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GUEBIBA TO CFTP
HAZID/HAZOP/SIL/ TOR
HAZID/HAZOP/SIL TOR
001/AR03/13
03/12
HAZID/HAZOP/SIL TOR
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.
INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................3
1.1
ABBREVIATIONS............................................................................................................ 4
Compagnie Franco-Tunisienne des Ptroles.........................................................................4
2.
HAZID STUDY............................................................................................ 5
2.1
2.2
2.3
3.
HAZOP STUDY........................................................................................... 7
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
3.9
3.10
4.
4.1
SCOPE & OBJECTIVES OF THE SIL STUDY........................................................................13
4.2
PROBABILITY OF FAILURE............................................................................................... 13
4.3
SIL CLASSIFICATION..................................................................................................... 14
1.1.1 RISK GRAPH TECHNIQUE...........................................................................................14
1.1.2 LAYER OF PROTECTION ANALYSIS..................................................................................15
4.4
RISK MATRIX.............................................................................................................. 15
4.5
RISK REDUCTION........................................................................................................ 16
4.6
RISK ANALYSIS TEAM.................................................................................................... 16
4.7
SIL RECORDING......................................................................................................... 17
5.
APPENDICES............................................................................................ 18
5.1
PROCESS SAFETY RISK GRAPH......................................................................................... 18
5.2
COMMERCIAL RISK GRAPH............................................................................................. 20
5.3
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK GRAPH......................................................................................... 21
5.4
TYPICAL PROBABILITIES OF FAILURE ON DEMAND (PFODS) FOR MENTIONED TYPES OF
INDEPENDENT PROTECTION LAYERS (IPLS)............................................................................23
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1. INTRODUCTION
This document provides significant aspects and considerations of HAZID, HAZOP, and SIL study related to
the construction of new pipeline from guebiba/tb to cftp project.
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2. Abbreviations
The following abbreviations will be used:
CFTP
HAZID
Hazard Identification
HAZOP
SIL
SIF
P&ID
SLC
LOPA
CIL
E/E/PES
IPF
IEC
EIL
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3. HAZID Study
3.1 SCOPE & OBJECTIVES OF THE HAZID STUDY
For this project, HAZID (Hazard Identification) analysis is required: the overall objective is to produce a
facility in respect of which all risks to the human, Environment, company reputation and the assets
have to be identified and minimized.
The HAZID worksheet objectives are:
To list all the needed documents about the project, that must be prepared in the following basic or
detail design phase.
Considering the simplicity of the design, the risk-ranking for the recommendations has been limited to
cases where a clear critical consequence was specified and the recommendation is proposed as a
choice between different solutions.
For all the recommendations requiring further analysis, design and / or engineering studies /
documents, operating procedures development, or other efforts that however must be done or
prepared, the risk ranking will be considered superfluous.
3.2 HAZID TECHNIQUE
The HAZID Review will be conducted as a guided brainstorming, by means of guidewords applied to the
project.
The specific intention of this Hazards review is to highlight and estimate hazards deriving from the new
pipeline from Guebiba/TB to CFTP, not only at normal operation phase but also during construction,
commissioning and maintenance activities.
The analysis is concentrated on the inherent external and internal hazards for the project, and is focussed
on specific parts of the selected process, philosophies and operational concepts.
A part is dedicated to the environmental aspect where potential impacts, corresponding causes,
consequences and associated protections are identified, this analysis enables quick and yet trustful setting
of documented Environmental Protection and regulatory compliance measures.
With the help of guidewords, hazards will be identified together with potential means of control and
mitigation.
For each hazard, a qualitative assessment of the expected likelihood and severity of consequences will be
given, on the basis of the risk assessment documents.
The minutes of the HAZID Review detailing the hazards, causes and consequences, risk-ranking,
recommendations and residual risk ranking will be recorded in HAZID Worksheets.
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4. HAZOP Study
4.1 SCOPE & OBJECTIVES
OF
HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Study) is a qualitative methodology that identifies possible deviations from
the correct functioning of the process, analyzing moreover the consequences of such anomalies and the
actions to be taken in order to limit them to the smallest possible areas.
The HAZOPs targets are:
-
To identify possible deviations from the intended operation that can cause personnel or
Guidewords
Flow
No
Reverse
More
Less
Temperature
More
Less
Pressure
Composition
Level
More
Less
As well as
Part of
More
Less
Deviations
No Flow (complete lack of flow)
Reverse Flow (flow in the opposite direction than the normal operation)
More Flow (higher flow rate than expected)
Less Flow (lower flow rate than expected)
Higher Temperature (than expected)
Lower Temperature (than expected)
Higher Pressure (than expected)
Lower Pressure (than expected)
Contamination
Composition Change (fluid composition different than expected, e.g. offspec feed, incorrect chemical dosing, etc.)
Higher Level (higher liquid level in a vessel or tank, up to overfilling
condition)
Lower Level (lower liquid level in a vessel or tank, up to a complete loss
of level)
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Parameters
Guidewords
Deviations
Other
Other
Other (any other cause of upset or unsafe condition identified during the
HAZOP but not linked to an identified parameter)
Clarify the design intent and the normal operating conditions of the Node;
Identify a Deviation from the intent or operating conditions by applying parameter and a
Guidewords;
List possible Causes and Consequences of the Deviation (a Deviation can be considered
meaningful if it has credible causes and can result in harmful consequences);
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The following figure summarizes the HAZOP Procedure that has been applied.
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Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
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created;
Copy, reorder, and renumber topics.
The record will be made during the session using laptop, and will be projected onto a suitable screen
so that all team members can see inputs to the record as it is produced.
4.5 HAZOP NODES
In order to perform the analysis and focus the teams attention on a specific area, the different process
systems will be divided into a convenient number of discrete nodes. Each node represents a section of
the system that can be composed by one or more items with homogeneous characteristics in terms of
pressure, temperature or service. A new node starts when main process parameters change or isolation
is present.
4.6 HAZOP TEAM
The HAZOP shall be carried out by a multidisciplinary team to ensure all aspects of the plant and its
operations are covered. The team members specialists include process design, instrumentation and
control, mechanical engineering, safety and operation.
The chairman has to:
Chair the HAZOP meetings: Trigger the discussion using guidewords and parameters,
The team will include a nominated scribe, responsible for recording discussion and findings.
4.7 HAZOP FOLLOW UP
The HAZOP Actions Coordinator will be responsible for ensuring the Action Items are forwarded to the
parties responsible for action implementation, and for recording the status of the actions.
The relevant discipline specialists should close-out the addressed actions, indicating the resolution and
providing references and evidence of implementation. The action sheet completed with close-out
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information shall be returned to the HAZOP Actions Coordinator. The HAZOP Actions Coordinator should
review the responses and proceed until full resolution of all pending issues.
When an action is closed, the HAZOP Actions Coordinator should mark the action as CLOSED in the
action status column. When all actions will be closed, the Coordinator can issue the close-out report
(i.e. the collection of all the resolutions and action close-outs). All Actions shall be ideally closed
before the end of the Engineering Phase.
4.8 HAZOP RECOMMENDATIONS
The analysis results of the HAZOP study shall be represented by a series of recommendations which
take the form of suggested design changes, requirements of verification and additional studies or
suggestions for specific operational procedures to be implemented. The recommendations will be
managed in the activity of follow-up and implemented during the project development.
4.9 PROCESS SYSTEMS / FACILITIES
To ensure process integrity and to identify process hazards and operational problems for process
systems or facilities, a systematic review of the P&IDs shall be made.
4.10
REPORT
The HAZOP Report is a key document pertaining to the safety of the plant. It should provide sufficient
information on each element so that, either read alone or together with available and clearly cross
referenced documents, an assessment can be made of the adequacy of the HAZOP study carried out.
The contents of such a summary might typically be:
-
Introduction;
Methodology;
Team members;
HAZOP results:
Reporting principles,
Classification of recordings,
Main results;
Appendices:
P&IDs (marked),
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List of participants.
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OF FAILURE
To categorise the safety integrity of a safety function the probability of failure is considered in effect
the inverse of the SIL definition, looking at failure to perform rather than success.
It is easier to identify and quantify possible conditions and causes leading to failure of a safety function
than to guarantee the desired action of a safety function when called upon.
Two classes of SIL are identified, depending on the service provided by the safety function
For safety functions that are activated when required (on demand mode) the probability of
The probabilities of failure are related to one of four safety integrity levels, as shown in Table 1:
Table 2: Probability of failure
Probability of failure
Safety Integrity
Level (SIL)
b
4
3
2
1
a
to
to
to
to
<
<
<
<
10-8
10-7
10-6
10-5
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The risk graph method is a qualitative approach to determine the level of integrity required for the
identified Instrumented Protective Functions (IPF) for the project. The approach is based on the
International Electro technical Commission standard, IEC61511.
Risk graph analysis uses four parameters to make a SIL selection. These parameters are consequence
(C), occupancy (F), probability of avoiding the hazard (P), and demand rate (W).
-
Consequence Severity
Personnel Exposure
Demand Rate
The SIL rating is calculated using the response to the 4 questions and the appropriate SIL level is
generated using the IEC risk graph attached in Appendix (6.1).
-
Each of the loops reviewed shall be subjected to an Asset Protection Review. This shall be carried out
on the following basis:
Consequence Severity
Demand Rate
The risk graph for asset / economic loss is provided in Appendix. Before this chart is used, it must be
calibrated for the specific plant it is used on. Consequence severity should represent the meaningful
range of negative impacts towards important asset or economic objectives (e.g. reliability,
replacement or repair costs)
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The equivalent CIL rating is calculated using the response to the 2 questions and the appropriate
equivalent CIL level is generated using the IEC risk graph attached in Appendix (6.2).
-
Each of the loops reviewed shall be subjected to an Environmental Review. This shall be carried out on
the following basis:
Consequence Severity
Demand Rate
Environmental protective functions should be assessed against a risk graph that provides the range of
negative consequences with respect to important environmental objectives for the specific plant, area
of operation and local legislative requirements. For example, violation of discharge permits or flare
consents spills of varying magnitude.
The equivalent EIL rating is calculated using the response to the 2 questions and the appropriate
equivalent EIL level is generated using the IEC risk graph attached in Appendix (6.3).
5.3.2
LAYER
OF
PROTECTION ANALYSIS
LOPA is one of the techniques developed in response to a requirement within the process industry to be
able to assess the adequacy of the layers of protection provided for an activity. Initially this was driven
by industry codes of practice or guidance and latterly by the development of international standards
such as IEC61508 and IEC61511.
Once the tolerable frequency for a SIF is established, all causes of the initiating event are listed. For
each cause of the initiating event, its likelihood is established. The layers of protection and associated
PFD for each cause are then listed. The mitigated event frequency for each cause is determined. After
each cause is analyzed the total event frequency due to all causes for the initiating event is
determined. The SIL is determined by comparing the established tolerable frequency (goal) with the
total mitigated event frequency.
5.4
RISK MATRIX
The risk matrix is a method categorizing the frequency or likelihood and severity of a risk event using
multiple qualitative levels. The risk matrix tolerance will represented with risk matrix. The OMV risk
matrix is shown below:
Intolerable Region
Tolerable if ALARP Region
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B
A
Consequence Level
Low
5
High
SIL Facilitator;
Secretary;
Process Engineer;
Safety Engineer;
Instrument Engineer;
Operations Personnel;
Specialist Engineers and Technicians (for example HVAC and Rotating Machinery).
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6. Appendices
6.1 PROCESS SAFETY RISK GRAPH
- = No safety requirements
NR = Not recommended. Consider alternatives
Table 1: IEC Process Safety Risk Graph Data
Risk Parameter
C1
C2
C3
Consequence (C)
C4
Classification
Comments
1. The classification system has been developed to
Slight Injury
Serious injury or 1 death deal with injury and death to people.
Death to several people
2. For the interpretation of C1, C2, C3 and C4, the
Very many people killed
Frequency
of,
and
exposure
time
in,
hazardous
(F)
F1
the
zone F2
in
hazardous zone
the
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Risk Parameter
Classification
4.
This
Comments
parameter
takes
into
account:
Possibility
avoiding
of
the
hazardous event
detected
(P)
without
technical
measures);
Almost impossible
certain
conditions);
W2
Probability f the
unwanted
risk
reduction
facilities
occurrence (W)
W3
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- = No safety requirements
NR = Not recommended. Consider alternatives
Table 2: Commercial Risk Graph Data
Risk Parameter
Classification
C0
C1
Consequence
C2
C3
Possibility of
avoiding the
hazardous event
(P)
Comments
No operational upset or
equipment damage
Minor operational upset or
equipment damage.
Moderate operational upset
or equipment damage
Major operational upset or
equipment damage.
Damage to essential
C4
P1
conditions
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Almost impossible
W1
not exist)
7. The purpose of the W factor is to estimate the
30 years or more.
Probability f the
W2
unwanted
occurrence (W)
W3
- = No safety requirements
NR = Not recommended. Consider alternatives
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Risk Parameter
C0
C1
Consequence
C2
C3
C4
P1
Classification
No release or a negligible
Comments
1. Each facility will have specific
environmental impact
Release with minor impact on
environmental; consequences /
environmental reportable
Release with moderate impact on the
environment.
Release with temporary major impact
on the environment.
Release with permanent major impact
on the environment
Possibility of avoiding
(P)
P2
Almost impossible
Probability f the
unwanted occurrence
W1
(W)
W2
or more.
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Risk Parameter
Classification
W3
Comments
IPL Type
Description
BPCS
Human
response
(10 min
available)
PFOD from
Literature and
Industry
PFOD
Chosen
for LOPA
10-1 to 10-2
1.00E-01
1 to 10-1
1.00E+00
Human
response
(40 min
available)
10-1 to 10-2
1.00E-01
Passive
10-1 to 10-3
1.00E-02
Relief
device
10-1 to 10-5
1.00E-03