic
sachet was then brought by PO2 Mendoza to the police station where he placed his
initials "EM"; (3) thereafter, said sachet was brought to the crime laboratory for
examination; and (4) the laboratory examination was conducted by Police Inspector
Abraham Verde Tecson.
The defense of frame-up or denial in drug cases requires strong and
convincing evidence because of the presumption that the law enforcement agencies
acted in the regular performance of their official duties. Bare denials of appellant
cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the three police officers. Moreover,
there is no evidence of any improper motive on the part of the police officers who
conducted the buy-bust operation to falsely testify against appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE vs. REYNALDO BATURI
G.R No. 189812, September 1, 2014, J. Del Castillo
Arguing that the failure of the buy-bust team to comply with the procedure
governing the handling, custody and disposition of the illegal drugs resulted to the
failure of the prosecution to establish the corpus delicti, the appellant contends that
the RTC and the CA erred in finding him guilty of violating Section 5, Article II of RA
No. 9165. The SC found no hiatus or confusion in the confiscation, handling, custody
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and examination of the shabu. The illegal drug that was inventoried at the PDEA
office, subjected to qualitative examination at the crime laboratory, and finally
introduced in evidence against appellant was the same illegal drug that was
confiscated from him when he was caught inflagrante delicto selling the same. No
apparent irregularity is sufficiently shown to have attended the chain of custody of
the shabu. Its identity, integrity and probative value were preserved and kept intact
by the police officers. Besides, the failure of the police officers to comply strictly
with the chain of custody rule is not fatal. It will not render the arrest of appellant
illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. "What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused."
Facts:
On August 6, 2005, a confidential informant reported to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) the illegal drug activities of appellant Baturi, a.k.a.
Naldong, in Rosales, Pangasinan. PO3 Velasquez then relayed the information to
SP02 Rabago, the Special Enforcement Team Leader of the PDEA, who, in turn,
ordered the former to conduct a surveillance to verify the information.
Immediately after PO3 Velasquez closed a deal with appellant Baturi
regarding the sale of 10 "bultos" of shabu that would transpire the next day, SPO2
Rabago formed a team to conduct an entrapment operation where PO3 Velasquez
was to act as poseur-buyer.
The next day, the buy-bust team coordinated with the police authorities
stationed in the Municipality of Rosales and held a final briefing before proceeding
to Baturis house. Upon arrival thereat, PO3 Velasquez approached Baturi and
informed him that he already had the payment. Thereafter, Baturi took out a carton,
opened it and showed the contents thereof to PO3 Velasquez, who, in turn, gave the
buy-bust money.
PO3 Velasquez examined the contents of the carton and upon seeing that it
contained plastic sachets with white crystalline granules, he made the pre-arranged
signal. Another police officer immediately showed up and recovered the buy-bust
money from Baturi, while PO3 Velasquez seized he carton containing the sachets of
white crystalline granules. After informing Baturi of his rights, the police officers
arrested and took him to the PDEA office for further investigation.
A Certificate of Inventory was then prepared by the police authorities which
was signed by two barangay officials and a media representative. Baturi was
requested to sign the certificate of inventory which he refused. This whole process
was photographed. Thereafter, on the basis of a formal request, the seized shabu
was referred and delivered to the PNP Provincial Crime Laboratory. P/Insp. Roderos
issued Chemistry Report No. D-121-2005-Ustating that the white crystalline
substance was positive for shabu.

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The RTC convicted Baturi and found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165. On appeal, Baturi
contended that the buy-bust team failed to comply with the procedure governing
the handling, custody and disposition of the illegal drugs. Because of this, there was
failure on the part of the prosecution to establish the corpus delicti. Thus, the RTC
erred in finding him guilty of the crime charged. The Court of Appeals then rendered
a decision affirming in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove appellant Baturis guilt
beyond reasonable doubt
Ruling:
Yes, the prosecution was able to prove Baturis guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
In a successful prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements
must concur: "(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. x x x
What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that
the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti" or the illicit drug in evidence.
In this case, the prosecution successfully established all the essential
elements of the illegal sale of shabu. PO3 Velasquez, who acted as poseur-buyer,
positively identified Baturi as the seller of the shabu and categorically testified that
the shabu was received by him, and the payment therefor by Baturi, in a legitimate
buy-bust operation.
The Court is not persuaded by Baturis averment that the prosecution failed
to establish that the shabu allegedly seized from him was the same shabu
submitted for laboratory examination. The following negates Baturis claim: (1) the
police officers inventoried the confiscated shabu immediately after its seizure from
Baturi. The process was witnessed by barangay officials and a media representative
who affixed their signatures in the Certificate of Inventory; (2) the inventory-taking
was photographed and the photographs show that the actual conduct of inventory
was witnessed by Baturi himself; (3) it is undisputed that Baturi was asked to affix
his signature in the Certificate of Inventory but he refused; (4) it was shown that a
PDEA personnel thereafter prepared a formal request and the white crystalline
granules contained in the plastic sachets seized from Baturi were indorsed and
delivered promptly by PO3 Velasquez to P/Insp. Roderos to the crime laboratory.
It is true that the prosecution did not formally offer in evidence the Certificate
of Inventory and the formal request for examination of the confiscated substance.
Be that as it may, the Court has previously held that even if an exhibit is not
formally offered, the same "may still be admitted against the adverse party if, first,
it has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, it has itself been
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incorporated in the records of the case."PO3 Velasquez categorically testified that
an inventory of the seized drugs was performed, a corresponding certificate was
prepared, and a formal request for examination was made. He further narrated that
together with the formal request, he submitted and delivered the confiscated drugs
to the crime laboratory. On the basis of the said formal request, P/Insp. Roderos
examined the specimen and she likewise testified on this. The counsel of Baturi
even asked the said prosecution witnesses regarding these documents. Considering
the said testimonies and the fact that the documents were incorporated in the
records of the case, they are therefore admissible against Baturi.
Besides, the failure of the police officers to comply strictly with the chain of
custody rule is not fatal. It will not render the arrest of Baturi illegal or the items
seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. "What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the
same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused."
In this case, the Court finds no hiatus or confusion in the confiscation,
handling, custody and examination of the shabu. The illegal drug that was
inventoried at the PDEA office, subjected to qualitative examination at the crime
laboratory, and finally introduced in evidence against Baturi was the same illegal
drug that was confiscated from him when he was caught inflagrante delicto selling
the same. No apparent irregularity is sufficiently shown to have attended the chain
of custody of the shabu. Its identity, integrity and probative value were preserved
and kept intact by the police officers.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEO DE LA TRINIDAD y OBALLES
G.R. No. 199898, September 3, 2014, J. Perez
The finding of illicit drugs and paraphernalia in a house or building owned or
occupied by a particular person raises the presumption of knowledge and
possession thereof which, standing alone, is sufficient to convict. Here, Trinidad
failed to present any evidence to overcome such presumption. He merely insisted
that he was framed and had no knowledge of where the prohibited drugs came
from. In the absence of any contrary evidence, he is deemed to be in full control
and dominion of the drugs found in his house. Thus, he must be convicted for
possession of illegal drugs.
Non-compliance with the requirements for the custody and handling of seized
dangerous drugs is permitted under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items. Thus, if the police were accompanied by the witnesses who
were present since the briefing for the execution of the search warrant, in its
execution and arrest of Trinidad, and the inventory of the seized marijuana; and
when the witnesses also signed the bags where the marijuana were placed, the
chain of custody is preserved.
Facts:
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An information was filed with the RTC charging accused-appellant Leo De La
Trinidad with violation of Sec. 11, Art. II or R.A. 9165. The police conducted two testbuys after confirming that Trinidad was involved in drug trafficking. The police were
twice able to purchase marijuana from Trinidad. The police applied for two search
warrants; one for violation of R.A. 9165, the other for illegal possession of firearms
and ammunitions. Among those in the briefing for the execution of the warrants
were the mandatory witnesses: a representative of DOJ, media representative, and
2 elected barangay officials.
The group proceeded to the residence of Trinidad. They were accompanied by
the DOJ and media representatives together with the local barangay officials. Upon
reaching Trinidads house, the raiding team knocked at his door and identified
themselves as police officers and informed him that they are executing the search
warrants. They told Trinidad that they have witnesses with them, and read to him
the contents of the warrants and apprised him of his constitutional rights. PO2
Quintin Tusara took pictures of everything that transpired while the operatives were
executing the warrants.
When Trinidad was asked to produce the items enumerated in the search
warrant, if indeed he really had them, he voluntarily presented the items which he
took under his pillow. The items consisted of nine and a half (9 ) bricks of
suspected dried marijuana leaves sealed with packaging tape, two (2) big bricks of
suspected dried marijuana leaves sealed with packaging tape, four (4) medium size
cubes of suspected dried marijuana leaves placed inside the small transparent
plastic sachet, and eighteen (18)pieces of small cubes of suspected dried marijuana
leaves placed inside the small transparent plastic sachet Also found were seventyseven (77)pieces of empty transparent plastic sachets. SPO1 Aguilar, placed his
initial, FBA, in the said items.
No firearm was found at the residence of Trinidad. An inventory was then
conducted right inside the house of appellant and a certificate of inventory was
prepared by SPO1 Louie Ordonez. The Certificate of Inventory and Certification of
Orderly Search were duly signed by the witnesses in the presence of Trinidad. When
subjected to both initial and final test the seized items were found positive for the
presence of marijuana.
The defense narrated that Trinidad was in his house together with his wife
and children. The police arrived and framed him up with the charge.
The RTC convicted Trinidad, as the evidence for the prosecution adequately
proved all the elements of the offense. The CA affirmed the RTC.
Issue:
1. Was Trinidad not in possession of the drugs as he had no knowledge of
their location, and that the police only framed him up?
2. Did the prosecution fail to establish the corpus delicti?
Ruling:
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1. No, as mere possession of illegal drugs, coupled with intent to possess, is
sufficient to convict an accused absent any satisfactory explanation.
Trinidads contention is belied by the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution. It bears to stress that the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has
been invariably viewed with disfavor by this Court for it can easily be concocted and
is a common defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act. They are self-serving evidence, and unless substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, cannot be given weight over the positive assertions of credible
witnesses.
In the prosecution of illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs, the
following elements must be established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item
or object, which is identified to be prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession
is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the
drug. As correctly ruled by the CA, these elements were duly established by the
prosecution. Jurisprudence is consistent in that mere possession of a prohibited drug
constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to
convict an accused in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.
Criminal intent is not necessary. However, the prosecution must prove that
the accused had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession,
under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession.
Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate possession or control of
the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is
under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise
dominion and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or
control isnot necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise
control and dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with
another.
It must be emphasized that the finding of illicit drugs and paraphernalia in a
house or building owned or occupied by a particular person raises the presumption
of knowledge and possession thereof which, standing alone, is sufficient to convict.
Here, Trinidad failed to present any evidence to overcome such presumption. He
merely insisted that he was framed and had no knowledge of where the prohibited
drugs came from. In the absence of any contrary evidence, he is deemed to be in
full control and dominion of the drugs found in his house.
2. No, as the chain of custody rule provides that non-compliance with its
requirements ma be allowed on justifiable grounds
Sec. 21 (a), Art. II of the IRR of R.A. 9165, which states in part that that
non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items does not
even require that the certificate of inventory must indicate the markings and the
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weight of the seized items. In fact, the rule even sanctions substantial compliance
with the procedure to establish a chain of custody, as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are property preserved by the apprehending
officers. In People v. Pringas, the Court recognized that the strict compliance with
the requirements of Section 21 may not always be possible under field conditions;
the police operates under varied conditions, and cannot at all times attend to all the
niceties of the procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence.
As correctly ruled by the CA, the prosecution was able to establish the
integrity of corpus delicti and the unbroken chain of custody. It was sufficiently
established that representatives from the media and Department of Justice and
even two (2) barangay local officials were present during the briefing and even until
the conduct of the inventory. And that immediately after seizure and confiscation of
the dangerous drugs, the same were inventoried and photographed in the presence
of Trinidad and said persons, who even signed copies of the inventory. The seized
illegal drugs were marked at accuseds residence and in his presence. P/S Insp.
Villalobos testified that the seized item she received from Aguilar already contained
the markings, FBA. Besides, he also placed his own initials and signatures in blue
markings to preserve and maintain the integrity of the specimens.
The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless
there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered
with. Trinidad bears the burden of showing that the evidence was tampered or
meddled with in order to overcome the presumption of regularity in the handling of
exhibits by public officers and the presumption that public officers properly
discharged their duties. Trinidad in this case failed to present any plausible reason
to impute ill motive on the part of the arresting officers. Thus, the testimonies of the
apprehending officers deserve full faith and credit. In fact, Trinidad did not even
question the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. He anchored his appeal solely
on his allegation of frame-up and denial and on the alleged broken chain of the
custody of the seized drugs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDILBERTO BALIBAY y LABIS and MARICEL
BALIBAY BIJA-AN
G.R. No. 202701, September 10, 2014, J. PEREZ
When there are doubts on whether the seized substance was the same
substance examined and established to be the prohibited drug, there can be no
crime of illegal possession or illegal sale of a prohibited drug. Such is the case at
bar. Failure to prove that the specimen allegedly seized from the accused was the
same one presented in court is fatal to the prosecutions case. Besides its failure to
identify the corpus delicti with moral certainty, the prosecution also failed to
establish an unbroken chain of custody. The chain of evidence is constructed by
proper exhibit handling, storage, labelling and recording, and must exist from the
time the evidence is found until the time it is offered in evidence.

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Facts:
Accuseds conviction stemmed from two (2) sets of Information. Criminal
Case No. 2004-469 accuses Edilberto Balibay y Labis (Labis)and Maricel Balibay y
Bija-An (Bija-An)for Violation of Paragraph 1, Section 5 in relation to Section 26, both
of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.Criminal Case No. 2004-470accuses Maricel
Balibay y Bija-An for violation of Section 11, Paragraph 2(3), Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165
During trial, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses: Senior Police
Officer 1 Mariano Durango (SPO1 Durango), the Receiving Clerk of the Crime
Laboratory, Philippine National Police (PNP), Patag, Cagayan de Oro City; Police
Officer 3 Danilo Radam (PO3 Radam), who after seeing the accused hand one (1)
sachet containing white crystalline substance to PO1 Cotta Tanggote (PO1
Tanggote), arrested the accused, informed them of their constitutional rights and
conducted a body search and recovered the P200.00 marked money; and PO1
Tanggote, who acted as poseur-buyer, conducted a body search on accused Maricel
and recovered one (1) sachet containing white crystalline substance.
Acting as poseur-buyer, PO1 Tanggote, together with a confidential agent,
proceeded to the house of the accused to conduct buy-bust operation. While there,
accused Edilberto called her daughter, accused Maricel, who was at the second floor
of the house. After a while, accused Maricel went downstairs and handed one (1)
sachet containing white crystalline substance to PO1 Tanggote, who immediately
called the back-up police officers. Immediately, the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) personnel rushed to the scene and arrested both the accused. PO3
Radam, after informing the accused their constitutional rights, conducted a body
search on accused Edilberto and recovered the marked money of P200.00. PO1
Tanggote, on the other hand, conducted a body search on accused Maricel and
recovered one (1) transparent sachet containing white crystalline substance.
Both the accused were brought to the PDEA Office at Velez Street, Cagayan
de Oro City for booking and inventory. The investigation was conducted by SPO1
Benjamin Amacanim (SPO1 Amacanim). While conducting the investigation, SPO1
Amacanim requested PO1 Tanggote to mark the specimen
After the investigation, the specimens were returned to PO3 Radam, who
drafted the request for laboratory examination and brought the specimens to the
laboratory for testing. In the PNP Crime Laboratory, the seized specimens together
with the sample urine from both the accused, were received by the receiving clerk
SPO1 Durango, and turned over to Chemist April Grace Carbajal Madroo (Madroo),
who conducted the laboratory tests, which all tested positive for Methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.

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The RTC and the CA rejected the defenses allegation of planting of evidence.
According to the lower courts, there was no evidence that points to any irregularity
in the arresting officers exercise of duty except for the accuseds bare denials of
the accusations against them. It was pointed out that the arresting officers do not
know the accused before their arrest and have no motive to implicate them. The CA,
affirming the ruling of the RTC, relied on the principle of presumption of regularity.
Such that absent ill-motive or deviation in the exercise of their duty, police officers
are presumed to have exercised their duty regularly; their testimony shall prevail
over the accuseds allegation of frame-up. Hence, this appeal.
Issues:
1. Whether or not due to the failure without any justification of the arresting
officers to substantially comply with the requirements provided in Section 21
of R.A. No. 9165, such as conducting an inventory and taking photographs of
the specimen, the integrity of the corpus delicti has not been properly
established.
2. Whether or not there is a break in the chain of custody of the evidence as the
prosecution failed to establish how SPO1 Amacanim preserved the specimen.
Ruling:
The Court cannot discount the arresting officer's utter disregard of the
procedural requirements, failure to establish with moral certainty the identity and
integrity of the corpus delicti, and hiatus in the chain of custody under the cloak of
the presumption of regularity.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of the illegal sale of drugs are as
follows: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor. The
prosecution, to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, must present in evidence the
corpus delicti of the case. The corpus delicti is the seized illegal drugs. This is to
establish with unwavering exactitude that the seized illegal drugs from the suspect
is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit.
The prosecution failed to establish the elements of the crime; the prosecution
failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti, much less, the identity of the
corpus delicti with moral certainty. As this court already held, when there are doubts
on whether the seized substance was the same substance examined and
established to be the prohibited drug, there can be no crime of illegal possession or
illegal sale of a prohibited drug. Such is the case at bar. Failure to prove that the
specimen allegedly seized from the accused was the same one presented in court is
fatal to the prosecutions case.

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Besides its failure to identify the corpus delicti with moral certainty, the
prosecution also failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody.
The chain of evidence is constructed by proper exhibit handling, storage,
labelling and recording, and must exist from the time the evidence is found until the
time it is offered in evidence. Besides the fact that PO1 Tanggote failed to ascertain
the identity of the seized substance, the prosecution also failed to establish how
SPO1 Amacanim, the investing officer, and Chemist Madroo, the laboratory
technician, preserved the integrity of the substance. The prosecution failed to
establish the manner of handling, storage, labelling and recording of the substance
from the time it was seized until it was offered as evidence in court as the
substance contained unidentified markings and sealing. Assuming that PO1
Tanggotes allegation that SPO1 Amacanim labeled the substance is truthful, SPO1
Amacanim and other officers who held custody of the substance should have been
presented in the court to attest to such fact. Further, all other police officers who
had custody of the substance, may it be briefly or otherwise, must be presented in
court to attest to the allegation of PO1 Tanggote.
Since the evidence custodian, SPO1 Amacanim, was not presented in court,
we cannot be sure and certain that the substance offered as evidence in court was
the same substance seized from the accused.
The prosecution failed to show how the seized shabu changed hands. Given
the unique character of shabu, and the unavoidable multiple transmittal of the
specimen to different hands, it is imperative for the officer who seized the
substance from the accused to place his marking on its plastic container and seal
the same, preferably with adhesive tape that cannot be removed without leaving a
tear on the plastic container, which the arresting officer failed to comply. The police
officers failure to properly seal the seized shabu, coupled with the failure of the
prosecution to present the officer who had custody of the seized substance deprived
the court of the means to ascertain the corpus delicti in drugs cases.
Indeed, where, as here, there was non-compliance with the requirements set
forth in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, there can be no presumption that the official
duties have been regularly performed by the police officers.
In resume, PO1 Tanggote, the arresting officer, failed to identify with moral
certainty the corpus delicti. Second, the prosecution failed to establish the presence
of an unbroken chain of custody of the seized substance. Despite the failure to
properly seal the seized substance, the prosecution also failed to present the
testimony of the officers who held custody of the seized substance including the
handling, storage, labelling and recording of the seized substance from the time it
was seized until it was offered as evidence in court to establish that there is an
unbroken chain of custody of the seized substance. Third, without any justifiable
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reasons, the arresting officers failed to comply with the procedural requirements set
forth in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICHARD GUINTO


G.R. No. 198314, September 24, 2014, J. Perez
In illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the identity
of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration of the sale and the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment therefor. Hence, to establish a concrete case, it is
an utmost importance to prove the identity of the narcotic substance itself as it
constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital
to sustain a judgment of conviction. It is therefore imperative for the prosecution to
first establish beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the dangerous drug before
asserting other arguments.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that each and every element that
constitutes an illegal sale of dangerous drug was present to convict the accused.
Upon evaluation of the testimonies of PO1 Familara and PO1 Mendoza, it is
apparent that there is an inconsistency on the identity and number of plastic
sachets bought from the accused. In his statement, PO1 Familara recalled that upon
arrival at the place of arrest, PO1 Mendoza told him that he was able to buy one
plastic sachet of shabu from Guinto. On the other hand, PO1 Mendoza recalled that
he was able to buy two plastic sachets instead of one. The pointed inconsistency is
not a minor one that can be brushed aside as the discrepancy taints the very
corpus deliciti of the crime of illegal sale. A vital point of contention, the
prosecutions evidence places in reasonable doubt the identification of the
dangerous drug that was presented in court.
Facts:
Accused Guinto was apprehended on January 20, 2004 thru a buy-bust
operation conducted by the operatives from the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Task Force
(AIDSTF), Pasig City in coordination with the PDEA. According P01 Mendoza, who
stood as the poseur-buyer, he was introduced by the informant to Accused Guinto
as the person in need of illegal drugs worth P200.00. When PO1 Mendoza gave the
buy-bust money, Guinto drew two (2) plastic sachets containing shabu and gave it
to the former. Consequently, Guinto was arrested and underwent further
investigation while the pieces of evidence used or obtained in the buy-bust
operation were documented and examined.
The prosecution presented two (2) other witnesses. PO1 Familara
corroborated the statements of P01 Mendoza but there were certain inconsistencies
that surfaced concerning: 1) who gave the buy-bust money; 2) the pre-arranged
signal; 3) the time of arrival of the asset; and 4) the number of sachets sold by
Accused Guinto. The last witness, P02 Noble, also differed as to the time of arrival of
the asset, of the police team and when Guinto went out.

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For the defense, Guinto interposed denial. He narrated that prior to the
apprehension there were several unidentified men who barged in to his house,
grabbed his arm and searched the premises. Thereafter, he was brought to the
police. The wife and son of Guinto related the same sequence of events.
The trial court found the Accused Guinto guilty of violating Sec. 5, Article II of
R.A. No. 9156. It held that all the elements to constitute illegal sale were proven. On
appeal, the CA affirmed this judgment and further held that the chain of custody
was established and in spite certain inconsistencies the presumption of regularity
must be accorded to the arresting officers.
Issue:
Whether or not the elements of illegal sale were duly proven to support the
guilty verdict
Ruling:
NO, the elements of illegal sale were not all satisfactorily proved in this case.
In illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the identity
of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration of the sale and the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment therefor. Hence, to establish a concrete case, it is
an utmost importance to prove the identity of the narcotic substance itself as it
constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital
to sustain a judgment of conviction. It is therefore imperative for the prosecution to
first establish beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the dangerous drug before
asserting other arguments.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that each and every element that
constitutes an illegal sale of dangerous drug was present to convict the accused.
Upon evaluation of the testimonies of PO1 Familara and PO1 Mendoza, it is apparent
that there is an inconsistency on the identity and number of plastic sachets bought
from the accused. In his statement, PO1 Familara recalled that upon arrival at the
place of arrest, PO1 Mendoza told him that he was able to buy one plastic sachet of
shabu from Guinto. On the other hand, PO1 Mendoza recalled that he was able to
buy two plastic sachets instead of one. The pointed inconsistency is not a minor one
that can be brushed aside as the discrepancy taints the very corpus deliciti of the
crime of illegal sale. A vital point of contention, the prosecutions evidence places in
reasonable doubt the identification of the dangerous drug that was presented in
court.
Further, the conflicting statements of the police officers negates the
presumption of regularity and the credibility of the entire buy-bust operation. The
testimonies of the police officers are not consonant with respect to the pre-arranged
signal, length of time the police officers spent in waiting for the accused and the
exact time of the arrest. The inconsistencies are further amplified when the
witnesses differed as to the source of the buy-bust money, as to the circumstances

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that took prior to arrest, and during the encounter from which pocket of Guinto they
were able to retrieve the marked money.
In People v. Roble, the Court ruled that generally, the evaluation of the trial
court of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great
weight and generally not disturbed upon appeal. However, such rule does not apply
when the trial court has overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact of
weight or substance. In this present case, the contra-dictions, numerous and
material, warrant the acquittal of accused-appellant.
Similarly, one of the means used by the Court in determining the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses is the objective test. Following this test, in order to
establish the credibility of prosecution witnesses regarding the conduct of buy-bust
operation, prosecution must be able to present a complete picture detailing the buybust operationfrom the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher,
the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration, until the
consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal subject of sale. The manner
by which the initial contact was made, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment
of the buy-bust money, and the delivery of the illegal drug must be the subject of
strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully
induced to commit an offense. In light of these guiding principles, [the Court rules]
that the prosecution failed to present a clear picture on what really transpired on
the buy-bust operation.
In People v. Unisa, the Court held that in cases involving violations of the
Dangerous Drug Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police
officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner,
unless there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-motive on the part of the
police officers.
True, the absence of ill motive or ill will is ordinarily considered by the Court
as proof that the statement of the police officers is credible. As maintained by the
People, through the OSG, in the absence of any improper motive, presumption of
regularity of performance of duty prevails. However, it must be similarly noted that
the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of public officers does not
outweigh another recognized presumption the presumption of innocence of the
accused until proven beyond reasonable doubt.
In several occasions, the Court had declared that the presumption of
regularity of performance of duties must be harmonized with the other interest of
the State which is the interest of adherence to the presumption of innocence of the
accused.
However in case of conflict between the presumption of regularity of police
officers and the presumption of innocence of the accused, the latter must prevail as
the law imposes upon the prosecution the highest degree of proof of evidence to
sustain conviction.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICHARD GUINTO Y SAN ANDRES
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G.R. No. 198314, September 24, 2014, J. Perez
Dangerous drugs: In illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must
establish the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration of the
sale and the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. Hence, to
establish a concrete case, it is an utmost importance to prove the identity of the
narcotic substance itself as it constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and
the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction. It is therefore
imperative for the prosecution to first establish beyond reasonable doubt the
identity of the dangerous drug before asserting other arguments.
Credibility of witness: One of the means used by the Court in determining the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses is the objective test. Following this test, in
order to establish the credibility of prosecution witnesses regarding the conduct of
buy-bust operation, prosecution must be able to present a complete picture
detailing the buy-bust operationfrom the initial contact between the poseur-buyer
and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration,
until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal subject of sale. The
manner by which the initial contact was made, the offer to purchase the drug, the
payment of the buy-bust money, and the delivery of the illegal drug must be the
subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not
unlawfully induced to commit an offense.
Facts:
As narrated by PO1 Mendoza, a buy-bust operation was conducted on 20
January 2004 by the members of Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Task Force (AIDSTF). It
was prompted by an information given by a female caller received by AIDSTF.
According to the female caller, a certain Chard was selling shabu in a place
located Barangay Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City. Upon positive verification, P/Insp.
Esguerra formed a buy-bust team and designated PO1 Mendoza to act as the
poseur-buyer. In turn, SPO3 Matias prepared the pre-operation report and
coordinated with the PDEA on the buy-bust operation. PO1 Mendoza, as the poseurbuyer, was given 2 pieces of marked P100.00 bills as buy-bust money by P/Insp.
Esguerra.
After the briefing, the team including the informant proceeded to the target
area. Upon arrival, PO1 Mendoza and the informant positioned themselves outside
the house of this certain Chard (later identified as the accused Richard S.A.
Guinto) and waited for him to step out. Guinto finally went out of the house. The
informant approached Chard and introduced PO1 Mendoza as a person in need of
illegal drugs worth P200.00. PO1 Mendoza then gave buy-bust money to Guinto as
payment. Guinto, in turn, drew two (2) plastic sachets containing shabu and gave
them to PO1 Mendoza. Guinto then put the money on his left pocket. The other
members of the team responded and arrested Guinto. The buy-bust team brought
Guinto to Pasig City Police Station. PO1 Mendoza turned over the confiscated drugs
to SPO2 Basco. Consequently, SPO2 Basco asked for a laboratory examination
request to determine the chemical composition of the confiscated drugs. Thereafter,
confiscated drug was brought by PO1 Noble to the Philippine National Police (PNP)
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Crime Laboratory for examination. The prosecution also presented PO1 Familara as
its second witness to corroborate the statements given by PO1 Mendoza. However,
several inconsistencies were apparent in his testimony.
The defense interposed denial. Guinto narrated that at the time of the arrest
at 10:00 oclock in the evening of 19 January 2004, he was in their house cooking
with his family. Several men suddenly entered the house, grabbed his arm and
searched the premises. When asked why the men entered their home, the men did
not give them any reason. Afterwards, Guinto was brought to the police
headquarters and investigated by the police.
The trial court rendered a decision finding Guinto guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense charged. The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial
court. It ruled that all the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drug were proven as
testified by the police officers PO1 Mendoza and PO1 Familara. It found credible the
straightforward and categorical statements of the prosecution witnesses on what
transpired during the buy-bust operation
Issue:
Whether or not Guinto is guilty of the offense charged.
Ruling:
The Court reverses the finding of trial court. The prosecution failed to prove
the identity of the corpus delicti. This is fatal in establishing illegal sale. Moreover,
the conflicting statements of the policemen on material points tarnished the
credibility of the testimony for the prosecution.
The prosecution failed to prove that each and every element that constitutes
an illegal sale of dangerous drug was present to convict the accused. Upon
evaluation of the testimonies of PO1 Familara and PO1 Mendoza, it is apparent that
there is an inconsistency on the identity and number of plastic sachets bought from
the accused. In his statement, PO1 Familara recalled that upon arrival at the place
of arrest, PO1 Mendoza told him that he was able to buy one plastic sachet of shabu
from Guinto. On the other hand, PO1 Mendoza recalled that he was able to buy two
plastic sachets instead of one. The pointed inconsistency is not a minor one that
can be brushed aside as the discrepancy taints the very corpus delicti of the crime
of illegal sale. A vital point of contention, the prosecutions evidence places in
reasonable doubt the identification of the dangerous drug that was presented in
court.
The Court found several inconsistencies on points material to the credibility
of the buy-bust operation, among others are the following: First, as to identity of
the corpus delicti of the crime.PO1 Mendoza and PO1 Familara fatally contradicted
each others testimony as to the number of sachets bought from Guinto. In his
direct testimony, PO1 Mendoza positively identified that the accused gave two
plastic sachets in exchange of the P200 marked money, However, the same
identification was refuted when PO1 Familara testified that PO1 Mendoza informed
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him that he (Mendoza) successfully bought one plastic sachet of shabu from Guinto.
Second, as to where the marked money was recovered after the buy-bust operation.
According to PO1 Mendoza, he was able to obtain possession of the buy-bust money
from the left front pocket of Guinto as transcribed in his direct testimony dated 19
August 2004. However, in his direct testimony dated 18 August 2005, Mendoza
testified that he was able to recover the buy-bust money from the right hand of
Guinto, as opposed from his previous narration that he recovered the money from
Guintos left pocket. Third, conflicting circumstances before the arrest. In his first
testimony, PO1 Mendoza recalled that upon their arrival at the target area at around
eleven oclock in the evening, the team waited for almost two hours for the accused
to come out from his house. However, PO1 Familara testified that they arrived at the
target area at around one oclock in the morning of 20 January 2004. Witness PO1
Noble, on the other hand, recalled that they left for the area at around eleven in the
evening and waited for 15 to 20 minutes for Guinto to come out but contradicted his
former statement and testified that they arrived at around one oclock in the
morning. The prosecution failed to present a clear picture on what really transpired
on the buy-bust operation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GARRY DELA CRUZ y DE GUZMAN
G.R. No. 205821, October 1, 2014, J. Leonen
Apart from the blatantly irregular handling by PO1 Bobon of the seven (7)
sachets, it is also admitted that no physical inventory and taking of photographs in
the presence of Dela Cruz or of any of the other persons specified by Section 21
were conducted. The significance of complying with Section 21s requirements
cannot be overemphasized. Non-compliance is tantamount to failure in establishing
identity of corpus delicti, an essential element of the offenses of illegal sale and
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. By failing to establish an element of these
offenses, non-compliance will, thus, engender the acquittal of an accused.
Facts:
Dela Cruz was arrested in a buy-bust operation. The buy-bust operation was
allegedly conducted after a civilian informant tipped the Zamboanga City Police
Office that a certain Gary was selling illegal drugs at the parking area for buses
behind Food Mart, Governor Lim Street, Sangali, Bunguioa, Zamboanga City (the
target area).
At around 11:00 a.m. of September 14, 2004, the buy-bust operation team,
accompanied by the informant, went to the target area. The informant initially
brokered the sale of shabu. It was PO1 Bobon who handed the marked money to
Dela Cruz in exchange for one (1) heat-sealed plastic sachet of suspected shabu.
After which, he removed his bull cap. SPO1 Roca then arrested Dela Cruz.
Upon frisking dela Cruz, PO1 Bobon supposedly recovered six (6) more heatsealed sachets of suspected shabu. PO1 Bobon placed the sachet he purchased
from dela Cruz in his right pocket and the six (6) other sachets in his left pocket.
SPO1 Roca recovered the marked 100.00 bill. The Regional Trial Court convicted
Dela Cruz for violating Article II, Sections 5 and 11 of the Comprehensive Dangerous
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Drugs Act of 2002. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming Dela Cruz
conviction in toto.
Issue:
Whether Dela Cruzs guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating Sections 5
and 11 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was established
Ruling:
No. In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following
elements must first be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place
and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.
On the other hand, in prosecutions for illegal possession of a dangerous drug,
it must be shown that (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object
identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized
by law, and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession
of the drug. Similarly, in this case, the evidence of the corpus delicti must be
established beyond reasonable doubt.
With respect to the element of corpus delicti, Section 21 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 provides for the custody and
disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug
paraphernalia.
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
dangerous
drugs,
controlled
precursors
and
essential
chemicals,
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted
at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or
at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
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apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures
and custody over said items.
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous
drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the
same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and
quantitative examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall
be done by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued immediately upon the
receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals
does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory
examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities
of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided,
however, That a final certification shall be issued immediately upon completion of
the said examination and certification;
By failing to establish identity of corpus delicti, non-compliance with Section
21 indicates a failure to establish an element of the offense of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs. It follows that this non-compliance suffices as a ground for
acquittal.
In People v. Nandi, the Court explained that four (4) links should be
established in the chain of custody of the confiscated item: first, the seizure and
marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
In this case, the Regional Trial Court acknowledged that no physical inventory
of the seized items was conducted. Similarly, there is nothing in the records to show
that the seized items were photographed in the manner required by Section 21.
Likewise, none of the persons required by Section 21 to be present (or their possible
substitutes) have been shown to be present. The circumstance of PO1 Bobon
keeping narcotics in his own pockets precisely underscores the importance of
strictly complying with Section 21. His subsequent identification in open court of the
items coming out of his own pockets is self-serving.
The prosecution effectively admits that from the moment of the supposed
buy-bust operation until the seized items turnover for examination, these items had
been in the sole possession of a police officer. In fact, not only had they been in his
possession, they had been in such close proximity to him that they had been
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Keeping one of the seized items in his right pocket and the rest in his left
pocket is a doubtful and suspicious way of ensuring the integrity of the items.
Contrary to the Court of Appeals finding that PO1 Bobon took the necessary
precautions, the Court finds his actions reckless, if not dubious.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLITO ANDAYA y REANO
G.R. No. 183700, October 13, 2014, J. Bersamin
The non-presentation of the confidential informant as a witness does not
ordinarily weaken the State's case against the accused. However, if the arresting
lawmen arrested the accused based on the pre-arranged signal from the
confidential informant who acted as the poseur buyer, his non-presentation must be
credibly explained and the transaction established by other ways in order to satisfy
the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt because the arresting lawmen did
not themselves participate in the buy-bust transaction with the accused.
Facts:
On February 7, 2003, an information for violation of Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 9165 (RA 9165) (illegal sale of dangerous drugs) was filed charging Pablito
Andaya y Reano (Andaya). Upon arraignment, Andaya pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution presented five
(witnesses), namely: SPO4 Delfin Alea, SPO3 Nelio Lopez, SPO2 Danilo Mercado,
SPO4 Protasio Marasigan and Jupri Delantar.
SPO2 Delfin Alea testified that at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of
December 16, 2002, their asset who was conducting surveillance of Pablito Andaya
in Barangay San Jose Sico, Batangas City, arrived at their station. Said asset
reported that he had arranged to buy shabu from Pablito. A team composed of SPO1
Aguila, SPO1 Cabungcal, Eric de Chavez, PO1 Lindberg Yap, Edwalberto Villar and
asset Bagsit was constituted to conduct a buy-bust. Two (2) pieces of P100.00 bills
both duly marked "X" were recorded in the police blotter. Alea gave the marked bills
to the asset. Upon reaching the designated place, the team members alighted from
their vehicles and occupied different positions where they could see and observe
the asset. The asset knocked on the door of Pablito's house. Pablito came out.
Pablito and the asset talked briefly. The asset gave Pablito the marked money. The
asset received something from appellant. As the pre-arranged signal signifying
consummation of the transaction was given, the team members approached Pablito
and the asset, introduced themselves as police officers and arrested accused. He
was brought to the police station and the arrival of the team was recorded in the
police blotter. The merchandise handed by accused to the asset was then sent to
the Regional Crime Laboratory in Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna. Eventually,
the specimen was positive for methampethamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a
dangerous drug. Also, SPO2 Lopez testified that received the person of the accused,
the marked money and the item accused handed to the asset. He also prepared the
request for laboratory examination and the documents required for the filing of the
case with the Public Prosecutor. Furthermore, when presented, SPO2 Danilo Mercado
testified that he recorded the marked bills in the police blotter before the buy-bust.
Upon the team's return, the marked money and the merchandise from accused
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were turned over to him. He prepared a complaint sheet. Thereafter, he turned over
accused and the evidence to the Police Investigator.SPO4 Protacio Marasigan, for his
part testified that he received a written request for laboratory examination of the
subject merchandise and brought the same to the crime laboratory in Laguna.
Moreover, Jupri Delantar, a Forensic Chemical Officer in Camp Vicente Lim, Laguna,
testified that he conducted the examination in which the merchandise tested
positive for shabu.
Eventually, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, in Batangas City (RTC)
rendered its judgment convicting Andaya as charged, and meted him the penalty of
life imprisonment. On appeal, the said decision was affirmed in toto.
Issue:
Whether or not Andaya shall be held guilty for the illegal sale of shabu albeit
the prosecutions non-presentation of the confidential informant, which according to
accused, was adverse to the prosecution and indicates that his guilt was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
Accused Pablito Andaya y Reano is hereby acquitted for failure to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt and his immediate release from confinement at the
National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City is also ordered.
To secure the conviction of the accused who is charged with the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs as defined and punished by Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 (Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002), the State must establish the concurrence
of the following elements, namely: (a) that the transaction or sale took place
between the accused and the poseur buyer; and (b) that the dangerous drugs
subject of the transaction or sale is presented in court as evidence of the corpus
delicti.
Proof of the transaction must be credible and complete. In every criminal
prosecution, it is the State, and no other, that bears the burden of proving the illegal
sale of the dangerous drug beyond reasonable doubt. This responsibility imposed on
the State accords with the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, who
has no duty to prove his innocence until and unless the presumption of innocence in
his favor has been overcome by sufficient and competent evidence. Here, the
confidential informant was not a police officer. It is notable that the members of the
buy-bust team arrested Andaya on the basis of the pre-arranged signal from the
poseur buyer. The pre-arranged signal signified to the members of the buy-bust
team that the transaction had been consummated between the poseur buyer and
Andaya. However, the State did not present the confidential informant/poseur buyer
during the trial to describe how exactly the transaction between him and Andaya
had taken place. There would have been no issue against that, except that none of
the members of the buy-bust team had directly witnessed the transaction, if any,
between Andaya and the poseur buyer due to their being positioned at a distance
from the poseur buyer and Andaya at the moment of the supposed transaction.
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This Court is also of the view that the justification by the CA in not finding
anything wrong or odd in the non-presentation of the poseur buyer as a witness
against the accused, was off-tangent and does not help the State's cause. In this
case, the poseur buyer and the confidential informant were one and the same.
Without the poseur buyer's testimony, the State did not credibly incriminate
Andaya.
Under the law, selling was any act "of giving away any dangerous drug and/or
controlled precursor and essential chemical whether for money or any other
consideration;"while delivering was any act "of knowingly passing a dangerous drug
to another, personally or otherwise, and by any means, with or without
consideration." Given the legal characterizations of the acts constituting the offense
charged, the members of the buy-bust team could not incriminate Andaya by simply
declaring that they had seen from their positions the poseur buyer handing
something to Andaya who, in turn, gave something to the poseur buyer. If the
transaction was a sale, it was unwarranted to infer from such testimonies of the
members of the buy-bust team that what the poseur buyer handed over were the
marked P100.00 bills and that what Andaya gave to the poseur buyer was the
shabu purchased.
Another mark of suspicion attending the evidence of guilt related to the
reliance by the members of the buy-bust team on the pre-arranged signal from the
poseur buyer. To start with, the record does not show what the prearranged signal
consisted of. It is fundamental enough to expect the State to be clear and definite
about its evidence of guilt, particularly here where the conviction of Andaya would
require him to spend the rest of his natural life behind bars. Secondly, the reliance
on the supposed signal to establish the consummation of the transaction between
the poseur buyer and Andaya was unwarranted because the unmitigatedly hearsay
character of the signal rendered it entirely bereft of trustworthiness. The arresting
members of the buy-bust team interpreted the signal from the anonymous poseur
buyer as the sign of the consummation of the transaction. Their interpretation,
being necessarily subjective without the testimony of the poseur buyer, unfairly
threatened the liberty of Andaya. We should not allow that threat to perpetuate
itself. And, lastly, the reliance on the signal would deprive Andaya the right to
confront and test the credibility of the poseur buyer who supposedly gave it.
The Court should look at the situation of Andaya with utmost caution because
of what our judicial experience through the years has told us about unscrupulous
lawmen resorting to stratagems of false incrimination in order to arrest individuals
they target for ulterior reasons. In this case, the arrest did not emanate from
probable cause, for the formless signal from the anonymous poseur buyer did not
establish beyond reasonable doubt the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs
under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDWIN CABRERA
G.R. No. 190175, November 12, 2014, J. Del Castillo

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When an accused raises the issue of non-compliance by the police officers
with Sec. 21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 particularly the lack of physical inventory of
the seized specimen and the non-taking of photograph thereof on appeal after the
CA rendered a decision, the Court must uphold his conviction. Cabrera should have
raised the said issue before the trial court. Truly, objection to evidence cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the
evidence offered, he must so state in the form of an objection. Without such
objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.
Facts:
After receiving information from informants and a report from a confidential
asset, police operatives, namely PO1 Palconit, PO3 Cabuenas, and PO2 Cunan
conducted a buy-bust operation against Accused-appellant Cabrera on September
30, 2002. At about 4:30 p.m., poseur-buyer PO1 Palconit, together with the
confidential asset, approached Cabrera who was standing outside his house. The
confidential asset introduced PO1 Palconit to Cabrera as a person who wanted to
buy shabu. PO1 Palconit gave Cabrera two marked PhP50.00 bills, while the latter
handed to him two plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance.
Thereupon, PO1 Palconit made the pre-arranged signal by touching his head with his
right hand. His back-ups then rushed to the scene and simultaneously therewith
PO1 Palconit arrested the appellant. He then wrote the markings EC on the two
plastic sachets and brought the same to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Labo-ratory for forensic examination.
Thereafter, a complaint/information was filed against appellant charging him
with violation of Sec. 5, Article II, of R.A. No. 9165 as amended. The chemistry report
from the PNP Crime Laboratory later revealed that the two plastic sachets marked
with EC tested positive for shabu, a dangerous drug. Cabrera pleaded not guilty
to the crime charged and interposed a denial.
The RTC convicted Cabrera of the crime charged which was affirmed by the
CA. Cabrera in his ultimate appeal raised as additional assignment of errors the lack
of physical inventory of the seized specimen and the non-taking of its photograph
pursuant to Sec. 21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165.
Issue:
Whether or not Cabrera should be held guilty for violating R.A. No. 9165 in
spite certain procedural lapses of the arresting officers.
Ruling:
Yes, Cabrera can still be held liable.
With regard to the non-compliance by the police officers with Sec. 21 of the
IRR of R.A. No. 9165 as alleged by Cabrera in his Supplemental Brief, particularly
the lack of physical inventory of the seized specimen and the non-taking of
photograph thereof, the Court notes that [Cabrera] raised the same only in this
appeal.

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The records of the case is bereft of any showing that Cabrera objected before
the RTC regarding the seizure and safekeeping of the shabu seized from him on
account of the failure of the police officers to maintain an unbroken chain of custody
of the said drugs. The only time that Cabrera questioned the chain of custody was
before the CA but not on the ground of lack of physical inventory or non-taking of
photograph, but on the alleged gap between the time of confiscation of the
specimen and the time of its submission to the PNP Crime Laboratory. But even
then, it was already too late in the day for appellant to do so. Cabrera should have
raised the said issue before the trial court.
In similar cases, the Court brushed aside the Cabrera's belated contention
that the illegal drugs confiscated from his person were inadmissible because the
arresting officers failed to comply with Sec. 21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165. Whatever
justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers from literally complying with Sec.
21 will remain unknown, because Cabrera did not question during trial the
safekeeping of the items seized from him. Objection to evidence cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence
offered, he must so state in the form of an objection. Without such objection, he
cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. Besides and as already
mentioned, the CA had already aptly concluded that the identity of the seized drugs
was established by the prosecution and its integrity preserved.
RIZALDY SANCHEZ Y CAJILI vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014, J. Mendoza
In this case, the prosecution failed to account for each and every link in the
chain of custody of the shabu, from the moment it was allegedly confiscated up to
the time it was presented before the court as proof of the corpus delicti. The Court
entertains doubts whether the shabu allegedly seized from Sanchez was the very
same item presented during the trial of this case. The Court notes that there were
several lapses in the law enforcers handling of the seized item which, when taken
collectively, render the standards of chain of custody seriously breached. Thus, the
chain of custody requirement has a two-fold purpose: (1) the preservation of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, and (2) the removal of
unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence.
Facts:
Sanchez was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in the
Information, filed before the RTC. That, the Sanchez, not being authorized by law,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
control and custody, 0.1017 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly
known as shabu, a dangerous drug. When arraigned, Sanchez pleaded not guilty
to the offense charged. During the pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense
stipulated on the existence and due execution of the following pieces of evidence:
1) the request for laboratory examination; 2) certification issued by the National
Bureau of Investigation; 3) Dangerous Drugs Report; and 4) transparent plastic

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sachet containing small transparent plastic sachet of white crystalline substance.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecutions version states that around 2:50 pm of March 19, 2003,
acting on the information that Jacinta Marciano, aka Intang, was selling drugs to
tricycle drivers, SPO1 Elmer Amposta, together with CSU Edmundo Hernandez, CSU
Jose Tagle, Jr., and CSU Samuel Monzon, was dispatched to Barangay Alapan 1-B,
Imus, Cavite to conduct an operation. While at the place, the group waited for a
tricycle going to, and coming from, the house of Jacinta. After a few minutes, they
spotted a tricycle carrying Rizaldy Sanchez coming out of the house. The group
chased the tricycle. After catching up with it, they requested Rizaldy to alight. It was
then that they noticed Rizaldy holding a match box. SPO1 Amposta asked Rizaldy if
he could see the contents of the match box. Rizaldy agreed. While examining it,
SPO1 Amposta found a small transparent plastic sachet which contained a white
crystalline substance. Suspecting that the substance was a regulated drug, the
group accosted Rizaldy and the tricycle driver. The group brought the two to the
police station. Salud M. Rosales, a forensic chemist from the NBI, submitted a
Certification that the specimen/s gave positive results for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
In the present petition, Sanchez denied the accusation against him and
presented a different version of the events that transpired in the afternoon of March
19, 2003. He testified that on the date and time in question, he, together with a
certain Darwin Reyes, was on their way home from Brgy. Alapan, Imus, Cavite,
where they transported a passenger, when their way was blocked by four (4) armed
men riding an owner-type jeepney. Without a word, the four men frisked him and
Darwin. He protested and asked what offense they committed. The arresting officers
told him that they had just bought drugs from Alapan. He reasoned out that he
merely transported a passenger there but the policemen still accosted him and he
was brought to the Imus Police Station where he was further investigated. The
police officer, however, let Darwin Reyes go.
The RTC rendered its decision finding that Sanchez was caught in flagrante
delicto, in actual possession of shabu. It stated that the police operatives had
reasonable ground to believe that Sanchez was in possession of the said dangerous
drug and such suspicion was confirmed when the match box Sanchez was carrying
was found to contain shabu. The CA found no cogent reason to reverse or modify
the findings of facts and conclusions reached by the RTC and, thus, upheld the
conviction of the accused for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The
CA then went on to write that non-compliance by the police officers on the
requirements of Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, particularly on
the conduct of inventory and photograph of the seized drug, was not fatal to the
prosecutions cause since its integrity and evidentiary value had been duly
preserved. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack and/or excess of jurisdiction when it held that non-compliance with Section 21,
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paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act no. 9165 does not automatically render the
seized items inadmissible in evidence.
Ruling:
Yes, the CA erred. Furthermore, the Court entertains doubts whether the
shabu allegedly seized from Sanchez was the very same item presented during the
trial of this case. The Court notes that there were several lapses in the law
enforcers handling of the seized item which, when taken collectively, render the
standards of chain of custody seriously breached.
Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and
custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction. The function of the chain of custody
requirement is to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the
evidence are removed. Thus, the chain of custody requirement has a two-fold
purpose: (1) the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items, and (2) the removal of unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence.
In this case, the prosecution failed to account for each and every link in the
chain of custody of the shabu, from the moment it was allegedly confiscated up to
the time it was presented before the court as proof of the corpus delicti. The
testimony of SPO1 Amposta was limited to the fact that he placed the marking
RSC on the seized drug; and that he and the three other police officers brought
Sanchez and the subject shabu to their station and turned them over to their
investigator. The prosecution evidence did not disclose where the marking of the
confiscated shabu took place and who witnessed it. The evidence does not show
who was in possession of the seized shabu from the crime scene to the police
station. A reading of the Certification, issued by Forensic Chemist Salud Rosales
shows that a certain PO1 Edgardo Nario submitted the specimen to the NBI for
laboratory examination, but this piece of evidence does not establish the identity of
the police investigator to whom SPO1 Amposta and his group turned over the seized
shabu. The identities of the person who received the specimen at the NBI laboratory
and the person who had the custody and safekeeping of the seized marijuana after
it was chemically analyzed pending its presentation in court were also not disclosed.
Given the procedural lapses pointed out above, a serious uncertainty hangs
over the identity of the seized shabu that the prosecution introduced in evidence.
The prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody, resulting in
rendering the seizure and confiscation of the shabu open to doubt and suspicion.
Hence, the incriminatory evidence cannot pass judicial scrutiny.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROSALINDA CASABUENA
G.R. No. 186455, November 19, 2014, J. Brion
In a prosecution for the illegal sale of a prohibited drug under Section 5 of
R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the identity
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of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor. To remove any doubt or uncertainty on the
identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must definitely show that the
illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from
Casabuena; otherwise, the prosecution for possession or for drug pushing under
R.A. No. 9165 fails. The testimonies of SPO1 Balolong, SPO2 Ancheta, and Armando
all showed that the police did not inventory or photograph the seized shabu either
at the place where it was seized or at the police station. No photographs or
certificate of inventory of the confiscated items appear in the records.
Facts:
The prosecution charged the Casabuena with illegal sale of shabu under
Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. That Casabuena, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell in a buy bust operation to Armando Joaquin acting as
the poseur-buyer 0.0139 gram of shabu, a dangerous drug, contained in one plastic
sachet, without any license or authority to sell the same. The Casabuena was duly
arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge laid.
SPO1 Balolong testified that on February 4, 2004, one of the police
informants, Armando, went to the Laoag City Police Station and informed him that
the Casabuena was selling shabu in Barangay 5. Acting on this information, the
citys chief of police formed an entrapment team. The team conducted a briefing,
assigned Armando as the poseur-buyer, and then went to the target area. When the
team arrived there, they positioned themselves 15 meters from the Casabuenas
compound. Armando followed them after receiving a call from SPO1 Balolong.
Armando entered the Casabuenas house when he arrived; he went out after two (2)
minutes and made the pre-arranged signal to the other members of the buy-bust
team.Once inside, Armando handed the sachet of shabu to SPO1 Balolong. Armando
then led the police to the bathroom, and there, Armando grabbed the left hand of
the Casabuena. SPO1 Balolong, for his part, forced open Casabuenas right hand
and took two P100 bills from her. SPO1Balolong informed the Casabuena of her
constitutional rights, and then ordered PO1 Mangapit to arrest her.
The police then brought the Casabuena and the seized items to the Laoag
City Police Station. When they arrived there, SPO1 Balolong submitted the seized
items to SPO2 Loreto Ancheta, the evidence custodian who, in turn, marked these
items. On cross examination, SPO1 Balolong stated that Armando was just a walkin informant. SPO1 Balolong also admitted that he did not witness the transaction
between Armando and the Casabuena since he was outside the latters house. P/Sr.
Insp. Cayabyab, the Forensic Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory in Laoag
City, stated that, Merlita Pasion, the laboratorys receiving clerk, handed to her a
letter-request and a small plastic sachet containing alleged shabu. She put her
initials on the sachet, made an initial preliminary examination on the submitted
specimen, and found it positive for the presence of 0.0139 gram of shabu. She
conducted a confirmatory test on the specimen, and this test yielded the same
result. The results of these two tests were reflected in the Initial Laboratory Report
and in Chemistry Report. With regard to the marked money, SPO2 Ancheta claimed
that he noted their respective serial numbers, and then placed them in a steel
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cabinet. He maintained that the item presented to him was the same item given to
him by SPO1 Balolong because it bore the markings he made.
The Defense version states that Abian recalled that at around 11:00 a.m. on
February 4, 2004, he was in front of the gate of the Casabuenas house when
Armando approached him and asked if there was any available shabu, and whether
his aunt was selling shabu. When he answered in the negative, Abian asked him for
his aunts identity. Abian pointed to the Casabuena who was then near the
bathroom. Thereafter, the Casabuena called Abian and asked him to buy a
shampoo. Abian did as instructed and bought shampoo. When he returned, he
handed the shampoo to the Casabuena who, in turn, went inside the bathroom.
Afterwards, SPO1 Balolong went to the bathroom, kicked the door open, and asked
the Casabuena where the money was. When the Casabuena answered that there
was no money, SPO1Balolong pulled her out of the bathroom. The police asked
Casabuena to put her clothes on, and then brought her to the police headquarters.
According to the Casabuena, the police did not sign any confiscation receipt. She
maintained that she did not sell shabu to Armando on February 4, 2004.The RTC
found the Casabuena guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The CA held that the
prosecution was able to prove that the appellant sold shabu to the poseur-buyer.
Issue:
Whether or not the chain of custody over the seized drug was broken and
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the object evidence had not been
preserved
Ruling:
Yes, the chain of custody was broken.
In a prosecution for the illegal sale of a prohibited drug under Section 5 of
R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the identity of
the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor. To remove any doubt or uncertainty on the
identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must definitely show that the
illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from
Casabuena; otherwise, the prosecution for possession or for drug pushing under
R.A. No. 9165 fails.
The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Strict compliance with the
prescribed procedure is required because of the illegal drug's unique characteristic
rendering it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering,
alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise. The outlined procedure,
however, was not shown to have been complied with by the members of the buybust team, and nothing on record suggests that they had extended reasonable
efforts to comply with the said statutory requirement in handling the seized
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evidence. The testimonies of SPO1 Balolong, SPO2 Ancheta, and Armando all
showed that the police did not inventory or photograph the seized shabu either at
the place where it was seized or at the police station. No photographs or certificate
of inventory of the confiscated items appear in the records.
Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR offers some flexibility in complying with the
express requirements under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,
non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items. These conditions were not met in the present case, as the
prosecution did not even attempt to offer any justification why it failed to inventory
and to photograph the seized items. The Court cannot simply presume what these
justifications are. Contrary to the CAs ruling, the so-called field test of the drugs
recovered and its turn over to the crime laboratory together with the marked
money are not the procedures mandated by Section 21 and its IRR.
In prosecutions involving narcotics, the narcotic substance itself constitutes
the corpus delicti of the offense and its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that
unwavering exactitude be observed in establishing the corpus delicti. The chain of
custody rule performs this function as it ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. The rule seeks to settle
definitively whether the object evidence subjected to laboratory examination and
presented in court is the same object allegedly seized from appellant. In the present
case, the prosecutions evidence failed to establish the chain that would have
shown that the shabu presented in court was the very same specimen seized from
the Casabuena.
A vital link in the chain of custody is SPO1 Balolongs possession of the plastic
sachet at Barangay 5, Laoag City and his delivery of this sachet at the police
station. This Court points out that SPO1 Balolong did not mark the plastic sachet; it
was SPO2 Ancheta who allegedly placed markings when the plastic sachet was
handed to him at the police station. P/Sr. Insp. Cayabyabs testimony is inconsistent
the claim of SPO2 Ancheta that he marked the seized sachet with, among others,
RC which stands for the appellants initials. This Court is puzzled why the
specimen presented to SPO2 Ancheta bore the initial RC while the item presented
to P/Sr. Insp. did not have Casabuenas initials. In the absence of any evidence, we
cannot assume that the markings being referred to in both the Initial Laboratory
Report and in the Chemistry Report were the same markings allegedly placed by
SPO2 Ancheta. The Court cannot assume a matter not stated in the records. The
Court also notes that there is a discrepancy between the quantity of shabu stated in
the Request For Laboratory Examination (0.1 gram) and in the Chemistry Report
(0.0139 gram).
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMIL DORIA DAHIL AND ROMMEL
CASTRO y CARLOS
G.R. No. 212196, January 12, 2015, J. Mendoza

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The presentation of the dangerous drugs as evidence in court is material if
not indispensable in every prosecution for the illegal sale and possession of
dangerous drugs. As such, the identity of the dangerous drugs should be
established beyond doubt by showing that the items offered in court were the same
substances bought during the buy-bust operation. This rigorous requirement, known
under R.A. No. 9165 as the chain of custody, performs the function of ensuring that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
Facts:
On October 1, 2002, Dahil and Castro were charged in three (3) separate
Informations before the RTC. In Criminal Case No. DC 02-376, Dahil and Castro were
charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for the sale of 26.8098
grams of marijuana. In Criminal Case No. DC 02-377, Dahil was charged with
possession of 20.6642 grams of marijuana. In Criminal Case No. DC 02-378, Castro
was charged with possession of 130.8286 grams of marijuana. On November 14,
2002, Castro was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty. Dahil, on the other hand, filed
a motion for reinvestigation and his arraignment was deferred. The RTC discovered
that Dahil was never arraigned through inadvertence.
Evidence of prosecution shows that PDEA conducted relative to the
information they received that a certain alias Buddy and alias Mel were
trafficking dried marijuana. The Chief of PDEA formed a team to conduct a buy-bust
operation. The team proceeded to the target place. When PO2 Corpuz and the
informant were in front of the house, they met Dahil and Castro. The informant then
introduced PO2 Corpuz as the buyer of marijuana. Dahil asked PO2 Corpuz how
much would he be buying and the latter answered that he would buy 200.00 worth
of marijuana. At this juncture, Dahil took out from his pockets plastic sachets of
marijuana and handed them to PO2 Corpuz. After checking the items, PO2 Corpuz
handed 2100.00 marked bills to Castro. Immediately thereafter, PO2 Cruz took off
his cap to signal that the sale had been consummated. The rest of the buy-bust
team then rushed to their location and arrested Castro and Dahil. PO2 Corpuz
frisked Dahil and recovered from his possession another 5 plastic sachets containing
marijuana while SPO1 Licu searched the person of Castro and confiscated from him
1 brick of suspected marijuana. Both Castro and Dahil, together with the confiscated
drugs, were then brought by the buy-bust team to the PDEA office. There, the seized
items were marked by PO2 Corpuz and SPO1 Licu. Sergeant dela Cruz then prepared
the request for laboratory examination, affidavits of arrest and other pertinent
documents. An inventory of the seized items was also prepared which was signed
by Kagawad Pamintuan. Thereafter, PO2 Corpuz brought the confiscated drugs to
the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination, which subsequently yielded positive
results for marijuana.
In his defense, Dahil claimed that on September 29, 2002, a tricycle driver
came looking for him after he had arrived home. He was then asked by the unknown
man whether he knew a certain Buddy in their place. He answered that there were
many persons named Buddy. Suddenly, persons alighted from the vehicles parked in
front of his house and dragged him into one of the vehicles. He was brought to Clark
Air Base and was charged with illegal selling and possession of marijuana. Castro
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testified that on September 29, 2002, he was on Barangay Ninoy Aquino, Angeles
City, watching a game of chess when he was approached by some men who asked if
he knew a certain Boy residing at Hardian Extension. He then replied that he did not
know the said person and then the men ordered him to board a vehicle and brought
him to Clark Air Base where he was charged with illegal possession of marijuana.
The RTC found both accused liable. The RTC was convinced that the
prosecution was able to prove the case of selling and possession of illegal drugs
against the accused. All the elements of the crimes were established. On appeal,
the CA denied the appeal. In its view, the prosecution was able to establish that the
illegal sale of marijuana actually took place. It was also held that the prosecution
was able to establish the chain of custody. PO2 Corpuz and SPO1 Licu testified that
the said drugs were marked at the police station.
Issue:
Whether or not the law enforcement officers substantially complied with the
chain of custody procedure required by R.A. No. 9165.
Ruling:
No. The strict procedure under Sec. 21 of RA 9165 was not complied with.
The said provision requires the apprehending team, after seizure and
confiscation, to immediately (1) conduct a physically inventory; and (2) photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. First,
the inventory of the property was not immediately conducted after seizure and
confiscation as it was only done at the police station. The prosecution did not even
claim that the PDEA Office Region 3 was the nearest office from TB Pavilion where
the drugs were seized. The prosecution also failed to give sufficient justification for
the delayed conduct of the inventory. Second, there is doubt as to the identity of the
person who prepared the Inventory of Property Seized. According to the CA decision,
it was Sergeant Dela Cruz who prepared the said document.27 PO2 Cruz on the
other hand, testified that it was their investigator who prepared the document while
SPO1 Licus testimony was that a certain SPO4 Jamisolamin was their investigator.
Third, there were conflicting claims on whether the seized items were photographed
in the presence of the accused or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official.
The prosecution failed to establish that the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items were preserved.
PO2 Corpuz and SPO1 Licu claimed that they had placed their initials on the
seized items. They, however, gave little information on how they actually did the
marking. It is clear, nonetheless, that the marking was not immediately done at the
place of seizure, and the markings were only placed at the police station based on
the testimony of PO2 Corpuz. From the place of the seizure to the PDEA Office
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Region 3, the seized items were not marked. It could not, therefore, be determined
how the unmarked drugs were handled. Also, the investigator in this case was a
certain SPO4 Jamisolamin. Surprisingly, there was no testimony from the witnesses
as to the turnover of the seized items to SPO4 Jamisolamin. It is highly improbable
for an investigator in a drug-related case to effectively perform his work without
having custody of the seized items. Further, no testimonial or documentary
evidence was given whatsoever as to how the drugs were kept while in the custody
of the forensic chemist until it was transferred to the court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANOLITO OPIANA Y TANAEL
G.R. No. 200797, January 12, 2015, J. Del Castillo
For the violation of Section 5, the prosecution satisfactorily established the
following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that
the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti or the illicit drug in evidence.
Facts:
On April 8, 2008, the Makati police officers and Makati Anti-Drug Abuse
Council (MADAC) operatives conducted an entrapment/buy-bust operation on
Opiana who was reportedly engaged in illegal drug trade. MADAC operative Serrano
acted as poseur-buyer. After having been introduced by the informant as a scorer
of shabu, Opiana and Serrano negotiated for the sale of P300.00 worth of shabu.
Serrano gave Opiana the P300 marked money and in exchange, appellant handed to
Serrano a heat-sealed sachet containing white crystalline substance. After making
the pre-arranged signal, Opiana was apprehended and when bodily frisked, 19 heatsealed sachets were recovered from his possession. Laboratory examination
revealed that all 20 heat-sealed sachets yielded positive results for shabu. Opiana
was charged with the crimes of violations of Section 5 (sale of illegal drugs; 0.05
gram) and Section 11 (possession of dangerous drugs; 0.74 gram), both of Article II,
RA 9165.
Opiana denied the charges against him. He claimed that on April 8, 2008, he
was repairing a vehicle in front of his house when a green van arrived and 3 men
alighted. When he affirmatively answered to their query whether he is Noli, he
was immediately arrested. He asserted that the police officers mistook him as the
Noli who was known to be a drug peddler in their area. He argued that he is
known in their place as Noli Mekaniko, and not the drug peddler.
The RTC convicted appellant of violations of Sections 5 and 11 of Article II of
RA 9165.Opiana appealed to the CA. In his Brief, Opiana alleged that the buy-bust
team did not observe the proper procedure governing the handling, custody and
disposition of the illegal drugs. However, the CA denied the appeal. The CA ruled
that all the elements for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
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Whether Opiana is guilty of the offense charged.
Ruling:
The Court finds the appeal to be lacking in merit.
For the violation of Section 5, the prosecution satisfactorily established the
following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that
the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti or the illicit drug in evidence. The prosecution satisfactorily
established the following elements for the illegal possession of dangerous drugs in
violation of Section 11, to wit: appellant was shown to have been in possession of
0.74 gram of shabu, a prohibited drug; his possession was not authorized by law;
and that he freely and consciously possessed the said illegal drug.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAKIM MINANGA y DUMANSAL
G.R. No. 202837, January 21, 2015, J. Villarama, Jr.
The Court gives full faith and credence to the testimonies of the police
officers and upholds the presumption of regularity in the apprehending officers
performance of official duty. It is a settled rule that in cases involving violations of
the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are
police officers, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.
Facts:
After receiving reliable information from a police asset that Rakim is actively
engaged in selling illegal drugs, a team and the police asset was formed to conduct
a buy-bust operation in Butuan City, against the appellant. PO1 Rommel dela Cruz
Condez (PO1 Condez) was designated to act as the poseur-buyer with PO2 Saldino
Virtudazo (PO2 Virtudazo) as his back-up. The team brought with them the amount
of P20,000.00 as show money.
Upon arrival at the designated place, the police asset introduced PO1 Condez
to Rakim as an interested buyer of shabu. After Rakim agreed to sell to PO1 Condez
four sacks of shabu for the amount of P20,000.00, appellant told PO1 Condez to
wait. Appellant then left and after a few minutes returned. He then showed PO1
Condez four big sachets of shabu. After receiving the four sachets, PO1 Condez
examined them and being convinced of their genuineness, gave the prearranged
signal. Thus, PO2 Virtudazo rushed to the scene. The police officers introduced
themselves as PDEA agents and arrested the appellant, informing the latter of his
constitutional rights. The money was not given to appellant as it was intended only
as show money. PO1 Condez marked the four sachets given by the appellant as
RCC 1 to RCC 4. The appellant was then brought to the police station for
investigation.
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At the police station, Rakim was photographed in the presence of a Barangay
Captain and a State Prosecutor. Armed with the corresponding requests, the four
marked sachets and the appellant were brought by PO1 Condez and PO2 Virtudazo
to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. At the PNP Crime Laboratory, the four
sachets were marked as A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4 by the Forensic Chemist. While the
drug test conducted on the person of the appellant yielded a negative result, the
four sachets with a total weight of 12.882 grams were positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Initially the PDEA filed a case against the appellant for violation of Section 5,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or for illegal sale of shabu but when the investigation
reached the Office of the City Prosecutor the case was modified to one for illegal
possession.
On the other hand, Rakim denied such allegations and presented different
witnesses to belie the claim.
The RTC found Rakim guilty as charged of violation of Section 11, paragraph
2, sub-paragraph (1),20 Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or illegal possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The CA affirmed the RTCs Decision and
subsequently denied a motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellants guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
The essential elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs are (1) the
accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited
drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possess the said drug.
The Court finds that these essential elements were proven in this case.
Rakim was caught in flagrante possessing 12.882 grams of shabu, a dangerous
drug, packed in four big sachets. His possession of said dangerous drugs is not
authorized by law. And he was freely and consciously possessing the contraband as
shown by his act of handing these four sachets to PO1 Condez in an intended sale.
The Court notes that Rakim was positively identified by PO1 Condez as the one who
handed over the four sachets. However, the money was not given to Rakim as it
was intended only as show money.
The Court gives full faith and credence to the testimonies of the police
officers and upholds the presumption of regularity in the apprehending officers
performance of official duty. It is a settled rule that in cases involving violations of
the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police
officers, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner,
unless there is evidence to the contrary.
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On the other hand, Rakim failed to present clear and convincing evidence to
overturn the presumption that the arresting officers regularly performed their
duties. Except for his bare allegations of denial and frame-up that a certain Muslim
was behind his arrest, nothing supports his claim that the police officers were
impelled by improper motives to testify against him. In fact, in his direct testimony,
appellant was asked whether he knew said Muslim but despite the opportunity
given to him, he failed to identify him in court.
This Court has invariably viewed with disfavor the defenses of denial and
frame-up. Such defenses can easily be fabricated and are common ploy in
prosecutions for the illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs. In order to
prosper, such defenses must be proved with strong and convincing evidence.
Moreover, in weighing the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses vis--vis
those of the defense, the RTC gave more credence to the version of the prosecution,
to which this Court finds no reason to disagree. Well-settled is the rule that in the
absence of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge,
the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on
appeal. Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the
police officers who conduct the buy-bust operation and appellate courts, upon
established precedents and of necessity, rely on the assessment of the credibility of
witnesses by the trial courts which have the unique opportunity, unavailable to the
appellate courts, to observe the witnesses and to note their demeanor, conduct,
and attitude under direct and cross-examination.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHI CHAN LIU A. K. A. CHAN QUE AND HUI
LAO CHUNG A.K.A. LEOFE SENGLAO
G.R. No. 189272, January 21, 2015, J. Peralta
Charging appellants with illegal possession when the information filed
against them charges the crime of importation does not violate their constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation brought against
them. The rule is that when there is a variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the
offense as charged necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged. An offense
charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter.
Facts:
At 10:00 a.m. of December 3, 1998, SPO2 Lazaro Paglicawan and SPO3
Isagani Yuzon, the officers-on-duty at the Philippine National Police (PNP) Station,
Looc, Occidental Mindoro, received a radio message from the Barangay Captain of
Ambil Island, Looc, Maximo Torreliza, that a suspicious looking boat was seen
somewhere within the vicinity of said island. Immediately thereafter, the police
officers headed towards the specified location wherein they spotted two (2) boats
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anchored side by side, one of which resembled a fishing boat and the other, a
speedboat. They noticed one (1) person on board the fishing boat and two (2) on
board the speed boat who were transferring cargo from the former to the latter. As
they moved closer to the area, the fishing boat hurriedly sped away. Due to the
strong waves, the police officers were prevented from chasing the same and
instead, went towards the speed boat, which seemed to be experiencing engine
trouble.
On board the speed boat, the officers found the appellants Chi Chan Liu a.k.a.
Chan Que and Hui Lao Chung a.k.a. Leofe Senglao with several transparent plastic
bags containing a white, crystalline substance they instantly suspected to be the
regulated drug, methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu.
They requested the appellants to show their identification papers but appellants
failed to do so. Thus, the police officers directed appellants to transfer to their
service boat and thereafter towed appellants speed boat to the shore behind the
Municipal Hall of Looc, Occidental Mindoro. On their way, the police officers testified
that appellant Chi Chan Liu repeatedly offered them big, big amount of money
which they ignored.
Upon reaching the shore, the police officers led the appellants, together with
the bags containing the crystalline substance, to the police station. In the presence
of the appellants and Municipal Mayor Felesteo Telebrico, they conducted an
inventory of the plastic bags which were forty-five (45) in number, weighing about a
kilo each. Again, SPO3 Yuson requested proper documentation from the appellants
as to their identities as well as to the purpose of their entry in the Philippine
territory. However, the appellants did not answer any of SPO3 Yusons questions.
Immediately thereafter, SPO3 Yuson reported the incident to their superiors. The
PNP Regional Director General Reynaldo Acop advised them to await his arrival the
following day.
On December 4, 1998, General Acop arrived. They talked with Mayor
Telebrico and the arresting officers and then brought the appellants with the
suspected illegal drugs to Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna, for further
investigation. There, the appellants and the suspected prohibited drugs were turned
over to Police Inspector Julieto B. Culili, of the Intelligence and Investigation
Division, PNP, Regional Office IV, who attempted to communicate with the
appellants using broken English. According to Inspector Culili, appellant Chi Chan
Liu only kept saying the phrase call China, big money, giving him a certain cellular
phone number.
With the assistance of said interpreter, Inspector Culili informed and
explained to the appellants their rights under Philippine laws inclusive of the right to
remain silent, the right to counsel, as well as the right to be informed of the charges
against them, and the consequences thereof. Inspector Culili also requested the
interpreter to ask the appellants whether they wanted to avail of said constitutional
rights. However, appellants only kept repeating the phrase big money, call China.
According to Inspector Culili, moreover, he was able to confirm that the
appellants are Chinese nationals from Guandong, China, based on an earlier
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intelligence report that foreign nationals on board extraordinary types of vessels
were seen along the sealine of Lubang Island in Cavite, and Quezon Province.
Thereafter, Police Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo, PNP Chief Forensic
Chemist/Physical Examiner assigned at the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Service
Office, Camp Vicente Lim, Laguna conducted an examination of the white,
crystalline substance in the forty-five (45) bags seized from the appellants. After
performing three (3) tests thereon, she positively confirmed in her Chemistry Report
that the same is, indeed, methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as
shabu.
On December 8, 1998, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental
Mindoro filed an Information21 with the RTC of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro,
against appellants for violation of Section 14, Article III, in relation to Section 21 (a),
Article IV of RA No. 6425 as amended by RA No. 7659, or the Importation of
Regulated Drugs. Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges against them.
The testimonies of the witnesses for the defense, namely: Jesus Astorga and
Fernando Oliva, both residents of Ambil Island, Leopoldo S. J. Lozada, a former
Supervising Crime Photographer of the PNP, and Godofredo de la Fuente Robles, a
Member of the Looc Municipal Council, essentially maintain that the subject
crystalline substance was merely recovered by the apprehending police officers
from the house of Barangay Captain Maximo Torreliza and not actually from the
speed boat the appellants were on
The trial court found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the Decision of the RTC in its Decision
dated January 9, 2009. On April 24, 2009, it further denied the appellants Motion
for Reconsideration in its Resolution finding no cogent reason to make any revision,
amendment, or reversal of its assailed Decision.
Issues:
1. Are all elements of the crime of importation of regulated drugs punishable
under Section14, Article III, in relation to Section 21(A), Article IV of Republic
Act 6425, as amended by Republic Act 7659, present in this case?
2. Has the corpus delicti of the crime charged been established beyond
reasonable doubt?
Ruling:
1.
No. The crime of importation of regulated drugs is committed by importing or
bringing any regulated drug into the Philippines without being authorized by law.
According to appellants, if it is not proven that the regulated drugs are brought into
the Philippines from a foreign origin, there is no importation.

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The CA, in finding that there was importation in the present case, stated:
Appellants admission that they were Chinese nationals and their penchant for
making reference during custodial investigation to China where they could obtain
money to bribe the police officers lead this Court to no other reasonable conclusion
but that China is the country of origin of the confiscated drugs. All elements of the
crime of illegal importation of regulated drugs being present in this case, conviction
thereof is in order.
The Court disagrees. The mere fact that the appellants were Chinese
nationals as well as their penchant for making reference to China where they could
obtain money to bribe the apprehending officers does not necessarily mean that the
confiscated drugs necessarily came from China. The records only bear the fact that
the speed boat on which the appellants were apprehended was docked on the coast
of Ambil Island in the Municipality of Looc, Occidental Mindoro. But it could have
easily come from some other locality within the country, and not necessarily from
China or any foreign port, as held by the CA. This Court notes that for a vessel
which resembles a speed boat, it is rather difficult to suppose how appellants made
their way to the shores of Occidental Mindoro from China. Moreover, an earlier
intelligence report that foreign nationals on board extraordinary types of vessels
were seen along the sealine of Lubang Island in Cavite, and Quezon Province, does
not sufficiently prove the allegation that appellants herein were, in fact, importing
illegal drugs in the country from an external source. This, notwithstanding, had the
prosecution presented more concrete evidence to convince this Court that the
prohibited drugs, indeed, came from a source outside of the Philippines, the
importation contention could have been sustained.
Appellants exoneration from illegal importation of regulated drugs under
Section 14, Article III of RA No. 6425 does not, however, free them from all criminal
liability for their possession of the same is clearly evident.
At this point, this Court notes that charging appellants with illegal possession
when the information filed against them charges the crime of importation does not
violate their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation brought against them. The rule is that when there is a variance between
the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established
by the evidence, and the offense as charged necessarily includes the offense
proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which
is charged. An offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when
some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter.
Indeed, the courts have had several occasions in the past wherein an
accused, charged with the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, was convicted of illegal
possession thereof. In those cases, this Court upheld the prevailing doctrine that the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs absorbs the illegal possession thereof except if the
seller was also apprehended in the illegal possession of another quantity of
dangerous drugs not covered by or not included in the illegal sale, and the other
quantity of dangerous drugs was probably intended for some future dealings or use
by the accused. Illegal possession of dangerous drugs is therefore an element of
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and is necessarily included in illegal sale. Hence, convicting the accused with the
former does not violate his right to be informed of the accusation against him for it
is an element of the latter.
In a similar manner, considering that illegal possession is likewise an element
of and is necessarily included in illegal importation of dangerous drugs, convicting
appellants of the former, if duly established beyond reasonable doubt, does not
amount to a violation of their right to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against them. Indeed, where an accused is charged with a specific
crime, he is duly informed not only of such specific crime but also of lesser crimes
or offenses included therein.
Thus, in view of the fact that illegal possession is an element of and is
necessarily included in the illegal importation of regulated drugs, this Court shall
determine appellants culpability under Section 16, Article III of RA No. 6425.
The elements of illegal possession of regulated drugs are as follows: (a) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a regulated
drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the regulated drug.
The evidence on record clearly established that appellants were in possession
of the bags containing the regulated drugs without the requisite authority. As
mentioned previously, on the date of appellants arrest, the apprehending officers
were conducting a surveillance of the coast of Ambil Island in the Municipality of
Looc, Occidental Mindoro, upon being informed by the Municipalitys Barangay
Captain that a suspicious-looking boat was within the vicinity. Not long after, they
spotted two (2) boats anchored side by side, the persons on which were transferring
cargo from one to the other. Interestingly, as they moved closer to the area, one of
the boats hurriedly sped away. Upon reaching the other boat, the police officers
found the appellants with several transparent plastic bags containing what
appeared to be shabu which were plainly exposed to the view of the officers.
Clearly, appellants were found to be in possession of the subject regulated drugs.
2.
Yes. From the time of appellants arrest, the seized bags of regulated drugs
were properly marked and photographed. Proper inventory was also conducted in
the presence of the appellants and Mayor Telebrico, who signed a receipt evidencing
that the confiscated drugs were turned over to the PNP Regional Headquarters.
There, the evidence was sent to the Regional Crime Laboratory Service Office for an
examination which yielded positive results. The laboratory report, photographs, and
receipts were all made part of the records of this case. In fact, the bags containing
the crystalline substance were presented before the trial court during the hearing
held on October 12, 1999 which was identified by SPO3 Yuson, the officer who
confiscated the same. Evidently, an unbroken chain of custody of the confiscated
drugs was established by the prosecution.
Anent appellants claim that their constitutional rights were further violated
for during custodial investigation, they did not have counsel of their choice nor were
they provided with one, this deserves scant consideration since the same is relevant
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and material only when an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from an
accused becomes the basis of his conviction. In this case, neither one of the
appellants executed an admission or confession. In fact, as the records clearly show,
appellants barely even spoke and merely kept repeating the phrase call China, big
money. The trial court convicted them not on the basis of anything they said during
custodial investigation but on other convincing evidence such as the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses. Verily, there was no violation of appellants constitutional
right to counsel during custodial investigation.
From the foregoing, considering that appellants were found to have
possessed forty-five (45) kilograms of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, which is
more than the two hundred (200) grams stipulated above, the imposable penalty is
reclusion perpetua, in accordance with R.A. No. 9346, otherwise known as An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines. As regards the fine,
the Court finds that the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) for each
appellant imposed by the RTC is proper, in view of the quantity seized from them.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GERARDO ENUMERABLE y DE VILLA
G.R. No. 207993, January 21, 2015, J. CARPIO
It is settled that in prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous drug, not only
must the essential elements of the offense be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but
likewise the identity of the prohibited drug. The dangerous drug itself constitutes
the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment
of conviction. Hence, the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish who had
custody of the illegal drug from the moment it was allegedly transmitted to the
Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory on 27 May 2004 until it was allegedly
delivered to the Regional Crime Laboratory on 4 June 2004, it is just right for the
Court to acquit the appellant.
While appellant admitted during the pre-trial the authenticity and due
execution of the Chemistry Report, prepared by Police Inspector and Forensic
Chemist, this admission merely affirms the existence of the specimen and the
request for laboratory examination and the results thereof.
Facts:
A buy-bust operation was conducted by the elements of the Batangas City
Police Station with the assistance of Police Inspector Danilo Balmes of the CIDG
Batangas Province on May 27, 2004 at 11:30 oclock in the morning at the Petron
Gasoline Station along B. Morada Ave., Lipa City. Using two (2) pieces of marked
P500.00 bills and boodle money to make the appearance of about P24,000.00, the
police asset, PO3 Edwalberto Villas, who posed as a buyer transacted with the alias
Gerry upon his arrival at the gas station. After the exchange of the marked money
and the three (3) plastic sachets of shabu placed in a black plastic box, alias Gerry
was placed under arrest. He was later identified as Gerardo Enumerable y de Villa.
The marked money was recovered from his possession by PO3 Villas who also took
custody of the specimen shabu which he marked EMV 1 to EMV 3. The three (3)
sachets of shabu were turned over to the Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory,
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pursuant to the request for laboratory examination. However, that Crime laboratory
indorsed to the Regional Crime Laboratory in Calamba City.
Police Inspector and Forensic Chemist Donna Villa P. Huelgas found the
specimens positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug, as shown by Chemistry Report No. D-566-04, the authenticity and
genuineness of which were admitted by accused during the pre-trial.
The trial court found Enumerable guilty of the offense charged. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the conviction of Enumerable for the offense charged. Hence, this
appeal.
Issue:
Whether the prosecution established the identity and integrity of the
confiscated illegal drug, which is the corpus delicti of the offense charged against
Enumerable.
Ruling: Appeal granted
It is settled that in prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous drug, not only
must the essential elements of the offense be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but
likewise the identity of the prohibited drug. The dangerous drug itself constitutes
the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of
conviction.
Necessarily, the prosecution must establish that the substance seized from
the accused is the same substance offered in court as exhibit. In this regard, the
prosecution must sufficiently prove the unbroken chain of custody of the confiscated
illegal drug.
In this case, there was a glaring gap in the custody of the illegal drug since
the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish who had custody of the illegal drug
from the moment it was allegedly transmitted to the Batangas Provincial Crime
Laboratory on 27 May 2004 until it was allegedly delivered to the Regional Crime
Laboratory on 4 June 2004. There was no evidence presented how the confiscated
sachets of shabu were stored, preserved or labeled nor who had custody prior to
their delivery to the Regional Crime Laboratory and their subsequent presentation
before the trial court. This is evident from the testimony of PO3 Villas, who stated
he had no knowledge on who had custody of the sachets of shabu from 27 May
2004 until 4 June 2004. PO3 Villas had no personal knowledge on (1) how the illegal
drugs were delivered and who delivered the drugs from the Batangas Provincial
Crime Laboratory to the Regional Crime Laboratory; (2) who received the drugs in
the Regional Crime Laboratory; and (3) who had custody of the drugs from 27 May
2004 to 3 June 2004 until their presentation before the trial court. The testimony of
PO3 Villas merely attests to the existence of the Memorandum from the Chief of the
Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory to the Regional Crime Laboratory.

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While Enumerable admitted during the pre-trial the authenticity and due
execution of the Chemistry Report, prepared by Police Inspector and Forensic
Chemist Donna Villa P. Huelgas, this admission merely affirms the existence of the
specimen and the request for laboratory examination and the results thereof.
Appellants admission does not relate to the issue of chain of custody. In fact,
appellant qualified his admission that the specimens were not taken or bought from
him.
Since the failure of the prosecution to establish every link in the chain of
custody of the illegal drug gravely compromised its identity and integrity, which
illegal drug is the corpus delicti of the offense charged against Enumerable, his
acquittal is therefore in order.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NATHANIEL PASION Y DELA CRUZ A.K.A.
ATHAN AND DENNIS MICHAEL PAZ Y SIBAYAN
G.R. No. 203026, January 28, 2015, J. Perez
It is a well-entrenched rule that full faith and credence are given to the
narration of police officers who testify for the prosecution on the entrapment or
buy-bust operation, because as police officers, they are presumed to have regularly
performed their duties. This presumption is overturned only if there is clear and
convincing evidence that the officers were not properly performing their duty or
that they were inspired by improper motive. The foregoing principle applies with
equal, if not greater, force in prosecutions involving violations of [R.A. No.] 9165,
especially those originating from buy-bust operations. In this case, while the
defense denied having violated [R.A. No. 9165], it offered no evidence that the
arresting officers had been improperly or maliciously motivated in effecting the
arrest of appellants. With nothing to substantiate appellants malicious accusation
that the police officers were improperly motivated, credence shall be given to the
narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses.
Facts:
Two separate Informations were filed against Nathaniel Pasion and Dennis Paz
for violation of Sec. 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 (Illegal Delivery of Dangerous Drugs)
and violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165 (Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs). Immediately, during arraignment, Pasion pleaded not guilty; Paz, on the
other hand, refused to enter a plea arguing that his arrest was illegal. Pursuant to
the Rules the trial court ordered the entry of a plea of not guilty on Pazs behalf.
Both the accused-appellants were apprehended through a separate buy-bust
operation.
During trial, for their defense, both accused-appellants Pasion and Paz denied
liability and maintained that on the evening in question they were just having a
drinking spree to unwind at Pasions house, Pasion. Paz, on the other hand, was
supposed to go to Pasions house later that night when he received a text message
from Pasion to instead meet at 365 Plaza. Upon his arrival at 365 Plaza, he was
suddenly manhandled, searched and arrested by unknown men who turned out to
be PDEA officers conducting a purported buy-bust operation. In the main,
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appellants claimed that they were framed up in a buy-bust operation by the police
for no apparent reason.
After trial, the RTC found the accused-appellate guilty. The appellate court
subsequently affirmed the RTCs decision.
To question the finding of guilt of both the lower courts, accused- appellants
Pasion and Paz assail the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) officers who conducted the surveillance of
appellants, and the separate buy bust operations that led to their apprehension.
Accused-appellants Pasion and Paz first insist that the intelligence officers
testimonies were riddled with inconsistencies, specifically on their respective
locations during their surveillance of accused-appellants Pasion and Paz which, they
argue, indicate that no actual surveillance was carried out.
Issue:
Whether the inconsistencies on the apprehending officers testimonies
regarding the location of their surveillance warrant the acquittal of Pasion and Paz.
Ruling:
No.
It is a well-entrenched rule that full faith and credence are given to the
narration of police officers who testify for the prosecution on the entrapment or buybust operation, because as police officers, they are presumed to have regularly
performed their duties. Indeed, the presumption of regularity must prevail over
appellants unsubstantiated allegations. This presumption is overturned only if there
is clear and convincing evidence that the officers were not properly performing their
duty or that they were inspired by improper motive. In this case, there was none.
The foregoing principle applies with equal, if not greater, force in
prosecutions involving violations of [R.A. No.] 9165, especially those originating
from buy-bust operations. In such cases, the testimonies of the police officers who
conducted the buy-bust operations are generally accorded full faith and credit, in
view of the presumption of regularity in the performance of public duties. Hence,
when lined up against an unsubstantiated denial or claim of frame-up, the
testimonies of the officers who caught the accused red-handed are given more
weight and usually prevail. In order to overcome the presumption of regularity,
jurisprudence teaches us that there must be clear and convincing evidence that the
police officers did not properly perform their duties or that they were prompted with
ill motive.
While the defense denied having violated [R.A. No. 9165], it offered no
evidence that the arresting officers had been improperly or maliciously motivated in
effecting the arrest of appellants. With nothing to substantiate appellants malicious
accusation that the police officers were improperly motivated, credence shall be
given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses because, being
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police officers, they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
manner. Certainly, the presumption of regularity must prevail over appellants
unfounded allegations. Bare denials and the frail defense of frame-up cannot prevail
over the categorical and unshaken testimonies of the apprehending officers who
nabbed them red-handed and positively identified them as the persons they caught
for violation of R.A. 9165 during the buy-bust operation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DENNIS SUMILI
G.R. No. 212160, February 4, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
When there was delay in the turn-over of the corpus delicti to the PNP Crime
Laboratory as it was alleged that the date the illegal sachet was seized falls on a
Friday and therefore the PNP Crime Laboratory was closed but it appears that said
date falls on a Wednesday, not on a Friday, conviction must be immediately set
aside. It must be emphasized that in criminal prosecutions involving illegal drugs,
the presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls
for the necessity of proving with moral certainty that they are the same seized
items.
Facts:
On June 7, 2006, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency Iligan City SubOffice received a report from a confidential informant that Sumili was selling shabu.
Acting on the same, SPO2 Englatiera dispatched SPO2 Cabahug to conduct
surveillance on Sumili, which confirmed the truth and veracity of the aforesaid
report. Consequently, SPO2 Englatiera organized a team divided into two (2) groups
and briefed them on the buy-bust operation.
During the buy-bust operation, Sumili let the poseur-buyer in, the latter gave
the pre-arranged signal that the sale has been consummated. Almost immediately,
the buy-bust team stormed the house but Sumili escaped by jumping through the
window, throwing the marked money at the roof beside his house. The poseur-buyer
turned over the sachet of suspected shabu to SPO2 Englatiera, who marked the
same and prepared a request for laboratory examination and instructed NonUniform Personnel Carlito Ong (NUP Ong) to bring the sachet together with the
request to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. However, NUP Ong failed to
do so on the same day as the PNP Crime Laboratory was already closed. It was only
on June 9, 2006, or two (2) days after the buy-bust operation, that NUP Ong was
able to bring and turn-over the seized sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Upon
examination, it was confirmed that said sachet contained 0.32 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.
The RTC found Sumili guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165. The CA affirmed Sumilis conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not Sumilis conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs in
violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld.
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Ruling:
No, Sumili is not guilty.
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165, the following elements must concur: (a) the identities of the
buyer and the seller, object, and consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold
and the corresponding payment for it. As the dangerous drug itself forms an integral
and key part of the corpus delicti of the crime, it is therefore essential that the
identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the
prosecution must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the
dangerous drug, from the moment it was seized from the accused up to the time it
was presented in court as proof of the corpus delicti.
To expand, Section 2129 of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule
outlining the procedure that the apprehending officers should follow in handling the
seized drugs, in order to preserve its integrity and evidentiary value. It requires,
inter alia, that: (a) the apprehending team that has initial custody over the seized
drugs immediately conduct an inventory and take photographs of the same in the
presence of the accused or the person from whom such items were seized, or the
accuseds or the persons representative or counsel, a representative from the
media, the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall then sign
the copies of the inventory; and (b) the seized drugs be turned over to the PNP
Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from its confiscation for examination purposes.
While the chain of custody rule demands utmost compliance from the aforesaid
officers, Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, as
well as jurisprudence nevertheless provide that non-compliance with the
requirements of this rule will not automatically render the seizure and custody of
the items void and invalid, so long as: (a) there is a justifiable ground for such noncompliance; AND (b) the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved. Hence, any divergence from the prescribed procedure must be justified
and should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items.
After a judicious review of the records, the Court finds that the prosecution
failed to establish the identity of the substance allegedly confiscated from Sumili
due to unjustified gaps in the chain of custody, thus, militating against a finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
As may be gleaned from the established facts, there was delay in the turnover of the corpus delicti. To justify this, SPO2 Englatiera and NUP Ong insist that
the PNP Crime Laboratory was already closed on June 7, 2006, and since it was a
Friday, the delivery of the seized sachet was only done on June 9, 2006. However,
contrary to their claims, June 7, 2006 is not a Friday, but a Wednesday. Thus, if the
PNP Crime Laboratory was indeed closed on June 7, 2006, the delivery of the seized
sachet could have easily been done on the next day, or on June 8, 2006, instead of
doing it two (2) days after the buy-bust operation. This glaring fact, coupled with the
absence in the records as to who among the apprehending officers had actual
custody of the seized sachet from the time it was prepared for turn-over until its
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delivery to the PNP Crime Laboratory, presents a substantial and unexplained gap in
the chain of custody of the alleged shabu seized from Sumili. Undoubtedly, the
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised.
It must be emphasized that in criminal prosecutions involving illegal drugs,
the presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls
for the necessity of proving with moral certainty that they are the same seized
items. Failing in which, the acquittal of the accused on the ground of reasonable
doubt becomes a matter of right, as in this case.
In sum, since the identity of the prohibited drugs had not been established by
proof beyond reasonable doubt, Sumilis conviction must be immediately set aside.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDER DACUMA y LUNSOD
G.R. No. 205889, February 04, 2015, J. Perez
In the prosecution of illegal sale, what is essential is to prove that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
evidence of the corpus delicti. The consummation of sale is perfected the moment
the buyer receives the drug from the seller. In this case, the prosecution failed to
prove that the four sachets which tested positive for shabu and eventually
presented in court were the same ones confiscated by the police officers due to its
non-marking at the place where the buy-bust operation was committed at the police
station. This non- marking violated the measures defined under Section 21(1) of
Republic Act No. 9165 and Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165 which are also known as the Rule on Chain of
Custody.
Facts:
PO2 Cabaltera, certain PO3 Macalino, PO3 Baltar and PO2 Llovia, members of
Anti-Illegal Drug Task Force of Leyte Provincial Police Office under the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), were ordered by their superior Superintendent
Unay to proceed to Carigara Police Station to verify the veracity of a report of a
confidential informant about the sale of dangerous drugs. Upon arrival at the police
station, Chief of Police Repulda gave a short briefing to conduct a buy-bust
operation and gave the assigned poseur-buyer PO2 Cabaltera four pieces of one
hundred peso bills to be used as marked money. Thereafter, PO2 Cabaltera, PO2
Parena and the confidential informant proceeded to the target area. Upon arrival,
PO2 Cabaltera and the confidential informant approached the accused-appellant
Dacuma and proposed to buy shabu worth P600.00. Meanwhile, PO2 Parena
remained at a distance to act as a back-up police officer. Dacuma, accepted the
offer and took from his pocket four plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance and handed them to PO2 Cabaltera, who in turn, handed the marked
money including his personal money worth P400.00. Thereafter, PO2 Cabaltera
raised his hand as pre-arranged signal to alert the back-up police officers that the
illegal sale had already been consummated. PO2 Parena immediately ran towards
them and introduced himself as a police officer. They then apprehended the
accused and brought him to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Station.
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Barangay Councilor Lesiguez and a certain Councilor Macalinao were summoned by
the police officers to conduct a body search on the person of Dacuma inside the
police station. During the search, three sachets of shabu, marked money and one
disposable lighter were recovered from Dacuma.
Issue:
Whether or not Dacuma is guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
Ruling:
No.
The following requisites are necessary in order to successfully prosecute an
offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object and consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment therefor.
In the prosecution of illegal sale, what is essential is to prove that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
evidence of the corpus delicti. The consummation of sale is perfected the moment
the buyer receives the drug from the seller. In this case, the prosecution failed to
prove that the four sachets which tested positive for shabu and eventually
presented in court were the same ones confiscated by the police officers due to its
non-marking at the place where the buy-bust operation was committed at the police
station.
This non- marking violated the measures defined under Section 21(1) of Republic
Act No. 9165 and Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
Republic Act No. 9165 which are also known as the Rule on Chain of Custody.
In this case, records show that the first element to establish chain of custody
which is the seizure and marking of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by
the apprehending officer is missing to establish illegal sale. In fact, no one among
the prosecution witnesses testified about the marking of the four sachets subject of
illegal sale. Though the police officers in their testimonies narrated that there was a
buy-bust operation and they apprehended the accused red-handed, all of them
failed to testify on who among them complied with the marking requirement to
identify the seized items. Quite notably, the Joint Affidavit of Arrest also failed to
mention that the apprehending officers marked the four sachets confiscated from
Dacuma. It was only then when Police Superintendent Amado E. Marquez, Jr. sent a
request for a laboratory examination to the PNP Crime Laboratory, Region 8 that the
fours sachets containing white crystalline substance were shown to be marked as
SD. These specimens eventually became the specimens tested by Forensic
Chemist Cruto which resulted to a positive result of methamphetamine
hydrochloride and presented in court as the corpus delicti. Clearly from the
foregoing, there is a serious doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti presented in
court as subject of illegal sale.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPINES vs. MHODS USMAN y GOGO
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G.R. No. 201100, February 4, 2015, J. Perez
A buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned
by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors. Since accused-appellant
was caught by the buy-bust team in flagrante delicto, his immediate arrest was also
validly made. Accused-appellants arrest being valid, we also hold that the
subsequent warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from his person is equally valid.
Facts:
A male confidential informant came to PO1 Joel Sta. Maria (PO1 Sta. Maria),
PO2 Elymar Garcia, Irene Vidal, and PSI Judycel Macapagal (PSI Macapagal) and
SPO3 Rolando del Rosario, and informed them of the illegal selling of shabu by a
certain Mhods, a muslim at Isla Puting Bato. This led them to conduct a buy bust
operation against the subject.
When they reached the place of Usman, the latter approached the
Confidential Informant and asked him if he is going to get, meaning if he is going to
buy shabu. Instead of answering, the confidential informant pointed to him who
was beside him at that time. The herein witness showed the marked money and
the accused took them. Usman turned his back a little and got something from his
right pocket and passed to him a plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance suspected to be shabu. Upon receipt he grabbed the Usman and
introduced himself as a police officer.
Thereafter, the plastic sachet was turned over to the investigator Elymar
Garcia, who in turn prepared a request for laboratory examination (Exhibit C) and
brought the same together to the crime laboratory for examination. After lab test,
the specimen was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On crossexamination, Usman claimed that he was a victim of frame-up by the arresting
officers.
The RTC rendered a judgment of conviction. On appeal, the CA affirmed in
toto the RTC Decision. The appellate court ruled that Usmans arrest was valid
because he was caught in flagrante delicto selling dangerous drugs, that all the
elements of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs are present in the case at
bar, that there was substantial compliance with the legal requirements on the
handling of the seized item, and that there was no proof to support accusedappelllants allegation of frame-up.
Issue:
Whether or not there were serious lapses in the procedure mandated by R. A.
No. 9165 in the handling of the seized shabu, as well as non-compliance with the
chain of custody rule that could render him innocent of the crime charged.
Ruling:
No, there was none. Usman is liable of the crime charged.
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The fact of the matter is that Usman was caught in flagrante delicto of selling
illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest,
thus, falls within the ambit of Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure when an arrest made without warrant is deemed lawful.
A buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned
by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors. Since accused-appellant
was caught by the buy-bust team in flagrante delicto, his immediate arrest was also
validly made. Usman was caught in the act and had to be apprehended on the spot.
His arrest being valid, this Court also hold that the subsequent warrantless seizure
of the illegal drugs from his person is equally valid. The legitimate warrantless
arrest also cloaks the arresting police officer with the authority to validly search and
seize from the offender those that may be used to prove the commission of the
offense.
Aside from the validity of the arrest, the guilt of Usman was also established
beyond reasonable doubt. In a catena of cases, this Court laid down the essential
elements to be duly established for a successful prosecution of offenses involving
the illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs, like shabu, under Section 5, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of
the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment
therefor.
Briefly, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of
the marked money by the seller successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction.
What is material, therefore, is the proof that the transaction or sale transpired,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. The concurrence of said
elements can be gleaned from the testimony of the witness.
However, this Court has, in many cases, held that while the chain of custody
should ideally be perfect, in reality it is not, as it is almost always impossible to
obtain an unbroken chain. The most important factor is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
In the case at bar, after the sale was consummated, PO1 Sta. Maria retained
possession of the seized sachet until he was able to properly mark it, then turned it
over to PO2 Garcia who prepared the request for laboratory examination and
brought the same to the crime laboratory, where PSI Macapagal later on confirmed
that the substance was methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The same
sachet was positively identified by PO1 Sta. Maria in open court to be the same item
he confiscated from accused-appellant. Hence, the prosecutions failure to submit in
evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs as required
under Article 21 of R. A. No. 9165, will not render the accuseds arrest illegal or the
items seized from him inadmissible.
Lastly, on the issue of frame-up, although drug-related violators have
commonly tendered such defenses to fend off or refute valid prosecutions of their
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drug-related violations, the Court has required that such defenses, to be credited at
all, must be established with clear and convincing evidence.
In the case at bar, Usman failed to ascribe, much less prove, any ill will or
improper motive on the part of the apprehending police officers. Usman admitted
that he does not know said police officers prior to his arrest, and that he is not
aware of any established motive for them to charge him falsely of a grave offense.
Moreover, accused-appellant acknowledged that he is not a good subject for
extortion. Thus, in the absence of any evidence of ill will or improper motive, none
is presumed to exist.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AMY DASIGAN y OLIVA
G.R. No. 206229, February 04, 2015, J. Perez
The prosecutions failure to submit in evidence the physical inventory and
photograph of the seized drugs as required under Article 21 of R. A. No. 9165, will
not render the accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized from him inadmissible.
Clearly, the chain of custody is not established solely by compliance with the
prescribed physical inventory and photographing of the seized drugs in the
presence of the enumerated persons.
However, the exoneration of an accused from the charge of illegal sale of
dangerous or prohibited drugs, does not spell freedom from all criminal liability as
she may still be convicted for illegal possession of dangerous or prohibited drugs. It
is settled that possession is necessarily included in the sale of dangerous or
prohibited drugs.
Facts:
On December 5, 2006, at the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
office, Melvin Jones Grandstand, Harrison Road, Baguio City, a male confidential
informant reported to Police Chief Inspector Luisito Meris that a certain alias Amy
is engaged in delivering Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as Shabu
within the vicinity of the La Trinidad Trading Post at Km. 5, La Trinidad, Benguet.
Those present at the office were PO2 Arieltino Corpuz, SPO2 Cabily Agbayani and
SPO1 Bernardo Ventura and they all heard this piece of information.
A buy-bust operation was planned. PO2 Corpuz was introduced to Amy as
the buyer of shabu. Amy said she had something else to do and so she just
gave PO2 Corpuz her cell phone number. Days after, PO2 Corpuz called Amy and
asked her regarding their transaction as he was willing to buy shabu worth two
thousand pesos (PHP 2,000.00). Amy said she will deliver the shabu the following
day.
On the said day, Amy brought what appeared to be small transparent
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance, picked out two sachets
(Exhibits C and C-1) and gave it to PO2 Corpuz. Amy then demanded the
payment. He was ready with the amount but he was instructed that once the
shabu was given to him, he need not hand the money any longer. So PO2 Corpuz
placed the two sachets in his pant[s] pocket and held Amys right hand and
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announced Pulis ako! PO2 Corpuz then got the sealed sachets and he turned over
all the six sachets, the two sachets sold to him and the four sachets which Amy
brought out from her pocket, as well as the cell phone to the team leader PCI Meris.
PCI Meris then held on to the items as they went to the La Trinidad Police Station.
Oliva was charged of illegal possession of shabu with violation of Sections 11 (3)
(Criminal Case Nos. 072-CR-6702) and illegal sale in violation of Section 5 Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165) or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002 (Criminal case No. 073-CR-6703)
PO2 Corpuz, SPO1 Ventura and SPO2 Agbayani each placed their initials on all
the plastic sachets containing suspected shabu. Inventory and laboratory
examination was done and it was revealed that the seized specimen were
Methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
Both the RTC and the CA ruled against Dasigan.
Issues:
1. Whether or not there was compliance of the chain of custody considering
that no photographs were taken by the apprehending officers, and as, although an
inventory was conducted.
2. Whether or not Dasigan could be held guilty of illegal sale and possession
of dangerous drugs under Republic Act No. 9165.
Ruling:
1. Yes, there was compliance with the chain of custody rule.
This Court has, in many cases, held that while the chain of custody should
ideally be perfect, in reality it is not, as it is almost always impossible to obtain an
unbroken chain. The most important factor is the preservation of the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt
or innocence of the accused. Hence, the prosecutions failure to submit in evidence
the physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs as required under Article
21 of R. A. No. 9165, will not render the accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized
from him inadmissible. Clearly, the chain of custody is not established solely by
compliance with the prescribed physical inventory and photographing of the seized
drugs in the presence of the enumerated persons.
In the case at bar, after the items were seized by Police Officer (PO) 2
Arieltino G. Corpuz (PO2 Corpuz) from Dasigan, he turned them over to Police Chief
Inspector (PCI) Luisito Meris (PCI Meris) who retained possession until they reached
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Office where the arresting officers
were able to mark them (i.e, CJA for Cabily J. Agbayani; AGC for Arieltino G.
Corpuz, and BAV for Bernado A. Ventura). PCI Meris then submitted said seized
items to Senior Police Officer (SPO) 3 Romeo L. Abordo, Sr. (SPO3 Abordo, Sr.), the
Evidence Custodian of PDEA Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) who, in turn,
prepared the inventory and the request for laboratory examination. It was SPO3
Abordo, Sr. who brought the request for laboratory examination and the seized
items to the PNP Crime Laboratory where they were received by PO1 Joseph Andrew
P. Dulnuan who submitted them to Forensic Chemist Police Senior Inspector (PSI)
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Edward Gayados, and it was the latter who, after a full qualitative examination,
confirmed that the seized items were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride,
a dangerous drug. In open court, PO2 Corpuz and SPO2 Cabily Agbayani easily
identified the sachets as the ones they seized from Dasigan as the sachets still bore
their initials, together with the initials of SPO1 Bernardo Ventura.
The fact that the seized items were marked only at the police station and not
during the actual apprehension and seizure will not exonerate Dasigan from the
offense charged. In several cases, the Court ruled that the marking of the seized
substance immediately upon arrival at the police station qualified as a compliance
with the marking requirement.
Clearly, there was no hiatus or confusion in the confiscation, handling,
custody and examination of the shabu. The shabu that was seized from Dasigan,
taken to the PDEA Office and thereat duly marked, then taken to the crime
laboratory and subjected to a qualitative examination, and thereafter introduced in
evidence against accused-appellant was the same shabu confiscated from Dasigan
when she was caught in flagrante delicto possessing the same.
2. No, Dasigan is guilty of illegal possession of dangerous drugs only.
Under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the elements of the offense of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said
drug.
In the case of illegal possession, all these elements were proven. First, the
four plastic sachets containing shabu, which are the subject of the charge for illegal
possession of dangerous or prohibited drugs, were found on Dasigans person
during the search conducted by the PDEA officers following accused-appellants
arrest in flagrante delicto for illegal sale of shabu. Second, Dasigan was not able to
demonstrate his legal authority to possess the subject shabu. And third, Dasigans
act of giving PO2 Corpuz, the poseur-buyer, one sachet and telling him maganda
ito, first class ito, and then bringing out more sachets and selecting two sachets to
give to PO2 Corpuz indicates that she freely and consciously possessed the subject
shabu. Consequently, Dasigan was correctly charged and convicted of illegal
possession of shabu.
On the other hand, in a successful prosecution for offenses involving the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the
following elements must concur: (1) the identities of the buyer and seller, object,
and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it.
What is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.
In the case of illegal sale, the Court notes, however, that the sale was not
consummated as there was no receipt of the consideration. It is undisputed from the
facts that although Dasigan was shown the consideration before she handed over

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the subject shabu to the poseur-buyer, such is not sufficient to consummate the
sale. As previously held by the Court, looking at a thing does not transfer
possession of it to the beholder. Such a tenet would make window shoppers liable
for theft.
Dasigans exoneration from the charge of illegal sale of dangerous or
prohibited drugs, however, does not spell freedom from all criminal liability as she
may still be convicted for illegal possession of dangerous or prohibited drugs. It is
settled that possession is necessarily included in the sale of dangerous or prohibited
drugs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROWENA TAPUGAY y VENTURA
G.R. No. 200336, February 11, 2015, J. Perez
The respondent was convicted both by the RTC and Court of Appeals for
violation of Section 5 of RA 9165(illegal sale of dangerous drugs).The respondents
denies the accusations against her and asserts that she should not be convicted of
the crime charged. The Supreme Court ruled that the defense of denial or frame-up,
like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as
easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most
prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Facts:
Tapugay was charged before RTC, Branch 16, Laoag City for violation of
Section 5, Article II of R.A No. 9165 in an information. Chief of the Intelligence
Section of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Laoag City, SPO3 Rovimanuel
Balolong (SPO3 Balolong), received a phone call from a concerned citizen reporting
the illegal drug activities of Rowena Tapugay (Rowena). Upon arrival at the locus
criminis at around 8 oclock in the evening, PO2 Garcia walked towards three (3)
women who were then conversing, while the other members of the team
strategically positioned themselves. PO2 Garcia approached the woman in a red
sleeveless shirt and told her that he was going to buy shabu worth (Php500.00).
PO2 Garcia then handed to Rowena the marked Five Hundred Peso (Php500.00) bill.
Rowena thereafter pocketed the money and asked PO2 Garcia to come near her.
Appellant then reached inside her jeans pocket to get the shabu and handed it to
PO2 Garcia. It was at this time that PO2 Garcia introduced himself as a police officer
and grabbed appellant.13 The other members of the team then rushed in to assist
PO2 Garcia in arresting the suspect.14 SPO3 Balolong recovered from Rowena the
marked Php500.00 bill. Rowena was not able to produce any document showing her
authority to sell shabu when asked by SPO3 Balolong.
Rowena denied the accusations against her. The defense insisted that
Rowena was having dinner inside her house at around 8 oclock in the evening of 28
November 2003 when police officers suddenly entered and grabbed her. She was
allegedly searched but the policemen did not find anything inside her pocket.
Rowena was thereafter forced outside her house, placed inside a police car, and
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The Regional Trial Court convicted the accused of the crime charged. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, the current
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Rowena can be convicted of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
Ruling:
The Court finds the appeal bereft of merit and affirm Rowenas guilt.
In the prosecution of a case of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is necessary
that the prosecution is able to establish the following essential elements: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and its payment. What is material is the proof that
the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti as evidence. The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer
and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummate the
buy-bust transaction.
After a careful evaluation of the records, the Court finds that these elements
were clearly met. The prosecutions evidence positively identified PO2 Garcia as the
buyer and Rowena as the seller of the shabu. Likewise, the prosecution presented in
evidence one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing shabu as the object
of the sale and the marked Php500.00 as consideration thereof. Finally, the delivery
of the shabu sold and its payment were clearly testified to by the prosecution
witnesses.
Rowenas defense which is anchored principally on denial and frame-up
cannot be given credence. It does not have more evidentiary weight than the
positive assertions of the prosecution witnesses. Her defense is unavailing
considering that she was caught in flagrante delicto in a legitimate buy-bust
operation. This Court has ruled that the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has
been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be
concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecution for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JIMMY GABUYA y ADLAWAN
G.R. No. 195245, February 16, 2015, J. Del Castillo
The prosecution convincingly proved that the police operatives indeed
complied with the required unbroken chain in the custody of the subject illegal
drugs. It bears stressing that the SC has already brushed aside an accuseds
belated contention that the illegal drugs confiscated from his person is inadmissible
for failure of the arresting officers to comply with Section 21 of R.A. 9165. This is
considering that whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers from
literally complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because Gabuya did not
question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Objection to
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evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the
court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of an objection.
Facts:
PO1 Rosales relayed to P/Insp. Cruz the information he received from a
confidential informant that Gabuya was selling illegal drugs on Second Avenue,
Caloocan City. Thus, P/Insp. Cruz formed a buy-bust team and dusted a P100.00 bill
with ultraviolet fluorescent powder to be used as marked money. He designated
PO1 Rosales as poseur-buyer while the other members would serve as back-ups.
PO1 Rosales then approached Gabuya and told him that he wanted to buy
illegal drugs worth P100.00. He then showed appellant the P100.00 marked money
who took the same and placed it in his pocket. Thereafter, Gabuya retrieved from
another pocket three plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance and
gave one to PO1 Rosales, who thereupon scratched his head as the pre-arranged
signal to the buy-bust team that the illegal drug transaction had already been
consummated. When the back-ups arrived, PO1 Rosales informed Gabuya that he is
a police officer and immediately caused his arrest. He then confiscated the other
two plastic sachets from appellant while PO3 De Guzman recovered the marked
money after Gabuya emptied his pocket.
Gabuya, together with the marked money and the specimens recovered from
him, were turned-over to the police investigator, PO3 Randulfo Hipolito, who marked
each sachet with the letters JGA, the initials of Gabuya. The seized items and
Gabuya were thereafter brought to the police crime laboratory for examination of
the forensic chemist, P/Insp. Jimmy Calabocal (P/Insp. Calabocal). The results
revealed that: (1) the contents of all the plastic sachets were positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu; (2) the contents of the two sachets
recovered from Gabuya weighed 0.09 gram while the other one subject of the sale
weighed 0.05 gram; and (3) Gabuyas hand and the marked money were positive
for ultraviolet fluorescent powder.
Gabuya avers that the police officers did not comply with Section 21 of R.A.
9165 and its Implementing Rules, particularly when they failed to mark the seized
items at the scene of the crime in his presence. He likewise argues that the lack of
information on the whereabouts of the shabu after its examination by the forensic
chemist and the absence of testimony thereon revealed a gap in the chain of
custody of the evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not police operatives complied with the required unbroken chain
in the custody of the subject illegal drugs
Ruling:

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Yes, the Court finds that the prosecution convincingly proved that the police
operatives indeed complied with the required unbroken chain in the custody of the
subject illegal drugsviz:
a.) beginning from the lawful buy-bust operation undertaken by the police
operatives on 06 June 2003 and the recovery of the subject illegal drugs as
well as the marked money resulting from Gabuyas valid warrantless search
and seizure;
b.) upon seizure of the one hundred (Php100) pesos with serial number
#JK623663 used as marked money and the subject drugs by PO1 ROSALES,
said specimens remained in his possession until they were turned over to the
police investigator PO2 HIPOLITO upon reaching the police headquarters;
c.) upon receipt of the subject drugs and buy-bust money, PO2 HIPOLITO
marked the specimens JGA-1 (0.05 gram),JGA-2(0.04 gram) and JGA3(0.05 gram) which stands for the Gabuyas initials;
d.) a Laboratory Examination Request was then prepared by Chief Police
Inspector CESAR GONZALES CRUZ (Chief P/Insp. CRUZ) addressed to the
Chief PNP, NPD Crime Laboratory Office, Samson Road, Caloocan City,
requesting for the examination of the three (3) pieces of small plastic
transparent heat-sealed sachets containing white crystalline substance that
were confiscated from the Appellant;
e.) upon receipt of the subject drugs, the same were examined by forensic
chemist P/Insp. CALABOCAL who found them to be positive for shabu;
f.) thereafter, Chief P/Insp. CRUZ prepared a Referral Slip dated 06 June 2003
addressed to the City Prosecutor of Caloocan presenting as evidence, inter
alia, the three (3) plastic sachets confiscated from the Appellant, the
Laboratory Examination Report dated 06 June 2003 and the one hundred
(Php100) pesos used as marked money;
g.) the three (3) plastic sachets were turned over to the custody of the
prosecutor which PO1 ROSALES identified on direct examination as the
subject drugs sold and confiscated from Appellant during the buy-bust
operation;
h.) the subject specimens were then marked as Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C3 for the prosecution and was finally surrendered to the court a quo when
formally offered as evidence by the prosecution on 19 August 2004
It bears stressing that the Court has already brushed aside an accuseds
belated contention that the illegal drugs confiscated from his person is inadmissible
for failure of the arresting officers to comply with Section 21 of R.A. 9165. This is
considering that whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers from
literally complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because Gabuya did not
question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Objection to
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evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the
court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of an objection.
Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.
Besides and as already mentioned, the CA has already concluded that the identity
of the seized drugs was established by the prosecution and its integrity preserved.
In view of the foregoing, the Court upheld Gabuyas conviction for violation of
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. 9165 as well as the penalties imposed upon him.
It must be added, however, that he is not eligible for parole with respect to the case
of illegal sale of shabu.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ABOLA BIO y PANAYANGAN
G.R. No. 195850, February 16, 2015, J. Del Castillo
To sustain a conviction under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, all that is
needed for the prosecution to establish are (1) the identity of the buyer, seller,
object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor. In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, on the other hand, it is
necessary to prove that: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which
is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law;
and, (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. In his testimony,
PO2 Salonga, the poseur-buyer, positively identified Abola as the seller of the plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance which was later identified by the PNP
Forensic Chemist to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The
same sachet and substance was identified in court by PO2 Salonga as the shabu
sold to him by Abola for the sum of P200.00. Therefore, all the elements of the
offense of illegal sale of shabu are obtaining in this case. In the same vein, Abola,
upon being frisked after his apprehension, was found possessing another plastic
sachet containing 0.15 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. There is
no evidence on record showing that he was legally authorized to possess the same.
Neither was there any explanation that he did not freely or consciously possess the
said illegal drug. Settled is the rule that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes
prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi, which is sufficient to
convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such
possession. Clearly, all the elements of the offense of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs are likewise present in this case.
Facts:
In this case, the evidence for the prosecution established that at around 9:00
p.m. of September 8, 2003, an asset reported to P/Supt. Wong, Chief of the Station
Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Unit (SAID-SOTU), Novaliches Police
Station, the alleged illegal drugs activities of Abola. P/Supt. Wong immediately
formed a team including PO2 Fernando Salonga (PO2 Salonga). As PO2 Salonga
would act as the poseur-buyer, he was provided with two 100-peso bills as buy-bust
money.
The team then proceeded to the designated area along Ramirez St., Brgy.
Nova Proper. Upon arrival thereat an hour later, the asset introduced PO2 Salonga
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to the Abola as a buyer of shabu. After a brief conversation, Abola agreed to the
sale. PO2 Salonga handed to Abola the two 100-peso bills and, in turn, the latter
gave the former a plastic sachet. PO2 Salonga thereupon scratched his head as the
pre-arranged signal to his companions that the sale had been consummated. He
then introduced himself to Abola as a police officer and apprehended him.
However, before he could handcuff Abola, a woman later identified as Abolas wife,
suddenly grabbed Abola such that the latter was able to run away. PO2 Salonga
gave a chase and caught Abola, who, when searched, was found possessing another
plastic sachet suspected to contain shabu.
Abola, together with the buy-bust money previously marked with PO2
Salongas initials FAS and the two plastic sachets, were then brought to the
Novaliches Police Station. Thereat, the plastic sachet subject of the sale was
marked with the initial FAS3 while the sachet recovered from appellants
possession with FAS-1. They were thereafter turned over to the duty desk officer
for booking and later, to PO1 Oliver Estrelles (PO1 Estrelles), the police investigator
on duty. Afterwards, Abola and the above-mentioned pieces of evidence were
brought by PO2 Salonga and PO1 Estrelles to the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory. A qualitative examination conducted by Forensic Chemist P/Insp.
Leonard Arban shows that each sachet contained a net weight of 0.15 gram of white
crystalline substance that tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu.
The RTC rendered a Decision finding Abola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. 9165. It ruled that the elements for
the prosecution of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs have been
established. The CA affirmed Abolass conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove the indispensable element of
corpus delicti of the crime
Ruling:
No, the SC affirmed the lower courts findings of a confluence of the elements
of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs as to justify Abolas
conviction for the said offenses
To sustain a conviction under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, all that is
needed for the prosecution to establish are (1) the identity of the buyer, seller,
object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor. In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, on the other hand, it is necessary
to prove that: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is
identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and,
(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
In his testimony, PO2 Salonga, the poseur-buyer, positively identified Abola as
the seller of the plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance which was
later identified by the PNP Forensic Chemist to be positive for methamphetamine
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hydrochloride or shabu. The same sachet and substance was identified in court by
PO2 Salonga as the shabu sold to him by Abola for the sum of P200.00. As correctly
ruled, therefore, by both lower courts, all the elements of the offense of illegal sale
of shabu are obtaining in this case. In the same vein, Abola, upon being frisked
after his apprehension, was found possessing another plastic sachet containing 0.15
gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. There is no evidence on record
showing that he was legally authorized to possess the same. Neither was there any
explanation that he did not freely or consciously possess the said illegal drug.
Settled is the rule that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie
evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi, which is sufficient to convict an
accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession. Clearly,
all the elements of the offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs are likewise
present in this case.
Abola, however, questions the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items due to the failure of the police officers to comply with requirements set forth
under Section 21 of R.A. 9165.
In the present case, the links in the chain have been duly proven. During the
conduct of the buy-bust operation, PO2 SALONGA, the poseur-buyer, was able to
confiscate two (2) plastic sachets of shabu from accused-appellant: the first one was
sold to him in exchange for the buy-bust money, and the second one was recovered
from the latter during the routinary frisk conducted by PO2 SALONGA. He thereafter
gave the plastic sachets to SPO3 CONCEPCION, who kept the same in his custody
until they reached the police station, where SPO3 CONCEPCION, in turn, surrendered
them to the desk officer who placed the appropriate markings thereon.
Subsequently, the seized items were turned over to PO1 ESTRELLES, the police
officer on duty, who prepared the request for laboratory examination on the
specimens, which he delivered, together with the seized plastic sachets, to the PNP
Crime Laboratory on September 9, 2003. Thereupon, forensic chemist P/INSP
ARBAN duly received the request for laboratory examination and the confiscated
items and conducted the qualitative examination thereon, which yielded positive
results.
Thus, the prosecution in this case was able to establish the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the shabu seized from Abola, hence, there was substantial
compliance with the requirements of the law. It must be stressed that noncompliance with Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 does not render an accuseds arrest illegal or
the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. The requirements under R.A.
9165 and its implementing rules are not inflexible. What is essential is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the
same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERIC ROSAURO y BONGCAWIL
G.R. No. 209588, February 18, 2015, J. Perez
Equally important in every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous or
prohibited drugs is the presentation of evidence of the seized drug as the corpus
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delicti. The identity of the prohibited drug must be proved with moral certainty. It
must also be established with the same degree of certitude that the substance
bought or seized during the buy-bust operation is the same item offered in court as
exhibit.In the case at bar, after the sale was consummated, the confidential
informant gave the seized item to SPO4 Larot who placed tape on the sachet and
marked it Exhibit A. Upon reaching the police station, SPO4 Larot executed the
Certificate of Inventory, as well as the request for laboratory examination. The
request, the specimen, as well as the marked money and Rosauro were then
brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. They were received by SPO2
Ricardo Maisog, the Receiving Clerk of the PNP Crime Laboratory Office, who then
forwarded them to Police Inspector Ma. Leocy Jabonillo Mag-abo, the Forensic
Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory. Moreover, the seized item was duly
identified by SPO4 Larot in open court as the same item seized from Rosauro.
Hence, the prosecution was able to prove the corpus delicti.
Facts:
Accused-appellant Rosauro was charged with violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R. A.
No. 9165.On October 13, 2002, on the basis of unconfirmed reports that accusedappellant Eric Rosauro (Rosauro) was selling and distributing drugs, the Provincial
Drug Enforcement Unit of Misamis Oriental conducted a test-buy operation in the
Municipality of Villanueva, Misamis Oriental using a confidential agent. The
confidential agent bought shabu from Rosauro at Purok 2, Barangay Katipunan,
Villanueva, Misamis Oriental. The substance bought from Rosauro was examined by
the PNP crime laboratory and yielded a positive result for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (commonly known as shabu).
On July 3, 2004, the police authorities received information that again drugs
were being distributed at Purok 3, Barangay Poblacion, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental.
Thus, at 5:30 oclock in the afternoon, the Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs Special
Operation Task Unit (PAID-SOTU) elements led by SPO4 Lorenzo Larot and PO3
JuanchoDizon positioned themselves in the house of their confidential agent.
There, the PAID-SOTU elements saw Rosauro negotiate with the confidential
agent. In exchange for the one (1) sachet of shabu given by Rosauro to the
confidential agent, the latter gave him a marked 100-peso bill with serial number
YZ7 12579.
After the transaction, Larot and Dizon came out of their hiding place and
arrested Rosauro. Thereafter, the confidential agent handed the sachet to Larot,
who taped it, marked it with the marking Exhibit A, and placed it inside his pocket.
He also took pictures of Rosauro and the drugs. In the police station, he prepared a
Certificate of Inventory and a Request for Laboratory Examination. Both the drugs
and Rosauro were then turned over to the Crime laboratory.
On the basis of the request made by Larot, Police Chief Inspector Ma. Leocy
Mag-abo, the Forensic Chemical Officer of PNP Crime Laboratory conducted a
laboratory examination on the contents of the sachet, on Rosauro, and the marked
money. The examination of the seized item yielded positive result for
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu); while Rosauro and the marked money
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tested positive for the presence of ultra-violet fluorescent powder. Both the RTC and
CA rendered a judgment of conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was not able to prove the corpus delicti, and
that the statutory safeguards provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not
followed
Ruling:
No, the prosecution was able to prove the corpus delicti.
Indeed, equally important in every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous or
prohibited drugs is the presentation of evidence of the seized drug as the corpus
delicti. The identity of the prohibited drug must be proved with moral certainty. It
must also be established with the same degree of certitude that the substance
bought or seized during the buy-bust operation is the same item offered in court as
exhibit.
In the case at bar, after the sale was consummated, the confidential
informant gave the seized item to SPO4 Larot who placed tape on the sachet and
marked it Exhibit A. Upon reaching the police station, SPO4 Larot executed the
Certificate of Inventory, as well as the request for laboratory examination. The
request, the specimen, as well as the marked money and Rosauro were then
brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. They were received by SPO2
Ricardo Maisog, the Receiving Clerk of the PNP Crime Laboratory Office, who then
forwarded them to Police Inspector Ma. Leocy Jabonillo Mag-abo, the Forensic
Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory. Moreover, the seized item was duly
identified by SPO4 Larot in open court as the same item seized from Rosauro.
Furthermore, all the elements for a conviction of illegal sale of dangerous or
prohibited drugs were proven by the prosecution: the identity of Rosauro as the
seller, and that of the confidential informant as poseur-buyer were established, as
well as the exchange of the sachet of shabu and the marked money. It was also
ascertained that the seized item was positive for shabu, a dangerous drug, and that
the same item was properly identified in open court by SPO4 Larot. Moreover, the
P100.00 bill with serial number YZ712579, or the subject marked money, as well as
the living body of the accused-appellant revealed a positive result for ultraviolet
fluorescent powder. Therefore, Rosauros guilt was established beyond reasonable
doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANTE DELA PEA and DENNIS DELIMA
G.R. No. 207635, February 18, 2015, J. Villarama, Jr.
In the prosecution of a case for violation of R.A. 9165, both for illegal sale and
illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the primary consideration is to ensure that
the identity and integrity of the seized drugs have been preserved from the
time they were confiscated from the accused until their presentation as evidence in
court. The prosecution must establish with moral certainty that the specimen
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submitted to the crime laboratory and found positive for dangerous drugs, and
finally introduced in evidence against the accused was the same illegal drug that
was confiscated from him. All the elements of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal
possession of shabu, a dangerous drug, were clearly proven by the prosecution
through the credible testimony of IO1 Kintanar.
Facts:
The three separate Informations filed on June 23, 2008 by the City
Prosecutor's Office of Cebu City indicted Dela Pea and Delima for the following
crimes, to wit:
In Criminal Case No. CBU-83576, the Information charged Dela Pea with
violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 for illegal sale of shabu.
In Criminal Case No. CBU-83577, the Information charged Dela Pea with
violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165 for illegal possession of shabu.
The Information in Criminal Case No. CBU-83578 charged Delima with illegal
possession of shabu.
Dela Pea and Delima separately entered pleas of Not Guilty upon
arraignment. Joint trial of the three cases was conducted by the RTC.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Intelligence Officer 1
Ferdenand Kintanar (IO1 Kintanar); and (2) Intelligence Officer 1 Baby Rallos (IO1
Rallos), both operatives of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, Region VII
(PDEA-7). Their testimonies were summarized by the appellate court, thus:
When IO1 Kintanar received a report from their confidential informant
that Dela Pea was selling shabu in Barangay Sawang Calero, Cebu City, he
immediately instructed OJT Steven Balles to conduct a surveillance, which
confirmed the report.
In the evening of June 19, 2008, a team of PDEA officers was formed to
conduct a buy-bust operation against Dela Pea. IO1 Kintanar, who was tasked to
act as poseur-buyer, was given 3pcs. of one hundred peso (Php100.00) bills as buybust money bearing serial numbers which were all pre-marked with IO1 Kintanars
initials FK.
The buy-bust team, proceeded to Barangay Sawang Calero. The team
searched for Dela Pea in the area. When they finally found him standing along the
road with Delima, IO1 Kintanar and the confidential informant approached him while
the rest of the members positioned themselves where, from their vantage point,
they could clearly see the transaction.
The informant and IO1 Kintanar informed Dela Pea of their intention to buy
shabu. IO1 Kintanar handed the marked money to Dela Pea, who, in turn, handed a
small sachet of suspected shabu. Delima, who was beside Dela Pea, also showed a
sachet of suspected shabu to IO1 Kintanar but the latter ignored him. Immediately,
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IO1 Kintanar executed the pre-arranged signal indicating that the sale was
consummated.
The rest of the team members approached the group and arrested Dela Pea
and Delima. IO1 Kintanar seized from Dela Pea the buy-bust money and 4 sachets
of suspected shabu. On the other hand, IO1 Rallos, who arrested Delima recovered
from the latter a small sachet of shabu which he turned over to IO1 Kintanar. The
buy-bust team apprised the duo of their constitutional rights and brought them,
together with the confiscated items, to the PDEA office where the said items were
marked by IO1 Kintanar.
The plastic sachet of shabu were marked, photographed and recorded in the
blotter and listed in a Certificate of Inventory in the presence of Dela Pea and
Delima and was duly witnessed and signed by Barangay Captain Jerome B. Lim and
media representative Chito O. Aragon. The following day, IO1 Kintanar delivered the
confiscated plastic sachets of suspected shabu to the crime laboratory which tested
positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu.
Both appellants interposed the defense of denial.
Giving credence to the version of the prosecution witnesses who have no illmotive to testify against Dela Pea and Delima, and finding that the prosecution
established the elements of the crimes charged, the RTC found Dela Pea and
Delima guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
The CA affirmed the RTC Decision. However, the CA modified the penalties by
lowering the maximum periods of the imposed penalties from 15 years to 14
years and 8 months, to the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for a period of
12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months and to pay a fine in the amount
of P300,000.00 for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165. Insisting on their
innocence, Dela Pea and Delima interposed the present appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Dela Pea and Delimas guilt for the crimes charged was
established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
Yes, after a circumspect review of the evidence on record, the Court affirms
the conviction of Dela Pea and Delima. The elements of the crimes charged were
established beyond reasonable doubt.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of a charge for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 are:
(1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

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On the other hand, the elements of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous
drug are:
(a) the accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a
prohibited or dangerous drug;
(b) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
All the elements of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu, a
dangerous drug, were clearly proven by the prosecution through the credible
testimony of IO1 Kintanar. The identity of the parties to the sale transaction (Dela
Pea and IO1 Kintanar) involving the subject sachet of shabu worth P300.00 and
the consummation of the sale were duly established by IO1 Kintanar. IO1
Kintanars testimony likewise established the illegal possession of sachets of shabu
by Dela Pea and Delima.
No ill-motive was shown by the defense for IO1 Kintanar to unjustly implicate
Dela Pea and Delima in the present cases. Where there is no evidence that the
principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, like IO1
Kintanar in the present case, the presumption is that he was not actuated and his
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
IO1 Kintanar, who acted as the poseur-buyer, recounted the details of the
successful entrapment conducted against Dela Pea, as well as how he saw Delima
holding one sachet of shabu. The contents of the plastic sachet sold by Dela Pea to
IO1 Kintanar and the four sachets found in his possession, the single sachet seized
from Delima, all tested positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, a
dangerous drug, upon the laboratory examination.
Dela Pea and Delima failed to overcome with competent evidence the
positive findings for shabu of the contents of the subject sachets.
The Courts judicious review of the records revealed no reason for the Court
to deviate from the factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that a
legitimate buy-bust operation was successfully conducted against Dela Pea. What
is material to the prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the
illegal sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti as evidence.
Possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge
or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a
satisfactory explanation of such possession.
Except for their self-serving denial, the accused could not present any viable
defense. The defense of denial or frame-up has been invariably viewed with
disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common defense ploy in
prosecutions for violation of R.A. 9165. In the absence of clear and convincing
evidence to substantiate it, said defense deserves outright rejection. Hence, in
failing to produce their license and/or authority to possess the shabu, Dela Pea and

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Delima were correctly found guilty for violation of Section 11, Article II, of R.A.
9165.
The prosecution established the unbroken chain of custody of the sachets of
shabu seized from Dela Pea and Delima.
In the prosecution of a case for violation of R.A. 9165, both for illegal sale and
illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the primary consideration is to ensure that
the identity and integrity of the seized drugs have been preserved from the
time they were confiscated from the accused until their presentation as evidence in
court. The prosecution must establish with moral certainty that the specimen
submitted to the crime laboratory and found positive for dangerous drugs, and
finally introduced in evidence against the accused was the same illegal drug that
was confiscated from him.
To sum up, from the time the illegal drugs were seized from Dela Pea and
Delima, up to their delivery to the crime laboratory for chemical examination, until
their presentation in evidence before the RTC, the integrity of said items was
preserved. No evidence was adduced by the defense showing that they were
tainted in any manner. Verily, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be
preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence
has been tampered with. Dela Pea and Delima failed to discharge their burden of
proving that the evidence was tampered to overcome the presumption of regularity
in the handling of exhibits by public officers and the presumption that the public
officers properly discharged their duties.
All told, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt, the guilt of
Dela Pea in Criminal Case Nos. CBU-83576 and CBU-83577, and of Delima in CBU83578, for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of R.A. 9165.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VIRGILIO LARGO PERONDO
G.R. No. 193855, February 18, 2015, J. Del Castillo
In a successful prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements
must concur (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. In
this case, the prosecution successfully proved the existence of all the essential
elements of illegal sale of shabu. Perondo was positively identified by the police
officers who conducted the buy-bust operation as the person who sold the shabu to
the poseur buyer. The Court is not impressed with Perondos insistence that the
failure to present the poseur-buyer is fatal to the prosecution. The Court finds no
reason to doubt the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies.
The RTC and the CA are one in finding that their testimonies were direct, definite,
and consistent with one another in relevant points and also with the physical
evidence.
Facts:
An Information containing the following accusatory allegations was filed
against Virgilio Perondo that the accused with deliberate intent, and without
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authority of law, did then and there sell, deliver or give away to a poseur buyer one
heat sealed plastic packet of 0.05 gram of white crystalline substance, locally
known as SHABU a dangerous drug. Perondo pleaded not guilty during his
arraignment. After the pre-trial conference, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented Police Senior Inspector Mutchit G. Salinas a
Forensic Chemist, and buy-bust team members SPO2 Benjamin G. Genzon, Jr. and
PO3 Simeon A. Tapanan, Jr. From their testimonies, on July 20, 2003, SPO2 Genzon,
SPO1 James Estrera, PO3 Emmanuel Sarmiento and PO3 Tapanan were briefed
regarding a planned buy-bust operation to be conducted against appellant on that
same day in Brgy. San Roque, Cebu City. During the briefing, a civilian asset was
designated as the poseur-buyer and two 50-peso marked bills were given to him as
buy-bust money.
Thereafter, the team proceeded to the target area and, upon arrival,
strategically positioned themselves 10 to 15 meters away from the barangay hall
where Perondo was seen standing. The poseur-buyer approached Perondo. After
briefly talking to the latter, the poseur-buyer took out the 50-peso marked bills from
his pocket and gave them to the Perondo. In exchange, Perondo handed over to the
poseur-buyer a small plastic pack containing white crystalline substance. The
poseur-buyer examined it and then touched his head, which was the pre-arranged
signal that the transaction was already consummated. The members of the buybust team then rushed to the scene and arrested Perondo. They recovered from
him the buy-bust money. Anent the plastic sachet, PO3 Tapanan retrieved the same
from the poseur-buyer while PO3 Sarmiento wrote thereon Perondos initials. A
qualitative examination conducted on the contents of the plastic sachet by PSI
Salinas later revealed that the substance is positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. Perondo denied that a buy-bust operation was conducted
against him. Instead, he claimed that at around 9:15 p.m. of July 20, 2003, he was
eating and watching television at a barbecue stand when he was suddenly arrested
by SPO1 Estrera, PO3 Sarmiento and PO3 Tapanan. He was then taken to a police
station and interrogated on the identities of big time drug dealers in Cebu. Because
he was not able to provide any information as he is not even from Cebu, the police
officers blottered an incident implicating him in the alleged sale of shabu. The RTC
gave credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and convicted Perondo
of the crime charged. Agreeing with the OSG, the CA affirmed in toto the assailed
decision of the RTC. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding Virgilio Perondo guilty
of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act 9165 despite failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
No, the trial court did not err.

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In a successful prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements
must concur (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What
is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti. In this case, the prosecution successfully proved the existence of
all the essential elements of illegal sale of shabu. Perondo was positively identified
by the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation as the person who sold
the shabu to the poseur-buyer.
It is clear from the foregoing that the prosecution was able to establish the
elements of illegal sale of shabu. Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely
on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. The
Court finds no reason to doubt the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and their
testimonies. The RTC and the CA are one in finding that their testimonies were
direct, definite, and consistent with one another in relevant points and also with the
physical evidence.
The Court is not impressed with Perondos insistence that the failure to
present the poseur-buyer is fatal to the prosecution. It must be noted that whatever
relevant information the poseur-buyer may have was also equally known to the
police officers who testified for the prosecution during trial. Perondo failed to proffer
clear and convincing evidence of improper motive to overturn the presumption that
the arresting officers regularly performed their duties. Thus, there is no basis to
suspect the veracity of the statements of the police officers who testified against
him. Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses.
Perondo contends that the testimony of PSI Salinas, the Forensic Chemist,
was insufficient to conclude that the sachet of shabu she examined in the crime
laboratory was the same illegal drug allegedly seized from him. Perondos
contention does not adversely affect the identity, integrity and probative value of
the seized shabu. Chemistry Report No. D-1252-2003 reveals that PSI Salinas
immediately conducted an examination on the specimen submitted and released
the result thereof on that day. The span of time that lapsed from the time the
specimen was received by PO1 Abesia until the same was examined by PSI Salinas
was, therefore, too short to be considered consequential. Also, the marking placed
on the seized item by PO3 Sarmiento matches the label of the heat-plastic packet
containing white crystalline substance that, per said Chemistry Report No. D-12522003, was examined by PSI Salinas. It is thus reasonable to conclude that the
specimen submitted was the same one examined. Besides, Perondos claim that
the same may have been altered is just his mere speculation and nothing more.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO REYES y SANTOS
G.R. No. 194606, February 18, 2015, J. Del Castillo
The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the
seller of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction. In
this case, SPO1 Acosta positively identified Santos as the person he transacted with
and who handed to him the two sachets of shabu presented in court, however, the
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prosecution was unable to discharge its burden of establishing the element of
consideration or payment for the sachets of shabu. The charge against him was not
confined to the sale of shabu. To deliver a dangerous drug is an act that is also
punishable under the same Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165. During the buy bust
operation, SPO1 Acosta asked Santos for the shabu and Santos responded by taking
out from his pocket the shabu and handing over its possession to SPO1 Acosta
without receiving any payment thereto.
Facts:
An Information charging Alfredo Santos with violation of Section 5, Article II of
R.A. 9165, otherwise known as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
as amended, was filed with the RTC of San Fernando City, La Union, that Reyes sell
and deliver to a poseur-buyer two (2) heat sealed transparent plastic sachets
containing Shabu, weighing 0.82 gram and 0.85, without first securing the
necessary permit, license or prescription from the proper government agency.
Appellant pleaded not guilty during his arraignment. After the termination of the
pre-trial conference, trial ensued.
Based on the prosecution, on June 28, 2005, a confidential informant went to
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency office in Camp Diego Silang, San Fernando
City, La Union and reported to SPO1 Rene Acosta that Santos was selling shabu.
SPO1 Acosta relayed the information to his superior officer, Senior Inspector
Reynaldo Lizardo, who formed a buy-bust team and designated SPO1 Acosta as
poseur-buyer. On June 29, 2005, SPO1 Acosta and PDEA Agent Ellizier Ignacio, who
would act as back-up, arrived in the designated area at 5:30 a.m. Santos arrived
after 20 minutes with the CI and approached SPO1 Acosta. The CI then introduced
SPO1 Acosta to Reyes as the buyer of shabu. SPO1 Acosta asked him if he has the
stuff and if SPO1 Acosta could see them. Reyes thus handed over to SPO1 Acosta
two plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. SPO1 Acosta then made
the pre-arranged signal by removing the towel from his shoulder to indicate the
completion of the transaction. Ignacio thus rushed to SPO1 Acosta and together,
they arrested Reyes. Anent the seized items, SPO1 Acosta took possession of the
same up until they were brought to the police station. Thereat, he marked them
with his initials RA. On the same day, Sr. Insp. Lizardo prepared and signed a
Request for Laboratory Examination that SPO1 Acosta delivered together with the
seized plastic sachets to the PNP Crime Laboratory Office in La Union. Police
Inspector Valeriano Laya II conducted a qualitative examination on the contents of
the plastic sachets and confirmed the same to be positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.
Reyes denied the accusations against him. He claimed that on June 28, 2005,
he was on board a bus bound for San Fernando City, La Union to discuss a business
proposal with his wifes nephew, Rolando Pinon, Jr. However, Pinon was not around
when he arrived in the early morning of June 29, 2005. Tired from the long journey,
Reyes boarded a tricycle and instructed the driver to take him to the cheapest hotel.
While on their way, a car suddenly blocked the road and three of the four men on
board the vehicle alighted and pointed their guns at him. He was instructed to
board the car and taken to Carlatan, San Fernando City, La Union. Upon their arrival,
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his captors ordered him to face the wall and take off his clothes. They also
confiscated his bag and then asked him why there was shabu inside. He denied
possession of the same. Santos spent the night in detention and was brought to the
RTC of San Fernando City, La Union the following morning. The RTC found appellant
guilty as charged. The CA rendered its Decision affirming the RTCs judgment of
conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not the conviction of Alfredo Reyes must be sustained
Ruling:
Yes, but for delivery of dangerous drugs, not for sale of shabu.
The crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, such as shabu, has the following
elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration;
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The delivery of the illicit
drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money
successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction. In this case, SPO1 Acosta
positively identified Santos as the person he transacted with and who handed to
him the two sachets of shabu presented in court. However and as correctly pointed
out by Santos, the prosecution was unable to discharge its burden of establishing
the element of consideration or payment for the sachets of shabu. SPO1 Acosta
practically admitted in his testimony the lack of consideration or payment for the
sachets of shabu delivered to him by Reyes. Clearly, the element of receipt of
payment for the thing sold is absent in this case. Hence, the offense of illegal sale
of shabu against Santos cannot stand. However, this finding does not necessarily
result in Reyess exoneration.
The charge against him was not confined to the sale of shabu. To deliver a
dangerous drug is an act that is also punishable under the same Section 5, Article II
of R.A. 9165. Under Article I, Section 3(k) of the same statute, the term deliver
means any act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another, personally or
otherwise, and by any means, with or without consideration. To establish the guilt of
an accused for the illegal delivery of a dangerous drug, there must be evidence that
(1) the accused passed on possession of a dangerous drug to another, personally or
otherwise, and by any means; (2) such delivery is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused knowingly made the delivery with or without consideration.
In this case, there was a prior arrangement between SPO1 Acosta and Reyes
to meet. During the scheduled meeting, SPO1 Acosta introduced himself and asked
Reyes for the shabu. Reyes responded by taking out from his pocket the shabu and
handing over its possession to SPO1 Acosta without receiving any payment therefor.
Reyes had no authority under the law to deliver the shabu since he was working as
a carpenter at the time of his arrest. Reyes likewise knowingly and voluntarily made
the delivery. On the basis therefore of the charges against Reyes and the evidence
presented by the prosecution, he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
delivery of shabu under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165.
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The Court disagrees with the contention of appellant that the police officers
did not comply with the chain of custody rule under Section 21(a) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 9165. In this case, the Certificate of
Inventory prepared by the police officers belies the contention of Santos that there
was no compliance with the above-quoted provision. While the said certificate was
signed only by the DOJ representative, the failure of the police officers to include
the signatures of the other persons enumerated under the subject provision does
not affect the evidentiary weight of the subject shabu as the chain of custody of the
evidence remained unbroken. In like manner, the absence of photographs of the
seized shabu does not render said drugs inadmissible or impair the integrity of the
chain of custody of the same. As established by the prosecution, the police officers
immediately arrested appellant after his delivery of the sachets of shabu. They took
him to the police station together with the seized items and conducted an
investigation on his commission of the criminal offense. There is also no doubt that
the marking was done in the presence of Santos since he was also in the police
station at the time of the marking. The short period in which these events occurred
ensures the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.
The RTC and CA did not err in giving credence to the narration of the incident
by the prosecution witnesses, who as police officers, are presumed to have regularly
performed their official duties. This presumption is not overturned by the assertion
of appellant that: (1) they failed to present the marked money; (2) they failed to
inform him upon arrest of his constitutional right to counsel; and (3) they detained
him for 24 hours before the filing of the charges. The presentation of the marked
money is immaterial in this case since the crime of illegal delivery of a dangerous
drug can be committed even without consideration or payment.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LARRY BASILIO y HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 185774, February 23, 2015, J. Del Castillo
A buy-bust operation was conducted by the police to apprehend Larry Basilio.
Basilio was successfully apprehended by the police after he sold shabu to a police
acting as poseur-buyer. The RTC and CA convicted the accused. Basilio questions
the chain of custody of the drug. Marking the subject item at the police station did
not dent the prosecution's case. While R.A. No. 9165 provides for the immediate
marking of the seized item, it does not specify a time frame when and where said
marking should be done.
Facts:
Pursuant to an information he received the day before, Police Senior Inspector
(PSI) Julian T. Olonan (PSI Olonan) organized in the morning of November 2, 2006 a
team to conduct a "buy-bust" operation against a certain "Kagi" who was said to be
active in the illegal sale of drugs.
At about 10:00 p.m., the team proceeded to the target area in San Gabriel,
Old Sta. Mesa, Manila. SPO1 Chua approached Kagi, later identified as Basilio and
told the latter that he was going to score. Basilio asked SPO1 Chua magkano and
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the latter replied piso lang. Basilio got the money fromSPO1 Chua and in turn
handed to the latter a small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance. Whereupon, SPO1 Chua scratched the back of his head
signifying to the back-up members that the sale had been consummated. Forthwith,
SPO1 Chua arrested Basilio. Thereat, SPO1 Chua placed the marking LBH on the
plastic sachet and turned over the same to their investigator, PO3 Jimenez.PSI
Reyes then conducted a qualitative examination of the specimen which weighed
0.083 gram and tested positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.
The RTC found all the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs to have
been clearly established by the prosecution. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower courts correctly convicted Basilio of the offense of
illegal sale of shabu
Ruling:
The lower courts did not err in sustaining the conviction of Basilio.
The prosecution witnesses positively identified Basilio as the seller of the
substance to the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Chua, for the sum of P100.00. The white
crystalline substance presented during trial was identified by SPO1 Chua as the
substance sold and delivered to him by Basilio. The substance when examined by
Forensic Chemical Officer PSI Reyes tested positive to methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. Clearly, the prosecution has adequately and satisfactorily
proved all the elements of the offense.
The chain of custody requirement aims to ensure that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized item are preserved, so much so that doubts as to the
identity of the evidence are removed. To be admissible, the prosecution must show
by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between
the time it came into possession of the police officers and until it was tested in the
laboratory to determine its composition up to the time it was offered in evidence.
Basilio also posits that the marking of the seized item at the police station
instead of at the place of seizure immediately after his arrest engendered serious
doubt as to its identity. The Court is not convinced. Marking the subject item at the
police station did not dent the prosecution's case. While R.A. No. 9165 provides for
the immediate marking of the seized item, it does not specify a timeframe when
and where said marking should be done.
Finally, while it is admitted that the apprehending officers failed to conduct an
inventory of the seized item and to photograph the same. However, the noncompliance did not affect the seized

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item's evidentiary weight and admissibility in evidence. As previously discussed, the
chain of custody of the seized item was unbroken; hence, its integrity and
evidentiary value were not compromised. It must be stressed that what is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
item.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALLAN DIAZ y ROXAS
G.R. No. 197818, February 25, 2015, J. Del Castillo
Prosecution of cases involving illegal drugs depends largely on the credibility
of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. It is fundamental that
the factual findings of the trial court and those involving credibility of witnesses are
accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts, or
speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such
findings. The trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses,
having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent application where
said findings are sustained by the CA. thus, if the testimony of the police who was
the poseur-buyer and who marked the sachets of shabu are supported by
documents such as the marked buy-bust money, chemistry report, affidavit of
arrest, among others, which all clearly attest to the fact that a sale of shabu took
place between him and Diaz, the conviction will be upheld.
In addition, an accused may still be found guilty, despite the failure to
faithfully observe the requirements provided under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, for
as long as the chain of custody remains unbroken. Here, it is beyond cavil that the
prosecution was able to establish the necessary links in the chain of custody of the
subject specimen from the moment it was seized from Diaz up to the time it was
presented during trial as proof of the corpus delicti.
Facts:
An information was filed with the RTC, charging accused-Diaz with a violation
of Section 5, R.A. 9165 for illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The prosecution alleged
that the police caught Diaz selling drugs in a buy-bust operation, with PO2 Coronel
as the poseur buyer. After PO2 Coronel received the shabu from Diaz, he the signal
upon which the other police officers arrested Diaz. He was brought to the police
station where the plastic sachet containing the shabu was marked by PO2 Coronel.
The substance tested positive for shabu. Diaz alleges that he was just walking home
when he was suddenly arrested, brought to the police station and subjected to
inquest proceedings.
The RTC convicted Diaz as charged, and the CA affirmed in toto the RTC.
Issues:
1. Was PO2 Coronel not a credible witness?
2. Did the prosecution fail to comply with the chain of custody requirement?
Ruling:
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1. No, PO2 Coronels testimony is supported by other evidence such as the marked
buy-bust money, chemistry report, affidavit of arrest, among others, which all
clearly attest to the fact that a sale of shabu took place between him and Diaz
Diaz assails the trial courts assessment of the credibility of prosecution
witness PO2 Coronel. He faults the RTC in giving more faith and credit to PO2
Coronels testimony regarding the buy-bust operation over his defense of denial.
Prosecution of cases involving illegal drugs depends largely on the credibility
of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. It is fundamental that
the factual findings of the trial court and those involving credibility of witnesses are
accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts, or
speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such
findings. The trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses,
having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent application where
said findings are sustained by the CA, as in this case. The Court has thoroughly
examined the records of this case and finds the testimony of PO2 Coronel credible.
The said testimony is pertinently supported by documents such as the marked buybust money, chemistry report, affidavit of arrest, among others, which all clearly
attest to the fact that a sale of shabu took place between him and Diaz. On the
other hand, Diazs defense of denial, aside from being self-serving, is
unsubstantiated and thus, has little weight in law. Hence, the lower courts correctly
gave more credence to the evidence of the prosecution.
2. No, even if the police failed to faithfully observe the requirements under Sec. 21,
R.A. 9165, Diaz may still be found guilty as the chain of custody remained unbroken.
Diaz banks on the prosecutions alleged failure to comply with the
requirements of law with respect to the proper marking, inventory, and taking of
photograph of the seized specimen. However, it does not escape the Courts
attention that Diaz failed to contest the admissibility in evidence of the seized item
during trial. In fact, at no instance did he manifest or even hint that there were
lapses on the part of the police officers in handling the seized item which affected
its integrity and evidentiary value. As held by the Court in People v. Domado, citing
People v. Hernandez, objection to the admissibility of evidence cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal. When a party desires the court to reject the evidence
offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection, he cannot
raise the question for the first time on appeal. In this case, Diaz raised the police
operatives alleged non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for
the first time on appeal before the CA. Thus, following established jurisprudence,
the alleged flaws do not adversely affect the prosecutions case.
In any event, it is settled that an accused may still be found guilty, despite
the failure to faithfully observe the requirements provided under Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165, for as long as the chain of custody remains unbroken. Here, it is beyond
cavil that the prosecution was able to establish the necessary links in the chain of

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custody of the subject specimen from the moment it was seized from Diaz up to the
time it was presented during trial as proof of the corpus delicti.
ALEX TIONCO y ORTEGA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No.192284, March 11, 2015, J. Del Castillo
Accused was charged of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. He argued
that no physical inventory was conducted, or photograph of the drugs taken,
immediately upon seizure, in violation of the procedures provided by law. The Court
ruled that the failure of the arresting officers to strictly comply with the law is not
fatal and will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated
from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items.
Facts:
Petitioner Alex was charged with violation of Section 11(3), Article II of R.A.
9165 or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
PO1 Joel G. Sta. Maria and PO1 Fernando Reyes were conducting an anticriminality patrol in Tondo, Manila. From a distance of about three meters, they saw
Alex holding and examining a plastic sachet with white crystalline substance
believed to be shabu. They approached him and after ascertaining the contents of
the plastic sachet, confiscated the same. Alex was arrested, told of his alleged
violation, and apprised of his constitutional rights.
Alex denied the charges against him. He recounted that in the morning of
said incident, he was sitting in front of his uncles house when policemen
approached and arrested him. When he asked them why he was being arrested, he
was merely told to follow their instructions. He was brought to Police Station 2
where he was frisked but nothing illegal was found on him. He was detained after
being informed that he violated the law pertaining to drugs. PO1 Sta. Maria
demanded P6,000.00 from him in exchange for his release but no money was
forthcoming.
The RTC convicted Alex. The CA affirmed the conviction and found the
elements of illegal possession of dangerous drug present.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the conviction of Alex;
2. Whether or not there was failure on the part of the police officers to
preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item
Ruling:
1. No, the Court upheld the conviction.

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For illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs, the following elements
must be established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is
identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
The circumstances on how Alex was seen holding and examining a piece of
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, how the same was confiscated
from him by the police officers, and his eventual arrest were narrated by PO1 Sta.
Maria in a direct and consistent manner. In open court, he positively identified Alex
as the person holding the plastic sachet. He also identified the plastic sachet
marked ATO as the same item confiscated from Alex. There is nothing on record to
show that Alex was legally authorized to possess the same. And having been caught
in flagrante delicto, there is prima facie evidence that Alex freely and consciously
possessed the drug, which he failed to rebut.
The Court disagreed with the contention that it is highly improbable and
contrary to human experience that Alex would hold and examine the subject plastic
sachet with people around and in broad daylight. It has been observed in many
cases that drug pushers sell their prohibited articles to any prospective customer,
be he a stranger or not, in private as well as in public places, even during daytime.
Undeniably, drug pushers have become increasingly daring, dangerous and, worse,
openly defiant of the law. Hence, what matters is not the time or place where the
violation was committed but the acts constituting the violation of the dangerous
drug law.
2. No, there was no failure to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized item.
With respect to the seized illegal substance, the presentation of the drug
itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and its existence is indispensable
to a judgment of conviction. It must be shown that the item subject of the offense is
the same substance offered in court as exhibit. The chain of custody requirements
provided for in Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 performs this function as it ensures
the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the item so that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
Alex argued that no physical inventory was conducted, or photograph of it
taken, immediately upon seizure, in violation of the procedures provided by law. The
Court noted that the defense did not question the admissibility of the seized item as
evidence during trial. It was only during the appeal to the CA that he questioned the
same. Settled is the rule that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it had
been raised in the court below.
However, the Court ruled that the failure of the arresting officers to strictly
comply with the law is not fatal and will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the
items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.

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What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. When Alex was arrested and
the suspected shabu was confiscated from him by PO1 Sta. Maria, the latter
immediately brought the item to the police station where he marked the plastic
sachet with Alexs initials ATO, and turned it over to the investigator PO 1 Garcia.
The latter, together with PO 1 Sta. Maria, then forwarded the said plastic sachet
marked with "ATO" and the letter request for laboratory examination to the WPD
Crime Laboratory. Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Macapagal personally received the same
from PO 1 Garcia and after conducting qualitative examination on the contents
thereof, found the same to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu. When the prosecution presented as evidence in court the plastic sachet
marked with "ATO," PO1 Sta. Maria in no uncertain terms positively identified it as
the one he confiscated from Alex.
The Court ruled that the chain of custody of the seized item was shown to not
have been broken, and, hence, its integrity and evidentiary value properly
preserved.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BRIAN MERCADO
G.R. No. 207988, March 11, 2015, J. Perez
The Court has consistently ruled that for the successful prosecution of
offenses involving the illegal sale of drugs under Sec. 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,
the following elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the
object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the nothing sold and the payment
therefor. In other words, there is a need to establish beyond reasonable doubt that
the accused actually sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and that the
former indeed knew that what he had sold and delivered to the latter was a
prohibited drug. To reiterate, what is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, plus
the presentation in court of corpus delicti as evidence. On the other hand, [the
Court] have adhered to the time-honored principle that for illegal possession of
regulated or prohibited drugs under Sec. 11 of the same law, the prosecution must
establish the following elements: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or
object, which is identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession
is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the
drug.
Facts:
Accused-appellant Mercado was arrested following a buy-bust operation in
which the police operatives obtained several sachets of shabu. Subsequently, he
was formally charged for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165. The
trial court rendered a decision finding Mercado guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
the said crimes.
The trial court held that the prosecution was able to prove the offer and sale
that transpired between Mercado and the police operatives. In addition, the
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testimonies of the police officers, who participated in the buy-bust operation,
appear credible and reliable and there is absence of any ill-motive on their part to
concoct trumped charges. On the opposite end, the claim of extortion of Mercado
was weak and unsubstantiated. The CA affirmed this judgment of conviction and
rejected Mercados protest that there were misgivings in the chain-of-custody of the
confiscated drugs.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of violating Sections 5 and 11
of R.A. No. 9165.
Ruling:
YES, the prosecution was able to present evidence establishing beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of Mercado.
Upon perusal of the records of the case, the Court see no reason to reverse or
modify the findings of the trial court on the credibility of the testimony of
prosecutions witnesses, more so in the present case, in which its findings were
affirmed by the CA. It is worthy to mention that, in addition to the legal presumption
of regularity in the performance of their official duty, the court a quo was in the best
position to weigh the evidence presented during trial and ascertain the credibility of
the police officers who testified as to the conduct of the buy-bust operation and in
preserving the integrity of the seized illegal drug.
The Court has consistently ruled that for the successful prosecution of
offenses involving the illegal sale of drugs under Sec. 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,
the following elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the
object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the nothing sold and the payment
therefor. In other words, there is a need to establish beyond reasonable doubt that
the accused actually sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and that the
former indeed knew that what he had sold and delivered to the latter was a
prohibited drug. To reiterate, what is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, plus
the presentation in court of corpus delicti as evidence. On the other hand, the Court
have adhered to the time-honored principle that for illegal possession of regulated
or prohibited drugs under Sec. 11 of the same law, the prosecution must establish
the following elements: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which
is identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
Undoubtedly, the prosecution had indeed established that there was a buybust operation showing that accused-appellant sold and delivered the shabu for
value to the poseur-buyer. xxx Likewise, Mercado was fully aware that what he
was selling was illegal and prohibited considering that when poseur-buyer told him,
pre, pa-iskor naman, the former immediately answered, magkano?, then when
the poseur-buyer replied, dos lang, it resulted to the production of three (3) pieces
of plastic sachets from Mercados pocket. Thereafter, the corpus delicti or the
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subject drug was seized, marked, and subsequently identified as a prohibited drug.
Note that there was nothing in the records showing that he had authority to possess
them. Jurisprudence had pronounced repeatedly that mere possession of a
prohibited drug constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi
sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.
Above all, Mercado likewise failed to present contrary evidence to rebut his
possession of the shabu. Taken collectively, the illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs by Mercado were indeed established beyond reasonable doubt.
Furthermore, the Court has time and again adopted the chain of custody rule,
a method of authenticating evidence which requires that the admission of an exhibit
be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question
is what the proponent claims it to be. This would include testimony about every link
in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in
evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe
how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in
the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in
which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.
It is essential for the prosecution to prove that the prohibited drug
confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in
court as exhibit. Its identity must be established with unwavering exactitude for it to
lead to a finding of guilt.
From the testimonies of the police officers in the case at bench, the
prosecution established that they had custody of the drug seized from the accused
from the moment he was arrested, during the time he was transported to the police
station, and up to the time the drug was submitted to the crime laboratory for
examination. The same witnesses also identified the seized drug with certainty
when this was presented in court. With regard to the handling of the seized drugs,
there are no conflicting testimonies or glaring inconsistencies that would cast doubt
on the integrity thereof as evidence presented and scrutinized in court. It is
therefore safe to conclude that, to the unprejudiced mind, the testimonies show
without a doubt that the evidence seized from the accused-appellant at the time of
the buy-bust operation was the same one tested, introduced, and testified to in
court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BRIAN MERCADO y SARMIENTO
G.R. No. 207988, March 11, 2015, J. Perez
A person carrying an illegal drug without authorization to do so shall be liable
for violation of RA 9165 for possession of dangerous drug. Mere possession of the
same shall be prima facie evidence of possession. On the other hand, if the person
sells the drug, the prosecution must prove the following: (1) the identity of the
buyer and seller, the object and consideration; (2) actual delivery of the thing sold
and payment thereof.
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Facts:
A tip from an anonymous informant that Mercado was selling dangerous
drugs was received by the police. The police then planned a buy bust operation with
SPO2 William Quillan as team leader and PO3 Ramon Galvez as poseur buyer. PO3
Galvez told Mercado, Pre, pa-iskor naman. Mercado then answered, Magkano?
PO3 Galvez handed two marked 100-peso bills to Mercado and was given an
opportunity to choose 1 from the 3 sachets containing crystalline substance. After
making his choice, PO3 Galvez claimed from Mercado a sachet and signaled to his
colleagues. The police force arrested Mercado and the 3 sachets were confiscated
and transmitted to laboratory for examination. The results confirmed that the
crystalline substance was shabu and Mercado was charged of violations of Sections
5 and 11 of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
During the trial, Mercado denied the version of facts of the prosecution and
contended that he was suddenly arrested by the police on the morning of July 27,
2007 and was asked to produce P10,000 in exchange for his freedom. Having failed
to do so, he was charged of the said offenses.
The RTC found Mercado guilty. On appeal, Mercado raised that he was
wrongfully convicted on the ground of inadmissibility of evidence. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC and rejected the stance of the accused
holding that Mercado cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Mercado is guilty of selling and possession of illegal drugs
Ruling:
Yes, he is.
The Court has consistently ruled that for the successful prosecution of
offenses involving the illegal sale of drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.
9165, the following elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and
seller, the object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor. In other words, there is a need to establish beyond reasonable
doubt that the accused actually sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and
that the former indeed knew that what he had sold and delivered to the latter was a
prohibited drug. To reiterate, what is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, plus
the presentation in court of corpus delicti as evidence. On the other hand, this court
has adhered to the time-honored principle that for illegal possession of regulated or
prohibited drugs under Section 11 of the same law, the prosecution must establish
the following elements: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which
is identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.

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Undoubtedly, the prosecution had indeed established that there was a buybust operation showing that accused-appellant sold and delivered the shabu for
value to PO3 Ramon Galvez (PO3 Galvez), the poseur-buyer. PO3 Galvez himself
testified that there was an actual exchange of the marked-money and the prohibited
drug. Likewise, accused-appellant was fully aware that what he was selling was
illegal and prohibited considering that when PO3 Galvez told him, pre, pa-iskor
naman, the former immediately answered, magkano?, then when the poseurbuyer replied, dos lang, it resulted to the production of three (3) pieces of plastic
sachets from accused-appellants pocket. Thereafter, the corpus delicti or the
subject drug was seized, marked, and subsequently identified as a prohibited drug.
Note that there was nothing in the records showing that he had authority to possess
them. Jurisprudence had pronounced repeatedly that mere possession of a
prohibited drug constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi
sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.
Above all, accused-appellant likewise failed to present contrary evidence to rebut
his possession of the shabu. Taken collectively, the illegal sale and illegal possession
of dangerous drugs by accused-appellant were indeed established beyond
reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RANDY ROLLO y LAGASCA
G.R. No. 211199, March 25, 2015, J. Perez
Randy avers that the police officers failed to strictly abide by the procedures
for the custody and disposition of the confiscated drugs as provided in Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 9165. The Court held that absent any missing link in the chain of
custody of the seized drug items and absent any showing that substantial or
relevant facts bearing on the elements of the crime have been misapplied or
overlooked, the Court can only accord full credence to such factual assessment of
the Regional Trial Court which had the distinct advantage of observing the
demeanor and conduct of the witnesses at the trial.
Facts:
Acting on a tip from a confidential informant that Randy was engaged in the
sale of prohibited drugs, the 312 Provincial Mobile Group (PMG) of Malacampa,
Camiling, Tarlac formed a buy-bust team composed of PO1 Ayad as poseur-buyer.
The PMG prepared a Five Hundred Peso (P500.00) bill as marked money.
At around 4:30 p.m. of 23 June 2008, the buy-bust team proceeded to the
target area. Upon reaching the area, PO1 Ayad proceeded to talk to Randy who was
then standing in front of a store, while the other members of the buy-bust team
were positioned in the area. After a brief conversation, Randy handed to PO1 Ayad
two plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. In exchange, PO1 Ayad
handed the pre-marked five hundred peso (P500.00) bill to appellant.
Thereafter, PO1 Ayad made the pre-arranged signal of removing the
handkerchief on his forehead. The back-up team emerged and introduced
themselves as police officers to Randy. PO3 Verdadero and PO1 Ayad requested
Randy to empty his pockets and they were able to recover the buy-bust money and
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one heat- sealed sachet of white crystalline substance from appellant. Randy was
then arrested and brought to the police station for investigation. The seized items
and the marked money were turned over at the police station to SPO1 Jorge
Caoagdan, who marked the two plastic sachets. The Chemistry Report found that
the seized plastic sachets are positive for the presence of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride or Shabu.
The RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty of violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the
RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not Randy is guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165
Ruling:
In every prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be
sufficiently proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
All the elements for illegal sale were duly established with appellant being
caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu through a buy- bust operation conducted
by members of the PMG in Camiling, Tarlac.
In the affidavit, the police officers made a detailed account of the
preparations made prior to the buy-bust operation such as the documentation,
marking on the boodle money, operational strategy and the like were detailed. PO1
Ayad also categorically stated that he gave the marked money to appellant in
exchange for one (1) piece of transparent plastic heat-sealed sachet of shabu.
The result of the laboratory examination, as testified to by the forensic chemist,
confirmed the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride on the white crystalline
substance inside the plastic sachet confiscated from appellant. The delivery of the
illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money
successfully consummated the buy-bust transaction.
Randy avers that the police officers failed to strictly abide by the procedures
for the custody and disposition of the confiscated drugs as provided in Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 9165. In particular, he points out that the markings of the seized
items were done in the police station; that there was no physical inventory made or
photographs of the seized items; and that there were no representatives from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 provides for the custody
and disposition of the confiscated illegal drugs, to wit:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
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photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Jurisprudence dictates that a testimony that included the marking of the
seized items at the police station and in the presence of the accused was sufficient
in showing compliance with the rules on chain of custody. Marking upon immediate
confiscation contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team.
The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the
required physical inventory in the place where the subject shabu was seized does
not automatically render accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized from him
inadmissible. A proviso was added in the implementing rules that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items. Pertinently, it is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items which must be proven to establish the corpus delicti.
Resolving the chain of custody rule, this Court quotes with approval the
pertinent ruling of the Court of Appeals, thus:
Indeed, to erase all doubts as to the identity of the seized drugs, it is
important to adhere to the so-called chain of custody rule where the prosecution
should establish the following links: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of
the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second,
the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal
drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover
and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the
court.
In this case, the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish every link in the
chain of custody, as well as the integrity of the corpus delicti. As testified to by PO3
Verdadero and PO1 Ayad, after the arrest and confiscation of the items, they
immediately brought Accused-Appellant to Camp Makabulos, Tarlac City where the
investigator at the station, SPO1 Jorge Caoagdan marked the seized items with the
initials RRL1 and RRL2 in the presence of PO1 Ayad. From the investigating
officer, the seized items were turned over to the forensic chemist PSI Jebie Timario
[for] laboratory examination. After examination, PSI Timario also placed her own
markings on the said seized items. On the witness stand, PSI Timario declared that
the items shown to her were the same items which she received from Pereja in the
presence of Police Officer Dinoy. Lastly, PO3 Verdadero testified that the items
presented in court were the very same items that they seized during the buy-bust
operation.

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The foregoing facts clearly established that there was substantial compliance
with the law, and the integrity of the drugs seized from Randy was well preserved.
The chain of custody of the drugs subject matter of the case was shown no to have
been broken. Absent any missing link in the chain of custody of the seized drug
items and absent any showing that substantial or relevant facts bearing on the
elements of the crime have been misapplied or overlooked, this Court can only
accord full credence to such factual assessment of the Regional Trial Court which
had the distinct advantage of observing the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses
at the trial.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHARLIE SORIN y TAGAYLO
G.R. No. 212635, March 25, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from
the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized
from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings,
thus, preventing switching, planting, or contamination of evidence. Hence, the
Court should acquit the accused on the ground of failure to mark the plastic sachets
confiscated during the buy-bust operation
Facts:
Sorin was charged before the RTC for violating Sections 5 and 15, Article II of
RA 9165. According to the prosecution, on November 2, 2005, the Philippine
National Police (PNP) intelligence section chief of El Salvador, Misamis Oriental
received a report that Sorin was selling illegal drugs at his residence in Barangay
Amoros, El Salvador, Misamis Oriental. Prior to this date, or on October 25, 2005, a
test-buy was conducted by the PNP where Sorin sold illegal drugs to a civilian asset.
As a result, Police Chief Inspector Rolindo Soguillon (PCI Soguillon) formed a buybust team composed of PO2 Edgardo Dador (PO2 Dador) and PO1 Sonny Adams
Cambangay (PO1 Cambangay), as poseur-buyers, and PO3 Edilberto Estrada, SPO1
Graciano Mugot, Jr. (SPO1 Mugot), SPO1 Samuel Madjos, and SPO2 Elias Villarte, as
back-up team. The poseur-buyers were provided with four (4) one hundred peso bills
as marked money.
At around 7:30 in the evening, the buy-bust team proceeded to the target
area. PO2 Dador and PO1 Cambangay approached Sorins residence, knocked on
the door, and were eventually let in. They asked if they could buy shabu, and Sorin
responded that each sachet costs 200.00. PO2 Dador offered to purchase two (2)
sachets. After examining said sachets, each containing white crystalline substance,
PO2 Dador gave Sorin the 400.00 marked money. PO2 Dador then tapped Sorin on
the shoulder, brought him outside the house where he and the rest of the buy-bust
team introduced themselves as police officers, and arrested Sorin. The latter was
then brought to the police station.
At the police station, PO2 Dador turned over the seized items and the marked
money to SPO1 Mugot, who marked the same, prepared the inventory and request
for laboratory examination, and sent the seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
The PNP Crime Laboratory tested the following items: (a) the sachets seized from
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Sorin during the buy-bust operation for the presence of illegal drugs; (b) Sorins
hands and the marked money used to purchase the aforementioned illegal drugs for
ultraviolet fluorescent powder; and (c) Sorins urine for the presence of illegal drugs.
The seized sachets tested positive for shabu, while Sorins hands and the marked
money used contained traces of ultraviolet fluorescent powder. Also, Sorins urine
tested positive for the presence of shabu.
The RTC found Sorin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165. Aggrieved, Sorin appealed his conviction before the CA. The CA
affirmed Sorins conviction in toto. Undaunted, Sorin filed the instant appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Sorins conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA
9165 should be upheld.
Ruling:
No. In order to convict an accused charged with violating Section 5, Article II
of RA 9165, the prosecution must be able to prove beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (b) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment. Accordingly, it is of paramount
importance for the prosecution to establish that the transaction actually took place,
and to present the corpus delicti, i.e., the seized drug/s, before the court.
Similarly, it must be shown that the integrity and evidentiary value of such
seized items have been preserved. In other words, the dangerous drug presented in
court as evidence against an accused must be the same as that seized from him.
The chain of custody requirement ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the
identity of the evidence are removed. In People v. Viterbo, citing People v.
Cervantes, the Court had occasion to elaborate on the requirements rationale:
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165, the following elements must concur: (a) the identities of the
buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment for it. As the dangerous drug itself forms an integral and key part
of the corpus delicti of the crime, it is therefore essential that the identity of the
prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the prosecution
must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous
drug, from the moment it was seized from the accused up to the time it was
presented in court as proof of the corpus delicti.
In this case, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to establish the
identity of the substance allegedly confiscated from Sorin due to unjustified gaps in
the chain of custody, thus warranting his acquittal.
Records bear out that PO2 Dador, i.e., the apprehending officer who seized
the sachets from Sorin during the buy-bust operation conducted on November 2,
2005, failed to mark the same and, instead, turned them over unmarked to SPO1
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Mugot who was the one who conducted the marking; prepared the request for
laboratory examination of the seized sachets, Sorins urine, and the marked money;
delivered the said request, together with the seized sachets and marked money, to
the PNP Crime Laboratory; and later received the examination results. PO2 Dador
had, in fact, admitted that the sachets he seized from Sorin were not even marked
in his presence.
The Court cannot over-emphasize the significance of marking in illegal drugs
cases. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from
the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized
from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings,
thus, preventing switching, planting, or contamination of evidence. Hence, in People
v. Sabdula, the Court acquitted the accused on the ground of failure to mark the
plastic sachets confiscated during the buy-bust operation
With these lapses unveiled from the foregoing testimonies, the Court is
unconvinced that the chain of custody rule had been substantially complied with.
Not only did the apprehending officer who had initial custody over the seized drugs,
i.e., PO2 Dador, fail to mark the same or even witness its alleged marking, but also
the officer to which the marking of the seized items was attributed to, i.e., SPO1
Mugot, himself disclaimed that he had done such marking and admitted that he
only marked a transparent plastic cellophane container, and not the individual
sachets PO2 Dador had turned-over to him containing the seized drugs themselves.
Thus, there is no gainsaying that the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus
delicti had been compromised.
CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
UNJUST INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
ROMEO R. ARAULLO vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al.
G.R. No. 194157, July 30, 2014, J. Reyes
Specifically for the charge of violation of Art. 206 of the RPC which penalizes
the issuance of unjust interlocutory orders, it was necessary to show that; (1) the
orders issued by the respondents to his complaint were unjust, and (2) the said
orders were knowingly rendered or rendered through inexcusable negligence or
ignorance. On this matter, the Ombudsman correctly held that LAs order for the
quashal of the writ of execution, and the NLRCs resolution affirming it, were not
unjust, for being in accordance with law and the rules of the NLRC.
Facts:
The records indicate that Petitioner Araullo had previously obtained a
favorable judgment in a labor complaint for illegal dismissal which he filed against
Club Filipino. His labor complaint was initially dismissed by the Labor Arbiter (LA)
whose ruling was affirmed by the NLRC. Upon appeal, however, both the CA and the
Supreme Court ruled that Araullo was illegally dismissed from employment. Club
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Filipino was then ordered to reinstate Araullo and to pay him his full backwages and
other monetary benefits.
Following the finality of the decision in his favor, Araullo filed with LA a
motion for issuance of a writ of execution. The issuance of the writ was questioned
by Club Filipino on the ground that it had filed a Motion to Recompute the judgment
award, which remained unresolved by the LA. Club Filipino then filed its Motion to
Quash the Writ of Execution.
Dissatisfied with the quashal of the writ, Araullo filed a petition to set aside
LA Annis order, which was denied. When Araullos motion for reconsideration was
denied by the NLRC, he filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) the
criminal complaint against Respondents LA Anni, Chairman Nograles, Commissioner
Go, Commissioner Velasco, Atty. Tabao, Atty. De Leon and Atty. Balbin. He charged
them of violating Art. 206 of the RPC and Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Araullos charges were dismissed by the Ombudsman. It reasoned that the
deferral in the execution of the judgment in favor of Araullo could not be attributed
to the respondents in the criminal complaint. The presumption that the respondents
regularly performed their official duty was not overcome by sufficient evidence. The
LAs and NLRCs rulings were rendered pursuant to the Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC. This finding then barred a prosecution for violation of Art. 206 of the RPC.
Feeling aggrieved, Araullo filed this petition for certiorari to assail the
Ombudsmans dismissal of his criminal complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman violated Art. 206 of the RPC or the unjust
interlocutory order when it granted the motion to quash filed by Club Filipino.
Ruling:
No.
Upon review, the Court has determined that the Ombudsman did not commit
grave abuse of discretion. Explained clearly in the assailed resolution were the
grounds that supported its finding of lack of probable cause, and which then
justified the dismissal of the criminal complaints filed by Araullo.
To establish probable cause, Araullo, being the complainant, then should have
proved the elements of the crimes alleged to have been committed. In addition,
there should have been a clear showing of the respective participation of the
respondents, to at least support a ruling that would call for their further prosecution.
Specifically for the charge of violation of Art. 206 of the RPC which penalizes
the issuance of unjust interlocutory orders, it was necessary to show that, first, the
orders issued by the respondents to his complaint were unjust, and second, the said
orders were knowingly rendered or rendered through inexcusable negligence or
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ignorance. On this matter, the OMB correctly held that LA Annis order for the
quashal of the writ of execution, and the NLRCs resolution affirming it, were not
unjust. Contrary to Araullos claim, the rulings of the labor officials were in
accordance with law and the rules of the NLRC, specifically since Rule XI, Sec. 4 of
the 2005 NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure provided that:
Sec. 4. Computation during execution. Where further computation
of the award in the decision, resolution or order is necessary during
the course of the execution proceedings, no writ of execution shall be
issued until after the computation has been approved by the [LA] in an
order issued after the parties have been duly notified and heard on the
matter.
Given this provision, the quashal of the writ was then only necessary to
rectify LA Annis prior issuance of a writ of execution notwithstanding a pending
motion for re-computation that was filed by Club Filipino. Araullo failed to establish
that the labor officials were impelled by any motive other than the correction of this
error. At any rate, this issue on the propriety of the quashal of the writ had been
resolved by the Court in an earlier review.
Clearly, the Ombudsman committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding
no probable cause for violation of Art. 206 against the respondents labor officials.
Without a finding of probable cause against these labor officials, the dismissal of the
charge against Atty. Balbin, Atty. Tabao and Atty. De Leon, being private individuals
who did not appear to conspire with their co-respondents for the commission of a
criminal offense, was also warranted.
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
SILVERINA E. CONSIGNA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), and EMERLINA MOLETA
G.R. Nos. 175750-51, April 2, 2014, J. Perez
The following are the essential elements of violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019: 1. the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or
official functions 2. he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or inexcusable negligence and 3. that his action caused any undue injury to any
party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
There is no doubt that Consigna, being a municipal treasurer, was a public
officer discharging official functions when she misused such position to be able to
take out a loan from Moleta, who was misled into the belief that she, as municipal
treasurer, was acting on behalf of the municipality.
Facts:
On or about 14 June 1994, Petitioner Consigna, the Municipal Treasurer of
General Luna, Surigao del Norte, together with Jose Herasmio, obtained as loan from
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private respondent Hermelina Moleta, the sum of P320,000.00, to pay for the
salaries of the employees of the municipality and to construct the municipal
gymnasium as the municipalitys IRA had not yet arrived. As payment, Consigna
issued three (3) LBP checks signed by Jaime Rusillon (Rusillon), the incumbent
mayor of the Municipality of General Luna.
Between 15 June 1994 and 18 August 1994, in several attempts on different
occasions, Moleta demanded payment from Consigna and Rusillon, but to no avail.
Thus, on 18 August 1994, Moleta deposited the three (3) LBP checks to her account
in Metrobank Surigao Branch. Upon presentation for payment, Metrobank returned
the checks to Moleta as the checks had no funds. The following day, Moleta again
deposited the checks. This time, however, she deposited the checks to her LBP
account. Upon presentation for payment, the checks were again returned for the
reason, Signature Not on File. Upon verification, LBP informed Moleta that the
municipalitys account was already closed and transferred to DBP, and that
Consigna, the municipal treasurer, has been relieved from her position. Hence,
Moleta filed with the Sandiganbayan two (2) sets of Information against Consigna, in
the latters capacity as Municipal Treasurer and Rusillon, in his capacity as Municipal
Mayor of General Luna, for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and Art. 315 of the
RPC. After trial, the Sandiganbayan found Consigna guilty, but exonerated Rusillon.
Issue:
Whether Consigna is guilty of violating Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Ruling:
The following are the essential elements of violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019: 1. the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or
official functions 2. he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or inexcusable negligence and 3. that his action caused any undue injury to any
party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
There is no doubt that Consigna, being a municipal treasurer, was a public
officer dischar-ging official functions when she misused such position to be able to
take out a loan from Moleta, who was misled into the belief that she, as municipal
treasurer, was acting on behalf of the municipality.
In Montilla vs. Hilario, the Court described the offense committed in relation
to the office as: the relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the
Constitution is, in the Courts opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall into the
intent of the Constitution, the relation has to be such that, in the legal sense, the
offense cannot exist without the office. In other words, the office must be a
constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute xxx.
In this case, it was not only alleged in the Information, but was proved with
certainty during trial that the manner by which Consigna perpetrated the crime
necessarily relates to her official function as a municipal treasurer. Consignas
official function created in her favor an impression of authority to transact business
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with Moleta involving government financial concerns. There is, therefore, a direct
relation between the commission of the crime and Consignas office - the latter
being the very reason or consideration that led to the unwarranted benefit she
gained from Moleta, for which the latter suffered damages in the amount of
P320,000.00.
As regards the two other elements, the Court explained in Cabrera vs.
Sandiganbayan that there are two (2) ways by which a public official violates Sec.
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the performance of his functions, namely: (a) by causing
undue injury to any party, including the Government or (b) by giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference. The mode or under both.
In this case, Consigna was charged of violating Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 under the
alternative mode of causing undue injury to Moleta committed with evident bad
faith, for which she was correctly found guilty. Evident bad faith connotes not only
bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to
do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.
Evident bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes, which
manifested in Consignas actuations and representation. The inevitable conclusion is
that Consigna capitalized on her official function to commit the crimes charged.
Without her position, Consigna would not have induced Moleta to part with her
money. In the same vein, [she] could not have orchestrated a scheme of issuing
post-dated checks meddling with the municipalitys coffers and defiling the mayors
signature.
Given the above disquisition, it becomes superfluous to dwell further on the
issue raised by Consigna that Sec. 3(e) applies only to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or other
concessions. Nonetheless, to finally settle the issue, the last sentence of the said
provision is not a restrictive requirement which limits the application or extent of its
coverage. This has long been settled in our ruling in Mejorada vs. Sandiganbayan,
where the Court categorically declared that a prosecution for violation of Sec. 3(e)
of the Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of whether or not the accused public officer
is charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. All the
elements of the crimes as charged are present in the case at bar.
ALOYSIUS DAIT LUMAUIG vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No.166680, July 07, 2014, J. Del Castillo
The accused was charged for having allegedly utilized the cash advance for a
purpose other than for which it was obtained. He alleged that he was neither
informed nor did he receive any demand from COA to liquidate his cash advances.
The Supreme Court reiterated the rule that a prior notice or demand for
liquidation of cash advances is not a condition sine qua non before an accountable
public officer may be held liable under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code.
Facts:

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The accused was the former municipal mayor of Alfonso Lista,
Ifugao. Sometime in January 1998, Commission on Audit (COA) Auditor Florence L.
Paguirigan, during her examination of the year-end reports of the municipality, she
came across a disbursement voucher for P101,736.00 prepared for Lamauig, as
cash advance for the payment of freight and other cargo charges for 12 units of
motorcycles supposed to be donated to the municipality. The amount was covered
by a check wherein the payee is Lamauig. Her further investigation of the
accounting records revealed that no payment intended for the charge was made to
Royal Cargo Agencies for the month of August 1994.
Lamauig admitted having obtained the cash advance of P101,736.00 during
his incumbency. This amount was intended for the payment of freight and insurance
coverage of 12 units of motorcycles to be donated to the municipality by the City of
Manila. However, instead of motorcycles, he was able to secure two buses and five
patrol cars. He claimed that it never came to his mind to settle or liquidate the
amount advanced since the vehicles were already turned over to the
municipality. He alleged that he was neither informed nor did he receive any
demand from COA to liquidate his cash advances. It was only in 2001 while he was
claiming for separation pay when he came to know that he still has an unliquidated
cash advance. And so as not to prolong the issue, he paid the amount of
P101,736.00 to the municipal treasurer on June 4, 2001.
The Sandiganbayan acquitted him for violation of Section 3 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act but convicted him
of Failure of Accountable Officer to Render Accounts under Article 218 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Lumauig argues that since the cases for which he was indicted involve the
same subject cash advance in the amount of P101,736.00, his exoneration in the
anti-graft case should likewise exculpate him from further liability in the present
case.
Issues:
1. Whether the acquittal of petitioner in the anti- graft case is a bar to his conviction
for failure to render an account in the present case
2. Whether the prior demand to liquidate is a requisite for conviction under Article
218 of the Revised Penal Code.
3. Whether the penalty imposed may be modified considering that the accused
subsequently liquidated the subject cash advance
Ruling:
1. No
It is undisputed that the two charges stemmed from the same incident.
However the Court have consistently held that the same act may give rise to two
or more separate and distinct charges. Further, because there is a variance
between the elements of the two offenses charged, Lumauig cannot safely assume
that his innocence in one case will extend to the other case even if both cases hinge
on the same set of evidence.

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To hold a person criminally liable under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the following
elements must be present:
1. (1) That the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in
conspiracy with the former;
2. (2) That said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the
performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public
positions;
3. (3) That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government
or a private party;
4. (4) That such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to such parties; and
5. (5) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. 17
On the other hand, the elements of the felony punishable under Article 218 of
the Revised Penal Code are:
(1) That the offender is a public officer whether in the service or separated
therefrom;
2) That he must be an accountable officer for public funds or property;
(3) That he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the COA or to a
provincial auditor; and,
(4) That he fails to do so for a period of two months after such account should be
rendered.
2. No
Nowhere in the provision does it require that there first be a demand before
an accountable officer is held liable for a violation of the crime. The law is very
clear. Where none is provided, the court may not introduce exceptions or conditions,
neither may it engraft into the law qualifications not contemplated. Where the law is
clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court
has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed. There is no room for
interpretation, but only application.
As correctly found by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was liable for violation of
Article 218 because it took him over six years before settling his accounts.
3. Yes
In malversation of public funds, the payment, indemnification, or
reimbursement of the funds misappropriated may be considered a mitigating
circumstance being analogous to voluntary surrender.Although this case does not
involve malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code but
rather failure to render an account under Article 218, the same reasoning may be
applied to the return or full restitution of the funds that were previously unliquidated
in considering the same as a mitigating circumstance in favor of Lumauig.
ROMEO R. ARAULLO vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al.
G.R. No. 194157, July 30, 2014, J. Reyes
Violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 has the following elements: (1) the
accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
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functions; (2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
inexcusable negligence; and (3) that his action caused any undue injury to any
party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
Applying the foregoing elements, the Ombudsman, in granting the motion to
quash, did not violate the said law considering that there could have been no undue
injury suffered by Araullo notwith-standing the labor officials rulings as he was not
left without any remedy to enforce the final judgment in his favor. The NLRCs
endorsement of his case to the arbitration branch of origin was merely for the
resolution of pending incidents in the case; to hear these matters first in order to
ensure that all the parties to the case were afforded due process.
Facts:
The records indicate that Araullo had previously obtained a favorable
judgment in a labor complaint for illegal dismissal which he filed against Club
Filipino. His labor complaint was initially dismissed by the Labor Arbiter (LA) whose
ruling was affirmed by the NLRC. Upon appeal, however, both the CA and the
Supreme Court ruled that Araullo was illegally dismissed from employment. Club
Filipino was then ordered to reinstate Araullo and to pay him his full backwages and
other monetary benefits.
Following the finality of the decision in his favor, Araullo filed with LA a
motion for issuance of a writ of execution. The issuance of the writ was questioned
by Club Filipino on the ground that it had filed a Motion to Recompute the judgment
award, which remained unresolved by the LA. Club Filipino then filed its Motion to
Quash the Writ of Execution.
Dissatisfied with the quashal of the writ, Araullo filed a petition to set aside
LA Annis order, which was denied. When Araullos motion for reconsideration was
denied by the NLRC, he filed with the Office of the Ombudsman the criminal
complaint against Respondents LA Anni, Chairman Nograles, Commissioner Go,
Commissioner Velasco, Atty. Tabao, Atty. De Leon and Atty. Balbin. He charged them
of violating Art. 206 of the RPC and Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Araullos charges were dismissed by the OMB. For the claim of violation of
R.A. No. 3019, the Office of the Ombudsman also found no probable cause given
Araullos failure to establish that the respondents to his complaint gave undue
advantage to Club Filipino, or that they acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or gross and inexcusable negligence.
Feeling aggrieved, Araullo filed this petition for certiorari to assail the OMBs
dismissal of his criminal complaint.
Issue:

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Whether or not the OMB violated Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 when it granted
the motion to quash filed by Club Filipino.
Ruling:
No.
A violation under this provision entails the following:
1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative,
judicial or official functions;
2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
inexcusable negli-gence; and
3) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
The second and third elements are wanting in this case. With the Courts
finding on the correctness of the LAs and NLRCs rulings, there could have been no
undue injury suffered by Araullo notwithstanding the mentioning that
notwithstanding the labor officials rulings, Araullo was not even left without any
remedy to enforce the final judgment in his favor. The NLRCs endorsement of his
case to the arbitration branch of origin was merely for the resolution of pending
incidents in the case. It was necessary to hear these matters first in order to ensure
that all the parties to the case were afforded due process.
There was also no showing that the labor officials actions were performed
with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence. Araullo failed
to prove that the respondents were impelled to act by any of such motives. The
records instead indicate that the labor officials only wanted to satisfy the demands
of law and their procedural rules.
Finally, the mere fact that Araullos counsel was not furnished with a copy of
Club Filipinos motion to quash the writ also failed to support Araullos criminal
complaint. As the Court had declared in Araullo, it appears that the apparent
failure of petitioner's counsel to be served with a copy of the assailed decision did
not prejudice Araullo's rights.
DIONISIO B. COLOMA, JR. vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 205561, September 24, 2014, J. Mendoza
Anent the third element of violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the
Sandiganbayan aptly explained: By making himself a signatory to the current
accounts and presenting a cost estimate significantly higher than that submitted by
Engineer Vacnot, the accused also caused undue injury to the PPSC when the latter
lost control of the funds for RTS 9, and only the authorized signatories could enter
into transactions with regard to the project. In this case, the Prosecution was able to
prove the existence of undue injury by giving a detailed background of the estimate
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for facilities and materials for the construction of the project. The substantial
difference between the cost estimate given by the accused and that of Engineer
Vacnot
caused
injury
to
the
government
in
the
amount
of
approximately PhP2,500,00000 becomes more evident in light of the fact that the
fifty capacity barracks have not been constructed.
Facts:
Coloma, the Director of the Philippine National Police Academy (PNPA), was
designated as Special Assistant and Action Officer to the Director, Logistics and
Installation Services (LIS) of the Philippine Public Safety College (PPSC). Then PPSC
President Ernesto B. Gimenez assigned Coloma to assist in the search for a suitable
construction site of the Philippine National Police Regional Training Site 9 Annex in
Bongao, Tawi-Tawi (RTS 9). The PPSC team including Coloma chose a four-hectare lot
formerly owned by one Juaini Bahad. The Engineering Division of the PPSC prepared
the graphical layout plan for the construction of the following: a) fifty-capacity
barracks; b) one (1) unit classroom; c) land development for the initial construction;
and d) administration building. The layout was approved by Gimenez. The funds for
the construction of RTS 9 came from the Congressional Development Fund (CDF) of
Tawi-Tawi Representative, Nur Jaafar. The same eventually formed part of PPSCs
capital
outlay.
The
approximate
cost
of
the
project
construction
was PhP5,727,278.59, but the said amount was not released in 1998. Thus, in 1999,
the amount became accounts payable and were released to creditors, namely:
New Alems Enterprise (the supplier for materials) in the amount
of PhP4,199,994.50; and A.C. Lim Construction (labor supplier) in the amount of
PhP1,800,005.50. Thereafter, Coloma was relieved by Atty. Ramsey Lapuz Ocampo,
the successor of Gimenez as PPSC President. Coloma was ordered to render a
termination report relative to his participation and observation in the construction of
RTS 9. Coloma submitted a report stating, among others, that: the land
development was 100% complete; the construction of the administration building
was 90% accomplished; and the construction of the fifty-capacity barracks and
classroom had just started and was expected to be completed by December 15,
2001. In the same report, Coloma allegedly attached the Deed of Donation signed
by Juaini Bahad in favor of the PPSC.
Subsequently, Ocampo ordered an investigation and instructed SPO4 Gilbert
Concepcion to conduct the same. In his report, SPO4 Concepcion discovered the
following irregularities: 1) the land development which Coloma reported to be 100%
completed referred only to the exact site where the administration building and the
one-unit classroom were erected; 2) only the administrative building with one-unit
classroom was erected; 3) the construction of the 50-capacity barracks which
Coloma reported to have been started was nowhere to be found; 4) the 50-capacity
mess hall had also been erected; 5) the appropriate cost of the facilities constructed
and the improvements made on the project was valued at around P3,150,000.00
only, contrary to what was reported by Coloma that the payment made for the
project was P5,722,278,29; 6) the payment made by the contractor and the supplier
of the construction materials was deposited at Land Bank Tawi-Tawi Branch under
current accounts booked with Coloma as joint depositor; and 7) contrary to
Colomas After-Mission Report stating that the value of the property on which the
training facilities were constructed was PhP1,500,000.00, the value of the property
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per hectare was only PhP9,730.00 as per a provincial ordinance of Tawi-Tawi fixing
the schedule of fair market value of real properties.
Coloma was indicted thru the information filed with the Sandiganbayan. The
prosecution presented, among others, Engr. Vacnot, as Project Evaluation Officer I of
the PPSC, who testified that the administration building approximately
cost PhP11,280,000.00, while the standard two-unit classroom and its comfort
rooms approximately cost PhP1,800,000.00. The Sandiganbayan found Coloma
guilty as charged. It found that all the essential elements of the crime of violation of
Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Issue:
Whether or not Colomas conviction for the crime of violation of Sec. 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019 was proper.
Ruling:
Yes, the conviction of Coloma is tenable under the circumstances.
Coloma was charged with the crime of violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
which has the following essential elements: (a) the accused must be a public officer
discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (b) he must have acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (c) his
action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions. As observed by the Sandiganbayan, all these elements exist in this case.
It is irrefutable that the first element is present. Coloma was undisputably the
Director of the PNPA at the time material to the charge against him. Apart from this,
he never denied his designation as the Special Assistant and Action Officer to the
Director of the LIS-PPSC. From the task of selecting the site for RTS 9 to the dealings
with the contractors for the project, this latter position signifies Colomas task to
oversee and administer the construction of RTS 9.
The second element of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed in three
ways, that is, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. Proof of any of these three in connection with the prohibited acts
mentioned in Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is enough to convict. Here, the results of the
ocular inspection clearly belie Colomas reports. While it may be conceded that
there was no averment of the entire projects completion, and that completion
may be susceptible of a subjective interpretation, it still perplexes the Court as to
why Coloma, a responsible officer in the administration of the multi-million peso
project, failed to provide a reliable and accurate description of the projects
accomplishment. The discrepancy between the results of the ocular inspection and
Colomas statements in his report was not a trivial matter that would merit
disregard.
Anent the third element, the Sandiganbayan aptly explained: By making
himself a signatory to the current accounts and presenting a cost estimate
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significantly higher than that submitted by Engineer Vacnot, the accused also
caused undue injury to the PPSC when the latter lost control of the funds for RTS 9,
and only the authorized signatories could enter into transactions with regard to the
project. In this case, the Prosecution was able to prove the existence of undue injury
by giving a detailed background of the estimate for facilities and materials for the
construction of the project. The substantial difference between the cost estimate
given by the accused and that of Engineer Vacnot caused injury to the government
in the amount of approximately PhP2,500,00000 becomes more evident in light of
the fact that the fifty capacity barracks have not been constructed.
VAN D. LUSPO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES/SUPT. ARTURO H.
MONTANO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES/C/INSP. SALLVADOR S. CURAN
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 188487 (consolidated), October 22, 2014, J. Nachura
In Cabrera vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court explained that there are two ways
for a public official to violate this provision in the performance of his functions,
namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the government; or (b)
by giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference. In
that case, [the Court] enumerated the essential elements of the offense, viz.: 1.
[t]he accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official
functions; 2. [h]e must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or
gross inexcusable negligence; and 3. [h]is action caused undue injury to any party,
including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions. It bears emphasis that
the charge against Luspos co-accused Domondon consisted of the same omissions.
Both offered similar documentary and testimonial pieces of evidence for their
exoneration, but the same were appreciated only in Domondons favor. The
Sandiganbayan shelved Luspos claim that he was authorized by Domondon to sign
the ASAs in the formers behalf, and tagged the same as self-serving and
unsubstantiated. In its consolidated comment, respondent People of the Philippines,
represented by the OMB through the OSP, harks back to the Sandiganbayans
conclusion and lobbies for its affirmation. The Court disagrees with the
Sandiganbayan. A perusal of the records the Sandiganbayans wherewithal
reveals the contrary and had the trial court expanded the range of its probing, it
would not have arrived at divergent conclusions regarding the two accused.
Facts:
Cesar P. Nazareno, being then the Director General; Guillermo T. Domondon,
Director for Comptrollership; Van D. Luspo, Chief, Fiscal Services and Budget
Division; Arturo H. Montano, Chief Comptroller, North CAPCOM and Salvador C.
Duran, Sr., Chief, Regional Finance Services Unit (RFSU), North CAPCOM, all of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) where charged with violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019. It appears that the PhP10,000,000.00 was released to DI-BEN Trading, MT
Enterprises, J-MOS Enterprises and Triple 888 Enterprises, all owned and operated
by Accused Margarita B. Tugaoen, purportedly for the purchase of combat, clothing
and individual equipment (CCIE) for use of North CAPCOM personnel, to which no
actual delivery of said CCIE items were ever effected by accused supplier Tugaoen.
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Subsequently, the filed, upon leave of court, a Consolidated Motion for
Demurrer to Evidence, arguing in the main, the inadmissibility, under the best
evidence rule, of the photocopies of the ASAs, the 100 checks, the original printout
of the full master list and detail list of the checks from the PHC, and the bank
statement prepared by the UCPB. The Information was dismissed as to Nazareno in
a resolution dated March 20, 2007 on account of his death. Domondon was also
exonerated because by virtue of the Delegation of Authority and Schedule of
Delegation issued by Nazareno. Sandiganbayan later convicted the accusedappellants.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is correct in convicting the accusedappellants.
Ruling:
Yes, the graft court should be upheld except as to its finding of conviction
against Luspo.
In Cabrera vs. Sandiganbayan, we explained that there are two ways for a
public official to violate this provision in the performance of his functions, namely:
(a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the government; or (b) by giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference. In that case,
we enumerated the essential elements of the offense, viz.: 1. [t]he accused must be
a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions; 2. [h]e must
have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence; and 3. his action caused undue injury to any party, including the
government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or
preference in the discharge of his functions.
It bears emphasis that the charge against Luspos Co-accused Domondon
consisted of the same omissions. Both offered similar documentary and testimonial
pieces of evidence for their exoneration, but the same were appreciated only in
Domondons favor. The Sandiganbayan shelved Luspos claim that he was
authorized by Domondon to sign the ASAs in the formers behalf, and tagged the
same as self-serving and unsubstantiated. In its consolidated comment, Respondent
People, represented by the OMB through the OSP, harks back to the
Sandiganbayans conclusion and lobbies for its affirmation. [The Court disagrees]
with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of the records and the Sandiganbayans
wherewithal reveals the contrary and had the trial court expanded the range of its
probing, it would not have arrived at divergent conclusions regarding the two
accused.
Generally, factual findings of the anti-graft court are conclusive upon the
Supreme Court, except where: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on
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misapprehension of facts and the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are
premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record.
The last instance attends in the instant case. Clear and unmistakable in the August
30, 1993 resolution of the OMB-AFP is the crucial detail that, on January 31, 1991,
Domondon issued a Memorandum delega-ting to Luspo and a certain Supt. Reynold
Osia the authority to sign for him (Domondon) and on his behalf, allotments for
personal services in the amount not exceeding Five Million Pesos (PhP5,000,000.00),
and in his absence, the amount of PhP20,000,000.00. This was, in fact, the hammer
that drove the nail and linked Domondon to the conspiracy theory advanced by the
prose-cution.
Lastly, the prosecution cannot link Luspo as a conspirator to defraud the
PNP/government on the strength merely of his signature, nor can a valid assumption
be made that he connived with Duran and Montano, who subsequently disbursed
the ASAs. Proof, not mere conjectures or assumptions, should be proffered to
indicate that the accused had taken part in the planning, preparation and
perpetration of the alleged conspiracy to defraud the government for, otherwise,
any careless use of the conspiracy theory (can) sweep into jail even innocent
persons who may have (only) been made unwitting tools by the criminal minds
really responsible for that irregularity.
Again, Luspo committed no prohibited act; neither did he violate any law,
rule, or internal order when he signed the ASAs. Logically, his signature in the ASAs
cannot be considered as an overt act in furtherance of one common design to
defraud the government. Given the above premises, the acquittal of Luspo is
inevitable.
Unfortunately, the immediately preceding disquisition does not apply to
Duran, Montano, and Tugaoen. Duran avers that his signing of the checks was a
mere ministerial act in compliance with Montanos directives and upon reliance on
the latters assurance that their issuance was supported by appropriate documents.
The contention has no merit. The 100 checks were made payable to only 4
enterprises at 25 checks each. This should have sounded alarm bells in the mind of
any reasonably judicious accountable officer, such as Duran, to inquire into the
veracity of the transaction concerned. But he did not even bother to demand that
the alleged supporting documents be forwarded to him, in conformity with
disbursement rules, to verify the legality or propriety of the claim.
To repeat, bad faith does not simply connote bad moral judgment or
negligence. It is a manifest deliberate intent on the part of an accused to do wrong
or to cause damage. There is nothing on record to show that Luspo was spurred by
any corrupt motive or that he received any material benefit when he signed the
ASAs.
Indeed, there is ample evidence proving beyond reasonable doubt that Duran
and Montano were propelled by evident bad faith in preparing and issuing 100
checks to facilitate a fictitious and fraudulent transaction and Tugaoen, in accepting
the checks and receiving their value without giving in exchange a single piece of
CCIE.
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Durans and Montanos palpable bias in favor of Tugaoen is shown by their
failure to support and justify the checks issued to Tugaoens enterprises with the
obligatory paper trail relative to the conduct of public bidding or any procurement
contract. As aptly discerned by the Sandiganbayan, the acts of Duran, Montano and
Tugaoen evince a bold and unabashed conspiracy scheme to defraud the
government of P10 million: The drawing of one hundred checks in the amount of
one hundred thousand pesos each by Duran and Montano, on that same day of
August 12, 1992, eloquently bespeaks of splitting of payments, too glaring to be
ignored. These one hundred checks could have been consolidated into four (4)
checks only considering that there were only four (4) business establishments with
which they claim to have transacted with.
There is likewise no proof that Luspo acted with palpable bias or favor
towards Tugaoen. The prosecution failed to show that it was Luspos duty to search
for, negotiate and contract with suppliers. The only deduction extant from the
prosecutions evidence is that, being then the Chief of the Fiscal Services and
Budget Division of the Office of the Directorate for Comptrollership, it was Luspos
duty to distribute the funds allocated to the PNP by the DBM by the issuance of an
ASA in favor of the forces regional commands. Once the funds were released from
his custody through the ASAs, his responsibility ceased and it then devolved upon
the recipients of the ASA to see to it that the funds were legally and properly
disbursed for the purpose for which they were released. He had no control over the
disbursement, and thus, he could not be blamed if the funds were eventually
expended for unauthorized or illegal purposes.
At any rate, even if the Court was to hold that the investigation conducted by
the PNP was custodial in nature, the improprieties that Tugaoen bewail would not
prevail against strong and overwhelming evidence showing her and her coconspirators guilt. Allegations of impropriety committed during custodial
investigation are material only when an extrajudicial admission or confession is the
basis of conviction. In the present case, the conviction of Montano, Duran, and
Tugaoen was not deduced solely from Tugaoens admission, but from the confluence
of evidence showing their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISISON ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) vs. THE
HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES, et al.
G.R. No. 206357, November 12, 2014, J. Velasco, Jr.
R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 11 provides that all offenses punishable under said law
shall prescribe in ten (10) years. This period was later increased to fifteen (15)
years with the passage of [BP Blg. 195], which took effect on March 16, 1982. This
does not mean, however, that the longer prescriptive period shall apply to all
violations of [R.A. No. 3019]. Following the Courts pronouncements in People vs.
Pacificador, the rule is that in the interpretation of the law on prescription of
crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is to be adopted. As such, the
longer prescriptive period of 15 years pursuant to BP Blg. 195 cannot be applied to
crimes committed prior to the effectivity of the said amending law on March 16,
1982. Considering that the crimes were committed in 1969, 1970, 1973, 1975, and
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1977, the applicable prescriptive period thereon is the ten-year period set in R.A.
No. 3019, the law in force at that time. Moreover, the prescriptive period
commences to run at the time of the discovery of the offense.
Facts:
Then-President Ramos issued an administrative order creating a Presidential
Ad-Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Ad Hoc Committee) who shall
investigate and study loans granted by government financing institutions that
amount to behest loans. One of the loan accounts referred to the Ad Hoc Committee
for investigation was that of Resorts Hotel Corporation (RHC).
Incorporated in 1968, RHC was 37.2% owned by Rodolfo Cuenca, a known
Marcos business associate. RHC obtained four loans from DBP totalling to PhP86.9
million. On the basis of the foregoing, the Ad Hoc Committee found that DBPs total
exposure as of 1986 amounted to PhP99.1 million. Subsequently, the Ad Hoc
Committee submitted a report to the President where it concluded that the RHC
account qualifies as behest in character anchored on the ground among others that
the officers of the borrower corporation are identified as Marcos cronies.
Consequently, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the PCGG, filed an
affidavit-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), against respondent
directors and officers of RHC and the directors of DBP for violations R.A. No. 3019 or
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Acting on the motion, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Order dismissing
the complaint on the ground of prescription stating that in as much as the record
indicates that the instant complaint was filed with the OMB office only on 6 January
2003, or more than ten (10) years from the time the crimes were discovered on 4
January 1993, the offenses charged herein had already prescribed.
Aggrieved, PCGG seeks recourse from the Court arguing that the offense has
not yet prescribed. PCGG insists that the prescriptive period should only commence
to run on January 6, 2003 when it filed the Affidavit-Complaint with the OMB, and
not on January 4, 1993 when the crimes were discovered. Moreover, he insists that
Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 3019 sets the prescription of offenses under said law at fifteen
(15) years, not ten (10) as held by the Ombudsman.
Issue:
Whether or not the affidavit-complaint of PCGG be dismissed on the ground of
prescription.
Ruling:
Yes, prescription has set-in for the alleged offenses of R.A. No. 3019.
R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 11 provides that all offenses punishable under said law
shall prescribe in ten (10) years. This period was later increased to fifteen (15) years
with the passage of BP Blg. 195, which took effect on March 16, 1982. This does not
mean, however, that the longer prescrip-tive period shall apply to all violations of
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[R.A. No. 3019]. Following [the Courts] pronouncements in People vs.
Pacificador, the rule is that in the interpretation of the law on prescription of
crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is to be adopted. As such, the
longer prescriptive period of 15 years pursuant to BP Blg. 195 cannot be applied to
crimes committed prior to the effectivity of the said amending law on March 16,
1982. Considering that the crimes were committed in 1969, 1970, 1973, 1975, and
1977, the applicable prescriptive period thereon is the ten-year period set in R.A.
No. 3019, the law in force at that time.
Going to the question of the reckoning point of the prescriptive period of
violations of R.A. No. 3019, an evaluation of jurisprudence on the matter reveals the
following guidelines:
1) As a general rule, prescription begins to run from the date of the
commission of the offense;
2) If the date of the commission of the violation is not known, it shall be
counted form the date of discovery thereof; and,
3) In determining whether it is the general rule or the exception that should
apply in a particular case, the availability or suppression of the information
relative to the crime should first be determined.
If the necessary information, data, or records based on which the crime could
be discovered is readily available to the public, the general rule applies. Prescription
shall, therefore, run from the date of the commission of the crime. Otherwise,
should martial law prevent the filing thereof or should information about the
violation be suppressed, possibly through connivance, then the exception applies
and the period of prescription shall be reckoned from the date of discovery thereof.
In the case at bar, involving as it does the grant of behest loans which the
Court had recognized as a violation that, by their nature, could be concealed from
the public eye by the simple expedient of suppressing their documentation, the
second mode applies. The Court, therefore, counts the running of the prescriptive
period from the date of discovery thereof on January 4, 1993, when the Ad Hoc
Committee reported to the President its findings and conclusions anent RHCs loans.
This being the case, the filing by the PCGG of its Affidavit-Complaint before the
Office of the Ombudsman on January 6,2003, a little over ten (10) years from the
date of discovery of the crimes, is clearly belated. Undoubtedly, the ten-year period
within which to institute the action has already lapsed, making it proper for the
Ombudsman to dismiss PCGGs complaint on the ground of prescription. Simply put,
and as correctly held by the Ombudsman, prescription has already set in when
PCGG filed the Affidavit-Complaint on January 6, 2003.
ALEJANDRO C. RIVERA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 156577 (consolidated), December 03, 2014, J. Mendoza
The Court held that there are two ways by which a public official violates Sec.
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the performance of his functions, namely: by causing undue
injury to any party, including the Government; or by giving any private party any
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. The Court found that the petitioners
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committed undue injury to the government and gave unwarranted benefits to PAL
Boat through manifest partiality. The manifest reluctance to hold a public bidding
and award the contract to the winning bidder indicates of favoritism and partiality
toward PAL Boat. Petitioners pre-qualified PAL Boat despite its financial inability to
undertake the project. They also did not impose retention money and taxes against
PAL Boat, to the detriment of the government. The government was obligated to
use more funds and effort to rehabilitate the vessels.
Facts:
A MOA was entered into by the DoH, the DPWH, DILG, and the Development
Coordinating Councils for Leyte and Samar, for the construction of riverine boats to
be used as floating clinics. The construction of seven units of these floating clinics
was proposed for the delivery of health care services to the remote barangays in
Samar and Leyte. The DOH Region VIII entered into a negotiated contract with PAL
Boat Industry, managed by Engineer Norberto Palanas, with a contract price of
PhP700,000.00.
An anonymous letter from a concerned citizen was sent to the Office of the
Ombudsman, stating that there were small white boats for the DOH in a small
shipyard within their neighborhood. It further stated that the boats were built many
months ago but they had been left rotting on land, not on water. It asked why the
boats were not delivered to the DOH. The officials of the various agencies were
directed to answer the complaint.
The COA conducted a technical-financial audit on the project. Internal Auditor
Luz Ramos reported the anomalies in the floating clinics project. The COA
recommended the filing of criminal information for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against Montero, Perez, Rivera, Soriano
and Elazegui. The case against Elazegui was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
After trial, the Sandiganbayan found Montero, Perez and Rivera guilty of the crime
charged but acquitted Soriano for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
As to the essential elements of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, Sandiganbayan
was satisfied that these were substantiated by the COA Audit Report which stated
that the accused failed to withhold the 10% retention money, 1% withholding tax
and 2% contractors tax on the first three progress payments. The government
could have had PhP47,590.20 retention money and PhO6,191.50 taxes, in the total
amount of PhP53,781.70. These reflect a clear undue injury dealt to the
government. The retention money could have been added to the balance of PhP70,000.00 as an additional security in the performance of the contract. Also, the
failure to withhold these amounts, at the very least, showed gross negligence.
Issue:
Whether or not the conviction of the petitioners for violating R.A. No. 3019 is
proper.

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Ruling:
Yes, the Court affirmed the conviction.
The petitioners violated Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The essential elements of
such crime are as follows: (1) The accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) The accused must have acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) The
action of the accused caused undue injury to any party, including the government,
or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of the functions of the accused.
The Court held that there are two ways by which a public official violates Sec.
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the performance of his functions, namely: (1) by causing
undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (2) by giving any private
party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.
The accused may be charged under either mode or both. The disjunctive term
or connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019.It is not enough that undue injury was caused or unwarranted benefits were
given as these acts must be performed through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
Partiality is synonymous with bias which excites a disposition to see and
report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are. Bad faith does not
simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty
through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. Gross
negligence has been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of even
slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to
consequences in so far as other persons may be affected.
The Court found that the petitioners (1) committed undue injury to the
government and (2) gave unwarranted benefits to PAL Boat through manifest
partiality.
The Court rules that the petitioners gave unwarranted benefits to PAL Boat
and its manager, Palanas, especially in its pre-qualification. The word unwarranted
means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized or without
justification or adequate reason. Advantage means a more favorable or improved
position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of
action. Preference signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or
estimation above another.
PAL Boat was not financially and technically capable of undertaking the
floating clinics project. Petitioners knew that and still awarded the project to PAL
Boat. They also failed to follow the proper procedure and documentations in

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awarding a negotiated contract. These unwarranted benefits were due to the
manifest partiality exhibited by them in numerous instances.
Under P.D. No. 1594, infrastructure projects are awarded in the order of
priority as follows: First, by public bidding and second by a negotiated contract.
Resort to negotiated contract, however, is permitted only after a failure of public
bidding. The implementing rules are clear as to when there is a failure of public
bidding. Thus, if no bid is acceptable in accordance with the implementing rules
during the first bidding, the project should again be advertised for a second bidding
and in the event the second bidding fails anew, a negotiated contract may be
undertaken.
As admitted by Montero, they never conducted the public bidding. So there
can never be a failure of bidding when there is no public bidding to begin with.
According to Montero, it would be futile to conduct public bidding if Palanas was the
only qualified participant. The Court agreed with Sandiganbayan that he should
have instead published a region-wide invitation to bid. And even assuming that
Palanas was the only naval architect and marine engineer in Region VIII or in the
whole Visayas Region, a public bidding must still be conducted. It was only after
conducting the required public bidding that it could be fully verified that PAL Boat
was the only qualified bidder.
The manifest reluctance to hold a public bidding and award the contract to
the winning bidder indicates of favoritism and partiality toward PAL Boat.
Perez pre-qualified PAL Boat despite its financial inability to undertake the
project, and his knowledge that PAL Boat had more liabilities than capital. The
purpose of pre-qualification in any public bidding is to determine, at the earliest
opportunity, the ability of the bidder to undertake the project. Thus, with respect to
the bidder's financial capacity at the pre-qualification stage, the government
agency must examine and determine the ability of the bidder to fund the entire cost
of the project by considering the maximum amounts that each bidder may invest in
the project at the time of pre-qualification.
Liquid assets of a prospective contractor are specifically required so that the
contractor can easily comply with the project, despite some delay in the progress
payments. In this case, the alleged 1,200-square meter lot of PAL Boat was an
unliquidated asset and should not have been considered in determining its financial
capability. As found by the Sandiganbayan, PAL Boat did not have the working
capital to augment whatever routinary delay that may occur in the release of funds.
There were also other dubious findings on PAL Boat. The Sandiganbayan
found that PAL Boat did not have a business license despite its operation since
1982. It was only one week after the negotiated contract was approved when it
applied for a business permit. These glaring circumstances should have warned
Perez to disqualify PAL Boat as a bidder. Perez also failed to publish the notice
invitation to bid. His lone testimony that he had posted such notices was selfserving absent any other proof.

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Rivera was also held liable for recommending the pre-qualification of Palanas
based on the documents submitted. As part of the technical staff, he should have
followed the Implementing Rules and Regulations by requiring Palanas to submit the
detailed engineering documents consisting of design standards, field surveys,
contract plans, quantities, special provisions, unit prices, agency estimate,
bid/tender documents, and program work. The inadequate submission of these
documents led to the improper monitoring of the project.
Rivera failed to submit the proper documents for technical evaluation within
five days from the perfection of the negotiated contract. An inquiry as to the
reasons for noncompliance initially revealed that the agency did not conduct the
detailed engineering works. If the contract underwent technical evaluation, the
corrective measures for defects could have been made. As there was lack of proper
basis for evaluation, the petitioners merely relied on ocular inspections, which were
insufficient to properly monitor the project.
The Court ruled that all these circumstances taken together clearly
demonstrate the manifest partiality of the petitioners towards PAL Boat, giving the
latter unwarranted benefits to obtain the government project.
Petitioners also caused undue injury to the government through their
continuing and manifest partiality towards PAL Boat.
Undue injury in the context of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 should be equated
with that civil law concept of actual damage. Unlike in actions for torts, undue
injury in Sec. 3(e) cannot be presumed even after a wrong or a violation of a right
has been established. Its existence must be proven as one of the elements of the
crime. In fact, the causing of undue injury or the giving of any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence constitutes the very act punished under this section. Thus, it
is required that the undue injury be specified, quantified and proven to the point of
moral certainty.
The total contract price was PhP700,000.00. The DOH, however, only paid
PhP630,000.00 because, upon the discovery by the new Regional Director Ortiz of
the defects of the vessels, Palanas was required to conduct repairs. Still he failed to
do so. Ortiz formally severed the contract of PAL Boat and did not anymore pay the
remaining balance of PhP70,000.00.
The retention money, according to the then IRR of P.D. No. 1594, is the
amount retained, at a rate of 10%, in every progress payment. Retention money is a
form of security which seeks to ensure that the work is satisfactorily done and on
schedule. It is withheld by the procuring entity from progress payments due to the
contractor to guarantee indemnity for uncorrected discovered defects and thirdparty liabilities in infrastructure projects.
The P53,781.70 was the retention money and taxes that should have been
retained by the petitioners in every progress payment. It is completely different
from the PhP70,000.00 balance of the project which Regional Director Ortiz refused
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to pay to PAL Boat. They came from different sources but could have been both
used for the same purpose of repairing the vessels. The petitioners chose not to
impose retention money and taxes against PAL Boat, to the detriment of the
Government.
Perez contended that what was important was that the vessels were
delivered to the riverside barangays of Samar and Leyte. The vessels, however,
were not correctly built by PAL Boat and the government even had to spend
additional funds to rehabilitate them. The defects were only discovered when
Director Ortiz came into office. Were it not for his intervention, the petitioners would
have probably continued the anomalous contract with PAL Boat. The final delivery of
the floating clinics to the end-users was not due to the proficiency of PAL Boat, as
the contract was already terminated. The government was obligated to use more
funds and effort to rehabilitate the vessels. The petitioners could not certainly use
the fact of completion of the floating clinics to avoid criminal liability.
The Court held that the criminal design still exists despite Soriano's acquittal,
because all the petitioners were involved in pre-qualifying PAL Boat. Rivera
recommended the pre-qualification of PAL Boat, which was approved by Perez and
then Montero eventually entered into a negotiated contract with it. Hence, the unity
of criminal design and execution was very patent.
ALEX M. VALENCERINA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 206162, December 10, 2014, J. Mendoza
The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan in finding Valencerina guilty of
violating Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 based upon the pieces of evidence presented by
the prosecution. In finding Valencerina guilty of giving undue advantage or
preference to Ecobel, in violation of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, the Sandiganbayan was convinced that the elements of the crime were duly
established.
In this case, Valencerina clearly extended, with evident bad faith, undue
advantage to Ecobel in the process of issuing and negotiating the subject bond. His
act of endorsing Ecobels application to the PGM despite his knowledge that the
obligee of the loan was not PVB but a foreign lender, clearly shows his disregard for
the policy of GSIS requiring the existence of governmental interest in the
transaction. In the observation of the GSIS audit team, as it appeared in a report
before the Sandiganbayan, PVB was merely used to show that GSIS has an
insurable interest in the loan. The truth, however, is that BSIL was the funder and
obligee of the credit sought to be guaranteed by the bond.
Facts:
Sometime in October 1997, Ecobel, represented by its Chairman and Accused
Josephine Boright, applied for the issuance of a bond with GSIS to guarantee the
repayment of a loan in the amount of US$10,000,000.00, supposedly obtained from
the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) and allegedly for the construction of a 26-storey
commercial/residential Ecobel Condominium. On January 27, 1998, a memorandum
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was prepared by Petitioner Valencerina upon the instructions of Accused Mallari,
who was then the SVP of the GSIS General Insurance Group. It contained an
endorsement of Ecobels bond for evaluation of the GSIS Investment Committee. It
also included Mallaris strong recommendation through a marginal note with the
words Strong reco. Based on info & collateral herein stated. On March 10, 1998,
the GSIS Investment Committee approved the subject bond. In a certification, dated
January 14, 1999, it was made to appear that the bond was a genuine, valid and
binding obligation of GSIS. Eventually, Accused Estela J. Edralin, as a representative
of Ecobel, signed on February 4, 1999 a Term Loan Agreement with Bear Stearns
Interna-tional, Ltd. The following month, Ecobel made a drawdown from the loan in
the amount of US$9,307,000.00. In a letter, dated March 7, 2000, URSA Minor
Limited, the assignee of BSIL, demanded payment from Ecobel. A notice of failure
was sent by Bankers Trust, informing GSIS of Ecobels failure to pay the obligation
which became due on March 9, 2001. On April 5, 2000, Aon Financial Products, Inc.,
also a subsequent assignee of BSIL, sent a Notice of Demand to the then Secretary
of Finance, calling on the guarantee of the Republic under the subject bond.
Thus, for having participated in, or contributed to the release or issuance of
the subject surety bond, an Information was filed before the Sandiganbayan, against
Valencerina, along with Campaa, Mallari, Leticia G. Bernardo, Edralin, and Boright,
for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Sandiganbayan found that
Valencerina must have known that Ecobel could not be given such bond to
guarantee payment of a loan obtained from foreign entities because his position
entailed knowledge of the fact that GSIS could only issue a guarantee payment
bond if the government had an interest therein. Yet, despite this rule and his
knowledge that the obligee was not actually PVB, as misrepresented by Ecobel, but
a foreign funder, Valencerina still submitted the application to the PGM for the
evaluation of the Investment Committee. The Sandiganbayan took this as proof of
the presence of the element of the offense: that Valencerina acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence in giving unwarranted
benefits in favor of Ecobel.
Valencerina and Mallari separately moved for reconsideration, but their
motions were subsequently denied by the Sandiganbayan in its March 1, 2013
Resolution.
Issue:
Whether or not the complained act of giving unwarranted benefit, preference
or advantage in favor of Ecobel with manifest impartiality, evident bad faith or gross
negligence was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
Yes, some of the badges of graft enumerated under Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 3019
were duly proven in the instant case warranting the conviction of the Valencerina.
It must be emphasized that irregularities did occur in the issuance of the
subject bond. These irregularities were adequately proved by the testimonies of
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both the prosecution and the defense, together with the documentary evidence
presented before the Sandiganbayan that the security bond was issued without
the adequate collaterals; that it was used to guarantee a high-risk foreign loan
which was disqualified for lack of government interest in it; that it was issued
without the approval of the Board of Trustees as required by GSIS for high-risk
bonds; that it was issued without the premium for reinsurance being paid; and that
Ecobel received undue benefits as it was able to make a drawdown from the loan by
reason of the guarantee under the subject bond. It is also quite clear that the issues
surrounding the Ecobel bond had exposed the government to unwarranted risks,
which could have been avoided had steps been taken to consciously follow the
policies of GSIS.
It is in this light that Valencerina was tried. His participation in the issuance of
the subject bond was put to test to determine whether he violated Sec. 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019.
The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan in finding Valencerina guilty of
violating Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 based upon the pieces of evidence presented by
the prosecution. In finding Valencerina guilty of giving undue advantage or
preference to Ecobel, in violation of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, the Sandiganbayan was convinced that the elements of the crime were duly
established.
In this case, Valencerina clearly extended, with evident bad faith, undue
advantage to Ecobel in the process of issuing and negotiating the subject bond. His
act of endorsing Ecobels application to the PGM despite his knowledge that the
obligee of the loan was not PVB but a foreign lender, clearly shows his disregard for
the policy of GSIS requiring the existence of governmental interest in the
transaction. In the observation of the GSIS audit team, as it appeared in a report
before the Sandiganbayan, PVB was merely used to show that GSIS has an insurable
interest in the loan. The truth, however, is that BSIL was the funder and obligee of
the credit sought to be guaranteed by the bond.
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
PARRICIDE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROY SAN GASPAR
G.R. No. 180496, April 2, 2014, J. Del Castillo
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed (2) the deceased is killed
by the accused (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate
or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the
legitimate spouse of the accused. In this case, the prosecution was able to
satisfactorily establish that the victim, who is the legitimate spouse of Roy San
Gaspar, was shot and killed by the latter based on the eyewitnesses account, there
being no showing that said eyewitnesses were impelled by any ill motive to testify
against him.
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Facts:
On June 2, 2000, Roy San Gaspar (Roy) was charged with the crime of
Parricide under Article 246 of the RPC in an Information. For the prosecution, the
following witnesses testified: Joramel Estimo (Joramel) and Cherme Estimo
(Cherme), children of the victim Imelda E. San Gaspar (Imelda) and stepchildren of
Roy; and Dr. Flocerpida V. Jocson (Dr. Jocson), the Municipal Health Officer who
conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim, among others. Their collective
testimonies are summarized as follows:
In the afternoon of April 25, 1999, Roy, without informing his lawfully married
wife Imelda, went to Norala, South Cotabato together with his father to attend the
funeral of a relative. At that time, Roy and Imelda were not on speaking terms for
about a week already. At around 11:30 p.m. of the same day and while Imelda and
her two children Joramel and Cherme were already fast asleep, Roy returned home
and pounded on their front door. Apparently, Roy was mad because nobody
immediately opened the door for him. He got even more furious when he entered
the house and saw Imelda sleeping sidebyside with her grownup children. Roy thus
kicked Imelda on the leg while she was still lying on the floor and this started a
heated altercation between them.
Still enraged, Roy went upstairs and returned with a .12 gauge shotgun. He
loaded it and lit a kerosene lamp which he placed near the door of their room. He
then aimed the .12 gauge shotgun at his wife and in front of Joramel and Cherme,
shot Imelda on the head. Roy thereafter immediately ran away. Imelda was brought
to Sultan Kudarat Provincial Hospital where she passed away.
Dr. Jocson, conducted an autopsy on Imeldas body. According to the Autopsy
Report, Imelda suffered a fatal gunshot wound on the front left side of her head
which penetrated her brain tissue with a depth of six inches. Gunpowder residue
surrounded the entry wounds, an indication that Imelda was shot at closerange.
The defense, on the other hand, presented the following witnesses: Librada
San Gaspar, the mother of Roy Vicente Martinez, the owner of the tricycle used in
transporting Imelda to the hospital and Roy himself. Their testimonies are
summarized as follows:
In the morning of April 25, 1999, Roy went to Norala, South Cotabato with his
father to attend the funeral of a relative. It was already around 11:00 p.m. when Roy
came home. But as he pushed the door to enter their room, he heard a gunshot
from a .12 gauge shotgun. Since it was dark, Roy rushed downstairs to fetch a lamp
to see what had just happened. With a lit lamp, he saw Imelda lying on the floor
drenched in her own blood. Joramel and Cherme were beside her crying. Roy thus
immediately went out of their house to look for a tricycle to transport Imelda to the
hospital.
From the above narration, the defense postulates that when Roy pushed the
door open, it hit the shotgun, causing it to accidentally discharge and hit Imelda.

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The RTC convicted Roy of the crime of Parricide. It relied on the testimonies of
the witnesses for the prosecution particularly, Joramel and Cherme. Having
witnessed the shooting incident, both of them positively identified Roy as the
person who shot their mother, Imelda. On the other hand, the RTC found Roys
defense of denial doubtful and unreliable. It further held that denial is a weak
defense and that the same cannot prevail over the eyewitnesses positive
identification of Roy as the culprit.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, with modification as to the award for
damages. It held that since Roy asserted that the shooting was accidental, it was
incumbent upon him to prove the existence of the elements of the exempting
circumstance of accident. However, he failed to discharge this burden. Furthermore,
Roys version of the circumstances leading to Imeldas death was incredulous.
Contrary to his claim of accidental firing of the shotgun, the trajectory of the
gunshot and the gunpowder burns around Imeldas wound suggest that the
shooting was intentional.
Issue:
Whether or not Roy San Gaspar is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Parricide.
Ruling:
Yes. Roy is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide.
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed (2) the deceased is killed
by the accused (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate
or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the
legitimate spouse of the accused.
In this case the prosecution was able to satisfactorily establish that Imelda
was shot and killed by Roy based on the eyewitnesses account. Joramel and
Cherme positively and categorically identified Roy as the one who shot and killed
Imelda. Their testimonies corroborated each other on material details. Moreover,
there is no showing that Joramel and Cherme were impelled by any ill motive to
testify against Roy. It has been held that in the absence of any ill motives on the
part of the witnesses, their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit. On the
other hand, Roy only offered his bare denial of the offense. However, [t]he Court
had consistently stressed that denial, like alibi, is a weak defense that becomes
even weaker in the face of positive identification of the accused by prosecution
witnesses.
Clearly, all the elements of the crime of Parricide under Article 246 of the RPC
are present in this case.
While Roy describes the prosecutions version of events as unnatural,
implausible, and contrary to human nature and experience, the Court finds that it
is his story of accidental discharge of the shotgun that is incredulous and
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unbelievable. Contrary to what Roy wants this Court to believe, a .12 gauge shotgun
will not go off unless it is loaded, cocked, and its trigger squeezed. To this Court,
Roys allegation is nothing but a selfserving statement without an ounce of proof or
a lick of credibility. Moreover, the same does not jibe with the result of the autopsy
conducted on Imeldas body.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GEORGE ZAPATA y VIANA
G.R. No. 197046, July 21, 2014, J. Del Castillo
In the crime of parricide, only the following elements need to be satisfactorily
established: (1) the death of the deceased (2) that he or she was killed by the
accused and (3) that the deceased was a legitimate ascendant or descendant, or
the legitimate spouse of the accused. In this case, all these elements have been
proven beyond doubt. Moreover, there is no doubt that the accused George Zapata
intentionally killed his wife the shooting was not accidental. Both the trial court and
the appellate court correctly found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of parricide. His claim that he accidentally pulled the trigger while attempting to
catch the same when it fell from the cabinet is incredible.
Facts:
The accused George Zapata y Viana (Zapata) was charged with the crime of
parricide. Zapata entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned.
On May 11, 2002, around 3 oclock in the afternoon, Zapata was having a
drinking spree with his brother Manny Zapata and his cousin Edwin Bautista in their
family home in Rodriguez, Rizal. After several hours of continuous alcohol splurge or
at around 7 oclock in the evening, a gunshot was heard emanating from the
bedroom of George Zapata and his wife Queeny. It appears that Zapata killed his
wife Queeny using his .45 caliber pistol with a single gunshot fired at close range at
Queenys chest. Zapata brought Queenys bloodied body to the sala. Seconds later,
Edwin immediately left Zapatas house and proceeded to the house of his brother
nearby while Manny likewise went to the house of their cousin next door. Zapata
fled from the scene of the crime without seeking help for his wife. Queeny was left
alone in the sala soaked in her very own blood.
The same gunshot alerted Zapatas neighbors. Queenys body was later
discovered and brought to the Amang Rodriguez Medical Center.
During trial, Zapata claimed that the shooting of his wife was accidental. He
alleged that he wanted to show his gun to his cousin but it fell when he tried to
retrieve the gun from the cabinet. In his attempt to catch the gun, he accidentally
squeezed the trigger hitting his wife in the process.
The trial court did not lend credence to his contentions. On the contrary, it
found that based on the evidence presented, Zapata deliberately pulled the trigger
of his gun and shot his wife. Thus, the trial court rendered judgment finding Zapata
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide.
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Aggrieved, Zapata filed a Notice of Appeal. Just like the trial court, the Court
of Appeals found that the evidence presented satisfactorily showed that Zapata
intentionally shot his wife.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused George Zapata is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of parricide.
Ruling:
Yes. The accused George Zapata is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of parricide.
In the crime of parricide, only the following elements need to be satisfactorily
established: (1) the death of the deceased (2) that he or she was killed by the
accused and (3) that the deceased was a legitimate ascendant or descendant, or
the legitimate spouse of the accused. All these elements have been proven beyond
doubt.
There is no doubt that Zapata intentionally killed his wife the shooting was
not accidental. Zapatas claim that he accidentally pulled the trigger while
attempting to catch the same when it fell from the cabinet is incredible. First,
Zapata was a former Corporal in the Philippine Marines and is thus assumed to
know and undertake all safety precautions in storing his firearm. In this case,
Zapata apparently threw caution to the wind when he placed the gun on top of a
cabinet and not inside a locked drawer or cabinet. Second, the gun was loaded.
Third, the gun is equipped with several safety measures. Interestingly, all these
safety measures were not in place at the time of the shooting making Zapatas
claim of accident highly unbelievable. Fourth, the trajectory of the bullet and the
point of entry negate Zapatas claim that he pressed the trigger when the gun fell
on the floor. If the shot came from the floor where the gun allegedly fell, the shot
should have been in an upward direction. However, as testified to by the medicolegal officer, the bullets point of entry was at the breast region and it exited at the
lower back of the body. In short, the assailant was in front of the victim and the shot
was directed posteriorwards.
Moreover, Zapatas actions immediately after the shooting is contrary to his
assertion that he did not intend to harm his wife. Indeed, if the shooting was
accidental, Zapata would have immediately sought help from his relatives and
neighbors to bring the victim to the hospital. Instead, he just left her sitting on a
chair soaked in her blood. Zapata would not have become alarmed by the arrival of
the police authorities. Instead, he fled from the crime scene leaving his neighbors to
tend to his bleeding wife.
MURDER/HOMICIDE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANTE DULAY
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G.R. No. 194629, April 21, 2014, J. Reyes
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was
somewhere else when the offense was committed and that he was so far away that
it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime
or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. Hence, when the accused
was not able to prove that he was in a certain place when the crime was
committed, and the witness positively identified him as the assailant, the denial and
alibi are weak defenses, which cannot prevail against positive identification.
Facts:
In the evening of 30 December 2002 at around 6:30, Orlando Jr. (or simply
Junior), a child about six years of age, was outside the kitchen of their house
located in Ligaya, Aglipay, Province of Quirino. His father, the late Orlando Sr., was
also somewhere in the yard. Wondering why the dog was barking loudly, Mrs.
Engracia Legaspi peeped from inside the kitchen and noticed Dulays dog in the
vicinity. She surmised that its master, Dulay, was also present. Juniors elder sister,
Melanie went out to look for the dogleash to transfer the mutt to another area.
Using the flashlight he was constantly prohibited from playing with, Junior
directed a beam towards the grassy area where he discovered Dulay whom he
recognized because of the characteristic mumps below his left ear. Melanie also
saw Dulay as he was staring at Orlando Sr. Their uncle Dante suddenly threw
something that resembled a ball, towards the cemented part of the yard. It turned
out to be a grenade, and it landed about seven meters from where Junior and his
father were. Junior was hurt in his pelvic area, while his father was fatally hit by
shrapnel, causing his death. Dulay then went away on his bicycle towards the
direction of his house.
In the early morning, three of the male neighbors searched and found a
grenade safety lever, along with a tornout pair of rubber shoes in the road near
Dulays house. Examining the rubber shoes which turned out to belong to the latter,
the three men further recovered a grenade ring pin from inside the left shoe.
The RTC found Dulay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
Murder with Attempted Murder. The CA affirmed the conviction with modification.
The CA convicted Dulay of the complex crime of murder and frustrated murder.
Issue:
Whether or not Dulay should be held liable of the crimes charged.
Ruling:
Yes, he should.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, Dulay must prove that he was somewhere
else when the offense was committed and that he was so far away that it was not
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possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or at its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. Since Dulay was not able to prove
that he was in Dibul when the crime was committed, both the CA and the RTC were
correct in disregarding his alibi. Junior and Melanie, Juniors elder sister, on the other
hand, have both positively identified Dulay as the assailant. On this score, this Court
has held in a number of cases that denial and alibi are weak defenses, which cannot
prevail against positive identification.
As regards the crime committed against Junior, the Court is in accord with the
CAs conclusion that Dulay is guilty of frustrated murder. The requisites of a
frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution
which would produce the felony; and (2) that the felony is not produced due to
causes independent of the perpetrators will.
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, Dulay has performed all acts of
execution in throwing the grenade which could have caused Juniors death as a
consequence, but because of immediate medical assistance, a cause independent
of Dulays will, Junior survived.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANILO FELICIANO, JR., et al.
G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014, J. Leonen
For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the
employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity
to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately
or consciously adopted. The victims in this case were eating lunch on campus. They
were not at a place where they would be reasonably expected to be on guard for
any sudden attack by rival fraternity men. The victims, who were unarmed, were
also attacked with lead pipes and baseball bats. The only way they could parry the
blows was with their arms. In a situation where they were unnamed and
outnumbered, it would be impossible for them to fight back against the attackers.
The attack also happened in less than a minute, which would preclude any
possibility of the bystanders being able to help them until after the incident. The
swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for the victims to
retaliate or even to defend themselves. Treachery, therefore, was present in this
case.
Facts:
On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7)
members of the Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House
Canteen, near the Main Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, when
they were attacked by several masked men carrying baseball bats and lead pipes.
Some of them sustained injuries that required hospitalization. One of them, Dennis
Venturina, died from his injuries.
An information for murder was filed against several members of the Scintilla
Juris fraternity, namely, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor L. Medalla, Warren L.
Zingapan, Robert Michael Beltran Alvir, Christopher L. Soliva, Reynaldo G. Ablanida,
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Carlo Jolette Fajardo, George Morano, Raymund E. Narag, Gilbert Merle Magpantay,
Benedict Guerrero, and Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. with the RTC.
The RTC found Alvir, Feliciano, Jr., Soliva, Medalla, and Zingapan guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder and were sentenced to,
among other penalties, the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellants Feliciano, et al. were correctly charged
with murder and there was treachery in the commission of the crime
Ruling:
Yes, according to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
accused-appellants were correctly charged with murder. Article 248 states:
ART. 248. Murder.-Any person who, not falling within the provisions of
Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid
of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of
means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
xxxx
It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, a group of men armed with lead
pipes and baseball bats attacked Dennis Venturina and his companions, which
resulted in Venturina's death. As correctly found by the trial court and the appellate
court, the offense committed against Dennis Venturina was committed by a group
that took advantage of its superior strength and with the aid of armed men. The
appellate court, however, incorrectly ruled out the presence of treachery in the
commission of the offense.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the
attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner,
affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape. For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur:
(1) the employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no
opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and
(2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.

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The appellate court, in affirming the conviction of the accused-appellants
Feliciano, ruled that contrary to the findings of the trial court, there was no
treachery involved. In particular, they ruled that although the attack was sudden
and unexpected, "it was done in broad daylight with a lot of people who could see
them" and that "there was a possibility for the victims to have fought back or that
the people in the canteen could have helped the victims."
This reasoning is clearly erroneous. The victims in this case were eating lunch
on campus. They were not at a place where they would be reasonably expected to
be on guard for any sudden attack by rival fraternity men.
The victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead pipes and
baseball bats. The only way they could parry the blows was with their arms. In a
situation where they were unnamed and outnumbered, it would be impossible for
them to fight back against the attackers. The attack also happened in less than a
minute, which would preclude any possibility of the bystanders being able to help
them until after the incident.
The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for the
victims to retaliate or even to defend themselves. Treachery, therefore, was present
in this case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGER RINGOR UMAWID
G.R. No. 208719, June 9, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
The defense of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance because
an accused invoking the same admits to have committed the crime but claims that
he or she is not guilty because of such insanity. Minor children, who by reason of
their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. Thus, when an adult
person illegally attacks a minor, treachery exists.
Two (2) conditions must concur for treachery to be appreciated: first, the
employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity
to defend himself or to retaliate; and, second, the means of execution was
deliberate or consciously adopted
The Court agrees in this case with the findings of the RTC and the CA that
treachery was attendant in the killing of Maureen. The facts of this case show that
Umawid suddenly appeared at the terrace of Vicentes house and started attacking
Vicente with panabas. However, the latter was able to evade Umawids attacks,
resulting in Maureen being inadvertently hit and killed in the process. While it was
not shown that Umawid consciously employed treachery so as to insure the death
of Maureen, who was then just two (2) years old at the time, it is well to reiterate
that the killing by an adult of a minor child is treacherous, and thus, qualifies
Maureens killing to Murder.
Facts:

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On November 26, 2002, Vicente Ringor (Vicente) was staying with his two (2)year old granddaughter, Maureen Joy Ringor (Maureen), at the terrace of their house
located at Villanueva, San Manuel, Isabela. Suddenly, Umawid appeared and started
attacking Vicente with a panabas with neither reason nor provocation. While Vicente
was able to evade Umawids blows, the latter nevertheless hit Maureen on her
abdomen and back, causing her instantaneous death. Upon seeing Maureen
bloodied, Umawid walked away.
Thereafter, Umawid went to a nearby house which was only five (5) meters
away from Vicentes house where his nephew, Jeffrey R. Mercado (Jeffrey), was
sleeping. Awakened by the commotion, Jeffrey went outside only to see his uncle
charging at him with his panabas. Instinctively, Jeffrey, along with his sister and
cousin, rushed inside the house to seek for safety. However, Umawid was able to
prevent Jeffrey from closing the door of the house, and the former was able to barge
into the said house. Jeffrey crouched and covered his head with his arms to shield
him from Umawids impending attacks. Eventually, Umawid delivered fatal hacking
blows to Jeffrey, causing the mutilation of the latters fingers. When Jeffrey
pretended to be dead, Umawid stopped his barrage.
Umawid set up the defense of insanity, but did not, however, take the witness
stand to attest to the same. Instead, he presented the testimonies of Dr. Quincina
and Dr. Juliana to bolster his claim. Dr. Quincina testified that he evaluated
Umawids psychiatric condition in May 2002, February 2003, and on March 24, 2003
and found that the latter was manifesting psychotic symptoms. However, he could
not tell with certainty whether Umawid was psychotic at the time of the commission
of the crimes. On the other hand, Dr. Juliana failed to testify on Umawids mental
state since she merely referred the latter to another doctor for further evaluation.
RTC found Umawid guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder of
Maureen and was also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Frustrated Murder of Jeffrey. The RTC held that Umawid committed the acts
complained of in the informations and that they were done in a treacherous manner,
considering that Maureen was only two (2) years old at the time of the attack and
thus, cannot be expected to put up a defense, and that Jeffrey was never given an
opportunity to defend himself.
CA affirmed Umawids conviction. It held that by invoking the defense of
insanity, Umawid had, in effect, admitted the commission of the crimes but
nevertheless pleaded to be exonerated from criminal liability. However, he failed to
prove by clear and positive evidence that he was actually insane immediately
preceding the time of the commission of the crimes or during their execution.
Issue:
Whether or not Umawids conviction for the crimes of Murder and Frustrated
Murder should be upheld.
Ruling:

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Yes. Umawids appeal is bereft of merit.
The defense of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance because
an accused invoking the same admits to have committed the crime but claims that
he or she is not guilty because of such insanity. As there is a presumption in favor of
sanity, anyone who pleads the said defense bears the burden of proving it with clear
and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the evidence on this matter must relate to
the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the
offense/s with which he is charged. Thus, in order to lend credence to a defense of
insanity, it must be shown that the accused had no full and clear understanding of
the nature and consequences of his or her acts.
Records, however, reveal that Dr. Quincinas testimony only showed that he
only examined Umawid six (6) months before the latter committed the crimes and
three (3) months and four (4) months thereafter. Notably, he admitted that his
findings did not include Umawids mental disposition immediately before or at the
very moment when he committed such crimes. As such, Dr. Quincinas testimony
cannot prove Umawids insanity. Neither would Dr. Julianas testimony shore up
Umawids cause as the former failed to attest to the latters mental condition and
even referred him to another doctor for further evaluation. Given these
circumstances, Umawids defense of insanity remained unsubstantiated.
The Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that treachery was
attendant in the killing of Maureen. The facts of this case show that Umawid
suddenly appeared at the terrace of Vicentes house and started attacking Vicente
with panabas. However, the latter was able to evade Umawids attacks, resulting in
Maureen being inadvertently hit and killed in the process. While it was not shown
that Umawid consciously employed treachery so as to insure the death of Maureen,
who was then just two (2) years old at the time, it is well to reiterate that the killing
by an adult of a minor child is treacherous, and thus, qualifies Maureens killing to
Murder.
Two (2) conditions must concur for treachery to be appreciated: first, the
employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate; and, second, the means of execution was deliberate
or consciously adopted.
In the same manner, treachery exists in Umawids attack on Jeffrey, albeit the
Court disagrees with the RTC and the CAs finding that Umawid employed means,
methods, and forms that rendered Jeffrey incapable of raising a credible defense.
A review of the factual circumstances herein would reveal that it was not
impossible for Jeffrey to put up a defense against Umawids attacks. In fact, Jeffrey
was sufficiently informed of Umawids impending assault upon him as he saw the
latter charging at him. Jeffrey even attempted to prevent Umawid from entering the
house, albeit he was unsuccessful in doing so. Despite this, Jeffrey was still capable
of mounting a defense against Umawids attacks but it was simply unfortunate
that he chose not to do so when he crouched and covered his head with his arms.
Nevertheless, treachery may still be appreciated on account of Jeffreys minority,
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considering that he was just 15 years of age when Umawid attacked him. Instructive
on this point is the case of People v. Guzman where it was held that treachery
attended the killing of a 17-year old victim due to his minority.
Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to
put up a defense. Thus, when an adult person illegally attacks a minor, treachery
exists.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JEFFERSON WARRINER y NICDAO
G.R. No. 208678, June 16, 2014, J. Reyes
The accused shot the victim in the head, which was found to be the direct
cause of his death. The accused was found guilty of murder. It was not a case of
self-defense since there was no unlawful aggression from the victim. It is settled
that not every form or degree of aggression justifies a claim of self-defense. The
Court ruled that there was treachery since the sudden attack of the accused upon
the victim was clearly without warning and unexpected on the part of the victim,
giving him no chance for defense.
Facts:
Jefferson and Jeffrey Warriner Nicdao, and Valentino Villaflor Masangkay were
charged with the crime of murder for conspiring and confederating with intent to
kill, qualified by treachery, attacking Lou Anthony Sta. Maria Pamintuan by hitting
and shooting him in the head with use of a .38 caliber revolver, inflicting a gunshot
wound which was the direct cause of his death.
Prosecution presented as witnesses Joshua Candolisas and Claudinick Blacer,
friends of the victim, who were with Lou Anthony when he was shot at the Ray
Charles Bar in Malate, Manila. They claimed that some crew members of the
Jollibee-Harrison Plaza branch has a bonding session at the said bar until early
morning. Their group stayed at the bars patio, and had ordered almost 20 bottles of
Red Horse beer. At about 2:30 a.m., Lou Anthony noticed that a group of three men
from another table kept giving their group dagger looks. He then remarked to
Claudinick, Pare, parang masama yata yung tingin nung nasa kabilang table.
Lou Anthony approached and confronted the other group. By that time, he
had taken about three bottles of beer and was already tipsy. After Lou Anthony
returned to their table, Claudinick approached the other group and apologized for
his friend saying, pare, pasensya na kayo. The two members of the other group,
Jeffrey and Valentino, accepted the apology. Jefferson, however, did not appear to
take the matter lightly and said, pag-suotin mo ng helmet yan, referring to Lou
Anthony.
At about 3:00 a.m., the group of Jefferson approached Lou Anthonys table.
Without any warning, however, Jefferson hit Lou Anthonys head with a gun, and as
the latter was about to rise from his seat and face his assailant, Jefferson shot Lou
Anthony in the forehead. Jeffersons group immediately fled from the crime scene.

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Claudinick came to the assistance of Lou Anthony, whom he and Jeff brought to the
Philippine General Hospital.
All of the accused were presented as witnesses. They testified that Lou
Anthony, who approached them and tapped their table exclaiming, Tang ina nyo,
bakit ang sama ng mga tingin nyo, ano ang gusto nyong mangyari? Their group did
not mind Lou Anthony and after the latter had left, Claudinick approached their
group to apologize. Jefferson allegedly replied, Sige, okay lang.
Jefferson admitted that he shot the victim, but invoked self-defense. He
claimed that before his group left the bar, Valentino went to the restroom while
Jeffrey went to the cashier to pay their bill. Jefferson approached the table of Lou
Anthony, as he wanted to settle their earlier altercation. Lou Anthony, however,
grabbed Jefferson by his collar and uttered offensive words. Alarmed, Jefferson
instinctively reached for his gun and then shot Lou Anthony. Both Valentino and
Jeffrey denied any liability for Lou Anthonys death.
The trial court found Jefferson guilty beyond reasonable doubt, and Jeffery
and Valentino were acquitted by the court for lack of evidence. The appellate court
affirmed the RTCs finding.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Jefferson can properly avail self-defense
2. Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of treachery was established
Ruling:
1. No, there can be no self-defense in this case.
There is no dispute that it was Jefferson who killed the victim. During the trial,
Jefferson admitted to have inflicted the gunshot wound which led to Lou Anthonys
eventual demise. While Jefferson claimed to have merely defended himself given
the dagger looks and violent tendencies which were exhibited by his victim, the
trial and appellate courts correctly ruled on the weakness of such claim.
To successfully invoke self-defense, it requires the following elements: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.
Jefferson failed to prove the elements. The records indicate the absence of an
unlawful aggression which could be ascribed to Lou Anthony. It is settled that not
every form or degree of aggression justifies a claim of self-defense. The test for the
presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression
from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending
himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat.

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There must be concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely:
(a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault
must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be
unlawful.
From the prosecution and defense witnesses testimonies, it was clear that
Lou Anthony did not perform any act that put Jeffersons life or safety in actual or
imminent danger. The perceived violent and aggressive attitude of Lou Anthony did
not sufficiently demonstrate through acts that confirmed Jeffersons fear for a real
peril.
2. Yes, there was treachery.
The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a
swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. Otherwise stated, an unexpected
and sudden attack which renders the victim unable and unprepared to put up a
defense is the essence of treachery.
Any animosity between the two groups had waned following Claudinicks offer
of apology, which was readily accepted by the group of Jefferson. No further
exchange transpired between the two groups until Jeffersons group approached Lou
Anthonys group, on the pretext that the former was already leaving the bar. Given
the circumstances, the sudden attack of Jefferson upon Lou Anthony by hitting him
hard with a gun was clearly without warning and unexpected on the part of the
victim, who was then merely seated with his companions.
The strike upon Lou Anthony caused him to fall, and even before he could
stand up to face his assailant, Jefferson shot him in the forehead. Clearly, Lou
Anthony had no chance to hold a defense against Jefferson. Considering the
circumstances, he could not have anticipated the fatal attack.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALEX DE LOS SANTOS
G.R. No. 207818, July 23, 2014, J. Bienvenido L. Reyes
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the
justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without it, there can be no self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete, that can validly be invoked. "There is an unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim when he puts in actual or imminent danger the
life, limb, or right of the person invoking self-defense. There must be actual physical
force or actual use of a weapon." "It is present only when the one attacked faces
real and immediate threat to ones life."
It has been repeatedly ruled that the nature, number and location of the
wounds sustained by the victim disprove a plea of self-defense.
The essence of treachery lies in the attack that comes without warning, and
the attack is swift, deliberate and unexpected, and affords the hapless, unarmed
and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape, thereby ensuring its
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accomplishment without the risk to the aggressor, without the slightest provocation
on the part of the victim. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made
it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.
Facts:
While having a drinking spree, Catriz asked the Alex De Los Santos if he can
till the family lot in Cagayan. When the De Los Santos answered that he cannot
decide on the matter since the land is family-owned, Catriz suddenly stood up and
slapped the Alexs face. The latter did not take offense and simply left, while Catriz
summoned his wife and children, and headed home. Catriz, however, returned
between 9:00 to 10:00 p.m. looking for Alex but didnt find him.
After the incident, Alex saw Catriz unloading chickens. He approached him
and offered help, but Catriz pushed him away causing Alex to stumble down. Catriz
then tried to hack Alex with a bolo but the latter was able to dodge the attacks. On
Catrizs third attempt, Alex got hold of a knife from the wall of a nearby house and
defended himself by plunging the same on Catriz. When Catriz again attempted to
hack him, the latter shoved the knife against him once more. Alex failed to recall
how many times he stabbed Catriz because he got dizzy and lost touch with his
senses.
Dazed with what he has just witnessed, Aginawang ran to the back of a house
towards a creek. Alex, on the other hand, proceeded towards the road where he met
one Abe Ballesil who accompanied him, upon his request, to the police station to
surrender.
RTC convicted Alex for crime of murder which was affirmed by CA. Allegation
of self-defense was rejected because: (1) he failed to claim it at the earliest
opportunity when he surrendered to the police station; (2) the number and
seriousness of the wounds he inflicted on Catriz showed a determined effort on his
part to kill the victim; and (3) he failed to surrender the weapon to the police and he
instead threw it away.
Issue:
Whether or not Alex De Los Santos is liable for crime of murder?
Ruling:
Yes, Alex De Los Santos is liable for crime of murder.
Generally, the burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt rather than upon the accused that he was in fact
innocent. However, if the accused admits killing the victim, but pleads self-defense,
the burden of evidence is shifted to him to prove such defense by clear, satisfactory
and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on his
part. Self-defense, when invoked, as a justifying circumstance implies the admission
by the accused that he committed the criminal act. Thus, to escape criminal
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liability, the accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence the concurrence
of the following requisites under the second paragraph of Article 11 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), viz: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the
justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without it, there can be no self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete, that can validly be invoked. "There is an unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim when he puts in actual or imminent danger the
life, limb, or right of the person invoking self-defense. There must be actual physical
force or actual use of a weapon." "It is present only when the one attacked faces
real and immediate threat to ones life."
Here, the De Los Santos failed to prove that unlawful aggression was initiated
by Catriz. The physical evidence of Catrizs incised wound on the left scapula belies
the version of events adduced by the defense and is more consistent with the
narration of the prosecutions eyewitness Bayudan that the initial blow came from
the accused-appellant who suddenly emerged behind Catriz and hacked him. The
testimony of expert witness Dr. Yuaga further confirmed that such incised wound
could have been inflicted from behind.
De Los Santoss claim that Catriz boxed him first and then tried to hack him
with a bolois grounded on contradictory, hence, unreliable testimonies. According to
defense witness Aginawang, he saw Catriz push and then box the De Los Santos. It
is noticeable, however, from De Los Santoss own narration that the detail relating
to the punching is absent. Also, Aginawang admitted oncross-examination that it
was the accused-appellant who delivered the first aggression by stabbing Catriz.
Further, the Court agrees with the CAs observation that the presence of a
knife in the wall of the nearby house was highly dubious. The immediate availability
of a knife within De Los Santoss convenient reach in a public place at the exact
moment that he was allegedly being hacked by Catriz is too inconceivable to
warrant trustworthiness. The sequence of the narration of eyewitness Bayudan is
more rational and thus in accord with the spontaneity of a truthful account that all
the while, the accused-appellant had the knife in his possession and he used it to
continue stabbing Catriz when the first weapon he used dislodged from its handle.
Further, the location, the number and gravity of the wounds inflicted on Catriz
indicate a determined effort to kill and not merely to defend. It has been repeatedly
ruled that the nature, number and location of the wounds sustained by the victim
disprove a plea of self-defense.
Further, the killing of Catriz by De Los Santos was attended with treachery.
"There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specifically to ensure the execution of the crime without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. To establish treachery, two
elements must concur: (a) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
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position to defend himself; and (b) that the offender consciously adopted the
particular means of attack employed."
"The essence of treachery lies in the attack that comes without warning, and
the attack is swift, deliberate and unexpected, and affords the hapless, unarmed
and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape, thereby ensuring its
accomplishment without the risk to the aggressor, without the slightest provocation
on the part of the victim. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack madeit
impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate."
It is evident in this case that, as testified by eyewitness Bayudan, De Los
Santos attacked Catriz when the latter was defenseless and unable to retaliate. He
commenced his attack from behind Catriz and when the latter eventually fell down
to his knees begging for his life, De Los Santos continued stabbing him. Clearly, he
took advantage of the vulnerable position of Catriz to ensure the successful
execution of the offense without risk, and deny the victim the opportunity to defend
himself.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ROLANDO LAS PIAS, JIMMY DELIZO AND
MERWIN LAS PIAS
G.R. No. 191723, July 23, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Casto
To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must
be established: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her;
(3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned
in Article 248of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or
infanticide. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without
warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.
In this case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that (1) Edgardo,
Benjamin and Carlito were shot and killed; (2) the accused appellants were three of
the eight perpetrators who killed them; (3) Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlitos killing
was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery as testified to by
prosecution eyewitness, Roger; and (4) the killing of Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito
were neither parricide nor infanticide.
In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. It does not need to be proven by
direct evidence and may be inferred from the conduct before, during, and after
the commission of the crime indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and
concurrence of sentiments as in conspiracy.
In this case, all the accused/accused-appellants were convincingly shown to
have acted in concert to achieve a common purpose of assaulting their unarmed
victims with their guns. Their acting in concert was manifest not only from their
going together to the fishpen located offshore on board the same boat, but also
from their joint attack commenced simultaneously, firing successive shots at the

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four victims and immediately followed by clambering up the platform and resuming
their shooting of Roger, Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito.
Facts:
Roger and his brothers, Edgardo and Benjamin, and their cousin, Carlito
Lasala, were at Edgardos fishpen. The fishpen was supported by four wooden posts
arranged in a square. On top of the posts was a 9 to 10-meter bamboo platform
about four to five meters above the sea. While on the platform, they lighted three
pressure lamps in the middle of the fishpen to attract the fish. After checking the
fishnet and eating supper, they took turns in resting and watching.
While Roger was on guard duty and the rest were sleeping, the Rolando Las
Pinas et al. arrived on board a "sibid-sibid," a long wooden boat mobilized by
paddles. The accused then climbed up the platform and opened fire at the Aringo
brothers and Carlito.
Specifically, Roger narrated that he saw accused Armando and Rolando shoot
Edgardo and Benjamin, while he witnessed Jimmy, Merwin and Freddie shoot Carlito.
He likewise witnessed Armando slash the throat of Edgardo after the latter was
incapacitated, and throw his (Edgardo) body into the sea. As for himself, Roger
testified that his assailants were accused Renato, Salvador and Gilberto; and tha the
sustained gunshot wounds on his right cheek, left chest, and left buttock. The
carnage finally ended when the accused thought that the three Aringo brothers and
Carlito were all dead; and then they boarded their boat and left. Roger recognized
all the accused because they used to be neighbors at Sorsogon.
Of the four, only Roger remained alive by daybreak and was eventually
rescued by a passing fisherman. He was brought to the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital
for treatment. Initially, only the bodies of Benjamin and Carlito were recovered from
the platform. But four days later, Edgardos body was found floating in the water.
Three informations were filed against Rolando Las Pinas et al with the crime of
Murder which circumstance was attended by treachery. On the other hand, Rolando
Las Pinas et al. denied such allegation by using the defense of alibi.
RTC convicted Rolando Las Pinas, et al. of the crime of Murder which was
affirmed by CA.
Issue:
1) Whether or not Rolando Las Pinas et al. can be held liable for the crime of
murder.
2) Whether or not there was Conspiracy.
3) Whether or not defense of denial and alibi can be admitted.
Ruling:
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1) Yes, they can be held liable for the crime of murder.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
provides that Article 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the
provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of
armed men, or employing means toweaken the defense or of means or persons to
insure or afford impunity
To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must
be established: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her;
(3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned
in Article 248of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or
infanticide.
In this case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that (1) Edgardo,
Benjamin and Carlitowere shot and killed; (2) the accused appellants were three of
the eight perpetrators who killed them; (3) Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlitos killing
was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery as testified to by
prosecution eyewitness, Roger; and (4) the killing of Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito
were neither parricide nor infanticide.
Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code defines treachery as the
direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime
against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done
in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting
victim no chance to resist or escape. In order for treachery to be properly
appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim
was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and
deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed
by him. These elements are extant in the facts of this case and as testified to by
Roger above-quoted.
To emphasize, the victims, Roger, Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito, were
caught off guard when the accused, including the accused-appellants, in the dead of
night, arrived at the fishpen and climbed the same, and without warning, opened
fire at the sleeping/resting victims to disable them. Upon disabling the victims, the
accused and the accused-appellants continued shooting at the victims accused
Armando and accused-appellant Rolando shot Edgardo and Carlito; accusedappellants Jimmy and Merwin and accused Freddie shot Benjamin; and accused
Renato, Salvador and Gilberto shot Roger. Accused Armando even slashed
Edgardos throat after shooting him and threw his body out to the sea the stealth,
swiftness and methodical manner by which the attack was carried out gave the four

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victims no chance at all to evade the bullets and defend themselves from the
unexpected onslaught. Thus, there is no denying that the collective acts of the
accused and the accused-appellants reek of treachery.
2) Yes, there was Conspiracy.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code states that "conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it." It does not need to be proven by direct evidence and may be
inferred from the conduct before, during, and after the commission of the crime
indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments as in
conspiracy. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
That there was conspiracy among the accused and accused-appellants is a
matter not in issue. Both trial courts and the Court of Appeals deduced the
conspiracy among the accused/accused-appellants from the mode and manner in
which they perpetrated the killings. This Court is satisfied that their deduction was
warranted. Proof of the actual agreement to commit the crime need not be direct
because conspiracy may be implied or inferred from their conduct before, during,
and after the commission of the crime indicative of a joint purpose, concerted
action, and concurrence of sentiments as in conspiracy. In this case, all the
accused/accused-appellants were convincingly shown to have acted in concert to
achieve a common purpose of assaulting their unarmed victims with their guns.
Their acting in concert was manifest not only from their going together to the
fishpen located offshore on board the same boat, but also from their joint attack
commenced simultaneously, firing successive shots at the four victims and
immediately followed by clambering up the platform and resuming their shooting of
Roger, Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito. It was also significant that they fled together
on board the boat that they arrived in as soon as they had achieved their common
purpose. Their conduct before, during, and after the commission of the crime
indicated a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments. Hence,
conspiracy attended the commission of the crimes.
3) No, twin defenses of denial and alibi must fail in light of the positive
identification made by one of their victims, Roger.
Alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must be brushed aside
when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the
accused as in this case. It is also axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over
negative testimony. The accused-appellants alibis that they were at different places
at the time of the shooting, and that family members and or their friends vouched
for their whereabouts are negative and self-serving assertions and cannot not be
given more evidentiary value vis-vis the affirmative testimony of a credible
witness. The accused-appellants and Roger, at one point, resided in the same
barangay and, are, therefore, familiar with one another. Therefore, Roger could not
have been mistaken on the accused-appellants identity, including the five other
accused who remained at large.

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Further, it has been held that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused
must prove the following: (i) that he was present at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the crime; and (ii) that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the scene of the crime during its commission. Physical impossibility involves the
distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and the location of the
accused when the crime was committed. The accused must demonstrate that he
was so far away and could not have been physically present at the crime scene and
its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed. Here, the accused-appellants
utterly failed to satisfy the above-quoted requirements. As held by the Court of
Appeals, "[j]udicial notice was taken of the fact that Barangay Bitan-o in Sorsogon
City where the accused claimed they were at the time of the shooting and the area
of the sea adjacent to the municipality of Castilla where the incident took place are
neighboring sites that can be negotiated with the use of a banca in one hour or
less." Certainly, the distance was not too far as to preclude the presence of
accused-appellants at the fishpen, and/or for them to slip away from where they
were supposed to be, unnoticed.
Finally, the defense failed to show any ill motive on the part of the
prosecutions witnesses to discredit their testimonies. Absent any reason or motive
for a prosecution witness to perjure himself, the logical conclusion is that no such
motive exists, and his testimony is, thus, worthy of full faith and credit.
LEOPOLDO QUINTOS y DELAMOR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 205298, September 10, 2014, Acting C.J. Carpio
To escape liability, the accused must show by sufficient, satisfactory and
convincing evidence that: (a) the victim committed unlawful aggression amounting
to an actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the accused claiming selfdefense; (b) there was reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent or
repel the unlawful aggression; and (c) there was lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the accused claiming self-defense or at least any provocation executed
by the accused claiming self-defense was not the proximate and immediate cause
of the victims aggression.
To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution;
he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be
performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy.
In this case, the Court is not persuaded in the allegations of the petitioner
Leopoldo that his conviction was not supported by proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. His argument revolves mainly on self-defense, defense of relatives and
absence of conspiracy. The records of this case show that the prosecution witnesses
Eduardo Oyando, Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz positively and
consistently identified the accused and relayed the sequence of events.
Facts:
There are two versions of facts disputed in this case:

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The prosecution established that on January 15, 2008, Freddie, Robert,
Felomina (all surnamed DELA CRUZ) and Eduardo Oyando were walking along the
barangay road of Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan. They were on their way to the town
proper when they were accosted by Leopoldo (Petitioner), Pedro, Rolly, Lando (all
surnamed QUINTOS), Narciso Buni. Pedro was wielding a samurai, Lando, Narciso
and Leopoldo were carrying bolos, and Rolly was holding a big stone. Freddie,
Robert, Felomina and Eduardo ran back towards their house, but the five attackers
caught up with them.
Pedro struck Robert with the samurai, but the latter parried the attack with
his left hand. Robert attempted to gain control of the samurai, but Rolly hit him in
the face, near the jaw, with the stone Rolly was carrying. Robert lost his hold of the
samurai and fell to the ground.
Lando struck Freddie at the back of his head, which caused the latter to fall
face up. Leopoldo joined Lando in hacking Freddie, who, while defending himself
with his hands, sustained injuries on his right hand and lost a few fingers on his left.
Rolly then crushed Freddies chest with the same stone he used to hit Robert in the
face.
Pedro advanced towards Felomina as the latter moved towards Robert. Pedro
pulled Felominas hair, slashed her nape with the samurai, and then kicked her to
the ground. Eduardo was forced to stand aside and was prevented from helping the
dela Cruzes because Narciso was aiming a bolo at him. The attackers left when they
were done, and only then was Eduardo able to approach the victims and call for
help. Robert, Freddie and Felomina, were brought to the hospital. They were treated
for the injuries sustained from the attack.
After a few days, Freddie died from his injuries. Before he died, he identified
Pedro and Lando Quintos as his attackers.
The defense presented a different version of the events. They alleged that on
January 15, 2008, Robert, Freddie, Felomina and Eduardo Oyando came to the
Quintos house looking for trouble. Pedro, who was in the front portion of the house,
went out to try and pacify them. Robert punched Pedro first, hitting him in the face.
Robert then went to Felomina and took a bolo wrapped in a towel that the latter was
holding. Pedro and Robert grappled for the bolo. Felomina approached the two and
tried to help Robert, and in the process got slashed with the bolo. The scuffle
resulted in Robert falling to the ground and Pedro gaining control of the bolo.
Pedro then noticed that Freddie, who was holding a bolo, was fighting with
Lando. Pedro hurried over and hacked Freddie to defend his brother Lando.
According to Pedro, his senses dimmed and he did not remember how many times
he hacked Freddie. His brothers pacified him, and Pedro went with them back to the
house; while Robert, Freddie and Felomina, were brought to the hospital.
RTC gave full faith and credit to the version of the prosecution. Petitioner was
found guilty for the crime of homicide for the death of Freddie dela Cruz. However,
the trial court held that the uncertainty on the nature of the wounds of Robert and
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Felomina dela Cruz warrants the appreciation of a lesser gravity of the crime from
frustrated homicide to attempted homicide.
Petitioner and Pedro Quintos appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals,
alleging that the trial court gravely erred in convicting them despite the
prosecutions failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. CA found the
appeal bereft of merit and dismissed it.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the conviction, despite the
prosecutions failure to prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Whether or not the CA erred in finding that conspiracy exists, in particular, that a
finding of conspiracy should not be left to conjecture, in light of the alleged
failure of the prosecution to present evidence that petitioner took part in
inflicting injuries on the victims in furtherance of a common design to kill.
Ruling:
The petition is unmeritorious.
1.

No. The Court is not persuaded in the allegations of the petitioner Leopoldo
that his conviction was not supported by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
His argument revolves mainly on self-defense, defense of relatives and absence
of conspiracy. The records of this case show that the prosecution witnesses
Eduardo Oyando, Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz positively and
consistently identified the accused and relayed the sequence of events. Their
testimonies are corroborated by the evidence presented by the doctors who
attended the hacking victims, as well as by the police officer who took the
statement of Freddie before the latter died.
The trial court found the prosecution witnesses credible. The assessment of
the trial court on this point is generally binding on this Court, and none of the
exceptions to this rule are obtaining here. Pedro Quintos admitted to hacking
Robert and Freddie dela Cruz, and hitting Felomina dela Cruz, invoking selfdefense. Because of Pedros admissions, he and his co-conspirators assumed the
burden to establish such defense by credible, clear and convincing evidence;
otherwise, the same admissions would lead to their conviction.
Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when it is uncorroborated by
independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself.
Indeed, the accused must discharge the burden of proof by relying on the
strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the States evidence,
because the existence of self-defense is a separate issue from the existence of
the crime, and establishing self defense does not require or involve the negation
of any of the elements of the offense itself.
To escape liability, the accused must show by sufficient, satisfactory and
convincing evidence that: (a) the victim committed unlawful aggression
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amounting to an actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the accused
claiming self-defense; (b) there was reasonable necessity in the means
employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (c) there was lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the accused claiming self-defense or at least
any provocation executed by the accused claiming self-defense was not the
proximate and immediate cause of the victims aggression.
Both petitioner and Pedro also testified that Pedro hacked Freddie in defense
of their brother Lando. For the accused to be entitled to exoneration based on
defense of relatives, complete or incomplete, it is essential that there be
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, for if there is no unlawful
aggression, there would be nothing to prevent or repel.
Mere shouting, and intimidating or threatening attitude of the victim does not
constitute unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression refers to an attack that
has actually broken out or materialized or at the very least is clearly imminent; it
cannot consist in oral threats or merely a threatening stance or posture.
2.

No. Indeed, mere presence does not signify conspiracy. However, neither
does it indicate the lack thereof Conspiracy can be inferred from and established
by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose
and design, concerted action and community of interest. In fact, the prosecution
established that petitioner was actively involved in the attack on Freddie dela
Cruz.
To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution;
he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to
be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy.
Each conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which may
appear unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort
to achieve their common criminal objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of
one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or morality of
participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are
principals. The acts of petitioner before, during and after the attacks on Robert
and Felomina dela Cruz disclose his agreement with the joint purpose and design
in the commission of the felony.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHARLIE FIELDAD, RYAN CORNISTA, and


EDGAR PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 196005, October 1, 2014, C.J. Carpio
Appellants were charged in conspiracy with others for murder of two jail
guards and for carnapping. They alleged however, that the prosecution has failed to
prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that they denied such allegation.
There is treachery when the following essential elements are present, viz: (a) at the

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time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the
accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, method or form
of attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected
attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any
chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission withour risk of
himself. In the instant case, despite being armed, the jail officers were not afforded
any chance of defending themselves. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts of the
accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action and community of interest. Once conspiracy is shown the act of one is the
act of all the conspirators. Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor
vehicle belonging to another without consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. The elements of the crime of
carnapping are that: (1) there is an actual taking of the vehicle; (2) the offender
intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle; (3) the vehicle belongs to a person
other than the offender himself; and (4) the taking is without the consent of the
owner thereof, or it was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things. All the elements of carnapping are present
in this case. Both appellants admitted that they boarded the Tamaraw jeep and
drove away in it. The owner of the vehicle, Benjamin Bauzon, testified that he did
not consent to the taking of his vehicle by appellants.
Facts:
Appellants Charlie Fieldad (Fieldad), Ryan Comista (Comista) and Edgar
Pimentel (Pimentel) were charged in conspiracy with others for the murder of two
jail guards and for camapping. The prosecution established that at around 7:00 a.m.
on 9 March 1999, JO2 Reynaldo Gamboa (JO2 Gamboa), JO1 Juan Bacolor, Jr. (JO1
Bacolor) and JO2 Marlon Niturada (JO2 Niturada) were inside the nipa hut searching
area near the main gate of the district jail. JO2 Gamboa summoned inmate Dionisio
Badua (Badua). JO2 Gamboa gave Badua the keys to the prison cells and instructed
the latter to open all the cells for the routine headcount. Julius Chan (Chan) went to
the nipa hut to ask JO2 Gamboa regarding the time of his hearing scheduled for that
day. While JO2 Gamboa and Chan were conversing, the telephone in the
administration building rang. JO2 Niturada ran from the nipa hut to the
administration building to answer the phone. After the phone call, JO2 Niturada
proceeded towards the basketball court. On his way there, he turned his head
towards the nipa hut and saw Chan place an arm on the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa,
who was seated, and shoot the latter with a short firearm. JO2 Gamboa fell.
Meanwhile, Fieldad and Cornista grappled with JO1 Bacolor for the possession of an
armalite. Cornista struck JO1 Bacolor at the back of the head, which caused the
latter to fall down. Fieldad, armed with JO2 Gamboas gun, shot JO1 Bacolor twice.
Florante Leal (Leal) took the armalite from JO1 Bacolor and shot at JO2 Niturada. JO2
Niturada returned fire with his .38 caliber handgun. Cornista opened the main gate
with keys taken from JO2 Gamboa. Twelve inmates went out the main gate. After
seeing the inmates run out, Badua padlocked the main gate and returned to his cell.
Once outside the jail compound, Fieldad, Leal, Cornista, and Pimentel boarded a

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parked Tamaraw jeep with plate number CDY-255 belonging to Benjamin Bauzon,
without the latters knowledge and consent. They picked up Federico Delim (Delim)
and Chan along the way. Before they reached Asingan, Pangasinan, the group
alighted from the Tamaraw jeep and transferred to a Mazda pick-up truck. When
they reached San Miguel, Tarlac, the Mazda pick-up truck turned turtle. The group
abandoned the vehicle and ran towards a cane field. Police authorities surrounded
the cane field and arrested appellants and their companions. Appellants denied any
criminal liability.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder and carnapping
Ruling:
Yes, they are guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Nature of killing
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and speciallyto insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might take.
In People v. Escote, Jr., where an armed off-duty police officer was killed, the
Court held:
There is treachery when the following essential elements are present, viz: (a)
at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b)
the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, method or
form of attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter
of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission withour risk of
himself. Treachery may also be appreciated even if the victim was warned of the
danger to his life where he was defenseless and unable to flee atthe time of the
infliction of the coup de grace. In the case at bar, the victim suffered six wounds,
one on the mouth, another on the right ear,one on the shoulder, another on the
right breast, one on the upper right cornea of the sternum and one above the right
iliac crest. Juan and Victor were armed with handguns. They first disarmed SPO1
Manio, Jr. and then shot him even as hepleaded for dear life. When the victim was
shot, he was defenseless. He was shot at close range, thus insuring his death.
In the instant case, despite being armed, the jail officers were not afforded
any chance of defending themselves. Without warning, Fieldad and his cohorts
disabled the defenses of the jail officers. Chan held the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa as
he shot the latter. Meanwhile, Fieldad teamed-up with Cornista to divest JO1 Bacolor

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of his armalite, and to knock him down. Then Fieldad took JO2 Gamboas gun and
shot JO1 Bacolor.
Conspiracy in the Killings
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy can be
inferred from and established by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts
point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.
Once conspiracy is shown the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.
Contrary to his contentions, the acts of Fieldad before, during and after the
attacks on JOs Bacolor, Jr. and Gamboa disclose his agreement with the joint
purpose and design in the commission of the felonies. The positive testimony of
Badua is corroborated by a web of circumstantial evidence that points to no other
conclusion than that Fieldad was complicit in the conspiracy to murder the jail
guards.
Elements of Carnapping
Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to
another without consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons,
or by using force upon things. The elements of the crime of carnapping are that: (1)
there is an actual taking of the vehicle; (2) the offender intends to gain from the
taking of the vehicle; (3) the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender
himself; and (4) the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof, or it was
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using
force upon things.
All the elements of carnapping are present in this case. Both appellants
admitted that they boarded the Tamaraw jeep and drove away in it. The owner of
the vehicle, BenjaminBauzon, testified that he did not consent to the taking of his
vehicle by appellants. Intent to gain or animus lucrandiis an internal act, presumed
from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the
important consideration is the intent to gain. The term "gain" is not merely limited
to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be
derived orexpected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the
thing which was taken without the owners consent constitutes gain.
ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 178512, November 26, 2014, J. Bersamin
Frustrated homicide requires intent to kill on the part of the offender. Without
proof of such intent, the felony may only be serious physical injuries. Intent to kill
may be established through the overt and external acts and conduct of the offender
before, during and after the assault, or by the nature, location and number of the
wounds inflicted on the victim.

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Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed that intent to kill was
present. Supreme Court concurs with them. Contrary to the Alfredos submission,
the wounds sustained by Alexander were not mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat
of anger or as the result of a fistfight between them. Alfredo wielded and used a
knife in his assault on Alexander. The medical records indicate, indeed, that
Alexander sustained two stab wounds, specifically, one on his upper left chest and
the other on the left side of his face. There is also to be no doubt about the wound
on Alexanders chest being sufficient to result into his death were it not for the
timely medical intervention.
Facts:
Alexander Flojo (Alexander) was fetching water below his rented house at 443
Aglipay Street, Old Zaniga St., Mandaluyong City when suddenly Alfredo De Guzman
(Alfredo), the brother of his land lady, Lucila Bautista (Lucila), hit him on the nape.
Alexander informed Lucila about what Alfredo did to him. Lucila apologized to
Alexander by saying, Pasensya ka na Mang Alex and told the latter to just go up.
Alexander obliged and went upstairs. He took a rest for about two hours. Then, at
around 12:00 to 12:15 A.M., Alexander went down and continued to fetch water.
While pouring water into a container, Alfredo suddenly appeared in front of
Alexander and stabbed him on his left face and chest.
Cirilino Bantaya, son-in-law of Alexander, saw the latter bleeding on the left
portion of his body and begging for help. Alexander then told Cirilino that Alfredo
stabbed him. Cirilino immediately loaded Alexander into his motorcycle and brought
him to the Mandaluyong City Medical Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the
doctors immediately rendered medical assistance to Alexander. Alexander stayed in
the emergency room of said hospital for about 30 to 40 minutes. Then, he was
brought to the second floor of the said hospital where he was confined for two days.
Thereafter, Alexander was transferred to the Polymedic General Hospital where he
was subjected for further medical examination.
Alexander sustained two stabbed wounds. According to Dr. Francisco
Obmerga, the physician who treated the victim, the second wound was fatal and
could have caused Alexanders death without timely medical intervention.
Alfredo denied having stabbed Alexander. According to him, on December 25,
1997 at around midnight, he passed by Alexander who was, then, fixing a
motorcycle. At that point, he accidentally hit Alexanders back, causing the latter to
throw invective words against him. He felt insulted, thus, a fistfight ensued between
them. They even rolled on the ground. Alfredo hit Alexander on the cheek causing
blood to ooze from the latters face.
The RTC convicted the Alfredo of the crime of Frustrated Homicide. CA
affirmed the Alfredos conviction. CA denied the Alfredos motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:

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Whether or not Alfredo is properly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
frustrated homicide.
Ruling:
The appeal lacks merit.
The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his
victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim
sustained fatal or mortal wound but did not die because of timely medical
assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstances for murder under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present. Inasmuch as the trial and
appellate courts found none of the qualifying circumstances in murder under Article
248 to be present, the Court immediately proceed to ascertain the presence of the
two other elements.
The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of the
offender to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of
injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent that the State must allege in the
information, and then prove by either direct or circumstantial evidence, as
differentiated from a general criminal intent, which is presumed from the
commission of a felony by dolo. Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by
the courts only through external manifestations, i.e., the acts and conduct of the
accused at the time of the assault and immediately thereafter.
Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed that intent to kill was
present. Supreme Court concurs with them. Contrary to the Alfredos submission,
the wounds sustained by Alexander were not mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat
of anger or as the result of a fistfight between them. Alfredo wielded and used a
knife in his assault on Alexander. The medical records indicate, indeed, that
Alexander sustained two stab wounds, specifically, one on his upper left chest and
the other on the left side of his face. There is also to be no doubt about the wound
on Alexanders chest being sufficient to result into his death were it not for the
timely medical intervention.
The Court has no cogent reason to deviate from or to disregard the findings
of the trial and appellate courts on the credibility of Alexanders testimony. It is not
disputed that the testimony of a single but credible and trustworthy witness sufficed
to support the conviction of Alfredo. This guideline finds more compelling
application when the lone witness is the victim himself whose direct and positive
identification of his assailant is almost always regarded with indubitable credibility,
owing to the natural tendency of the victim to seek justice for himself, and thus
strive to remember the face of his assailant and to recall the manner in which the
latter committed the crime.
Moreover, it is significant that the Alfredos mere denial of the deadly manner
of his attack was contradicted by the credible physical evidence corroborating
Alexanders statements. Under the circumstances, The Court can only affirm the
Alfredos conviction for frustrated homicide.
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ROGELIO J. GONZAGA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 195671, January 21, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
In order to establish a motorists liability for the negligent operation of a
vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such
negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. To constitute the offense of
reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the
operation of a motor vehicle a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is
required. Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others within the
meaning of reckless driving statutes has been held to involve a conscious choice of
a course of action which injures another, either with knowledge of serious danger to
others involved, or with knowledge of facts which would disclose the danger to any
reasonable person.
Facts:
Around 6 o'clock in the morning of June 25, 1997, Dionesio Inguito, Sr.
(Dionesio, Sr.) was driving his motorcycle along Brgy. Kiara, Bukidnon towards Brgy.
Bocboc of the same municipality, to bring his two (2) minor children, Dionesio
Inguito, Jr. (Dionesio, Jr.) and Cherry Inguito6 (Cherry), to school. While they were
ascending the curving road going to Bocboc on their proper lane on the right side of
the road, a Toyota Land Cruiser (Land Cruiser) driven by Rogelio was swiftly
descending the same lane from the opposite direction. Dionesio, Sr. blew the horn of
his motorcycle to signal the Land Cruiser to return to its proper lane but the Land
Cruiser remained. In order to avoid collision, Dionesio, Sr. tried to swerve to the left,
but the Land Cruiser suddenly swerved towards the same direction and collided
head-on with the motorcycle.
As a result of the collision, Dionesio, Sr. and his 2 children were thrown off the
motorcycle. Dionesio, Sr. was pinned beneath the Land Cruiser, while Cherry and
Dionesio, Jr. were thrown over the hood of the Land Cruiser and fell on the side of
the road, causing injuries to their legs. Siblings Rolf, Cherry, and Jenny Ann Aquino,
who were traversing the same road aboard their own motorcycle, stopped to help
and placed the victims together on the rightmost side of the road facing Brgy.
Bocboc, while Rogelio remained inside the Land Cruiser.
Rolf left the scene of the incident to seek further assistance, leaving his two
(2) sisters to cater to the victims. Eventually, he chanced upon Kagawad Nerio
Dadivas (Kgd. Dadivas), who had just opened his store, and informed the latter of
the vehicular accident. After reporting the incident to the police and getting his
vehicle, Kgd. Dadivas proceeded to the site and loaded the victims to his vehicle
with Rolfs assistance. Meanwhile, Rolf went to Brgy. Kawilihan to inform Dionesio,
Sr.s wife, Clemencia Inguito (Clemencia), of what had transpired.
Thereafter, the victims were brought to the Emergency Hospital of Maramag
where they were treated. Operations were performed on the legs of Dionesio, Jr. and
Dionesio, Sr., but the latter eventually expired. Cherrys leg was placed in a cast and

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she was confined in the hospital, together with Dionesio, Jr., for more than one (1)
month, or until July 26, 1997. All the expenses were shouldered by Clemencia.
In view of the foregoing mishap, the provincial prosecutor filed an Information
charging Rogelio for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double
Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property with the aggravating
circumstance that accused failed to lend on the spot to the injured party such help
that was in his hands to give before the RTC. The RTC found Rogelio guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with
Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property punishable under Article
365 in relation to Article 263 of the RPC.
Rogelio filed a motion for reconsideration35 which was partly granted in a
Resolution dated February 22, 2007, reducing the penalty to four (4) months and
one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as maximum, with the same civil liabilities. Aggrieved, Rogelio
appealed to the CA.
The CA reinstated the RTCs July 31, 2006 Decision, thereby imposing on
Rogelio the original indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months of
prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor medium, as maximum, and the same civil liabilities, hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Rogelios conviction in accordance
with the RTCs July 31, 2006 Decision
Ruling:
The petition lacks merit. Reckless imprudence, as defined in Article 365 of the
RPC, consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the
part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
In order to establish a motorists liability for the negligent operation of a
vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such
negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. To constitute the offense of
reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the
operation of a motor vehicle a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is
required. Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others within the
meaning of reckless driving statutes has been held to involve a conscious choice of
a course of action which injures another, either with knowledge of serious danger to
others involved, or with knowledge of facts which would disclose the danger to any
reasonable person. Verily, it is the inexcusable lack of precaution or conscious
indifference to the consequences of the conduct which supplies the criminal intent
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and brings an act of mere negligence and imprudence under the operation of the
penal law, without regard to whether the private offended party may himself be
considered likewise at fault.
In the present case, the RTC and the CA uniformly found that Rogelios act of
driving very fast on the wrong side of the road was the proximate cause of the
collision, resulting to the death of Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical injuries to
Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry. Notably, the road where the incident occurred was a curve
sloping upwards towards Brgy. Bocboc where the Inguitos were bound and
descending towards the opposite direction where Rogelio was going. Indeed, the
very fact of speeding, under such circumstances, is indicative of imprudent
behavior. As a motorist, Rogelio was bound to exercise ordinary care in such affair
by driving at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the conditions
encountered, as this would enable him to keep the vehicle under control and avoid
injury to others using the highway. Moreover, it is elementary in traffic school that a
driver slows down before negotiating a curve as it may be reasonably anticipated
that another vehicle may appear from the opposite direction at any moment. Hence,
excessive speed, combined with other circumstances such as the occurrence of the
accident on or near a curve, as in this case, constitutes negligence. Consequently,
the Court finds that Rogelio acted recklessly and imprudently in driving at a fast
speed on the wrong side of the road while approaching the curve where the incident
happened, thereby rendering him criminally liable, as well as civilly accountable for
the material damages resulting therefrom.
Nonetheless, while the CA and the RTC concurred that the proximate cause of
the collision was Rogelios reckless driving, the CA Decision made no mention as to
the presence or absence of the limiting element in the last paragraph of Article 365
of the RPC, which imposes the penalty next higher in degree upon the offender who
fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in his hands to
give. Based on case law, the obligation under this paragraph: (a) is dependent on
the means in the hands of the offender, i.e., the type and degree of assistance that
he/she, at the time and place of the incident, is capable of giving; and (b) requires
adequate proof.
Here, Rogelio was charged with the offense of Reckless Imprudence Resulting
to Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property under
Article 365 in relation to Article 263 of the RPC, a complex crime. Article 48 of the
RPC provides that when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime, in this case, Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Homicide, shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
Under Article 365 of the RPC, when reckless imprudence in the use of a motor
vehicle results in the death of a person, as in this case, the accused shall be
punished with the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods,i.e., two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of said penalty should be taken from
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period,
or four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months.
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Consequently, the Court finds a need to modify the penalty to be imposed on
Rogelio and thus, sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years
of prision correccional in its minimum, as minimum, to six years of prision
correccional in its maximum, as maximum.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DOMINGO DILLA y PAULAR
G.R. No. 200333, January 21, 2015, J. DEL CASTILLO
The records show that there was direct proof identifying the accused as the
perpetrator of the crime, thus, belying the claim of the accused. Furthermore, the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses established without a shadow of doubt that it
was accused who mercilessly killed his brother.
Facts:
Domingo Dilla y Paular (Domingo) was charged with the crime of murder for
the death of his brother, Pepito Dilla y Paular (Pepito). Based on the evidence
presented by the prosecution, it was shown that at around 5:30 in the afternoon of
July 22, 2003, at Sitio Ilaud, Himaao, Pili, Camarines Sur, Pepito was working on his
farm when Domingo suddenly appeared and shot Pepito with a gun hitting him on
his left thigh. The victim managed to run but was overtaken by Domingo who then
stabbed him with a bolo. The son of the victim, Pepito Jr., and Mary Jane Renegado
(Renegado), witnessed the incident.
On the other hand, Domingo claimed that it was Pepito who was the
aggressor. He narrated that Pepito went to Domingos house and challenged him to
a fight. Dismissing the challenge, Domingo went out of his house and proceeded to
his farm to get his carabao but the victim pursued him. They grappled for
possession of the gun and bolo. In the ensuing struggle, he struck the victim with a
wrench. He denied having fired the gun. He pointed to somebody allegedly wearing
a hat who could have shot and stabbed Pepito.
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32, found Domingo
guilty of murder, finding Domingos tale incredible and self-serving especially in
view of his positive identification by the prosecution witnesses. On appeal to the CA,
affirmed the ruling of the RTC with modification as to damages and indemnity.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether Domingo is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.
Ruling:
Yes, he is.
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court finds the appeal to
be lacking in merit. The records belie appellants contention that there was no
direct proof identifying him as the perpetrator of the crime. The testimonies of
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prosecution witnesses Pepito, Jr. and Renegado established without a shadow of
doubt that it was appellant who mercilessly killed his brother, Pepito. Pepito, Jr.s
testimony was corroborated in all material points by the testimony of Renegado.
In fine, both the RTC and the CA correctly found Domingo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and properly sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Moreover, appellant is not eligible for parole
pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition
of Death Penalty in the Philippines. The awards of civil indemnity in the amount of
P75,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 are proper. In
addition, the heirs of the victim are entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of
P30,000.00.
Anent the award of actual damages in the amount of P35,448.00, the find
that only the amount of P15,000.00 was duly receipted.9 The amount of
P20,448.0010 which supposedly pertained to expenses incurred during the wake
was not supported by receipts but consisted only of handwritten entries. As we held
in People v. Villanueva, when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial
amount to less than P25,000.00, as in this case, the award of temperate damages of
P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount. Accordingly,
the Court grants temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in lieu of actual
damages. In addition, all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TOMAS DIMACUHA, JR., et al.
G.R. No. 191060, February 2, 2015, J. Mariano C. Del Castillo
The fatal shooting of Agon was attended by treachery, a qualifying
circumstance listed under Article 248 and notably, alleged in the Information. For
treachery to be properly appreciated, two conditions must be present: (1) at the
time of the assault, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the
offender consciously adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack
employed by him. These conditions were present in the killing of Agon. The assault
upon Agon was deliberate, swift and sudden, denying him the opportunity to
protect or defendhimself. He was unarmed and unaware of the plot of appellants to
kill him. Moreover, the means, method or manner of execution of the attack was
deliberately and consciously adopted by appellants, the same being in accordance
with their groups plan to liquidate Agon.
There is conspiracy "when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It arises on the very
instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and
forthwith decide to pursue it." Here, the evidence is sufficient to prove that
appellants conspired to murder Agon. In this case, upon their arrival thereat, the
members of the group which included appellants positioned themselves according
to their plan and waited for Agon to leave. Later on, Caballero signaled Vitan and
the other alleged gunman, accused Theo (Theo), that the target had left the arena
and that his vehicle was already approaching their position. When Agons vehicle

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came, Vitan and Theo fired at him. Vitan, Caballero, Alvarez, who acted as one of
the back-ups, and the rest of the group then fled the scene of the crime.
Facts:
Appellants Edgar Allen Alvarez (Alvarez) and Rodel Caballero (Caballero),
together with the accused who remain at-large, were charged with the crime of
murder for the fatal shooting of Nicanor Morfe Agon (Agon).
RTC found them guilty of the crime of murder. Aggrieved, appellants appealed
to the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming decision of RTC. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
1. Whether or not appellants were guilty for crime of murder.
2. Whether or not there was conspiracy.
Ruling:
1. Yes, appellants are guilty for crime of murder.
The elements of the crime of murder are: (1) a person was killed; (2) the
accused killed him or her; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (4)
that the killing is not parricide or infanticide. These requisites have been established
by the prosecution.
The gunman himself who testified for the prosecution testified that his group
"Black Shark" killed Agon. One of the responding policemen PO2 Arnold Abdon, for
his part, testified that he went to the hospital where Agon was taken and the latter
was already dead when he arrived. Further, the Medico-Legal Officer testified on the
post-mortem examination he conducted upon Agon which showed that the latter
sustained six gunshot wounds, two of which were fatal. The element therefore that
a person was killed is obtaining in this case.
The fatal shooting of Agon was attended by treachery, a qualifying
circumstance listed under Article 248 and notably, alleged in the Information. For
treachery to be properly appreciated, two conditions must be present: (1) at the
time of the assault, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the
offender consciously adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack
employed by him. These conditions were present in the killing of Agon. The assault
upon Agon was deliberate, swift and sudden, denying him the opportunity to protect
or defendhimself. He was unarmed and unaware of the plot of appellants to kill him.
Moreover, the means, method or manner of execution of the attack was deliberately
and consciously adopted by appellants, the same being in accordance with their
groups plan to liquidate Agon.
Finally, the killing of Agon was neither parricide nor infanticide. All the
elements of the crime of murder being present in this case.
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It must be noted as well that the evidence adduced by the prosecution is also
sufficient to establish the presence of the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation, which has the following elements: (1) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused
clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between determination
and execution to allow himself time to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
Vitan testified that the plan to kill Agon was conceived a day before the victim was
fatally shot. Appellants and their cohorts therefore, had adequate time to reflect on
the consequences of their contemplated crime prior to its execution. The period of
time when appellants planned tokill Agon and the time when they implemented
such plan afforded them the opportunity for meditation and reflection on the
consequences of the murder they committed.
2. Yes, there was conspiracy.
The lower courts finding of conspiracy must also be sustained. There is
conspiracy "when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It arises on the very instant the
plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to
pursue it." Here, the evidence is sufficient to prove that appellants conspired to
murder Agon. In this case, upon their arrival thereat, the members of the group
which included appellants positioned themselves according to their plan and waited
for Agon to leave. Later on, Caballero signaled Vitan and the other alleged gunman,
accused Theo (Theo), that the target had left the arena and that his vehicle was
already approaching their position. When Agons vehicle came, Vitan and Theo fired
at him. Vitan, Caballero, Alvarez, who acted as one of the back-ups, and the rest of
the group then fled the scene of the crime.
Clearly, there was unity of action and purpose among the members of "Black
Shark," which include appellants in killing Agon. Conspiracy having been
established, evidence as to who delivered the fatal blow is no longer indispensable.
Hence, it is immaterial if Caballeros role was merely to signal the gunmen and
Alvarezs, to act as back-up. Each of the offender is equally guilty of the criminal act
since in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. OSCAR SEVILLANO y RETANAL
G.R. No. 200800, February 09, 2015, J. Perez
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court
convicting the accused of the crime of murder for stabbing his victim seven times in
the body. The accused contends that the act was merely for self-dense. The
Supreme Court ruled that it is not persuaded by the appellants defense of denial as
this cannot prevail over the eyewitnesses positive identification of him as the
perpetrator of the crime. Denial, like alibi, if not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in
law.
Facts:
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The accused Retanal was charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court
for allegedly stabbing his victim (the name of the victim is not indicated in the
case). It was alleged that the victim and his friends were seated at a vacant lot
when the accused who is drunk came towards the victim and his friends and
repeated stabbed the victim. The victim was rushed to the hospital and thereafter
he died. The Regional Trial Court convicted the accused of murder. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, the current petition.
Retanal, for his part, denied the accusations against him. He interposed selfdefense to absolve himself from criminal liability.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused Retanal is guilty of murder.
Ruling:
The accused Retanal is guilty of murder. The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
Well entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that findings of the trial court
on the credibility of witnesses deserve great weight, as the trial judge is in the best
position to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and has the unique opportunity to
observe the witness first hand and note his demeanor, conduct and attitude under
gruelling examination. Absent any showing that the trial courts calibration of
credibility was flawed, the appellate court is bound by its assessment.
In the prosecution of the crime of murder as defined in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), the following elements must be established by the
prosecution: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed that person; (3)
that the killing was attended by treachery; and (4) that the killing is not infanticide
or parricide.
After a careful evaluation of the records, the Court finds that these elements
were clearly met. The prosecution witnesses positively identified the appellant as
the person who stabbed Pablo several times on the chest which eventually caused
the latters death. They testified that they even tried to stop appellants attack but
unfortunately, were unsuccessful. The court finds no reason to disbelieve the
testimonies of these witnesses considering that their narration of facts were
straightforward and replete with details that coincide with the medical examination
conducted on the body of the victim. The Court is not persuaded by the appellants
defense of denial as this cannot prevail over the eyewitnesses positive
identification of him as the perpetrator of the crime. Denial, like alibi, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving
evidence undeserving of weight in law.
By invoking self-defense, Retanal in effect, admits to having inflicted the stab
wounds which killed the victim. The burden was, therefore, shifted on him to prove
that the killing was done in self-defense. In Razon v. People, this Court held that
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where an accused admits the killing, he assumes the burden to establish his plea by
credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his
admission that he killed the victim. Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated
when corroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely
doubtful by itself.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARCELINO OLOVERIO
G.R. No. 211159, March 18, 2015, J. Leonen
There is passional obfuscation when the crime was committed due to an
uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to
a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. On the other hand, a
sudden attack by the assailant, whether frontally or from behind, is treachery if
such mode of attack was coolly and deliberately adopted by him with the purpose
of depriving the victim of a chance to either fight or retreat. The rule does not
apply, however, where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted
but was just triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of the accused because
of the provocative act of the victim. The attack, while sudden, cannot be said to
have been unexpected or unprovoked. Accused-appellant alleged that before the
attack, Gulane had been insulting him and mocking him in a loud voice, "How many
times did you have sexual intercourse with your mother?" This utterance, along
with testimonies of Gulane's previous insults, would have been sufficient
provocation for accused-appellant to stab him.
Facts: According to the prosecution, Rudipico Pogay and Dominador Panday saw
Rodulfo Gulane walking about five (5) meters away from them with Oloverio trailing
behind him. Oloverio allegedly tapped Gulane's right shoulder and hacked him on
the chest and extremities with a bolo until Gulane collapsed on the ground. Oloverio
then allegedly took Gulane's money from his pocket. Pogay heard Oloverio shouting
the words, "Patay na ang datu sa Brgy. San Pablo!" ("The rich man in San Pablo is
already dead!") After, Gulane died.
In his defense, Oloverio alleged that at the time and day of the incident,
Gulane had been accusing him of having an incestuous relationship with his mother.
He allegedly kept his cool and told Gulane to go home, but the latter continued to
mock him by asking in a loud voice, "How many times did you have sexual
intercourse with your mother?" He allegedly asked Gulane to go home again but the
latter angrily replied, "Who are you to tell me to go home?"
Gulane allegedly attempted to draw his bolo but Oloverio stopped him by
drawing his own bolo. They grappled with it, and eventually, Oloverio ended up
stabbing Gulane, which resulted in the latter's death. Accompanied by a barangay
tanod, Oloverio went to the municipal hall to surrender to the authorities. He
admitted that he stabbed Gulane because he could no longer bear the insulting
remarks against him.
Romulo Lamoste, then Barangay Captain of Barangay Belen, alleged that
Gulane and Oloverio had an altercation before the incident. He alleged that
Oloverio's daughter had once confided to Oloverio that Gulane wanted to touch her
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private parts. About a month later, he allegedly heard Gulane ask Oloverio "in a
joking manner about his incestuous relationship with his mother." Oloverio allegedly
got mad and they ended up fighting, but Lamoste was able to subdue them.
The RTC found Oloverio guilty of murder. It ruled that the mitigating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation was not present in this case since it could
not co-exist with the presence of treachery. The only mitigating circumstance it
found present was of voluntary surrender. As murder was punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death, it imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. The CA
affirmed the conviction.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstances of passion
and obfuscation and of voluntary surrender;
2. Whether or not the presence of treachery has been sufficiently established;
3. Whether or not the accused is guilty of murder
Ruling:
1. Yes. To be able to successfully plead the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation, the accused must be able to prove the following elements:
a. that there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such
condition of mind; and
b. that said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from
the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during
which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.
In People v. Lobino: It has been held that "There is passional
obfuscation when the crime was committed due to an uncontrollable burst of
passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus
so powerful as to overcome reason."
"The obfuscation must originate from lawful feelings. The turmoil and
unreason which naturally result from a quarrel or fight should not be confused with
the sentiment or excitement in the mind of a person injured or offended to such a
degree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-control, because the cause of this
condition of mind must necessarily have preceded the commission of the offense."
Moreover, "the act producing the obfuscation must not be far removed
from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which
the accused might have recovered his normal equanimity." There is no uniform rule
on what constitutes "a considerable length of time." The provocation and the
commission of the crime should not be so far apart that a reasonable length of time
has passed during which the accused would have calmed down and be able to
reflect on the consequences of his or her actions. What is important is that the
accused has not yet "recovered his normal equanimity" when he committed the
crime. To appreciate passion and obfuscation as a mitigating circumstance, the facts
must be examined on a case-to-case basis.
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In the case at bar, Gulane not only threatened to molest Oloverio's
daughter but also accused him in public of having incestuous relations with his
mother. Gulane was said to have insulted accused-appelant in full view of his
immediate superior, the barangay captain. There was neither a reason given why
Gulane acted that way towards Oloverio nor any evidence to show that Oloverio had
previously wronged him.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals considered Oloverio's voluntary
surrender to the authorities as a mitigating circumstance. We find no reason to
disturb this conclusion.
2. No. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof, which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.
For treachery to be appreciated, the following elements must be proven: (a)
the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and (b) the means of execution was
deliberately or consciously adopted.
The mere suddenness of an attack should not be the sole basis in finding
treachery. There must be evidence to show that the accused deliberately or
consciously adopted the means of execution to ensure its success. In People v. Real:
As a rule, a sudden attack by the assailant, whether frontally or from behind, is
treachery if such mode of attack was coolly and deliberately adopted by him with
the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to either fight or retreat. The rule
does not apply, however, where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately
adopted but was just triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of the accused
because of the provocative act of the victim.
The attack, while sudden, cannot be said to have been unexpected or
unprovoked. Oloverio alleged that before the attack, Gulane had been insulting him
and mocking him in a loud voice, "How many times did you have sexual intercourse
with your mother?" This utterance, along with testimonies of Gulane's previous
insults, would have been sufficient provocation for accused-appellant to stab him.
3. No. Murder is the act of killing a person under the circumstances mentioned in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The provision states:
ARTICLE 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article
24626 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed
men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to
insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.

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3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a
vessel, derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an
airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means
involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph,
or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone,, epidemic, or
any other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the
victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
To be able to sustain a conviction for murder, the prosecution must prove the
following elements:
1. That a person was killed.
2. That the accused killed him.
3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Art. 248.
4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide.
Since treachery has not been proven, the crime is merely homicide. Under the
Revised
Penal
Code:
ARTICLE 249. Homicide. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of
article 246 shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances
enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and
be punished by reclusion temporal.
PHYSICAL INJURIES
FEDERICO SABAY vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 192150, October 01, 2014, J. Brion
Since the accused alleges self-defense, he carries the burden of evidence to
prove that he satisfied the elements required by law; he who alleges must prove.
By admitting the commission of the act charged and pleading avoidance based on
the law, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence to prove that the facts
that the legal avoidance requires are present; the weakness of the prosecutions
evidence is immaterial after he admitted the commission of the act charged. As
pointed out, Sabay failed to substantiate his claimed self-defense because he did
not even present any medical certificate as supporting evidence, notwithstanding
his claim that he consulted a doctor. Nor did he ever present the doctor he allegedly
consulted. His contention, too, that he was attacked by Godofredo and was shot
with a .38 caliber gun by Jessie was refuted by the prosecution eyewitnesses
Rodolfo and Dina who both testified that it was the petitioner who had attacked
Godofredo.
Facts:

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While Sabay and his daughter Erlinda were busy laying wood and water pipes
in the yard of Godofredo Lopez, the latter confronted Sabay about Sabays alleged
intrusion into Godofredos property. A verbal altercation ensued between them.
In the course of the verbal exchange, Erlinda hit Godofredo on the head with
a hard object. Sabay joined in by throwing a stone at Godofredos face, breaking the
latters eyeglasses. Godofredo claimed that as a result, he felt dizzy. Sabay and
Erlinda then shouted at Godofredo and threatened to kill him. Immediately
thereafter, Jervie Lopez came and pacified the three. But in the course his efforts,
he was hit in the hand with a bolo. The neighbors intervened not long after and
pacified
the
parties.
The Medico Legal Certificates dated June 12, 2001 showed that Godofredo
suffered a contusion on the left parietal area of his head and an abrasion in his left
cheek, while Jervie sustained a wound in his right palm.
On June 13, 2001, Godofredo and Jervie filed a complaint against Sabay
before the barangay. The parties agreed to settle the complaint based on the
recommendation of the building inspector and reflected their agreement in their
Kasunduang Pag-aayos dated June 20, 2001. The Kasunduan, however, was not
implemented because the building inspector failed to make the promised
recommendation to resolve the boundary dispute between the parties. Thus, the
Office of the Barangay Captain issued a Certificate to File an Action.Sabay was
accordingly charged with the crime of Physical Injuries under two (2) Informations
before the MTC. Sabay, together with his daughter Erlinda, was also charged with
Light Threats for allegedly uttering threatening words against the private
complainant, Godofredo.
Sabay denied the charge and claimed that he had simply acted in selfdefense. He narrated that on the date of the incident while he was putting a
monument on his lot, Godofredo suddenly hit him with an iron bar in his right hand,
causing him injuries. Jesus Lopez, Godofredos son, went out of their house and with
a .38 caliber gun, fired the gun at him. To defend himself, he got a stone and threw
it at Godofredo.
Issue:
Whether or not Bacays claim of self- defense exonerates him from the crime.
Ruling:
No.
Since the accused alleges self-defense, he carries the burden of evidence to
prove that he satisfied the elements required by law; he who alleges must prove. By
admitting the commission of the act charged and pleading avoidance based on the
law, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence to prove that the facts that
the legal avoidance requires are present; the weakness of the prosecutions
evidence is immaterial after he admitted the commission of the act charged.

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In this case, Sabay admitted the acts attributed to him, and only pleads that
he acted in self-defense. His case essentially rests on the existence of unlawful
aggression that Godofredo hit him with an iron bar on his right hand. As pointed
out, Sabay failed to substantiate his claimed self-defense because he did not even
present any medical certificate as supporting evidence, notwithstanding his claim
that he consulted a doctor. Nor did he ever present the doctor he allegedly
consulted. His contention, too, that he was attacked by Godofredo and was shot
with a .38 caliber gun by Jessie was refuted by the prosecution eyewitnesses
Rodolfo and Dina who both testified that it was the petitioner who had attacked
Godofredo.
The prosecution eyewitnesses testimonies were supported by the medico legal
certificates showing that Godofredo sustained a contusion on the left parietal area
of his head and an abrasion on his left cheek. These medico legal findings are
consistent with Godofredos claim that the petitioner hit him and inflicted physical
injuries.
In sum, we are fully satisfied that the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) counts of slight physical injuries. His claim of self-defense fails for
lack of supporting evidence; he failed to present any evidence of unlawful
aggression and cannot thus be said to have hit Godofredo as a measure to defend
himself.
RAPE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RENE SANTIAGO
G.R. No. 196970, April 2, 2014, J. Del Castillo
The elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal
knowledge of a woman and (2) that the woman is below 12 years of age x x x. In
this case, although the Informations alleged that AAA was 11 years of age when
the rape incidents transpired, she was actually 13 years of age when the rape
incidents transpired on December 25, 2004 and January 21, 2005, as her Certificate
of Birth showed that she was born on March 10, 1991. Thus, Santiago is guilty only
of simple, not statutory rape.
Facts:
Rene Santiago (Santiago) was charged with two counts of rape. When
arraigned Santiago entered a plea of not guilty. Santiagos defense of denial and
alibi was not given any credence by the trial court for being self-serving and
unsubstantiated and considering his positive identification by AAA. Consequently,
the Regional Trial Court rendered decision convicting Santiago of two counts of
simple rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
of the two cases.
Aggrieved, Santiago appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its decision, the
appellate court affirmed in toto the trial courts ruling.

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Santiago argues that AAA did not resist his sexual advances neither were
they against her will. He also claims that the prosecution failed to establish that he
intimidated or coerced AAA into having sexual intercourse with him.
Issue:
Whether or not Santiago is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of
simple rape.
Ruling:
Yes. Santiago is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of simple rape.
From a complete denial of the occurrence of the rape incidents when he
testified before the trial court, Santiago made a sudden turnaround by admitting
having had sexual intercourse with AAA that were, however, consensual as the
latter never resisted his advances. But he offered no reason why AAA would consent
to having sexual liaison with him. By arguing in this manner, Santiago changed the
theory of his defense, i.e., from denial and alibi to consensual intercourse, to his
utter detriment. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, a change in theory
merely accentuates the Santiagos lack of credibility and candor. Changing the
defense on appeal is an indication of desperation on the part of Santiago, due to the
seeming inadequacy of his defense adopted in the first instance.
With regard to Santiagos second contention, AAA testified that she was
threatened, forced, and coerced into sexual copulation. When AAA was placed on
the witness stand, she categorically testified that during the first rape incident,
Santiago threatened to hurt her if she would report the incident to anyone. As
regards the second rape incident, AAA declared that Santiago consummated the
dastardly act by pointing an ice pick at her. Admittedly, these were not mentioned
in AAAs Sinumpaang Salaysay however, they did not diminish her credibility. As
correctly held by the appellate court, that AAA failed to mention in her Sinumpaang
Salaysay what she narrated in open court about Santiagos threats on her life and
his use of an ice pick as he unleashed his perversity, hardly affects her credibility.
It is generally conceded that ex parte affidavits tend to be incomplete and
inaccurate for lack of or absence of searching inquiries by the investigating officer.
It is not a complete reproduction of what the declarant has in mind because it is
generally prepared by the administering officer and the affiant simply signs it after
it has been read to him. Hence, whenever there is a variance between the
statements in the affidavit and those made in open court by the same witness, the
latter generally prevail. Indeed, it is doctrinal that open court declarations take
precedence over written affidavits in the hierarchy of evidence.
Finally, both the trial court and the CA correctly convicted Santiago of simple
rape, instead of statutory rape. The elements of [statutory rape] are: (1) that the
accused had carnal knowledge of a woman and (2) that the woman is below 12
years of age x x x. In this case, although the Informations alleged that AAA was
11 years of age when the rape incidents transpired, she was actually 13 years of
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age when the rape incidents transpired on December 25, 2004 and January 21,
2005, as her Certificate of Birth showed that she was born on March 10, 1991. Thus,
Santiago is guilty only of simple, not statutory rape for which he was properly
imposed the sentence of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 266B of the Revised
Penal Code. However, it must be mentioned that Santiago is not eligible for parole
pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEL DIOQUINO y GARBIN


G.R. No. 191390, April 2, 2014, J. Villarama, Jr.

In adopting the sweetheart theory as a defense, the accused necessarily


admitted carnal knowledge of ABC, the first element of rape. This admission makes
the sweetheart theory more difficult to defend, for it is not only an affirmative
defense that needs convincing proof, but also after the prosecution has successfully
established a prima facie case, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused,
who has to adduce evidence that the intercourse was consensual.

Facts:

Dioquino was charged with eight counts of rape allegedly committed against
ABC, a 17-year old minor. Upon arraignment, Dioquino entered a plea of not guilty
to all the charges as stated in the informations. Trial ensued. According to the
prosecution, on July 31, 1999, at around 9:00 oclock in the evening, ABC and the
Dioquino both attended a dance held in the national high school. When ABC was on
her way home, Dioquino attacked her and was able to obtain carnal knowledge of
her despite her resistance. The victim was not able to tell the attack to her parents.
Dioquino was able to repeat the sexual assaults upon ABC through the use of force
and intimidation. Dioquino also threatened the victim that he will kill the family of
the victim if she disclose the incident to others.

On the other hand, Dioquino presented the sweetheart defense. Claiming to


be ABCs boyfriend, Dioquino took the witness stand and asserted that the alleged
rapes complained against him were, in reality, the mutual acts of young lovers.
Having made love to said minor two months after she became his girlfriend,
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Dioquino claimed that he engaged in a string of consensual sexual encounters with
ABC.

The RTC found Dioquino guilty of seven counts of rape and sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua for each count. The RTC did not give any credence to Dioquinos
sweetheart defense for it was admittedly not supported by any evidence of their
relationship. Moreover, the existence of force and intimidation was proven by the
prosecution for each of the times Dioquino had carnal knowledge of ABC. The CA
agreed with the RTC that ABCs testimony was candid, straightforward, and credible.
Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

Whether the CA and the RTC erred in not giving credence to the sweetheart
theory

Ruling:

No. Dioquinos bare invocation of the sweetheart theory cannot stand. To be


credible, the sweetheart theory must be corroborated by documentary, testimonial,
or other evidence. Usually, these are letters, notes, photos, mementos, or credible
testimonies of those who know the lovers. Dioquinos defense admittedly lacks
these pieces of evidence. In adopting the sweetheart theory as a defense, however,
he necessarily admitted carnal knowledge of ABC, the first element of rape. This
admission makes the sweetheart theory more difficult to defend, for it is not only an
affirmative defense that needs convincing proof, but also after the prosecution has
successfully established a prima facie case, the burden of evidence is shifted to the
accused, who has to adduce evidence that the intercourse was consensual. No such
evidence was presented to show that the several episodes of sexual intercourse
were consensual. The medical examination done on ABC debunks any claim of
Dioquino that he did not force himself upon ABC.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEL ABAT y COMETA


G.R. No. 202704, April 2, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Impregnation of a woman is not an element of rape.

Facts:

On November 15, 2001, an Information was filed before the RTC, charging
Abat with the crime of Rape allegedly committed against AAA, his niece, and a 15
year old minor. Abat pleaded not guilty to the charge upon his arraignment on
January 30, 2002. The pre-trial conference was held, after which, trial on the merits
ensued. According to the prosecution, the facts of the case are as follows: On
September 22, 2001, around eight oclock in the evening, AAA was home with her
parents and siblings. Abat, (an uncle of AAA, being the half-brother of AAAs father),
with the permission of AAAs parents, brought AAA with him to the poblacion to buy
medicine. The two proceeded to the poblacion on board a tricycle driven by Abat.
Then, he drove the tricycle to Barangay Malabo. Upon reaching Barangay Malabo,
Abat brought AAA to her grandfathers nipa hut. Abat undressed himself then laid
AAA down on a bamboo bed. Abat then succeeded to obtain carnal knowledge of
the victim. AAA struggled and tried to push Abat away but he threatened to kill her
and her family if she would tell anybody about the act. AAA, fearing that Abat will
make good of his threat, didnt tell her parents of the assault.

On November 12, 2001, Abat tried to force AAA to go to his house. Thus, in
the evening, AAA informed her parents about the rape incident and they went to
Victoria Police Station to lodge a complaint against Abat. Because of rape, AAA, on
April 24, 2002, gave birth to a baby girl. For his defense, Abat claims that he and
AAA considered themselves as lovers. She frequently visited him during Saturdays
and Sundays. AAAs parents filed a case against him when they discovered she was
pregnant.

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Abat was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape by the
RTC.
The Court of Appeals found no error committed by the RTC, and affirmed Abats
conviction.
Abat is now alleging that he and AAA had a romantic relationship, which eventually
turned sour when AAA started asking for money from him all the time. In support of
this claim, he cites the birth date of the baby, who was supposedly the product of
his crime. Abat says that if the baby was born in April 2002, then his version of the
story, that they had consensual sex in July 2001, is more credible than her story of
rape in September 2001 otherwise, the baby would have been premature.
Issues:

1. Is the determination of the exact date of fertilization material to the crime


of rape?
2. Is denial and ill-motive a defense in the crime of rape?
Ruling:

1. No. The Court, in People v. Sta. Ana, 291 SCRA 188 (1998), said: [A]uthorities in
forensic medicine agree that the determination of the exact date of fertilization is
problematic. The exact date thereof is unknown thus, the difficulty in determining
the actual normal duration of pregnancy. Citing a Filipino authority, the Court
further elucidated: The average duration of pregnancy is 270 to 280 days from the
onset of the last menstruation. There is, however, no means of determining it with
certainty. Evidence derived from pregnancy following a single coitus is trustworthy,
but inasmuch as some authorities consider more than two weeks as the life span of
the spermatozoa in the vaginal canal, it is hard to ascertain the exact date of
fertilization. There is no synchrony between coitus and fertilization.

In any event, the impregnation of a woman is not an element of rape. Proof


that the child was fathered by another man does not show that Abat is not guilty,
considering the positive testimony of Amalia that accused appellant had abused
her. As held in People v. Alib: Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances: (1) By using force or intimidation(2)When the woman is deprived of
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reason or otherwise unconscious and (3)When the woman is under twelve years of
age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding
paragraphs shall be present. It is therefore quite clear that the pregnancy of the
victim is not required. For the conviction of an accused, it is sufficient that the
prosecution establish beyond reasonable doubt that he had carnal knowledge of the
offended party and that he had committed such act under any of the circumstances
enumerated above. Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man having sexual
bodily connections with a woman.

2. Abats attempt to escape liability by denying the charge against him and coupling it
with the imputation of ill motive against AAAs parents must be ignored. Motives
such as resentment, hatred or revenge have never swayed this Court from giving
full credence to the testimony of a minor rape victim. More so in this case, where
the attribution of the improper motive is against AAAs parents and not her
personally.
Furthermore, the Court has never favorably looked upon the defense of
denial, which constitutes self-serving negative evidence that cannot be accorded
greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration of a credible witness. To
elucidate on the point, this Court, in People v. Espinosa, held that: It is well-settled
that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a self-serving
assertion that deserves no weight in law. Denial cannot prevail over the positive,
candid and categorical testimony of the complainant, and as between the positive
declaration of the complainant and the negative statement of the appellant, the
former deserves more credence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MAURICIO HALLARTE y MENDOZA


G.R. No.205382, April 02, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since
when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed.
In statutory rape, there must be independent evidence proving the age of the
victim, other than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the absence of
denial by the accused.
Facts:
Two separate informations were filed against Mauricio, charging him of the
crime of rape. The victims, as stated in the informations, are minors AAA, who was
then 7 year old and BBB, then 8 year old. Both are nieces of Mauricio. During his
arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the
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offenses charged. At pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the minority of both AAA and
BBB.
Upon trial, the prosecution claims that in the afternoon of June 4, 2000, AAA
was playing with Charissa Hallarte, her cousin and the daughter of her uncle, herein
appellant, at the second floor of the latters house in Barangay Pasong Tamo,
Quezon City where she had also been staying. At the time, Mauricio happened to
also be at the second floor of the house. When Charissa went to the ground floor to
urinate, Mauricio approached AAA and began to remove his shorts. Thereafter, he
laid AAA, raised her skirt and pulled down her underwear. Then, Mauricio inserted
his penis into her vagina, causing AAA to feel pain and to shout for help from
Charissa. When appellant realized that his daughter Charissa might be returning
anytime, he let AAA go. AAA did not recount her ordeal to anyone until she
complained to her mother, CCC, of the pain in her vagina. AAA then confessed that
her uncle, appellant herein, inserted his penis into her vagina.
On the other hand, at around 8 oclock in the evening of June 17, 2000, while
Mauricios other niece, BBB, was with him in his house, he inserted his penis into
her mouth and threatened her not to tell anyone what he had done. BBB did not
report the incident immediately because she feared Mauricio.
Mauricio interposed the defense of denial.
On April 7, 2009, after trial on the merits, the RTC convicted Mauricio as
charged. In a Decision dated April 20, 2012, the CA affirmed appellants conviction
for both crimes but modified the penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. Q-00-93226
for Rape by Sexual Assault, meting instead the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period as prescribed under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7610.
Hence, this appeal.
Issues:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming appellants conviction for both crimes
charged.
2. Whether the penalty imposed by the CA is correct.
Ruling:
1. No.
In this case, the Court gives full weight to the RTCs finding, as affirmed by
the CA, that Mauricio indeed committed the crimes charged and is therefore guilty
beyond reasonable doubt therefor. As observed by the RTC, which had the
opportunity to personally scrutinize both AAAs and BBBs conduct and demeanor
during trial, they were credible witnesses whose testimonies must be accorded
great probative weight. The trial judges evaluation, which the CA sustained, now
binds the Court, leaving Mauricio the burden to bring to the fore facts or
circumstances of weight that were otherwise overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted but would materially affect the disposition of the case differently if
duly considered. Unfortunately for Mauricio, he failed to discharge this burden.
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Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since
when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the
offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to
her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but
also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is
not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. A young
girls revelation that she had been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to
medical examination and willingness to undergo public trial where she could be
compelled to give out the details of an assault on her dignity, cannot be so easily
dismissed as mere concoction.
2. No.
While the Court upholds the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed upon
Mauricio in Criminal Case No. Q-00-93225 for Simple Rape, there is a need to modify
the penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. Q-0093226 for Rape by Sexual Assault in
view of the failure of the prosecution to satisfactorily prove the age of BBB. While
the information alleged that BBB was 8 years of age, a minor, and the parties
stipulated on her minority during the pre-trial conference, the same are insufficient
evidence of her age which must be proved conclusively and indubitably as the
crime itself. As the Court succinctly explained in People v. Soria:
[T]here must be independent evidence proving the age of the victim, other
than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the absence of denial by the
accused. Documents such as her original or duly certified
birth certificate,
baptismal certificate or school records would suffice as competent evidence of her
age. Here, there was nothing on record to prove the minority of AAA other than
her testimony, Mauricios absence of denial, and their pre-trial stipulation. The
prosecution also failed to establish that the documents referred to above were lost,
destroyed, unavailable or otherwise totally absent. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
Apart from BBBs testimony and the aforesaid stipulation, records are bereft
of sufficient evidence to prove BBBs age.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODRIGO GUTIEREZ y ROBLES ALIAS ROD
AND JOHN LENNON
G.R. No. 208007, April 2, 2014, J. Leonen

Statutory rape is committed when (1) the offended party is under 12 years of
age and (2) the accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there
was force, threat or intimidation whether the victim was deprived of reason or

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consciousness or whether it was done through fraud or grave abuse of authority. It
is enough that the age of the victim is proven and that there was sexual
intercourse.

Facts:

On November 30, 2005, an information was filed against Rodrigo Gutierez


before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. Upon arraignment, Rodrigo Gutierez
pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution presented the
victim, AAA, who was then 10 years old and a Grade 2 student. She testified that on
November 29, 2005, she went home from school at around 12 noon to have lunch.
On the way home, she met Rodrigo at his house. He brought her to his room and
laid her down on the bed. He then raised her skirt and removed her panties. He
pulled down his pants and then inserted his penis into her vagina. According to AAA,
Rodrigo stayed on top of her for a long time, and when he withdrew his penis, white
liquid came out. He then gave her five pesos (P5.00) before she went back to
school. AAA also disclosed during trial that Rodrigo had done the same thing to her
about 10 times on separate occasions. After each act, he would give her ten
(P10.00) or five (P5.00) pesos. The prosecution also presented Dr. Asuncion Ogues
as an expert witness. Dr. Ogues was the superior of Dr. Pascua who examined AAA.
Dr. Ogues testified based on the medical certificate issued by the examining
physician that there was blunt force penetrating trauma that could have been
caused by sexual abuse.

In his defense, Rodrigo denied the allegation and claimed he was already at
work at 1:30 p.m. He has known AAA for a long time since his family rented the
house of AAAs grandfather from 2001 to 2004. Rodrigo admitted that he had a
relationship with AAAs sister, and they even lived together as common law
spouses. He also admitted that a similar complaint was filed against him by AAAs
mother when AAA was eight years old, but they settled the case at the barangay
level.

On July 4, 2007, the trial court rendered a judgment finding Rodrigo guilty.
Rodrigo appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming that AAAs testimony fell short of
the requirement of the law on the quantum of evidence required. He argued that
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she did not cry for help when her familys house was just nearby, which was cause
for reasonable doubt that the trial court failed to appreciate. On February 28, 2013,
the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the conviction.
Hence, this appeal was instituted.

Issue:

Whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
Rodrigo was guilty of statutory rape punishable under Article 266A of the Revised
Penal Code.

Ruling:

Yes. Statutory rape is committed when (1) the offended party is under 12
years of age and (2) the accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of
whether there was force, threat or intimidation whether the victim was deprived of
reason or consciousness or whether it was done through fraud or grave abuse of
authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is proven and that there was sexual
intercourse.

As shown by her testimony, AAA was able to narrate in a clear and


categorical manner the ordeal that was done to her. As a child victim who has taken
significant risks in coming to court, her testimony deserves full weight and
credence. People v. Veloso, 690 SCRA 586 (2013), stated that: In a litany of cases,
this Court has ruled that the testimonies of child victims of rape are to be given full
weight and credence. Reason and experience dictate that a girl of tender years, who
barely understands sex and sexuality, is unlikely to impute to any man a crime so
serious as rape, if what she claims is not true. Her candid narration of how she was
raped bears the earmarks of credibility, especially if no ill will as in this case
motivates her to testify falsely against the accused. It is well settled that when a
woman, more so when she is a minor, says she has been raped, she says in effect
all that is required to prove the ravishment. The accused may thus be convicted

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solely on her testimony provided it is credible, natural, convincing and consistent
with human nature and the normal course of things.

In any case, whether she cried for help is immaterial in a charge of statutory
rape since [t]he law presumes that such a victim, on account of her tender age,
does not and cannot have a will of her own. Beyond reasonable doubt, Rodrigo
Gutierez raped AAA, a minor who was only 10 years of age, on November 29, 2005.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HERMENIGILDO DELEN y ESCOBILLA


G.R. No. 194446, April 21, 2014, J. De Castro

Under Section 3(b), Article I of Republic Act No. 7610, the term "child abuse"
is defined as the maltreatment of a child, whether habitual or not, which includes
the physical abuse of a child, among other acts. In this case, AAA positively
identified Delen as the person who kicked her in the buttocks, hit her head with a
hammer, and smashed her head on the wall on. Furthermore, the Court finds no
cogent reason to disbelieve AAAs testimony, which was corroborated by the
medical findings of Dr. Rivamonte and Dr. Arellano that the victims hymen had
"complete healed lacerations at 1, 3, 6, 9 oclock positions." Jurisprudence provides
that the eloquent testimony of the victim, coupled with the medical findings
attesting to her non-virgin state, should be enough to confirm the truth of her
charges of rape.

Facts:

Delen was separately charged with child abuse under Section 10(a), Article VI
of Republic Act No. 7610 and qualified rape in separate informations before the RTC.
Said crimes were alleged to have been committed against AAA as follows:

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AAA was born on March 29, 1992 to Delen and BBB. AAAs parents separated
as Delen was beating BBB. AAA then lived with her aunt until the Delen took her in.
In the year 2000, AAA lived in the Delens house. One day, she was awakened from
her sleep when Delen removed her shorts and panty. Delen then removed his shorts
and went on top of AAA. He inserted his penis into her organ and told her not to
create any noise because their neighbors might hear them. He also warned AAA
that he would kill her if she would report the incident. AAA could not do anything
but cry. Subsequently, at around 6:00 a.m. on January 17, 2005, AAA woke up with
her legs spread apart and tied to wooden panels on the wall. She was only wearing
her upper clothing and was not wearing her shorts and panty anymore. Delen
removed his shorts and only wore briefs. Delen then lay on top of her and began to
insert his penis into her organ, which caused her pain. While Delen was doing said
act, he told AAA not to report the incident; otherwise, he threatened to cut her
tongue and kill her. Thereafter, the Delen untied her.

On January 23, 2005, Delen asked AAA to look for a lighter. When AAA failed
to find one, Delen told her to go inside a room in their house. There, he kicked AAA
in the buttocks, hit her head with a hammer and smashed her head on the wooden
wall. She suffered injuries on her forehead and the back of her head. Afterwards,
she told the Delen that she was going to use the toilet so she was able to go out of
their house. She ran to the street and went to the house of a neighbor, Ate Annie.
Delen looked for her there so she hid under the bed. After Delen left, AAA was
brought to the house of Nanay Loleng, a neighbor of Ate Annie. They treated AAAs
wounds and put her to sleep. When she woke up, the barangay tanods were already
at the place. They first talked to AAA then they called the police so that Delen could
be apprehended. When Delen was arrested, AAA was brought to the police station
where she gave her statement. AAA was then taken to the hospital where she was
treated and examined by doctors.

Issue:

Whether or not Delen is guilty of child abuse and qualified rape.

Ruling:

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Yes.

guilty
injury
"child
which

In Criminal Case No. 13870, the RTC and the Court of Appeals found Delen
beyond reasonable doubt of committing child abuse by infliction of physical
against AAA. Under Section 3(b), Article I of Republic Act No. 7610, the term
abuse" is defined as the maltreatment of a child, whether habitual or not,
includes the physical abuse of a child, among other acts.

In this case, AAA positively identified Delen as the person who kicked her in
the buttocks, hit her head with a hammer, and smashed her head on the wall on
January 23, 2005. Because of the said brutal and inhumane acts of Delen, AAA
suffered bruises and contusions in different parts of her body. The Medico-Legal
Certification of Dr. Rivamonte and Dr. Arellano clearly reflected the fact that AAA
indeed sustained contusions, coupled with a finding that she suffered multiple
physical injuries secondary to mauling.

In the case of qualified rape, pursuant to Art. 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code, a charge of rape to prosper under the above provision, the prosecution must
prove that: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he
accomplished such act through force, threat, or intimidation, or when she was
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under twelve years
of age or was demented.

In the instant case, the prosecution was able to establish that Delen had
carnal knowledge of AAA on January 17, 2005. AAA narrated in a straightforward
manner the harrowing details of how Delen had sexual intercourse with her. Again,
the RTC found credible and convincing AAAs testimony on this matter. Likewise, the
Court finds no cogent reason to disbelieve AAAs testimony, which was corroborated
by the medical findings of Dr. Rivamonte and Dr. Arellano that the victims hymen
had "complete healed lacerations at 1, 3, 6, 9 oclock positions." The Court held in
People v. Oden that the "eloquent testimony of the victim, coupled with the medical
findings attesting to her non-virgin state, should be enough to confirm the truth of
her charges." As to the manner by which the rape was committed, the Delens
moral ascendancy over AAA takes the place of the force and intimidation that is
required in rape cases.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDGAR JUMAWAN


G.R. No. 187495, April 21, 2014, J. Reyes
Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists
within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her
will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the
CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape
under R.A. No. 8353. It is true that the Family Code, obligates the spouses to love
one another but this rule sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of
love, that are both spontaneous and mutual and not the kind which is unilaterally
exacted by force or coercion. The definition of rape in Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 8353
pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally known; (b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape
or that where the victim is the perpetrator's own spouse. The single definition for all
three forms of the crime shows that the law does not distinguish between rape
committed in wedlock and those committed without a marriage.
Facts:
In 1975, Jumawan and victim KKK got married and bore 4 children. In 1998,
KKK and Jumawan started quarrelling usually upon his complaint that she failed to
attend to him. In October 1998, Jumawan, his wife KKK and their children went
about their nightly routine. The family store in their residence was closed at about
9:00 p.m. before supper was taken. Afterwards, KKK did some of her motherly duties
to her children. Soon after, the Jumawan fetched KKK and bid her to come with him
to their conjugal bedroom in the third floor of the house. KKK complied.
Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial
bed but she did not lie thereon with Jumawan and instead, rested separately in a cot
near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: Why are you
lying on the cot?, and to instantaneously order: You transfer here to our bed. KKK
insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal
pain due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he
got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing
KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow
and transferred to the bed. Jumawan then lay beside KKK and not before long,
expressed his desire to copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She
politely declined by warding off his hand and reiterating that she was not feeling
well. Jumawan again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by
holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the
sides. KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs. Jumawan then raised KKK's
daster, stretched her legs apart and rested his own legs on them. She tried to
wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As he
was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by desperately
shouting: Don't do that to me because I'm not feeling well.

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Evening of the following day, KKK decided to spend the night in the room's
small bed and the girls were already fixing the beddings when Jumawan entered.
Why are you sleeping in the room of our children, he asked KKK, who responded
that she preferred to sleep with the children. He left the room and returned 15
minutes later and when KKK still refused to go with him, he became infuriated. He
lifted her from the bed and attempted to carry her out of the room as he exclaimed:
Why will you sleep here. Lets go to our bedroom. When she defied him, he
grabbed her short pants causing them to tear apart. At this point, MMM interfered,
Pa, don't do that to Mama because we are in front of you. The presence of his
children apparently did not pacify Jumawan who yelled, Even in front of you, I can
have sex of your mother because I'm the head of the family. The episodes in the
bedroom were no less disturbing. Jumawan forcibly pulled KKK's short pants and
panties. He paid no heed as she begged, Don't do that to me, my body is still
aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do [sic]. I
cannot withstand sex. After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed her
legs, held her hands, mounted her and forced himself inside her.
Issue:
Whether or not Jumawan is guilty of rape.
Ruling:
Yes, Accused Jumawan is guilty of marital rape.
The ancient customs and ideologies from which the irrevocable implied
consent theory (states that women and wives are mere properties of men and
husbands that they can have sexual intercourse anytime) evolved have already
been superseded by modem global principles on the equality of rights between men
and women and respect for human dignity established in various international
conventions, such as the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms
of Discrimination Against Women (UN-CEDAW). The Philippines, as State Party to the
CEDAW, recognized that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of
women in society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality between them.
Accordingly, the country vowed to take all appropriate measures to modify the
social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving
the elimination of prejudices, customs and all other practices which are based on
the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes. One of such
measures is R.A. No. 8353 insofar as it eradicated the archaic notion that marital
rape cannot exist because a husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wife's
body and thus her consent to every act of sexual intimacy with him is always
obligatory or at least, presumed. Another important interna-tional instrument on
gender equality is the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women, which was Promulgated by the UN General Assembly subsequent to the
CEDAW. The Declaration, in enumerating the forms of gender-based violence that
constitute acts of discrimination against women, identified marital rape as a
species of sexual violence.

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Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists
within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her
will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the
CEDAW and its accompanying Decla-ration, defines and penalizes the act as rape
under R.A. No. 8353. It is true that the Family Code, obligates the spouses to love
one another but this rule sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of
love, that are both spontaneous and mutual and not the kind which is unilaterally
exacted by force or coercion.
The definition of rape in Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as
traditionally known; (b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim
is the perpetrator's own spouse. The single definition for all three forms of the crime
shows that the law does not distinguish between rape committed in wedlock and
those committed without a marriage. Hence, the law affords protection to women
raped by their husband and those raped by any other man alike. In fine, since the
law does not separately categorize marital rape and non-marital rape nor provide
for different definition or elements for either, the Court, tasked to interpret and
apply what the law dictates, cannot trudge the forbidden sphere of judicial
legislation and unlawfully divert from what the law sets forth. Neither can the Court
frame distinct or stricter evidentiary rules for marital rape cases as it would
inequitably burden its victims and unreasonably and irrationally classify them
differently from the victims of non-marital rape.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRED TRAIGO
G.R. No. 199096, June 02, 2014, J. Brion
AAA was only ten (10) years old when Traigo raped her in September 2004.
The minority of the victim and her relationship to Traigo, however, raised the crime
from statutory rape to qualified rape. Simply put, qualified rape is statutory rape in
its qualified form. The also evidence showed that the she was 12 years old when
she was raped on March 2006, as evidenced by her Certificate of Live Birth showing
that she was born on November, 18, 1993. The evidence also established that the
Traigo was the common-law spouse of BBB. Under Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code, the death penalty shall be imposed when the victim is below 18 years
of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of
the parent of the victim. The SC cannot, however, impose the death penalty in view
of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled An Act Prohibiting the imposition of the Death
Penalty in the Philippines.
Facts:
AAA testified that the Fred Traigo inserted his penis into her vagina on two
occasions that is on March 2006 and September 2004. Her testimony was
corroborated by the Initial Medico-Legal Report showing that she suffered deephealed hymenal lacerations. The RTC convicted Traigo of the crimes of rape and
qualified rape for the sexual abuses committed against AAA on March 2006 and
September 2004, respectively. The CA also ruled that the exact date of the rape is
immaterial, and that AAAs delay in reporting this first rape was understandable
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since the appellant threatened to kill her mother, BBB, if she would reveal the
incident to anyone.
For the simple rape committed in March 2006, the RTC sentenced Traigo to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to pay AAA the amounts
of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, all with legal interest. For the qualified rape committed in
September 2004, the RTC sentenced Traigo to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and ordered him to pay the victim the following amounts: P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, also with legal interest until fully paid.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. It found AAA to be a credible,
honest, and straightforward witness; AAA never wavered in her identification of
Traigo as her abuser despite the defenses grueling cross-examination. According to
the CA, the testimony of a sole witness is sufficient for conviction if it is free from
any sign of impropriety or falsehood. The CA also found unmeritorious Traigos
denial, and reasoned out that the presence of other persons inside the room did not
negate the commission of rape.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime committed by Traigo should be modified from
simple rape to qualified rape
Ruling:
Yes, the SC denied the appeal, but modified the crime committed, the penalty
imposed, and the awarded indemnities.
Traigo did not impute any improper motive on AAAs part to falsely testify
against him. AAAs testimony was also corroborated by the medical findings of Dr.
Joseph Palmero showing that the victim suffered deep-healed lacerations at 3 & 8
oclock position on her hymen. It is settled that when a rape victim's account is
straightforward and candid, and is corroborated by the medical findings of the
examining physician, the testimony is sufficient to support a conviction.
The Court find unmeritorious Traigos defense that it was impossible for him
to rape AAA because the latters two sisters also slept in the same place when the
rapes allegedly happened. It is recognized that lust is no respecter of time and
place; rape can thus be committed even in places where people congregate, in
parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside a house where there are
other occupants, and even in the same room where other members of the family
are also sleeping. To the Courts mind, it is not impossible or incredible for the
members of the victim's sisters to be in deep slumber and not to be awakened while
a sexual assault is being committed.
The Court modified the crime committed by the appellant in Criminal Case
No. 133721 from simple rape to qualified rape. The evidence showed that she was
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12 years old when she was raped on March 2006, as evidenced by her Certificate of
Live Birth showing that she was born on November, 18, 1993. The evidence also
established that the appellant was the common-law spouse of BBB. Under Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the death penalty shall be imposed when the
victim is below 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. The Court cannot, however,
impose the death penalty in view of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled An Act
Prohibiting the imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines. In lieu of the
death penalty, we impose on the appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole. Accordingly, the Court increases the awarded moral
damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.
The Court likewise points out in Criminal Case No. 133722 that AAA was only
ten (10) years old when Traigo raped her in September 2004. The minority of the
victim and her relationship to the Traigo, however, raised the crime from statutory
rape to qualified rape. Simply put, qualified rape is statutory rape in its qualified
form. Accordingly, the Court sentences Traigo to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole; and increase the awarded moral damages
from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 to conform to prevailing jurisprudence on qualified
rape cases.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VALENTIN SABAL y PARBA, JR.
G.R. No. 201861, June 2, 2014, J. Brion
The modification of the crime committed by the Valentin Sabal from statutory
rape to qualified rape is proper. The evidence also established that the appellant
was the brother of the victims' father. The minority of the victims and their
relationship to the appellant in the present case raised the crime from statutory
rape to qualified rape.
Facts:
In its decision dated August 20, 2008, the RTC convicted Valentin Sabal of two
counts of statutory rape for having carnal knowledge with two his nieces, AAA and
BBB on May 2, 2003. The RTC found the testimonies of the AAA and BBB credible
and convincing; it was corroborated by the findings of Dr. Victoria Galang showing
that both victims suffered hymenal lacerations on their private part. The RTC added
that it was inconceivable for minor children aged ten (10) and seven (7) years old,
who are unfamiliar and nave in the ways of the world, to fabricate a story of rape,
allow an examination of their private parts, and submit themselves to public ridicule
had they not been really sexually abused. It also found unmeritorious the
appellants denial for being uncorroborated. Accordingly, the RTC imposed on
Valentin Sabal the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and directed him to
pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00
as actual damages, for each count of statutory rape. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
RTC decision with modifications. We decide the appeal, filed by appellant Valentin
Sabal, Jr., decision of the Court of Appeals.

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Issue:
Whether or not the conviction of Valentin Sabal of statutory rape is proper.
Ruling:
No, the Court affirms Valentin Sabals conviction, but modify the designation
of the crime committed.
For a charge of rape to prosper under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished such act through force, threat, or
intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when
she was under 12 years of age or was demented. Sexual congress with a girl under
12 years old is always rape. In this type of rape, force and intimidation are
immaterial; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal
knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have
a will of her own on account of her tender years; the childs consent is immaterial
because of her presumed incapacity to discern evil from good. In the present case,
AAA testified that while she was in the house of her grandmother in the afternoon of
May 2, 2003, her uncle, Sabal, undressed her and went on top of her; Sabal then
inserted his penis in her vagina, as a result of which she felt pain. BBB, for her part,
narrated that on the same day and place, the Sabal removed her panty, inserted his
penis in her vagina, and made a push and pull movement. According to BBB, she
kept crying during the rape.
Notably, Dr. Galangs medical findings showed that both victims suffered
hymenal lacerations on their private part; she also testified that there had been
penetration of the victims vagina. We find unmeritorious the appellants twin
defenses of denial and alibi. Denial could not prevail over the victims direct,
positive and categorical assertion. We modify the crime committed by the Valentin
Sabal in Criminal Case from statutory rape to qualified rape. The presented
evidence showed that AAA and BBB were ten (10) and seven (7) years old,
respectively, when the appellant raped them on May 2, 2003. The evidence also
established that the appellant was the brother of the victims' father. Under Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the death penalty shall be imposed when the
victim is below 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. The minority of the victims and
their relationship to Sabal in the present case raised the crime from statutory rape
to qualified rape. Since the death penalty cannot be imposed in view of Republic Act
No. 9346, the CA correctly sentenced Sabal to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole for each count.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DEMOCRITO PARAS
G.R. No. 192912, June 4, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro
Pregnancy is not an essential element of rape. Whether the child which the
rape victim bore was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of
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no moment. What is important and decisive is that the accused had carnal
knowledge of the victim against the latter's will or without her consent, and such
fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful manner. Thus, when the victim, a 17year old girl who was the house helper of the sister of the accused, categorically
and consistently testified that the accused had carnal knowledge of her while
pointing a gun in her mouth, the courts will give credence to her testimony and
convict the accused regardless of the pregnancy of the victim.
Facts:
Democrito Paras was charged with rape before the RTC. It was alleged that
sometime in March 1996, AAA, a 17-year old house-helper of the Spouses Sergio
and Heny Agua, the latter being accused-appellant Democrito Parass sister. AAA
was weeding the grass of her employers yard when she was approached by a gunwielding Paras. Paras pointed the gun at AAAs mouth and gained carnal knowledge
of the latter. Subsequently, AAA got pregnant due to the incident, and gave birth to
a child.
Paras denied having raped AAA, and testified that he was in the market the
whole day at the time the alleged rape occurred. Paras also asserted that AAA
accused her of rape due to a misunderstanding between him and Sergio regarding
the mango trees owned by Parass mother.
The RTC convicted Paras as charged, and the CA upheld the RTC. Hence the
appeal.
Paras argues that since AAA was already 3 months pregnant when she was
examined on October 1996, AAA could have had sexual intercourse sometime in
June or July 1996 and not in March 1996 when the alleged rape was supposed to
have been committed.
Issue:
Did the pregnancy of AAA prove that Paras did not rape her?
Ruling:
The appeal is denied.
In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals adjudged the accusedappellant guilty of rape by having carnal knowledge of AAA without her consent
using force or intimidation. The courts a quo relied on the testimony of AAA and her
positive identification of the Paras as the perpetrator of the sexual abuse. After
thoroughly reviewing the records of this case, the Court finds that AAA was indeed
categorical and consistent in her testimony that Paras was the one who pointed a
gun to her mouth and forcibly had sexual intercourse with her. We, thus, see no
reason to disturb the lower courts appreciation of the credibility of AAAs testimony.

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Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child
which the rape victim bore was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown
individual, is of no moment. What is important and decisive is that the accused had
carnal knowledge of the victim against the latter's will or without her consent, and
such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful manner.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DEMOCRITO PARAS
G.R. No. 192912, June 4, 2014 , J. Leonardo-De Castro
Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the
elements of the crime are not grounds for acquittal. As long as the inaccuracies
concern only minor matters, the same do not affect the credibility of witnesses.
Truth-telling witnesses are not always expected to give error-free testimonies
considering the lapse of time and treachery of human memory. Inaccuracies may
even suggest that the witnesses are telling the truth and have not been rehearsed.
Authorities in forensic medicine agree that the determination of the exact
date of fertilization is problematic. The exact date thereof is unknown; thus, the
difficulty in determining the actual normal duration of pregnancy. Pregnancy is not
an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the rape victim
bore was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no
moment. What is important and decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge
of the victim against the latter's will or without her consent, and such fact was
testified to by the victim in a truthful manner.
Facts:
While the victim [AAA], a house-helper of spouses Sergio and Heny Agua, was
weeding grass using a bolo at her employers farm in [XXX], appellant Democrito
Paras approached her from behind. He pulled [AAA] towards the lower portion of the
farm and pointed a short firearm at her mouth. While pointing the gun at [AAA],
Democrito Paras pulled down her long pants and panties. He also pulled down his
pants and underwear. He laid [AAA] on the grassy ground and mounted her. Since
[AAA] was afraid of him and that she was also afraid to kill a person, she did not
strike appellant with the bolo she was holding. Democrito Paras told [AAA] not to
shout. While struggling, [AAA] even threw stones at him. After appellant
consummated his bestial lust, he dressed up and fled, while [AAA] went back to the
house of her employers Subsequently, [AAA] got pregnant due to the incident. She
gave birth to a child who was more than a year old when [AAA] testified.
The defense, on the other hand, laid out the following narrative of denial and
alibi. Accused-appellant, Democrito Paras, knows the private complainant because
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she was the helper at the house of his elder sister. He vehemently denie[d] having
raped AAA.
RTC convicted the accused-appellant of the crime charged which was upheld
by CA.
Issue:
Whether or not Democrito Paras is guilty for the crime of rape.
Ruling:
Yes, Democrito Paras is guilty for the crime of rape.
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or
by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals adjudged the accusedappellant guilty of rape by having carnal knowledge of AAA without her consent
using force or intimidation. The courts a quo relied on the testimony of AAA and her
positive identification of the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the sexual
abuse. After thoroughly reviewing the records of this case, the Court finds that AAA
was indeed categorical and consistent in her testimony that the accused-appellant
was the one who pointed a gun to her mouth and forcibly had sexual intercourse
with her.
Inconsistencies pointed out by the accused-appellant in the testimony of AAA,
namely, her inability to remember the birth date of her child and the name of her
neighbor, did not destroy her credibility as a witness. These details had nothing to
do with the essential elements of rape, that is, carnal knowledge of a person
through force or intimidation.
Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the
elements of the crime are not grounds for acquittal. As long as the inaccuracies

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concern only minor matters, the same do not affect the credibility of witnesses.
Truth-telling witnesses are not always expected to give error-free testimonies
considering the lapse of time and treachery of human memory. Inaccuracies may
even suggest that the witnesses are telling the truth and have not been rehearsed.
Authorities in forensic medicine agree that the determination of the exact
date of fertilization is problematic. The exact date thereof is unknown; thus, the
difficulty in determining the actual normal duration of pregnancy. Pregnancy is not
an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the rape victim
bore was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment.
What is important and decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of the
victim against the latter's will or without her consent, and such fact was testified to
by the victim in a truthful manner.
Anent the alleged failure of AAA to defend herself despite having many
opportunities to do so, we are not persuaded. People react differently under
emotional stress. There is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a
shocking incident, especially if the assailant is physically near. The workings of the
human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable. In a given
situation, some may shout, others may faint, and still others may be frozen into
silence. Consequently, the failure of complainant to run away or shout for help at
the very first opportunity cannot be construed consent to the sexual intercourse.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RENATO BESMONTE


G.R. No. 196228, June 4, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro
To convict an accused for statutory rape, two elements must be proven: 1.)
the victim is a female under 12 years of age or is demented; and the offender has
carnal knowledge of the victim. Thus, where the prosecution was able to present a
7-year old girls credible, positive and categorical testimony relative to the
circumstances surrounding her rape; and the physical evidence consistent with
AAAs assertion that she was raped, the accused must be held guilty of statutory
rape.
Facts:
Accused-appellant Renato Besmonte was charged with two counts of
statutory rape. The prosecution alleged that the victim AAA was merely seven years
old when the first rape incident was committed. Besmonte was in AAAs house, and
after her younger brothers left the house upon Besmontes instructions, the latter
ordered AAA to lie down on a mat and remove her clothes. Afterwards he undressed
and tried to insert his penis into her vagina but was unable to penetrate since AAA
was crying because of pain. This prompted Besmonte to leave.

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The second rape incident occurred when AAA was accompanying Besmonte
in the upland to get some root crops. AAA was made to sit down on a banana leaf
Besmonte placed on the ground. He tried to look for lice on her hair, and AAA was
surprised when he poked a fan knife at her chest and ordered her to lie down and
remove her clothes. Thenceforth, he undressed himself, laid on top of her, and
succeeded in inserting his penis into AAAs vagina. The latter felt pain and observed
that her vagina was torn. Besmonte denied raping AAA, her niece, on both
occasions.
The RTC found Besmonte guilty of the two counts of rape, and imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue:
Were the accusations of rape insufficiently proven?
Ruling:
The appeal is denied.
Basic in the prosecution of statutory rape is that there must be concurrence
of the following elements:
1.

the victim is a female under 12 years of age or is demented; and


the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim.
Thus, to successfully convict an accused for said crime, it is imperative for the
prosecution to prove that the age of the woman is under 12 years and carnal
knowledge took place.
2.

In this case, Besmonte was charged with two counts of statutory rape. The
RTC and the Court of Appeals were one in finding that he twice had carnal
knowledge of AAA, a child of tender years at the time of the commission of the two
counts of rape. Despite his vigorous protestations, the Court agrees in the finding
that the crime of rape committed by Besmonte against AAA was proved by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the following:
a) AAAs credible, positive and categorical testimony relative to the
circumstances surrounding her rape; and
b) The physical evidence consistent with AAAs assertion that she was raped.
Besmonte would have the Court reverse his conviction for the first count of
statutory rape on the ground that AAA admitted in open court that the rape
committed in March 2000 did not happen.
His attempt is futile. A review of the transcript of the testimony of AAA
clarified such misleading assertion her testimony that nothing happened simply
meant that he tried to insert his penis into her vagina but was unsuccessful because
it did not fit. In fact, AAA cried out with pain at his attempts to put it in; and her cry
of pain was what prompted Besmonte to leave abruptly. That she suffered severe
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pain inside her genitalia while his penis was penetrating her, could only be
understood in light of the foregoing explanation made herein about his penis
attaining some degree of penetration beneath the surface of her genitalia.
Carnal knowledge, the other essential element in consummated statutory
rape, does not require full penile penetration of the female. In People v.
Campuhan, the Court made clear that the mere touching of the external genitalia by
a penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal
knowledge. All that is necessary to reach the consummated stage of rape is for the
penis of the accused capable of consummating the sexual act to come into contact
with the lips of the pudendum of the victim. This means that the rape is
consummated once the penis of the accused capable of consummating the sexual
act touches either labia of the pudendum. And People v. Bali-Balita instructed that
the touching that constitutes rape does not mean mere epidermal contact, or
stroking or grazing of organs, or a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the
external layer of the victims vagina, or the mons pubis, but rather the erect penis
touching the labias or sliding into the female genitalia. xxx is required, however,
that this manner of touching of the labias must be sufficiently and convincingly
established. For the Court, the proof of the touching of the penis of accusedappellant and the labias of AAA had been convincingly established from AAAs
categorical testimony that his penis had gone beyond her mons pubis and had
reached her labias majora and minora.
With respect to the rape committed on May 4, 2001 the Court concurs with
the RTC and the Court of Appeals conclusion that AAAs testimonial account
thereon and the physical injury that she sustained as a result thereof sufficiently
and convincingly established the commission of the second count of statutory rape.
Besmonte tried to interject reasonable doubt thereto by claiming that AAAs
account of the second incident was highly incredible considering that she did not
even bother to escape from him; or why she even went with Besmonte in the first
place in view of the supposed earlier incident of rape.
But the Court, in People v. Jastiva taught that it does not follow that because
the victim failed to shout for help or struggle against her attacker means that she
could not have been raped. The force, violence, or intimidation in rape is a relative
term, depending not only on the age, size, and strength of the parties but also on
their relationship with each other. And physical resistance need not be established
in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself
against her will to the rapists advances because of fear for her life and personal
safety, or the exercise of the moral ascendancy of the rapist over the victim.
Time and again, this Court has recognized that different people react
differently to a given situation involving a startling occurrence. The workings of the
human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable, and people react
differently - some may shout, others may faint, and still others may be shocked into
insensibility even if there may be a few who may openly welcome the
intrusion. More to the point, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine
whether a woman involuntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELIAS BUENVINOTO y PAGLINAWAN
G.R. No. 207990, June 9, 2014, J. Reyes
When a de facto foster father was alleged to have raped his de facto minor
adopted child, and the victim had clearly and categorically testified that he had
penetrated her vagina, the absence of hymenal laceration does not preclude rape,
because it is possible for a womans hymen to remain intact even after having been
raped if it is lax, thick and elastic. Carnal knowledge is the element of rape, not
hymenal laceration. Further, delays in the reporting of the rape does not destroy the
credibility of the rape victim, especially when the accused had performed acts of
violence on the victim, which are enough to cow the 13-year old victim into silence.
Facts:
When AAA was still an infant, her biological mother, BBB, abandoned the
family. AAA and her four siblings were thus left in the sole care of their father, CCC,
a shoemaker. When AAA was seven months old, she was given by CCC to their
neighbors, the accused-appellant Elias Buenvinoto and his common-law wife.
However, the adoption was merely verbal and was never formalized.
AAA claimed that she was raped by Buenvinoto on four separate occasions in
2004. Back then, AAA was 13 years old. Shortly after AAA was allegedly raped for
the fourth time, she reported the matter to the authorities. Four separate
informations were thereafter filed before the RTC against Buenvinoto.
Among the witnesses for the prosecution was AAA herself, who recounted the
sordid acts which Buenvinoto had committed against her. AAA alleged that she was
first raped at around 11:00 a.m. of June 14, 2004. She was then at home, washing
the dishes when Buenvinoto poked a knife at her neck and dragged her towards a
room. Buenvinoto undressed her even when she struggled to push him away. He
then inserted his penis inside her vagina and she cried in pain. He kicked her when
she continued in her attempt to push him away.
The second rape incident occurred at around 2:00 p.m. of July 7, 2004. AAA
was at home cooking food and washing. Buenvinoto dragged her to a room. At
knifepoint, he undressed her, put a piece of cloth in her mouth and made her lie
down in bed. He again succeeded in inserting his penis inside her vagina. When she
tried to push him way, he slapped her. Thereafter, he ordered her to buy ice. She
complied as she was too consumed by fear.
At around 10:00 a.m. of August 18, 2004, AAA was working on her school
assignments. Buenvinoto again dragged her into a room and tore her dress apart.
She cried and pleaded for the Buenvinoto to stop. Her pleas fell on deaf ears as
Buenvinoto proceeded to rape her for the third time.
On September 13, 2004, at around 3:00 a.m., both AAA and Buenvinoto were
at home. The latter forcefully removed AAAs short pants and underwear, undressed
himself and inserted his penis into her vagina.

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Dr, Fajardo, medico legal officer from the NBI, testified that she examined
AAAs genitalia and found that her hymen was intact and did not bear lacerations, it
was distensible, extending to more than 2.5 centimeters. Dr. Fajardo explained that
this condition is commonly caused by sexual intercourse.
The defense, on its part, offered as evidence the lone testimony of the
accused-appellant. Buenvinoto interposed denial and alibi as defenses. He stated
that on the dates and times the alleged rape occurred, he was home alone and was
oblivious of AAAs whereabouts. Buenvinoto speculated that the rape complaints
were filed for the purpose of discrediting and ruining him, but the questions of by
whom and for what reason it was done, he could not answer. He claimed that AAA
has been in his custody since the latter was almost one year old and that their
relationship with each other was pleasant.
The RTC convicted Buenvinoto for four counts of simple rape. AAA clearly and
categorically stated that he was able to penetrate his penis into her vagina. The
absence of lacerations or injury in AAAs vagina does not preclude rape.
Buenvinotos alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive and categorical
statements of AAA. The CA affirmed the RTC in toto.
Issue:
Was Buenvinotos guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, considering
that there were no hymenal lacerations and AAAs delay in reporting the rape
incidents?
Ruling:
The appeal is denied.
The Court finds the RTC and CA decisions as amply supported by both
evidence and jurisprudence. Buenvinoto had not ascribed any ill motive on the part
of AAA which could have otherwise impelled her to file a fabricated charge. Further,
AAAs testimony was straightforward, categorical and unwavering. It is likewise
unlikely that a girl of tender age can concoct with detail the commission against her
of such sordid acts, which would cast shame and dishonor upon her family.
The Court need not belabor each of Buenvinotos arguments as the RTC and
CA had sufficiently disposed of the same. However, the Court takes exception of two
of the accused-appellants defenses, to wit, AAAs lack of hymenal lacerations and
the delay in reporting the rape incidents.
Buenvinoto posited that the absence of lacerations in AAAs hymen proves
that she did not fight off the sexual advances. Instead, her vaginal canal was
lubricated, hence, evidence exists that she was aroused during those instances of
sexual intercourse. The Court agrees with the CA that the Buenvinotos claim is
plainly inane.
AAA cried rape and unwaveringly testified on how and when the acts were
committed. The accused-appellant, on the other hand, offered flimsy and
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uncorroborated defenses of alibi and denial, and even now implores the Court to be
swayed by his proposition that AAA consented to the performance of sexual acts
upon her. Buenvinotos alibi and denial were inconsistent with his claim of
consensual intercourse. Besides, the Court has repeatedly ruled that it is possible
for a womans hymen to remain intact even after having been raped if it is lax, thick
and elastic.
As to AAAs delay in reporting the rape incidents to the authorities, the Court
finds no reason to rule that this omission puts a dent on the credibility of her
testimony. Delay in revealing the commission of a crime such as rape does not
necessarily render such charge unworthy of belief. This is because the victim may
choose to keep quiet rather than expose her defilement to the harsh glare of public
scrutiny. Only when the delay is unreasonable or unexplained may it work to
discredit the complainant.
In the case at bar, it is worth remembering that Buenvinoto had repeatedly
inflicted acts of physical violence and intimidation against AAA. He had slapped her,
poked a knife at her neck, kicked her, and shoved a piece of cloth in her mouth.
These acts are enough to cow a 13-year-old girl into silence and submission
especially since the perpetrator is her own de facto adoptive father. The delay is
hence justified. Besides, there was no delay to speak of as far as the fourth rape
incident is concerned.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JERUSALEM ESTEBAN y BALLESTEROS


G.R. No. 200920, June 9, 2014, J. Reyes

No sane girl would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her


private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not in truth,
been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. Youth
and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.

The Court has time and time again ruled that denial and alibi are inherently
weak defenses as these are self-serving. The absence of fresh lacerations in the
hymen cannot be a firm indication that the complainant was not raped. It is settled
that hymenal lacerations are not an element of rape.

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After a thorough perusal of the records of this case, the Court finds that the
prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of rape
under Article 266-A of the RPC. AAA, who was then only 13 years old, testified that
Esteban succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her and, thus, being AAAs
father, is presumed to have employed force and/or intimidation. Both the lower
courts found AAAs testimony in this matter clear, convincing and credible.

Facts:

It was alleged in an information charging the accused Jerusalem Esteban y


Ballesteros (Esteban) for the felony of rape that by means of force, threat and
intimidation, he did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the private complainant [AAA] against her will and in their own house,
with the aggravating circumstances, to wit: the victim [AAA] is under eighteen years
of age; he is the father (parent) of the victim; and the rape was committed in the
dwelling house where both accused and victim reside.

Esteban pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. After pre-trial conference, trial
on the merits ensued. People alleged that on December 17, 2002, at around
midnight, Esteban entered the room where AAA, his daughter who was only 13
years old then, was sleeping. After entering the room, Esteban removed his clothes
and went beside AAA. Esteban then touched AAAs back and started to undress her.
AAA shouted and struggled to prevent her fathers advances, but the latter
threatened and intimidated her. After removing AAAs clothes, Esteban went on top
of AAA; despite AAAs pleas, he inserted his penis in AAAs vagina. After satisfying
his lust, Esteban left AAA in the room. AAA reported the incident to her brother BBB
and her aunt CCC, who both did not believe her. AAA then told her other aunt DDD
what her father did to her; the latter then brought AAA to the barangay office to
report the matter. Afterwards, they proceeded to the police station in Mayantoc
where AAA executed her sworn statement.

On December 19, 2002, AAA submitted herself to medical examination by Dr.


Carolyn Abrigo, who found old lacerations above AAAs clitoris and over her hymen.
Esteban denied the allegations against him, and claimed that at the time of the
alleged rape incident, he was staying at the house of his employer, Engineer
Villalon, which is about 1,000 meters away from his own house. Before 2002, only
four of his six children were living with him. When AAA was only seven years old,
EEE, his eldest daughter, brought AAA to live with her in their house at Maliwalo,
Tarlac City. There, EEEs husband raped AAA, but the case filed against him was
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settled and eventually dismissed. Thereafter, EEE took AAA to Manila. In 2002, AAA
and her other siblings again lived with Esteban in Mayantoc, Tarlac.

He also claimed that AAA visited him in jail after she had given her testimony
in open court and gave him a letter wherein she supposedly stated that her
allegations against her father were not true and that she was just angry at him for
his failure to protect her from the sexual abuse she suffered from her brother-in-law.

RTC ruled that Esteban is guilty of the crime of Rape punishable under Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended in relation to Article 266-B (1) of the
same Code.

CA affirmed with modification the RTC Decision. As regards the letter


supposedly written by AAA, the CA held that, other than Estebans claim, there is no
other evidence to support the finding that AAA indeed retracted her allegations
against her father in the said letter. Further, the CA opined that the said letter is
hearsay and has no probative value as AAA was never called to testify thereon.
Further, the absence of fresh laceration on AAAs hymen, the CA pointed out, does
not negate the conclusion that Esteban raped AAA. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision which found Esteban
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of rape under Article 266-A of the RPC.

Ruling:
No. The appeal is dismissed for lack of merit.

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The crime of rape is defined under Article 266-A of the RPC, which states
that:

Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. Rape is


committed:
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; and
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or
is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned
above be present.

2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances


mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual
assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person.

The elements necessary to sustain a conviction for rape are: (1) that the
accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished
(a) through the use of force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or
is demented. Under Article 266-B of the RPC, the felony of rape is qualified when the
victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is, inter alia, a parent.

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After a thorough perusal of the records of this case, the Court finds that the
prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of rape
under Article 266-A of the RPC. AAA testified that Esteban succeeded in having
carnal knowledge with her and, thus, being AAAs father, is presumed to have
employed force and/or intimidation. Both the lower courts found AAAs testimony in
this matter clear, convincing and credible.

It is well-settled that, in a criminal case, factual findings of the trial court are
generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal, especially when such
findings are supported by substantial evidence on record. It is only in exceptional
circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant
matters, that this Court will re-calibrate and evaluate the factual findings of the
court below. The Court sees no reason to depart from the foregoing rule.

Other than Estebans testimony that AAA indeed wrote the said letter, there
is no other evidence which would support the said claim. It is but a mere
unsubstantiated allegation and, hence, not worthy of credence. Further, as aptly
pointed out by the CA, the said letter is hearsay since AAA was not called upon to
testify on the contents thereof.

Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that AAA, then only 13 years old, would feign
a traumatizing experience merely out of spite towards her father, who supposedly
failed to protect her from the sexual abuse she suffered from her brother-in-law. No
sane girl would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private
parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not in truth, been a
victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. The weight of such
testimony may be countered by physical evidence to the contrary or indubitable
proof that the accused could not have committed the rape, but in the absence of
such countervailing proof, the testimony shall be accorded utmost value.

Against AAAs testimony, Esteban was only able to proffer the defense of
denial and alibi. The Court has time and time again ruled that denial and alibi are
inherently weak defenses as these are self-serving.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE DALAN y PALDINGAN


G.R. No. 203086, June 11, 2014, J. Brion

The term statutory rape should only be confined to situations where the
victim of rape is a person less than 12 years of age. If the victim of rape is a person
with mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation, the crime committed is simple
rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1) (b) as she is considered "deprived of
reason" notwithstanding that her mental age is equivalent to that of a person under
12. In short, carnal knowledge with a mental retardate whose mental age is that of
a person below 12 years, while akin to statutory rape under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1(d), should still be designated as simple rape under paragraph 1(b).
Facts:

The RTC convicted the Jose Dalan (Dalan) of two counts of statutory rape. It
ruled that the prosecution was able to prove that the Dalan inserted his penis in
AAA's vagina on two occasions, namely, in December 2006 and on March 3, 2007. It
added that AAA's testimony was corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Sabrina
Florendo. The RTC further explained that AAA's mental retardation cannot disqualify
her as a witness, since she capably narrated the details of the sexual abuses
committed against her by the Dalan.

Accordingly, the RTC sentenced the Dalan to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and to indemnify the victim the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P50,000.00 as moral damages, both for each count of statutory rape.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The CA ruled that AAA positively
identified the Dalan as the person who raped her on two occasions. According to the
CA, AAA was consistent in her recollection of the details of the crime. It also added
that AAAs moderate mental retardation was sufficiently established by the
prosecutions evidence. Finally, the RTC found the Dalans uncorroborated denial
and alibi to be unmeritorious. Hence, this appeal.

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Issue:
Whether or not the designation of the crime should be statutory rape.
Ruling:
The Court denies the appeal, but modifies the designation of the crime
committed and the awarded indemnities.

In the present case, the prosecution established the elements of rape under
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. First, AAA positively identified
the Dalan as the person who inserted his penis in her vagina in December 2006 and
in March 2007; she never wavered in this identification. Significantly, AAAs claim of
sexual intercourse had been corroborated by the medical findings and testimony of
Dr. Florendo who testified that the marked attenuated hymen at 6 oclock position
was most probably caused by an erect penis, while the absent hymen at the 4, 5
and 7 oclock positions could be caused by repeated sexual experience.

Second, the prosecution satisfactorily established the mental condition of the


victim. Dr. Ekid conducted a battery of tests to determine the mental age, social
maturity and emotional condition of AAA. During trial, Dr. Ekid explained each test,
and how she arrived at her conclusions. Accordingly, she found AAA to be suffering
from moderate retardation, with a mental age of a person four (4) years and seven
(7) months old.

Aside from erroneously equating AAAs mental retardation with dementia, the
RTC further justified its conviction of Dalan of statutory rape on account of the
victims mental age. The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape, as provided for
in Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is the
carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years old. To convict an accused of the
crime of statutory rape, the prosecution must prove: first, the age of the
complainant; second, the identity of the accused; and last but not the least, the
carnal knowledge between the accused and the complainant
It is not disputed that AAA was already 17 years old when she was raped. In
People v. Butiong, the Court held that carnal knowledge of a female mental

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retardate with the mental age below 12 years of age is considered as rape of a
woman deprived of reason, thus:

It should no longer be debatable that rape of a mental retardate falls


under paragraph 1(b), of Article 266-A, x x x, because the provision
refers to a rape of a female "deprived of reason," a phrase that refers
to mental abnormality, deficiency or retardation.

Based on these discussions, we hold that the term statutory rape should only
be confined to situations where the victim of rape is a person less than 12 years of
age. If the victim of rape is a person with mental abnormality, deficiency, or
retardation, the crime committed is simple rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)
(b) as she is considered "deprived of reason" notwithstanding that her mental age is
equivalent to that of a person under 12. In short, carnal knowledge with a mental
retardate whose mental age is that of a person below 12 years, while akin to
statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d), should still be designated as
simple rape under paragraph 1(b). At any rate, proof of force, threat or intimidation
is dispensed with in both statutory rape and rape with a person who is deprived of
reason.

Thus, the CA decision is affirmed with the modification, among others, that
Dalan is found guilty of simple rape under Article 266-A(1)(b) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. OLIVER A. BUCLAO


G.R. No. 208173, June 11, 2014, J. Leonen
Accused, the biological father of the 15-year-old victim, committed rape
twice. Medical examination results indicate that the victim did not suffer injuries.
The Court held that the foremost consideration in a rape case is the victims
testimony which, in this case, was candid and straightforward. It is doctrinally
settled that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of the
rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed.
Absence of physical evidence does not necessarily negate commission of rape.
Facts:

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Oliver Buclao was charged with two counts of rape. According to AAAs
testimony, on June 3, 2003, Oliver Buclao, her biological father, called the 15-yearold AAA inside the house then pushed her onto the bed. He pulled her pants and
panties and inserted his penis into her vagina and started doing push and pull
motion. Before he left, Buclao threatened AAA that he would kill her if she told
anyone about the incident.
On September 2004, AAA was raped for the second time. She was awakened
when Oliver Buclao was getting on top of her. After the incident, she was again
threatened by Buclao. It was only in 2006 when AAA told her maternal grandmother
about the rape. They then reported it to the police.
Prosecution presented as witness Dr. Genalin Manipol who examined AAAs
genitalia and found no injuries. Oliver Buclao denied raping his daughter twice.
The trial court found him guilty of two counts of rape. On appeal, it was
affirmed with modification. He was found guilty of two counts of qualified rape. In
his brief, accused argued that physical evidence is the best evidence in a rape case
and Dr. Manipols examination resulted in a possibility that no penis entered AAAs
vagina.
Issue:
Whether or not Oliver Buclao is guilty of two counts of qualified rape beyond
reasonable doubt
Ruling:
Yes, he is guilty. Rape is qualified when the victim is under 18 years of age
and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of
the parent of the victim. The elements are: (1) sexual congress; (2) with a woman;
(3) done by force and without consent; (4) the victim is under 18 years of age at the
time of rape; (5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate, or
adopted) of the victim.
Both trial court and Court of Appeals found that prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements. The Court finds no reason to depart from the
findings. AAAs recollection of the heinous acts of her father was vivid and
straightforward. She was able to positively identify the accused as her sexual
assailant. Her testimony was given in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous,
and candid manner.
The Court disagrees with the argument of Buclao, citing the ruling in the case
of People vs. Araojo that: The absence of external signs or physical injuries on the
complainants body does not necessarily negate the commission of rape, hymenal
laceration not being, to repeat, an element of the crime of rape. A healed or fresh
laceration would of course be a compelling proof of defloration. However, the
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foremost consideration in the prosecution of rape is the victims testimony and not
the findings of the medico-legal officer.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BRICCIO BACULANTA
G.R. No. 207513, June 16, 2014, J. Reyes
Accused was charged of raping the 7-year-old victim. The victims testimony
was found credible and it sufficiently established the guilt of the accused. The Court
ruled that testimonies of victims of tender age are credible, more so if they are
without any motive to falsely against their offender.
Facts:
On February 2005, the victim AAA, then 7 years old, was left with her
younger brother at their family residence by their mother, CCC. The accused Briccio
Baculanta, whom AAA treated as close relative being the godfather of CCC, was with
them.
Baculanta ordered AAA to fetch water from the river near the house. He
followed her to the river and there, he pushed AAA into the water, then ordered her
to get up and lie on a rock. Baculanta undressed her and went on top her then
inserted his penis to her vagina. Thereafter, he threatened to kill AAA if she
reported the incident.
The following day, CCC discovered that AAA was raped when her younger
brother said AAA was menstruating. Since she was too young to menstruate, CCC
checked AAA and found blood on her genitals. AAA then confided that she was
raped.
Upon physical examination by Dr. May Conde Hernandez, there was a finding
of an indicative of penetration by a penis. She also surmised that AAAs resistance
to an internal examination was due to pain resulting from the swelling of the girls
vagina.
Both trial court and Court of Appeals found him guilty of rape beyond
reasonable doubt.
Issue:
Whether or not Briccio Baculanta is guilty of rape
Ruling:
Yes, he is guilty. The testimony of AAA, corroborated by other testimonies and
supported by records, sufficiently established the fact of carnal knowledge by
Baculanta of AAA. As held in People vs. Abellera, testimonies of victims of tender
age are credible, more so if they are without any motive to falsely against their
offender. Their revelations that they were raped, coupled with their willingness to

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undergo public trial where they could be compelled to describe the details of the
assault on their dignity could not be easily dismissed as concoctions.
The trial court cited in its decision the credibility of AAA as witness and her
clear narration of her ordeal. Considering that the trial court has the best
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness while on stand, it was in the
best position to discern whether or not she was telling the truth. The medical report
also supported the claim of AAA.
AAAs age at the time of rape, that she was only 7 years old, was also
sufficiently established. This is material, given that a man commits by having carnal
knowledge of a child under 12 years of age, even in absence of: (1) force, threat, or
intimidation; (2) that the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; (3) fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HERMNIGILDO T. ABAYAN
G.R. No. 190620, June 18, 2014, J. Perez
Rape is essentially committed in relative isolation or even secrecy. As such, it
is usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced coitus.
In its prosecution, therefore, the credibility of the victim is almost always the single
and most important issue to deal with.
Facts:
In the evening of 24 July 2006, AAA and her six year old brother stayed at the
Abayans house as their parents were out of town. Their grandmother, Abayans
wife, was also not around so it was only AAA, her brother and the Abayan who were
at the latters house on the said date. On that fateful night, they slept together in
one room. While sleeping, AAA was awakened when she felt Abayan removing her
short pants and panty. He then took off his short pants and inserted his penis into
AAAs vagina but he was unable to make full penetration. AAA cried and exclaimed,
"its painful Lolo," to which the Abayan replied, "do not cry." The next day, AAA
disclosed to her aunt her harrowing experience at the hands of her grandfather.
They subsequently proceeded to the police station, where AAA executed her sworn
statement. Castillo confirmed the findings that AAA was positive for gonococcal
infection or gonorrhea as she was the one who examined the vaginal smear of AAA
as requested to by Dr. Guiang. The defense, for its part, presented Abayan as its
sole witness, who relied principally on denial for his defense.
Issue:
Whether Abayan is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
Ruling:
Yes, he is.
To determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in rape cases, the courts
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are guided by three settled principles: (a) an accusation for rape is easy to make,
difficult to prove and even more difficult to disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic
nature of the crime, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
utmost caution; and (c) the evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own
merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.
Rape is essentially committed in relative isolation or even secrecy. As such, it
is usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced coitus.
In its prosecution, therefore, the credibility of the victim is almost always the single
and most important issue to deal with. If her testimony meets the test of credibility,
the accused can justifiably be convicted on the basis thereof; otherwise, he should
be acquitted of the crime.
After poring through the records and the transcript of stenographic notes, the
Court finds AAAs testimony, who was only eight years old when the rape occurred,
to be clear, credible, convincing and worthy of belief.
Moreover, the prevailing rule is that the testimony of rape victims who are
young and immature deserves full credence. No woman, especially one of tender
age, practically only a girl, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts and thereafter expose herself to a public trial, if
she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and
punished.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CARLOS ALHAMBRA
G.R. No. 207774, June 30, 2014, J. Reyes
Delay in revealing the commission of a crime such as rape does not
necessarily render such charge unworthy of belief. This is because the victim may
choose to keep quiet rather than expose her defilement to the harsh glare of public
scrutiny. Only when the delay is unreasonable or unexplained may it work to
discredit the complainant.
Facts:
Three informations were charged against Alhambra: first, Criminal Case No.
220-05 charging him for the crime of rape having a carnal knowledge on October 6,
2004 with his own daughter, AAA, a minor, 17 years old, against her will and
without her consent; second, Criminal Case No. 219-05 charging Alhambra with the
crime of rape and is similarly worded except as to the date of the commission of the
crime, which is during the summer of 1999, and the age of AAA, who was then only
12 years old; and third, Criminal Case No. 347-04 charging him with the crime of
acts of lasciviousness under Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610 for allegedly
kissing her lips, neck, breast, private parts and lay on top of his minor daughter AAA
against the will and without the consent of the latter on October 21, 2004. Upon
arraignment, Alhambra entered a plea of not guilty to the charges against him.

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AAA testified that, on October 6, 2004, while she was changing her clothes
inside her room, Alhambra suddenly entered her room, pushed her, removed her
undergarments, and kissed her on the neck, breasts, and vagina. Alhambra then
inserted his penis into AAAs vagina, while kissing her on the breast and undressing
her. In the afternoon of October 21, 2004, AAA, still in her undergarments with a
towel wrapped around her body, after having taken a bath, entered her bedroom to
put on clothes. Alhambra then removed the towel covering AAAs body and her bra.
He then started to kiss AAA on the neck. Consequently, AAA told her mother what
her father had done to her. Alhambra denied all the allegations against him,
claiming that AAA only fabricated the allegations against him since he wanted her
to be separated from her boyfriend.
The RTC found Alhambra guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Crim. Case No.
220-05 and Crim. Case No. 347-04. However, The RTC acquitted Alhambra of the
charge in Criminal Case No. 219-05 since the evidence presented by the
prosecution therein was insufficient to establish that he indeed raped her daughter,
AAA, during the summer of 1999. The RTC pointed out that statement of AAA before
the police and her testimony in court shows that there was just a passing mention
of the incident complained of. Alhambra appealed the RTC decision contending that
his acquittal for the charge of rape in Criminal Case No. 219-05 seriously casts
doubt on the allegations of AAA. Moreover, he claimed that AAAs delay in reporting
the charge of rape in Criminal Case No. 219-05, which supposedly happened during
the summer of 1999, calls into question the credibility of AAA as a witness. Also,
Alhambra alleged that he cannot be convicted for the crime of sexual abuse since
AAA is neither a child exploited in prostitution nor a child subjected to other sexual
abuse. The CA affirmed the RTCs decision. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision which found Alhambra
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and of sexual abuse under
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
Ruling:
The appeal is dismissed for lack of merit.
The prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of rape under Article 266-A of the RPC. AAA testified that Alhambra
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her on October 16, 2004, and, thus,
being AAAs father, is presumed to have employed force and/or intimidation. 15
Both the lower courts found AAAs testimony in this matter straightforward and
worthy of credence.
Alhambras claim that his acquittal for the charge of rape in Criminal Case No.
219-05 casts serious doubt on AAAs credibility deserves scant consideration. The
charge in Criminal Case No. 219-05 is separate and distinct from the charge in
Criminal Case No. 220-05. AAA may have given an incomplete account of the
attendant circumstances in Criminal Case No. 219-05, which resulted in Alhambras
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acquittal from the charge therein, but her
circumstances in Criminal Case No. 220-05 is
Court to acquit Alhambra in Criminal Case
reason that he was acquitted of the charge in

testimony as regards the attendant


clear. There is, thus, no reason for the
No. 220-05 merely on the mundane
Criminal Case No. 219-05.

AAAs delay in filing a complaint against him, for the alleged rape incident,
which happened during the summer of 1999, cannot be taken against AAAs claim.
Delay in reporting an incident of rape does not create any doubt over the credibility
of the complainant nor can it be taken against her. Against AAAs testimony,
Alhambra was only able to proffer the defense of denial and alibi. In any case, it
should be stressed that the delay in the filing of the complaint is only with respect
to the charge in Criminal Case No. 219-05, where Alhambra was acquitted by the
RTC. There was no considerable delay in the filing of the complaint against
Alhambra in Criminal Case No. 220-05. The Court has time and time again ruled that
denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses as these are self-serving.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLANDO RONDINA
G.R. No. 207763, June 30, 2014, J. Reyes
It has been held that when the victims testimony is corroborated by the
physicians finding of penetration, there is sufficient foundation to conclude the
existence of the essential requisite of carnal knowledge; that laceration, whether
healed or fresh, is the best physical evidence of forcible defloration. The Court,
however, finds no physical evidence of sexual penetration and no corroboration of
other vital details in AAAs narration of the rape. when the victim says that the
accused inserted his penis into her vagina and pushed and pulled inside her "for a
long time," and she felt pain and blood oozed from her organ, the stark absence of
any vaginal tear or laceration will have to be medically explained, or else, the Court
is left with no inference other than that the charge of rape may have been a mere
fabrication.
Facts:
An information was filed against Rondina charging him of rape, as follows:
That on or about the 30th day of August, 1998, about 12:00 oclock noon, at
Barangay XXX, Municipality of YYY, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, Rondina, with lewd design and lustful intent and
by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one AAA, without her consent and
against her will.

The version of the defense paints a lovers tryst. According to Rondina he met
AAA at a benefit dance held during their town fiesta. On August 29, 1998, Rondina
again saw AAA, and it was then that he broached an "intimate" proposal to her. She
agreed, but told him to come back at noon the next day since her parents would be
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away in the farm. Rondina returned as agreed, and AAA herself opened the door.
AAA led him to the kitchen, and there the lovers lost no time kissing and caressing
each other. Rondina insisted that he and AAA still had their underwear on when BBB
arrived just when they were about to commence the sexual act. BBB caught them
half-naked, and she angrily demanded, why did you do it? But AAA just cried,
while Rondina quickly arose and feebly tried to explain that he and AAA already had
an understanding. BBB refused to be pacified and Rondina had to leave. He put on
his shorts and exited through the kitchen. Believing that he committed no crime,
Rondina was surprised when the police came to his rented house and arrested him.

The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt which was
later affirmed by the CA. The case is elevated to the SC for automatic review.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused s guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
The Court votes to acquit Rondina.
The elements of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the RPC are: (1)
the offender is a man who had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he
accomplished such act through force or intimidation upon her; or she is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; or she is under 12 years of age or is demented.
The RTC and the CA both found that AAAs testimony clearly established that
Rondina had sexual intercourse with her without her consent and against her will;
that to satisfy his lust, he employed force and threats.
The victims narration is inconsistent with the physical evidence of the
supposed rape by a stranger. The Court, however, finds no physical evidence of
sexual penetration and no corroboration of other vital details in AAAs narration of
the rape. When the victim says that Rondina inserted his penis into her vagina and
pushed and pulled inside her "for a long time," and she felt pain and blood oozed
from her organ, the stark absence of any vaginal tear or laceration will have to be
medically explained, or else, the Court is left with no inference other than that the
charge of rape may have been a mere fabrication.
The scenario created by the prosecution is that of a barrio maiden whose
purity was being forcibly assailed in a sudden attack, and the attacker is a stranger,
one who naturally has no demands upon the victims affections nor exercises moral
ascendancy over her. It thus beggars belief that without putting up a resistance,

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AAA just lay still on her back and mutely suffered the shame and pain of her
repeated violation by Rondina. She did not even raise a shout or a whimper, yet it
was noonday, the windows and doors of her house were open, there were people
within a few arms length in the vicinity, and her grandmother BBB lived just a
house away. After her attacker had fled, still she raised no outcry.
The victims and her familys actuations after the alleged rape defy logic and
ordinary experience. If indeed she was raped, AAAs utter failure not only to resist
Rondinas advances but also to shout for help before, during or after the rape are
truly baffling, and defy the ordinary standards of human behavior.
Incomprehensibly, too, after the dastardly rape, which went on for a "long time,"
AAA stayed half naked and supine, and with her face looking up she carried on a
hushed conversation with her supposed attacker, who just sat still beside her, also
half-naked like her. While a rape victim is not expected to resist until death, it is
contrary to human experience that AAA did not even make an outcry or put up a
resistance, particularly since throughout her ordeal, her hands were free of
restraint, and Rondinas knife lay by her side most of the time, if indeed he had a
knife. The neighbors were just a few arms length nearby, and her granduncle was
the barangay captain, so after Rondina fled, AAA had no more reason to still be
afraid. Yet AAA did not even tell her mother the first night, or the next night,
choosing instead to return to her employer in Tacloban two days later rather than
report the incident. It has been held that "the victim's instant willingness, as well as
courage, to face interrogation and medical examination could be a mute but
eloquent proof of the truth of her claim.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROSENDO AMARO
G.R. No. 199100, July 18, 2014, J. Perez
The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of
the Revised Penal Code, are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless
of her age, civil status, or reputation (2) that she is taken against her will and (3)
that the abduction is with lewd designs. On the other hand, rape under Article 266A
is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman by: (1) force or intimidation,
or (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or is unconscious, or (3) when she is
under twelve years of age. The prosecution was able to prove all these elements in
this case.
Facts:
On 26 May 1998, Rosendo Amaro (Amaro) was charged with the crime of
forcible abduction with rape. Amaro pleaded not guilty. Trial then proceeded.
AAA, who was then only 7 years old, testified that she was walking on her
way home from school when she passed by Boots & Maya store. She met a man,
whom she later identified in court as the Amaro, who asked her to buy cigarettes.
After buying the cigarettes and handing it to Amaro, the latter gave her bread and
banana cue. After eating them, she suddenly became dizzy and passed out. AAA
was brought to the house of Amaro. When she regained consciousness, she saw
Amaro naked. Amaro then undressed her, kissed her on the lips and neck, and
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inserted his penis into her vagina, causing her to feel pain. AAA cried but Amaro
covered her mouth with his hand. AAA was detained for six (6) days and was raped
five (5) times by Amaro. AAA clarified that Amaros penis touched the outer portion
of her vagina.
During the crossexamination, AAA admitted that she voluntarily went with
Amaro because the latter promised to bring her home. On the last day of her
detention, AAA and Amaro went out of the house. On their way to San Jose, a
certain Aunt Ruthie saw AAA walking and immediately picked her up and brought
her to the police station. Amaro noticed AAA being taken away but he did nothing.
The prosecution also presented AAAs mother, BBB, to corroborate her
daughters testimony. BBB narrated that on 26 March 1998, she was in the house
when AAA came home at around noon time to eat. Thereafter, AAA told BBB that
she had to go back to school. At around 5:00 p.m. when AAA had not come home,
BBB went to the school to look for her. When the teacher told BBB that school
children had already been sent home, she proceeded to the police station to report
her missing daughter. After six (6) days, AAA was found by BBBs former employer
who brought her to the police. Upon receiving a call from the police, BBB
immediately went to the police station and saw her daughter. BBB observed that
AAA was still in shock and could not walk properly so she was brought to the doctor
on the following day. She only learned that her daughter was raped after the
medical examination.
Amaro testified on his behalf. He denied abducting and raping AAA but
admitted that he brought the latter to his house when AAA approached him asking
for bread first, before begging him to take her with him because she was always
being scolded by her parents. Upon reaching his house, Amaro entrusted AAA to the
care of Florante Magays sister. Amaro then went back to town to attend to his work
as a mason. He only decided to go back home when he heard his name on the radio
in connection with the disappearance of a girl. He picked up the child in Barangay
Tagburos and brought her to her house in Buncag. AAA walked alone towards her
house.
The trial court found Amaro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
forcible abduction with rape. It found AAAs testimony as credible and
straightforward and supported by medical findings. From the aforesaid decision,
Amaro appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, in turn, affirmed the ruling of the
RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish from the testimony of
the complainant the guilt of the accused for the crime of forcible abduction with
rape beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:

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Yes. The prosecution was able to establish the guilt of Amaro for the crime of
forcible abduction with rape beyond reasonable doubt.
The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of
the Revised Penal Code, are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman,
regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation (2) that she is taken against her
will and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs. On the other hand, rape
under Article 266A is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman by: (1)
force or intimidation, or (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or is
unconscious, or (3) when she is under twelve years of age.
The prosecution was able to prove all these elements in this case. The victim,
AAA was a seven (7)yearold girl who was taken against her will by Amaro who told
her that he knew her mother and that he would bring her home. At her tender age,
AAA could have easily been deceived by Amaro. The employment of deception
suffices to constitute the forcible taking, especially since the victim is an
unsuspecting young girl. It is the taking advantage of their innocence that makes
them easy culprits of deceiving minds. The presence of lewd designs in forcible
abduction is established by the actual rape of the victim. The fact of sexual
intercourse is corroborated by the medical findings that the victim suffered from
laceration on the upper and lower part of the introitus.
Amaro was properly charged of the complex crime of forcible abduction with
rape. AAAs abduction was a necessary means to commit rape. Sexual intercourse
with AAA was facilitated and ensured by her abduction.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VIRGILIO ANTONIO y RIVERA


G.R. No. 208623, July 23, 2014, J. Reyes
Jurisprudence strictly dictates that the guardian must be a person who has a
legal relationship with his ward, which does not obtain in this case. Ineluctably,
guardianship cannot be considered as a qualifying circumstance and the accusedappellant can only be convicted of simple rape.
Facts:
Two separate informations for rape were filed against the Antonio before the
RTC. The victim, as alleged by the informations, is AAA, a 14 year old minor. The
accused-appellant entered a not guilty plea during the arraignment. On February
23, 2005, pre-trial was conducted. The prosecution proposed for the parties to
stipulate on the following, which the defense admitted: (a) the identity of Antonio;
(b) his relationship as AAAs godfather; (c) the dates, times and places of the
commission of rape; and (d) AAAs minority at the time the crimes were
allegedly perpetrated.

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Based on the evidence of the prosecution, in March of 2001, then eleven-year
old AAA began living with accused-appellants family in Maraburab, Alcala, Cagayan
Province after her parents had separated. Antonio and his wife, Rose, are AAAs
godparents, who treated her as one of their own children.
The first incident of rape was allegedly occurred sometime in April 2001.
Antonio, who maintains a farm in the highlands of Cagayan, asked AAA to help him
harvest palay there. They were alone in the rice field. Just before lunch time,
Antonio led AAA to a bamboo grove within the farm. Once there, he threatened to
kill her if she told anyone regarding what he was about to do. Antonio lost no time
in making AAA lie down. After which, he took off her shorts and underwear.
Although very much alarmed, he likewise removed his own shorts and underwear.
AAA could not do anything as she was afraid because they were alone. Antonio
thereafter obtain carnal knowledge of the victim. The second incident of rape
happened on August 26, 2003 when the accused-appellant were left alone in the
home. Antonio went to the room where AAA was sleeping and proceeded to have a
sexual intercourse with her.
Antonio, on the other hand, was vehement in denying the charges against
him.
On September 4, 2009, the RTC rendered a Judgment convicting Antonio of
two counts of rape. On October 8, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the
accused-appellants conviction.
Issue:
Whether guardianship can be considered as a qualifying circumstance in this
case.
Ruling:
No.
As regards the second rape incident, guardianship was alleged in the
information and was not assailed by the defense. Also, the parties stipulated during
the pre-trial that Antonio was AAAs godfather. Notwithstanding the foregoing,
jurisprudence strictly dictates that the guardian must be a person who has a legal
relationship with his ward, which does not obtain in this case. Ineluctably,
guardianship cannot be considered as a qualifying circumstance and Antonio can
only be convicted of simple rape.
Nonetheless, the Court sustains the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by
the RTC and CA on Antonio for each of the two counts of rape which he committed.
The aggravating circumstances of minority and commission of the crime in an
uninhabited place were present as regards the first rape incident. The second rape
was, on the other hand, aggravated by minority alone since legal guardianship was
not proven. The aggravating circumstances attendant in the instant case are all
merely generic and not qualifying. Generic aggravating circumstances increase the
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penalty for the crime to its maximum period, but it cannot increase the same to the
next higher degree.
In Antonio's case, the two counts of rape were committed through the use of
force and intimidation. The crime falls under Article 266-A(l)(a) of the Revised Penal
Code. Article 266-B of the same code provides that the said crime is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, which is an indivisible penalty. Therefore, despite the
attendance of generic aggravating circumstances, the penalty imposable upon
Antonio for each count of rape remains the same.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. STANLEY BUNAGAN y JUAN
G.R. No. 196786, July 23, 2014, J. Del Castillo

Rape may be committed by a man having carnal knowledge of a woman


through threat or intimidation. According to "AAA," every time Juan will have sexual
intercourse with her, he would issue threats that he would kill her, her mother and
grandmother

Although "AAAs" minority was alleged, the same was not proved during trial;
neither was her Birth Certificate submitted in evidence. Her relationship with the
Juan was likewise not established. Although the Information alleged that Juan is an
uncle of "AAA," such relationship was not proved during trial. Based on Juans
testimony, he was never married to "AAAs" relative.

Facts:

During trial, "AAA" testified that Bunagan is the husband of her grandmother;
that she resided in the house of her grandmother since she was nine years old; that
in 1998 when she was already 13 years of age, Bunagan started raping her; that her
grandmother leaves the house to work while Bunagan is unemployed and just stays
at the house; that the last rape incident happened in August 2001 when she was 16
years old; that Bunagan threatened to kill her mother and grandmother if she would
not succumb to his desire; that after the last rape incident, she got pregnant; that
when her mother and grandmother confronted her about her pregnancy, she told

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them that Bunagan raped her several times; and that her mother and grandmother
reported the incident to the police authorities resulting in the arrest of the Bunagan.

RTC convicted Bunagan for crime of rape which was affirmed by CA.

Issue:

Whether or not Bunagan is guilty for crime of rape.


Ruling:

Yes, Bunagan is guilty for crime of rape.

The sexual congress between "AAA" and Bunagan is undisputed. In fact, he


admits the same. However, he claims that it is consensual because "AAA" was his
girlfriend. Both the trial court and the CA correctly disregarded the "sweetheart
theory" proffered by Bunagan for being self-serving and uncorroborated. No
evidence such as love letters, pictures, gifts, etc. was offered to show the existence
of such relationship. Besides, such claim is totally absurd and preposterous.

Going by the testimony of the Bunagan that his love relationship with "AAA"
started sometime in 1997, "AAA" would have been only 12 years of age while
Bunagan would be about 46 years old. It is also on record that "AAA" vehemently
denied her alleged love relationship with the Juan.

Rape may be committed by a man having carnal knowledge of a woman


through threat or intimidation. According to "AAA," every time Bunagan will have
sexual intercourse with her, he would issue threats that he would kill her, her
mother and grandmother.

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Although "AAAs" minority was alleged, the same was not proved during trial;
neither was her Birth Certificate submitted in evidence. Her relationship with the
Juan was likewise not established. Although the Information alleged that Juan is an
uncle of "AAA," such relationship was not proved during trial. Based on Juans
testimony, he was never married to "AAAs" relative.

In fact, Bunagan was merely the live-in partner of the sister of "AAAs"
grandmother. As such, he and the victim cannot be said to be related by affinity
within the third civil degree at the time of the commission of the crime."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEONARDO BATTAD, et al.


G.R. No. 206368, August 6, 2014, J. Reyes
Under the Revised Penal Code, as amended, rape is committed when: (1) the
offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (b) that the same was committed
by using force and intimidation. Despite her low mentality, AAA was able to narrate
her harrowing experience in the hands of the two accused, who took turns in raping
her. The SC ruled that a victim who cries rape, more so if she is a minor, almost
always says all that is needed to signify that the crime has been committed, and so
long as her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted
on the basis thereof.
Facts:
The 17-year old private complainant AAA, testified that on April 9, 2004 at
around three oclock in the afternoon, she went to the fields located in Barangay
PPP to pasture her three carabaos and eight goats. On her way to the fields, AAA
saw the Battad and Marcelino Bacnis (Bacnis) drinking gin in the house of both AAA
and Bacnis uncle, UUU. AAA knew Battad and Bacnis as they used to go to her
house to buy ice.
After AAA had pastured her carabaos, she was surprised when Battad and
Bacnis approached her from behind. Bacnis pulled her towards the place where
paper trees grew. AAA said that Bacnis undressed her and that the two accused
took turns in raping her but she was confused as to who raped her first. While one
of them was raping her, the other was holding her hands and vice versa. Her mouth
was also covered to prevent her from shouting. When asked how Battad raped her,
AAA testified that he did it by inserting his penis.
According to AAA, Battad and Bacnis warned her not to tell anyone about the
incident, otherwise they would kill her. Eventually, however, AAA told her mother
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about it when the latter noticed that AAA was pregnant. Later on, she slipped near a
tamarind tree while carrying something heavy which resulted to the miscarriage of
the baby.
The other witness for the prosecution, (Dr. Eugenio), Medical Officer III of
Gabriela Silang General Hospital testified that she examined AAA on July 22, 2004
and found that the latter was already 5 to 6 months pregnant as verified by an
ultrasound result.
After trial, both Battad and Bacnis were convicted of the crime of rape by the
RTC. The RTCs decision was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove Battads guilt beyond
reasonable doubt
Ruling:
No, the SC does not find any basis to overrule Battads conviction for the
crime of Rape.
Under Article 266-A (1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, rape is
committed when: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (b) that
the same was committed by using force and intimidation.
Despite her low mentality, AAA was able to narrate her harrowing experience
in the hands of Battad and Bacnis, who took turns in raping her. "The Court have
ruled that a victim who cries rape, more so if she is a minor, almost always says all
that is needed to signify that the crime has been committed, and so long as her
testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis
thereof."
The fact that AAA was not able to fight back or physically resist the attack
does not negate the presence of force, threat or intimidation. As already settled in
jurisprudence, not all victims react the same way. Some people may cry out; some
may faint; some may be shocked into insensibility; others may appear to yield to
the intrusion. Some may offer strong resistance, while others may be too
intimidated to offer any resistance at all. Besides, resistance is not an element of
rape. A rape victim has no burden to prove that she did all within her power to resist
the force or intimidation employed upon her. As long as force or intimidation was
present, whether it was more or less irresistible, is beside the point.
AAA testified that while one of the accused raped her, her mouth was
covered and her hands were held by the other. Thus, it is needless to say that the
combined strength of the two accused, both male, overpowered AAA, a 17-year old
female. Additionally, AAA and Bacnis uncle UUU, testified as witness for the
defense that he was not home during the incident. Therefore, the Battads
allegation that he along with Bacnis could not have pulled AAA in front of UUUs
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inhabited house deserves scant consideration, for there was in fact no one in the
house who could have come to AAAs aid even if the crime was committed in broad
daylight.
Finally, in Battads attempt to exonerate himself, he asserted that AAA was
already 5 to 6 months pregnant based on Dr. Eugenios findings, whereas the
alleged incident occurred merely 3 months before AAAs medical examination;
therefore he could not have authored the rape.
Contrary to Battads view, AAAs pregnancy is immaterial to the issue.
"Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child
which the rape victim bore was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown
individual, is of no moment. What is important and decisive is that the accused had
carnal knowledge of the victim against the latters will or without her consent, and
such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful manner." As long as the
elements of rape are present and proven by the prosecution, the accused could be
adjudged guilty thereof notwithstanding the attendance of other matters which are
completely irrelevant to the crime.
Hence, the actuality that AAA was pregnant at the time of the rape does not
go against the fact that Battad and Bacnis had forcible sexual coitus with her. The
gravamen of the offense is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or
without her consent. And that is all the prosecution had to prove.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO CLOSA Y LUALHATI
G.R. No. 211049, August 6, 2014, J. Reyes
The precise date or time of the commission of the rape is not an essential
element of the crime of rape. Hence, the fact that the victim could not remember
the exact dates when each of other rapes occurred will not affect the conviction of
the accused.
Facts:
Romeo Closa y Lualhati (Closa) was charged with two (2) counts of rape and
one (1) count of attempted rape of his minor daughter AAA.
Born on February 13, 1996 and the eldest of six (6) children of Romeo Closa ,
AAA was only ten (10) years old and in Grade 2 when the first rape allegedly in
2006. Her mother was in Batangas to attend an occasion, and she was asleep with
four (4) of her siblings when the Closa, who slept in the sala, entered her room,
moved aside her baby sister who slept beside her, pulled down her shorts and
underwear, mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina. For 10 minutes he
did a pumping motion, causing AAA much pain. Being only ten (10) years old, AAA
did not understand the full meaning of what her father did to her. In her fear of her
father, she kept silent about it.
Closa continued to rape AAA during the next three yearstoo many times
that she could not recall the dates when they happened. But when she was 13 years
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old He pumped for 10 minutes and after he ejaculated inside her he stood up. Afraid
of what Closa do to her and her mother, AAA chose to keep quiet about the incident.
AAA became pregnant and eventually pointed to Closa as the father.
For his defense, Closa called AAA herself to the witness stand. She affirmed
that she executed an affidavit of desistance and that she was recanting her previous
testimony, saying this time that it was her boyfriend who had impregnated her.
The trial court rendered its decision finding Closa guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) counts of rape and one (1) count of attempted rape. It found that
the original testimony of AAA was substantiated by the medical examination
conducted on her, whereas her recantation did not show that her previous
testimony was vitiated. The trial court also noted that she recanted due to pressures
exerted upon her by her family.
In his appeal, he claimed that AAAs testimony was attended with numerous
misgivings, inconsistencies and contradictions, i.e. she could not recall the dates
when she was allegedly raped in the years 2007, 2008 and 2009; she said her birth
was not registered but later she identified her birth certificate.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove Closas guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of rape
Ruling:
No.
Rape is committed in secrecy, and often it is only the victim who can testify
as to the fact of the forced coitus. AAAs sole testimony is sufficient to produce
conviction. When a woman says she was raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that a rape was committed, and if her testimony meets the test
of credibility, conviction may issue on the basis thereof. This holds true with greater
force when the woman is the minor daughter of Closa, and no motive has been
shown why she would concoct such a sordid charge against her own father, unless it
is true.
Furthermore, considering AAAs very tender youth and the internal turmoil
the accused-appellant caused her by his unremitting abuses, it would not be fair to
expect AAA to remember the exact dates when each of these other rapes occurred.
Nonetheless, the precise date or time of the commission of the rape is not an
essential element of the crime of rape. Contrary to the accused-appellants
allegation, the appellate court noted from the transcript that it was AAA herself and
not the prosecutor who supplied the date of the second reported rape, October 26,
2009.
Concerning AAAs affidavit of desistance, it is important to note that it was
executed only after AAA had completed her testimony, boldly and candidly accusing
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her father of rape. The RTC and the appellate court are correct to disregard AAAs
said affidavit.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SAMUEL "TIW-TIW" SANICO
G.R. No. 208469, August 13, 2014, J. Reyes
"For conviction to be had in the crime of rape, the following elements must
be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of
the victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished (a) through the use of force or
intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious,
or (c) when the victim is twelve years of age, or is demented." In the instant appeal,
the RTC and the CA both found AAAs testimony that she was raped in 2005 as
credible. AAA did not specifically refer to an exact month and date when the sordid
act was committed. Her testimony that the he threatened to kill her, pushed her to
the wall and inserted his penis in her vagina, while she was alone washing dishes at
home, was positive, clear and categorical.
Facts:
Two separate Informations were filed against Sanico before the RTC, viz:
In Criminal Case No. 12021 for Acts of Lasciviousness
In Criminal Case No. 12022 for Rape
Sanico went into hiding but was subsequently arrested in his hometown in
Leyte on May 13, 2008.
As indicated in her birth certificate, AAA was born on June 14, 1993. AAA was
12 years old when the acts complained of were allegedly committed, but was
already 15 years of age at the time she testified in court.
Sanico was a pig butcher. He and his children rented a room for about ten
(10) years in the house where AAA lives with her family. Then, they moved to their
own house built near AAAs residence.
AAA claimed that Sanico raped her in 2005, but she could not recall the exact
month and date. She remembered that she was raped while she was washing dishes
in the kitchen. There was nobody else in the house except her and Sanico . He
threatened to kill her if she would shout. Knowing that he was a pig butcher, AAA
was overcome by fear. He then succeeded in removing her clothes and pushing her
against the wall. He inserted his penis into her vagina for two to three minutes. She
felt pain.
On April 19, 2006, at around 1:00 p.m., AAA was napping when AAA woke up,
she felt that Sanico was touching her. Her father, CCC, was just in another room but
out of fear, AAA kept quiet. Being merely built out of wood, the house shook, which
caused CCC to wake up. CCC lost consciousness for a short period of time when he
caught Sanico performing lascivious acts on AAA. Sanico then seized the
opportunity to flee.
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On the same day, Dr. Orais performed a medico-genital examination on AAA
and found that she have suffered from sexual abuse. AAAs hymen was slightly
open and bore "old healed laceration".
Sanico testified in court, he was 53 years old. On April 19, 2006, he had a
drinking spree with CCC. As the two were both drunk, Sanico slept in the sala while
CCC did so in his room. He woke up from slumber when AAA touched the formers
pocket to search for money. She got some coins and bills. He, in turn, touched AAAs
chest and asked the latter to remove her short pants. AAA complied. As he was
touching AAAs breast, CCC woke up. Upon seeing what was taking place, CCC got a
bolo to hack Sanico, but the latter escaped.
He testified that he had never inserted his penis in AAAs vagina. He
admitted touching AAA but he did so only because the latter initiated it.
The RTC convicted Sanico of one count of rape and of acts of lasciviousness.
The CA affirmed with modifications the Omnibus Judgment of the RTC regarding the
imposable penalties.
The contention of Sanico that the rape allegedly committed was highly
implausible because of the absence of fresh lacerations and spermatozoa in AAAs
vagina is untenable. It should be emphasized that he was charged with rape that
occurred sometime in 2005 and not on April 19, 2006. The fact that only old healed
lacerations were found does not negate rape. x x x:
x x x In People v. Espinoza, it was held that healed lacerations do not negate rape.
In fact, lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best physical evidence of
forcible defloration.x x x. Moreover, in the present case, Dr. Orais clarified to the
court that even if the alleged sexual assault took place in the year 2005 or a year
after AAA was examined, the old healed lacerations could still be found.
The absence of spermatozoa does not disprove rape, In fact, in People v.
Perez, it was held that:
The absence of spermatozoa is not a negation of rape. The presence or
absence of spermatozoa is immaterial since it is penetration, not ejaculation, which
constitutes the crime of rape.
Issue:
Whether or not Sanico is guilty beyond reasonable doubt that he had, in fact,
raped AAA.
Ruling:
Yes, The Court affirms the CAs verdict convicting Sanico of the charges
against him, but modify the same by (a) reinstating the penalty and damages for
lascivious conduct imposed by the RTC in Criminal Case No. 12021; and (b) reducing

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to six percent the interests imposed upon the damages awarded to AAA in both
Criminal Case Nos. 12021 and 12022.
Criminal Case No. 12021
It would be a superfluity to exhaustively re-evaluate Sanicos conviction in
Criminal Case No. 12021 for lasciviousness conduct committed on April 19, 2006.
The RTC and the CA uniformly found him guilty as charged. Sanico himself admitted
touching AAAs breast and directing the latter to take off her short pants.
The RTC and the CA, were however, not in agreement as to the proper
imposable penalty for the lascivious conduct. The RTC applied the provisions of
Article 336 of the RPC and sentenced Sanico to 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6
years of imprisonment. The CA, invoking Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, which
punishes sexual abuses committed against minors, imposed upon the accusedappellant the indeterminate penalty of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as
minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
In the instant appeal, the Information relative to Criminal Case No. 12021
bears the caption "for acts of lasciviousness." It is indicated that the acts are being
prosecuted pursuant to the provisions of "Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to R.A.
No. 7610."
It bears stressing that the case before the Court involves two separate
Informations filed one for rape and another for lascivious conduct.
In the case at bench, the commission of lascivious conduct was admitted by
Sanico in his testimony. No issue regarding his conviction for lascivious conduct had
been raised in his appeal before the CA as well. Despite the fact that the appeal
filed was captioned as one with reference to Criminal Case Nos. 12021 and 12022,
the body stated in no uncertain terms that what was being assailed was merely the
conviction for rape. It was as if no appeal was filed relative to Criminal Case No.
12021. Hence, the penalty imposed by the RTC for lascivious conduct should not be
disturbed anymore. The CA cannot impose a graver penalty and increase the
amount of damages awarded to AAA at least relative to Criminal Case No. 12021.
This is the path more in accord with the general rule that penal laws are to be
construed liberally in favor of the accused.
In Criminal Case No. 12022 for Rape
The court finds no reversible error committed by the RTC and the CA anent
Sanicos conviction for rape.
The Court has repeatedly held that when the offended parties are young and
immature girls, as in this case, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version
of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability, but also the
shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the matter about
which they testified were not true.

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The foregoing doctrines apply with greater force in the instant case where the
Sanico cannot ascribe any ill-motive against AAA in accusing him of the offenses
charged, and where the factual findings of the RTC coincide with those of the CA.
"For conviction to be had in the crime of rape, the following elements must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of the
victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished (a) through the use of force or
intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious,
or (c) when the victim is twelve years of age, or is demented."
In the instant appeal, the RTC and the CA both found AAAs testimony that
she was raped in 2005 as credible. AAA did not specifically refer to an exact month
and date when the sordid act was committed. Her testimony that the he threatened
to kill her, pushed her to the wall and inserted his penis in her vagina, while she was
alone washing dishes at home, was positive, clear and categorical.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATION: In Criminal Case No. 12021, the indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2
months and 1 day of imprisonment as minimum to 6 years as maximum imposed by
the RTC upon the accused-appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WENDEL OCDOL y MENDOVA, EDISON
TABIANAN, AND DANTE BORINAGA
G.R. No. 200645, August 20, 2014, J. Perez
AAA while going home, was suddenly abducted by Edison and dragged into a
dark portion. In the said area, Wendel through force and intimidation, committed
rape against AAA while Dante and Edison held her and pointed a knife at her.
Wendel posited the sweetheart defense. In disregarding the said defense, the Court
ruled that the "sweetheart theory" is an admission of carnal knowledge of the
victim and consequently places on the accused the burden of proving the supposed
relationship by substantial evidence. Otherwise called as the "sweetheart defense,"
it is an oft-abused justification that rashly derides the intelligence of this Court and
sorely tests the Courts patience. The defense cannot just present testimonial
evidence in support of the theory, as in the instant case. Independent proof is
required such as tokens, mementos, and photographs. Appellant presented no
such evidence to substantiate his claim.
Facts:
On August 31, 2000 at around 8:00 oclock in the evening, AAA was sent by
her mother to buy ice at the store. While AAA was about to go home, Edision
Tabianan called AAAs attention, told AAA "just something" and he immediately held
AAAs arm dragging her to a darkened portion of a chapel near the store. AAA
resisted but she could not move because Edison poked a knife at her. Then, AAA
saw two (2) people in the place where she was dragged. She identified the two as
Dante Borinaga and Tisoy known as Wendel Ocdol. Dante likewise poked an arrow at
AAAs neck. Wendel suddenly held AAAs hand, laid her on the ground, and removed
her shorts and panty. AAA still resisted the attack. Wendel took off his shorts and
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brief, mounted on top of AAA and inserted his penis into AAAs vagina causing the
latter to pain. Wendel also kissed AAA on the lips and fondled her breasts. When the
three (3) accused heard that someone was looking for AAA, Wendel immediately got
up and put on his brief and shorts and three (3) accused scampered away. AAA put
her panty and shorts on, and ran towards home. The following day, AAAs
grandmother came and it was only then that AAA narrated what happened to her.
Upon learning of the incident, AAAs grandmother left and reported it to Rufino
Villarino, the barangay captain of Matlang. Rufino summoned three (3) of his
barangay tanods who arrested Edison and Dante. The barangay officials referred the
matter to the police who picked-up the two accused for investigation. Upon advice
of the policemen, AAA was brought by her mother to a doctor for medico-legal
examination. The medico legal certified that there were fresh hymenal lacerations
and several abrasions surrounding the vaginal opening.
On the other hand, Wendel interposed the sweetheart defense. He alleged
that on August 27, 2000, Philip, Wendels friend, introduced him to AAA at the pier
in Pingag, Isabel, Leyte until they became friends. He met AAA again on August 29,
2000 at Philips house when the latter came to visit him. They talked at the balcony
of Philips house for one (1) hour and courted AAA until they became sweethearts.
Allegedly, AAA invited Wendel to the pier. In a nearby nipa hut located in the pier,
AAA embraced him first and so he returned the favor, and they kissed each other.
Then, he removed his shorts and AAA also took off her shorts and panty. Wendel
inserted his organ into the vagina of AAA but he was not able to penetrate because
the latter felt pain. During the sexual act, AAA neither cried nor shouted. Not long
thereafter, they stopped and went home.
The RTC convicted Ocdol with rape and Edison and Dante as accomplices
thereto. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that Ocdol is guilty of rape
Ruling:
Yes, the prosecution was able to discharge its burden.
At the outset, for conviction in the crime of rape, the following elements must
be proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of
the victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished: (a) through the use of force or
intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious,
or (c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented.
In the case at bench, the presence of the first element is undisputed since
Wendel admits his sexual congress with complainant. While making such admission
however, he contends that there was no force or intimidation to speak of as it was
consensual. Wendel alleges that AAA willingly participated in the sexual act because
they were lovers. He even presented a witness to corroborate his claim.
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Notwithstanding, their testimonies leave the Court unconvinced of Wendels alleged
innocence.
The "sweetheart theory" is an admission of carnal knowledge of the victim
and consequently places on the accused the burden of proving the supposed
relationship by substantial evidence. Otherwise called as the "sweetheart defense,"
it is an oft-abused justification that rashly derides the intelligence of this Court and
sorely tests the Courts patience. The defense cannot just present testimonial
evidence in support of the theory, as in the instant case. Independent proof is
required such as tokens, mementos, and photographs. Wendel presented no such
evidence to substantiate his claim.
Moreover, the Court agrees with the pronouncement of the appellate court
that even if it were true that they were indeed sweethearts, a love affair does not
justify rape. As judiciously enunciated, a man does not have the unbridled license to
subject his beloved to his unreciprocated carnal desires.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHARLES REYES y MARASIGAN
G.R. No. 210619, August 20, 2014, J. Reyes
A minor was allegedly raped by the common law husband of her mother two
times. The Court upheld the conviction of the lower courts and stated that statutory
rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of age
regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act. Proof of force,
intimidation or consent is unnecessary as they are not elements of statutory rape,
considering that the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the
victim is below the age of 12. At that age, the law presumes that the victim does
not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual
act. Thus, to convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution
carries the burden of proving: (a) the age of the complainant; (b) the identity of the
accused; and (c) the sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant.
Facts:
Two separate informations for rape were filed against the Reyes before the
RTC.
In 2002, AAA was an eleven (11) year old girl, having been born on October
31, 1990. She is living with her mother BBB and her common-law husband, Charles
Reyes in their residence in Barangay Calero, Calapan City.
Sometime in May 2002, while AAA was alone inside the room of their house,
Reyes entered the room and touched her breasts, after which, Reyes removed her
clothes, sando shirt, shorts and panty; she tried to go out of the room but Reyes did
not allow her to do so. Then, Reyes removed his shorts and brief[s], placed himself
on top of her and tried to insert his penis into her vagina causing her to feel pain;
failing to insert his penis into her vagina, Reyes put on his shorts and briefs and
went out of the house. Although AAA was able to talk to her mother after the rape

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incident, she did not inform her about it because she was afraid of the threat of
Reyes that the latter will kill her and her mother.
On August 5, 2002, at around four oclock in the afternoon, AAA was again
alone in the room of their house when Reyes entered the room. He removed her
blouse, skirt, sando shirt and panty. She was not able to do anything because Reyes
threatened to kill her and her mother. While naked, Reyes placed himself on top of
her and tried to insert his penis into her vagina. She tried to push Reyes away but
she was unsuccessful. She felt pain in her vagina when Reyes made a push and pull
motion. Thereafter, Reyes put on his shorts and brief[s] and left her in the room[,]
after which, she put on her clothes.
At around 8:00 oclock in the evening, she told her mother about the rape
incidents. Her mother and an employee of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) accompanied her to the Calapan City Police Station where
they reported the rape incidents.
Reyes, who was then a 34-year old construction worker when he took the
witness stand, vehemently denied the charges against him.
On November 25, 2009, the RTC rendered a Joint Decision convicting the
Reyes of two counts of rape. On appeal, the CA rendered the herein assailed
decision affirming in toto the RTCs judgment. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Charles Reyes is innocent of the 2 counts of rape
Ruling:
No, the decision of the RTC and CA is affirmed.
The Court sustains the CAs verdict convicting the Reyes of two counts of
rape, but modify the amount of damages imposed.
Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended,
substantially states that rape is committed by a man, who shall have carnal
knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age or is demented. To be liable under the
above provision, it is not necessary that the commission of the crime is attended by
the use of force, threat, intimidation, fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority, or that the victim is deprived of reason or unconscious.
Article 266-B of the same code, on the other hand, provides that the
imposable penalty for acts falling under Article 266-A(1)(d) is reclusion perpetua.
However, the death penalty shall be imposed if rape is committed with aggravating
or qualifying circumstances enumerated in Article 266-B therein, among which is
when the victim is below 18 years of age and the offender is a common-law spouse
of the parent of the victim.

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Records show that the elements of statutory rape are present in the case
under review. First, AAA was 11 years old when the sordid crimes were committed.
Her birth certificate was presented as evidence by both the prosecution and the
defense. Second, AAA positively, categorically and resolutely testified that the
Reyes had carnal knowledge of her on two separate occasions in May and on August
5 of 2002. Dr. Nieva-Bolors findings of hymenal lacerations, both healed and not, in
AAAs vagina corroborated the latters claims.
The eloquent testimony of the victim, coupled with the medical findings
attesting to her non-virgin state, should be enough to confirm the truth of her
charges." This is especially true in the case of AAA, a girl of tender age, who is not
likely to fabricate a story of her own defloration which may expose her and her
family to humiliation. Reyes denied the charges and in his defense posited that AAA
filed the complaints in anger after the former drove BBB and the children away from
the house. The RTC declared this ascribed motive as too flimsy and insignificant,
and we find no reason to depart from the said finding.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ECO YABA y BASA a.k.a. Plok
G.R. No. 194946, September 3, 2014, J. Perez
When the rape victim had testified in a straightforward and categorical
manner that the accused had used force and intimidation to insert his penis into her
vagina, and the trial court gave credence to her testimony, such findings are
binding upon the Supreme Court. In addition, the sweetheart theory, absent any
substantial evidence as proof of a relationship between the victim and the accused,
will not be a sufficient defense for rape. Besides, the fact that both parties are
sweethearts does not negate rape.
Facts:
Eco Yaba was charged before the RTC with rape in relation to R.A. 7610. The
prosecution alleged that AAA, a 15-year old minor at the time and who was staying
with her grandmother on schooldays, was permitted by her grandmother to go
home in Lupi provided she was to be accompanied by Yaba, who was a family friend.
While on the way, AAA told Yaba to return home as she was to be
accompanied by a friend, who turned out to be not yet home when AAA dropped by
the latters house. AAA went home alone, and while on the way Yaba grabbed her
by the hair and boxed and kicked her thrice. Yaba threatened physical harm upon
AAA, and killing her family if she will not give in to what Yaba wanted. Yaba
undressed her, laid on top of AAA and inserted his penis into her vagina.
Yaba denied the allegations in the complaint, and averred that when he was
accompanying AAA, it rained heavily and AAA stumbled to the ground with her legs
wide apart and hit a mango tree. He noticed blood on AAAs short pants and learned
that she was menstruating that day. He helped AAA stand up but kept his distance
when AAA was changing her clothes. He, however, claimed that was not the first
time AAA undressed in front of him. He further claimed that AAA had no qualms
undressing in front of him because they were lovers.
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The RTC relied on the straightforward and categorical narration of AAA on
how Yaba raped her, and convicted Yaba. Even if there was no medical certificate
presented, the testimony alone of the victim being credible, is enough to convict the
Cordero of the crime charged. The trial court also noted that the family of AAA
subjected her to a medical examination right the following morning. Such reaction
revealed the familys resolve to have justice served for what had happened to their
daughter. The trial court further held that even if the medical certificate did not
mention about the presence or absence of spermatozoa, still it was of the belief that
AAA had been raped and it was the Cordero who raped her. The CA affirmed the
RTC.
Issue:
1. Whether or not AAAs testimony not credible as to warrant Yabas conviction?
2. Whether or not the fact that Yaba and AAA were lovers negate the allegation
of rape?
Ruling:
1. No, as the findings of the trial court as to the credibility of the witness
deserves great weight and respect.
The trial court placed full faith and credence upon the testimony of AAA. It
found her testimony to be credible in itself. The theory of rape through force and
intimidation proffered by the prosecution was successfully established through the
credibility of AAAs testimony.
The basic rule is that findings and conclusions of a trial court, upon whom the
responsibility of assessing the credibility of witnesses primarily rests, deserve great
weight and respect. Conclusions as to the credibility of witnesses in rape cases lie
heavily on the sound judgment of the trial court. When the question arises as to
which version is to be believed, the judgment of the trial court is accorded the
highest respect in view of the opportunity it had to observe the witnesses
demeanor and deportment on the witness stand. Concededly, it is in a better
position than an appellate court to discern whether a witness is telling the truth or
fabricating a lie. Barring arbitrariness and oversight of facts which might affect the
result of the case, such assessment must bind even this Court.
The Court finds no reason to depart from the findings of the trial court as
affirmed by the CA. Hence, the Court sustains the conviction.
2. No, as the sweetheart theory bereft of compelling evidence such as tokens,
mementos and photographs will not be a sufficient defense for rape. Besides,
being sweethearts does not prove consent to the sexual act.
Yaba would have this Court believe that he and AAA were lovers. This
sweetheart theory, however, is bereft of any substantial proof. Other than his selfserving assertions and the testimonies of Sarmiento and Manalo, there were no
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other evidence presented to satisfactorily prove the alleged romantic relationship.
The testimonies that they were seen together talking on the day of the incident or
that they were walking hand in hand in going to Lupi do not give rise to the
inference that they were sweethearts. The Court previously held that the
sweetheart theory or sweetheart defense is an oft-abused justification that rashly
derides the intelligence of this Court and sorely tests its patience. For the Court to
even consider giving credence to such defense, it must be proven by compelling
evidence. The defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in support of the
theory, as in the instant case. Independent proof is required such as tokens,
mementos, and photographs. There is none presented here by the defense.
Besides, even if it were true that Yaba and AAA were sweethearts, this fact
does not necessarily negate the commission of rape. Being sweethearts does not
prove consent to the sexual act. Definitely, a man cannot demand sexual
gratification from a fiance and worse, employ violence upon her on the pretext of
love. Love is not a license for lust.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BOBBY BELGAR
G.R. No. 182794, September 8, 2014, J. Bersamin
According to Article 266-A (1) (a), Revised Penal Code, rape is committed: 1)
by a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances: a) through force, threat or intimidation.
In the instant case, according to AAA, Belgar poked a knife at her neck,
forced her to get up from her sleep, and dragged her outside of the house. She
resisted and would have shouted but he warned her against shouting, and
threatened to stab her and her sleeping sisters. Once they were outside, he injected
a substance into her belly, thereby causing her to lose consciousness. Upon
regaining her consciousness, she was already naked and had blood in her vagina.
Belgar employed force, threat and intimidation in order to commit carnal knowledge
of AAA.
The commission of the rape was competently established although AAA had
been unconscious during the commission of the act. Proof of the commission of the
crime need not always be by direct evidence, for circumstantial evidence could also
sufficiently and competently establish the crime beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed,
the Court affirmed convictions for rape based on circumstantial evidence.
Facts:
There are two versions of facts in this case.
According to the Prosecution, on January 20, 2000, at about 8:00 p.m., AAA
and her two sisters were sleeping in their house in Tigaon, Camarines Sur, when she
was awakened because someone was touching her feet. She saw that it was Belgar,
who was poking her neck with a knife. She resisted but he warned her not to shout
or he would stab her and her sisters. He dragged her outside the house and brought
her to a nearby tree, where he injected an unknown substance into her stomach.
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She fell unconscious afterwards. Upon regaining consciousness, she found herself
naked, and her vagina was aching and soaked with white and red substance. She
put on her clothes and returned to the house. She attended school the next
morning. During her class, she broke a mirror and slashed her left wrist. Her teacher
came to her aid and had her treated. While being treated she confided the rape to
her teacher. She was thus brought to the Municipal Health Office of Tigaon,
Camarines Sur, and was examined there by Dr. Villanueva, who issued her medicolegal report stating that there is brownish discoloration of the skin at the anterior
area of the distal portion of the left lower arm, multiple hymenal lacerations old,
healed complete at 9 o clock and 6 oclock positions and old healed partial
lacerations at 3 o clock and 12 o clock positions.
According to the Defense, Belgar denied raping AAA and interposed alibi,
insisting that he was sleeping in his house in San Miguel, Tigaon, Camarines Sur at
midnight of January 20, 2000, having gone to bed there at 8:00 p.m. on the same
date and waking up at 5:00 a.m. of the next day; that he did not leave the house in
that period of time; and that it was his first time to see AAA when she identified him
inside the Municipal Jail of Tigaon as the one who had raped her at midnight of
January 20, 2000.
RTC found that all the elements of rape under Article 266-A (1) (a) of Republic
Act No. 8353 had been duly established; that the State had shown that Belgar had
committed carnal knowledge of AAA by force, threat, and intimidation; that AAA was
candid and truthful as a witness; and that Belgars alibi could not prevail because it
was uncorroborated, and he did not show the physical impossibility for him to be at
the crime scene at the time of the commission of the crime.
CA affirmed the conviction, holding that the conviction for rape could be
based on the circumstantial evidence adduced through the testimony of AAA; that
the absence of spermatozoa from the vagina of the victim did not disprove rape
because ejaculation was not an element of the crime; and that the RTC properly
rejected Belgars alibi upon finding AAAs testimony credible.
Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of rape
when said victim was unconscious when the incident happened.
Ruling:
The appeal lacks merit.
The information charged Belgar with rape committed through force, threat or
intimidation as defined under Article 266-A (1) (a), Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 8353, to wit:
Article 266-A. Rape; Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is
committed.
1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any
of the following circumstances:
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a) Through force, threat or intimidation
The elements of the crime charged are that the offender had carnal
knowledge of a female, and that the same was committed by using force, threat or
intimidation. The elements were proved beyond reasonable doubt. According to
AAA, Belgar poked a knife at her neck, forced her to get up from her sleep, and
dragged her outside of the house. She resisted and would have shouted but he
warned her against shouting, and threatened to stab her and her sleeping sisters.
Once they were outside, he injected a substance into her belly, thereby causing her
to lose consciousness. Upon regaining her consciousness, she was already naked
and had blood in her vagina.
Belgar employed force, threat and intimidation in order to commit carnal
knowledge of AAA.
The Court likewise notes that AAA did not hesitate or waver in her narration
even during her rigorous cross examination. As such, her sole but credible
testimony as the rape victim sufficed to convict the accused of his crime. It is
remarkable, indeed, that there was neither allegation nor proof of any ill motive on
her part or on the part of her family in accusing him of raping her.
Belgars alibi was rightly rejected. Alibi, to prosper, must be substantiated
with clear and convincing evidence. He must demonstrate not only that he was
somewhere else when the crime occurred, but also that it was physically impossible
for him to beat the crime scene when the crime was committed. But he failed to
adequately support his alibi. Although he attested that on January 20, 2000, he
slept in his house situated in Barangay San Miguel, Tigaon, Camarines Sur
continuously from 8:00 p.m. until getting up at 5:00 a.m. of the next day, he did not
dispute that his house was but two kilometers away from where the rape was
committed.
The commission of the rape was competently established although AAA had
been unconscious during the commission of the act. Proof of the commission of the
crime need not always be by direct evidence, for circumstantial evidence could also
sufficiently and competently establish the crime beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed,
the Court affirmed convictions for rape based on circumstantial evidence. In this
connection, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the conditions set
forth in Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court are shown to exist, to wit:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence
is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ADEL RAMOS y ABELLANA
G.R. No. 200077, September 17, 2014, J. Perez
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The behavior of a rape victim in reacting to the incidents of rape after the
offense varies from one victim to another. The act of the victim of going back to the
place where the crime was committed does not ipso facto make the sexual
intercourse consensual.
Facts:
AAA, a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, charged Ramos with
4 counts of rape. The first incident happened when her family was staying at
Ramos house since the construction of their house was not yet finished. When she
went to the comfort room during the wee hours in the morning, she found Ramos
who told her to enter the bathroom with a gun pointed at her side. She was also told
to lie down and undress. Ramos then successfully had carnal knowledge with her.
The second incident was when AAAs mother sent viand for the Ramoses. She went
to their house and when she was about to leave, Ramos pulled her inside the house
and successfully had sexual congress with her. The third incident happened when
she was returning things to Ranos daughter Jocelyn. She entered the house and
was about to leave when Ramos forced her to go back inside and had sex with her.
The last incident occurred when AAA went to the bathroom of their house and saw
Ramos inside already. He forced her to come inside and had sex with her standing
up. AAA told her friend Roselyn what happened and after her encouragement, AAA
told the story to her mother. Her mother had her medically checked.
During the trial, Ramos denied all the allegations with one sweeping denial.
The RTC found him guilty of rape which was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not Ramos is guilty of rape
Ruling:
Yes. Articles 266-A, paragraph 1(a), and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code
enumerate how rape is committed and the penalty therefor:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is
committed
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
xxxx
Both the lower courts correctly gave credence to AAAs testimony, which was
personally observed by the trial judge. On more than one occasion, we have held
that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of
the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing and consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things. As in this case, the final resolution of the
issue turns on the credibility of the victim.
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In the review of rape cases, the Court continues to be guided by the following
principles: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove
but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view
of the nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and, (3) the
evidence for the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed
to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Thus, in a prosecution for rape,
the complainant's credibility becomes the single most important issue.
Moreover, the Court has consistently held that the testimony of minor victims
is normally given full weight and credit. When a woman states that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed.
AAA was still a minor when the rape occurred and her testimony was found by the
lower courts to be a straightforward and categorical account of all the incidents,
notwithstanding her youth and innocence.
As the lower courts have noted, we find AAAs testimony credible; she
remained steadfast and never wavered in her claim that Ramos raped her, as she
recounted the harrowing ordeal repeated four (4) times.
AAAs testimony is corroborated by the medical finding evincing forcible
defloration, which taken together, provide sufficient basis to conclude that the
essential requisites of carnal knowledge through force, threat and intimidation have
been established.
Ramos claims that AAA did not employ even the slightest amount of
resistance as she did not push him away or attempt to shout. He further avers that
during the first incident when he supposedly poked a gun at AAA, it was unusual
that AAA remained passive under attack and went back to sleep in Ramos house
after having been sexually assaulted.
To begin with, tenacious resistance against rape is not required; neither is a
determined or a persistent physical struggle on the part of the victim necessary. It is
well-settled that the force contemplated by law in the commission of rape is
relative, depending on the age, size and strength of the parties.
Next, Ramos casts doubt on the credibility of AAA by insisting that AAA could
have easily escaped during the second and third incidents but did not, nor did she
even try to shout for help. In addition, he argues that her visits to his house twice a
week thereafter and her carelessly going to his house make it hard to believe that
AAA was subjected to anything against her will.
The Court disagrees.
Failure to cry for help or attempt to escape during the rape is not fatal to the
charge of rape; it does not make voluntary AAAs submission to appellants lust.
Rape through intimidation includes the moral kind such as the fear caused by
threatening the girl with a knife or pistol.
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In this case, Ramos gun and continual threats were enough to make AAA
cower in fear. Thus, the lower courts did not err in finding that Ramos employed
enough force and intimidation to consummate his purpose in mind. And as correctly
held by the trial court, the fact that she was able to sleep after the first incident of
rape is a trivial matter and does not affect the positive and categorical testimony of
AAA about the rape.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PRIMO P. JAPSON alias "Longlong"
G.R. No. 210658, September 17, 2014, J. Reyes
Japson was charged of the crime of raping AAA, who admitted she had a
relationship with the him. Japson claimed it was a consensual act. The Court held
that the invocation of the sweetheart theory cannot stand. To be credible, the
sweetheart defense should be substantiated by some documentary or other
evidence of relationship such as notes, gifts, pictures, mementos, and the like.
Facts:
AAA, the complainant, testified that around 6 p.m., while on her way to her
grandmothers house, Japson suddenly appeared and brought her into a grassy
portion. She shouted for help but the nearest house was still 80 to 100 meters away
from where she was. She resisted and tried to free herself but Japson was stronger
than her.
Japson laid her down and went on top of her and placed his legs between her
thighs and held her arms with his hands. He pulled down her underwear with left
hand and kicked it away. He then inserted his index finger and forefinger inside
AAAs vagina causing her to feel pain and become weak. He then inserted his penis
into her vagina, and made push and pull movements. A few minutes later, AAA
noticed that fluids came out from his sexual organ.
Japson sexually abused AAA for the second time. He again inserted his two
fingers inside AAAs vagina and afterwards his penis. Before leaving he threatened
her not to tell her mother or grandmother about the incident, otherwise, he would
kill her. Upon arriving at her grandmothers house, AAA related the incident and
subsequently, it was reported to the police.
Upon cross-examination, AAA admitted that she had a relationship with
Japson for a month. She broke up with him because her mother was against it since
she was only 15 years old and was still studying. AAA was submitted herself to a
physical examination. The medical report revealed that she has fresh hymenal
lacerations at the 9, 6 and 5 oclock positions.
Japson claimed their intercourse was a consensual act. He claimed that they
agreed to have sex near the area on the way to AAAs grandmothers house. He
alleged that despite the break up, they continued their relationship.

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CCC, the uncle of AAA, and his son, DDD, testified for Japson. They testified
that Japson could not have raped AAA because the two were sweethearts. They
both stated that AAA used to send love letters to him through CCCs daughter-inlaw. DDD also testified that on the date and time of the incident, he saw both of
them walking by the seashore going to the house of their grandmother as he was
watching them at a distance. He also said that while Japson was already in jail, AAA
sent the latter a love letter through him.
Both trial court and appellate court found Japson guilty of two counts of Rape.
Issue:
Whether or not Japson is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
Ruling:
Yes, the Court finds him guilty.
In resolving rape cases, the primordial question is given to the credibility of
the victims testimony because conviction for rape may be solely based on the
victims testimony provided it is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things. Both the lower courts found AAAs
testimony as credible and such finding is conclusive and binding.
The sole testimony of AAA, recounting the facts and circumstances of her
ordeal was sufficiently straightforward, spontaneous and consistent. AAA was really
positive and firm in pointing an accusing finger on Japson as the very person who
sexually assaulted her.
Her behavior after the incident was indicative of her resistance to the acts of
Japson. On the same night, she directly reported to her grandmother that she was
raped. The incident was immediately reported to the police that same evening
negating any opportunity for concoction. On the following day after the incident,
AAA went to the police station to formally lodge a complaint and to submit herself
to a medical examination. AAAs testimony is buttressed by the medico-legal
findings. Indeed, AAA would not have sought police and medical assistance if her
claim of rape were a simple trumped-up story.
Japson averred the consensual sex theory and argued that there was no force
or intimidation to speak of as AAA willingly participated in the sexual act. Because
of this, the burden of evidence has shifted to him. Accused argued that there was no
resistance from AAA during and after the act and that the absence of injuries in
AAAs body negates the employment of force upon her.
The Court ruled that a rape victim has no burden to prove that she did all
within her power to resist the force or intimidation employed upon her. The lack of
active resistance cannot be equated to consent. Absence of external signs or
physical injuries does not negate the commission of rape since proof of injuries is
not an essential element of the crime.
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The Court held that the invocation of the sweetheart theory cannot stand.
The only evidence adduced was Japsons testimony and those of his relatives, CCC
and DDD. The Court finds that these testimonies are unpersuasive and rely too
much on hasty conclusions rather than factual observations. CCC merely said that
he knew of the relationship because Japson told him, while the testimony of DDD as
regards seeing AAA and Japson on the date and time of the incident walking
together does not in any way suggest a romantic or sexual relationship between
them.
To be credible, the sweetheart defense should be substantiated by some
documentary or other evidence of relationship such as notes, gifts, pictures,
mementos, and the like. The alleged love letter sent by AAA, through DDD, to
Japson while in jail was never produced in court, if indeed, there really was one.
And even if it were true that they were sweethearts, this fact does not
necessarily negate rape. A love affair does not justify rape for a man does not have
the unbridled license to subject his beloved to his carnal desires against her will.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULITO GERANDOY


G.R. No. 202838, September 17, 2014, J. Perez
The Court ruled that as to the first incident, accused is guilty of rape. Despite
the absence in AAAs testimony that there was actual carnal knowledge considering
that she lost consciousness before that, circumstances indicate that the bloodied
vagina was a result of insertion of the accuseds penis to the vagina of the victim.
Even without direct evidence, the accused may be convicted on the basis of
circumstantial evidence, provided the proven circumstances constitute an unbroken
chain leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. The Court held that there was only an
act of lasciviousness on the second incident. Accused mounted himself on top of
AAA, touched and sucked her nipple and kissed her on her lips. Lascivious conduct
is the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, with the intent to abuse, humiliate, harass,
degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
Facts:
Gerandoy was charged with two counts of rape, with the qualifying
circumstance of relationship, the victim AAA being the daughter of the accused and
aggravating circumstance of use of deadly weapon.
According to AAA, then 13-years-old, narrated that her father, Gerandoy,
raped her on two occasions. She recalled in the first rape that while she was
sleeping with her brothers and sisters in one of the two rooms inside their house,

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she was awakened when Gerandoy entered the room and hugged her. He then
forced her to lie down despite her resistance. He then kissed her cheeks and tore
her dress with a knife. She kept on resisting but Gerandoy told her that he would kill
them all if she would not consent to his advances. He then boxed her stomach. She
lost her consciousness. After she became conscious, she was already undressed and
noticed that her vagina was bleeding while Gerandoy was lying beside her. She
cried and went away to the farm and reported the incident to the elder sister of her
mother, CCC.
In the second incident of rape, AAA recalled that she was sleeping in a room
she shared with her brothers and sisters when awakened by Gerandoy. Gerandoy
then touched her face and told her that he will rape her again. She pleaded him to
stop but her father continued to touch her body. AAA resisted but her father held
her arms and forced her to lie down. She kept on resisting but Gerandoy held a knife
at her waist and warned that he could easily stab her. He slapped her and warned
further that he would kill all members of their family if she would keep on resisting.
Gerandoy told her not to resist anymore as her two older sisters have already been
molested by him. She was then undressed and Gerandoy mounted her. He touched
and sucked her nipple and kissed her lips. After that, AAA went again to her aunt
and told her what happened.
AAA clarified that she reported the first incident of rape to her aunt one
month after it happened. She reported the second incident three months after. She
explained that the delay was due to her fear that her father would make real his
warning and continuing threats that he would kill them all. When asked why she
reported the incidents to her aunt instead of her mother, she answered that she did
tell her mother about what happened but was told to keep quiet.
AAA then executed an Affidavit of Desistance that she was no longer pursuing
her case against her father. However, the court ordered the continuance of the case
to determine the voluntariness of the execution of the affidavit.
The defense presented its first witness BBB, the mother of AAA and wife of
Gerandoy. She denied that her daughter AAA was raped on the alleged date of the
first incident as the victim was not in their house. Likewise, she denied that AAA
was raped on the alleged date of the second incident. BBB testified that AAA left
their house at around 8:00 p.m. to attend a Christmas party with her friends. AAA
did not return and stayed in her Aunt CCCs house. BBB further said that it was
unlikely that Gerandoy would be able to rape AAA as he was in the farm on that
date and time and arrived home at 7:00 a.m. the day after. Upon learning that AAA
did not return home, the he scolded and beat her with a broom. As a result, AAA
went away to her aunt.
AAA was called to testify on the voluntariness of the affidavit of desistance.
She testified that pity for her father prompted her desistance. She expressed her
apprehension that nobody would take care of her other siblings if the case against
her father would push through. She confirmed that her Aunt CCC convinced her to
file a rape case against her father.

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Gerandoy denied the charges and said he was in the farm during the alleged
incidents and that he did not even went home to sleep for a few days at that time.
The trial court found him guilty for each count of rape. On appeal, he was
found guilty of two counts of Acts of Lasciviousness in relation with Section 5(b) of
Republic Act No. 7610 or Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. The CA ruled
that the two counts of rape have not been sufficiently established by the
prosecution with moral certainty.
Issue:
Whether Gerandoy is guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness or Rape
Ruling:
The Court ruled that as to the first incident, Gerandoy is guilty of rape and as
to the second incident, he was found guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness.
The Court found that the positive and credible testimony of AAA is sufficient
to convict Gerandoy of the crime of rape. The prosecution was able to prove that on
the first incident, Gerandoy, through the use of force, threat, intimidation and
deadly weapon, succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the victim against her
will.
Despite the absence in AAAs testimony that there was actual carnal
knowledge considering that she lost consciousness before that, circumstances
indicate that the bloodied vagina was a result of insertion of the accuseds penis to
the vagina of the victim.
Even without direct evidence, Gerandoy may be convicted on the basis of
circumstantial evidence, provided the proven circumstances constitute an unbroken
chain leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. To prove conviction based on
circumstantial evidence, there was more than one circumstance; the facts from
which the inferences were derived were proved; and the combination of all the
circumstances was such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. What
was essential was that the unbroken chain of the established circumstances led to
no other logical conclusion except Gerandoys guilt.
The Court found Gerandoy guilty of the crime of rape based on the following
unbroken circumstances. First, Gerandoy entered the room where AAA was sleeping
and forced her to lie down. Second, AAA resisted but Gerandoy continued to kiss
her. Third, Gerandoy succeeded in undressing her by tearing her clothes with a knife
despite her resistance. Fourth, he pointed his knife in her waist and threatened to
kill her. Fifth, due to AAAs continued resistance, he stabbed and boxed her stomach
causing AAA to lose consciousness. Sixth, upon regaining her consciousness, AAA
was already undressed and her vagina was already bleeding while Gerandoy was
lying at her side.

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But the Court agrees with the appellate court that there was only an act of
lasciviousness on the second incident.
The Court found credible AAAs testimony that Gerandoy entered the small
room where the victim was sleeping and pawed her body. Gerandoy undressed AAA
and forced her to lie down. He then mounted himself on top of AAA, touched and
sucked her nipple and kissed her on her lips.
Lascivious conduct is defined as intentional touching, either directly or
through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether
of the same or opposite sex, with the intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
It is deemed that a child is sexually abused under Section 5(b) of Republic Act
No. 7610, when he or she is subjected to other lascivious conduct under the
coercion or influence of any adult. There must be some form of compulsion
equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended partys
free will.
As to the theory that Gerandoy could not have done such acts due to the
presence of other persons in the room, the Court ruled that lust is no respecter of
time and place. Neither the crampness of the room, nor the presence of other
people therein, nor the high risk of being caught, has been held sufficient and
effective obstacle to deter the commission of rape.
Gerandoy argued that the CA erred when it failed to consider the affidavit of
desistance. The Court ruled that an affidavit of desistance is generally looked upon
with disfavor. The Court held that the lower courts correctly favored AAAs
testimony in open court over the affidavit of desistance. The statement that it was
executed out of pity for her father is only an additional reason why the desistance
would not suffice to acquit Gerandoy. It cannot affect the conclusion that he raped
and sexually abused his daughter.
Further, the delay on the part of the victim in relating her ordeal from her
own father was understandable. He is her parent and her confusion and fear are
logical under the circumstances. It was established during trial that aside from the
use of a knife to enfeeble her resistance, Gerandoy likewise threatened to kill her
and all the members of their family including himself if she would keep fighting off.
To make the matters worse, her own mother even expressed sympathy for the
husband over the child. Her mothers expression that it was embarrassing to relate
her sad plight aggravated the fear already sowed inside the minor victim.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELADIO B. LUMAHO alias "ATTUMPANG
G.R. No. 208716, September 24, 2014, J. Perez

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Rape is committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances: a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; c) By
means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and d) When the
offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present. In the case at bar, AAA positively
identified her father Lumaho as the person who had carnal knowledge of her in his
shanty. She narrated that when she visited her father, he brought her to a shanty
and while inside, he removed all her pieces of clothing, from her shirt up to her
panty. He then successfully had a carnal knowledge of her by inserting his penis
into her vagina.
Facts:
The victim, AAA, then 7-years-old, narrated that her father, accused Lumaho,
raped her sometime in December 2007. She narrated that she was staying in her
grandfathers house in Panubtuban, Asipulo, Ifugao, when she decided to visit her
father Lumaho in his house located also in Panubtuban. Upon reaching his house,
she narrated that Lumaho brought her to a shanty and he removed her shirt, pants
and panty. He then had carnal knowledge of AAA by inserting his penis inside her
vagina. The victim felt pain and cried after the wrongful deed of her father. Lumaho
warned AAA not to tell anybody about the incident. However, the crime eventually
came to the knowledge of BBB (distant grandmother), prompting BBB and AAA to
go to the police station to report the crime. Afterwards, AAA was brought to the
hospital for medical examination. Though the victim failed to recall the exact date of
the commission of rape, she remembered that it happened in December because
she was on a school vacation and Christmas carols were being played during that
time.
The prosecution presented Dr. Mae Codamon-Diaz, a medico-legal expert who
examined AAA. Dr. Diaz narrated that on 28 January 2008, she examined AAA in
relation to her complaint of sexual abuse against her father. Upon examining AAAs
genitalia, Dr. Diaz found out that there was a month-old healed laceration on the
part of the victims hymen.
Finally, the prosecution presented its last witness, BBB. BBB testified that she
is the first cousin of the grandmother of AAA. She testified that sometime in March
2008, AAAs cousin, CCC, went to her and told her about the rape incident
committed against AAA. Out of pity, she brought AAA to the police station to report
the crime. In her presence, AAA narrated to the investigating officers that she (AAA)
was sexually abused by her own father Lumaho. Thereafter, CCC accompanied AAA
to the hospital to be medically examined. During cross-examination, however, BBB

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clarified that the first part of her testimony was narrated to her by CCC while the
last part was what she heard during the investigation in the police station.
Aside from the testimonies of AAA, Dr. Diaz and BBB, the prosecution likewise
offered as evidence a certificate issued by the Office of the Civil Registry of Asipulo,
Ifugao that AAA was born on 12 January 2000 to prove that she was a minor when
the incident of rape happened. The medical certificate issued by Dr. Diaz was also
presented. The defense presented its lone witness Roland Bennog to prove that the
accused Lumaho was not present in his house in Nuntiguing, Asipulo when the
alleged rape happened. He testified that from August 2007 until 3 January 2008,
Lumaho was with him in his house located at Naddug, Panubtuban, Asipulo, Ifugao.
The RTC found the accused guilty. CA affirmed said decision.
Issues:
1. Whether or not accused Lumaho is guilty of rape;
2. Whether or not BBBs testimony is hearsay
Ruling:
1. Yes. Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code describes how
rape is committed:
Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above
be present.
Rape is qualified if the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim.
In this case, the prosecution established all the elements to constitute as
qualified rape. In open court, AAA positively identified her father Lumaho as the
person who had carnal knowledge of her in his shanty. She narrated that when she
visited her father, he brought her to a shanty and while inside, he removed all her
pieces of clothing, from her shirt up to her panty. He then successfully had a carnal

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knowledge of her by inserting his penis into her vagina. Without any other recourse,
AAA did nothing but cry. Before she left, Lumaho threatened her to keep silent about
what happened. AAAs narration of the crime of rape was strengthened by the
testimony of Dr. Diaz, who narrated that upon her examination of AAAs genitalia
sometime in January 2008, she found that there was a month-old healed laceration
on the victims hymen. The period was held to consistent with the allegation of rape
which happened on December 2007.
In People v. Manigo, where a victims testimony is corroborated by the
physical findings of penetration, there is sufficient basis for concluding that sexual
intercourse did take place. A rape victims account is sufficient to support a
conviction for rape if it is straightforward, candid and corroborated by the medical
findings of the examining physician, as in the present case.
2. No. The defense is trying to suggest that BBBs knowledge of AAAs sexual
abuse is only hearsay. It emphasized BBBs answer during cross examination that
the first part of her testimony was related only by CCC.
An evidence is considered hearsay if its probative value is not based on
personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not
on the witness stand. A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge and derived from his own perception.
Upon review of the records, BBB indeed testified that the first portion of her
statement was related only by CCC. However, the defense failed to specify with
particularity which of the first portion was hearsay. Contrary to the allegation of the
defense, what is apparent is the narration of BBB that she personally heard from
AAA herself, during police investigation, that she was abused by her father. And this
statement obviously does not fall within the ambit of hearsay.

NORBERTO CRUZ y BARTOLOME vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. No. 166441, October 8, 2014, J. Bersamin

The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the distinction
between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness. The felony of attempted rape
requires such intent; the felony of acts of lasciviousness does not. Only the direct
overt acts of the offender establish the intent to lie with the female. However,
merely climbing on top of a naked female does not constitute attempted rape

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without proof of his erectile penis being in a position to penetrate the female's
vagina.

Facts:

Norberto Cruz y Bartolome (Norberto) was charged in the RTC with attempted
rape and acts of lasciviousness involving different victims.

The prosecution alleged that on December 20, 1993, Norberto and, his wife,
Belinda employed AAA and BBB to help them in selling their wares in Bangar, La
Union which was then celebrating its fiesta. From Libsong East, Lingayen,
Pangasinan to Bangar, La Union, AAA and BBB boarded a passenger jeepney owned
by Norberto. The young girls were accompanied by Norberto, Belinda, Ruben
Rodriguez (driver) and a sales boy by the name of "Jess". Upon reaching Bangar, La
Union, at around 8:00 in the evening of December 20, 1993, they parked in front of
Maroon enterprises and brought out all the goods and wares for display. Two tents
were fixed in order that they will have a place to sleep. Belinda and the driver
proceeded to Manila in order to get more goods to be sold.

On December 21, 1993, at around 1:00 oclock in the morning, AAA and BBB
went to sleep. Less than an hour later, AAA was awakened when she felt that
somebody was on top of her. Norberto was mashing her breast and touching her
private part. AAA realized that she was divested of her clothing and that she was
totally naked. Norberto ordered her not to scream or shell be killed. AAA tried to
push Norberto away and pleaded to have pity on her but her pleas fell on deaf ears.
She fought back and kicked Norberto twice. Norberto was not able to pursue his
lustful desires. Norberto offered her money and told her not to tell the incident to
her mother otherwise, she will be killed. AAA went out of the tent to seek help from
Jess (the house boy) but she failed to wake him up. Thirty minutes later, when AAA
returned to their tent, she saw Norberto touching the private parts of BBB. AAA saw
her companion awake but her hands were shaking. When she finally entered the
tent, Norberto left and went outside.

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Later that day, AAA and BBB narrated to Jess the incident that took place that
early morning. In the evening of December 21, 1993, AAA and BBB went straight to
the municipal hall where they met a policeman by the name of "Sabas". They told
Sabas the sexual advances made to them by Norberto. Norberto was summoned to
the police station where he personally confronted his accusers. When Norbertos
wife, Belinda, arrived at the police station, an argument ensued between them.

On the other hand, Norberto denied the criminal acts imputed to him.
Norberto maintained that it was not possible for him to commit the crimes hurled
against him. On the date of the alleged incident, there were many people around
who were preparing for the "simbang gabi". Considering the location of the tents,
which were near the road and the municipal hall, he could not possibly do the
dastardly acts out in the open, not to mention the fact that once AAA and BBB
would scream, the policemen in the municipal hall could hear them. He believes
that the reason why the complainants filed these cases against him was solely for
the purpose of extorting money from him.

After the joint trial of the two criminal cases, the RTC rendered its judgment
finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted rape and acts of
lasciviousness. On appeal, CA affirmed the conviction of Norberto for attempted
rape, but acquitting him of the acts of lasciviousness.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the Norbertos climbing on top of the undressed AAA such
that they faced each other, with him mashing her breasts and touching
her genitalia with his hands, constituted attempted rape.
2. Whether the acts
Lasciviousness

of

Norberto

against

AAA

constitutes

Acts

of

Ruling: The appeal is partly meritorious.

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1. No, the acts of Norberto does not constitute attempted rape.

As the evolving case law on rape stands, rape in its frustrated stage is a
physical impossibility, considering that the requisites of a frustrated felony under
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code are that: (1) the offender has performed all the
acts of execution which would produce the felony; and (2) that the felony is not
produced due to causes independent of the perpetrators will. Obviously, the
offender attains his purpose from the moment he has carnal knowledge of his
victim, because from that moment all the essential elements of the offense have
been accomplished, leaving nothing more to be done by him. Nonetheless, rape
admits of an attempted stage.

In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender
does not perform all the acts of execution of having carnal knowledge. If the
slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its
attempted stage requires the commencement of the commission of the felony
directly by overt acts without the offender performing all the acts of execution that
should produce the felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed by
the accused can be shown to have a causal relation to rape as the intended crime is
to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with the female. Accepting that intent,
being a mental act, is beyond the sphere of criminal law, that showing must be
through his overt acts directly connected with rape. He cannot be held liable for
attempted rape without such overt acts demonstrating the intent to lie with the
female. In short, the State, to establish attempted rape, must show that his overt
acts, should his criminal intent be carried to its complete termination without being
thwarted by extraneous matters, would ripen into rape, for, as succinctly put in
People v. Dominguez, Jr.: "The gauge in determining whether the crime of attempted
rape had been committed is the commencement of the act of sexual intercourse,
i.e., penetration of the penis into the vagina, before the interruption."

Norberto climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her
genitalia with his hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his
clutches and effectively ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring from such
circumstances that rape, and no other, was his intended felony would be highly
unwarranted. This was so, despite his lust for and lewd designs towards her being
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fully manifest. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or "susceptible of double
interpretation," as Justice Recto put in People v. Lamahang, such that it was not
permissible to directly infer from them the intention to cause rape as the particular
injury. Verily, his felony would not exclusively be rape had he been allowed by her to
continue, and to have sexual congress with her, for some other felony like simple
seduction (if he should employ deceit to have her yield to him) could also be
ultimate felony.

The Court clarifies that the direct overt acts of Norberto that would have
produced attempted rape did not include equivocal preparatory acts. The former
would have related to his acts directly connected to rape as the intended crime, but
the latter, whether external or internal, had no connection with rape as the intended
crime. Perforce, his perpetration of the preparatory acts would not render him guilty
of an attempt to commit such felony. His preparatory acts could include his putting
up of the separate tents, with one being for the use of AAA and BBB, and the other
for himself and his assistant, and his allowing his wife to leave for Manila earlier that
evening to buy more wares. Such acts, being equivocal, had no direct connection to
rape. As a rule, preparatory acts are not punishable under the Revised Penal Code
for as long as they remained equivocal or of uncertain significance, because by their
equivocality no one could determine with certainty what the perpetrators intent
really was.

2. Yes, Norberto may be held liable of Acts of Lasciviousness

It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and


acts of lasciviousness is the offenders intent to lie with the female. In rape, intent
to lie with the female is indispensable, but this element is not required in acts of
lasciviousness. Attempted rape is committed, therefore, when the "touching" of the
vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate. The intent to penetrate
is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of consummating the
sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female. Without such showing, only
the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed.

Based on Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the felony of acts of
lasciviousness is consummated when the following essential elements concur,
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namely: (a) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness upon
another person of either sex; and (b) the act of lasciviousness or lewdness is
committed either (i) by using force or intimidation; or (ii) when the offended party is
deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party is
under 12 years of age. In that regard, lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent,
lecherous; it signifies that form of immorality that has relation to moral impurity; or
that which is carried on a wanton manner.

The information charged that Norberto "remove[d] her panty and underwear
and la[id] on top of said AAA embracing and touching her vagina and breast." With
such allegation of the information being competently and satisfactorily proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, he was guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, not
attempted rape. His embracing her and touching her vagina and breasts did not
directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack of evidence showing his erectile
penis being in the position to penetrate her when he was on top of her deterred any
inference about his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts reflected lewdness and
lust for her.

The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred against Norberto,
even from his own declaration of it, if any, unless he committed overt acts directly
leading to rape. A good illustration of this can be seen in People v. Bugarin, where
the accused was charged with attempted rape through an information alleging that
he, by means of force and intimidation, "did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Rape directly by overt acts,
by then and there kissing the nipples and the vagina of the undersigned
[complainant], a minor, and about to lay on top of her, all against her will, however,
[he] did not perform all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime
of Rape by reason of some causes other than his own spontaneous desistance, that
is, undersigned complainant push[ed] him away." Norberto was held liable only for
acts of lasciviousness because the intent to commit rape "is not apparent from the
act described," and the intent to have sexual intercourse with her was not inferable
from the act of licking her genitalia. The Court also pointed out that the "act
imputed to him cannot be considered a preparatory act to sexual intercourse."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEONARDO CATAYTAY y SILVANO
G.R. No. 196315, October 22, 2014, J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

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The Court differentiated the terms "deprived of reason" and "demented," as
follows, the term demented refers to a person who has dementia, which is a
condition of deteriorated mentality, characterized by marked decline from the
individual's former intellectual level and often by emotional apathy, madness, or
insanity. On the other hand, the phrase deprived of reason under paragraph 1 (b)
has been interpreted to include those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency,
or retardation. Thus, AAA, who was clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate,
can be properly classified as a person who is "deprived of reason," and not one who
is "demented."

Facts:

BBB (AAAs mother) testified that she knew accused-appellant Cataytay as


her neighbor in their compound in Mandaluyong City. Cataytay was a shoe
repairman who had a shop six houses away from BBBs house. Thirty minutes later,
her neighbor, Lito, told her that there was a problem, and brought her to the
barangay outpost. AAA and Cataytay were already at the outpost. When BBB saw
AAA, the latter told her, "Mommy, ni-rape po ako." BBB asked her who raped her.
AAA responded by pointing to Cataytay.

During the interviews made by the barangay officials, AAA narrated how she
was raped by Cataytay, which ended when a certain "Mimi" knocked at the door.
When Cataytay answered the knock, Mimi told the former that she will shout if he
does not leave the house. AAA went out of the house and sought help from their
neighbors. One of their neighbors, Amelita Morante, called the barangay officials at
the outpost.

BBB identified a Psychological Evaluation Report from the Department of


Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), which was conducted in connection with
another rape case. The report stated that AAA had the mental capacity of an eightyear-old child. BBB also identified AAAs birth certificate which showed that she was
biologically 19 years old at the time of the incident.

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On cross-examination, BBB confirmed that AAA was the victim in a rape case
in 1999 against a certain Norberto Lerit. BBB admitted that she did not personally
witness the alleged rape committed by the accused appellant. Cataytay countered
such allegation by defense of denial and alibi.

RTC rendered its Judgment finding accused Cataytay liable for crime of rape
which was affirmed by CA.

Issue:

Whether or not Cataytay is liable for crime of rape.

Ruling:

Yes, Cataytay is liable for crime of rape.

Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed


1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;


b) When the offended party is deprived of reasonor is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

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d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
(Emphasis supplied)

The differentiated the terms "deprived of reason" and "demented," as follows,


the term demented refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition of
deteriorated mentality, characterized by marked decline from the individual's
former intellectual level and often by emotional apathy, madness, or insanity. On
the other hand, the phrase deprived of reason under paragraph 1 (b) has been
interpreted to include those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or
retardation. Thus, AAA, who was clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can
be properly classified as a person who is "deprived of reason," and not one who is
"demented."

In the case at bar, AAA was clinically diagnosed to have mental retardation
with the mental capacity of a seven-year old child. The prosecution and the defense
agreed to stipulate on the conclusion of the psychologist that the "mental age of the
victim whose chronological age at the time of the commission of the offense is
nineteen (19) years old x x x is that of a seven (7) year old child." Cataytay is
therefore criminally liable for rape under paragraph 1(b) of Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code. The appropriate penalty is provided for by Article 266-B, which
relevantly provides:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances xxx When the
offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap
of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.

Since Cataytays knowledge of AAAs mental retardation was alleged in the


Information and admitted by the former during the trial, the above special qualifying
circumstance is applicable, and the penalty of death should have been imposed.
With the passage, however, of Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of
the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall instead be imposed.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ENRIQUE QUINTOS Y BADILLA
G.R. No. 199402, November 12, 2014, J. Leonen
The accused was charged for raping an intellectually challenged girl. The
Supreme Court convicted the accused and ruled that a person commits rape when
he sexually assaults another who does not consent or is incapable of giving consent
to a sexual act. Children, either in chronological or mental age, are incapable of
giving consent to a sexual act.
Facts:
Two informations were filed against the accused Enrique Quintos for allegedly
raping a 21-year old girl who is confirmed to be intellectually disabled at the time
the rape incident happened. AAA testified that on several occasions, Quintos
inserted his penis in her vagina despite her protests. For his defense, Quintos
claimed that he has romantic relationships with AAA and that the act of AAA
accusing him of rape is only a way of AAA to get back at him because he ended
their relationship.
The Regional Trial Court gave credence to the testimony of AAA and
convicted Quintos for the crime charged. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the RTC. Hence, the current appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Quintos is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two counts of
rape.
Ruling:
The accused is guilty for two counts of rape. The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the Court of Appeals and convicted the accused for the crime charged.
The observance of the witnesses demeanor during an oral direct
examination, cross-examination, and during the entire period that he or she is
present during trial is indispensable especially in rape cases because it helps
establish the moral conviction that an accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged. Trial provides judges with the opportunity to detect, consciously
or unconsciously, observable cues and microexpressions that could, more than the
words said and taken as a whole, suggest sincerity or betray lies and ill will. These
important aspects can never be reflected or reproduced in documents and objects
used as evidence.
Hence, [t]he evaluation of the witnesses credibility is a matter best left to
the trial court because it has the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their
demeanor during the trial. Thus, the Court accords great respect to the trial courts
findings, more so when the Court of Appeals affirmed such findings.

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Moreover, when a victims testimony is credible and sufficiently establishes
the elements of the crime, it may be enough basis to convict an accused of rape. To
be convicted of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, it only needs to
be shown that a man had carnal knowledge with a woman, or a person sexually
assaulted another, under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) The victim is deprived of reason;
c) The victim is unconscious;
d) By means of fraudulent machination;
e) By means of grave abuse of authority;
f) When the victim is under 12 years of age; or
g) When the victim is demented.
In this case, AAA made a spontaneous and unadorned testimony in court
about the fact, the manner, and the circumstances of Quintos sexual intercourse
with her over a period of days. She was also able to positively identify Quintos,
when asked. It was also established by clinical psychologist Brenda Tablizo,
however, through examinations and interviews, that AAA was intellectually disabled
with a mental age of 6 years and 2 months.
AAA's mental condition does not make her testimony incredible as long as
she can recount her experience in a straightforward, spontaneous, and believable
manner. In People v. Monticalvo, this court said the following:
Competence and credibility of mentally deficient rape victims as witnesses
have been upheld by this Court where it is shown that they can communicate their
ordeal capable and consistently. Rather than undermine the gravity of the
complainant's accusations, it even lends greater credence to her testimony, that,
someone as feeble-minded and guileless could speak so tenaciously and explicitly
on the details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered such crime at the hands of
the accused.
AAAs testimony was corroborated by the medical findings, which showed
that there were lacerations in her hymen that were produced by a blunt object. The
testimonial evidence is bolstered by the presence of these lacerations. Together,
they produce a moral conviction that accused committed the crimes charged. The
presence of lacerations is not an element of the crime of rape. This court previously
characterized the presence or absence of lacerations as a "trivial or inconsequential
[matter] that does not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape." The
presence of lacerations is, therefore, not necessary to sustain a conviction. An
accused may be found guilty of rape regardless of the existence or inexistence of
lacerations. The absence of lacerations is not a sufficient defense. However, the
presence of lacerations may be used to sustain conviction of an accused by
corroborating testimonies of abuse and documents showing trauma upon the
victim's genitals.
Lastly, the Court ruled that Quintos allegation that AAA did not resist his
advances was belied by AAAs testimony that accused threatened the lives of her
mother and siblings. This is intimidation that could explain AAAs alleged lack of
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resistance. In any case, resistance is not an element of the crime of rape. It need
not be shown by the prosecution. Neither is it necessary to convict an accused.
The main element of rape is lack of consent.
Hence, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code does not simply say that rape
is committed when a man has carnal knowledge with or sexually assaults another
by means of force, threat, or intimidation. It enumerates at least four other
circumstances under which rape may be committed: (1) by taking advantage of a
persons deprived reason or unconscious state; (2) through fraudulent machination;
(3) by taking advantage of a persons age (12 years of age) or demented status;
and (4) through grave abuse of authority. Article 266-A recognizes that rape can
happen even in circumstances when there is no resistance from the victim.
Resistance, therefore, is not necessary to establish rape, especially when the
victim is unconscious, deprived of reason, manipulated, demented, or young either
in chronological age or mental age.
The circumstances when rape may be committed under Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code should be defined in terms of the capacity of an individual to
give consent. An unconscious person cannot rationally respond to stimuli or
perform acts such as giving consent or offering resistance because he or she is
either unaware, asleep, or in a coma.
Meanwhile, when a person is a victim of fraudulent machination or
manipulation, such as when she is induced to have carnal knowledge to treat a
persons disease that he or she does not really have, she is not in full control of his
or her decisions. He or she acts without full or with false knowledge of the
circumstances from which he or she bases his or her actions. Therefore, any
consent he or she gives is either false or not his or her own. Any lack of resistance
may not be interpreted as voluntariness.
In this case, the victim, AAA, is intellectually disabled, with a mental age of 6
years and 2 months at 21 years of chronological age and an IQ of 38 at the time of
the incident. Her capacity to give consent is only that of a 6-year-and 2-month-old
child. She is incapable of giving rational consent to a sexual act. Any sexual
intercourse with her, regardless of her relationship with accused and the presence
or absence of resistance, is considered rape.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GABRIEL DUCAY y BALAN
G.R. No. 209590, November 19, 2014, J. Reyes
It is well-settled rule that when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says she
has been raped, she says in effect, all that is necessary to prove that rape was
committed. Courts give greater weight to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of
sexual assault, especially a minor, for it is most unnatural for a young and immature
girl to fabricate a story as sordid as her own defilement, allow a medical
examination of her genitalia, subject herself to a public trial and expose herself to
public ridicule for no reason other than her thirst for justice. Based on the foregoing
guiding principle, the Court upholds the RTC in giving full faith and credence to
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AAAs testimony rather than the mere denial and alibi of Ducay. AAAs clear,
straightforward and candid narration sufficiently established the fact of rape and
the identity of Ducay as the perpetrator.
Facts:
AAA was born in Tikala, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. When she reached Grade
6, she transferred to Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City and lived in the house of her
uncle, (Carlito). On June 10, 2001, the birthday of Carlitos grandchildren, who were
also Charlenes sons, was celebrated. The accused-appellant Gabriel Ducay y Balan
(Ducay), being one of the neighbors, was invited as a guest. After the affair, at
around 11:20 p.m., AAA and Charlene went out to buy sugar. Along the way, they
passed by Ducays house.
Ducay followed the two girls, called them and volunteered to run the errand
for them since he was also going to buy cigarettes. Charlene acceded and gave him
the money. He forthwith walked ahead of them towards the store. The two then
stayed outside a church. A few minutes later, Ducay appeared and instructed
Charlene to send AAA to get the sugar from him because he still had to buy
cigarettes. He was about five houses away from where AAA and Charlene stood and
it was dark in the area where he waited.
AAA obliged and moved towards him. Upon approaching, Ducay grabbed AAA
and covered her mouth with a towel. He tied her hands with a rope and walked her
over to the coconut trees at the seashore. Ducay then made AAA lie on the sand,
and, with her hands still tied at her back, he removed her shirt and shorts then
squeezed her breasts. Ducay thereafter removed his shorts and brief, laid on top of
AAA and inserted his penis into her vagina twice. After satisfying his lust, he put his
shorts back on. As Ducay turned his back, AAA crawled slowly away from him. He
did not notice her until a dog barked at her, at which point AAA started running. He
gave her a chase but was unable to catch up. AAA kept running until she reached
the plaza in Agora. She was thereafter brought to the police station by a barangay
captain.
The RTC found that all the elements of rape were established beyond
reasonable doubt. On appeal, the CA upheld the RTCs findings but modified the
award of damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower courts were correct in finding Ducay guilty with the
crime of rape
Ruling:
Yes, the Court affirms Ducays conviction.
It is well-settled rule that when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says she
has been raped, she says in effect, all that is necessary to prove that rape was
committed. Courts give greater weight to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of
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sexual assault, especially a minor, for it is most unnatural for a young and immature
girl to fabricate a story as sordid as her own defilement, allow a medical
examination of her genitalia, subject herself to a public trial and expose herself to
public ridicule for no reason other than her thirst for justice.
Based on the foregoing guiding principle, the Court upholds the RTC in giving
full faith and credence to AAAs testimony rather than the mere denial and alibi of
Ducay. AAAs clear, straightforward and candid narration sufficiently established the
fact of rape and the identity of Ducay as the perpetrator.
When the victims testimony is corroborated by the physicians finding of
penetration, there is sufficient foundation to conclude the existence of the essential
requisite of carnal knowledge. Laceration is the best physical evidence of forcible
defloration. Force, on the other hand, is evident in the manner by which Ducay
physically coerced AAA to submit to his dastardly desires. After grabbing her, Ducay
tied AAAs hands behind her and covered her mouth and nose with a towel. She
remained so bound and gagged while he was consummating the felonious coitus
such that any attempt on her part to resist his depraved deed was futile.
All told, the courts a quo were correct in convicting Ducay with rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in accordance with Article
266-A in relation to 266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Further, Ducay shall not
be eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 which states
that "persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose
sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be
eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAUL SATO
G.R. No. 190863, November 19, 2014, J. Del Castillo
What is clear in this case is that the nine-year old victim, candidly and
spontaneously testified that she was raped by Sato. When the offended party is of
tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what
transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to
which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth
and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Both denial and alibi are
inherently weak defenses which cannot prevail over the positive and credible
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that Sato committed the crime. For alibi to
prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met.
Facts:
An information was filed before the trial court alleging that sometime in the
afternoon of the 10th day of September, 2004, at Province of Cebu, Raul Sato with
lewd design and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of "AAA" a 9-year old girl,
against her will. During his arraignment, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the crime
charged. Thereafter, pre-trial and trial ensued.
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The prosecution states that on September 10, 2004, then nine-year old "AAA"
and her six-year old cousin "BBB" were invited by the Sato, who was their neighbor,
to an abandoned nipa hut. Sato then carried "AAA" while "BBB" walked towards the
hut. Upon entering the premises, Sato told "AAA" and "BBB" to undress. When the
children complied, Sato started playing with the private parts of "AAA." He then
counted "one, two, three," inserted his penis into "AAAs" vagina, and made coital
movements that caused "AAA" to feel pain. Thereafter, Sato gave "AAA" P5.00 and
threatened to kill her and her father with a knife if she tells anyone of the things he
did to her. The whole time, "BBB," who was likewise naked, was just sitting beside
"AAA." Appellant did not molest or touch her. Appellant then carried "AAA" and
"BBB" and brought them out of the nipa hut through the window. "AAA" reported the
incident to her grandmother because her parents were not around at that time.
At the time of the incident, Efren Alcover was near the abandoned nipa hut
gathering balani. When he passed by the hut which had no door, he saw Sato,
"AAA" and "BBB" inside. Upon getting closer, he saw all of them naked. "AAA" was
lying down while Sato was doing push and pull movements on top of her. Beside
"AAA" was "BBB" whom Sato only gazed at. When Sato was done, Alcover saw him
give the children money. "AAA" was physically examined. Her physician found
hyperemia or an increase in redness of "AAAs" hymen.
Sato denied the accusations against him. He testified that at around 4:00
a.m. of September 10, 2004, he went fishing and returned ashore at 3:30 p.m. He
cooked some of the fish he caught and shared it with Arsenio Baraquia. This was
corroborated by Baraquia. Sato attributed ill motive to "AAA" and her parents in
filing the case. He claimed that he would often scold "AAA" for hurting his youngest
son. Anent her parents, he averred that he had a confrontation with them before the
barangay. On July 3, 2006, the RTC rendered its Judgment finding Sato guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape. The CA affirmed Satos conviction
but modified the award of damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the conviction of Sato.
Ruling:
Yes, the CA correctly affirmed the decision.
To support his bid for acquittal, Sato banks on the alleged improbabilities of
"AAAs" claim of rape. However, the Court finds that the said improbabilities have
all been amply discussed and correctly passed upon by the CA in its assailed
Decision such that it is not minded to discuss them all over again. Besides, the
improbabilities pointed out by Sato are inconsequential matters that do not bear
upon the elements of the crime of rape. As such, they cannot be used as grounds
for his acquittal.
What is clear in this case is that the nine-year old victim, "AAA," candidly and
spontaneously testified that she was raped by Sato. Testimonies of child-victims are
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normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor,
says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that
rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and
immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired,
considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she
would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Considering her tender age,
"AAA" could not have invented a horrible story. And although "AAAs" testimony was
already convincing proof, by itself, Satos guilt, it was further corroborated by the
testimony of Alcover, who personally witnessed the rape.
On the other hand, all that Sato put forward for his defense was mere denial
and the alibi that at the time of the incident, he went fishing, was back ashore in the
afternoon, cooked some fish, went home and slept throughout the night. As this
Court has oft pronounced, both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which
cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses that Sato committed the crime. For alibi to prosper, the requirements of
time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that Sato somewhere
else when the crime happened. He must also demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime at the approximate time of its commission. Unless substantiated by clear and
convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any
weight in law. Obviously, the physical impossibility is not present in this case. Sato
did not present any proof that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus
criminis at the time of the incident. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no
reversible error on the part of the RTC and the CA in finding Sato guilty of the crime
of statutory rape.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEONARDO CASTRODES
G.R. No. 206768, December 03, 2014, J. Perez
Castrodes argued that it was highly improbable that AAA was raped in broad
daylight and in a very highly visible area surrounded by eight houses. The Court
upheld his conviction. There is no rule that rape is committed only in seclusion. A
mans carnality is not hindered by time or placehis prurient desire impels him to
commit rape even in the most public of places.
Facts:
AAA who was 15 years old was busy gathering firewood on the coconut
plantation located downhill from the house she shared with her aunt BBB and uncle
CCC.
She was surprised when her neighbor Leonardo Castrodes suddenly appeared
behind her and wrested from her the bolo she was then using to gather firewood.
With the bolo in his hand, he embraced and carried AAA to a spot underneath a
coconut tree. AAA could not do anything due to fear of being hacked with the bolo.
Leonardo then started kissing AAA and caressing her breasts. He then forced AAA to
lie on the ground and then removed her shorts and panty. With both of them naked
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waist down, Leonardo then laid on top of AAA and attempted to insert his penis into
her vagina.
AAA tried to evade from his advances by squirming underneath his hold but
she was not strong enough to free herself. When he finally was able to penetrate
her, AAA felt pain and cried. After ravaging AAA, he then stood up and put on his
clothing. Leonardo threatened her that should she reveal to anyone what had
happened, he will kill her and anyone she confided to.
AAA kept her silence until when her uncle CCC noticed her crying inside their
house. AAA then told CCC what had transpired. The next day, BBB with AAAs father
reported the matter to the barangay officials in their village and had her examined
by the Municipal Health Officer.
Leonardo however narrated a different story. To corroborate his defense, his
first cousin, Jovenciano Castrodes took the witness stand. According to the defense,
Leonardo on the fateful day was nowhere near the area where the alleged rape
happened. As on that same day, at around 6:30 in the morning, he and Jovenciano
left the formers house and walked towards the latters farm. They then started
working around 7:00 a.m. and only took a break from working to take their lunch
and again resumed around 1:00 p.m. They finished working around 5 p.m. and
returned to Leonardos house. Jovenciano affirmed that he was physically beside his
cousin the whole day and there was no moment that he could not see Leonardo.
The trial court found Leonardo guilty of the crime of rape. The appellate court
affirmed the ruling.
The defense pointed to several circumstances and inconsistencies: (1) it was
highly incredible for AAA to bring a bolo when she was just merely gathering
firewood; (2) it was highly improbable that AAA was raped in broad daylight and in a
very highly visible area surrounded by eight houses; (3) AAAs delay in reporting the
incident, which showed the incredulity of AAAs allegation; and (4) there were no
vaginal lacerations found in AAA based on the Municipal Health Officers report.
Issue:
Whether or not Leonardo is guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt
Ruling:
Yes, the Court found him guilty.
There is no rule that rape is committed only in seclusion. A mans carnality is
not hindered by time or placehis prurient desire impels him to commit rape even
in the most public of places. The Court ruled that delay in reporting an incident of
rape does not discredit the credibility of a victim.
Human experience dictates that a rape victim, especially a young girl, who
experienced sexual assault, is expected to conceal assaults on her virtue. This
principle validates the social stigma a rape victim may suffer after she discloses her
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ordeal, especially in a conservative society. In effect, "the victim may choose to
keep quiet rather than expose her defilement to the harsh glare of public scrutiny."
The Court held that in prosecuting crimes of rape, the medical examination is
dispensable. There could be a finding of rape even if the medical examination
showed no vaginal laceration. Leonardo's alibi that he was working in a farm when
AAA was raped is not exculpatory because he failed to prove the physical
impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime at the time of the incident.
Leonardo was just twenty minutes away from the crime scene.
To merit credence, he must adduce clear and convincing evidence that he
was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time when the crime was
committed, such that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene
of the crime when it was committed. Leonardo failed to prove the fact vital to the
credibility of the alibi.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE ESTALIN PRODENCIADO
G.R. No. 192232, December 10, 2014, J. Del Castillo
When the crime of rape was committed by a father to his daughter, he shall
be liable for qualified rape and not simple rape. Also, the reactions of rape victims
after the commission of the offense may vary and shall not be confined to one
classification.
Facts:
Jose and BBB were common law spouses and they had 5 children including
AAA, the eldest. Sometime in 1993 when AAA was just 8 years old, she went to her
fathers hut where he rests after fishing. Jose then pulled her inside the hut, pointed
a knife at her and instructed her to undress. Subsequently, Jose succeeded to have
carnal knowledge with AAA.
When AAA reached 10 years old, Jose called AAA to the hut and had sexual
intercourse with her. At the aforementioned incidents, there were no other people
near the hut. The third and fourth incidents of sexual congress happened in the year
2000 when AAA was doing laundry by the river. Her mother BBB was cooking 2
meters from the hut and AAAs siblings were at the house when Jose, armed with a
bolo, dragged AAA to the hut and had carnal knowledge with her. After 30 minutes,
Jose and AAA had sex again. After seeing her daughter crying, BBB felt in her gut
that AAA was being sexually abused. She wanted to ask her what happened but
Jose was constantly watching while carrying his bolo.
BBB pretended to buy medicines to be able to report the incidents to the
police and Jose was successfully arrested and charged of 2 counts of statutory rape
and 2 counts of simple rape. During the trial, Jose alleged that the case was just a
ploy by BBB to leave him and elope with her other suitors. He also mentioned that
AAA agreed to file the case because he was always scolding her for accepting
suitors at a very young age.

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The RTC found Jose guilty of all charges which was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not Jose is guilty of all charges
Ruling:
Yes. Prodenciado made much of AAAs failure to pinpoint the dates when
she was raped. According to him, this does not only render AAAs credibility
suspect, but likewise deprived him of the full opportunity to defend himself thereby
violating his right to due process. Time and again, the Court has repeatedly held
that it is not incumbent upon the victim to establish the date when she was raped
for purposes of convicting the perpetrator. This is because [i]n rape cases, the date
of commission is not an essential element of the offense; what is material is its
occurrence, which in this case, was sufficiently established by AAA.
Prodenciado also finds fault in AAAs failure to report the alleged rape
incidents. He avers that if AAA was indeed sexually abused, she should have
wasted no time in reporting the matter to her mother, brothers and sisters, other
relatives and/or to the police considering that she was neither pushed against the
wall nor under Prodenciados watch 24 hours a day.
Clearly, AAA did not reveal to anyone what Prodenciado was doing to her
out of fear that he might make good his threats to kill her and her family. Indeed, in
one case, we have recognized that [t]he fear of [the victim] that her father would
kill her and the other members of her family, should she report the incident to her
mother or the police, is not so unbelievable nor is it contrary to human experience.
Besides, the failure of the victim to immediately report the rape is not an indication
of a fabricated charge and does not detract from the fact that rape was committed.
Prodenciado also questions the facility whereby AAA was able to resume her
life despite the supposed rape incidents. This hardly convinces. It has been held
that different people react differently to different situations and there is no
standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange,
startling or frightful experience, such as rape. Verily, some victims choose to suffer
in silence; while others may be moved to action out of a need to seek justice for
what was done to them. Then there are those who opt not to dwell on their
experience and try to live as though it never happened. To the Courts mind, this is
how AAA tried to cope with the harrowing experience that befell her. Moreover,
since she was just a young girl when all these rapes were committed against her,
AAA simply knew no other way of life than what she was accustomed to.
Appellant is liable for one count of statutory rape and three counts of
qualified rape. Here, the Information for the second rape subject of Criminal Case
No. 3209-M-2000 alleges that the rape was committed by appellant upon his own
minor daughter AAA, who was then 10 years old. These were eventually proved
during trial. Thus, it was correct for the trial court to hold Prodenciado liable for rape
under Article 335(3) of the RPC, albeit with the modification that it is qualified by
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the attendant circumstances of minority and relationship48 which, as mentioned,
were sufficiently alleged in the Information and ultimately proved by the
prosecution in the course of the proceedings below. Similarly, in the last two rape
cases committed in 2000, the prosecution properly alleged in their corresponding
Informations and duly proved during trial that they were committed through force
and intimidation; that the victim AAA is a minor; and, that appellant as the
offender is the victims father. Hence, the trial court should have also found
Prodenciado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape, not simple rape,
under the now prevailing provisions on rape cases which is Article 266-A of the RPC,
in relation to Article 266-B thereof.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRANCASIO DELFIN
G.R. No. 190349, December 10, 2014, J. Del Castillo
The failure of the prosecution to prove that the rape victim is below 12 years
old does not exonerate the convict from the offense but shall only be liable for
simple rape.
Facts:
On May 27, 2001, AAA, an 11-year old girl, was ordered by Delfin to come to
him. AAA tried to run but Delfin threatened to fire a slingshot at her. Unwillingly, she
went with Delfin inside a commercial building where he successfully had carnal
knowledge with AAA.
The second incident happened on June 30, 2001 when AAA decided to sleep
inside a jeepney parked outside of a billiard hall. Delfin entered the jeepney, woke
her up and successfully forced her to have sexual congress with him.
AAAs aunt, BBB noticed that AAA had a hard time urinating and swelling in
her stomach. AAA then told BBB about the incidents with Delfin. This prompted BBB
to have AAA medically checked. It was found out that AAA suffered lacerations and
that when one finger was inserted in her vagina, she felt pain.
Delfin was charged with statutory rape but during the trial, he denied the
allegations of AAA stating that he was at home at time the alleged rape incidents
happened. Further, he argued that he found AAAs aunt CCC packing shabu with her
live-in partner and reported them to the police and the case against him was only
their revenge.
The RTC convicted Delfin of statutory rape but the CA held that the
prosecution failed to prove that AAA was under 12 years of age but still found Delfin
guilty of simple rape.
Issue:
Whether or not Delfin is guilty of simple rape
Ruling:
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Yes. Under par. 1(a) Article 266-A of the RPC, rape is committed as follows:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is
committed
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
xxxx
Pertinently, the elements of rape under [the above-mentioned provision] are
the following: (1) that the offender is a man; (2) that the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman; and, (3) that such act is accomplished by using force or
intimidation These elements are present in this case.
AAAs testimony established that appellant, a man, had carnal knowledge
of her, a young lass. She positively identified Delfin as the one who raped her. Aside
from being clear and straightforward, her recollection of the material details of her
harrowing experience at the hands of Delfin is consistent. Moreover, the medical
findings of Dr. Edano corroborated AAAs testimony as the same showed that her
hymen was lacerated at 6 oclock position. There is sufficient basis, therefore, to
conclude that carnal knowledge in fact took place.
Further, Delfin, in committing the crime used force, threat, and intimidation.
Per AAAs testimony, she was forced to approach Delfin because he threatened to
shoot her with his slingshot. When AAA was already near the appellant, he
suddenly grabbed her and dragged her to the second floor of a commercial building
near the market. He then took off her panty, forcefully laid her down on top of
folded cartons, spread her thighs apart and inserted his penis into her vagina. After
ravishing AAA, Delfin threatened to kill her and her family should she tell anyone
about the incident. Verily, these satisfy the third element, that is, that the carnal
knowledge was accomplished by using force, threat or intimidation.
In view of the foregoing, the Court sustains Delfins conviction for simple rape
under par. 1(a), Article 266-A of the RPC.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NESTOR SUAREZ y MAGTANOB
G.R. No. 201151, January 14, 2015, J. Perez
Nestor was indicted before the RTC for the rape of his minor niece. It is a
well-entrenched principle that testimonies of child victims are given full weight and
credit, for when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.
Facts:
On the night of 21 December 2008, AAA, who was then 15 years old, went to
sleep next to her 12-year old sister. Her parents were not at home at that time. At
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around 10:00 p.m., AAA was awakened by someone mashing her breasts. She saw
her uncle on top of her legs wearing only his briefs. She we told by Nestor not
to make any noise because if she does, something bad might happen to her sister.
AAA tried to free herself but she was too weak. Nestor first kissed her on different
parts of her body and sucked her breast before he lowered AAAs shorts and
underwear and inserted his penis into her vagina.
The Medico Legal Certificate issued by Dr. Petronio Batulio shows that during
the medical examination, AAAs had whitish vaginal discharge, healed vaginal
laceration at 6 oclock position, and was found to be positive for pregnancy.
Finding that the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
appellant of the crime of rape, the RTC rendered judgment against Nestor. The CA
affirmed the conviction of Nestor.
Nestor contends before the Court that there appears to be no significant
resistance on the part of AAA when he was allegedly defiling her and poses the
possibility of a consensual sex with another man.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of rape
Ruling:
Yes.
The conviction or acquittal of one accused of rape most often depends almost
entirely on the credibility of the complainants testimony. By the very nature of this
crime, it is generally unwitnessed and usually the victim is left to testify for herself.
Her testimony is most vital and must be received with the utmost caution. When a
rape victims testimony, however, is straightforward and marked with consistency
despite grueling examination, it deserves full faith and confidence and cannot be
discarded. Once found credible, her lone testimony is sufficient to sustain a
conviction.
It has been settled that in rape cases, the law does not impose a burden on
the rape victim to prove resistance because it is not an element of rape. Not all
victims react the same way. Some people may cry out, some may faint, some may
be shocked into insensibility, while others may appear to yield to the intrusion.
Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any
resistance at all. The failure of a rape victim to offer tenacious resistance does not
make her submission to accuseds criminal acts voluntary. What is necessary is that
the force employed against her was sufficient to consummate the purpose which he
has in mind.
The medical examination of the victim is not an element of rape. Moreover,
the medical examination does not seek to establish who committed the crime,
rather it merely corroborates the testimony of the rape victim that she has been
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raped. The prime consideration in the prosecution of rape is the victim's testimony,
not necessarily the medical findings; a medical examination of the victim is not
indispensable in a prosecution for rape. The victim's testimony alone, if credible, is
sufficient to convict.
Indeed, and as contrasted to AAAs convincing recital of facts, Nestor's denial
and alibi will not stand. Alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive and
categorical testimony and identification of the complainant. The records disclose
that nobody corroborated his alibi. The testimonies of his family relate to
discrediting AAAs credibility by mere speculations that AAA could have been
impregnated by her boyfriend. They never supported Suarezs alibi. Alibi must be
supported by credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses, otherwise, it is
fatal to the accused. Further, for alibi to prosper, it must be demonstrated that it
was physically impossible for appellant to be present at the place where the crime
was committed at the time of its commission. By his own testimony, he clearly
failed to show that it was physically impossible for him to have been present at the
scene of the crime when the rape was alleged to have occurred. Appellant lived two
houses away from AAAs family and he admitted to have free access to AAAs house
being their close relatives.
All told, the Court is in accord with the findings of the trial court, as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, which led to the finding that Nestor is guilty of the crime of
rape, qualified by minority and relationship. Both qualifying circumstances were
sufficiently alleged in the information admitted by the accused during pre-trial.
RICHARD RICALDE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 211002, January 21, 2015, J. Leonen
Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as
instrument or object rape, gender-free rape, or homosexual rape. The
gravamen of rape through sexual assault is the insertion of the penis into another
persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another persons
genital or anal orifice.
Facts:
On January 30, 2002, XXX1 requested his mother to pick up Ricalde at
McDonalds Bel-Air, Sta. Rosa at past 8:00 p.m.9 Ricalde, then 31 years old, is a
distant relative and textmate of XXX, then 10 years old. After dinner, XXXs mother
told Ricalde to spend the night at their house as it was late. He slept on the sofa
while XXX slept on the living room floor.
It was around 2:00 a.m. when XXX awoke as he felt pain in his anus and stomach
and something inserted in his anus. He saw that Ricalde fondled his penis. When
Ricalde returned to the sofa, XXX ran toward his mothers room to tell her what
happened. He also told his mother that Ricalde played with his sexual organ.
1

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XXXs mother armed herself with a knife for self-defense when she confronted
Ricalde about the incident, but he remained silent. She asked him to leave. XXXs
mother then accompanied XXX to the barangay hall where they were directed to
report the incident to the Sta. Rosa police station.The police referred them to the
municipal health center for medical examination. Dr. Roy Camarillo examined XXX
and found no signs of recent trauma in his anal orifice that was also NEGATIVE for
[s]permatozoa.
On February 4, 2002, XXX and his mother executed their sworn statements at
the Sta. Rosa police station, leading to the criminal complaint filed against Ricalde.
The Provincial Prosecutor of Bian, Laguna filed an Information charging Ricalde of
rape through sexual assault. Ricalde pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on
August 21, 2002. The prosecution presented the victim (XXX), his mother, and the
medico-legal as witnesses, while the defense presented Ricalde as its sole witness.
Ricalde denied the accusations. He testified that he met XXX during the 2001
town fiesta of Calaca, Batangas and learned that XXXs mother is the cousin of his
cousin Arlan Ricalde. He and XXX became textmates, and XXX invited him to his
house. On January 30, 2002, XXXs mother picked him up to sleep at their house. He
slept at 10:00 p.m. on the living room sofa while XXX slept on the floor. He denied
the alleged rape through sexual assault.
The Regional Trial Court found Ricalde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape
through sexual assault. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Thus, Ricalde
filed this Petition praying for his acquittal.
Issues:
1. Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt petitioner Richard
Ricaldes guilt for the crime of rape through sexual assault.
2. Is petitioner's reliance on the medico-legals finding of no recent trauma in
XXXs anal orifice, or any trace of spermatozoa, meritorious?
3. Is petitioners invocation of the variance doctrine citing People v. Sumingwa
proper?
Rulings:
1. Yes. The Anti-Rape Law of 1997 classified rape as a crime against persons
and amended the Revised Penal Code to include Article 266-A on rape through
sexual assault:
Article 266A. Rape; When and How Committed.Rape is Committed:
xxx
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into
another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital
or anal orifice of another person.

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Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as
instrument or object rape, gender-free rape, or homosexual rape. The
gravamen of rape through sexual assault is the insertion of the penis into another
persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another persons
genital or anal orifice.
The trial court found that XXXs straightforward, unequivocal and convincing
testimony sufficiently proved that petitioner committed an act of sexual assault by
inserting his penis into XXXs anal orifice. There was no showing of ill motive on the
part of XXX to falsely accuse petitioner. The Court of Appeals accorded great weight
to the trial courts findings and affirmed petitioners conviction.
No cogent reason exists for this court to overturn the lower courts findings.
First, petitioners argument highlighting alleged inconsistencies in XXXs
testimony fails to convince. In a long line of cases, this court has given full weight
and credit to the testimonies of child victims. Their [y]outh and immaturity are
generally badges of truth and sincerity. XXX, then only 10 years old, had no reason
to concoct lies against petitioner. This court has also held that [l]eeway should be
given to witnesses who are minors, especially when they are relating past incidents
of abuse.
Petitioner contends that XXX did not categorically say that a penis was
inserted into his anal orifice, or that he saw a penis or any object being inserted into
his anal orifice.
In People v. Soria, this court discussed that a victim need not identify what
was inserted into his or her genital or anal orifice for the court to find that rape
through sexual assault was committed:
We find it inconsequential that AAA could not specifically identify the
particular instrument or object that was inserted into her genital. What is important
and relevant is that indeed something was inserted into her vagina. To require AAA
to identify the instrument or object that was inserted into her vagina would be
contrary to the fundamental tenets of due process.
2. No. Petitioner's reliance on the medico-legals finding of no recent trauma
in XXXs anal orifice, or any trace of spermatozoa, lacks merit. The absence of
spermatozoa in XXXs anal orifice does not negate the possibility of an erection and
penetration. This result does not contradict the positive testimony of XXX that the
lower courts found credible, natural, and consistent with human nature. This court
has explained the merely corroborative character of expert testimony and the
possibility of convictions for rape based on the victims credible lone testimony.
3. No. Section 4 in relation to Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides for the variance doctrine:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.When
there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and
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that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which I
included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the
offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.An offense
charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information,
constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense
proved, when the essential ingredients of the former continue or form part of those
constituting the latter.
In Sumingwa, the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and 1654 was charged
with qualified rape but was convicted for the lesser offense of acts of lasciviousness
committed against a child under Article III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610
since there was no penetration, or even an attempt to insert [the accuseds] penis
into [the victims] vagina.
In the instant case, no variance exists between what was charged and what
was proven during trial. The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt all
elements of the crime of rape through sexual assault. XXX testified that he felt
something was inserted [into his] anus. The slightest penetration into ones sexual
organ distinguishes an act of lasciviousness from the crime of rape.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MICHAEL JOSON y ROGANDO
G.R. No. 206393. January 21, 2015, J. Perez
The failure of the victim to shout for help or resist the sexual advances of the
rapist is not tantamount to consent. Physical resistance need not be established in
rape when threats and intimidation are employed and the victim submits herself to
her attackers of because of fear. Besides, physical resistance is not the sole test to
determine whether a woman voluntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused. Rape
victims show no uniform reaction. Some may offer strong resistance while others
may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. After all, resistance is not an
element of rape.
Facts:
Joson was charged with violation of Articles 266-A of the Revised Penal Code
in relation to Republic Act No. 7610. Prosecutions evidence is based on the sole
testimony of the victim. AAA lives with Joson and his common-law partner. AAA
testified that at around 1:00 in the morning of 14 May 2009, and while Josons wife
was away, AAA was awakened by Joson undressing her. AAA tried to struggle but
Joson was tightly holding her arms. After undressing her, Joson kissed and mounted
her. Appellant was able to insert his penis into her vagina. AAA felt pain in her
genitalia. Thereafter, Joson went back to sleep leaving AAA crying. At about 6:00 or
7:00 in the morning, Joson left AAA with a letter apologizing for what happened and
begging her not to tell on his wife.

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At around 5:00 in the afternoon of that same date, AAA related to Josons wife
the rape incident. And on 1 June 2009, AAA, accompanied by her father, reported
the incident to the police and she executed a sworn statement detailing the rape.
The prosecution presented a provisional medico-legal report on the
examination conducted on AAA by Irene D. Baluyut of Philippine General Hospital
which essentially states that there is no evident injury on AAA at the time of the
examination. Also submitted as part of the prosecutions evidence is the birth
certificate of AAA to prove that she was still a minor at the time the rape was
committed on 14 May 2009.
Joson admitted that AAA is his sister but he proffered the defense of alibi and
claimed that he was staying in Alfonso, Cavite on 14 May 2009 and only went back
to his house in Dasmarias on 26 May 2009. Joson vehemently denied the
accusation against him and speculated that AAA resented him because he was strict
with his sister. Joson also denied writing the apology letter and presented his
specimen handwriting in court.
After evaluating the evidence, the trial court found Joson guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and meted out the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. The Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed decision affirming the judgment of conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA gravely erred in finding accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape?
Ruling:
Upon a careful evaluation of the case, the Court find no reason to reverse
Josons conviction.
For a charge of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, the prosecution must prove that: (1) the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished this act through force,
threat or intimidation, when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious,
or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented.
AAA gave a complete account of her ordeal in the hands of her own brother.
Her testimony has established all the elements of rape required under Article 266-A
of the Revised Penal Code. First, Joson had carnal knowledge of the victim. AAA
positively identified her own brother as the assailant. She was likewise unwavering
in her narration that Joson inserted his penis into her vagina. Second, appellant
employed threat, force and intimidation to satisfy his lust. At this juncture, we quote
with approval the ruling of the Court of Appeals on this point:
The Court has, time and again, ruled that the force or violence that is
required in rape cases is relative; when applied, it need not be overpowering or
irresistible. That it enables the offender to consummate his purpose is enough. The
parties relative age, size and strength should be taken into account in evaluating
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the existence of the element of force in the crime of rape. The degree of force
which may not suffice when the victim is an adult may be more than enough if
employed against a person of tender age. In the case at bench, Joson employed that
amount of force sufficient to consummate the rape. It must be stressed that, at the
time of the incident, AAA was only 14 years old. Considering the tender years of
the offended party as compared to Joson who was in the prime of his life, the act of
Joson in pinning the arms of AAA to avoid any form of resistance from her suffices.
Force or intimidation is not limited to physical force. As long as it is present and
brings the desired result, all consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible
is beside the point.
The Court is not persuaded by the accused-appellants insistence that the
absence of any resistance on the part of AAA raised doubts as to whether the sexual
congress was without her consent. The failure of the victim to shout for help or
resist the sexual advances of the rapist is not tantamount to consent. Physical
resistance need not be established in rape when threats and intimidation are
employed and the victim submits herself to her attackers of because of fear.
Besides, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman
voluntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused. Rape victims show no uniform
reaction. Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to
offer any resistance at all. After all, resistance is not an element of rape and its
absence does not denigrate AAAs claim that Joson consummated his bestial act.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PACITO ESPEJON y LEBIOS
G.R. No. 199445, February 04, 2015, J. Perez
The mere fact that AAA did not tell her parents about what happened to
her immediately after the first incident on 10 August 2003 does not discredit her
accusations of rape and sexual molestation against Espejon. Delay or vacillation in
making a criminal accusation does not necessarily impair the credibility of
witnesses if such delay is satisfactorily explained. In this connection, fear of
reprisal, social humiliation, familial considerations, and economic reasons have all
been considered by this Court as sufficient explanations for such delay.
Facts:
On 15 June 2004, five (5) criminal informations for rape were filed against
appellant Pacito L. Espejon before the RTC. The informations charge Espejon of
rapingon five separate occasions in 2003AAA, a girl then only twelve (12) years
old.
The testimony of AAA mainly revolved around the events that took place on
the 10th of August, the 28th of September, the 26th of October, the 9th of November
and the 8th of December, all in the year 2003. AAA testified that on those dates, the
Espejon, armed with a bolo, brought her to the lower shrubby portion of the XYZ
elementary school wherein she was either undressed or was made to undress. AAA
narrated that in all five incidents Espejon was never able to penetrate her but had
always, except in the last one, forced her to masturbate him. AAA said that after
masturbating Espejon, would then give her P20.00.
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The prosecution presented AAAs birth certificate to prove that she was only
twelve (12) years of age during the events described in her testimony. Furthermore,
the prosecution presented a medico-legal report executed by doctors Manijas and
Palmera Isip-Baltazar Isip-Baltazar. The report, which contained the results of the
clinical examination conducted by the two doctors upon AAA stated that no physical
finding of penetration was apparent on AAAs vagina and that the latters hymen is
intact. The testimony of doctors Manijas and Isip-Baltazar, however, were dispensed
with after the defense admitted the reports authenticity.
Issue:
Whether or not Espejon is guilty of Attempted Rape.
Ruling:
Yes.
First. The mere fact that AAA did not tell her parents about what happened to
her immediately after the first incident on 10 August 2003 does not discredit her
accusations of rape and sexual molestation against Espejon. Delay or vacillation in
making a criminal accusation does not necessarily impair the credibility of witnesses
if such delay is satisfactorily explained. In this connection, fear of reprisal, social
humiliation, familial considerations, and economic reasons have all been considered
by this Court as sufficient explanations for such delay.
Second. AAAs receipt of P20.00 from Espejon right after the former was
forced to masturbate the latter is not prejudicial to the accusations of rape or
attempted rape Espejon. It neither excuses Espejons dastardly acts nor implies
AAAs consent thereto. What is most notable is the fact that the money was
an unsolicited thing that was handed to AAA after the ruttish subjection, such act
which is indignity upon insult being part and parcel of the whole crime that started
with the abductive taking to the bushes. The fear that numbed the person of AAA
was, at the time of the lustful offer, still was overpowering.
Then too, the Court must consider that AAA is a 12-year-old victim of rape
whose reputation for purity and chastity had never been sullied prior to her
encounters with Espejon. It is incomprehensible that for an ordinary 12-yearold Filipina girl, who hitherto had only the faintest notion of carnal matters if at all,
would just suddenly, and without any explanation whatsoever, surrender herself to
the sexual desires of a married man almost four times her elder in exchange for
money.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NILO COLENTAVA
G.R. No. 190348, February 09, 2015, J. Del Castillo
The RTC and the Court of Appeals convicted the accused of qualified rape. It
is the contention of the accused that he cannot be held liable for the crime charged
because the testimony of AAA is inconsistent and should not considered as a basis
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for his conviction. The Supreme Court ruled that testimonies of child-victims are
normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor,
says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that
rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and
immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired,
considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she
would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true.
Facts:
The defendant Nilo Colentava was charged with 3 separate information
charging him with qualified rape for raping his 16 year old daughter AAA on three
separate occasions. The Regional Trial Court convicted Colentava for the crime
charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, the current
petition.
It is the contention of Colentava that the charges against him should not have
been given credence because AAAs narration of the events leading to the alleged
rape were vague and highly improbable. The surrounding circumstances leading to
the alleged three incidents of rape were all the same which is highly unusual and
contrary to common experience. Colentava also contends that AAAs conduct after
the alleged rape incidents is questionable. Colentava argues that if he indeed raped
AAA, then the latter should have avoided returning to his house at Sitio Baco after
the alleged first incident of rape. Colentava also suggests that the normal thing to
do on the part of AAA was to report the rape to her grandmother which she failed
to do. Colentava likewise posits that the prosecution failed to rebut his allegation
that AAA was mad at him because he chastised her due to her improper ways.
According to Colentava, this could have been the reason why AAA pressed charges
against him.
Issue:
Whether or not Colentava is guilty of the crime of qualified rape.
Ruling:
Colentava is guilty of qualified rape for raping his daughter who is a minor at
the time of the commission of the crime. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision
of the Court of Appeals.
The alleged inconsistency in the date of the third rape is trivial and
forgivable, since a victim of rape cannot possibly give an exacting detail for each of
the previous incidents as these may just be but mere fragments of a prolonged and
continuing nightmare, a bad experience she might even be struggling to forget.
Verily, the exact date of rape is not an essential element of the crime, and the mere
failure to give a precise date, let alone an incorrect estimate, will not discredit the
testimony of the victim. While this Court agrees with the CA that the exact date of
the commission of rape is not an essential element of said crime, it cannot,

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however, convince itself that AAA committed any inconsistencies in declaring that
the third rape occurred on August 21, 2003.
In any case, an Information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements
of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. It is not necessary to
state therein the precise date the offense was committed, except when it is a
material ingredient of the offense. And as earlier mentioned, in rape cases the date
or time of commission of the offense is not an essential ingredient of said crime. In
fact, the precise time when the rape takes place has no substantial bearing on its
commission.
The elements therefore of qualified rape are: (1) sexual congress; (2) with a
woman; (3) done by force and without consent; (4) the victim is under 18 years of
age at the time of the rape; (5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted) of the victim.
In this case, both the trial court and the CA found that the prosecution was
able to sufficiently establish all the elements of qualified rape. This Court sees no
reason to depart from the findings of the lower courts. AAAs testimony on her
harrowing experience in the hands of appellant was found by the lower courts to be
positive, straightforward, categorical and steadfast. Moreover, the evidence on
record established that AAA was just 16 years old when appellant, her own father,
had carnal knowledge of her. Clearly, all the elements of qualified rape are present
in this case.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that AAA was a minor at the time she was raped.
The Court has been consistent in giving credence to testimonies of child-victims
especially in sensitive cases of rape. In People v. Garcia, it was held that:
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit,
since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in
fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and
immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what
transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the
shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she
testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth
and sincerity. A young girls revelation that she had been raped,
coupled with her voluntary submission to medical examination and
willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to
give out the details of an assault on her dignity, cannot be so easily
dismissed as mere concoction.
The Court thus upholds the credibility of AAA and accords credence to her
testimony.
It takes much more for a sixteen year old lass to fabricate a story of rape,
have her private parts examined, subject herself to the indignity of a public trial and
endure a lifetime of ridicule. Even when consumed with revenge, it takes a certain
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amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which
would put her own father for the most of his remaining life to jail and drag herself
and the rest of her family to a lifetime of shame.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. OSCAR SANTOS y ENCINAS
G.R. No. 205308, February 11, 2015, J. Carpio
The RTC and the CA convicted the accused of 1 count of rape and 15 counts
of acts of lasciviousness. The accused interposed a defense of denial and alibi. The
Supreme Court ruled Denial and alibi, which are self-serving negative evidence and
easily fabricated, especially when uncorroborated, cannot be accorded greater
evidentiary weight than the positive testimony of a credible witness. Appellants
denial and uncorroborated defense of alibi cannot prevail over the credible and
positive testimony of AAA that appellant raped her and committed acts of
lasciviousness against her. As found by the trial court and the appellate court, AAA
categorically identified appellant as the person who repeatedly molested her. AAAs
testimony was replete with delicate details which she could not have concocted
herself. She was consistent in her testimony and never wavered even during crossexamination.
Facts:
Appellant Santos was charged in 16 informations with one count of rape (in
relation to RA 7610) and 15 counts of acts of lasciviousness (violation of Art. 336 of
the RPC in relation to Sec. 5 of RA 7610). The information on rape alleged that in
June 1997, appellant had carnal knowledge with AAA, his seven-year old
goddaughter. The 15 charges of acts of lasciviousness alleged that Santos kissed
AAAs neck and lips, and and licked her sex organ on different dates from July 1997
to September 1998.
AAA testified that sometime in June 1997, Santos, whom she calls Ninong
Boy, grabbed her while she was playing alone outside their house. AAA could not
shout for help because Santos covered her mouth with his right hand. Santos then
brought AAA to his house nearby. Inside the house, Santos brought her to a room,
removed her panties and licked her vagina. Santos then poked his penis into her
vagina. AAA felt pain and tried to resist but Santos held both her hands and told her
to lie still. Santos also kissed her lips and neck. AAA further testified that once a
month from July 1997 to September 1998, Santos brought her to his house and once
inside, kissed her lips and neck, and licked her vagina. On two incidents, in July and
August 1997, Santos forcibly put his penis inside AAAs mouth. AAA was afraid and
could not resist because Santos was restraining her and told her to keep quiet.
Santos would then give AAA money in amounts ranging from P1.50 to P5.00 after he
was done with her. AAA did not tell anyone about these incidents because she was
afraid.
The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision convicting Santos of the crimes
charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, the current
appeal.

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Santos, the sole witness for the defense, denied sexually abusing AAA. He
testified that as a fisherman, he was always at sea fishing particularly during the
period of the alleged incidents. Santos testified that from June 1997 to September
1998, the only time he took a day off from fishing was on Good Friday.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty as charged.
Ruling:
The Court finds the appeal without merit. The Court of Appeals was correct in
affirming the ruling of the trial court that Santos guilt of the crimes he was accused
of was clearly established by the witnesses and the evidence of the prosecution.
The trial court, having the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor
during the trial, can best assess the credibility of the witnesses and their
testimonies. The trial courts findings are accorded great respect unless the trial
court has overlooked or misconstrued some substantial facts, which if considered
might affect the result of the case.
Denial and alibi, which are self-serving negative evidence and easily
fabricated, especially when uncorroborated, cannot be accorded greater evidentiary
weight than the positive testimony of a credible witness. Santos denial and
uncorroborated defense of alibi cannot prevail over the credible and positive
testimony of AAA that Santos raped her and committed acts of lasciviousness
against her. As found by the trial court and the appellate court, AAA categorically
identified Santos as the person who repeatedly molested her. AAAs testimony was
replete with delicate details which she could not have concocted herself. She was
consistent in her testimony and never wavered even during cross-examination.
However, the Court notes that AAA testified that Santos also forcibly put his
penis inside AAAs mouth on two occasions, that is, in July and August 1997. Under
Article 266-A(2) of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997,
rape is also committed when a person inserts his penis into another persons mouth
through force or intimidation. RA 8353 expanded the definition of rape and
reclassified rape as a crime against persons.
In this case, Santos was charged in 16 informations with one count of rape (in
relation to RA 7610) and 15 counts of acts of lasciviousness (violation of Art. 336 of
the RPC in relation to Sec. 5 of RA 7610). The 15 charges of acts of lasciviousness
alleged that Santos kissed AAAs neck and lips, and licked her vagina on different
dates from July 1997 to September 1998. However, the Court notes that AAA
testified that Santos also forcibly put his penis inside AAAs mouth on two
occasions, that is, in July and August 1997. Under Article 266-A(2) of the RPC, as
amended by RA 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, rape is also committed when a
person inserts his penis into another persons mouth through force or intimidation.
RA 8353 expanded the definition of rape and reclassified rape as a crime against
persons. The amended definition of rape reads:

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Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed
(1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances
(a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
(b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
(d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present.
(2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his
penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object,
into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Thus, the two incidents in July and August 1997 would have been categorized
as rape had these incidents happened after RA 8353 took effect on 22 October
1997. However, since the two incidents happened prior to the effectivity of RA 8353,
the informations for Criminal Case Nos. 7588 and 7589 correctly charged the
accused with acts of lasciviousness (violation of Article 336 of the RPC in relation to
Section 5 of RA 7610). Therefore, the Court upholds the rulings of the trial court and
the appellate court, finding Santos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape and 15 counts of acts of lasciviousness.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RONALD NICAL y ALMINARIO,
G.R. No. 210430, February 18, 2015, J. Reyes
Alminario insisted that he could not be convicted of rape because the
medical examination results showed that AAA suffered no lacerations or contusions.
It is settled that the absence of physical injuries or fresh lacerations does not
negate rape, and although medical results may not indicate physical abuse or
hymenal lacerations, rape can still be established since medical findings or proof of
injuries are not among the essential elements in the prosecution for rape.
Facts:
The Information charged Nical with the crime of rape. He pleaded not guilty
on arraignment, and when trial ensued, the prosecution presented AAA, the victim,
and Dr. Angelito Magno, a gynecologist at the PGH who examined her. The Nical
testified alone in his defense.
At around 1:00 p.m. on August 23, 2007, AAA, who worked as a maid, was
folding laundry in a room inside the big house when Nical, who was also a
household helper, suddenly entered the room and immediately proceeded to
embrace her. She tried to run but he grabbed her by her shorts and pushed her
against the concrete wall of the room that she hit her head against it and became
dizzy. AAA managed to stand up and run out of the room. But he gave chase and
caught up with her, where again he embraced her. AAA lost consciousness, and
when she woke up, she was lying naked with him on top of her and half naked.
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Alminario inserted his penis into her vagina and she felt pain, but she was able to to
push him off with her knee and make her escape.
She ran and told Nelyn Nacion (Nelyn), another maid, what Nical had just
done to her. Nelyn then texted AAAs sister, BBB, and they reported the incident to
the barangay officials. Two days later, AAA submitted herself for examination by Dr.
Magno at the PGH.
Dr. Magno testified that he examined AAA and he found no signs of any
injury, sexual abuse, lacerations, and bleeding in the private parts of AAA, whose
hymen he noted was no longer intact. Dr. Magno clarified that AAA could have had
prior sexual intercourse months or years earlier, although his medical findings do
not exclude the possibility that AAA was raped or sexually abused by the Alminario
a few days earlier.
The RTC gave full credence to AAAs narration of her ordeal and found
Alminario guilty as charged. The CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not Nical is guilty of the crime of rape.
Ruling:
The Courts review of the assailed decisions yields no new matters that could
prompt a reconsideration or reversal of Nicals conviction.
In her testimony, AAA gave a clear, credible and complete narration of
damning details showing that he did in fact assault her sexually.
Alminario insisted that he could not be convicted of rape because the medical
examination results showed that AAA suffered no lacerations or contusions.
It is settled that the absence of physical injuries or fresh lacerations does not
negate rape, and although medical results may not indicate physical abuse or
hymenal lacerations, rape can still be established since medical findings or proof of
injuries are not among the essential elements in the prosecution for rape.
In People v. Alicante, the Court held that the accused may be convicted on
the basis of the lone, uncorroborated testimony of the rape victim, provided that her
testimony is clear, positive, convincing and consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things. Truly, the absence of lacerated wounds in the
complainants vagina does not negate sexual intercourse.
No young woman would admit that she was raped, make public the offense
and allow the examination of her private parts, undergo the troubles and
humiliation of a public trial and endure the ordeal of testifying to all the gory details,
if she had not in fact been raped.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DOMINGO GALLANO y JARANILLA
G.R. No. 184762, February 25, 2015, J. Bersamin
Rape is a crime that is almost always committed in isolation or in secret,
usually leaving only the victim to testify about the commission of the crime. As
such, the accused may be convicted of rape on the basis of the victim's sole
testimony provided such testimony is logical, credible, consistent and
convincing. Moreover, the testimony of a young rape victim is given full weight and
credence considering that her denunciation against him for rape would necessarily
expose herself and her family to shame and perhaps ridicule.
Gallano was guilty only of simple rape, not of qualified rape. In order that the
accused is convicted of qualified rape under Article 266-B (1) of the Revised Penal
Code, two requisites must be met, namely: (1) the victim must be a less than 18
years old; and (2) the offender must either be related to the victim by
consanguinity of by affinity within the third civil degree, or is the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim. These two requisites must be both alleged and
proved with absolute certainty. Otherwise, the accused could only be held guilty of
simple rape. The qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority remain to be
relevant in the crime of rape despite the abolition of the death penalty under R.A.
No. 9346. The accused's civil liability depends on the mode of rape he committed.
Facts:
Private complainant, AAA, and her brother lived with their maternal aunt,
BBB, BBB's husband, Gallano, their children and BBB's brother in Baranggay
Guimbala-on, Silay City.
On January 2, 2003, BBB went to the hospital to take care of her father and
stayed there for days. AAA was home and was about to make her brother go to
sleep. She went inside the bedroom to a mat when appellant took her aside,
undressed her and laid her down on the bed. Standing over her, Domingo Gallano
(Gallano) pointed his penis at her and warned her not to tell her mother, otherwise,
he would kill her. When appellant's penis touched AAA's vagina, she felt pain and
instinctively kicked him away. Feeling distraught, AAA ran outside and cried.
On January 8, 2003, BBB's brother went to the hospital, he told BBB that he
saw AAA and Gallano inside the room, standing and facing each other. This
prompted BBB to ask AAA about the incident. At first, AAA hesitated and refused to
talk but later admitted that she was raped. BBB brought AAA to the city health
officer for examination on January 9, 2003.
The City Health Officer who examined AAA found hymenal lacerations on
AAA's private part. Gallano denied the charge, and asserted alibi, insisting that on
the day the rape was committed he had been working in the sugarcane field, having
left home for that purpose at 5:00 a.m. and returning only at 5:00 p.m.; that he had
brought his lunch then because he would take an hour to walk from the sugarcane

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field to his house; and that he had learned of the charge of rape against him only
after his arrest and detention.
RTC convicted Gallano of rape, qualified by minority and relationship.
On appeal, Gallano challenged his conviction, contending that the RTC
committed an error in finding him guilty of the crime of rape and in imposing the
death penalty. The CA affirmed Gallano's conviction for rape nonetheless because
the State had established all the elements of rape, including the force and
intimidation employed by Gallano.
Issue:
Whether or not Gallano should be convicted of rape upon the sole testimony
of AAA that had been tainted with improbabilities and contrariness to human
experience, hence, his guilt had not been established beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
The conviction of Gallano is affirmed, but the characterization of the crime as
qualified rape is set aside. He could be held guilty only of simple rape.
Rape is a crime that is almost always committed in isolation or in secret,
usually leaving only the victim to testify about the commission of the crime. As
such, the accused may be convicted of rape on the basis of the victim's sole
testimony provided such testimony is logical, credible, consistent and
convincing. Moreover, the testimony of a young rape victim is given full weight and
credence considering that her denunciation against him for rape would necessarily
expose herself and her family to shame and perhaps ridicule. Indeed, it is more
consistent with human experience to hold that a rape victim of tender age will
truthfully testify as to all matters necessary to show that she was raped.
After reviewing the records, the Court concludes that the trial court was not
arbitrary in its appreciation of the proof of rape, and, therefore, the CA correctly
ruled that the crime of rape was established beyond reasonable doubt even upon
the lone testimony of the victim herself. With the lower courts not being shown by
Gallano to have overlooked any matter or circumstance of weight that could alter
the result in his favor, their appreciation must be viewed with respect. It is settled
that the findings of fact by the trial court are accorded great weight, and are even
held to be conclusive and binding unless they were tainted with arbitrariness or
oversight. This respect is but a recognition that the trial court is better situated to
assess the testimonies and evidence laid out before it during the trial.
Nonetheless, Gallano was guilty only of simple rape, not of qualified rape. In
order that the accused [may be] convicted of qualified rape under Article 266-B (1)
of the Revised Penal Code, two requisites must be met, namely: (1) the victim must
be a less than 18 years old; and (2) the offender must either be related to the victim
by consanguinity of by affinity within the third civil degree, or is the common-law

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spouse of the parent of the victim. These two requisites must be both alleged and
proved with absolute certainty.
Although Gallano's relationship with AAA went uncontroverted because both
he and BBB had testified that they were legally married, AAA's minority was not
thereby competently established.
People v. Pruna states the controlling guidelines in evaluating evidence
presented to prove a rape victim's minority, to wit:
The Court hereby sets the following guidelines in appreciating age,
either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an
original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such
party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic
documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which
show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is
shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's
mother or a member of the family either by affinity or
consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting
pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended
party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence
shall
be
sufficient
under
the
following
circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought
to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought
to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic
document, or the testimony of the victim's mother or
relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's
testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused.
It is clear that the Prosecution failed to adduce AAA's certificate of live birth,
the best evidence to prove AAA's age in the context of Pruna. The Prosecution did
not also present any acceptable substitutionary documentary evidence to prove the
same. Instead, the Prosecution relied on the testimonies of AAA and BBB to
establish AAA's minority.
The Court holds that the testimonies of AAA and BBB are not sufficient to
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prove AAA's minority even if coupled with Gallano's supposed admission of the
same. BBB's testimony would have sufficed considering that the information alleged
that AAA was 12 years old at the time of the commission of the crime, and the
Prosecution was trying to prove that AAA was below 18 years old for the purpose of
qualifying the rape committed by the accused. Yet, Pruna dictated that BBB's
testimony must be clear and credible. BBB's testimony failed this test.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AAA vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
21ST DIVISION, MINDANAO STATION, RAYMUND CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL
OPORTO, AND MOISES ALQUIZOLA
G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015, J. Peralta
In reviewing rape cases, the lone testimony of the victim is and should be, by
itself, sufficient to warrant a judgment of conviction if found to be credible. Also, it
has been established that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she
says in effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been raped, and where her
testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on that basis
alone. This is because from the nature of the offense, the sole evidence that can
usually be offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the complainants
testimony itself.
Facts:
AAA attended her high school graduation ceremony in the morning and asked
permission from her father that she would be attending a graduation dinner with her
friends. AAA, together with Christian John Lim (Lim), Joefhel Oporto (Oporto), and
Raymund Carampatana (Carampatana), ate dinner at the house of one Mark
Gemeno. After eating, Lim invited them to go to Alsons Palace, which was merely a
walking distance away from Gemenos house. Outside the Alsons Palace, they were
greeted by Aldrin Montesco, Junver Alquizola, and Cherry Mae Fiel. After a while,
they went inside and proceeded to a bedroom on the second floor where they again
saw Montesco with Harold Batoctoy, Jansen Roda, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel
Rudinas, a certain Diego, and one Angelo. Rudinas suggested that they have a
drinking session to celebrate their graduation, to which the rest agreed.
At first, AAA refused to drink because she had never tried hard liquor before.
During the session, they shared their problems with each other. When it was AAAs
turn, she became emotional and started crying. It was then that she took her first
shot. The glasses were passed around and she consumed more or less five (5)
glasses of Emperador Brandy. Thereafter, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down
on Oportos lap. Oporto then started kissing her head and they would remove her
baseball cap. This angered her so she told them to stop, and simply tried to hide
her face with the cap. But they just laughed at her. Then, Roda also kissed her.
The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy were carrying her down the
stairs, and then she was asleep again. When she regained consciousness, she saw
that she was already at the Alquizola Lodging House. She recognized that place
because she had been there before. She would thereafter fall back asleep and wake
up again. And during one of the times that she was conscious, she saw Oporto on
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top of her, kissing her on different parts of her body, and having intercourse with
her. She started crying. She tried to resist when she felt pain in her genitals. She
also saw Carampatana and Moises Alquizola inside the room, watching as Oporto
abused her. At one point, AAA woke up while Carampatana was inserting his penis
into her private organ. She cried and told him to stop. Alquizola then joined and
started to kiss her. For the last time, she fell unconscious.
When she woke up, it was already 7:00 a.m. of the next day. She was all
alone. Her body felt heavy and exhausted. She found herself with her shirt on but
without her lower garments. When AAA reached their house, her father was waiting
for her and was already furious. When she told them that she was raped, her
mother started hitting her. They brought her to the Lala Police Station to make a
report. Thereafter, they proceeded to the district hospital for her medical
examination. Dr. Cyrus Acusta of the Kapatagan District Hospital examined AAA in
the morning of March 26, 2004, and found an old hymenal laceration at 5 oclock
position and hyperemia or redness at the posterior fornices. The vaginal smear
likewise revealed the presence of sperm.
On the other hand, accused denied that they raped AAA. After hearing, RTC
found private respondents Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. It, however, acquitted Dela Cruz, Rudinas,
Roda, Batoctoy, and Villame for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Aggrieved, private respondents brought the case to the CA,
where the court reversed the decision of the trial court and acquitted private
respondents. In sum, the CA found that the prosecution failed to prove private
respondents guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It gave more credence to the version
of the defense and ruled that AAA consented to the sexual congress.
Issue:
Whether the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape.
Ruling:
The elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the
victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when
the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is
under twelve years of age. Here, the accused intentionally made AAA consume hard
liquor more than she could handle. They still forced her to drink even when she was
already obviously inebriated. They never denied having sexual intercourse with
AAA, but the latter was clearly deprived of reason or unconscious at the time the
private respondents ravished her. The CA, however, readily concluded that she
agreed to the sexual act simply because she did not shout or offer any physical
resistance, disregarding her testimony that she was rendered weak and dizzy by
intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission of the crime. The appellate court
never provided any reason why AAAs testimony should deserve scant or no weight
at all, or why it cannot be accorded any credence. In reviewing rape cases, the lone
testimony of the victim is and should be, by itself, sufficient to warrant a judgment
of conviction if found to be credible. Also, it has been established that when a
woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to
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mean that she has been raped, and where her testimony passes the test of
credibility, the accused can be convicted on that basis alone. This is because from
the nature of the offense, the sole evidence that can usually be offered to establish
the guilt of the accused is the complainants testimony itself. The trial court
correctly ruled that if AAA was not truthful to her accusation, she would not have
opened herself to the rough and tumble of a public trial. AAA was certainly not
enjoying the prying eyes of those who were listening as she narrated her harrowing
experience.
AAA positively identified the private respondents as the ones who violated
her. She tried to resist, but because of the presence of alcohol, her assaulters still
prevailed. The RTC found AAAs testimony simple and candid, indicating that she
was telling the truth. The trial court likewise observed that her answers to the
lengthy and humiliating questions were simple and straightforward, negating the
possibility of a rehearsed testimony.
Furthermore, when it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment
deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The
reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses
deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the
appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence. Matters of credibility are
addressed basically to the trial judge who is in a better position than the appellate
court to appreciate the weight and evidentiary value of the testimonies of witnesses
who have personally appeared before him. The appellate courts are far detached
from the details and drama during trial and have to rely solely on the records of the
case in its review. On the matter of credence and credibility of witnesses, therefore,
the Court acknowledges said limitations and recognizes the advantage of the trial
court whose findings must be given due deference. Since the CA and the private
respondents failed to show any palpable error, arbitrariness, or capriciousness on
the findings of fact of the trial court, these findings deserve great weight and are
deemed conclusive and binding.
ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES FINANCE CENTER (AFPFC) vs. DAISY R. YAHON
G.R. No. 201043, June 16, 2014, J. Villarama, Jr.
The trial court directed AFPFC to automatically deduct a percentage from the
retirement benefits of S/Sgt. Charles Yahon, and to give the same directly to his
wife Daisy Yahon as spousal support in accordance of the permanent protection
order issued for his violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004. Despite the provision of exemption of funds provided in PD No. 1638,
the Court held that Sec. 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be
construed as laying down an exception to the general rule that retirement benefits
are exempt from execution.
Facts:
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Daisy R. Yahon filed a petition for the issuance of protection order under the
provisions of R.A. No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women
and Their Children Act of 2004, against her husband, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon, an
enlisted personnel of the Philippine Army who retired in January 2006. The couple
did not have any child but Daisy has a daughter with her previous live-in partner.
The trial court issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against Yahon,
enjoining him from threatening to commit further acts of physical abuse and
violence against Daisy, directing him to stay away at a distance of at least 500
meters from her, her residence or her place of work, to refrain from harassing,
annoying, intimidating, contacting or communicating with Daisy, prohibi-ting him
from using or possessing any firearm or deadly weapon on occasions not related to
his job, and to provide reasonable financial spousal support to Daisy. Furthermore,
to insure that Daisy can receive a fair share of Yahons retirement and other
benefits, various agencies or instrumentalities of the Government were directed to
withhold any retirement, pension and his other benefits.
Because of Yahons failure to appear in the subsequent hearings of the case,
the RTC allowed the ex-parte presentation of evidence to determine the necessity of
issuance of a Permanent Protection Order (PPO). Daisy claimed that Yahon
deliberately refused to give her spousal support as directed in the TPO, the RTC
issued another order directing Yahon to give her spousal support in the amount of
P4,000.00 per month and 50% of his retirement benefits which shall be
automatically deducted and given directly to Daisy.
Thereafter, the trial court granted the petition, issuing a PPO. Evidence
showed that Yahon repeatedly inflicted physical, verbal, emotional and economic
abuse and violence upon Daisy. Medical certificates showed physical injuries
suffered by Daisy at instances of their marital altercations. Yahon, at the height of
his anger, often poked a gun on Daisy and threatened to massacre her and her child
causing them to flee for their lives and sought refuge from other people. He had
demanded sex at an unreasonable time when she was sick and chilling and when
refused poked a gun at her. He would shout at her that he was wishing she would
die and he would celebrate if it happens and by calling and sending her threatening
text messages.
Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center (AFPFC) filed before the RTC a
Manifestation and Motion that it furnished the AFP Pension and Gratuity
Management Center (PGMC) copy of the TPO for appropriate action. AFPFC asserted
that the RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over the military institution due to lack of
summons, and hence it cannot be bound by the said court order. Not being
impleaded in the case, AFPFC argued that it was not afforded due process.
Said motion was denied by the RTC for having been filed out of time. The
decision granting the PPO has long been final and executory. AFPFC filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA praying for the nullification of the aforesaid orders and
decision insofar as it directs the AFPFC to automatically deduct from Yahons
retirement and pension benefits and directly give the same to Daisy as spousal
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support, allegedly issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
Daisy filed prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction, stating that that
there is no information as to whether Yahon already received his retirement benefit
and that the latter has repeatedly violated the provision on spousal support. CA
granted Daisys application, enjoining AFPFC to release the remaining pension that
may be due to Yahon. It denied AFPFCs petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not AFPFC may be ordered to automatically deduct a percentage
from the retirement benefits of its enlisted personnel, and to give the same directly
to the latters lawful wife as spousal support.
Ruling:
Yes, AFPEC may be ordered to regularly deduct a portion of the retirement
pension and/or benefits of its member for spousal support.
A protection order is an order issued by the court to prevent further acts of
violence against women and their children, their family or household members, and
to grant other necessary relief. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from
further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity
and ability to regain control of their life.
Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 9262 enumerates the reliefs that may be included in the
TPO, PPO or BPO, which includes: (g) directing the respondent to provide support
to the woman and/or her child if entitled to legal support. Notwithstanding other
laws to the contrary, the court shall order an appropriate percentage of the income
or salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly by the respondent's employer
for the same to be automatically remitted directly to the woman. Failure to remit
and/or withhold or any delay in the remittance of support to the woman and/or her
child without justifiable cause shall render the respondent or his employer liable for
indirect contempt of court.
AFPFC argued that it cannot comply with the RTCs directive for the automatic
deduction from Yahons retirement benefits and pension to be given directly to
Daisy, as it contravenes an explicit mandate under the law governing the retirement
and separation of military personnel. Sec. 31 of P.D. No. 1638 states that the
benefits authorized under this Decree, except as provided herein, shall not be
subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever; neither
shall they be assigned, ceded, or conveyed to any third person.
Sec. 13 of Rule 39 of Rules of Civil Procedure enumerates those properties
which are exempt from execution: Except as otherwise expressly provided by law,
the following property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution: (l) The right
to receive legal support, or money or property obtained as such support, or any
pension or gratuity from the Government.
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It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict
between two laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the more recent
expression of legislative will. The Court held that that Sec. 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262,
being a later enactment, should be construed as laying down an exception to the
general rule that retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The law itself
declares that the court shall order the withholding of a percentage of the income or
salary of the respondent by the employer, which shall be automatically remitted
directly to the woman notwithstanding other laws to the contrary.
The Court also disagreed with AFPFCs contention that the directive to
segregate portion of the retirement benefits is illegal because said money remained
as public funds. Sec. 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term employer, which
includes in its coverage the military institution, Yahons employer. Where the law
does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, Sec. 8(g) applies to all
employers, whether private or government.
The Court emphasized that said provision is support enforcement legislation.
In the United States, provisions of the Child Support Enforcement Act allow
garnishment of certain federal funds where the intended recipient has failed to
satisfy a legal obligation of child support. As these provisions were designed to
avoid sovereign immunity problems and provide that moneys payable by the
Government to any individual are subject to child support enforcement
proceedings, the law is clearly intended to create a limited waiver of sovereign
immunity so that state courts could issue valid orders directed against Government
agencies attaching funds in their possession.
Under R.A. No. 9262, the provision of spousal and child support specifically
address one form of violence committed against womeneconomic abuse. The
relief provided in Sec. 8(g) thus fulfills the objective of restoring the dignity of
women who are victims of domestic violence and provide them continued protection
against threats to their personal safety and security.
BBB vs. AAA
G.R. No. 193225, February 9, 2015, J. Reyes
It bears stressing that Sec. 23(d) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC20 explicitly
prohibits compromise on any act constituting the crime of violence against women.
Thus, in Garcia vs. Drilon, the Court declared that: [v]iolence, however, is not a
subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of
violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault.
AM No. 10-4-16-SC,23 on the other hand, directs the referral to mediation of
all issues under the Family Code and other laws in relation to support, custody,
visitation, property relations and guardianship of minor children, excepting
therefrom those covered by R.A. No. 9262.
While AAA filed her application for a TPO and a PPO as an independent action
and not as an incidental relief prayed for in a criminal suit, the instant petition
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cannot be taken outside the ambit of cases falling under the provisions of R.A. No.
9262. Perforce, the prohibition against subjecting the instant petition to
compromise applies.
Facts:
AAA and BBB are married. However, due to their frequent fights and alleged
illicit relations of BBB to a person named FFF and the alleged verbal abuses and
distresses that BBB gives to AAA, the latter filed an application for Permanent
Protection Order (PPO) under R.A. No. 9262. The RTC rendered a decision granting
the application of PPO of AAA. The CA affirmed this decision.
During the trial, however, AAA and BBB entered into a compromise
agreement. BBB submits that since there has been a compromise agreement
executed between the parties, the instant petition before the Court is rendered
moot and academic.
Issue:
Whether or not cases filed under R.A. No. 9262 can be a subject of a
compromise agreement.
Ruling:
NO, cases filed within the contemplation of RA 9262 cannot be the subject of
a compromise agreement between the parties.
The Court cannot take the simplest course of finally writing finis to the instant
petition by rendering a judgment merely based on compromise as prayed for by
BBB due to reasons discussed below.
Alleging psychological violence and economic abuse, AAA anchored her
application for the issuance of a TPO and a PPO on the basis of the provisions of R.A.
No. 9262. In the instant petition, what is essentially being assailed is the PPO issued
by the RTC and which was affirmed by the CA. The rules, however, intend that cases
filed under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 cannot be a subject of compromise
agreements.
It bears stressing that Sec. 23(d) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC20 explicitly
prohibits compromise on any act constituting the crime of violence against women.
Thus, in Garcia vs. Drilon, the Court declared that: [v]iolence, however, is not a
subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of
violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault.
AM No. 10-4-16-SC,23 on the other hand, directs the referral to mediation of
all issues under the Family Code and other laws in relation to support, custody,
visitation, property relations and guardianship of minor children, excepting
therefrom those covered by R.A. No. 9262.

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While AAA filed her application for a TPO and a PPO as an independent action
and not as an incidental relief prayed for in a criminal suit, the instant petition
cannot be taken outside the ambit of cases falling under the provisions of R.A. No.
9262. Perforce, the prohibition against subjecting the instant petition to compromise
applies.
ANTI-HAZING LAW
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LTSG. DOMINADOR BAYABOS, et al.
G.R. No. 171222, February 18, 2015, CJ. Sereno
It is a settled rule that the case against those charged as accomplices is not
ipso facto dismissed in the absence of trial of the purported principals; the dismissal
of the case against the latter; or even the latters acquittal, especially when the
occurrence of the crime has in fact been established. Hence, the Sandiganbayan
erred when it dismissed outright the case against respondents Bayabos, on the sole
ground that the case against the purported principals had already been dismissed.
Nonetheless, the SC affirmed the quashal of the Information against respondents
Bayabos. The indictment merely states that psychological pain and physical injuries
were inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation that the purported acts were
employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization. Failure to
aver this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful prosecution of the criminal
responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for the crime of
hazing. Plain reference to a technical term in this case, hazing is insufficient and
incomplete, as it is but a characterization of the acts allegedly committed and thus
a mere conclusion of law. Thus, the information must be quashed, as the ultimate
facts it presents do not constitute the crime of accomplice to hazing.
Facts:
Fernando Balidoy, Jr. was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the
Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA). In order to reach active status, all
new entrants were required to successfully complete the mandatory Indoctrination
and Orientation Period, which was set from 2 May to 1 June 2001. Balidoy died on 3
May 2001. The prosecutor of Zambales issued a resolution finding probable cause to
charge the following as principals to the crime of hazing: Alvarez, Montez, Reyes,
and Simpas. A criminal case against Alvarez, et al. was then filed with RTC of
Zambales.
The prosecutor also endorsed to the Deputy Ombudsman for MOLEO the
finding of probable cause to charge the following school authorities as accomplices
to hazing: RADM. Aris, LTSG. Bayabos, LTJG. Doctor, LTJG. Ferrer, LTJG. Mabborang
LTJG. Magsino, ENS. Velasco and ENS. Operio, or collectively Respondents Bayabos.
The Ombudsman Investigator agreed with the findings of the prosecutor and so
formal cases before the Sandiganbayan were commenced against Respondents
Bayabos as accomplices to the crime of hazing. Meanwhile, the RTCZambales
issued an Order dismissing the Information against the principal accused, Alvarez et
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Respondents Bayabos, et al. filed a Motion to Quash the Information. They
argued that the case against the principal accused had already been dismissed with
finality by the RTC. There being no more principals with whom they could have
cooperated in the execution of the offense, they asserted that the case against
them must be dismissed. The Special Prosecutor opposed the motion of Bayabos et
al. He insisted that the Information alleged the material facts that would sufficiently
establish the presence of the essential ingredients of the crime of accomplice to
hazing.
Six days before Respondents were set to be arraigned, the Sandiganbayan
issued the assailed Resolution (SB Resolution I) quashing the Information and
dismissing the criminal case against them. Six months after the Sandiganbayan
issued its Resolution dismissing the criminal case against Bayabos et al., the
accused Velasco surrendered and then filed his own Motion to Quash, adopting the
grounds raised by that court. On 3 August 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued another
Resolution (SB Resolution II) dismissing the case against him.
Aggrieved, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor,
filed with the SC on 13 March 2006 a Petition assailing SB Resolution I and, on 16
October 2006, another Petition challenging SB Resolution II.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the prosecution of Respondents for the crime of
accomplice to hazing can proceed in spite of the dismissal with finality of
the case against the principal accused.
2. Whether or not the Information filed against Respondents Bayabos
contains all the material averments for the prosecution of the crime of
accomplice to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law.
Ruling:
1.YES, the Sandiganbayan erred when it dismissed outright the case against
Respondents Bayabos, on the sole ground that the case against the purported
principals had already been dismissed.
It is a settled rule that the case against those charged as accomplices is not
ipso facto dismissed in the absence of trial of the purported principals; the dismissal
of the case against the latter; or even the latters acquittal, especially when the
occurrence of the crime has in fact been established.
The Court notes in the present case that Bayabos, et al. merely presented the
Order of Entry of Judgment dismissing the case against Alvarez, et al. Nowhere is it
mentioned in the order that the case was dismissed against the alleged principals,
because no crime had been committed. In fact, it does not cite the trial courts
reason for dismissing the case. Hence, the Sandiganbayan committed an error when
it simply relied on the Order of Entry of Judgment without so much as scrutinizing
the reason for the dismissal of the case against the purported principals.

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Nonetheless, the Court affirms the quashal of the Information against
Respondents Bayabos, et al.
2. NO, the information does not include all the material facts constituting the
crime of accomplice to hazing.
The crime of hazing is thus committed when the following essential elements
are established: (1) a person is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating
situation or subjected to physical or psychological suffering or injury; and (2) these
acts were employed as a prerequisite for the persons admission or entry into an
organization. In the crime of hazing, the crucial ingredient distinguishing it from the
crimes against persons defined under Title Eight of the Revised Penal Code is the
infliction by a person of physical or psychological suffering on another in
furtherance of the latters admission or entry into an organization.
In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct
participation in the act, they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is
shown that (1) hazing, as established by the above elements, occurred; (2) the
accused are school authorities or faculty members; and (3) they consented to or
failed to take preventive action against hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof.
First, the Court reject the contention of respondents that PMMA should not be
considered an organization. Under the Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the term
organization includes but is not limited to groups, teams, fraternities, sororities,
citizen army training corps, educational institutions, clubs, societies, cooperatives,
companies, partnerships, corporations, the PNP, and the AFP. Attached to the
Department of Transportation and Communications, the PMMA is a governmentowned educational institution established for the primary purpose of producing
efficient and well-trained merchant marine officers. Clearly, it is included in the term
organization within the meaning of the law.
The Court declared that the Motion to Quash must be granted, as the
Information does not include all the material facts constituting the crime of
accomplice to hazing. The indictment merely states that psychological pain and
physical injuries were inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation that the
purported acts were employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the
organization. Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful
prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as
accomplice, for the crime of hazing. Plain reference to a technical term in this
case, hazing is insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a characterization of the
acts allegedly committed and thus a mere conclusion of law. Thus, the infor-mation
must be quashed, as the ultimate facts it presents do not constitute the crime of
accomplice to hazing.
CHILD ABUSE LAW
FELINA ROSALDES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 173988, October 8, 2014, J. Bersamin

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In the crime of child abuse, the maltreatment may consist of an act by deeds
or by words that debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being. Such act, as settled, need not be habitual. Although a
school teacher could duly discipline her pupil, the infliction of the physical injuries
on the child was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The Family Code has even
expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishment by a school administrator,
teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority
(i.e., in loco parentis). Hence, a school teacher may be convicted of the said crime
and, all the more when her propensity for violence has been established clearly by
the prosecution.
Facts:
On February 13, 1996, seven year old Michael Ryan Gonzales (Michael) then a
Grade 1 pupil at Pughanan Elementary School located in the Municipality of
Lambunao, Iloilo, was hurriedly entering his classroom when he accidentally
bumped the knee of his teacher, Petitioner Felina Rosaldes, who was then asleep on
a bamboo sofa. Roused from sleep, she asked Michael to apolo-gize to her. When
Michael did not obey but instead proceeded to his seat, she went to Michael and
pinched him on his thigh. Then, she held him up by his armpits and pushed him to
the floor. As he fell, Michaels body hit a desk. As a result, he lost consciousness.
She proceeded to pick Michael up by his ears and repeatedly slammed him down on
the floor. After the incident, she proceeded to teach her class. During lunch break,
Michael, accompanied by two of his classmates, Louella Loredo and Jonalyn
Gonzales, went home crying and told his mother about the incident. His mother and
his aunt reported the incident to their Brgy. Captain. Michael was also examined by
a doctor and the incident was reported to the Police Station.
Eventually, Rosaldes was criminally charged and eventually convicted with
child abuse in the RTC of Iloilo City. On appeal, the CA affirmed her conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not Rosaldes shall be held liable with the crime of child abuse.
Ruling:
Rosaldes is guilty of the crime charged.
First, the Court finds that the contention that she did not deliberately inflict
the physical injuries suffered by Michael to maltreat or malign him in a manner that
would debase, demean or degrade his dignity, is utterly bereft of merit. Credence
cannot be given to her insistence that her acts came under the doctrine of in loco
parentis. Although as a school teacher, she could duly discipline Michael as her
pupil, her infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and
excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence suffered at her hands. She could
not justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical
maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no less than the Family Code,
which has expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishment by a school
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administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental
authority (i.e., in loco parentis).
Second, proof of the severe results of the her physical maltreatment of
Michael was provided by Dr. Teresita Castigador, the Medico-Legal Officer of the Dr.
Ricardo Y. Ladrido Memorial Hospital in Iloilo who examined the victim at about 1:00
oclock in the afternoon of February 13, 1996, barely three hours from the time the
boy had sustained his injuries. Hence, Section 3 of R.A. No. 7610 defines child
abuse, thusly:
xxxx xxxx
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of
the child which includes any of the following:
1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and
emotional maltreatment;
2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food
and shelter; or
4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child
resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in
his permanent incapacity or death.
xxxx
xxxx
In the crime charged against the Rosaldes, therefore, the maltreatment may
consist of an act by deeds or by words that debases, degrades or demeans the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being. The act need not be
habitual. The CA concluded that the Rosaldes "went overboard in disciplining
Michael Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year old boy, when she committed the acts
stated above. On her part, the trial judge said that the physical pain experienced by
the victim had been aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused him to stop
going to school altogether out of fear of Rosaldes, compelling his parents to transfer
him to another school where he had to adjust again. Such established
circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Rosaldes was guilty of
child abuse by deeds that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity
of Michael as a human being.
Third, it was also shown that Michaels physical maltreatment by Rosaldes
was neither her first nor only maltreatment of a child. Prosecution witness Louella
Loredo revealed on cross examination that she had also experienced Rosaldes
cruelty. She was also convicted by the RTC in Iloilo City for maltreatment of another
child named Dariel Legayada. Such previous incidents manifested that she had a
propensity for violence.
Last, Rosaldes claim that the information charging her with child abuse was
insufficient in form and substance deserves scant consideration. The information
explicitly averred the offense of child abuse charged against her in the context of
the statutory definition of child abuse found in Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, supra,
and thus complied with the requirements of Sec. 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the Court should no longer entertain her challenge against the sufficiency
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of the information in form and substance. Her last chance to pose the challenge was
prior to the time she pleaded to the information through a motion to quash on the
ground that the information did not conform substantially to the prescribed form, or
did not charge an offense. She did not do so, resulting in her waiver of the
challenge.
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MILAN ROXAS
G.R. No. 200793, June 4, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro
In determining the age for purposes of exemption from criminal liability
under R.A. No. 9344, Sec. 6 thereof clearly refers to the age as determined by the
anniversary of ones birth date, and not the mental age of the accused. Thus, a
person who is eighteen years old at the time of the commission of the crime of rape
is not exempt from criminal liability despite having a mental age of nine years old.
Mere allegation that the victim is the niece of the accused is insufficient
unless proven. Thus, if what was proven is only the minority of the victim and not
the relationship between accused and the victim, only minority will be considered
as the aggravating circumstance.
Facts:
Accused-appellant Milan Roxas was charged with five counts of rape with
force and intimidation. AAA, the minor niece of Roxas testified that from 1997 to
1998, Roxas, who was 18 years old, had carnal knowledge, while pointing a sharp
instrument, at her. In his defense, Roxas presented the testimony of Dr. Aglipay, the
Regional Psychiatrist of the BJMP, who said that Roxas was suffering from a mild
mental retardation with a mental age of nine (9) to ten (10) years old.
The RTC held that Accused-appellant Roxas is not exempt from criminal
responsibility on the ground that he cannot be considered a minor or an imbecile or
insane person, since Dr. Aglipay merely testified that he was an eighteen-year old
with a mental development comparable to that of children between nine to ten
years old. The CA affirmed with modification the RTC decision.
Issues:
1. May Roxas, who was eighteen years old at the time of the commission of the
crime, be exempt from criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344 due to having a
mental age of a nine year old?
2. Is the qualifying circumstance of relationship between Roxas and AAA
sufficiently proven?
Ruling:
1. No, the determining age is anniversary of ones birth date, not the mental
age.
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In the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 9344 is
explicit in providing that [a] child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the
day of the fifteenth anniversary of his/her birth date.
In determining age for purposes of exemption from criminal liability, Sec. 6
clearly refers to the age as determined by the anniversary of ones birth date, and
not the mental age as argued by Roxas. When the law is clear and free from any
doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construc-tion or interpretation. Only when
the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the court interpret or construe its
true intent.
2. No, mere allegation in the complaint that the victim is the niece of the
accused is insufficient.
While it appears that the circumstance of minority under Art. 335 (old rape
provision) and Art. 266-B was sufficiently proven, the allegation of the relationship
between AAA and Roxas is considered insufficient under present jurisprudence.
In the case at bar, the allegation that AAA was Roxass niece in each
information is therefore insufficient to constitute the qualifying circumstances of
minority and relationship. Instead, the applicable qualifying circumstance is that of
the use of a deadly weapon, for which the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.
Since there was no other aggravating circumstance alleged in the Information and
proven during the trial, the imposed penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of
rape is nonetheless proper even as the Court overturns the lower courts
appreciation of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship.
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY
KIDNAPPING
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARMANDO DIONALDO, et al.
G.R. No. 207949, July 23, 2014, J. Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe
Amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of special
complex crime of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the
distinction drawn by the courts between those cases where the killing of the
kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the accused, and those where the killing
of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought.
Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of
the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely
an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be
complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished
as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659.

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Thus, further taking into account the fact that the kidnapping was committed
for the purpose of extorting ransom, accused-appellants conviction must be
modified from Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention to the special complex
crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, which carries the penalty of death.
As earlier intimated, the enactment of R.A. No. 9346 had suspended the imposition
of the death penalty. This means that the accused-appellants could, as the CA and
trial court properly ruled, only be sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. To
this, the Court adds that the accused-appellants are not eligible for parole.
Facts:
Roderick Navarro (Roderick) dropped his brother Edwin Navarro (Edwin) off at
the Health Is Wealth Gym in Caloocan City. Thirty minutes later, he received a text
message from another brother who told him that Edwin had been
kidnapped. Records show that three (3) men, later identified as Armando, Renato,
and Mariano, forcibly dragged a bloodied Edwin down the stairway of the gym and
pushed him inside a dark green Toyota car with plate number UKF 194.
Upon receiving the message, Roderick immediately reported the incident to
the police. At around 10 oclock in the morning of the same day, he received a
phone call from Edwins kidnappers who threatened to kill Edwin if he should report
the matter to the police.
The following day, Roderick received another call from the kidnappers, who
demanded the payment of ransom money in the amount of PhP15,000,000.00.
Roderick told them he had no such money, as he only had PhP50,000.00. After
negotiations over the telephone, the kidnappers agreed to release Edwin in
exchange for the amount of PhP110,000.00. Roderick was then instructed to bring
the money to Batangas and wait for their next call. At around 7:30 in the evening of
the same day, as Roderick was on his way to Batangas to deliver the ransom
money, the kidnappers called and instructed him to open all the windows of the car
he was driving and to turn on the hazard light when he reaches the designated
place. After a while, Roderick received another call directing him to exit in Bicutan
instead and proceed to C-5 until he arrives at the Centennial Village. He was told to
park beside the Libingan ng mga Bayani. After several hours, an orange Mitsubishi
car with plate number DEH 498 pulled up in front of his vehicle where four (4) men
alighted. Roderick saw one of the men take a mobile phone and upon uttering the
word alat, the men returned to their car and drove away.
Meanwhile, a PACER team had been organized to investigate the kidnapping
of Edwin. During the course of the investigation, Rodolfo, an employee at the
Health Is Wealth Gym, confessed to PO3 Acebuche that he was part of the plan to
kidnap Edwin, as in fact he was the one who tipped off Mariano, Renato, Armando
and a certain Virgilio Varona (Virgilio) on the condition that he will be given a share
in the ransom money.
Rodolfo gave information on the whereabouts of his cohorts, leading to their
arrest. The early morning of the following day, the PACER team found the dead body
of Edwin at Batangas, which Roderick identified.
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The RTC convicted accused-appellants of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention which the CA affirmed in toto.
Issue:
Whether or not accused appellants are guilty of the crime of Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention.
Ruling:
No, accused-appellants are not guilty of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention, but that of special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with
Homicide.
This is in view of the victims (i.e., Edwins) death, which was (a) specifically
charged in the Information, and (b) clearly established during the trial of this case.
Notably, while this matter was not among the issues raised before the Court, the
same should nonetheless be considered in accordance with the settled rule that in a
criminal case, an appeal, as in this case, throws open the entire case wide open for
review, and the appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned, that may be
found in the appealed judgment.
Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private
individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner
deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death:
1) If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days;
2) If it shall have been committed simulating public authority;
3) If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been
made; or,
4) If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the
accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed
for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if
none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the
offense. When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is
raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall
be imposed.
Amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of special
complex crime of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the
distinction drawn by the courts between those cases where the killing of the
kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the accused, and those where the killing
of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought.
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Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of
the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely
an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be
complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished
as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659.
Thus, further taking into account the fact that the kidnapping was committed
for the purpose of extorting ransom, accused-appellants conviction must be
modified from Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention to the special complex
crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, which carries the penalty of death.
As earlier intimated, the enactment of RA 9346 had suspended the imposition of the
death penalty. This means that the accused-appellants could, as the CA and trial
court properly ruled, only be sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. To this,
the Court adds that the accused-appellants are not eligible for parole.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PETRUS YAU, A.K.A. JOHN AND RICKY,
AND SUSANA YAU
G.R. No. 208170, August 20, 2014, J. Mendoza
An American national was allegedly kidnapped by the accused. The victim
positively identified the accused as his kidnapper. In every criminal case, the task of
the prosecution is always two-fold, that is, (1) to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the commission of the crime charged; and (2) to establish with the same quantum
of proof the identity of the person or persons responsible therefor, because, even if
the commission of the crime is a given, there can be no conviction without the
identity of the malefactor being likewise clearly ascertained.
Facts:
Petrus and Susana were charged with the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom in
the Infor-mation, dated February 13, 2004.
On January 20, 2004, at around 1:30pm Private Complainant Alastair
Onglingswam, an, American National, went out of Makati Shangrila Hotel, where he
was billeted, and hailed a white Toyota taxi cab with plate number PVD-115 to take
him from the said hotel to Virra Mall Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila.
While the said taxicab was plying along EDSA, Alastair received a phone call. He
noted that while he was on the phone, Petrus Yau, whom he noted to have short
black hair, a moustache and gold framed eyeglasses, would from time to time turn
to him and talk as if he was also being spoken to. Thereafter, he felt groggy and
decided to hang-up his phone. He no longer knew what transpired except that when
he woke up lying down, his head was already covered with a plastic bag and he was
handcuffed and chained.
A man who was wearing a red mask and introduced himself as John
approached him and removed the plastic bag from his head and loosened his
handcuff. John informed him that he was being kidnapped for ransom and that he
will be allowed to make phone calls to his family and friends. Alastair was allowed to
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call his girlfriend and father and asked them for the PIN of his ATM cards and for
money, however, with instructions not to inform them that he was kidnapped. His
kidnappers were demanding Six Hundred Thousand Dollars (US$600,000.00) as
ransom and Twenty Thousand Pesos (PhP20,000.00) a day as room and board fee.
Subsequently, Iris Chau, Alastairs girlfriend, received an email from the
purported kidnapper demanding US$2,000.00. Chau then wired US$1,000.00, upon
instructions, to Ong Kwai Ping thru Metro Bank and Trust Company. Likewise,
Alastairs brother Aaron Onglingswam made eight (8) deposits to Ong Kwai Pings
account in Metro Bank, amounting to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(PhP200,000.00), to ensure his brothers safety and eventual release.
On February 10, 2004, the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response Task
Force (PACER) received information that a taxi with plate number PVD 115 plying
along Bacoor was victimizing passengers. Along the Aguinaldo Highway, they were
able to chance upon the said vehicle. The police officers talked with Yau who has
driving, and stated that the vehicle was being used for kidnapping. The driver
introduced himself as Petrus Yau, a British national, they asked him for his drivers
license and car registration but appellant was not able to produce any. Since he
could not produce any drivers license and car registration, they were supposed to
bring him to the police station for investigation, however, when shown a picture of
Alstair and asked if he knew him, he answered that the man is being kept in his
house. He was immediately informed that he was being placed under arrest for
kidnapping Alastair after being informed of his constitutional rights.
Yau then led the team to his house and after opening the gate of his
residence, he was led back to the police car. The rest of the members of PACER
proceeded inside the house and found a man sitting on the floor chained and
handcuffed. The man later identified himself as Alastair Onglingswam.
However, Petrus and Susana denied the accusation. On February 11, 2004
(the date the victim was allegedly rescued) at around 8:30 9:00 oclock in the
morning, after he alighted from his car, three (3) men bigger than him held his
hands: one (1) of them held his neck. They pushed him inside their van. They tied
his hands with packing tape, covered his eyes with the same tape, and his head
with a plastic bag. They kicked and beat him until he became unconscious. They
accused him of being a kidnapper, to which he replied that he was not. He pleaded
to them to allow him to make a call to the British Embassy, his friends and his wife,
but to no avail.
In its judgment, dated December 14, 2007, the RTC convicted Petrus Yau, as
principal, of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention, and
Susana Yau, as an accomplice to the commission thereof. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the conviction of Petrus and Susana.
Issue:
Whether or not the conviction for the crime of kidnapping such be sustained

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Ruling:
Yes, the appeal is bereft of merit. The decisions of the RTC and the CA are
affirmed.
In every criminal case, the task of the prosecution is always two-fold, that is,
(1) to prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged; and (2)
to establish with the same quantum of proof the identity of the person or persons
responsible therefor, because, even if the commission of the crime is a given, there
can be no conviction without the identity of the malefactor being likewise clearly
ascertained. Here, the prosecution was able to satisfactorily discharge this burden.
Victim Alastair positively identified Petrus as the driver of the white Toyota
Corolla taxicab with Plate No. PVD 115 .He claimed that while he was conversing
thru phone inside the taxicab, Petrus would turn his face towards him. Alastair
claimed that he had a good look and an ample opportunity to remember the facial
features of the driver as to be able to recognize and identify him in court. It is the
most natural reaction for victims of crimes to strive to remember the faces of their
accosters and the manner in which the craven acts are committed. Alastair also
recognized the voice behind the red mask used by his kidnapper as belonging to
Petrus. It was established that from the first to the twentieth day of Alastairs
captivity, his kidnapper would meet him five times a day and would talk to him for
an hour, thus, enabling him to remember the culprits voice which had a unique
tone and noticeable Chinese accent. Alastair declared with certainty that it was the
voice of Petrus.
The settled rule is that a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial
evidence can be upheld only if the following requisites concur: (1) there is more
than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The corollary rule is that the circumstances
proven must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person.
The combination of the following established facts and circumstances affirm
the findings of guilt by the RTC and the CA:
1)

the victim was rescued by the police inside the house owned by Petrus and
Susana;
2) the Toyota Corolla white taxicab bearing Plate No. PVD 115 was found in the
possession of the Accused-appellant Petrus on February 11, 2004;
3) the drivers license of Petrus and an ATM card in the name of Ong Kwai Ping
were recovered inside the Toyota Corolla taxicab of Petrus Yau;
4) in the house where the victim was rescued, the following evidence were
found: one (1) chain with padlock, handcuffs, short broken chain, checkered
pajama, black blazer, two (2) video camera cartridges, one showing the
victim in lying down position and family footages; eight (8) pieces of
cellphones, two (2) Talk n Tex SIM cards, Globe SIM card, ACR of Petrus Yau,
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Meralco bills, Asia Trust deposit slips, five ATM deposit slips, and PLDT bills,
among others;
5) two (2) cellphones, a QTEK Palmtop and a Sony Erickson were found in the
possession of Petrus. Incidentally, it was reported that the owner of the QTEK
Palmtop cellphone was a certain Jasper Beltran, also a kidnapped victim
whose whereabouts had not been known yet; and
6) the DNA examination on the red mask worn by the kidnapper that was
recovered inside the house and on the buccal swab taken from Petrus showed
that both DNA profiles matched.
The Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that the foregoing
pieces of circumstantial evidence, when analyzed and taken together, definitely
lead to no other conclusion than that Petrus was the author of the kidnapping for
ransom.
Anent the criminal liability of each accused-appellant, there is no doubt that
Petrus is liable as principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Susana, on the
other hand, is liable only as an accomplice to the crime as correctly found by the
lower courts. It must be emphasized that there was no evidence indubitably proving
that Susana participated in the decision to commit the criminal act. The only
evidence the prosecution had against her was the testimony of Alastair to the effect
that he remembered her as the woman who gave food to him or who accompanied
his kidnapper whenever he would bring food to him every breakfast, lunch and
dinner.
ANTI-TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ACT
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SHIRLEY A. CASIO
G.R. No. 211465, December 03, 2014, J. Leonen
Shirley Casio was charged with violation of Anti-Trafficking by soliciting the
services of minor victims. However, she alleged the prosecution has failed to prove
her guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that the minor victims were willing to do
such. The court ruled that Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case
to the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. Regardless of
the willingness of AAA and BBB, therefore, to be trafficked, [the Court affirms] the
text and spirit of our laws. Minors should spend their adolescence moulding their
character in environ-ments free of the vilest motives and the worse of other human
beings
Facts:
Accused Shirley A. Casio was charged for the violation of R.A. No. 9208, Sec.
4(a), qualified by Sec. 6(a) with deliberate intent, with intent to gain, did then and
there hire and/or recruit AAA, a minor, 17 years old and BBB for the purpose of
prostitution and sexual exploitation, by acting as their procurer for different
customers, for money, profit or any other consideration, in Violation of Sec. 4, Par.
(a), Qualified by Sec. 6, Par. (a), of R.A. No. 9208 (Qualified Trafficking in Persons).

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AAA stated that she knew Shirley A. Casio was a pimp because AAA would
usually see her pimping girls to customers in Barangay Kamagayan. AAA further
testified that on May 2, 2008, Shirley A. Casio solicited her services for a customer.
That was the first time that she was pimped by Shirley A. Casio Accused brought
her, BBB, and a certain Jocelyn to Queensland Motel. AAA descri-bed that her job as
a prostitute required her to display herself, along with other girls, between 7 p.m. to
8 p.m. She received PhP400.00 for every customer who selected her.
Issue:
Whether the prosecution was able to prove Shirley Casios guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
Yes, Casio should be punished for violating R.A. No. 9208.
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case
to the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is
worse. To be trafficked as a prostitute without ones consent and to be sexually
violated four to five times a day by different strangers is horrendous and atrocious.
Human trafficking indicts the society that tolerates the kind of poverty and its
accompanying desperation that compels our women to endure indignities. It reflects
the weaknesses of that society even as it convicts those who deviantly thrive in
such hopelessness. We should continue to strive for the best of our world, where our
choices of human intimacies are real choices, and not the last resort taken just to
survive. Human intimacies enhance our best and closest relationships. It serves as a
foundation for two human beings to face lifes joys and challenges while continually
growing together with many shared experiences. The quality of our human
relationships defines the world that we create also for others.
Regardless of the willingness of AAA and BBB, therefore, to be trafficked, [the
Court affirms] the text and spirit of our laws. Minors should spend their adolescence
moulding their character in environments free of the vilest motives and the worse of
other human beings. The evidence and the law compel the court to affirm the
conviction of accused in this case. But this is not all that we have done. By fulfilling
our duties, we also express the hope that our people and our government unite
against everything inhuman. We contribute to a commitment to finally stamp out
slavery and human trafficking. There are more AAAs and BBBs out there. They, too,
deserve to be rescued. They, too, need to be shown that in spite of what their lives
have been, there is still much good in [the present world]
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
ROBBERY

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARK JASON CHAVEZ Y BITANCOR ALIAS
NOY
G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014, J. Leonen
The court has held that what is imperative and essential for a conviction for
the crime of robbery with homicide is for the prosecution to establish the offenders
intent to take personal property before the killing, regardless of the time when the
homicide is actually carried out. In cases when the prosecution failed to
conclusively prove that homicide was committed for the purpose of robbing the
victim, no accused can be convicted of robbery with homicide.
Facts:
On October 28, 2006, witness Peamante arrived home at around 2:45 a.m.,
coming from work as a janitor in Eastwood City. When he was about to go inside his
house at 1326 Tuazon Street, Sampaloc, Manila, he saw a person (later on identified
as Chavez) wearing a black, long-sleeved shirt and black pants and holding
something while leaving the house/parlor of Elmer Duque (Barbie) at 1325 Tuazon
Street, Sampaloc, Manila, just six meters across Peamantes house.
Chavez could not close the door of Barbies house/parlor so he simply walked
away. However, he dropped something that he was holding and even fell down
when he stepped on it. He walked away after, and Peamante was not able to
determine what Chavez was holding. Peamante then entered his house and went
to bed.
Sometime after 10:00 a.m., the Scene of the Crime Office team arrived, led
by PCI Cayrel. The team noted that the lobby and the parlor were in disarray, and
they found Barbies dead body inside. At around 11:00 a.m., Peamantes landlady
woke him up and told him that Barbie was found dead at 9:00 a.m. He then
informed his landlady that he saw Chavez leaving Barbies house at 2:45 a.m.
Accompanied by his mother, Chavez voluntarily surrendered on November 5,
2006 to SPO3 Casimiro at the police station. In the information dated November 8,
2006, Mark Jason Chavez y Bitancor was charged with the crime of robbery with
homicide.
Issue:
Whether or not Chavez is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery with homicide.
Ruling:
No, Chavez was only guilty of homicide.
In the instant case, while there is no direct evidence showing that the
accused robbed and fatally stabbed the victim to death, nonetheless, the Court
believes that the following circumstances form a solid and unbroken chain of events
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that leads to the conclusion, beyond reasonable doubt, that accused Mark Jason
Chavez y Bitancor @ Noy committed the crime charged. First, it has been duly
established, as the accused himself admits, that he went to the parlor of the victim
at around 1:00 oclock in the morning of 28 October 2006 and the accused was
allowed by the victim to get inside his parlor as it serves as his residence too;
second, the victims two units of cellular phones without sim cards and batteries,
which were declared as part of the missing personal belongings of the victim, were
handled to SPO3 Steve Casimiro by the mother of the accused, Anjanette C. Tobias
on 05 November 2006 when the accused voluntarily surrendered, accompanied by
his mother, at the police station: third, on 28 October 2006 at about 2:45 oclock in
the morning, witness Angelo Peamante, who arrived from his work, saw a person
holding and/or carrying something and about to get out of the door of the house of
the victim located at 1325 G. Tuazon Street, Sampaloc, Manila, and trying to close
the door but the said person was not able to successfully do so. He later positively
identified the said person at the police station as Mark Jason Chavez Y Bitancor @
Noy, the accused herein; and finally, the time when the accused decided on 27
October 2006 to patch up things with the victim and the circumstances when the
latter was discovered fatally killed on 28 October 2006 is not a co-incidence. The
prosecution has equally established, based on the same circumstantial evidence,
that the accused had indeed killed the victim.
Nevertheless, the court has held that what is imperative and essential for a
conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide is for the prosecution to establish
the offenders intent to take personal property before the killing, regardless of the
time when the homicide is actually carried out. In cases when the prosecution
failed to conclusively prove that homicide was committed for the purpose of robbing
the victim, no accused can be convicted of robbery with homicide.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNEL BALUTE
G.R. No. 189272, January 21, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
In People vs. Ibaez, the Court exhaustively explained that [a] special
complex crime of robbery with homicide takes place when a homicide is committed
either by reason, or on the occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for
robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the
taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with
the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by
reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was
committed. A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose,
and [the] objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the
robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may
occur before, during or after the robbery. Homicide is said to have been committed
by reason or on occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was committed: (a) to
facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by
the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or
(d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime.
In the instant case, the CA correctly upheld the RTCs finding that the
prosecution was able to establish the fact that Balute poked his gun at SPO1
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Manaois, took the latters mobile phone, and thereafter, shot him, resulting in his
death despite surgical and medical intervention. This is buttressed by Cristita and
Blesildas positive identification of Balute as the one who committed the crime
Facts:
An information was filed before the RTC charging Balute of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide. According to the prosecution, at around 8 oclock in the
evening of March 22, 2002, SPO1 Manaois was on board his owner-type jeepney
with his wife Cristita and daughter Blesilda, and was traversing Road 10, Tondo,
Manila. While the vehicle was on a stop position at a lighted area due to heavy
traffic, two (2) male persons, later on identified as Balute and a certain Blaster,
suddenly appeared on either side of the jeepney, with Balute poking a gun at the
side of SPO1 Manaois and saying putangina, ilabas mo! Thereafter, Balute
grabbed SPO1 Manaoiss mobile phone from the latters chest pocket and shot him
at the left side of his torso. SPO1 Manaois reacted by drawing his own firearm and
alighting from his vehicle, but he was unable to fire at the assailants as he fell to the
ground. He was taken to Mary Johnston Hospital where he died despite undergoing
surgical operation and medical intervention.
The RTC found Balute guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide with the aggravating circumstance of treachery. Aggrieved, Balute
appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed Balutes conviction with modification that the
aggravating circumstance of treachery was no longer considered as the prosecution
failed to allege the same in the Information.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Balutes conviction for Robbery with
Homicide.
Ruling:
YES, Balute must held liable for the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
It must be stressed that in criminal cases, factual findings of the trial court
are generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal, especially when such
findings are supported by substantial evidence on record. It is only in exceptional
circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant
matters, that the Court will re-calibrate and evaluate the factual findings of the
court below. Guided by the foregoing principle, the Court finds no cogent reason to
disturb the RTCs factual findings, as affirmed by the CA.
In People vs. Ibaez, the Court exhaustively explained that [a] special
complex crime of robbery with homicide takes place when a homicide is committed
either by reason, or on the occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for
robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the
taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with
the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by
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reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was
committed. A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose,
and [the] objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the
robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may
occur before, during or after the robbery. Homicide is said to have been committed
by reason or on occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was committed: (a) to
facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by
the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or
(d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime.
In the instant case, the CA correctly upheld the RTCs finding that the
prosecution was able to establish the fact that Balute poked his gun at SPO1
Manaois, took the latters mobile phone, and thereafter, shot him, resulting in his
death despite surgical and medical intervention. This is buttressed by Cristita and
Blesildas positive identification of Balute as the one who committed the crime as
opposed to the latters denial and alibi which was correctly considered by both the
RTC and the CA as weak and self-serving, as it is well-settled that alibi and denial
are outweighed by positive identification that is categorical, consistent and
untainted by any ill motive on the part of the [eyewitnesses] testifying on the
matter. This is especially true when the eyewitnesses are the relatives of the victim
such as Cristita and Blesilda who are the wife and daughter of SPO1 Manaois,
respectively since [t]he natural interest of witnesses, who are relatives of the
victim, in securing the conviction of the guilty would actually deter them from
implicating persons other than the true culprits.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAY HINLO aka INDAY KABANG, et al.
G.R. No. 212151, February 18, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
Accused-appellants conspired to commit robbery in the house of Sps. Clavel.
Said robbery resulted to the death of Freddie Clavel. The RTC and CA convicted the
accused-appellants of Robbery with Homicide. In affirming the ruling of the RTC and
CA, the Supreme Court ruled that, it is settled that the positive identification of
accused-appellants prevails over their defense of alibi considering that in this
jurisdiction the latter is considered as inherently weak and, thus, cannot outweigh
the testimony of eyewitnesses establishing that accused-appellants committed the
crime. Moreover, conspiracy having been established, when a homicide takes place
by reason of or on occasion of the robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide whether they actually
participated in the killing, unless there is proof that there was an endeavour to
prevent the killing.
Facts:
Sometime in the afternoon of October 14,
Kabang (Hinlo), Palma, Senido, Pedroso, and one
were drinking at the house of Senido when the latter
to rob the house of Spouses Freddie and Judy Ann.
tasked to enter the house, Dumagat would act as

2003, Jay Hinlo a.k.a. Inday


Joemarie Dumagat (Dumagat)
informed the others of the plan
Palma, Senido, and Hinlo were
a look-out at the back of the

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house where a sugar cane field was located, and Pedroso would wait at the highway
with a tricycle.
In the early morning of October 15, 2003, they proceeded to the house of
Sps. Clavel where Senido used a knife to cut the cyclone wire fence. They destroyed
the knob of the kitchen door and gained entry where they took certain valuable
items. Meanwhile, Freddie woke up to go to the bathroom and as he opened the
bathroom door, Senido, who was hiding inside, assaulted him and the two wrestled.
Then, Hinlo approached Freddie and with the use of a bladed weapon, stabbed the
latter on his abdomen which led to his untimely demise. Thereafter, Palma, Senido,
Pedroso, Hinlo, and Dumagat hurriedly escaped. Shortly thereafter, the police
arrived and recovered the two leather bags where the compact discs and
microphone were placed.
Consequently, an Information was filed charging Palma, Senido, Pedroso,
Hinlo, and Dumagat with the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide. Upon
arraignment, Palma, Senido, Pedroso, and Dumagat entered separate pleas of not
guilty, while accused Hinlo remains at large. Subsequently, in an Order, Dumagat
was discharged as an accused to be a state witness. The RTC convicted Palma and
the others of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
ruling of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the ruling of the RTC
Ruling:
The CA did not err in sustaining the conviction the accused.
In People v. Uy, the Court explained that the elements for the crime of
robbery with homicide are: (a) the taking of personal property is committed with
violence or intimidation against persons; (b) the property belongs to another; (c) the
taking is animo lucrandi or with intent to gain;
and (d) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, homicide was committed. A
conviction requires that the robbery is the main purpose and the killing is merely
incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life,
but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.
In the instant case, the CA correctly upheld the RTCs conclusions finding that
accused-appellants were all armed with knives when they broke into the house of
the Sps. Clavel, took certain personal properties, and, in the course thereof, stabbed
Freddie, resulting to his death. This is supported by the testimony of the state
witness, Dumagat, who presented a detailed, consistent, and credible narrative of
the incident and positively identified accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the
crime.
It is settled that the positive identification of accused-appellants prevails over
their defense of alibi considering that in this jurisdiction the latter is considered as
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inherently weak and, thus, cannot outweigh the testimony of eyewitnesses
establishing that accused-appellants committed the crime. Moreover, conspiracy
having been established, when a homicide takes place by reason of or on occasion
of the robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of the special complex crime
of robbery with homicide whether they actually participated in the killing, unless
there is proof that there was an endeavour to prevent the killing.
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNEL BALUTE Y VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 189272, January 21, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
A special complex crime of robbery with homicide takes place when a
homicide is committed either by reason, or on the occasion, of the robbery. To
sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the
following elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2)
with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and
(4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in
its generic sense, was committed.
Facts:
An information was filed before the RTC charging Balute of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide. According to the prosecution, at around 8 oclock in the
evening of March 22, 2002, SPO1 Raymundo B. Manaois (SPO1 Manaois) was on
board his owner-type jeepney with his wife Cristita and daughter Blesilda, and was
traversing Road 10, Tondo, Manila. While the vehicle was on a stop position at a
lighted area due to heavy traffic, two (2) male persons, later on identified as Balute
and a certain Leo Blaster (Blaster), suddenly appeared on either side of the jeepney,
with Balute poking a gun at the side of SPO1 Manaois and saying putang ina, ilabas
mo! Thereafter, Balute grabbed SPO1 Manaoiss mobile phone from the latters
chest pocket and shot him at the left side of his torso. SPO1 Manaois reacted by
drawing his own firearm and alighting from his vehicle, but he was unable to fire at
the assailants as he fell to the ground. He was taken to Mary Johnston Hospital
where he died despite undergoing surgical operation and medical intervention.
RTC found Balute guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide with the aggravating circumstance of treachery. Aggrieved, Balute
appealed to the CA. the CA affirmed Balutes conviction with modification that the
aggravating circumstance of treachery was no longer considered as the prosecution
failed to allege the same in the Information. Hence, the instant appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Balutes conviction for Robbery with
Homicide.
Ruling:

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The appeal is bereft of merit.
It must be stressed that in criminal cases, factual findings of the trial court
are generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal, especially when such
findings are supported by substantial evidence on record. It is only in exceptional
circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant
matters, that the Court will re-calibrate and evaluate the factual findings of the
court below. Guided by the foregoing principle, the Court finds no cogent reason to
disturb the RTCs factual findings, as affirmed by the CA.
In People v. Ibaez, the Court exhaustively explained that [a] special
complex crime of robbery with homicide takes place when a homicide is committed
either by reason, or on the occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for
robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the
taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the
use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by
reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was
committed. A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose,
and [the] objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the
robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may
occur before, during or after the robbery. Homicide is said to have been committed
by reason or on occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was committed: (a) to
facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by
the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or
(d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime.
In the instant case, the CA correctly upheld the RTCs finding that the
prosecution was able to establish the fact that Balute poked his gun at SPO1
Manaois, took the latters mobile phone, and thereafter, shot him, resulting in his
death despite surgical and medical intervention. This is buttressed by Cristita and
Blesildas positive identification of Balute as the one who committed the crime as
opposed to the latters denial and alibi which was correctly considered by both the
RTC and the CA as weak and self-serving, as it is well-settled that alibi and denial
are outweighed by positive identification that is categorical, consistent and
untainted by any ill motive on the part of the [eyewitnesses] testifying on the
matter. This is especially true when the eyewitnesses are the relatives of the victim
such as Cristita and Blesilda who are the wife and daughter of SPO1 Manaois,
respectively since [t]he natural interest of witnesses, who are relatives of the
victim, in securing the conviction of the guilty would actually deter them from
implicating persons other than the true culprits.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHARLIE OROSCO
G.R. No. 209227, March 25, 2015, J. Villarama, Jr.
Charlie and John Doe had to kill Yap to accomplish their main objective of
stealing her money. In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the
malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by
reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of
human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery.
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Facts:
Arca testified that on May 16, 2006, about one oclock in the afternoon, he
went to the store of Lourdes Yap (Yap). After purchasing the ice, he noticed there
was a verbal tussle between Yap and two male customers who are Charlie Orosco
and John Doe. The men were arguing that they were given insufficient change and
insisting they gave a P500 bill and not P100. To verify, Yap allowed them to enter
the store. Upon getting inside, they held Yap with John Doe wrapping his arm around
her neck while Charlie held her hands at the back. With Yap pressed between the
two of them, John Doe stabbed her once in her chest before releasing her. Once she
fell down, Charlie quickly took the money placed at the altar inside the store and
fled together with John Doe and the two lookouts outside the store.Yap was brought
to the Aquinas University Hospital but she was declared dead on arrival.
Only Charlie was arrested as the others remained at large. The trial court
rendered judgment convicting Charlie of of the crime of robbery with homicide.
Charlie went to the CA but his appeal was dismissed.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in giving credit to the uncorroborated
eyewitness testimony of Arca who could not point to him during the trial
2. Whether or not the crime should only be robbery and not the complex
crime of robbery with homicide considering the fact that it was not Charlie
who stabbed Yap
Ruling:
1. No
It is settled that witnesses are to be weighed not numbered, such that the
testimony of a single, trustworthy and credible witness could be sufficient to convict
an accused. The testimony of a sole witness, if found convincing and credible by the
trial court, is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Corroborative evidence is necessary only when there are reasons to warrant the
suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his observation had been
inaccurate.
In this case, both the trial and appellate courts found the testimony of the
lone eyewitness, Arca, convincing notwithstanding that he was quite slow in
narrating the incident to the court and that he initially desisted from physically
pointing to appellant as the one who held Yaps hands from behind and took her
money at the store after she was stabbed by appellants cohort (John Doe).
Assessing the identification made by Arca, the trial court concluded that he
had positively identified appellant as one of the perpetrators of the robbery and
killing of Yap. Orosco repeatedly harped on the hesitation of Arca to point to him at
the trial. However, as the trial courts firsthand observation of said witness
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deportment revealed, Arcas fear of appellant sufficiently explains his initial refusal
to point to him in open court during his direct examination. Arca was finally able to
point to appellant as one of the perpetrators of the robbery and killing of Yap during
his additional direct examination when he had apparently mustered enough courage
to do so.
2. No
Robbery with homicide is defined under Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, which provides in part:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
Penalties. Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or
intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on
occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or
when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional
mutilation or arson.
The elements of the crime of robbery with homicide are: (1) the taking of
personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2)
the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is done with animo lucrandi;
and (4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide (used in its
generic sense) is committed. Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or
on the occasion of robbery if it is committed (a) to facilitate the robbery or the
escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to
prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses to
the commission of the crime. In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design
of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion
or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking
of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery.
Here, the homicide was committed by reason of or on the occasion of the
robbery as Charlie and John Doe had to kill Yap to accomplish their main objective of
stealing her money.
As the Court held in People v. Baron:
The concerted manner in which the appellant and his companions
perpetrated the crime showed beyond reasonable doubt the presence of
conspiracy. When a homicide takes place by reason of or on the occasion of
the robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide whether they actually participated in the
killing, unless there is proof that there was an endeavor to prevent the
killing. There was no evidence adduced in this case that the appellant
attempted to prevent the killing. Thus, regardless of the acts individually
performed by the appellant and his co-accused, and applying the basic
principle in conspiracy that the act of one is the act of all, the appellant is
guilty as a co-conspirator. As a result, the criminal liabilities of the appellant

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and his co-accused are one and the same. Having acted in conspiracy with
his co- accused, appellant is equally liable for the killing of Yap.
THEFT AND QUALIFIED THEFT
EDUARDO MAGSUMBOL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 207175, November 26, 2014, J. Mendoza
To warrant a conviction for theft of damaged property, the prosecution must
prove beyond reasonable that the accused maliciously damaged the property
belonging to another and, thereafter, removed or used the fruits or object thereof,
with intent to gain. When the [Magsumbol] was ordered by his brother-in-law to cut
down coconut trees on the latters property, and he asked permission from the
barangay captain to do so, and the fact that even the land owner was unsure as to
the position of the boundary of his land, then the accused had no criminal intent
when he mistakenly cut the trees of the complainant.
Facts:
Accused-appellant Magsumbol, together with Magsino, Inanoria and Ramirez,
were charged before the RTC of theft. The prosecution alleged that Ernesto Caringal,
caretaker of the land of Menandro Avanzado, saw Magsumbol with a group of men
cutting down the coconut trees on the property of Avanzado, and later the group
turned the felled trees into coco lumber.
The defense alleged that Atanacio authorized his brothers-in-law, Magsino
and Magsumbol, to cut down the coconut trees within the boundary of his property,
which was adjacent to the land co-owned by Menandro. Magsumbol, Magsino,
Ramirez, and Inanoria came to the office of Brgy. Captain seeking permission to cut
down the coconut trees planted on the land of Atanacio. Ramirez and Magsumbol
claimed that only the coconut trees which stood within the land owned by Atanacio.
The RTC convicted Magsumbol, et al. Magsumbol appealed to the CA, which
sustained the conclusions of law and fact made by the RTC.
Issue:
Did the prosecution fail to establish the criminal intent on the part of
Magsumbol and his co-accused?
Ruling:
NO, the Court finds for Accused-appellants Magsumbol et al.
To warrant a conviction under the provision for theft of damaged property,
the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable that the accused maliciously
damaged the property belonging to another and, thereafter, removed or used the
fruits or object thereof, with intent to gain. Evidently, theft of damaged property is
an intentional felony for which criminal liability attaches only when it is shown that
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the malefactor acted with criminal intent or malice. Criminal intent must be clearly
established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed.
Was criminal intent substantiated to justify the conviction of Magsumbol and his coaccused?
It does not so appear in this case.
There is no dispute that the land co-owned by Menandro is adjacent to the
land owned by Atanacio. The prosecution claimed that the thirty three (33) cut
coconut trees were planted within the land co-owned by Menandro. The defense, on
the other hand, averred that only the coconut trees found within the land of
Atanacio were felled by Magsumbol and his co-accused. Menandro testified that
there were monuments that delimit the boundaries between the adjacent lots while
Atanacio claimed that there were none and that x marks were just etched on the
trunk of the trees to delineate the boundary of his land. Apart from the bare
allegations of these witnesses, no con-crete and competent evidence was adduced
to substantiate the irrespective submissions. In view of such conflicting claims and
considering the meager evidence on hand, the Court cannot determine with
certainty the owner of the 33 felled coconut trees. The uncertainty of the exact
location of the coconut trees negates the presence of the criminal intent to gain.
At any rate, granting arguendo that the said coconut trees were within
Menandros land, no malice or criminal intent could be rightfully attributed to
Magsumbol and his co-accused. The RTC and the CA overlooked one important point
in the present case, to wit: Magsumbol and his co-accused went to Barangay
Kinatihan I, Candelaria, Quezon, to cut down the coconut trees belonging to
Atanacio upon the latters instruction.
Such fact was confirmed by Atanacio who narrated that due to financial
reversals, he sold all the coconut trees in his land to Ramirez, a coco lumber trader;
that since he could not go to the site due to health reasons, he authorized
Magsumbol and Magsino to cut down his trees and to oversee the gathering of the
felled trees; that he informed Menandro about this and even offered to pay for the
damages that he might have sustained as some of [Menandros] trees could have
been mista-kenly cut down in the process; that Menandro refused his offer of
compensation and replied that a case had already been filed against the four
accused; and that he tried to seek an audience again from Menandro, but the latter
refused to talk to him anymore.
If, indeed, in the course of executing Atanacios instructions, Magsumbol and
his co-accused encroached on the land co-owned by Menandro, because they
missed the undetectable boundary between the two lots, and cut down some of
Menandros trees, such act merely constituted mistake or judgmental error.
The criminal mind is indeed wanting in the situation where Magsumbol and
his co-accused even sought prior permission from Brgy. Captain Arguelles to cut
down the coconut trees which was done openly and during broad daylight
effectively negated malice and criminal intent on their part. It defies reason that the
accused would still approach the barangay captain if their real intention was to steal
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the coconut trees of Menandro. Besides, criminals would usually execute their
criminal activities clandestinely or through stealth or strategy to avoid detection of
the commission of a crime or a wrongdoing.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TRINIDAD A. CAHILIG
G.R. No. 199208, July 30, 2014, J. Carpio
Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of Qualified Theft, must be the
result of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between
the appellant and the offended party that might create a high degree of confidence
between them which the appellant abused. Applying this, Cahiligs act of
deliberately misleading the board of directors into authorizing disbursements for
money that eventually ended up in her personal account makes him guilty of the
crime of qualified theft considering that his position was one reposed with trust and
confidence as it involves handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing money
from complainant-depositors and other funds.
Facts:
Respondent Cahilig worked as cashier at Wyeth Philippines Employees
Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (WPESLAI) from December 1992 until 7
November 2001. She was tasked with handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing
the funds of the WPESLAI.
It was discovered that from 31 May 2000 to 31 July 2001, Cahilig made
withdrawals from the funds of WPESLAI and appropriated the same for her personal
benefit. Cahilig would prepare disbursement vouchers, to be approved by the
WPESLAI president and Board of Directors, in order to withdraw funds from one of
WPESLAIs bank accounts then transfer these funds to its other bank account. The
withdrawal was done by means of a check payable to Cahilig, in her capacity as
WPESLAI cashier. This procedure for transferring funds from one bank account to
another was said to be standard practice at WPESLAI. However, Cahilig did not
actually transfer the funds. Instead, she made it appear in her personal WPESLAI
ledger that a deposit was made into her account and then she would fill out a
withdrawal slip to simulate a withdrawal of said amount from her capital
contribution.
The trial court found that Cahilig employed the same scheme in each of the
30 cases of qualified theft filed against her. All 30 cases were consolidated and
jointly heard. Upon agreement of the parties, only three of the 30 cases went thru
trial. These were submitted for resolution.
The RTC found Cahilig guilty of the crimes charged. The CA denied Cahiligs
appeal and affirmed the RTCs Decision. The RTC held that Cahilig, as cashier of
WPESLAI, was granted trust and confidence by the key officers of the association.
The CA denied her appeal and affirmed the RTCs Decision.
Issue:

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Whether or not Cahilig is guilty of the crimes charged.
Ruling:
Yes, Cahilig is liable for qualified theft.
The elements of qualified theft, committed with grave abuse of confidence,
are as follows: 1. taking of personal property; 2. that the said property belongs to
another; 3. that the said taking be done with intent to gain; 4. that it be done
without the owners consent; 5. that it be accomplished without the use of violence
or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; 6. that it be done with
grave abuse of confidence.
It is clear that all the elements of qualified theft are present in these cases.
Cahilig took money from WPESLAI and its depositors by taking advantage of her
position. Her intent to gain is clear in the use of a carefully planned and deliberately
executed scheme to commit the theft.
Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of qualified theft, must be the
result of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between
the appellant and the offended party that might create a high degree of confidence
between them which the appellant abused. Cahiligs position was one reposed with
trust and confidence, considering that it involves handling, managing, receiving,
and disbursing money from WPESLAIs depositors and other funds of the
association. Cahiligs responsibilities as WPESLAI cashier required prudence and
vigilance over the money entrusted into her care. However, instead of executing her
duties, she deliberately misled the board of directors into authorizing disbursements
for money that eventually ended up in her personal account, a fact that Cahilig did
not deny.
JOEL YONGCO and JULIETO LAOJAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 209373 (consolidated), July 30, 2014, J. Velasco, Jr.
The elements of qualified theft, committed with grave abuse of discretion,
can simply be enumerated as follows: 1. Taking of personal property; 2. That the
said property belongs to another; 3. That the said taking be done with intent to
gain; 4. That it be done without the owners consent; 5. That it be accomplished
without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon
things; and6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence. The accused in this
case, it bears stressing, were guards and drivers with access to the entrance and
exit of the CEO premises. In other words, they enjoyed the trust and confidence
reposed on them by their employer to have access throughout the CEO premises on
account of their respective duties. It was this trust and confidence that was gravely
abused by them that makes the theft qualified.
Facts:
Pablo Salosod, a casual employee of the city government of Iligan, testified
that on April 16, 2005 at around 1:30 a.m., while attending a wake, he was fetched
and requested by Anecito Tangian, Jr., Jr., one of herein petitioners, to accompany
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him to the City Engineers Office (CEO). At the office garage, Salosod and his fellow
garbage collectors were allegedly directed by Petitioners Tangian, Jr. and Yongco to
load car parts that petitioners considered as waste items, the subject items of the
theft, on the truck driven by Tangian, Jr. They then drove to Tominobo, Iligan City
where the materials were unloaded in front of Delfin Junk Store, and before the
truck left the shop, Salosod allegedly saw Petitioner Laojan giving a thumbs-up
sign to Tangian, Jr.. On the way back, Tangian, Jr. allegedly confessed to Salosod that
it was Laojan who requested that the items be brought at the junk shop.
Prosecution witness Oliveros Garcia meanwhile testified witnessing the
unloading of the items in front of the junk store, after which, Laojan covered the
items up with a sack. The following morning, he allegedly saw Laojans brother-inlaw, who coincidentally works at the shop, take the items inside. Witnesses Dioscoro
Galorio and Atty. Ulysses Lagcao, employee and consultant of the city government,
respectively, testified that they conducted investigations relative to the incident and
found out that the items stolen consisted of one Nissan transmission, one unit
boom, one Nissan I-beam, and one differential of Tamaraw, with total valuation of
PhP12,000. Upon their investigation, they recommended to the city legal officer the
filing of the present criminal case against the petitioners.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are guilty of qualified theft.
Ruling:
Yes.
The elements of qualified theft, committed with grave abuse of discretion,
can simply be enumerated as follows: 1. Taking of personal property; 2. That the
said property belongs to another; 3. That the said taking be done with intent to
gain; 4. That it be done without the owners consent; 5. That it be accomplished
without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things;
and 6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
There is no dispute that the items (transmission, boom arm, differential
assembly, and I-beam) which are the subject matter of this case belong to the CEO
of Iligan City. There is no dispute that these items, although considered "heap of
scrap," have not yet been declared unserviceable or waste by the proper authority
or office. Nor have they been marked for proper disposal. There is also no dispute
that these items were taken away from the CEO and were already under complete
and effective control of the persons taking the same. This is because these items
were loaded onto the garbage truck driven by Tangian, Jr. and brought to Tominobo
at the Delfin Junk Store. Apparently, the taking of these items was without the
consent of the CEO of Iligan City because there was no gate pass issued to that
effect. Evidence shows that when the garbage truck left the premises of the CEO, no
gate pass was surrendered by Tangian, Jr. Yongco did not bother to ask for a gate
pass on the pretext that there was another guard on duty at the gate.

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It is equally patent that the taking of these items was done with grave abuse
of confidence. The accused in this case, it bears stressing, were guards and drivers
with access to the entrance and exit of the CEO premises. In other words, they
enjoyed the trust and confidence reposed on them by their employer (the City of
Iligan) to have access throughout the CEO premises on account of their respective
duties. More so since the primary function of the CSU is to guard the properties,
including the said items, of the CEO. It was this trust and confidence that was
gravely abused by them that makes the theft qualified.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERA JOY ELEUTERIO NIELLES, AND
MERA NIELLES DELOS REYES
G.R. No. 200308, February 23, 2015, J. Del Castillo
Nielles questions the decision of the CA finding her guilty of the crime of
qualified theft. The elements of qualified theft are as follows 1) taking of personal
property; 2) that said property belongs to another; 3) that the said taking was done
with intent to gain; 4) that it was done without the owners consent; 5) that it was
accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, or of
force upon things; and 6) that it was done with grave abuse of confidence. For
having established all the elements abovementioned, the SC affirmed the findings
and decision of the trial court and appellate court that petitioner had indeed
committed the crime of qualified theft.
Facts:
Private Complainant Juanita Flores was engaged in the business of
guaranteeing purchase orders and gift checks of Shoemart and Landmark and
disposing, selling or transferring them for consideration. Appellant Nielles, on the
other hand, was employed by Flores as her cashier. As such, she was assigned to
bill and collect from sub-guarantors, and to encash and deposit checks.
On July 15, 2004, Mera Joy collected PhP640,353.86 from the sub-guarantors.
Mera Joy however did not remit the amount to Flores or deposit the same in the
account of Flores. Instead, she issued 15 personal checks totalling PhP640,353.86
and deposited them to Flores account. Upon presentment all the checks were
dishonored due to account closed. Thereafter, Nielles absconded.
The RTC rendered a decision finding Mera Joy guilty of the crime of theft. On
appeal, Mera Joy argued that since Flores was abroad on July 15, 2004, she could
not have personally known whether she indeed collected amounts from the subguarantors. She posited that mere issuance of the 15 checks is not proof that she
received/collected payments from the sub-guarantors or that she failed to remit the
monies belonging to Flores. She insisted that the prosecution failed to establish that
she indeed collected monies from the sub-guarantors amounting to PhP640,353.86.
Mera Joy also theorized that she might have issued the checks in favor of the subguarantors for whatever transactions they have between them; and that thereafter,
when she went to these sub-guarantors to collect their dues for Flores, these subguarantors used the same checks she previously issued as their payment for Flores.

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For that reason her personal checks were deposited in private complainants
account.
The CA, however, affirmed the decision of the trial court. It held that the fact
that Flores was out of the country during the commission of the offense is irrelevant
since the prosecution has satisfactorily established that upon her arrival in the
Philippines, she immediately investigated the matter and talked to the subguarantors. Flores also confirmed that indeed Nielles issued 15 personal checks in
lieu of the amounts collected and deposited the same to Flores account but were all
dishonored upon presentment. Significantly, the CA noted that aside from her bare
denial, appellant did not present any evidence to support her claim that she did not
steal the amount of PhP640,353.86 from Flores. In fine, the CA found all the
elements for the crime of qualified theft to be present.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove Mera Joys guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
YES, the guilt of Mera Joy was satisfactorily proven in the instant case.
The Court agrees with the findings of the trial court and the CA that the
prosecution satisfactorily established all the elements of qualified theft, to wit: 1)
taking of personal property; 2) that said property belongs to another; 3) that the
said taking was done with intent to gain; 4) that it was done without the owners
consent; 5) that it was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation
against persons, or of force upon things; and 6) that it was done with grave abuse of
confidence.
The Court is with the trial court and the appellate court in finding that the
element of taking of personal property was satisfactorily established by the
prosecution. During her cross-examination, private complainant Flores testified that
upon having been apprised of the unremitted collections, she conducted an
investigation and inquired from her sub-guarantors who admitted making payments
to Nielles. She also testified during cross-examination that when Nielles arrived
from Hongkong, the latter went to Flores office and admitted to having converted
the collections to her personal use. Interestingly, when it was her turn to testify,
Nielles did not rebut Flores testi-mony.
Notably, when Flores testified during her cross-examination that she talked to
the sub-guarantors who admitted having made payments to Mera Joy, the latters
counsel no longer made further clarifications or follow-up questions. Thus, Flores
testimony on this fact remains on record unrebutted.
Significantly, when Mera Joy was placed on the witness stand, she did not
even make any attempt to explain her issuance of the 15 checks. In fact, during her
entire testimony, she never made any mention about the personal checks that she
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issued and deposited in Flores account. It was only in her Memorandum filed with
the trial court and her Brief submitted to the appellate court that the same was
discussed. However, her explanation as to its issuance is so convoluted that it
defies belief. All that Mera Joy could claim is that the issuance of the checks only
proves that the same was for a consideration but omitted to explain what the
consideration was. She also theorized that she might have issued the checks to the
sub-guarantors for her personal transactions but likewise failed to elaborate on what
these transactions were. In any event, if indeed Mera Joy did not steal the amount
of PhP640,353.86 belonging to Flores, how come she issued 15 personal checks in
favor of the latter and deposited the same in her account, albeit they were
subsequently dishonored? Besides, the Court notes that in Mera JoysCounter
Affidavit dated August 20, 2004 subscribed before 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor
Hannibal S. Santillan of Makati City, she already admitted having taken without the
knowledge and consent of Flores several purchase orders and gift checks worth
thousands of pesos. She claimed though that she was only forced to do so by Edna
Cruz and cohorts.
The Court also concurs with the findings of the trial court and the CA that the
prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that the amount of
PhP640,353.86 actually belonged to Flores; that Nielles stole the amount with intent
to gain and without Flores consent; that the taking was accomplished without the
use of violence or intimidation against persons, or of force upon things; and that it
was committed with grave abuse of confidence.
ESTAFA
JEAN D. GAMBOA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 188052, April 21, 2014, J. Perez
The CA convicted the accused for the commission of the crime of estafa.
Gamboa denied the allegations. The Court has ruled that findings of fact of the trial
court when affirmed by the CA is binding upon it unless there is proof that such
facts where overlooked, ignored, misconstrued, and misinterpreted. The fact of
misappropriation cannot be refuted by the mere allegation that the amount claimed
against Gamboa is unliquidated. Its effect is merely to put into question the actual
amount misappropriated and the damage sustained by TFS Pawnshop.
Facts:
Petitioner Gambao is the liaison officer of private complainant TFS Pawnshop.
She was charged with estafa with the prosecutors office for having misappropriated
or converted the funds she received in trust for the payment of permits and licenses
of the private respondent TFS Pawnshop.
Gambao denied the allegations by claiming that she did not misappropriate
the said funds, in fact, all the permits and licenses of TFS Pawnshop was already
fully paid and that she is in possession of the documents that would prove the fact
of payment. During her direct testimony before the trial court, in order to disprove
that she misappropriated and converted the funs intended for the payment of
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permits and licenses of TFS Pawnshop, Gambao claimed that she gave the monies
to a certain Lito Jacinto, a casual employee of the City Government of Manila. She
alleged that, pursuant to company practice, the employees were regularly
transacting with Lito Jacinto in order to expedite the process for the renewal of
licenses and permits. To corroborate her testi-mony, Gamboa presented as
documentary evidence a photocopy of a receipt payment signed by Lito Jacinto.
Despite the defenses made by Gambao, the trial court rendered judgment
convicting her for having committed the crime of estafa punishable under Art. 315
par. 1(b) of the RPC. On appeal, the OSG sided with Gambao after finding that her
defenses are meritorious. The OSG claimed that the element of misappropriation
necessary for the conviction for the crime of estafa is absent in the case at bar. It
alleged that Gambao merely followed the instructions of her superior to transact
and entrust the money with Lito Jacinto. The CA, however, affirmed the decision of
the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner Gambaos defenses should be given weight thereby
rendering her innocent of the crime of estafa.
Ruling:
No. the defense interposed by Gamboa should be given scant consideration.
It is well-settled that the credibility of witnesses is best determined by the
trial judge, who has the direct opportunity and unique advantage to observe at
close range their conduct and deportment on the witness stand. The general rule is
that findings of fact of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies, and the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions
based on said finding, are accorded by the appellate court utmost respect, if not
conclusive effect, and can only be set aside upon a clear showing that it overlooked,
ignored, misconstrued and misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if
considered, would alter the outcome of the case.
The Court, in affirming the decision of the CA, concluded that the defense
made by Gambao during her direct testimony that she gave the monies to Lito
Jacinto is riddled with inconsistencies and it is made only as a mere after thought. If
indeed she had entrusted the funds to Lito Jacinto and if indeed she is innocent, she
would have alleged that fact at the earliest possible time. Her belated invocation of
the said defense bolsters the conclusion that the defense was made only as a mere
after thought.
Moreover, neither did the defense present the original or xerox copy of
Exhibit 6 before the court a quo for marking during the pre-trial held on November
14, 2000. In addition, it was only during the direct examination of [Gamboa] on July
30, 2002 that she raised for the first time Exhibit 6 as a defense by passing the
blame to one Lito Jacinto. She never raised the said defense at the earliest
opportune time when she made a liquidation report of her cash advances. Further,
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she again failed to raise the said defense before the OCP of Makati City during the
preliminary investi-gation. If indeed she was innocent of the crime charged, ordinary
human behavior dictates that she should have divulged the said information to her
superiors or the investigating public prosecutor of such fact. Her failure to do so
casts serious doubt on her credibility.
In addition, the allegation that the actual amount of the claim is not
liquidated thereby cancelling out the fact of misappropriation cannot be given
credence. The [Court] ruled that the lack of certainty in the amount demanded by
TFS merely puts into question the actual amount that was misappropriated and the
damage on TFS, but not the fact of Gamboas misappropriation.
LITO CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014, J. Peralta
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that
money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty
to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such
receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the
offender. The prosecution was able to prove the existence of all the elements of the
crime. Tangcoy gave Corpuz the pieces of jewelry in trust, or on commission basis,
as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an obligation to sell or return the
same within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There was misappropriation when Corpuz
failed to remit the proceeds of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took place,
failed to return the same pieces of jewelry within or after the agreed period despite
demand from Tangcoy to the prejudice of the latter.
Facts:
Danilo Tangcoy and Petitioner Corpuz met at the Admiral Royale Casino in
Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Tangcoy was then engaged in the business of
lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces
of jewelry for sale, Corpuz approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and
offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Tangcoy agreed, and
as a consequence, he turned over to Corpuz the following items: an 18k diamond
ring for men; a woman's bracelet; a men's necklace and another men's bracelet,
with an aggregate value of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date.
They both agreed that Corpuz shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if
unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired
without Corpuz remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry.
When Tangcoy was able to meet Corpuz, the latter promised the former that he will
pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail. Thus, an
Information was filed against Corpuz for the crime of estafa.

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The prosecution presented the lone testimony of Danilo Tangcoy. After trial,
the RTC found Corpuz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
Information. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the last element of estafa, which is, that there is a demand by
the offended party on the offender, was not proved
Ruling:
No, the Court disagrees that the last element of estafa, which is, that there is
a demand by the offended party on the offender, was not proved.
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that
money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for adminis-tration, or under any other obligation involving the duty
to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such
receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the
offender. In his testimony, Tangcoy narrated how he was able to locate Corpuz after
almost two (2) months from the time he gave the pieces of jewelry and asked
Corpuz about the same items with the latter promising to pay them.
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand
need not even be formal; it may be verbal. The specific word demand need not
even be used to show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since
even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money in this case, property,
would be tantamount to a demand. As expounded in Asejo vs. People: With regard
to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this kind of
estafa need not be formal or written.
In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able
to prove the existence of all the elements of the crime. Tangcoy gave Corpuz the
pieces of jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated
May 2, 1991 with an obligation to sell or return the same within sixty (60) days, if
unsold. There was misappropriation when Corpuz failed to remit the proceeds of
those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the same
pieces of jewelry within or after the agreed period despite demand from Tangcoy to
the prejudice of the latter.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANGELITA I. DAUD, HANELITA M. GALLEMIT
and RODERICK GALLEMIT y TOLENTINO
G.R. No. 197539, June 2, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro
It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal
recruitment and Estafa. Rodericks contention that he cannot be convicted of estafa
because the element of deceit is lacking is without merit, as private complainants
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were able to establish, through their positive and credible testimonies, that
appellant acted in conspiracy with his co-accused to mislead private complainants
into believing that appellant and his co-accused, for a fee, can deploy private
complainants abroad for employment.
Facts:
Angelita I. Daud, Hanelita M. Gallemit, and appellant Roderick Gallemit y
Tolentino were charged before the RTC with illegal recruitment in large scale. That
on or about February 5, 2001 to August 2001, in the City of Paraaque, representing
themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for
employment abroad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, for a
fee, recruit and promise employment abroad to complainants Marcelo De Guzman,
Evangeline Relox, Maricel Rayo, Brigida Rayo, Gina Decena, Nenita Policarpio, Myrna
Crisostomo and Francisco Poserio, without first securing the required license or
authority from the Department of Labor and Employment thus deemed committed
in large scale and therefore amounting to economic sabotage. Eight more
Informations charged Daud, Hanelita, and appellant before the RTC with eight
counts of Estafa, committed separately upon eight private complainants, namely,
Marcelo I. De Guzman, Evangeline I. Relox, Marcelo E. Rayo, Brigada A. Rayo, Gina T.
Decena, Nenita F. Policarpio, Myrna S. Crisostomo and Francisco S. Poserio,
respectively.
Only Roderick was apprehended, while his co-accused Daud and Hanelita
eluded arrest and remained at large. The nine criminal cases against appellant
before the RTC were consolidated. When arraigned, Roderick pleaded not guilty to
all the charges against him. Thereafter, joint trial of the nine criminal cases ensued.
The prosecution offered as evidence the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) Certification stating that Green Pasture Worldwide Tour and
Consultancy, operated by Roderick and his co-accused, is not licensed to recruit
workers for overseas employment. Of all the private complainants, only De Guzman,
Decena, and Poserio testified against Gallem it. Evidence for the defense consisted
solely of appellants testimony.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision dated January 15, 2007
finding appellant guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Estafa on three (3)
counts. Considering that accused Angelita i. Daud and Hanelita m. Gallemit remain
at large for more than six (6) months since the issuance and delivery of the warrant
of arrest to the proper police or peace officer. Let an alias warrant of arrest be
issued against them. Following the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration by the
RTC, Roderick filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. All three complainants
positively identified appellant in court. The Court of Appeals affirmed Rodericks
conviction by the RTC
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting the Roderick of
Estafa despite the absence of the element of deceit.

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Ruling:
No, the trial court did not err in convicting Roderick of Estafa.
We likewise affirm the conviction of Roderick for three counts of estafa
committed against the private complainants, based on the very same evidence that
proved appellants criminal liability for illegal recruitment. It is settled that a person
may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under Republic Act
No. 8042, in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(a)of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused
defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and (b) that
damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended
party or third person. Appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of estafa
because the element of deceit is lacking. He insists on the absence of proof that he
made any false statement or fraudulent representation to private complainants.
Private complainants were able to establish, through their positive and credible
testimonies, that appellant acted in conspiracy with his co-accused to mislead
private complainants into believing that appellant and his co-accused, for a fee, can
deploy private complainants abroad for employment.
Appellant also argues that the second element of estafa, which is prejudice or
pecuniary loss, was not established during trial as the prosecution was unable to
present any receipt signed by Roderick proving that he received money from private
complainants. We reiterate that when conspiracy has been established, the act of
one conspirator is the act of all. Again, there is no cogent reason for us to disturb
the finding of the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that both elements of
estafa are present in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0123, 03-0127, and 03-0130. Thus, we
sustain appellants conviction for estafa, punishable under Article 315, paragraph
2(a), of the Revised Penal Code. It is not the issuance or signing of receipts for the
placement fees that makes a case for illegal recruitment, but rather the undertaking
of recruitment activities without the necessary license or authority. The absence of
receipts to evidence payment is not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions cause. A
person charged with the illegal recruitment may be convicted on the strength of the
testimony of the complainants, if found to be credible and convincing.
MA. ANA CONSUELO A.S. MADRIGAL vs. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
UNDERSECRETARY MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, CELESTINO M. PALMA
III, and HELEN T. CHUA
G.R. No. 168903, June 18, 2014, C.J. Sereno
As regards the first element, the Court finds that there was neither abuse of
confidence nor deceit in this case. On the charge of abuse of confidence, [the Court
again finds] that there is no evidence that could possibly lead to a conclusion that
respondents committed abuse of confidence in dealing with Madrigal. First, a
perusal of the evidence reveals that Madrigal did not sign a blank document nor
was she deceived by respondents regarding the terms of the CSA. On its face, the
CSA was a standard preprinted form. A plain reading thereof shows that the
signatory guarantees the punctual payment of indebtedness that may have been

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due or owed by the borrower. Madrigal ought to have read the terms of the CSA
before she signed it.
Second, considering the accountability of the signatory upon signing the CSA,
Madrigal must have observed prudence in order to protect her interests. Hence, she
should have personally indicated her own terms in the CSA whether she was signing
as a representative, a surety, or a witness. It is unlikely that FEBTC officers would
make it appear that she was personally liable as surety of a loan without her
knowledge and authority. Madrigal failed to overcome the presumption in favor of
respondents that the ordinary course of business has been followed.
Facts:
Petitioner Madrigal is the President of Madrigal Transport, Inc. (MTI) while
Respondents Palma III is the Vice-President of Far East Bank and Trust Company
(FEBTC), and Chua is an account officer of FEBTC. Madrigal filed a complaintaffidavit charging Palma with the crime of estafa under pars. 1(c), 2(a), 3(a) and
3(c) of Art. 315 of the RPC. Later on, Chua was named as additional respondent.
In 1997, MTI obtained and was granted a loan in the amount of $10 million
from FEBTC for the acquisition of the feeder vessel M/V Alicia (formerly the M.V.
Artemission). According to Madrigal, as president of MTI, she applied for a loan from
FEBTC in the amount of USD 10.5 million to finance the acquisition of a feeder
vessel, pursuant to a joint venture agreement between MTI and the another
corporation. FEBTC sent her various documents, and she signed the documents
without the material entries and sent them back to FEBTC. However, Madrigal was
advised by Palma that FEBTC could only grant MTI a loan in the amount of $10
million because of a lower valuation of the vessel M/V Alicia. Thus, she reapplied for
a loan for this reduced amount and signed a second set of loan documents,
guaranteeing the USD 10 million loan.
Madrigal then noticed that Respondent Palma was imposing upon MTI
additional obligations not originally contemplated and requested from FEBTC copies
of the documents to be signed in relation to the $10 million loan. Palma insisted that
petitioner was personally liable under the first agreement covering the $10.5 million
loan and compelled Madrigal to disburse from her personal funds the total amount
of PhP5,903,172.30, which was paid to FEBTC, to protect her reputation.
On the other hand, Palma averred that MTI had applied for a loan from FEBTC
in the amount of USD 11 million to finance the purchase of a vessel named M/V
Artemission (now the M/V Alicia) and contends that FEBTC considered the
immediate release of the proceeds of the loan, as accommodation to Madrigal,
provided that the latter, together with Luis P. Lorenzo, Jr. (the president of other
corporation), would execute personal undertakings as sureties for the loan of the
MTI to which Lorenzo acceded to do. Palma finally claimed that Madrigals institution
of the criminal complaint was merely a ploy resorted to question the due execution
of the Comprehen-sive Surety Agreement to evade her personal liability for MTIs
loan.

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After the initial finding of probable cause, the crime of estafa under Art. 315
1(c) was filed against Palma and Chua with the RTC. Palma and Chua filed a motion
to suspend the proceedings in view of the appeal before the DOJ which the RTC
granted. DOJ Secretary upheld the finding of the probable cause with the
modification that the charge against respondents should be for estafa under par.
3(c), Art. 315 of the RPC. Undersecretary Merceditas Gutierrez (Usec. Gutierrez)
reversed and set aside the Resolution after a motion for reconsideration by Palma
and Chua. Magdrigal filed a motion for reconsideration which was subsequently
denied by DOJ.
Madrigal then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging that the DOJ
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
setting aside the resolution finding probable cause against Palma and Chua. The CA
dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed resolutions of the DOJ.
The CA ruled that there was no probable cause to warrant the filing of the
Information for estafa under par. 1(c), Art. 315 against respondents. It found that
the indispensable element in the crime of estafa under par. 1(c) that the paper
with the signature of the offended party must be blank was lacking. That an
experienced businesswoman would thoughtlessly affix her signature to a blank
document was considered incredible by the appellate court. It likewise found to be
devoid of merit the assertion of petitioner that she did not sign the Comprehensive
Surety Agreement in her personal capacity, and that the agreement referred to an
abandoned loan application. Hence, the present action.
Issue:
Whether or not there is probable cause to charge Palma and Chua of the
crime of estafa.
Ruling:
No, there is no probable cause.
The elements of estafa in general are: 1) That the accused defrauded
another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and 2) That damage
or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third
person.
The first element covers the following ways of committing estafa: 1) with
unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence; 2) by means of false pretenses or fraudulent
acts; or 3) through fraudulent means.
The first way of committing estafa is known as estafa with abuse of
confidence, while the second and the third ways cover estafa by means of deceit.
[The Court] finds that the present case does not constitute estafa in either form.
As regards the first element, the Court finds that there was neither abuse of
confidence nor deceit in this case. On the charge of abuse of confidence, the Court
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again finds that there is no evidence that could possibly lead to a conclusion that
respondents committed abuse of confidence in dealing with Madrigal. First, a
perusal of the evidence reveals that Madrigal did not sign a blank document nor
was she deceived by respondents regarding the terms of the CSA. On its face, the
CSA was a standard preprinted form. A plain reading thereof shows that the
signatory guarantees the punctual payment of indebtedness that may have been
due or owed by the borrower. Madrigal ought to have read the terms of the CSA
before she signed it.
Second, considering the accountability of the signatory upon signing the CSA,
Madrigal must have observed prudence in order to protect her interests. Hence, she
should have personally indicated her own terms in the CSA whether she was signing
as a representative, a surety, or a witness. It is unlikely that FEBTC officers would
make it appear that she was personally liable as surety of a loan without her
knowledge and authority. [Madrigal] failed to overcome the presump-tion in favor of
respondents that the ordinary course of business has been followed.
On the contrary, considering further that the loan of $10 million was
approved and released to Madrigal prior to the execution of the second set of
documents, it is more sensible to believe that given her financial status and
capability to recompense the loan the bank approved the loan upon her personal
guarantee and execution of the first CSA.
Any intent to deceive through concealment was also negated when the FEBTC
officers, herein respondents, willingly presented the documents pertaining to the
loan upon the request of petitioner. In fact, a communication letter she had sent the
bank reveals that she knew all along and acknowledged the obligation that she,
together with Luis P. Lorenzo of Lapanday Holdings Corp., had acted as a surety of
MTIs loan.
The existence of two (2) documents is irrelevant in this case as the original
intention of the parties is evident that Madrigal and Luis P. Lorenzo, in their
personal capacities are co-sureties of MTIs loan. It would therefore be absurd to
conclude that Madrigal signed the CSA in her capacity as President of MTI
considering that the principle behind surety ship will be negated. Otherwise stated,
the borrower cannot at the same time be a guarantor/surety to assure the
fulfillment of its own loan application. Moreover, the CSA is a continuing guarantee
that Madrigal, upon executing the said document, bound herself to the contract
until the full and due payment and performance of all the obligations of the
borrower. Undisputedly, there was only one loan transaction, and FEBTC does not
intend to collect from both loan documents. Thus, [the Court finds] no abuse of
confidence or deceit committed by respondents in the foregoing circumstances.
SOLEDAD TRIA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 204755, September 17, 2014, J. Reyes
Tria received pieces of jewelry from Seven Sphere for her to sell on the
condition that she will deliver the proceeds and to return if unsold. Half of the
jewelries were returned, but [she] failed to pay the remaining value. She argued
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that the element of fraud is missing since she returned the jewelry. The Court held
that all elements of estafa through misappropriation or conversion are present.
Trias argument implies an admission of her receipt of the jewelry items and her
failure to account for all of them. The words convert and misappropriate
connote the act of using or disposing of anothers property as if it were ones own,
or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon.
Facts:
Accused Soledad is charged for allegedly defrauding Seven Sphere
Enterprises by misappro-priating and converting to own use the assorted jewelry
worth PhP23,375.50 received from Seven Sphere for her to sell and to deliver the
proceeds or to return if unsold.
Soledad received from Seven Sphere 22 pieces of jewelry valued at
P47,440.00 subject to the condition that she will remit the proceeds of the sale and
return any unsold pieces within six days. She returned 8 unsold pieces of the
jewelry valued at P16,380.00 leaving a balance of P31,060.00. Thereafter, Soledad
issued four Banco Filipino post-dated checks all with the equal face value of
PhP7,765.00. The checks were dishonored for the reason: account closed. Upon
being informed that the checks were dishonored, Soledad returned three pieces of
jewelry valued at P7,684.50, thus leaving the unpaid balance of PhP23,375.50.
Seven Sphere then sent a demand letter to Soledad for the payment of the unpaid
balance. She failed to pay.
After being formally charged in court, Soledad asserted that the element of
fraud in estafa is absent in view of Meneses admission that she returned the unsold
pieces of jewelry and remitted part of the sale proceeds. During the pendency of the
case, she claimed she has been paying her balance upon Seven Spheres
declaration that she will be eventually absolved from liability once she settles the
full amount. She averred that if it was her intention to defraud, then she could have
evaded paying the balance or even denied receipt of the jewelry entrusted to her.
She also claimed she failed to account for the jewelries because they were, in truth
and in fact, sold on credit, to different customers, who, however, failed and/or
refused to return the jewelries or pay the value thereof.:
Both trial court and appellate court found her guilty of estafa under Art. 315
(1)(b) of the RPC.
Issue:
Whether or not all the elements of estafa are present.
Ruling:
Yes, all the elements are present and thus, the Court found Soledad guilty of
estafa.

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Estafa through misappropriation or conversion is defined and penalized under
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC:
Any person who shall defraud another: 1. With unfaithfulness or
abuse of confidence, namely: (b) By misappropriating or
converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even
though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a
bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property.
The elements of estafa under this provision are: (1) that the money, good or
other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of,
or to return, the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such
money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that
such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4)
that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.
The first, third and fourth elements are immediately discernible from the
Receipt of Goods on Consignment shows that Soledad received pieces of jewelry
on consignment from Seven Sphere. This was corroborated by the testimony of
Gertrudes Meneses, the cash custodian, who signed the document in behalf of the
consignor at the time of its execution. She identified Soledads signature on the
document and confirmed the contents of the agreement as being a consignment
contract, as well as the Soledads consequent duties thereunder to remit sale
proceeds or return the unsold pieces of jewelry.
As to the second element, the words convert and misappropriate connote
the act of using or disposing of anothers property as if it were ones own, or of
devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. In proving the
element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption of misappropriation
arises when the [Tria] fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return the items
to be sold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts.
Meneses testimony that Seven Sphere was prejudiced in the amount of
PhP23,370.00 after the Soledad failed to return the remaining 11 pieces of jewelry
was unrebutted. Soledads assertion that she returned 11 pieces bolsters rather
than weakens the case for the prosecution, as it implies an admission of her receipt
of 22 jewelry items from Seven Sphere and her failure to account for all of them.
Soledad bound herself to return all of them if unsold. She breached her legal duty
under the consignment contract.
The Court did not give credence to her claim that her failure to account for
the jewelry was because she sold the same on credit. Such act directly contravenes
the explicit terms of the authority granted to her because the consignment
transaction with Seven Sphere prohibited her from selling the jewelry on credit.
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Misappropriation and conversion is again palpable from these circumstances. By
selling the jewelry on credit, Soledad used the property for a purpose other than
that agreed upon.
NENITA CARGANILLO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 182424, September 22, 2014, J. Brion
The offense of estafa committed with abuse of confidence requires that
money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty
to make delivery of or to return the same; that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such
receipt that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and that there is demand by the offended party to the offender.
Facts:
On September 23, 1998, Teresita Lazaro, a rice trader in Rizal, Nueva Ecija,
gave the Nenita Carganillo the amount of P132,000.00 for the purpose of buying
palay. According to the Kasunduan signed by them. The parties agreed that for
every kilo of palay bought, Nenita shall earn a commission of twenty centavos. But
if no palay is purchased and delivered on November 28, Nenita must return the
P132,000.00 to Teresita within one week after November 28.
After failing to receive any palay or the P132,000.00 on November 28 and
one week thereafter, Teresita made oral and written demands to the Nenita for the
return of the P132,000.00 but her demands were simply ignored. She thus filed an
affidavit-complaint for estafa against Nenita before the Fiscals Office.
Issue:
Whether or not Nenita should be convicted for the offense charged, despite
the prosecutions failure to prove her guilt of the crime of estafa beyond reasonable
doubt.
Ruling:
Yes, she should be.
Under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
the offense of estafa committed with abuse of confidence requires that money,
goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty
to make delivery of or to return the same; that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such
receipt that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and that there is demand by the offended party to the offender.
It was found that all the elements of estafa are present in this case: that the
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petitioner received in trust the amount of P132,000.00 from Teresita for the purpose
of buying palay and misappropriated it when she failed to return the said amount to
Teresita upon demand. As the CA and the RTC did, the Court finds worthy of credit
and belief the Kasunduan presented in evidence by the prosecution that was
admittedly signed by the petitioner and which contained the terms of agreement
between her and Teresita. This document clearly stated that the petitioner received
in trust the amount of P132,000.00 from Teresita for the purpose of buying palay
with the corresponding obligations to (1) deliver the palay to the Lazaro Palay
Buying Station on or before November 28, 1998, and (2) return the P132,000.00 to
Teresita one week after November 28 in the event that the petitioner failed to make
palay purchases
LEONORA B. RIMANDO vs. SPOUSES WINSTON and ELENITA ALDABA and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 203583, October 13, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
While a BP Blg. 22 case and an estafa case may be rooted from an identical
set of facts, they nevertheless present different causes of action, which, under the
law, are considered separate, distinct, and independent from each other.
Therefore, both cases can proceed to their final adjudication both as to their
criminal and civil aspects subject to the prohibition on double recovery. Perforce, a
ruling in a BP Blg. 22 case concerning the criminal and civil liabilities of the accused
cannot be given any bearing whatsoever in the criminal and civil aspects of a
related estafa case. Clearly, the simultaneous filing of BP Blg. 22 and estafa cases
do not amount to double jeopardy.
As such, an acquittal and subsequent exoneration in the BP Blg. 22 cases had
no effect in the estafa case, even if both cases were founded on the same factual
circumstances. There being no deceit employed to induce another for the
investment of money, the civil liability did not arise from any purported act
constituting the crime of estafa. Verily, the case at bar involves a liability traceable
from being an accommodation party. Thus, not being based upon the crime she is
charged with, the lower court correctly upheld the same despite her acquittal in the
estafa case.
Facts:
Accused-appellant Rimando has been charged of the crime of estafa through
the use of false manifestations and fraudulent representations. Allegedly, she
enticed Sps. Aldaba to invest in her business under the assurance that it is stable
and that their money would earn 8% monthly interest. Convinced by Rimandos
proposal and taking into consideration their long friendship, Sps. Aldaba gave her a
check in the amount of PhP500,000.00 as investment in her business. In turn, she
gave Sps. Aldaba three (3) post-dated checks, one for PhP500,000.00 and the other
two (2) for P40,000.00 each, and made them sign an investment contract with
Multitel International Holding Corporation (Multitel). Upon maturity of the checks,
Sps. Aldaba attempted to encash the same but were dishonored for being drawn
against insufficient funds. This prompted Sps. Aldaba to demand Rimando to make

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good the said checks, but to no avail. Hence, they were constrained to file a criminal
complaint for estafa against her.
In her defense, Rimando denied her friendship with Sps. Aldaba and that she
enticed them to invest in her own business, as she had none. According to her, she
only referred them to Multitel Investment Manager Jaimelyn Cayaban who handled
their investment. She also maintained that she only issued the three (3) post-dated
checks to accommodate them while waiting for the check from Multitel, but when
the latter issued the check, Sps. Aldaba refused to accept it so she can be held
liable in case their investment fails.
Meanwhile, Sps. Aldaba also filed a criminal case against Rimando for
violation of BP Blg. 22 before the MeTC of Manila. In July 2010, she was acquitted in
the BP Blg. 22 cases on the ground of reasonable doubt, with a declaration that the
act or omission from which liability may arise does not exist.
Eventually, the RTC acquitted her of the crime of estafa, but found her civilly
liable to Sps. Aldaba in the amount of PhP500,000.00. It found the absence of the
element of deceit as Sps. Aldaba were fully aware that they would be investing their
money in Multitel and not in Rimandos purported business. Nevertheless, the RTC
ruled that as an accommodation party to one of the checks she issued to Sps.
Aldaba on behalf of Multitel, Rimando should be held liable to Sps. Aldaba for the
corresponding amount of PhP500,000.00. On appeal to the CA, she contended in her
Appellants Brief that her acquittal and exoneration from the civil liability in the BP
Blg. 22 cases should have barred Sps. Aldaba from claiming civil liability from her in
the estafa case. Subsequently, the CA affirmed the RTC Ruling. It held that a
prosecution for violation of BP Blg. 22 is distinct, separate, and independent from a
prosecution for estafa, albeit they may both involve the same parties and
transaction. As such, Rimandos acquittal and subsequent exoneration from civil
liability in the BP Blg. 22 cases does not automatically absolve her from civil liability
in the estafa case.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Rimandos civil liability in the estafa
case despite her acquittal and exoneration from civil liability in the BP Blg. 22 cases.
Ruling:
It is well-settled that the acquittal of the accused does not automatically
preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of
the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a)
the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c)
the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime
of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be
deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal
action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist
or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
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In this case, Rimandos civil liability did not arise from any purported act
constituting the crime of estafa as the RTC clearly found that Rimando never
employed any deceit on Sps. Aldaba to induce them to invest money in Multitel.
Rather, her civil liability was correctly traced from being an accommodation party to
one of the checks she issued to Sps. Aldaba on behalf of Multitel. In lending her
name to Multitel, she, in effect, acted as a surety to the latter, and as such, she may
be held directly liable for the value of the issued check. Verily, Rimandos civil
liability to Sps. Aldaba in the amount of PhP500,000.00 does not arise from or is not
based upon the crime she is charged with, and hence, the CA correctly upheld the
same despite her acquittal in the estafa case. In this relation, the CA is also correct
in holding that Rimandos acquittal and subsequent exoneration in the BP Blg. 22
cases had no effect in the estafa case, even if both cases were founded on the same
factual circumstances. In Nierras vs. Judge Dacuycuy, the Court laid down the
fundamental differences between BP Blg. 22 and estafa, to wit:
What petitioner failed to mention in his argument is the fact that
deceit and damage are essential elements in [Art. 315 (2-d) of the
RPC], but are not required in [BP Blg. 22]. Under the latter law,
mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the
presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued
the same without sufficient funds and hence punishable which is
not so under the Penal Code. Other differences between the two
also include the following: (1) a drawer of a dishonored check may
be convicted under BP Blg. 22 even if he had issued the same for a
pre-existing obligation, while under [Art. 315 (2-d) of the RPC],
such circumstance negates criminal liability; (2) specific and
different penalties are imposed in each of the two offenses; (3)
estafa is essentially a crime against property, while violation of BP
Blg. 22 is principally a crime against public interest as it does injury
to the entire banking system; (4) violations of [Art. 315 of the RPC]
are mala in se, while those of BP Blg. 22 are mala prohibita.
Owing to such differences, jurisprudence in People vs. Reyes even instructs
that the simultaneous filing of BP 22 and estafa cases do not amount to double
jeopardy.
Essentially, while a BP Blg. 22 case and an estafa case may be rooted from an
identical set of facts, they nevertheless present different causes of action, which,
under the law, are considered separate, distinct, and independent from each
other. Therefore, both cases can proceed to their final adjudication both as to their
criminal and civil aspects subject to the prohibition on double recovery. Perforce, a
ruling in a BP 22 case concerning the criminal and civil liabilities of the accused
cannot be given any bearing whatsoever in the criminal and civil aspects of a
related estafa case, as in this instance.
MARGIE BALERTA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 205144, November 26, 2014, J. Reyes

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Here, Balerta held the funds in behalf of BABMPC. Over the funds, she had
mere physical or material possession, but she held no independent right or title,
which she can set up against BABMPC. Balerta was nothing more than a mere cash
custodian, thus one of the elements of estafa by misappropriation - the juridical
possession of the funds - is not proven. In addition, the testimony of the BABMPCs
manager, without corroborating evidence, does not prove misappropriation on
Balertas part.
When the accused in an estafa case is acquitted due to reasonable doubt as
to her criminal liability, civil liability may still be proven by preponderance of
evidence. Timonera made references to the alleged falsifications and
misappropriations committed by Balerta. However, he denied specific knowledge of
where exactly the falsifications and misappropriations were shown and recorded.
This, plus the fact that the prosecution made no formal offer of documentary
evidence, leaves the Court in the dark as to how Balerta's civil liability, if any, shall
be determined.
Facts:
Petitioner Balerta, cashier of Balasan Associated Barangays Multi-Purpose
Cooperative (BABMPC) was charged before the RTC of estafa. The prosecution
presented as its sole evidence, the testimony of BABMPCs General Manager,
Napoleon Timonera. Timonera testified, among others that Balerta stopped
reporting for work after BABMPC discovered discrepancies and fraud in her records.
Upon audit, BABMPC found that there was a discrepancy of some PhP185,000.00,
PhP90,000.00 of which in the passbook, while the rest of the amount related to the
records of the cooperative kept by Balerta. When asked by the Balertas counsel
about where exactly was the discrepancy shown in the copy of the banks ledger
and pages of a passbook, which were part of BABMPCs records, Timonera answered
that he is not an accountant and BABMPCs Internal Auditor Ambros knew more
about the matter.
Balerta, in her defense, testified that Timonera was ill-motivated when he
initiated the filing of the criminal complaint against her. Timonera intended to evade
his financial liabilities from BABMPC relative to his cash advances and the money
which he had diverted to other projects in violation of the rules of the cooperative.
Balerta also suspected that Timonera must have speculated that the former had
money as she then had plans to go abroad.
The RTC convicted Balerta as she failed to prove and explain to the Court the
exact figure or amount of money she is accountable of. She failed to cause an audit
of her own to show that no shortage was incurred by her. Her testimony was not
corroborated by any witness or other documentary evidence. The CA affirmed the
RTC, holding that all the elements of estafa were proven.
Issue:
Whether or not the elements of estafa are not proved?

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Ruling:
Yes, the elements of estafa were not proven.
Balerta had no juridical possession over the allegedly misappropriated funds.
Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the
thing which the trans-feree may set up even against the owner.
In Guzman v. [CA], a travelling sales agent misappropriated or failed to return
to his principal the proceeds of things or goods he was commissioned or authorized
to sell. He was, however, found liable for estafa. In this case the Court explained the
distinction between possession of a bank teller and an agent for purposes of
determining criminal liability: There is an essential distinction between the
possession by a receiving teller of funds received from third persons paid to the
bank, and an agent who receives the proceeds of sales of merchandise delivered to
him in agency by his principal. In the former case, payment by third persons to the
teller is payment to the bank itself; the teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the
funds received, and has no independent right or title to retain or possess the same
as against the bank. An agent, on the other hand, can even assert, as against his
own principal, an independent, autonomous, right to retain money or goods
received inconsequence of the agency; as when the principal fails to reimburse him
for advances he has made, and indemnify him for damages suffered without his
fault.
In the case at bench, there is no question that Balerta was handling the funds
lent by Care Philippines to BABMPC. However, she held the funds in behalf of
BABMPC. Over the funds, she had mere physical or material possession, but she
held no independent right or title, which she can set up against BABMPC. Balerta
was nothing more than a mere cash custodian. Hence, the Court finds that juridical
possession of the funds as an element of the crime of estafa by misappropriation is
absent in the instant case.
In the prosecution of the crime of estafa, demand need not be formal if there
exists evidence of misappropriation. However, in the instant case, conclusive proofs
of both misappropriation and demand are wanting.
While this Court does not find Timoneras testimony as incredible, by itself
alone, it is insufficient to discharge the burden of proof required for conviction in
criminal cases. Balerta was indicted for allegedly misappropriating the amount of
PhP185,584.06. However, Timonera failed to state with certainty where in the
records held by Balerta were the discrepancies shown. Timonera evaded answering
the question by emphasizing that he is not an accountant and that Ambros knew
more about the matter. Note too that Timonera admitted it was Balerta and De Asis
who were the two authorized signatories relative to the funds lent to BABMPC by
Care Philippines. Hence, Balerta did not have sole access over the records and
funds. Consequently, the authorship of the falsified entries in the passbook cannot
be attributed with certainty to Balerta alone. It was thus fatal for the prosecutions
cause that Ambros, De Asis, Mombay and the bank personnel did not take the

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witness stand especially since documentary evidence were never formally offered
as well.
The RTC and the CA faulted Balerta for not offering countervailing evidence,
including an audit conducted in her own behalf. Still, it does not justify a conviction
to be handed on that ground because the courts cannot magnify the weakness of
the defense and overlook the prosecutions failure to discharge the onus probandi.
In the case at bar the paltry evidence for the prosecution, consisting merely
of Timoneras testimony, casts doubts anent the guilt of Balerta, and does not
amply rebut her right to be pre-sumed innocent of the crime charged.
MARIA LINA S. VELAYO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 204025, November 26, 2014, J. Reyes
The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under Art.
315(1)(b) of the [RPC] are: (1) that personal property is received in trust, on
commission, for administration or under any other circumstance involving the duty
to make delivery of or to return the same, even though the obligation is guaranteed
by a bond; (2) that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person
who has so received it or a denial on his part that he received it; (3) that such
conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another; and (4) that there be
demand for the return of the property.
Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right
over the thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner.
In this case, it was Velayo alone who transacted with WJA and AIMS in behalf
of ARDC. It was to her that all the above checks were handed in payment for the
lots, and she alone opened a deposit account with UCPB, although in the name of
ARDC, where she deposited all the check payments she received from WJA. Then,
only her signature is in the UCPB signature cards, and thus she alone was the sole
authorized signatory for the said account. There is then no doubt that Velayo had
sole possession and control of the missing funds intended for payment of the
capital gains and documentary stamps taxes. Velayo did not receive the missing
funds in behalf of ARDC, but received it for herself, through her own
representations. WJA had no obligation to pay to ARDC the withholding tax; its
obligation was to pay the same to the BIR itself. It was only due to Velayos own
representations that she was able to get hold of the money.
Facts:
On March 29, 2001 in Pasay City, Petitioner Velayo, defrauded and deceived
WJA Holdings, Inc. herein represented by its President, Jayne Abuid. Velayo, being
then the President of Alorasan Realty Development Corporation entered into in its
behalf a contract to purchase two parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 142675 and
122230 for PhP20 million and PhP40 million respectively with WJA Holdings, Inc.,
with the understanding that the applicable withholding tax which WJA Holdings, Inc.
was supposed to withhold and remit to the BIR re: the PhP40 million purchase price
in the amount of PhP3 million representing the 7.5% withholding tax will not be
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deducted hence the total amount of PhP40 million was received by the accused
under the obligation of effecting the registration and transfer of the title in the
name of WJA and further accused received from the WJA the amount of
PhP346,670.00 representing documentary stamp tax for such transfer and the
accused once in possession of the said aggregate amount of PhP3,346,670.00,
which amount accused misapplied, misappropriated and converted to her own
personal use and benefit, and despite repeated demand made upon her, accused
failed to comply, to the damage and prejudice of said complainant in the aforesaid
amount of PhP3,346,670.00.
RTC convicted Velayo of estafa. It found that Velayo actually received the
total purchase price of PhP60 Million, including the PhP3 Million for the withholding
taxes on TCT No. 122230. It noted in particular that notwithstanding the express
provision in the parties Contract to Sell that WJA would remit the said taxes, Velayo
volunteered to do the errand herself for WJA and convinced them not to deduct the
taxes from the gross price. However, Velayo failed to remit to the BIR the PhP3
Million in taxes, as well as PhP429,617.00 in DST due on TCT No. 122230.
On appeal to CA, it affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC, having
determined that all the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are present: a)
that money, goods or other personal property was received by Velayo in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty
to make delivery of, or to return the same; b) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by Velayo; or denial on her part of such
receipt; and c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice
of WJA.
Velayo maintains that an essential element of the crime of estafa is absent,
since it is not shown that personal property was held by her in trust, on commission,
for administration or under any other circumstance, for WJA.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Velayo had no obligation to withhold taxes on behalf of
the buyer WJA and thus did not receive the subject funds in a manner that
would make her liable for the crime of estafa.
2. Whether or not Velayo did not have juridical possession over the subject
funds and could not therefore be held liable for the crime of estafa.
Ruling:
1. NO, Velayo is liable for the missing funds.
Velayo had sole possession and control of the missing funds intended for
payment of the capital gains and documentary stamps taxes.
It has been sufficiently established through the testimonies of Sayson, Abuid,
Paderanga and Pabilonia, as well as through the returned checks and the
acknowledgment receipts signed by Velayo herself, that Abuid gave to Velayo the
entire purchase price for the subject properties, inclusive of the missing funds
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intended for the withholding taxes on TCT No. 122230. Against Velayos bare denial
that she received the said funds, the checks and acknowledgment receipts
presented in evidence by the prosecution incontrovertibly show that she received
the entire PhP60 Million. WJA likewise issued a UCPB managers check for the
payment of DST for the two properties in the amount of PhP775,895.00.
Moreover, it was Velayo alone who transacted with WJA and AIMS in behalf of
ARDC. It was to her that all the above checks were handed in payment for the lots,
and she alone opened a deposit account with UCPB, although in the name of ARDC,
where she deposited all the check payments she received from WJA. Then, only her
signature is in the UCPB signature cards, and thus she alone was the sole authorized
signatory for the said account. There is then no doubt that Velayo had sole
possession and control of the missing funds intended for payment of the capital
gains and DSTs.
2. NO, Velayo has juridical possession over the subject funds and could
therefore be held liable for the crime of estafa.
That Velayo also had juridical possession of the said amount will become
readily apparent as the Court comes to understand that it was her offer of help in
remitting the taxes to BIR which induced WJA to not withhold the now-missing
amounts but instead to entrust the same to her, upon the understanding that she
has to pay the same to BIR in its behalf. It was an obligation which Velayo assumed
personally and not on behalf of ARDC; ARDC itself did not have such a duty,
notwithstanding that the checks were deposited in ARDCs account. Indeed, Velayo
did not require a prior authority from ARDC to volunteer for the aforesaid task, and
WJA fully relied on Velayos assurance that she could withdraw and remit the funds
to the BIR, because all throughout the transaction she acted with full freedom and
discretion as regards the funds in the account of ARDC. Without a doubt, a trust
relationship was established between WJA and Velayo in her personal capacity, not
in behalf of or representing ARDC, over the funds she offered to remit to BIR.
First, Velayo is not a mere bank teller or bank employee with only a material
possession of the missing funds, she was a Director and Corporate Secretary of
ARDC, and she exercised sole and complete control over the funds of the
company; second, Velayo is not being sued by ARDC for misappropriating the
missing funds, but by WJA, who entrusted the same to her in her personal capacity
because of her assurance that she would remit the same to the BIR; third, in ChuaBurce, the money deposited was intended for the depository bank, which acquired
juridical possession, even ownership, thereof, whereas here, although the checks for
the withholding taxes were deposited in the account of ARDC, Velayo and WJA were
fully aware that Velayo not only had sole material possession, but the missing funds
were personally entrusted to her, not to ARDC. ARDC had no obligation to receive,
keep or remit them in behalf of WJA, only Velayo.
As the CA noted, the clear intention of the parties was for Velayo herself, not
ARDC, to exercise juridical possession over the missing funds. Stated otherwise,
Velayo did not receive the same in behalf of ARDC, but received it for herself,
through her own representations. WJA had no obligation to pay to ARDC the
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withholding tax; its obligation was to pay the same to the BIR itself. It was only due
to Velayos own representations that she was able to get hold of the money. Thus,
while in Chua-Burce, as in People v. Locson, money was received by the bank teller
in the ordinary course of duty in behalf of the bank, in the instant case ARDC had
nothing to do with the arrangement between Abuid and Velayo as to the remittance
of the withholding taxes to BIR. Through her own representation, Velayo was able to
get hold of the funds, then she absconded with it. She acted on her own without
sanction from ARDC, and she cannot now be allowed to escape criminal liability for
her breach of trust. True, she was ARDCs representative in the principal transaction,
but this does not shield her from criminal liability because it was her voluntary
unilateral act which caused injury to WJA.
To reiterate then, it is well-settled that when the money, goods, or any other
personal property is received by the offender from the offended party in trust or on
commission or for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical
possession and juridical possession of the thing received.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PALMY TIBAYAN AND RICO Z. PUERTO
G.R. Nos. 209655-60, January 14, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
The elements of syndicated estafa are: (a) estafa or other forms of swindling,
as defined in Arts. 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed; (b) the estafa or swindling
is committed by a syndi-cate of five (5) or more persons; and (c) defraudation
results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members
of rural banks, cooperative, samahang nayon(s), or farmers associations, or of
funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.
In this case, a judicious review of the records reveals TGICIs modus operandi
of inducing the public to invest in it on the undertaking that their investment would
be returned with a very high monthly interest rate ranging from three to five and a
half percent (3%-5.5%). Under such lucrative promise, the investing public are
enticed to infuse funds into TGICI. However, as the directors/incorporators of TGICI
knew from the start that TGICI is operating without any paid-up capital and has no
clear trade by which it can pay the assured profits to its investors, they cannot
comply with their guarantee and had to simply abscond with their investors money.
Thus, the CA correctly held that accused-appellants, along with the other accused
who are still at large, used TGICI to engage in a Ponzi scheme, resulting in the
defraudation of the TGICI investors.
Facts:
Tibayan Group Investment Company, Inc. (TGICI) is an open-end investment
company registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Sometime
in 2002, the SEC conducted an investigation on TGICI and its subsidiaries. In the
course thereof, it discovered that TGICI was selling securities to the public without a
registration statement in violation of R.A. No. 8799 or otherwise known as The
Securities Regulation Code and that TGICI submitted a fraudulent Treasurers
Affidavit before the SEC. Resultantly, SEC revoked TGICIs corporate registration for
being fraudulently procured.
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The foregoing led to the filing of multiple criminal cases for syndicated estafa
against the incorporators and directors of TGICI including herein accused-appellants,
who were then arres-ted thru lawful warrants of arrest, while the others remained at
large.
The prosecution was able to present several investors who were deceived by
the illicit schemes of TGICI. These investors after parting with their monies were
given by TGICI checks representing their respective ROI but the same bounced upon
presentment. Accused-appellants denied having conspired with the other TGICI
incorporators and interposed the defense that their signatures appearing on the
companys SEC documents were forged.
After due trial, the RTC rendered a judgment finding the accused-appellants only
liable for simple estafa. The CA, on appeal, held that there were sufficient evidenced
adduced showing that TGICI and its subsidiaries were engaged in a Ponzi scheme
which relied on subsequent investors to pay its earlier investors and is what PD
1689 precisely aims to punish. It further ruled that the accused-appellants should be
convicted for syndicated estafa.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellants are guilty of syndicated estafa.
Ruling:
YES, there are no cogent reasons propounded thru the instant appeal
warranting the acquittal of the accused-appellants.
Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the RPC provides:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by
any means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xxxx

xxxx

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts


executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business, or imaginary
transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
xxxx
xxxx
The elements of estafa by means of deceit under this provision are the
following: (a) that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to
his power, influence, quali-fications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the
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offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and
was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the
offended party suffered damage.41
In relation thereto, Sec. 1 of PD 1689 defines syndicated estafa as follows:
Sec. 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of
swindling as defined in Arts. 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling
(estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons
formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act,
transaction, enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the
misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of
rural banks, cooperatives, samahang nayon(s), or farmers
associations, or funds solicited by corporations/associations from the
general public.
Thus, the elements of syndicated estafa are: (a) estafa or other forms of
swindling, as defined in Arts. 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed; (b) the estafa
or swindling is committed by a syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and (c)
defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders,
or members of rural banks, cooperative, samahang nayon(s), or farmers
associations, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general
public.
In this case, a judicious review of the records reveals TGICIs modus operandi
of inducing the public to invest in it on the undertaking that their investment would
be returned with a very high monthly interest rate ranging from three to five and a
half percent (3%-5.5%). Under such lucrative promise, the investing public are
enticed to infuse funds into TGICI. However, as the directors/incorporators of TGICI
knew from the start that TGICI is operating without any paid-up capital and has no
clear trade by which it can pay the assured profits to its investors, they cannot
comply with their guarantee and had to simply abscond with their investors money.
Thus, the CA correctly held that accused-appellants, along with the other accused
who are still at large, used TGICI to engage in a Ponzi scheme, resulting in the
defrau-dation of the TGICI investors.
To be sure, a Ponzi scheme is a type of investment fraud that involves the
payment of purported returns to existing investors from funds contributed by new
investors. Its organizers often solicit new investors by promising to invest funds in
opportunities claimed to generate high returns with little or no risk. In many Ponzi
schemes, the perpetrators focus on attracting new money to make promised
payments to earlier-stage investors to create the false appea-rance that investors
are profiting from a legitimate business. It is not an investment strategy but a
gullibility scheme, which works only as long as there is an ever increasing number
of new investors joining the scheme.46 It is difficult to sustain the scheme over a
long period of time because the operator needs an ever larger pool of later
investors to continue paying the promised profits to early investors. The idea behind
this type of swindle is that the con-man collects his money from his second or
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third round of investors and then absconds before anyone else shows up to collect.
Necessarily, Ponzi schemes only last weeks, or months at the most.
In this light, it is clear that all the elements of syndicated estafa, committed
through a Ponzi scheme, are present in this case, considering that:
a) the incorporators/directors of TGICI comprising more than five (5) people,
including herein accused-appellants, made false pretenses and
representations to the investing public -in this case, the private
complainants -regarding a supposed lucrative investment opportunity
with TGICI in order to solicit money from them;
b) the said false pretenses and representations were made prior to or
simultaneous with the commission of fraud;
c) relying on the same, private complainants invested their hard earned
money into TGICI; and
d) the incorporators/directors of TGICI ended up running away with the
private complainants' investments, obviously to the latter's prejudice.
Corollary thereto, the CA correctly upgraded accused-appellants'
conviction from simple estafa to syndic-cated estafa. In a criminal case,
an appeal throws the whole case wide open for review. Issues whether
raised or not by the parties may be resolved by the appellate court.
Hence, accused-appellants' appeal conferred upon the appellate court full
jurisdiction and rendered it competent to examine the records, revise the
judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper
provision of the penal law.
CHERRY ANN M. BENABAYE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 203466, February 25, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
The elements of estafa under this Art. 315 of RPC are: (a) the offender's
receipt of money, goods, or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or
for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to
return, the same; (b) misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money
or property received, or denial of receipt of the money or property; (c) the
misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d)
demand by the offended party that the offender return the money or property
received.
It bears to stress that a sum of money received by an employee on behalf of
an employer is considered to be only in the material possession of the employee.
The material possession of an employee is adjunct, by reason of his employment, to
a recognition of the juridical possession of the employer.
In this case, Benabaye maintains that the first element of estafa through
misappropriation has not been established, insisting that her possession of the
collected loan payments was merely material and not juridical; therefore, she
cannot be convicted of the said crime. The Court agrees. Records show that
Benabaye was merely a collector of loan payments from Siam Bank's clients. At the
end of every banking day, she was required to remit all cash payments received
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together with the corresponding cash transfer slips to her supervisor, Tupag. As
such, the money merely passes into her hands and she takes custody thereof only
for the duration of the banking day. Hence, as an employee of Siam Bank,
specifically, its temporary cash custodian whose tasks are akin to a bank teller, she
had no juridical possession over the missing funds but only their physical or
material possession.
Facts:
Petitioner Cherry Ann Benabaye (Benabaye) was the Loans Bookkeeper of
Siam Bank Inc., Iligan City Branch (Siam Bank). As such, she was authorized to
collect and/or accept loan payments of Siam Bank's clients and issue provisional
receipts therefor, accomplish a cash transfer slip at the end of each banking day
detailing the amounts of money that she has received, and remit such payments to
Jenkin U. Tupag (Tupag), her supervisor.
Sometime in 2001, Siam Bank conducted an audit investigation of its loan
transactions for the period December 1, 2000 to June 15, 2001, and thereby found
out that fraud and certain irregu-larities attended the same. Specifically, it
discovered the non-remittance of some loan payments received from its clients
based on the provisional receipts issued by its account officers, as well as the daily
collection reports corresponding to the said provisional receipts. Based on the audit,
853 provisional receipts in the aggregate amount of P470,768.00 were issued by
Benabaye but were unreported, and, more significantly, the corresponding
payments were unremitted based on the daily collection reports on file.
Siam Bank directed Benabaye to explain, among others, the discrepancies
between the provisional receipts she had issued and the unremitted money
involved. Likewise, Siam Bank made a final demand upon her to return the amount
of the money involved. In her written explanation, Benabaye claimed, among
others, that the discrepancies could be clarified by her supervisor, Tupag, to whom
she had submitted her daily cash transfer slips together with the corresponding
provi-sional receipts.
Meanwhile, Siam Bank also sent a memorandum to Tupag requiring him to
explain the same discrepancies between the provisional receipts and daily collection
reports that were submitted to him; it further demanded the return of the amount
involved. In his written explanation, Tupag admitted his accountability and, while
claiming that some of his co-employees were privy to the acts which resulted in the
discrepancies, he did not disclose their identities.
Apparently dissatisfied with their explanations, Siam Bank terminated the
employment of both Benabaye and Tupag and subsequently filed a criminal case
for estafa before the RTC of Iligan City against them. The RTC found both Benabaye
and Tupag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Art. 315, par. 1(b) as all
the elements of the crime charged have been established.
The CA affirmed Benabaye's conviction in toto, ruling that Benabaye,
together with Tupag, held the money collected in trust for Siam Bank. Likewise, the
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CA found that while there were 853 unremitted provisional receipts involved in this
case, Benabaye's continuing intention to commit estafa constituted a single
intention although committed on different dates. Thus, her crime was a
continuing offense as all the acts of misappropriation were part of a single
criminal design by the accused.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining Petitioner Benabaye's conviction
for the crime of estafa through misappropriation.
Ruling:
NO, the conviction must be reversed.
Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC, as amended, under which Benabaye was
charged and pro-secuted, states:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by
any means mentioned herein below shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000
pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the
latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the
penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be.
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxx (b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another,
money, goods or any other personal property received by the offender in
trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same,
even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond;
or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.
The elements of estafa under this provision are: (a) the offender's receipt of
money, goods, or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to
return, the same; (b) misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money
or property received, or denial of receipt of the money or property; (c) the
misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d)
demand by the offended party that the offender return the money or property
received.
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Under the first element, when the money, goods, or any other personal
property is received by the offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on
commission or (3) for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical
possession and juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical possession
means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing which the
transferee may set up even against the owner
It bears to stress that a sum of money received by an employee on behalf of
an employer is considered to be only in the material possession of the employee.
The material possession of an employee is adjunct, by reason of his employment, to
a recognition of the juridical possession of the employer. So long as the juridical
possession of the thing appropriated did not pass to the employee -perpetrator, the
offense committed remains to be theft, qualified or otherwise. Hence, the
conversion of personal property in the case of an employee having
mere material possession of the said property constitutes theft, whereas in the case
of an agent to whom both material and juridical possession have been transferred,
misappropriation of the same property constitutes estafa.
In this case, Benabaye maintains that the first element of estafa through
misappropriation has not been established, insisting that her possession of the
collected loan payments was merely material and not juridical; therefore, she
cannot be convicted of the said crime. The Court agrees.
Records show that Benabaye was merely a collector of loan payments from
Siam Bank's clients. At the end of every banking day, she was required to remit all
cash payments received together with the corresponding cash transfer slips to her
supervisor, Tupag. As such, the money merely passes into her hands and she takes
custody thereof only for the duration of the banking day. Hence, as an employee of
Siam Bank, specifically, its temporary cash custodian whose tasks are akin to a
bank teller, she had no juridical possession over the missing funds but only their
physical or material possession.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULIE GRACE K. VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 163662, February 25, 2015, J. Bersamin
The estafa charged in the information may be committed, therefore, when:
(1) the offender has post-dated or issued a check in payment of an obligation
contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or
issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the bank, or the funds
deposited are not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; (3) the payee has
been defrauded. The deceit here should be the efficient cause of the defraudation,
and should either be prior to, or simultaneously with, the act of the fraud.
All the elements of estafa were present in this case. The first element was
admitted by Villanueva, who confirmed that she had issued the checks to Madarang
in exchange for the jewelry she had purchased. There is no question that Madarang
accepted the checks upon the assurance of Villanueva that they would be funded
upon presentment. It is clear that Madarang would not have parted with and
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entrusted the pieces of valuable jewelry to Villanueva whom she barely knew unless
Villanueva gave such assurance to her. The second element was likewise
established because the checks were dishonored upon presentment due to
insufficiency of funds or because the account was already closed. The third element
was also proved by the showing that Madarang suffered prejudice by her failure to
collect from Villanueva the balance of PhP995,000.00.
Facts:
According to the prosecution, on August 1994, Loreto Madarang met Julie
Villanueva through a townmate and the latter was interested in buying jewelry.
Being then engaged in the business of selling jewelry, Madarang went to
Villanuevas residence at Galeria de Magallanes, and was able to sell to Villanueva
five sets of jewelry worth PhP1,010,000.00.Villanueva made out nine checks drawn
against PNB, eight of which were post-dated. Villanueva signed a receipt with a total
of PhP1,010,000. Madarang receive the checks because of Villanuevas assurance
that they would all be honored upon presentment. However, the drawee bank paid
only PNB Check No. 031501 and PNB Check No. 131531, the remaining seven
checks being dishonored either by reason of Account Closed or Drawn Against
Insufficient Funds. Madarang tried to call and see Villanueva at her residence to
inform her of the dishonored checks, but Madarang was barred by security guards
from reaching Villanueva and then resorted to demand letters, but efforts to contact
Villanueva proved futile. After Villanueva did not settle her obligations, Madarang
brought the criminal complaint for estafa and the corresponding Information
for estafa was ultimately filed in court.
Villanueva denied the accusation. She claimed that she met Madarang on
three times. The first was at the residence of a certain Cheng Diaz Davis, where
Madarang was selling jewelry. The second time was at her residence in Galeria de
Magallanes where Madarang arrived without prior notice at around 7:00 or 7:30 in
the evening. Madarang was persistent that Villanueva buy jewelry on credit, and
even assured Villanueva that she could replace the same if she was dissatisfied with
her purchase. Madarang prevailed on Villanueva to buy six pieces of jewelry, for
which she issued 6 checks as payment, five of which were post-dated. On August
16, 1994, Villanueva saw Madarang for the last time to have the jewelry replaced.
Villanueva retrieved the checks she had previously issued and replaced them with
another set of post-dated checks that were the subject of the criminal case against
her. Villanueva maintained that the second set of checks was issued as guarantee
under the agreement that they were not to be deposited until Villanueva advised
Madarang of the sufficiency of funds in her account. Villanueva insisted that she did
not received any notice from Madarang regarding the dishonor of the checks
RTC rendered its judgment finding Villanueva guilty as charged of the crime of
estafa as punished under Art. 315 par. 2(d) of the RPC in relation to PD No. 818. As
a consequence of this judgment, accused shall suffer the penalty of punishment for
a period of fourteen years eight months and one day to twenty years which is within
the range of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods.

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On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction but differed on the application of
the ISLAW, to wit: Nonetheless, the indeterminate penalty imposed by the trial
court, which is 14 years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years,
both of reclusion temporal, is erroneous.
Issue:
Whether or not Villanueva is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
estafa.
Ruling:
YES, Villanueva is guilty of the crime of estafa.
Art. 315, paragraph 2(d), of RPC provides:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa) Any person who shall defraud another by
any of the means mentioned herein below:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds
deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check.
The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to
cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank
and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack
or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit
constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
The estafa charged in the information may be committed, therefore, when:
(1) the offender has post-dated or issued a check in payment of an obligation
contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or
issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the bank, or the funds
deposited are not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; (3) the payee has
been defrauded. The deceit here should be the efficient cause of the defraudation,
and should either be prior to, or simultaneously with, the act of the fraud.
All the elements of estafa were present. The first element was admitted by
Villanueva, who confirmed that she had issued the checks to Madarang in exchange
for the jewelry she had purchased. There is no question that Madarang accepted the
checks upon the assurance of Villanueva that they would be funded upon
presentment. It is clear that Madarang would not have parted with and entrusted
the pieces of valuable jewelry to Villanueva whom she barely knew unless
Villanueva gave such assurance to her. The second element was likewise
established because the checks were dishonored upon presentment due to
insufficiency of funds or because the account was already closed. The third element

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was also proved by the showing that Madarang suffered prejudice by her failure to
collect from Villanueva the balance of PhP995,000.00.
In her defense, Villanueva adverts to an agreement with Madarang whereby
the latter would deposit or encash the checks only after being informed of the
sufficiency of funds in Villanuevas account. Villanueva posits that the receipt
Prosecution presented in evidence did not embody such agreement. Villanueva does
not impress. Her defense crumbles because she did not present proof of the
supposed agreement. The receipt signed by her proved the transaction and her
issuance of the post-dated checks by listing the items bought and the post-dated
checks issued as payment.
The Court simply cannot accept that Villanueva signed the receipt despite not
including the supposed agreement that would shield her from probable criminal
prosecution. In that regard, her being a businesswoman presumably made her
aware of the consequences of issuing unfunded checks.
Under [Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC, as amended by P.D 818], the penalty for
estafa when the total value of the checks exceed P22,000.00 is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period (i.e., 17 years, four months and one day to 20
years), plus one year for each additional P10,000. Applying the ISLAW, the
minimum term shall be from six years and one day to 12 years of prison mayor. In
imposing the indeterminate sentence of eight years and one day of prison
mayor, as minimum, to thirty years of reclusion perpetua as maximum, the CA
correctly applied the ISLAW. It is well to state that reclusion perpetua merely
describes in this instance the penalty actually imposed on account of the amount of
the fraud involved.
BOUNCING CHECKS LAW
MA. ROSARIO P. CAMPOS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and FIRST
WOMENS CREDIT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 187401, September 17, 2014, J. Reyes
The Court, however, considers Campos' defense that she exerted efforts to
reach an amicable settlement with her creditor after the checks which she issued
were dishonored by the drawee bank. Campos categorically declared in her petition
that, she has in her favor evidence to show that she was in good faith and indeed
made arrangements for the payment of her obligations subsequently after the
dishonor of the checks. Clearly, this statement was a confirmation that she actually
received the required notice of dishonor from FWCC. Campos would not have
entered into the alleged arrangements beginning January 1996 until May 1998 if
she had not received a notice of dishonor from her creditor, and had no knowledge
of the insufficiency of her funds with the bank and the dishonor of her checks.
Facts:
On March 17, 1995, Campos obtained a loan, payable on installments, from
respondent First Women's Credit Corporation (FWCC) in the amount of P80,000.00
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and issued several post-dated checks to cover the agreed installment payments.
However, the checks were dishonored when presented for payment and was
declared to be drawn against a closed account.
Campos failed to satisfy her outstanding obligation with FWCC despite
demand. She was charged before the MeTC with violations of B.P. Blg. 22 and was
tried in absentia. She was found guilty of the said offense by the MeTC. Aggrieved,
Campos appealed to the RTC which upheld Campos conviction. In affirming the RTC,
the CA rejects the contention of Campos that she was not notified by FWCC of the
subsequent dishonor of the checks.
Issue:
Whether or not lack of notice of dishonor on the part of Campos constitutes
good faith.
Ruling:
No, the contention of Campos is untenable.
To be liable for violation of [B.P. Blg. 22], the following essential elements
must be present: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for
account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the
time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent
dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered
the bank to stop payment.
The presence of the first and third elements is undisputed. An issue being
advanced by Campos through the present petition concerns her alleged failure to
receive a written demand letter from FWCC, the entity in whose favor the
dishonored checks were issued. In a line of cases, the Court has emphasized the
importance of proof of receipt of such notice of dishonor, although not as an
element of the offense, but as a means to establish that the issuer of a check was
aware of insufficiency of funds when he issued the check and the bank dishonored
it, in relation to the second element of the offense and Sec. 2 of B.P. Blg. 22.
Considering that the second element involves a state of mind which is difficult to
establish, Sec. 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency
of funds, as it reads:
Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making,
drawing, and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the
drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when
presented within ninety days from the date of the check, shall be
prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or
credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the
amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by

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the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving
notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
The Court has in truth repeatedly held that the mere presentation of registry
return receipts that cover registered mail was not sufficient to establish that written
notices of dishonor had been sent to or served on issuers of checks. The
authentication by affidavit of the mailers was necessary in order for service by
registered mail to be regarded as clear proof of the giving of notices of dishonor and
to predicate the existence of the second element of the offense.
In still finding no merit in the present petition, the Court, however, considers
Campos' defense that she exerted efforts to reach an amicable settlement with her
creditor after the checks which she issued were dishonored by the drawee bank.
Campos categorically declared in her petition that, [she] has in her favor evidence
to show that she was in good faith and indeed made arrangements for the payment
of her obligations subsequently after the dishonor of the checks. Clearly, this
statement was a confirmation that she actually received the required notice of
dishonor from FWCC. Campos would not have entered into the alleged
arrangements beginning January 1996 until May 1998 if she had not received a
notice of dishonor from her creditor, and had no knowledge of the insufficiency of
her funds with the bank and the dishonor of her checks.
ARIEL T. LIM vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 190834, November 26, 2014, J. Peralta
Lim questions the decision of the CA finding him guilty of violation of B.P. Blg.
22 despite the fact that he had already paid the amount of the dishonored checks
even before the informations against him were filed in court. Ruling in favor of Lim,
the Court ruled that although generally, only the full payment of the value of the
dishonored check during the five-day grace period would exculpate the accused
from criminal liability under B.P. Blg. 22 the Court acknowledges the existence of
extraordinary cases where, even if all the elements of the crime or offense are
present, the conviction of the accused would prove to be abhorrent to society's
sense of justice. The spirit of the law which, for B.P. Blg. 22, is the protection of the
credibility and stability of the banking system, would not be served by penalizing
people who have evidently made amends for their mistakes and made restitution
for damages even before charges have been filed against them. In effect, the
payment of the checks before the filing of the informations has already attained the
purpose of the law.
Facts:
In 1998, Petitioner Lim issued two Bank of Commerce checks, both payable to
cash, in the amount of PhP100,000 each. The checks were given to Mr. Willie Castor
as his campaign donation to the latters candidacy. Thereafter, Castor ordered the
delivery of printing materials and used the checks of Lim to pay the same. However,
since the printing materials were delivered too late, Castor instructed Lim to issue a
stop payment order for the two checks. Thus, the checks were disho-nored by the
bank when the same was presented to it. The bank officer, who was presented on
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the witness stand, likewise admitted that the said checks were drawn against
insufficient funds. Subsequently, Private Complainant Magna Badiee sent two
demand letters to Lim and likewise filed a complaint against her for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22. After the lapse of more than one month from receipt of the demand letters,
and after receiving the subpoena from the OCP, Lim issued a replace-ment check
dated September 8, 1998 in the amount of PhP200, 000. Private Complainant
Badiee was able to encash the said replacement check.
Nevertheless, six months after Lim had paid the amount of the bounced
checks, two infor-mations, were filed against him before the trial court which later
rendered a decision finding Lim guilty of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Both the RTC and
CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not Lim is still liable despite the fact that he had already paid the
amount of the dishonored checks even before the informations against him were
filed in court.
Ruling:
No.
In the case of Tan vs. Philippine Commercial International Bank, the principle
articulated in the case of Griffith vs. Cawas the precedent cited to justify the
acquittal of the accused in said case. Therein, the Court enumerated the elements
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 being (1) The accused makes, draws or issues a check
to apply to account or for value; (2) The accused knows at the time of the issuance
that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) The check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or
it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. To facilitate proving the second
element, the law created a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insuffi-ciency
of funds or credit, which is established when it is shown that the drawer of the
check was notified of its dishonor and, within five banking days thereafter, failed to
fully pay the amount of the check or make arrangements for its full payment. If the
check, however, is made good or the drawer pays the value of the check within the
five-day period, then the presumption is rebutted. Evidently, one of the essential
elements of the violation is no longer present and the drawer may no longer be
indicted... Said payment within the period prescribed by the law is a complete
defense.
Generally, only the full payment of the value of the dishonored check during
the five-day grace period would exculpate the accused from criminal liability under
B.P. Blg. 22 but, as the Court further elaborated in Tan:
In Griffith vs. CA, the Court held that were the creditor had collected more
than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks representing rental
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arrearages, holding the debtor's president to answer for a criminal offense under
B.P. Blg. 22 two years after the said collection is no longer tenable nor justified by
law or equitable considerations.
In that case, the Court ruled that albeit made beyond the grace period but
two years prior to the institution of the criminal case, the payment collected from
the proceeds of the foreclosure and auction sale of the petitioner's impounded
properties, with more than a million pesos to spare, justified the acquittal of the
petitioner.
In the present case, PCIB already extracted its proverbial pound of flesh by
receiving and keeping in possession the four buses trust properties surrendered by
Lim in about mid 1991 and March 1992 pursuant to Sec. 7 of the Trust Receipts Law,
the estimated value of which was about PhP6.6 million. It thus appears that the
total amount of the dishonored checks P1,785, 855.75 xxx was more than fully
satisfied prior to the transmittal and receipt of the July 9, 1992 letter of demand. In
keeping with jurisprudence, the Court then considers such payment of the
dishonored checks to have obliterated the criminal liability of Lim.
Thus, although payment of the value of the bounced check, if made beyond
the 5-day period provided for in B.P. Blg. 22, would normally not extinguish criminal
liability, the aforementioned cases show that the Court acknowledges the existence
of extraordinary cases where, even if all the elements of the crime or offense are
present, the conviction of the accused would prove to be abhorrent to society's
sense of justice. Just like in Griffith and in Tan, Lim should not be penalized
although all the elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are proven to be present. The
fact that the issuer of the check had already paid the value of the dishonored check
after having received the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor should have
forestalled the filing of the Information in court. The spirit of the law which, for B.P.
Blg. 22, is the protection of the credibility and stability of the banking system, would
not be served by penalizing people who have evidently made amends for their
mistakes and made restitution for damages even before charges have been filed
against them. In effect, the payment of the checks before the filing of the
informations has already attained the purpose of the law.
It should be emphasized as well that payment of the value of the bounced
check after the information has been filed in court would no longer have the effect
of exonerating the accused from possible conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Since from the commencement of the criminal proceedings in court, there is no
circumstance whatsoever to show that the accused had every intention to mitigate
or totally alleviate the ill-effects of his issuance of the unfunded check, then there is
no equitable and compelling reason to preclude his prosecution. In such a case, the
letter of the law should be applied to its full extent.
Furthermore, to avoid any confusion, the Court's ruling in this case should be
well differen-tiated from cases where the accused is charged with estafa under Art.
315, par. 2(d) of the [RPC], where the fraud is perpetuated by postdating a check, or
issuing a check in payment of an oblige-tion when the offender had no funds in the
bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the
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check. In said case of estafa, damage and deceit are the essential elements of the
offense, and the check is merely the accused's tool in committing fraud. In such a
case, paying the value of the dishonored check will not free the accused from
criminal liability. It will merely satisfy the civil liability of the crime but not the
criminal liability.
In fine, the Court holds that Lim must be exonerated from the imposition of
penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 as he had already paid the amount of the
dishonored checks six (6) months before the filing of informations with the court.
Such a course of action is more in keeping with justice and equity.
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JERIC FERNANDEZ y JAURIGUE
G.R. No. 199211, June 4, 2014, J. Brion
Fernandez allegedly recruited several persons for overseas employment in
Hongkong. The persons recruited, for failure to be deployed, instituted a case of
illegal recruitment against Fernandez. The RTC and CA convicted Fernandez. The
Supreme Court then ruled that for illegal recruitment in large scale to prosper, the
prosecution has to prove three essential elements, namely: (1) the accused
undertook a recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice
under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) the accused did not have the license or the
authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3)
the accused committed such illegal activity against three or more persons
individually or as a group.
Facts:
In its February 11, 2008 decision, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 211,
Mandaluyong City, convicted the appellant of the crimes of illegal recruitment in
large scale and five (5) counts of estafa committed against complainants Airene
Etac, Jowel A. Baja, Joemar Aquino, Luis M. Bernardo and Anthony M. Canlas.
The trial court ruled that the appellant represented to the complainants that
he had the power and ability to send them in Hongkong, and that by virtue of this
representation and fraud, the complainants were convinced to part with their money
in order to be employed.
On appeal, the CA upheld the factual findings of the RTC. It agreed with the
trial court that all the elements of illegal recruitment, as defined under Article 13(b),
in relation to Article 34 of the of the Labor Code, were sufficiently established by the
prosecutions evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the convictions should be affirmed and the penalties
prescribed

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Ruling:
The decision of the CA is affirmed.
For illegal recruitment in large scale to prosper, the prosecution has to prove
three essential elements, namely: (1) the accused undertook a recruitment activity
under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2)
the accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) the accused committed such illegal
activity against three or more persons individually or as a group. In the present
case, the appellant promised the five complainants that there were jobs available
for them in Hongkong; and that through his help, they could be deployed for work
within a month or two. He exacted money from them for the plane ticket, hotel
accommodation, processing of visa and placement fees. Notably, the prosecution
presented a Certification dated January 10, 2003 issued by Felicitas Q. Bay, Director
II of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) Licensing Branch, showing
that the appellant had no authority or license to lawfully engage in the recruitment
and placement of workers. These acts, to our mind, constitute illegal recruitment.
There is illegal recruitment when one who does not possess the necessary authority
or license gives the impression of having the ability to send a worker abroad.
Corollarily, where the offense is committed against three or more persons, as in this
case, it is qualified to illegal recruitment in large scale which provides a higher
penalty under Article 39(a) of the Labor Code.
We point out that conviction under the Labor Code for illegal recruitment
does not preclude punishment under the Revised Penal Code for the crime of estafa.
We are convinced that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant violated Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which
provides that estafa is committed by any person who defrauds another by using a
fictitious name; or by falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business; by imaginary transactions or similar forms of
deceit executed prior to or simultaneous with the fraud.
The maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prision correccional
maximum to prision mayor minimum is not prision mayor minimum as apparently
assumed by the RTC. To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty,
prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum should be divided into
three equal portions of time each of which portion shall be deemed to form one
period in accordance with Article 65 of the RPC. Following this procedure, the
maximum period of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum is
from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years. The incremental penalty, when
proper, shall thus be added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8
years, at the discretion of the court.
In computing the incremental penalty, jurisprudence tells us that the amount
defrauded should be subtracted by P22,000.00, and the difference shall be divided
by P10,000.00. Any fraction of a year shall be discarded.

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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MILDRED SALVATIERRA y MATUCO
G.R. No. 200884, June 4, 2014, J. Peralta
The appellant assails the decision of the CA finding guilty of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale. Affirming the decision of the CA the SC ruled that Illegal
recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or
more persons individually or as a group. It is necessary that the prosecution prove
the concurrence of the following elements: (1) the offender undertakes any of the
activities within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Article 13 (b) of
the labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of
the Labor Code (now Section 6 of RA 8042) and (2) the offender has no valid license
or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and
placement of workers. In the case of illegal recruitment in large scale, a third
element is added: that the offender commits any of the acts of recruitment and
placement against three or more persons, individually or as a group. In this case,
appellant engaged in recruitment when she represented herself to be capable of
deploying workers to South Korea upon submission of the pertinent documents and
payment of the required fees. It is also clear from the evidence presented that the
crime of illegal recruitment was committed by against against five persons.
Facts:
Appellant Mildred was charged of having committed Illegal Recruitment in
Large Scale in violation of Sec. 6 of RA 8042 also known as The Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 and of the crime of Estafa under Art. 315(a) of the
RPC. She allegedly represented herself as having the capacity to deploy workers to
South Korea upon submission of certain documents and upon payment of the
required fees. Believing on such representation, the victims parted with their money
and waited for Mildreds instructions. Upon receipt of the initial payments made by
the victims, Mildred issued either receipts or petty cash vouchers. After which,
Mildred stopped seeing them and failed to deploy them. Thereafter, Mildred yet
demanded additional placement fee and made instructions to meet them at
Greenwich Restaurant in Shaw Blvd. in Mandaluyong City. However, prior to said
meeting, the victims went to the NBI to complain about Mildreds activities. They
likewise informed the NBI of their scheduled meeting with Mildred, hence, the plan
for entrapment operation where Mildred was arrested. Upon her arrest, the NBI
agents took from her the marked money.
Upon arraignment, Mildred pleaded" not guilty" to all the charges. Trial on the
merits ensued. Mildred denied having transacted with the victims. She likewise
claimed the she herself was an applicant and a victim of Llanesa Consultancy. As to
the receipts and petty cash vouchers, she admitted having signed them but only
upon instructions of a certain Susan Carillo.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision finding Mildred guilty of all the
charges filed against her. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with
modification by increasing the fine imposed on the illegal recruitment case to P 500,
000. Hence, the present appeal.
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Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the Appellant Mildred is guilty of the crime of Illegal Recruitment
in Large Scale.
2. Whether or not the Appellant Mildred is guilty of the crime of Estafa.
3. Whether or not the penalties imposed are correct.
Ruling:
1. Yes, appellant Mildred is guilty of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale.
The crime of illegal recruitment is defined and penalized under Sections 6
and 7 of RA 8042, or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, to wit:
SEC. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean
any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or
procuring workers, and includes referring, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a
non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13 (f) of
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner,
offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be
deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts, x x x:
xxxx
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It
is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group.
The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals,
accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having
control, management or direction of their business shall be liable.
It is necessary that the prosecution prove the concurrence of the following
elements: (1) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of
"recruitment and placement" under Article 13 (b) of the labor Code, or any of the
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code (now Section 6
of RA 8042) and (2) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to
enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers. In the case
of illegal recruitment in large scale, a third element is added: that the offender
commits any of the acts of recruitment and placement against three or more
persons, individually or as a group.

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In this case, Mildred engaged in recruitment when she represented herself to
be capable of deploying workers to South Korea upon submission of the pertinent
documents and payment of the required fees. As Mildred claimed to be the liaison
officer of Llanesa Consultancy Services, the victims believed that she indeed had
the capability to deploy them abroad. All the witnesses and the supposed victims
identified Mildred as the one who made such representation and received the
payments they made evidenced by the petty cash vouchers and receipts she
signed. Moreover, Mildred was caught in an entrapment operation when she
received the amount demanded allegedly as additional requirement before they can
be deployed abroad. It was, likewise, certified to by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration Licensing Division that neither Mildred nor Llanesa
Consultancy Services were licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment. It
is also clear from the evidence presented that the crime of illegal recruitment was
committed by Mildred against five persons.
2. Yes, Mildred committed the crime of Estafa.
The Court likewise agrees with the appellate court that Mildred may also be
held liable for estafa. The very same evidence proving Mildreds criminal liability for
illegal recruitment also established her criminal liability for estafa. The elements of
estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by
means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation
is caused to the offended party or third person.
In this case, as testified to by the victims/witnesses, Mildred defrauded the
victims by making them believe that she has the capacity to deploy them to South
Korea as workers, even as she did not have the authority or license for the purpose.
Because of this enticement, the victims parted with their money in varying amounts
as placement fees to Mildred. Consequently, the victims suffered damages as the
promised employment abroad never materialized and the money they parted were
never recovered.
3. Yes. As the crime was committed in large scale, it is an offense involving
economic sabotage and is punishable by life imprisonment and a fine of not less
than P500,000.00 nor more than P1,000,000.00. The CA thus aptly imposed the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00.
The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315 of the RPC, is prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, if the amount of the fraud is
over P12,000.00
but
does
not
exceed P22,000.00.
If
the
amount
exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding
one year for each additionalP10,000.00, provided that the total penalty shall not
exceed 20 years.
As the amounts defrauded exceeded P22,000.00, the penalty shall be
imposed in its maximum period which is 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be within
the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC, or anywhere
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within prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or 6 months and 1
day to 4 years and 2 months. Clearly, the modification made by the CA on the RTC
computation of the minimum term is improper. The minimum term imposed which is
6 years, 8 months and 21 days of prision mayor is way above the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC. Although the minimum term
imposed by the RTC which is 4 years is within the range, we further modify the
same and make it 4 years and 2 months in all the cases.
The maximum term, on the other hand, shall be that which could be properly
imposed under the rules of the RPC, which in this case shall be 6 years, 8 months
and 21 days to 8 years. The incremental penalty, therefore, shall be added to the
maximum period of the prescribed penalty, which is anywhere between 6 years, 8
months and 21 days to 8 years. Thus, in Criminal Case No. MC05-9048, the amount
defrauded is P83,500.00 which is P61,500.00 more than P22,000.00. Six years shall
be added to 6 years, 8 months and 21 days making the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence to 12 years, 8 months and 21 days.
VILMA M. SULIMAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 190970, November 24, 2014, J. Peralta
Illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate carried out by a group of 3 or
more persons conspiring with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against 3 or more persons individually or as a group. Both the RTC and
the CA found that the prosecution has established that petitioner and her coaccused committed the acts enumerated under the provisions of Section 6 (a), (1)
and (m) of RA 8042 when: (1) they separately charged the private complainants
placement fees; (2) they failed to actually deploy the private complainants without
valid reasons, and; (3) they failed to reimburse the said complainants after such
failure to deploy.
The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the following, viz.: (a) that
there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the
offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and
was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof,
the offended party suffered damage. In the instant case, all the elements are
present. It was proven beyond reasonable doubt, that Suliman and her co-accused
misrepresented and falsely pretended that they had the capacity to deploy the
private complainants for employment either in South Korea, Saudi Arabia and
Canada. It was the misrepresentation and false pretenses made by petitioner and
her co-accused that induced the private complainants to part with their money. As a
result the private complainants suffered damages as the promised employment
abroad never materialized and the various amounts of money they paid were never
recovered.
Facts:

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In 6 Informations, all dated June 6, 2003, herein petitioner Vilma M. Suliman
and one Luz P. Garcia were charged before the RTC with 2 counts of illegal
recruitment under Section 6, paragraphs (a), (1) and (m) of Republic Act No. 8042,
otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as well
as 4 counts of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
Only petitioner Suliman was brought to trial as her co-accused, Garcia,
remained at-large despite the issuance of a warrant for her arrest.
The six cases were consolidated and the RTC rendered judgment finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of illegal recruitment
and three (3) counts of estafa.
The CA promulgated its Decision wherein the RTC's decision is affirmed.
Petitioner's counsel received a copy of the CA's Decision on May 26, 2009.
However, neither petitioner Suliman nor her counsel filed a motion for
reconsideration within the 15-day reglementary period for filing the said motion.
Hence, on June 11, 2009, the subject CA Decision became final.
On July 3, 2009, Suliman through her new counsel, filed a Motion to Admit
Attached Motion for Reconsideration praying that the same be admitted in the
higher interest of "substantial justice and due process." Suliman contended that her
former counsel committed gross and inexcusable neglect of his duty as counsel in
failing to immediately inform her about his receipt of the CA's Decision, thereby
depriving Suliman of her right to file a motion for reconsideration which is a
violation of her right to due process.
The CA issued a Resolution denying petitioner's Motion to Admit Attached
Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
1) Whether or not the CA erred in not admitting the motion for reconsideration of
Suliman.
2) Whether or not the CA erred in not holding that Suliman should not be bound by
the gross negligence of his previous atty. in not informing her about his receipt of
the decision of the CA adverse to her or in not filing a motion for reconsideration to
protect her rights.
Ruling:
The petition lacks merit.
The Court is not persuaded by Suliman's contention that she should not be
bound by her counsel's gross neglect of duty in not informing her of the adverse
decision of the CA. The Court agrees with the observation of the CA that she is not
entirely blameless as she was not vigilant in monitoring the progress of her case.
Evidence of her negligence is the fact that she did not make any effort to personally
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follow up her appeal with her counsel. Instead, she merely relied on a certain
Conrad Lucero, the person who referred her to her counsel, regarding updates of her
appeal with the CA. In this respect, the Court's ruling in Bejarasco, Jr. v. People is
instructive, to wit:
The general rule is that a client is bound by the counsel's acts, including even
mistakes in the realm of procedural technique. The rationale for the rule is that a
counsel, once retained, holds the implied authority to do all acts necessary or, at
least, incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his
client, such that any act or omission by counsel within the scope of the authority is
regarded in the eyes of the law, as the act or omission of the client himself.
A recognized exception to the rule is when the reckless or gross negligence of
the counsel deprives the client of due process of law. For the exception to apply, the
gross negligence should not be accompanied by the client's own negligence or
malice, considering that the client has the duty to be vigilant in respect of his
interests by keeping up-to-date on the status of the case. Failing in this duty, the
client should suffer whatever adverse judgment is rendered against him.
A litigant bears the responsibility to monitor the status of his case, for no
prudent party leaves the fate of his case entirely in the hands of his lawyer. It is the
client's duty to be in contact with his lawyer from time to time in order to be
informed of the process and developments of his case; hence, to merely rely on the
bare reassurances of his lawyer that everything is being taken care of is not
enough.
It is a settled rule that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part
of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provision of law. An appeal being a purely
statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid
down in the Rules of Court. Deviations from the Rules cannot be tolerated.
The rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to appreciate as the Rules
are designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of appealed cases. Their
observance cannot be left to the whims and caprices of appellants. In the instant
case, petitioner remained obstinate in her non-observance of the said Rules. Such
obstinacy is incongruous with her late plea for liberality in construing the Rules. On
the above basis alone, the Court finds that the instant petition is dismissible.
Even if the Court bends its Rules to allow the present petition, as it appears
that petitioner assails not only the denial by the CA of her motion to admit her
belated Motion for Reconsideration but likewise seeks the reversal of her conviction
for illegal recruitment and estafa, the Court still finds no cogent reason to depart
from the assailed ruling of the CA. After a thorough review of the evidence on
record, the Court finds that the lower courts did not commit any error in convicting
petitioner of the crimes of illegal recruitment and estafa.
It bears reiterating that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, the factual findings of the RTC, especially when affirmed by the
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CA, are generally held binding and conclusive on the Court. We emphasize that
while jurisprudence has provided exceptions to this rule, the petitioner carries the
burden of proving that one or more exceptional circumstances are present in the
case.
In the instant case, the Court finds that none of the exceptions are present .
Thus, there is no cogent reason to depart from the findings of both the RTC and the
CA that petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
The crime of illegal recruitment is defined under Section 6 of RA 8042,
otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, which
provides as follows:
Sec. 6. DEFINITIONS. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any
act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, procuring
workers and includes referring, contact services, promising or advertising for
employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-license or
non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No.
442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines. Provided,
that such non-license or non-holder, who, in any manner, offers or promises for a
fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It
shall likewise include the following acts, whether committed by any persons,
whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority.
(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than that specified
in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than that actually
received by him as a loan or advance;
(b) To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation to
recruitment or employment;
(c) To give any false notice, testimony, information or document or commit any act
of misrepresentation for the purpose of securing a license or authority under the
Labor Code;
(d) To induce or attempt to induce a worker already employed to quit his
employment in order to offer him another unless the transfer is designed to liberate
a worker from oppressive terms and conditions of employment;
(e) To influence or attempt to influence any persons or entity not to employ any
worker who has not applied for employment through his agency;
(f) To engage in the recruitment of placement of workers in jobs harmful to public
health or morality or to dignity of the Republic of the Philippines;
(g) To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment or by his duly authorized representative;

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(h) To fail to submit reports on the status of employment, placement vacancies,
remittances of foreign exchange earnings, separations from jobs, departures and
such other matters or information as may be required by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment;
(i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employment contracts
approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the time
of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the
expiration of the same without the approval of the Department of Labor and
Employment;
(j) For an officer or agent of a recruitment or placement agency to become an
officer or member of the Board of any corporation engaged in travel agency or to be
engaged directly or indirectly in the management of a travel agency;
(k) To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers before departure
for monetary or financial considerations other than those authorized under the
Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations;
(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reasons as determined by the Department
of Labor and Employment; and
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the workers in connection with his
documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the
deployment does not actually take place without the worker's fault. Illegal
recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered as
offense involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate carried out by a group of
three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is
deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group.
The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices
and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having control,
management or direction of their business shall be liable.
Both the RTC and the CA found that the prosecution has established that
petitioner and her co-accused committed the acts enumerated under the provisions
of Section 6 (a), (1) and (m) of RA 8042 when: (1) they separately charged the
private complainants the amounts of P132,460.00, P120,000.00 and P21,400.00 as
placement fees; (2) they failed to actually deploy the private complainants without
valid reasons, and; (3) they failed to reimburse the said complainants after such
failure to deploy.
As to the charge of estafa, the act complained of in the instant case is
penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC, wherein estafa is committed
by any person who shall defraud another by false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. It is
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committed by using fictitious name, or by pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by
means of other similar deceits. The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the
following, viz.: (a) that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation
as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation
was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
(c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent
means and was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result
thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
In the instant case, all the elements are present. It was proven beyond
reasonable doubt, as found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, that Suliman and her
co-accused misrepresented and falsely pretended that they had the capacity to
deploy the private complainants for employment either in South Korea, Saudi Arabia
and Canada. The misrepresentation was made prior to private complainants'
payment of placement fees. It was the misrepresentation and false pretenses made
by petitioner and her co-accused that induced the private complainants to part with
their money. As a result of such false pretenses and misrepresentations, the private
complainants suffered damages as the promised employment abroad never
materialized and the various amounts of money they paid were never recovered.
Suliman argues that she could not be held liable because she was not privy
nor was she aware of the recruitment activities done by her co-accused. Petitioner
avers that when her co-accused received several amounts of money from the
private complainants, she acted in her personal capacity and for her own benefit
without the knowledge and consent of petitioner.
The Court is not persuaded. As owner and general manager, Suliman was at
the forefront of the recruitment activities of Suliman International. She has control,
management or direction of the business. Her denial is an intrinsically weak
defense, especially in the face of positive assertions made by the private
complainants who had no ill motive to falsely testify against her. Where there is
nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper
motive, their positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand under the
solemnity of an oath deserve full faith and credence. She cannot deny participation
in the recruitment of the private complainants because the prosecution has
established that petitioner was the one who offered the private complainants an
alleged alternative employment in Ireland when their original deployment did not
materialize.
CRIMES AGAINST CIVIL STATUS
BIGAMY
NOEL A. LASANAS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R No. 159031, June 23, 2014, J. Bersamin

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The marriage between Lasanas and Patingo was void because of the absence
of a marriage license or of an affidavit of cohabitation. The ratificatory religious
wedding ceremony could not have validated the void marriage. Neither can the
church wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for to do so, all the essential and
formal requisites of a valid marriage should be present. But then, as the law and
jurisprudence say, Lasanas should have first secured a judicial declaration of the
nullity of his void marriage to Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban. Actually, he
did just that but after his marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he violated the
law on bigamy. To reiterate, before one could validly contract a subsequent
marriage, he must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage
although such first marriage is void ab initio.
Facts:
In February 1968, Judge Carlos B. Salazar of the Municipal Trial Court of San
Miguel, Iloilo solemnized the marriage of Accused-appellant Lasanas and Private
Complainant Socorro Patingo without the benefit of a marriage license. The records
show that Lasanas and Patingo had not executed any affidavit of cohabitation to
excuse the lack of the marriage license. In August 1980, Lasanas and Patingo
reaffirmed their marriage vows in a religious ceremony before Fr. Rodolfo Tamayo at
the San Jose Church in Iloilo City. They submitted no marriage license or affidavit of
cohabitation for that purpose; both ceremonies were evidenced by the
corresponding marriage certificates. In 1982, Lasanas and Patingo separated de
facto because of irreconcilable differences.
In December 1993, Lasanas contracted marriage with Josefa Eslaban in a
religious cere-mony solemnized by Fr. Ramon Sequito at the Sta. Maria Church in
Iloilo City. Their marriage certi-ficate reflected the civil status of the accused as
single. In July 1996, Lasanas filed a complaint for annulment of marriage and
damages against Socorro in the RTC in Iloilo City. The complaint alleged that Socorro
had employed deceit, misrepresentations and fraud in securing his consent to their
marriage.
During the period the parties were living together Patingo would nag Lasanas,
fabricate stories against him and displayed her fit of jealousy, neglect her marital
obligations even committed infidelity, which psychological incompatibilities and
marital breaches have forced the Lasanas to live separately from Patingo since 1982
up to the present.
In October 1998, Socorro charged the Lasanas with bigamy in the OCP of
Iloilo City.
Issue:
Whether the civil law rule embodied in Art. 40 of the Family Code requiring a
judicial declaration of nullity before one could contract a subsequent marriage
should apply in a purely criminal prosecution.
Ruling:
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Yes, it should.
The marriage between Lasanas and Patingo was void because of the absence
of a marriage license or of an affidavit of cohabitation. The ratificatory religious
wedding ceremony could not have validated the void marriage. Neither can the
church wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for to do so, all the essential and
formal requisites of a valid marriage should be present. But then, as the law and
jurisprudence say, Lasanas should have first secured a judicial declaration of the
nullity of his void marriage to Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban. Actually, he
did just that but after his marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he violated the
law on bigamy. To reiterate, before one could validly contract a subsequent
marriage, he must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage
although such first marriage is void ab initio.
ILLEGAL MARRIAGE CEREMONY
RENE RONULO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 182438, July 02, 2014, J. Brion
Art. 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer
who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this
crime are as follows: (1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his
performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. In the present case, Ronulo admitted
that he has authority to solemnize a marriage. Ronulo admitted that the parties
appeared before him and this fact was testified to by witnesses. Further, the
prosecution has proven, through the testimony of Florida that the contracting
parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife. Hence,
the Court found Ronulo guilty of violation of Art. 352 of the RPC.
Facts:
Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on
March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.
However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario
Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to
secure a marriage license. As recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong
tagalong, and Claire, clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents, sponsors
and guests, proceeded to the Aglipayan Church. They requested Ronulo, an
Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite having
been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate. Ronulo
conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the
principal and secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests.
An information for violation of Art. 352 of the RPC, as amended, was filed
against the Ronulo before the MTC of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing an
illegal marriage ceremony. Ronulo, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony,
denied that his act of blessing the couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the
marriage as contemplated by law. Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that

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she heard the couple declare during the ceremony that they take each other as
husband and wife.
Issue:
Whether or not Ronulo should be held guilty of violation of Art. 352 of the RPC
Ruling:
Yes, the elements of the crime punishable under Art. 352 of the RPC, as
amended, were proven by the prosecution.
Art. 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer
who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this
crime are as follows: (1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his
performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
In the present case, Ronulo admitted that he has authority to solemnize a
marriage. Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged blessing by
Ronulo is tantamount to the performance of an illegal marriage ceremony which is
punishable under Art. 352 of the RPC, as amended. The law sets the minimum
requirements constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there should be the personal
appearance of the contracting parties before a solemnizing officer; and second,
their declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses that they take each
other as husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, Ronulo admitted that the parties appeared before
him and this fact was testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, the
Court find that, contrary to the Ronulos allegation, the prosecution has proven,
through the testimony of Florida, that the contracting parties personally declared
that they take each other as husband and wife. Art. 6 of the Family Code provides
that no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage is
required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in
conducting its respective marital rites, subject only to the requirement that the core
requirements of law be observed.
Under Art. 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage
is the presence of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case, Ronulo admitted
that he knew that the couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted the
blessing of their relationship. Undoubtedly, Ronulo conducted the marriage
ceremony despite knowledge that the essential and formal requirements of
marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal.
Ronulos knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his defense of
good faith.
The Court also does not agree with Ronulo that
certificate negates his criminal liability in the present
determining if a marriage ceremony has been conducted,
not included in the requirements provided by Art. 3(3)

the lack of a marriage


case. For purposes of
a marriage certificate is
of the Family Code, as
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discussed above. Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the
couple negate criminal liability of Ronulo. Art. 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not
make this an element of the crime.
The penalty imposable in the present case is that covered under Sec. 44, and
not Sec. 39, of the Marriage Law. The penalized acts under Sec. 39 of Act No. 3613
do not include the present case. Ronulo was not found violating the provisions of the
Marriage Law but Art. 352 of the RPC, as amended. It is only the imposition of the
penalty for the violation of this provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On
this point, Art. 352 falls squarely under the provision of Sec. 44 of Act No. 3613
which provides for the penalty for any violation of the regulations to be promulgated
by the proper authorities; Art. 352 of the RPC, as amended, which was enacted after
the Marriage Law, is one of such regulations. Therefore, the penalty is fine in the
amount of P200.00 pursuant to Sec. 44 of the Marriage Law.
CRIMES AGAINST HONOR
LIBEL
ALEJANDRO C. ALMENDRAS, JR. vs. ALEXIS C. ALMENDRAS
G.R. No. 179491, January 14, 2015, C.J. Sereno
In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be
construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary
meaning as they would naturally be understood by the persons reading them,
unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense. In the
instant case, the letters tag respondent as a reknown black mailer, a vengeful
family member who filed cases against his mother and siblings, and with nefarious
designs. Even an impartial mind reading these descriptions would be led to
entertain doubts on the persons character, thereby affecting that persons
reputation.
Malice can also be presumed inasmuch as the letters are not privileged in
nature. Respondents contention that he has the legal, moral or social duty to make
the communication cannot be countenanced because he failed to communicate the
statements only to the person or persons who have some interest or duty in the
matter alleged, and who have the power to furnish the protection sought by the
author of the statement. A written letter containing libelous matter cannot be
classified as privileged when it is published and circulated among the public.
Facts:
Alejandro C. Almendras, Jr. (Alejandro) sent letters with similar contents on 7
February 1996 to House Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr., and on 26 February 1996 to Dr.
Nemesio Prudente, President of Oil Carriers, Inc. The controversial portion of the
first and second letters reads as follows:

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This is to notify your good self and your staff that one ALEXIS DODONG C.
ALMENDRAS, a brother, is not vested with any authority to liaison or transact
any business with any department, office, or bureau, public or otherwise, that
has bearing or relation with my office, mandates or functions. x x x.
Noteworthy to mention, perhaps, is the fact that Mr. Alexis Dodong C.
Almendras, a reknown blackmailer, is a bitter rival in the just concluded
election of 1995 who ran against the wishes of my father, the late
Congressman Alejandro D. Almendras, Sr. He has caused pain to the family
when he filed cases against us: his brothers and sisters, and worst against his
own mother.
I deemed that his act of transacting business that affects my person and
official functions is malicious in purpose, done with ill motive and part of a
larger plan of harassment activities to perforce realise his egoistic and evil
objectives.
May I therefore request the assistance of your office in circulating the above
information to concerned officials and secretariat employees of the House of
Representatives.
xxxx
These letters were allegedly printed, distributed, circulated and published by
Alejandro, assisted by Atty. Roberto Layug, in Digos, Davao del Sur and Quezon City,
with evident bad faith and manifest malice to destroy Alexis C. Almendras (Alexis)
good name. Hence, Alexis filed an action for damages arising from libel and
defamation against Alejandro in the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The RTC ruled in favor of Alexis, ruling that the he was libelled and defamed
and granted the award of damages of
P5,000,000.00 as moral damages;
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; P10,000.00 for litigation expenses; and
attorneys fees in the amount of 25% of whatever amounts actually received by
Alexis for this judgment. Alejandro moved for reconsideration and/or new trial, but
the same was denied by the trial court. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC stating that the letters were not privileged communications, since Alejandro
was not acting as a member of the Congress when he sent them. In fact, his letter
stated that he extends his apology for bringing this personal matter in the open,
Further, the CA upheld the damages awarded by the trial court, the amounts being
consistent with the social and financial standing of the parties involved. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether
or
not
the
letters
fall
within
privileged communication, hence, not libellous in character.

the

purview

of

Ruling:

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The Court denies the petition.
For an imputation to be libelous under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code,
the following requisites must be present: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be
malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable.
Consequently, under Article 354, every defamatory imputation is presumed
to be malicious, even if true, if no good intention and justifiable motive is shown. As
an exception to the rule, the presumption of malice is done away with when the
defamatory imputation qualifies as privileged communication. In order to qualify as
privileged communication under Article 354, Number 1, the following requisites
must concur: (1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or
social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect,
which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the
communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some
interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection
sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and
without malice.
Were petitioners letters defamatory in nature? The Court believes so.
In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be
construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary
meaning as they would naturally be understood by the persons reading them,
unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense. In the
instant case, the letters tag respondent, Alexis, as a reknown black mailer, a
vengeful family member who filed cases against his mother and siblings, and with
nefarious designs. Even an impartial mind reading these descriptions would be led
to entertain doubts on the persons character, thereby affecting that persons
reputation.
Malice can also be presumed inasmuch as the letters are not privileged in
nature. Alejandros contention that he has the legal, moral or social duty to make
the communication cannot be countenanced because he failed to communicate the
statements only to the person or persons who have some interest or duty in the
matter alleged, and who have the power to furnish the protection sought by the
author of the statement. A written letter containing libelous matter cannot be
classified as privileged when it is published and circulated among the
public. Examination of the letters would reveal that Alejandro himself intended for
the letters to be circulated (and they were so) when he said that:
May I therefore request the assistance of your office in circulating the above
information to concerned officials and secretariat employees of the House of
Representatives.
This lack of selectivity on his part is indicative of malice and is anathema to
his claim of privileged communication because such publication created upon the
minds of the readers a circumstance which brought discredit and shame to
respondents reputation.
OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
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MA. MIMIE CRESCENCIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. No. 205015, November 19, 2014, J. Reyes
The DENR personnel had the authority to arrest the Cresencio, even without
a warrant. Sec. 80 of the Forestry Code authorizes the forestry officer or employee
of the DENR or any personnel of the PNP to arrest, even without a warrant, any
person who has committed or is commit-ting in his presence any of the offenses
defined by the Forestry Code and to seize and confiscate the tools and equipment
used in committing the offense or the forest products gathered or taken by the
offender. It is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of
the forest products are legal or not. Mere possession of forest products without the
proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from
a legal source is immaterial because the Forestry Code is a special law which
considers mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper
documentation as malum prohibitum.
Facts:
Acting on an information that there was a stockpile of lumber or forest
products in the vicinity of the house of Petitioner Cresencio, Eufemio Abaniel, an
officer at CENRO-DENR, Talibon, Bohol, together with Forest Rangers Urcino Butal,
Alfredo Bastasa and Celso Ramos went to the Cresencios house at Balico, Talibon,
Bohol on March 15, 1994 at 3:00 p.m. Upon arriving thereat, they saw forest
products lying under the house of the Cresencio and at the shoreline about two
meters away from the Cresencios house. As the DENR personnel tried to
investigate from the neighborhood as to who was the owner of the lumber, the
Cresencio admitted its ownership. Thereafter, the DENR personnel entered the
premises of the Cresencios house without a search warrant.
Upon inspection, 24 pieces of magsihagon lumber, which is equivalent to 452
board feet, were discovered. When the DENR personnel asked for documents to
support the Cresencios claim of ownership, the latter showed to them a receipt
issued by Pengavitor Enterprises where she allegedly bought the said lumber.
However, when the DENR personnel scaled the lumber, they found out that the
dimensions and the species of the lumber did not tally with the items mentioned in
the receipt. The said receipt showed that the Crescencio bought 10 pieces of red
lawaan.
Since the Cresencio could not present any other receipt, Abaniel ordered the
confiscation of the lumber, asked for police assistance, and told the Cresencio that
they were going to transport the confiscated lumber to the DENR office for
safekeeping. SPO1 Desiderio Garcia testified that upon the request of Abaniel for
police assistance, he and PO3 Antonio Crescencio went to the house of the
Cresencio where they saw some lumber which was later loaded on a cargo truck.
Thereafter, they escorted the transport of the lumber to the DENR office.

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Cresencio was charged by the Provincial Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, Bohol,
with violation of Sec. 68 of PD No. 705, as amended by EO No. 277. During the
arraignment, the Cresencio pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter,
trial ensued wherein Crecensio was found guilty of the offense charged. The CA
dismissed the appeal outright because the Cresencio failed to furnish the OSG a
copy of the Appellants Brief in violation of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Cresencio is correctly convicted of the crime charged.
Ruling:
Yes, brushing aside the issue of technicality, the Court still finds that the
prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the Crescencios culpability.
In attempting to escape liability, the Crescencio contends that: (a) she had
the supporting documents to show that she bought the questioned lumber from
legitimate sources; and (b) the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the
DENR personnel was illegal and, thus, the items seized should not have been
admitted in evidence against her.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer,
who has a right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and
may be presented as evidence. There is no question that the DENR personnel were
not armed with a search warrant when they went to the house of the Cresencio.
When the DENR personnel arrived at the Cresencios house, the lumbers were lying
under the latters house and at the shoreline about two meters away from the
house of the Crescencio. It is clear, therefore, that the said lumber is plainly
exposed to sight. Hence, the seizure of the lumber outside the Crescencios house
falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine.
Besides, the DENR personnel had the authority to arrest the Cresencio, even
without a warrant. Sec. 80 of the Forestry Code authorizes the forestry officer or
employee of the DENR or any personnel of the PNP to arrest, even without a
warrant, any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the
offenses defined by the Forestry Code and to seize and confiscate the tools and
equipment used in committing the offense or the forest products gathered or taken
by the offender. It is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and
removal of the forest products are legal or not. Mere possession of forest products
without the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber
comes from a legal source is immaterial because the Forestry Code is a special law
which considers mere possession of timber or other forest products without the
proper documentation as malum prohibitum.
In the present case, the magsihagon lumber were admittedly owned by the
Crescencio but unfortunately no permit evidencing authority to possess said lumber
was duly presented. Thus, the Information correctly charged the Crescencio with the
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second offense which is consummated by the mere possession of forest products
without the proper documents. The prosecution adduced several documents to
prove that the lumber was confiscated from the Crescencio, namely: a Statement
Showing the Number/Pieces and Volume of Lumber Being Confiscated on March 15,
1994, seizure receipt, a photograph of the house of Crescencio, and a photograph of
the confiscated lumber. More so, the direct and affirmative testimony of the DENR
personnel as state witnesses on the circumstances surrounding the apprehension
well establishes Crescencios liability.
EDIGARDO GEROCHE, et al. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 179080, November 26, 2014, J. Peralta
Under Art. 128 of the RPC, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) if Violation
of Domicile be committed at night time or if any papers or effects not constituting
evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the search made by the
offender. In this case, petitioners barged in the house of Baleriano while they were
sleeping at night and, in addition, they took away with them his airgun. The penalty
prescribed by Art. 128 of the RPC is composed of only two, not three, periods. In
which case, Art. 65 of the same Code requires the division into three equal portions
the time included in the penalty, forming one period of each of the three portions.
Facts:
Petitioners Geroche, Garde and Marfil were charged with violation of domicile
under Art. 128 of the RPC. The prosecution alleged that the Geroche was a
barangay captain while Garde and Marfil are members of the CAFGU. One evening,
they suddenly entered the house of Baleriano without any search warrant. The
petitioners mauled him, striking with a Garand rifle, which caused his injuries. They
looked for firearms but instead found and took away his airgun. Petitioners denied
the charge, declaring that they were in their respective houses.
The RTC found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Less Serious Physical Injuries under the Art. 265 of the RPC. They were sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of arresto mayor maximum, that is, four (4)
months and one (1) day to six (6) months. According to the RTC, the prosecution
failed to prove that petitioners are public officers, which is an essential element of
Art. 128 of the RPC.
Petitioners elevated the case to the CA, which set aside the RTC decision,
holding that petitioners should be held liable for Violation of Domicile considering
their judicial admissions that they were barangay captain and part of the CAFGU.
The CA sentenced them to an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) Months, One (1)
Day of arresto mayor maximum to Six (6) Months and One (1) Day of prision
correccional minimum with the accessory penalty of suspension from public office
and from the right to follow a profession or calling pursuant to Art. 43 of the RPC.
Issue:

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Did the CA correctly impose the penalty?
Ruling:
NO, there is a need to rectify the penalty imposed.
Under Art. 128 of the RPC, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods (two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to
six (6) years if Violation of Domicile be committed at nighttime or if any papers or
effects not constituting evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the
search made by the offender. In this case, petitioners barged in the house of
Baleriano while they were sleeping at night and, in addition, they took away with
them his airgun.
In imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the RPC, the
[ISLAW] requires courts to impose upon the accused an indeterminate sentence.
The maximum term of the prison sentence shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said
Code. Yet the penalty prescribed by [Art. 128] of the RPC is composed of only two,
not three, periods. In which case, [Art. 65] of the same Code requires the division
into three equal portions the time included in the penalty, forming one period of
each of the three portions. Applying the provision, the minimum, medium and
maximum periods of the penalty prescribed by Art. 128 are:
Minimum 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 3 years, 6 months and 20
days
Medium 3 years, 6 months and 21 days to 4 years, 9 months and 10
days
Maximum 4 years, 9 months and 11 days to 6 years
Thus, applying in this case, the maximum term should be within the medium
period or from 3 years, 6 months and 21 days to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days, in
light of the provisions of Art. 64 of the RPC that if there are no other mitigating or
aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime, the penalty shall
be imposed in its medium period.
On the other hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC for the crime. The penalty next
lower to that prescribed by Art. 128 is arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period (or 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4
months).
The foregoing considered, in view of the attending circumstances in this case,
the Court hereby sentences the petitioners to suffer the indeterminate penalty from
two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4)
years.
ROSAL HUBILLA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 176102, November 26, 2014, J. Bersamin
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Hubilla insists, however, that the maximum of his indeterminate sentence of
eight years and one day of prison mayor should be reduced to only six years of
prision correccional to enable him to apply for probation under P.D. No. 968. This
argument is bereft of legal basis. Neither the RPC, nor R.A. No. 9344, nor any other
relevant law or rules support or justify the further reduction of the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence. To yield to his insistence would be to impose an illegal
penalty, and would cause the Court to deliberately violate the law. Thus, when he
was convicted at age 23, the suspension of his sentence is not available.
Facts:
Petitioner Hubilla was charged before the RTC with homicide. Hubilla was 17
years old when, on March 30, 2000, he stabbed Jayson Espinola in front of an
elementary school. Due to organ failure and overwhelming infection, Espinola died.
The RTC convicted him on July 19, 2006 and sentenced him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for four years and one day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as
maximum.
The CA affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty, reducing the
sentence to six months and one day to six years of prision correccional as
minimum, to six years and one day to twelve years of prision mayor as maximum.
On motion for reconsideration by Hubilla, the CA again modified the penalty,
sentencing him an indeterminate penalty of six months and one day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.
Issues:
1. Should the maximum of Hubillas indeterminate sentence be reduced to
only six years of prision correccional to enable him to apply for probation
under P.D. No. 968?
2. Would Hubillas imprisonment violate his rights as a child under R.A. No.
9344 and international agreements?
Ruling:
1. No, further reduction in imposed penalty of imprisonment may be had thru
P.D. No. 968.
Art. 249 of the RPC prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for homicide.
Considering that Hubilla was then a minor at the time of the commission of the
crime, being 17 years, four months and 28 days old when he committed the
homicide, such minority was a privileged mitigating circumstance that lowered the
penalty to prision mayor.
Under the ISLAW, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be
within the penalty next lower than the imposable penalty, which, herein, was prision
correccional (i.e., six months and one day to six years). For the maximum of the
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indeterminate sentence, prision mayor in its medium period eight years and one
day to 10 years was proper because there were no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances present. Accordingly, the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of six months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.
Hubilla insists, however, that the maximum of his indeterminate sentence of
eight years and one day of prison mayor should be reduced to only six years of
prision correccional to enable him to apply for probation under P.D. No. 968. This
argument is bereft of legal basis. Neither the [RPC, nor R.A. No. 9344, nor any other
relevant law or rules support or justify the further reduction of the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence. To yield to his insistence would be to impose an illegal
penalty, and would cause the Court to deliberately violate the law. Thus, when he
was convicted at age 23, the suspension of his sentence is not available.
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC10 (Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law) provides
that the rest-rictions on the personal liberty of the child shall be limited to the
minimum. Consistent with this principle, the amended decision of the CA imposed
the ultimate minimums of the indeterminate penalty for homicide under the ISLAW.
On its part, R.A. No. 9344 nowhere allows the trial and appellate courts the
discretion to reduce or lower the penalty further, even for the sake of enabling the
child in conflict with the law to qualify for probation.
Conformably with Sec. 9(a) of P.D. 968, which disqualifies from probation an
offender sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six
years, the petitioner could not qualify for probation. Although Sec. 38 of R.A. No.
9344 allows the suspension of the sentence of a child in conflict with the law
adjudged as guilty of a crime, the suspension is available only until the child
offender turns 21 years of age, pursuant to Sec. 40 of R.A. No. 9344.
The Court notes that Hubilla was well over 23 years of age at the time of his
conviction for homicide by the RTC on July 19, 2006. Hence, the suspension of his
sentence was no longer legally feasible or permissible.
2. No, both international law and agreements recognize imprisonment as the
disposition of last resort for juvenile offenders.
A review of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 reveals, however, that
imprisonment of children in conflict with the law is by no means prohibited. While
[Sec. 5 (c) of R.A. No. 9344] bes-tows on children in conflict with the law the right
not to be unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of their liberty; imprisonment as a proper
disposition of a case is duly recognized, subject to certain restrictions on the
imposition of imprisonment, namely: (a) the detention or imprisonment is a
disposition of last resort, and (b) the detention or imprisonment shall be for the
shortest appro-priate period of time. Thereby, the trial and appellate courts did not
violate the letter and spirit of Republic Act No. 9344 by imposing the penalty of
imprisonment on the petitioner simply because the penalty was imposed as a last
recourse after holding him to be disqualified from probation and from the

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suspension of his sentence, and the term of his imprisonment was for the shortest
dura-tion permitted by the law.
A survey of relevant international agreements supports the course of action
taken herein. The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of
Juvenile Justice (Beijing Guidelines), the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention
of Juvenile Delinquency (Riyadh Guidelines) and the United Nations Rules for the
Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Liberty are consistent in recognizing that
imprisonment is a valid form of disposition, provided it is imposed as a last resort
and for the minimum necessary period.
EDMUND SYDECO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 202692, November 12, 2014, J. Velasco
In the case at bar, the men manning the checkpoint in the subject area and
during the period material appeared not to have performed their duties as required
by law, or at least fell short of the norm expected of peace officers. They spotted
the Sionzons purported swerving vehicle. They then signaled him to stop which he
obeyed. But they did not demand the presentation of the drivers license or issue
any ticket or similar citation paper for traffic violation as required under the
particular premises by Sec. 29 of R.A. No. 4136 (Driving under the Influence of
Liquor). Instead, they inspected the vehicle, ordered the Sionzon and his
companions to step down of their pick up and concluded that the Sionzon was then
drunk mainly because of the cases of beer found at the trunk of the vehicle.
Facts:
P/Insp. Manuel Aguilar (Aguilar), SPO4 Bodino, PO3 Benedict Cruz III and
another officer were manning a checkpoint when, from about twenty (20) meters
away, they spotted a swerving red Ford Ranger pick-up driven by petitioner Sydeco.
The team members flagged the vehicle down and asked Sydeco to alight from the
vehicle so he could take a rest at the police station situated nearby, before he
resumes driving. Sydeco who the policemen claimed was smelling of liquor, denied
being drunk and insisted he could manage to drive. Then in a raised voice, Sydeco
started talking rudely to the policemen and in fact yelled at P/Insp. Aguilar blurting:
"Pg ina mo, bakit mo ako hinuhuli." At that remark, P/Insp. Aguilar, who earlier
pointed out to Sydeco that his team had seen him swerving and driving under the
influence of liquor, proceeded to arrest Sydeco who put up resistance. Despite
Sydecos efforts to parry the hold on him, the police eventually succeeded in
subduing him who was then brought to the Ospital ng Maynila where he was
examined and found to be under the influence of alcohol. Sydeco was then turned
over to the Malate Police Station for investigation.
Issue:
Whether or not Sionzon violated of R.A. No. 4136.
Ruling:

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No, Sionzon is not guilty for driving under the influence of alcohol.
In the case at bar, the men manning the checkpoint in the subject area and
during the period material appeared not to have performed their duties as required
by law, or at least fell short of the norm expected of peace officers. They spotted
the Sionzons purported swerving vehicle. They then signaled him to stop which he
obeyed. But they did not demand the presentation of the drivers license or issue
any ticket or similar citation paper for traffic violation as required under the
particular premises by Sec. 29 of R.A. No. 4136.
Instead of requiring the vehicles occupants to answer one or two routinary
questions out of respect to what the Court has, in Abenes vs. CA, adverted to as the
motorists right of free passage without intrusive interruption, P/Insp. Aguilar, et
al. engaged Sionzon in what appears to be an unnecessary conversation and when
utterances were made doubtless not to their liking, they ordered the latter to step
out of the vehicle, concluding after seeing three (3) empty cases of beer at the
trunk of the vehicle that Sionzon was driving under the influence of alcohol. Then
Sionzon went on with his plain view search line. The remark apparently pissed the
police officers off no end as one of them immediately lashed at Sionzon and his
companions as mga lasing (drunk) and to get out of the vehicle, an incongruous
response to an otherwise reasonable plea.
In fine, at the time of Sionzons apprehension, or when he was signaled to
stop, to be precise, Sionzon has not committed any crime or suspected of having
committed one. Swerving, as ordinarily understood, refers to a movement
wherein a vehicle shifts from a lane to another or to turn aside from a direct course
of action or movement. Swerving is not necessarily indicative of imprudent
behavior let alone constitutive of reckless driving which is punishable. To constitute
the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere
negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, and a willful and wanton disregard of
the consequences is required. Nothing in the records indicate that the area was a
no swerving or overtaking zone. Moreover, the swerving incident, if this be the
case, occurred at around 3:00 a.m. when the streets are usually clear of moving
vehicles and human traffic, and the danger to life, limb and property to third
persons is minimal. When the police officers stopped Sionzons car, they did not
issue any ticket for swerving as required under Sec. 29 of R.A. No. 4136. Instead,
they inspected the vehicle, ordered the Sionzon and his companions to step down of
their pick up and concluded that the Sionzon was then drunk mainly because of the
cases of beer found at the trunk of the vehicle.

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