Ep 95-0313 Hazop

General Foreword to EP HSE Manual
13 October 19950EP 95-0313
HAZOP
EP 95-0313
HSE MANUAL
EP HSE Manual Amendment Record Sheet

Section Number: EP 95-0313
Section Title: HAZOP
Rev.
No.
0
Chapter
Nos.
All
Description of amendment
Date
Amended by
dd/mm/yy
Original hard copy and CD-ROM issue
13/10/95
EPO/61
SUMMARY
The EP HSE Manual replaces the previous Safety Manual, EP 55000 and EP 92-0100, Users Guide to the Structure of
SMS and Safety Cases. It is expanded to include the management of all three issues of Health, Safety and the Environment
(HSE). The Manual comprises three volumes, each including a number of separate sections of which this is one. The
Manual describes the elements necessary to develop, implement and maintain an HSE Management System for
Exploration and Production activities and describes the tools and techniques available to do this. The HSE Manual follows
the guidelines described in the document 'HSE Management System' issued in September 1994 by the Shell HSE
Committee and endorsed by the Committee of Managing Directors (CMD). In line with the Shell strategy to adopt Industry
or International Standards wherever possible, the HSE Management System in this Manualhas been based on the

guidelines prepared by the Oil Industry International Exploration and Production Forum (E&P Forum*) which comply with
the current draft of HSE MS system under preparation by the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO).
Copyright
The copyright of this Manual is vested in Shell International Exploration and Production B.V. (SIEP), The Hague, the
Netherlands. The Manual is issued as guidance to companies of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group and associated companies
under service agreements with SIEP. These companies may give copies of the Manual to their contractors for the purpose
of implementing a relevant contract but such copies should be accompanied by an explanatory note on the manner in which
the Manual is to be used. Thesecompanies may also provide a copy for information to other third parties with the prior
consent of SIEP. Contractors and other third parties should not disclose the Manual outside their own organisation and
return their copy after an appropriate period.
Disclaimer
No liability is accepted by SIEP or any other company or person involved in the preparation of the Manual for any
consequences whatsoever resulting directly or indirectly from the use of the Manual or any error or omission therein even if
caused by a failure to exercise reasonable care.
*E&P FORUM
The Oil Industry International Exploration and Production Forum (E&P Forum) is an international association of oil
companies and petroleum industry organisations formed in 1974. The Forum has presently 52 members from the oil
industry in 60 different countries. Shell participated in a task force set up by the E&P Forum to develop guidelines for the
development and application of Health, Safety and Environmental Management Systems. These were published in July
1994.
EP HSE MANUAL OVERVIEW

OBJECTIVES
The Manual has been written to provide the guidance and tools necessary to develop and operate a
management system for HSE matters in a Shell EP operating company (Opco) at corporate and business activity
level following the principles described in the Shell HSE Committee HSE Management System Guideline. It
provides:
a reference of first resort for line managers and senior staff needing guidance in the essential HSE
requirements of any area of EP operations
a route map to more detailed references with guidance on their application
STRUCTURE AND CONTENT

The Manual is divided into three volumes:
Volume 1 HSE Management Systems EP 95-01XX series provides guidance for the development of an HSE
Management System within the Opco and with contractors, following the E&P Forum structure. It includes
separate documents on Contractor Management, Competence and Audit. HSE MS is part of an overall
management system and should therefore be strictly referred to as a sub-system but for simplicity the term HSE
MS is used. HSE MS is an integral part of the overall management system of the facility or the company.
Volume 1 will be of particular interest to those preparing corporate HSE Management Systems.
Volume 2 HSE Management in the Business EP 95-02XX series provides material for business processspecific HSE Management Systems based on the framework described in Volume 1. Each section in Volume 2
has a chapter devoted to HSE management issues specific to a business process defined in the EP Business
Model. This volume also includes professional HSE guidance in the management of hazards that can be utilised
or referenced in the activities catalogue part of an Opco HSE Case by the custodian or party responsible for that
activity.
Volume 3 Hazards and Effects Management EP 95-03XX series provides guidance on the application of tools
and techniques used in the management of hazards and effects throughout the life cycle of a field or operation.
Volume 3 focuses on the implementation of the Hazards and Effects Management Process which underpins the
HSE Management System described in Volume 1.
The three volumes, together with the international, industry and other selected references, form a suite of
integrated HSE guidelines. At the front of each volume there is a detailed master index for all volumes. A guide,
EP 95-0000 provides an overview of the EP HSE Manual and contains short abstracts for all the sections.
FORMAT
The Manual is arranged in three volumes which are available in a boxed set each containing a number of
individually bound sections.
The Manual will become available on CD-ROM to users registered with SIEP, The Hague. The CD-ROM and
installation security disc are issued in registered copies of the guide EP 95-0000.
E Mail: EPLIbrary.
USER BASE
HSE Manual users are expected to be EP Opcos, other Group companies, SIEP and selected contractors. The
Manual will either serve as a reference for others to assist in the development of 'in-house' specific reference
documents, or will be used as a first-line reference in the case of smaller organisations.
USING THE MANUAL

LANGUAGE
In this document the recommendations for a course of action are made with varying degrees of emphasis. As a
rule:
'may' indicates a possible course of action

'should' indicates a preferred course of action
'shall' indicates a course of action with a recommended mandatory status within the Opcos
'mandatory' indicates a course of action according to a written procedure or regulation from which deviation is
not allowed without written authority from the Opco's management.
The companies belonging to the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of companies are separate and distinct entities, but in
this document the collective expressions 'Shell' and 'Group' are sometimes used for convenience in contexts
where reference is made to the companies of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group in general. These expressions are
used where no useful purpose is served by identifying the particular company or companies.
APPLICATION
Should any significant deviations be made from the recommendations in these guidelines then users are
requested to inform SIEP of the nature and justification for these if it is intended that the deviations are to be
permanent.
FEEDBACK
These guidelines are not intended as a static set of rules, but a growing collection of HSE expertise.
Consequently users are invited to comment on the guidelines to SIEP and to suggest changes and additional
material which they consider would be useful for inclusion in future revisions.
RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER SYSTEMS

ESM, SMS AND ISO
A simple relationship exists between the 11 elements of ESM and those of the Management System Model used
in SMS and this HSE Manual (see Figure 1). The model fulfils the requirements of a typical ISO 9000 quality
system, in particular the ISO HSE MS standard presently in draft (ISO CD 14690).
FIGURE 1 THE ELEMENTS OF ESM AND THE HSE MS
The Safety Management System (SMS) approach was developed as a way of fully implementing the elements of
Enhanced Safety Management (ESM) in a structured manner, to ensure that the organisation, procedures and
practices are in place and can be shown to be working effectively. This methodology is based upon the principle
thatall hazards within the business must be understood and either eliminated or suitably controlled. This requires
an assessment of all the activities that the Opco is engaged in to determine the ones which have an HSE-critical
element. Understanding and control is achieved by applying the Hazards and Effects Management Process
(HEMP) in progressively more detail as more information becomes available.
EP BUSINESS MODEL
The EP Business Model (EPBM) describes all the activities, data and relationships within EP and has been
utilised as an aid for ensuring outline coverage of the HSE issues in each of the main business processes (see
Figure 2). The structure and layout within each document reflects the most practical way of presenting the HSE
issues in that process. The link to the Safety Case or HSE Case is provided in the hazards, effects and activity
matrices relating to the individual processes.
FIGURE 2 EP BUSINESS MODEL
E&P FORUM
The HSE MS for this Manual follows the structure of the E&P Forum Guidelines on HSE MS. The system is fully
compatible with the Shell Group Guidelines. The E&P Forum document is an industry document, known to
international contractors and operating companies in Exploration and Production. The standardisation in
terminology and approach introduces significant efficiency into the management of HSE.
DEPs and standards

The Manual makes extensive reference to Shell Design and Engineering Practices (DEPs) and other publications
such as those of the Shell Safety, Health and Environmental Committee (SSHEC). In the drive towards
standardisation, these Shell documents refer to an increasing extent to international standards such as ISO and
industry standards.
BACKGROUND TO THE EP HSE MANUAL

SHELL GROUP HSE GUIDELINES AND APPLICATION TO EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION (EP)
The move toward the business integration of HSE matters across the Group began in 1985 with the introduction
of Enhanced Safety Management (ESM), followed by the Environmental Management Guidelines (1987, revised
1992) and the Occupational Health Management Guidelines (1989). The current Policy Guideline on Health,
Safety and the Environment (HSE) for Shell Companies, endorsed by the Committee of Managing Directors
(CMD), was issued in 1991.
In September 1994, the Shell HSE Committee issued the HSE Management System document. This provides
direction and conceptual guidance to develop, implement and maintain an HSE Management System. The EP
HSE Manual describes the application of these guidelines to the EP function. The Manual has been based on the
guidelines prepared by the Oil Industry International Exploration and Production Forum (E&P Forum). These in
turn comply with the current draft of the HSE MS system under preparation by ISO.
The relationship between the various documents described above is shown in Figure 3.
FIGURE 3 SHELL GROUP HSE GUIDELINES
DEVELOPMENT OF EP HSE MANUAL

The EP HSE Manual replaces the previous Safety Manual, EP 55000. The subject coverage has been expanded
to include the management of all three issues of Health, Safety and the Environment (HSE). Principles of safety
management from EP 55000 have been incorporated into the HSE Manual but, where possible, the engineering
information has been moved to DEPs.
To further promote and maintain the management of enhanced safety, the concept of a Safety Management
System (SMS) was introduced in 1992. This system, which contains the elements of feedback and control
described in the Group Business Control Guidelines (1992), can be applied in the management of any part of the
business, not just safety.
EP 92-0100, 'User's Guide to SMS and Safety Cases', describes how Safety Cases were prepared as part
of the Safety Management System for specific facilities or areas of activity. These detail the specific hazards
and the controls in place to manage the risk.The Safety Case contains the evidence or 'case' that all the
hazards of a particular operation or facility have been addressed appropriately. This approach has also
become mandatoryin several parts of the world. The EP HSE Manual supersedes EP 92-0100 expanding
the guidance given there to include HSE MS and HSE Cases.
Figure 4 shows the various inputs to this Manual.
FIGURE 4 DEVELOPMENT OF EP HSE MANUAL
HSE Manual EP 95-0313 HAZOP
CONTENTS
10
EP 95-0313 Revision 0 13 October 1995
Contents
1
OVERVIEW
1.1
HAZOP METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW
1.2
HAZOP TECHNIQUE OVERVIEW
HAZOP STUDY TECHNIQUE
2.1
NODE DEFINITION AND INTENTION
2.2
PARAMETERS
2.3
GUIDE WORDS
11
2.4
DEVIATIONS
12
2.5
CAUSES
13
2.6
CONSEQUENCES
14
2.7
ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS
16
2.8
RISK ASSESSMENT RANKING (RISK MATRIX)
2.9
USE OF DOCUMENTATION DURING A STUDY18
17
2.10 TIME REQUIRED PER NODE AND STUDY DURATION

2.11 STRUCTURE OF MEETING SESSIONS
20
2.12 THE TEAM
21
2.12.1 TEAM SIZE
21
2.12.2 TEAM COMPOSITION
21
2.12.3 TEAM EXPERIENCE
23
19
25
THE ROLE OF HAZOP IN THE PROJECT LIFE-CYCLE
3.1
THE TIMING OF HAZOP STUDIES WITHIN THE PROJECT LIFE-CYCLE
3.2
COARSE HAZOP
27
3.2.1 TIMING AND DOCUMENTATION
27
3.2.2 SCOPE AND PURPOSE
27
3.2.3 RESULTS
27
MAIN HAZOP
28
28
31
3.3.3 RESULTS
31
FINAL HAZOP
32
32
3.3
3.4
25
11

32
3.4.3 RESULTS
32
3.5
MINOR CHANGE (MINI-) HAZOPS
33
3.6
EXISTING PLANT
34
3.6.1 PLANTS IN OPERATION
34
3.6.2 REVAMP/MODIFICATION PROJECTS (BROWN-FIELD DEVELOPMENTS) 34
3.7
INTERFACE WITH THE HSE CASE
HAZOP RECORDING AND REPORTING39
4.1
RECORDING THE RESULTS OF MEETINGS39
4.2
4.3
36
4.1.1 MINUTING
39
4.1.2 USE OF THE HAZOP WORKSHEET
41
COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
45
4.2.1 COMMERCIAL HAZOP PACKAGES
45
4.2.2 MINUTE-TAKING AND DISPLAY
45
HAZOP LEADER'S REPORT
47
4.3.1 INTRODUCTION
47
4.3.2 QUALITY OF THE STUDY
48
4.3.3 AREAS OF POTENTIAL WEAKNESS
48
4.3.4 COMMENTS APPLICABLE TO THE WHOLE PLANT

4.3.5 MAJOR AND PRIORITY FINDINGS
48
4.3.6 FURTHER STUDIES REQUIRED
48
4.3.7 HIGHLIGHT AREAS FOR NEXT HAZOP
48
48
4.3.8 REPORTS/COMMENTS FOR OTHER SAFETY MEETINGS/STUDIES
4.4
4.3.9 APPENDICES
48
FOLLOW-UP
50
4.4.1 IMPLEMENTATION/REJECTION
50
4.4.2 COMPLETION STATEMENTS
50
4.4.3 OVERLAPPING RECOMMENDATIONS
50
4.4.4 CONFIRMATION
50
4.5
IMPLICATION FOR VENDOR, CONTRACTOR AND CLIENT 51
4.6
ACTION RESPONSE
4.7
AUDIT/REVIEW OF THE HAZOP PROCESS AND FOLLOW-UP
12
48
52
54
Contents
4.8
CLOSE-OUT OF ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS
ROLE OF THE HAZOP LEADER AND SECRETARY 57
5.1
HAZOP LEADER
57
5.1.1 PREPARATION
57
5.1.2 CHAIRING THE MEETING
57
5.1.3 LEADER'S REPORT
58
5.1.4 ACTION RESPONSE FOLLOW-UP
58
5.2
SECRETARY
59
5.3
COMPETENCE
59
VARIATIONS ON THE HAZOP TECHNIQUE 63
6.1
BATCH PROCESSES
63
6.2
ACTIVITY BASED HAZOP
65
6.3
PROCEDURES HAZOP
66
GLOSSARY
55
69
13
OVERVIEW
This manual is intended to provide an overall understanding of the HAZOP process and
its optimum application within a project. The document outlines a recommended
practice for undertaking studies which HAZOP leaders, secretaries and team members
will find a useful reference. It is also applicable to project managers, engineers and
anyone involved in the decision to hold a HAZOP or the planning, scheduling and followup of a study. In order to retain clarity and focus, some detailed information specific to
the leadership of studies is excluded here. It is contained in the P-282 Leading HAZOPs
training course manual.
1.1
HAZOP METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW
Safety and its management is a primary issue for all plant, driven both by company
philosophy and external requirements. New technologies and the trend towards complex
integrated designs have identified the need for more searching and systematic methods
to identify and assess hazards.
HAZOP is a structured hazard identification tool using a multi-disciplined team. It has
become accepted as the main technique for the identification of process hazards in the
design and operation of a facility. Other identification techniques by discipline review or
compliance with checklists are limited by their reliance on previous experience and
constrained by their narrow approach. HAZOP is based on brainstorming and has
important advantages over other techniques for non-standard designs.
One formal definition would be 'The application of a formal systematic examination to
the process and engineering intentions of new or existing facilities to assess the
potential of maloperation or malfunction of individual items of equipment and their
consequential effects on the facility as a whole'.
The method is equally applicable to major green-field developments, brown-field projects,
small plant modifications or operating procedures. The concept is to break the plant into
small sections and then to identify hazards by examining each section and using a series
of parameter and guide word filters to structure the brainstorming process.
Team approach
The HAZOP team is multi-disciplined and the brainstorming procedure relies on the
broad experience of the team to identify potential hazards and operability problems.
Individual or discipline reviews are unlikely to be able to identify all the possible interdepartmental interfaces which are recognised as critical to the safety of complex plant.
The HAZOP technique's strength is that it allows personnel from all disciplines to
interact and question aspects of the facilities beyond their usual sphere of activity.
Method
The HAZOP process is the systematic application of combinations of parameters (flow,
pressure and temperature) and guide words (no, more, less) to produce deviations (no
14
1 Overview
flow, less pressure) from the design intent or intended operational mode of the plant.
Credible causes of deviations are identified for each plant section (called node). The
consequences arising are then discussed, assessed and minuted with actions or requests
for further consideration by the project team.
Results
There are two main deliverables from a HAZOP study. The first is a set of detailed
minutes, presented on worksheets for each node. These show the summary of the team's
discussions with action recommendations. The minutes should be a complete record of
the meeting including issues that have been discussed but have no action
recommendations.
The second deliverable is a detailed Leader's Report containing an appraisal of the
success of the meeting, and a summary of the main action points.
Strengths
HAZOP is the principal method for identifying hazards and operating problems. It is
applicable throughout a large project and is particularly effective at revealing hazards at
an early stage in the design process. The technique is often lengthy but it is cost
effective. If used early enough HAZOP may remove the need for expensive plant
alterations later in the design process or operating experience.
Brainstorming is an effective meeting technique. One of its strengths is that, when well
led, it breaks down rivalries and the static defence of a narrow view.
Weaknesses
An effective HAZOP study is dependent on the team's technical knowledge and
experience as well as the competence of the Leader. This major weakness is best
summed up in the phrase 'You do not know what you do not know'. The HAZOP team
cannot identify hazards or foresee causes that are outside their knowledge. This
limitation is an important factor to be considered in the selection of the team.
1.2
HAZOP TECHNIQUE OVERVIEW
Step-by-step methodology
The HAZOP process is best understood if divided into the following steps:
select the appropriate section of the plant (node)
define the nodes design intent and process conditions
apply the first/next parameter
apply the first/next guide word, which when combined with the parameter will
give the deviation
determine (by brainstorming) all the potential causes of the deviation
agree the credibility of each cause
15
assess the consequences of each cause
assess the protection provided against the causes and its consequences
evaluate the likelihood of the net effect of consequence and protection
agree a recommendation for action or further consideration of the problem
apply the next guide word (relevant to the selected parameter)
apply the next parameter until they have all been considered
move onto the next node of the system until the whole study has been examined.
The HAZOP methodology is described schematically in Figure 1.1 and each aspect is
described in the following text.
FIGURE 1.1 THE HAZOP PROCESS
Nodes
The division of the plant into appropriately sized nodes containing process lines and/or
equipment is made by the Leader prior to the study. Conceptual HAZOPs will tend to
have larger nodes than detailed studies where more design information is available.
Parameters
The usual parameters applied to all nodes are flow, pressure and temperature.
Additional ones include level, phase, composition, operation, etc and may be applied
as required by the contents of each node.
Guide words
The usual guide words include no, more, and less but there are a number of others
commonly used. Not all guide words are applicable to each parameter. Figure 1.2 shows
the usually accepted combinations.
Deviations
The combination of parameters and guide words, in sequence, will identify all the
deviations (no flow, more temperature, etc). There may be significant overlap between
the deviations considered (no flow may have the same effect as more pressure). These
will be identified and excluded during the team discussion.
Causes
The team will brainstorm to find all the potential causes of the deviation. There is
frequently more than one cause, for example no flow would be caused by a blockage, but
there may be several different causes of that blockage. All potential causes should be
identified and discussed. If only the generic cause is covered, methods of prevention and
operational issues will be missed.
16
1 Overview
Consequences and protection
The potential consequences for each deviation are discussed and assessed within the
limits of the information available and the expertise of the team. There may be several
consequences involving escalation to other pieces of equipment. The protection against
each of the consequences is assessed to give the net overall effect. If the protection is
inadequate then recommendations are made to rectify the situation.
Likelihood
The team have to assess the likelihood of the net effect of the consequences and the
protection provided by the design and operating procedures. This is at best a semiquantitative exercise as the HAZOP study will not have any detailed quantitative risk
assessment (QRA) data. The normal procedure is to allocate a number of arbitrary
bands, relevant to the project from say once per year through to once in the lifetime of
the installation or once in the whole groups operating experience. The tolerability of
the risk may then be determined using a tool such as the risk matrix (see Figure 2.2).
Recommendations
The recommendations can take the form of closed or open actions. Closed actions
(instructions) will be made when the team agree the solution and it is within their level
of competency. Open actions, calling for further work outside the study, will be made for
those cases where the situation is complex and the solution is not obvious. Wherever
possible the number of open actions should be minimised but the Leader must balance
this with the requirement not to unduly lengthen the discussion of complex issues.
17
Figure 1.2 Parameter guide word combinations
18
1 Overview
This page intentionally left blank
19
HAZOP STUDY TECHNIQUE
A HAZOP study progresses through the plant node by node. The selection of the node
sizes and the route through the plant is made before the study by the Leader. This
section describes how the HAZOP technique is applied within each node.
20
2 HAZOP Study Technique
2.1
NODE DEFINITION AND INTENTION
The Leader will select the nodes based on the stage of the project and the amount of
information available. The guidelines for the Leader to follow are based on changing
nodes at a major piece of equipment or where a critical parameter (flow, pressure,
temperature) changes. The objective being to focus on appropriately sized sections of the
plant for the team to be able to clearly identify all the design and operation issues. A
Conceptual HAZOP with little information will have larger nodes (including more
equipment) than a more detailed Main HAZOP.
The node intention defines how the process is expected to perform and it should be
recorded for all plant operating cases. It is important to give the full range of operating
and design conditions.
Before the study meeting, the process engineer should record the data on a node detail
form. During the study, he should give a brief description of the design intent at the
beginning of each node. This will be recorded in the minutes. Similarly the operator
should give a brief step by step description of start-up and shutdown actions before these
topics are addressed.
Operating Modes
All potential operating modes should be identified and included in the study. Each mode
may impose different maxima in the operating envelope and some nodes are used for
different purposes under the various operating modes for the plant. For example flow
rates and direction may change in wellhead lines during well kill or injection. Process
conditions may also change significantly during start-up or upset conditions, eg ESD and
blowdown. Maintenance isolation of individual trains or equipment sections may have
significant effects on other parts of the process by changing the flow rates or
temperatures/pressures/phases within the surrounding sections.
Life-cycle Issues
There are often substantial changes to well fluids throughout the life of a well as for
example the GOR changes and the water cut increases. Some equipment will only be
required for individual phases and temporary by-passes may be introduced.
2.2
PARAMETERS
Definition
There are seven specific parameters: Flow, Pressure, Temperature, Level, Phase,
Composition, and Operation, the first three of which are usually regarded as the
main parameters. Additional parameters may be selected for some of the nodes in a
study as appropriate.
Application
Not all parameters are applicable to each node. A parameter may only be left out if the
Leader thinks fit. He should tell the team why it is not relevant, eg level on a flowline.
Flow
Flow is usually applied as the first parameter as it is the easiest parameter to visualise
and for which to determine the effects of changes.
Pressure
Pressure is important because it leads to many of the most common hazards. Areas
causing common pressure related problems are:
HP/LP interfaces
isolation philosophy
vessel protection
compressor/pump maximum outputs.
Temperature
High and low temperatures may exceed the design parameters of the equipment or cause
hazards to the personnel. Phase changes may also occur due to freezing, boiling and
GOR changes. Low temperature may lead to waxing or hydration, causing blockages.
Level
Level is usually only relevant inside vessels where level control issues may arise,
including flooding or gas blowby. Sometimes there may be elevation issues (multideck
offshore platforms) where level is the most appropriate parameter. Many level hazards
overlap other deviations, eg 'more flow' gives 'more level'. In such cases level may be
easier for the team to visualise, and for vessels the Leader may decide to use level as the
first parameter, rather than flow.
Phase
Another 'minor' parameter which will often cover phase changes caused by the pressure/
temperature envelope. It is sometimes relevant for a plant where phase changes can be
caused by extreme operating conditions, eg solids, flashing or slugging in flowlines.
22

Composition
On hydrocarbon plants, the parameter composition normally covers issues where there
are more or fewer components than expected, eg more water or less hydrocarbon. It also
includes the possibility of contamination from other process streams, eg hydrocarbon in
a cooling water circuit, or the presence of unwanted components, eg H2S or radioactive
material. Lack of a component is also often a hazard, eg corrosion inhibitor.
Composition deviations may also be revealed under other parameters by application of

as well as and part of to flow.
Operation
Operation issues may be dealt with at any time during the study, usually under the
guide words other than. It is however often a very useful option to discuss them
together in a separate 'operation' parameter at the end of each node once all the process
parameters have been discussed.
Operation may be used to cover all the following:
isolation philosophy
failed operation or maintenance
start-up, shut down
maintenance access
normal operation or maintenance
different operating modes
blowdown
noise.
2.3
GUIDE WORDS
Definition
Guide words are simple words or phrases used to qualify or quantify the intention and
associated parameters in order to suggest deviations.
Applicability
There are seven standard guide words; No, More, Less, As Well As, Part of, Reverse
and Other Than, but not all are applicable to each parameter, eg 'no' or 'part of' do not
apply to the parameter of temperature (see Figure 1.2).
Other Than is very popular as a 'catch all' guide word at the end of each parameter.
There is a significant amount of overlap in parameter guide-word combinations. If some
deviations appear to be already covered, eg 'more flow' may lead to 'more level', then
the decision to move on should be made specifically for each guide word and not by
assuming that a whole parameter is already covered. A minute saying 'see more flow'
should be added in the 'more level' section of the worksheet. Care is, however, required,
as it is possible to overlook possible hazards. For example, more flow resulting in
'more level may not cause additional level problems, but may result in velocity issues.
FIGURE 2.1 CONTINUOUS PLANT GUIDE WORDS
GUIDE WORD
MEANING
COMMENT
NO
The complete negation of the design or

operating intent
No part of the intention is achieved
MORE
Quantitative increase
More of the intention occurs or is achieved
LESS
Quantitative decrease
Less intention occurs or is achieved
AS WELL AS
Qualitative increase
All the intention is achieved with some addition
PART OF
Qualitative decrease
Only some of the intention is achieved
REVERSE
Logical opposite of the intention
The reverse of the operating intention occurs
OTHER THAN
Something else happens
No part of the intention occurs
24
2.4
DEVIATIONS
Definition
Deviations are the key to the HAZOP process. They are departures from the design
intent of the process and are identified by the systematic application of the appropriate
parameter/guide word combinations (See Figure 1.2).
In some cases the parameter and guide word when combined make a well understood
deviation, eg less flow. In other cases explanations may need to be developed for the
deviation, eg as well as flow may more easily be described as 'additional component,
and part of flow arises when an element of the flow composition is missing.
2.5
CAUSES
There may be many causes identified for each deviation, and all potential causes should
be discussed, as the consequences and recommendations for action may be different. It is
not sufficient to refer to generic causes, eg blockage, since the method of prevention and
operational issues cannot be adequately defined.
Credible causes
Causes have to be credible, eg impact damage from the explosion of the neighbouring
vessel is only possible if the vessel contains flammable material or is at great pressure.
If incredible or highly unlikely causes are considered by the team this might lead to
expensive and unnecessary modifications to the plant.
The three major categories of causes in decreasing probability are:
human error
equipment failure
external events.
26
2.6
CONSEQUENCES
Having identified the credible causes of the deviation, discussion should move on to
analyse and assess the significance of the consequences. The role of HAZOP is to
determine the net effect of the potential consequences and the mitigating effect of all the
protective measures.
Protective Measures
Most hazards will be protected against by a combination of hardware, instrumentation
and operating practices. Protection may be provided by a combination of the following:
the intrinsic mechanical strength of the plant
process control responding to the deviation
alarms to alert operators to manually intervene in the process
plant trips and shutdowns
relief systems being activated.
Will Protection Always Work?

It should be recognised that protective systems have a finite failure rate. The team
should consider how probable a failure would be, and also the potential consequences of
any failure. A single high-level alarm may be acceptable on a water-storage tank but
would be unacceptable on the suction scrubber of an expensive compressor.
Failures in Protection
The protective elements provided for the facility may fail for the following reasons:
human failure
Operators may fail to prevent a hazard by inappropriate response to an alarm due
to wrong procedure/instruction, inadequate time, or inadequate data for the
diagnosis of the problem. The manning philosophy and associated reaction time
should always be analysed when hazards are mitigated by alarm and operator
intervention. Operator action should normally follow the activation of a pre-alarm,
giving time to intervene before major executive action by the control system is
required.
Hardware failures
Hardware failures can be of two types:
patent failure
A patent failure is one where the failure is immediately apparent (self-revealing),
eg a normally open control valve fails shut and the process flow stops. These types
of failure are normally easily identified as causes of deviations.
latent failure
A latent failure occurs when a fault is not immediately apparent. It is usually

caused by a protective device (eg a high-level alarm or switch failure) which will not
reveal itself until a demand is made on it by the failure of the normal control
function. This is a common problem but must not be confused with double
jeopardy which is defined as two simultaneous and independent failures. In
most HAZOP studies, double jeopardy is assumed to have a very low probability
and is normally excluded.
Protection on worksheet
Some HAZOP worksheets have a separate column for protection. Others assess the
protection under consequences. The addition of the protection column is only a
convenience for the Leader or Secretary. The balance of cause and protection leading to
consequence should always be clearly described using either method. The additional
protection column is preferable, as it ensures clarity and eases transfer of the
information to other safety documents such as HSE Case Hazard Register Sheets.
28
2.7
ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS
Scope
The purpose of the HAZOP meeting is to discover potential hazards of the process and
its operation. It is generally not within its scope to try to solve the sometimes complex
problems and stipulate detailed actions. A prescriptive action recommendation may be
counter-productive in that it may inhibit the engineer from considering an alternative,
and perhaps better, solution.
Closed (simple) actions
It is preferable for the team to agree and recommend simple actions, which can be
defined as closed, because they do not ask the responding engineer to consider options.
The team should be of sufficient experience and seniority in order to make design
decisions for the project. A HAZOP which produces too many inconclusive
recommendations in the 'study', 'consider' or 'investigate' categories is unlikely to be
effective. Furthermore their subsequent outcome is unknown to the HAZOP team and
may not address the root of problems. The team should therefore be able to take
decisions whilst not spending undue time developing solutions to complex problems.
Open (complex) actions
If the team are divided in view, or if there is not enough time available to complete the
discussion, an open action (recommendation for further work) may be appropriate. It is
most important that the team's concern is clearly established in the worksheet so that
the responding engineer knows the scope of study required and the objective he is trying
to achieve. It is often helpful to offer a preferred solution whilst giving the responding
engineer scope to suggest alternatives.
Conditional recommendations
The team will occasionally propose changes to one node that are conditional on the
acceptance of recommendations made on another node considered earlier. These will be
invalidated if the earlier recommendations are rejected by the project manager and
hence the link between the two recommendations must be explicit in the minutes. It is
often difficult to write a complete (stand-alone) minute in such cases which gives the full
background such that the combined action is clear. Hence the use of conditional
recommendations should be minimised as there is a real danger that, in the course of
HAZOP follow-up, the teams primary concern may be lost.
2.8
RISK ASSESSMENT RANKING (RISK MATRIX)
It may be of benefit, particularly for prioritising follow-up, to assess the significance of

uthe actions using some semi-quantitative basis. The Leader should ensure that the
method adopted is capable of effectively classifying hazards but without taking too much
time or distracting the team from their primary focus.
One method of achieving this is to assess the consequence and the probability/likelihood
of each on a scale of 1 to 5. The two figures may then be combined using an risk matrix
to give an assessment of the risk (see Figure 2.2).
Likelihood - A sufficiently experienced team should be able to use its judgement to
assess the approximate frequency of most events and from this the likelihood of the
deviation under consideration, within ranges from extremely rare (range 1) to often
(range 5).
Consequence - As with likelihood, the consequences may also be assessed in terms of
approximate magnitude. Again, a five-category system is used, from slight injury,
damage of leak (range 1) to multiple fatality, extensive damage or massive leak (range
5). In the case of several consequences, the worst case should be selected.
Risk - The combination of likelihood and consequence will lead to an approximation of
the risk involved for each hazard. Using the matrix, based on the estimation of likelihood
and consequence, a categorisation of the recommendation may be made.
Where assessment of the risk cannot be done by the team, and there is residual concern
regarding the severity of the consequence, further in-depth analysis may be
recommended (eg QRA study). Further discussion on risk management can be found in
EP 95-0352.
FIGURE 2.2 RISK MATRIX
30
2.9
USE OF DOCUMENTATION DURING A STUDY
It is important for each team member to follow the study on their own drawings. In
addition, a master set of full-size drawings should be displayed on the wall and markedup to show progress through the study.
Highlighting and colour coding to identify nodes and record progress
A system of highlight colours should be used to ensure that the limits of the node are
fully understood by the team and that at the end of the study the coverage (covered,
excluded, duplicate section) is clear.
Highlighting techniques are often particular to a Leader, but all are based on
demonstrating the extent of the node as it is studied, and marking the progress. Lines
and equipment not covered by the study because they are duplicates should be
highlighted using an individual colour or technique, eg dashed lines. Lines outside the
scope of the study on revamp or minor changes HAZOPs should also be identified by a
unique colour.
The master drawings should be archived with the study. To make subsequent review of
the HAZOP easier a drawing with the individual nodes highlighted in different colours
should be made.
2.10 TIME REQUIRED PER NODE AND STUDY DURATION

Prediction
Predicting the time required for a HAZOP study is always a matter of judgement. It is
however important that a realistic schedule be developed for the whole study. The overall
timing must be established in order that team members can be released from other
tasks. Underestimation leads to the possibility that the 'core' team members will be lost
at the end of the agreed schedule. This will mean that the final parts of the study will
have to be looked at in less detail or completed later.
The timing is dependent upon the experience of the Leader, the size of the team and the
number of nodes under consideration. The size of the team is determined by the
complexity of the study but also includes the involvement of engineering contractors,
subcontractors and vendors.
Experience has shown that it is common for projects to underestimate the time required
for major HAZOPs. This has inevitably lead to disruption of the project schedule or the
team working excessively long hours in order to achieve the predicted completion date.
In such cases it is probable that the quality of the study will suffer significantly.
Operating modes
If the study includes several operating modes this will add significantly to the time
required. The best assessment method is to estimate the number of additional case
nodes that will be studied and allow about half the time of the original node for each
one.
Fatigue
The team will get progressively more tired as the study progresses and the time
required for each node will increase in order to achieve the same quality. The effect of
fatigue will need to be considered in conjunction with the agreed policy on session length
and the number of sessions per day. Fatigue will also have to be considered when
determining the sequence in which the nodes are to be studied, to ensure that complex
nodes are not tackled when the team are tired.
Overall time
The Leader should estimate the overall time for the study based on the predicted length
of the individual nodes, the session length and the number of schedule sessions per day.
The best way to judge the duration of a HAZOP is to base it on feedback from timing of
similar studies in the past. Figure 3.3 can be used to give an approximate estimate of
the overall study hours required. Typically a HAZID or Coarse HAZOP for a new
development would take 3 days. A Main HAZOP for a major project would take 3 to 10
weeks and minor modifications would take anything from 2 hours to 2 days.
32
2.11 STRUCTURE OF MEETING SESSIONS

Half-day sessions
Ideal for studies lasting for more than three days, with the team released during the
afternoons to go back to their normal work. There may be a problem in that some
members of the team will become distracted by other issues and may not attend all the
study sessions. It is also impracticable for staff who are away from their normal office.
One benefit of half-day sessions is that it allows the Leader and Secretary to prepare for
the next session and complete the worksheets.
Whole-day sessions
Often the only practicable solution. Rest and coffee breaks should be regular and the
Leader should encourage relaxation and social activities in the evenings. One advantage
is that it is often possible to get senior personnel participating in the study if time away
from their main work is minimised.
Session length
With either whole or half-day meetings, the maximum session length should be four
hours with at least one 15-minute break in the middle.
Facilities
The meeting room should be appropriate for the HAZOP techniques that are to be
adopted, eg curtains/blinds may be required if an overhead projector is to be used, and
there should be adequate wall space to display the drawings.
The availability of appropriate hardware (computer, overhead projector and printer)
should be checked if computerised minutes are to be taken. Sufficient highlighter pens
should be provided to ensure that nodes can readily be defined on the drawings.
It is also important that adequate refreshments are provided as this helps with
maintaining concentration and in building a team spirit.
2.12 THE TEAM

A balanced team is required to provide an appropriate level of project knowledge coupled
with independent members providing relevant expertise.
2.12.1 TEAM SIZE

Appropriate numbers
A HAZOP team usually consists of five to eight people although a smaller team may be
sufficient for a small facility or a change order, and in these cases three to four is
adequate. More may be required in a hand-over meeting where two project teams are
represented. This is often the case for studies where there is some duplication in client
and contractor representation.
Too large
If the team is too large, the group approach fails because so many people are trying to
communicate with one another and are inhibited from working closely. It is also highly
probable that a large team will naturally migrate towards an inner cabinet of
contributors and an outer ring of spectators.
Too small
If the group is too small, it may lack the breadth of knowledge needed to help assure
completeness and creativity generated by multiple interactions.
2.12.2 TEAM COMPOSITION

The composition of the HAZOP team for a Main HAZOP should be approximately as
follows:
Core members
The core members of the team should be present at all sessions. As well as the Leader
and Secretary they include:
Process Engineer
The role of the process engineer is to provide expertise on the process design and
intended operation of the plant. It is important that the individual has a full
knowledge of the design history of the part of the plant being studied as well as a
deep overall understanding of the whole plant. For large projects it may be
advisable to include the process discipline supervisor who has knowledge of the
whole plant, supported by the appropriate package lead engineers who may have
more detailed knowledge of the area under study for each session.
Project Engineer
The project engineer's role is to ensure that the objectives of the project are
recognised throughout the study. These may include commercial as well as
technical constraints on the plant.
34
Operations and/or Maintenance Personnel

Representation from the eventual operators of the plant is essential. They can
contribute important information on intended work practices as well as experience
of operating issues on similar equipment. If the study is undertaken during a
contractor's design phase, the client should supply the operational input rather
than the Contractor.
Instrument (Control Systems) Engineer

The instrument engineer has a far wider involvement in the plant design and
operation than the other 'specialist' engineers. Many of the control and automatic
protection devices are plant-wide in their application and it is therefore often
advisable that he is a member of the core team contributing to the whole study.
Part-time members
It is inefficient to have a big team containing people waiting for a specific node.
Specialist engineering disciplines may be called upon to attend specific sessions as
required.
Safety Engineer
For many studies the safety engineer is included in the core team. If the project or
process engineer is responsible for undertaking the QRA studies and assessing the
overall level of process risk, then part-time involvement of the safety engineer is
adequate.
He may provide the expertise to the team on consequence assessment (flame
length, etc) and on historical failure probabilities.
machinery specialists
Machinery and packaged equipment issues rarely extend far beyond the machine
itself, hence the machinery engineer is only required whilst the individual
equipment issues are discussed.
Vendor's representatives
Once vendor designs are available it is advisable that a vendor representative is
present whilst the package is studied. The level of representation will depend on
the size and complexity of the package. It is often advisable to hold Mini-HAZOPs
of complex packages during the vendor's design rather than wait to review a
completed design.
Civil/Structural Engineers
In most HAZOP studies the requirement for civil engineers is limited and it is
usual for them to be called upon when only required or for specific sections of the
plant, eg drainage routing.
Specialist Engineers (piping, instrumentation, electrical, corrosion, etc)
The requirement for specialist designers is similar to civil engineers or machinery

specialists. Examples would be the need for electrical engineers when considering
the interface between power utilities and the plant, and the potential for common
mode failures.
36
2.12.3 TEAM EXPERIENCE

HAZOP techniques
It is preferable but not essential that some of the team have been to HAZOP meetings
before. If a large number of the team are new to the technique or have not attended a
meeting for a long time, then a short pre-meeting should be held to describe and
demonstrate the basic techniques.
Project independence
A HAZOP is a project review and should be substantially manned by the project team
but should also contain some independent members. Hence there should be sufficient
project experience available such that the background to the design can be discussed. It
is very important to have as many questions answered as possible during the meeting as
this will tend to greatly reduce the number of action points asking for confirmation of
the basis for design decisions.
38
3 The Role of HAZOP in the Project Life-Cycle
THE ROLE OF HAZOP IN THE PROJECT LIFE-CYCLE
3.1
THE TIMING OF HAZOP STUDIES WITHIN THE PROJECT

LIFE-CYCLE
HAZOP studies are an integral part of the project activity. Planned HAZOP studies
should be included in the Project Schedule on the critical path, with the timing
determined by the availability of the main drawings of the correct quality. It is the
responsibility of the project manager to determine whether HAZOPs are needed, when
they are required, and which type of study is appropriate. He also has to plan the
resources required, duration and information needs. Figure 3.1 shows the general
sequence of HAZOP studies through a project. The applicability of these studies is
dependent on the type of project under consideration.
FIGURE 3.1 SEQUENCE OF HAZOP STUDIES THROUGH A PROJECT
For a large project a sequence of HAZOP studies should be planned, varying in scope
from conceptual to detailed. The conceptual studies look at the plant in less detail but at
a time when the cost and schedule impact of major changes is minimised.
HSE-HAZID
This is a hazards and effects identification technique using similar analysis and
brainstorming techniques to HAZOP, but designed to be used at a much earlier
stage in the project. Described in EP 95-0312, HSE-HAZID concentrates on wider
health, safety and environmental issues with less of a process focus. HSE-HAZID is
included here because it is complementary to Coarse HAZOP and in certain
circumstances the two study types can be combined.
Coarse HAZOP
This uses the full HAZOP methodology but is intended to be used early in a
project's life where there is still the 'ability to change the design, operating and
maintenance policy'. The plant is divided into a small number of large nodes
appropriate for an early stage in the design development.
Main HAZOP
This study should be held at the end of the project specification phase (front end
engineering phase) of a project. Its objective is the assurance of the safety of the
current design ('Will it Work?') rather than making radical recommendations for
change.
Final HAZOP
This study is held at the end of the detailed design stage when drawings are ready
to Approve for Construction. The technique is the same as the Main HAZOP except
that the study focuses on changes since the Main HAZOP, rather than reviewing
the agreed design.
Minor change (Mini-)HAZOP

This study, usually linked to a change control procedure, can be applied at any
stage in the design development or subsequent operation of the facility to assess
proposed changes or vendor package details. The methodology is similar to that of a
HAZOP for a brown-field development.
3.2
COARSE HAZOP
This study has the objective of making the plant inherently safe before many detailed
engineering decisions have been made. It may be of particular use prior to the letting of
a design contract to ensure that the consultant/contractor is provided with a sound
design.

The requirement for a coarse HAZOP is that the design has progressed to the point
where the Process Flow Scheme (PFS) has been developed showing all major lines and
equipment. Typically this is at the end of the development of the project's basis for
design. The documents required are:
Process Flow Schemes (PFS)
full mass balance information
plot layout
process description including all operating cases
project definition including life-cycle issues and planned plant flexibility
safety philosophy
preliminary operating and maintenance philosophy and product off-take

constraints.
All drawings should be supplied with full legends for symbols and guides to the meaning
of line numbering, etc.

The Coarse HAZOP would usually be the first HAZOP study for a project. It often
represents the first opportunity for all the design disciplines, project management and
operations to be involved in a complete review of the project. The key objective is to
optimise the design and minimise any significant rework which would cause slippage of
the schedule. All the project disciplines should have senior representation and the
composition of the team is critical to the HAZOPs success. This study presents the best
opportunity to challenge many of the basic process assumptions used in the design. It
may be a relatively short study applying the full HAZOP technique to large nodes
appropriate to the limited engineering details that are available.
3.2.3 RESULTS
This project stage is the most appropriate time to call for detailed QRA studies or other
supporting investigations. Qualitative Risk Analysis is helpful in identifying the issues
giving major concern.
3.3
MAIN HAZOP
This is the primary HAZOP study for any project using the full technique and
addressing all the details of the plant.
The objective is to look in detail at all aspects of the design, and the main HAZOP will
be the most comprehensive HAZOP study within the project.

The study should be held at the end of the project specification phase. The Process
Engineering Flowsheets (PEFS) should almost be of Approved For Design (AFD) quality
and signed off by the Project Manager as suitable for HAZOP purposes. Attempts to
carry out a full Main HAZOP before the design is fully defined to AFD status will
probably result in failure because insufficient detail will be available. Any changes to the
PEFS following this HAZOP should be covered by formal change control procedures,
which itself should potentially include a Minor Change (Mini-)HAZOP.
Information Pack
Each team member should have an information pack The extent of the information
required for the pack will be dictated by the scope of the HAZOP. The Main HAZOP in a
project would require full documentation, as described below. For other categories of
HAZOP it is preferable to have as much of the information as is available, but it should
be remembered that this will be in a form commensurate with the stage in the project.
The contents should be selected from the following documents listed in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1
Information pack contents
Meeting details
Team member details
Proposed node list
Drawings to be studied
Title, place and timing

Name and affiliation
For use in the meeting but subject to change during the study
List of the drawing numbers including the revision number and
status
Standards, philosophy documents and codesList of the background documents used for the design, which will
be available at the meetings for reference as required.
Operation modes
List of the operation modes that will be considered during the
study.
Life-cycle issues
List of the life-cycle issues that will be considered during the study
Short HAZOP introduction
Lists of the guide words and other HAZOP technique notes which
will be of use to team members who are less familiar with the
study method
Copies of documents produced by software If computerised minutes are to be taken it is useful if the team are
aids
able to see the format of the worksheets that will be produced
Commonly the computer display ,which may be projected for the
team to see, will only show part of the worksheet
Project description document
This is an advance version of the presentation to be given at the

beginning of the meeting by the Project Manager
Process design document
Optional - if available
This is an advance version of the presentation to be given at the
beginning of the meeting by the Process Engineer
Hazard Register/HSE Case
If available, sections from within a HSE Case will provide an

overview of the facilities and critical equipment/systems, etc
(primarily for HAZOPs of existing plant) and an inventory of the
hazards (Hazard Register Sheets)
(Previous HAZOP outstanding issues)
Where applicable
If the HAZOP is part of a series of meetings on the same project it
is sometimes appropriate to discuss previous action points that
have not been understood or actioned.
Project Description and Process Design

Some of the team may be unfamiliar with the history and current position of the project.
The project manager or other appropriate person should prepare a short written
description and oral presentation of the pertinent details and current status of the
project. It is most beneficial if the written version is included in the literature pack.
There should always be an oral presentation at the meeting to ensure all team members
have a common understanding of the facility. Similarly, the process engineer should
explain the process design history and the present position of the project.
Drawing Types
Process Engineering Flowsheets (PEFS)

A master set of PEFSs is marked up during the meeting, by the Leader, to show the
progress of the study. Some of the changes, eg moved valves, may be marked on the
drawings. However, this set only acts as an aid during the meeting. The HAZOP
minutes will provide a complete record of the decisions and recommendations of the
team.
Process Flowsheets (PFS)

As PEFS are focused on small areas of the process and contain a lot of detail, it is
usually valuable to have some copies of the PFS. These show the position of the
equipment within the whole process and they also contain the following
information, which must be provided for the study:
the mass balance (separate document required if not shown on the PFS)
system pressures and temperatures
the overall plant control arrangements.
Plot Plans
These are essential for considering escape routes and interaction between
equipment items. A single large copy for general reference is usually sufficient.
Cause and Effect Diagrams

These show the alarm and trip logic as well as the equipment and plant shutdown
details.
Process Safeguarding Drawings

This is a simplified process schematic with all the valving and instrumentation
removed except that required for the plant safety. If available it serves as a clear
representation of the key protective features.
Interconnection Diagrams and old PEFS

For revamp projects or any study where a combination of new and old equipment is
considered the team must be able to see the full extent of any consequence arising
from hazards on the new plant. Commonly there are potential hazards where new
connections are made to existing headers or common systems, which may overload
the facilities.
legend details
The explanation of piping, mechanical and instrument symbols is important, as
there are many different standards, and client, contractor and vendors may use
different notation.
Explanation of line numbering with particular reference to process fluid content,
pressure class, material specification and insulation details is also required.
others
If there is a significant risk to third parties from fire and explosion or pollution
then other information may be required such as:
local population densities and infrastructure
areas of particular sensitivity (local rivers, marshes, etc).
Philosophies
Operating Philosophy
The basis of operation of the facilities needs to be clearly stated, especially where
there are multiple operating modes.
Safety Philosophy
The basis of protection of life, the installation and the environment following a
hazardous event should be available to the team.
Evacuation Philosophy
This is required for offshore installations. Personnel escape routes should be shown.
If there is a significant third-party risk, accommodation and local population
densities may also be appropriate.
Other documents
previous meeting minutes/action lists

If there is more than one HAZOP study on a project, then each study should draw
on the experience gained from the last.
minutes
The minutes of any previous HAZOP studies should be available. This helps to
minimise duplication of studies.
action lists
Action lists from any previous HAZOP studies should be available, with an
indication of the current status of each of the actions.

The main HAZOP is the most comprehensive study in the project and examines in great
detail all aspects of the design.
3.3.3 RESULTS
The detailed report of the study should catalogue all the hazards identified and all areas
where there was insufficient information or gaps in the knowledge of the team. It should
be remembered that the Main HAZOP is usually too late to start challenging basic
concepts in the design of the plant.
3.4
FINAL HAZOP
The final study is required to look at changes made to the Approved For Design (AFD)
drawings resulting from the contractor's detailed design effort and the availability of
vendor's information. The technique is the same as the Main study but the team is
limited to looking at changes rather than reviewing the agreed design.

The PEFS should be of pre-Approved For Construction (AFC) standard and signed off as
agreed for the HAZOP. Any changes to the PEFS following this study should use a
Variation Change Control (VCC) procedure which itself should include a Minor Change
(Mini-)HAZOP.

The concept is to extend the Main HAZOP, picking up on details that were not available
at the last meeting, and concentrating on the changes to the design, and the additional
vendor details. This should be a shorter meeting than the Main HAZOP but the time
required depends significantly on the quality of the AFD drawings used for the Main
study and the number and control of subsequent design changes.
3.4.3 RESULTS
At the end of this meeting the design should be frozen and the HAZOP exercise
complete. The AFC drawings should be frozen once the recommendations of this study
have been reviewed and incorporated.
3.5
MINOR CHANGE (MINI-) HAZOPS
It is necessary to carry out formally HAZOP studies for minor changes to the drawings
following the Main HAZOP. Such a meeting would not require the full team used for the
Main HAZOP but just the core members involved in that area of the plant.
Minor Plant changes
A safety statement should be issued on each change to confirm that it does not affect the
safety of the main plant. Several minor changes can be studied together once the net
effect is seen to have a significant effect on the design or operation of the plant. Figure
3.2 shows a format for a change matrix which should be adopted to determine if a
HAZOP is required.
FIGURE 3.2 CHANGE MATRIX
Changes to procedures or activities

Procedural changes should be treated in the same way as minor changes.
3.6
EXISTING PLANT
3.6.1 PLANTS IN OPERATION

Existing plants have an inherent hazard potential. Plants can continue in operation for
several years and may undergo minor modifications and de-bottlenecking several times.
Older plants may also never have been subject to a HAZOP study. There is an increasing
need to demonstrate adequate management of hazards for existing facilities, especially
those that require a HSE Case. HAZOP is a valuable tool for this purpose for existing
plant.
3.6.2 REVAMP/MODIFICATION PROJECTS (BROWN-FIELD

DEVELOPMENTS)
The objective of a HAZOP of a brown-field development is to ensure that the proposed
modification is safe and operable. Interfaces between the modification and the existing
facilities must not jeopardise the original design basis of the facilities.
Essentially a brown-field HAZOP is conducted identically with a green-field project.
Difficulties may arise however when establishing the scope and information required for
the study. In summary the main concerns when preparing for a HAZOP on a brown-field
project are:
node selection
The selection of the nodes for a modification HAZOP should reflect the interfaces
with, and allow analysis of, the effects on the surrounding systems.
physical interfaces and associated changes

The interfaces between the new and existing plant (tie-in points, etc) must be
sufficiently understood and documented so that the team can establish if any
hazards can cross the boundary.
The physical interfaces of the new with the existing installation shall be clearly
shown on the HAZOP drawings. Prior to the study the process engineer shall
analyse the extent to which the process parameters change within the existing
facilities due to the modification (including those that have to be made to other
systems to accommodate the new facilities, eg changes in relief valve sizes). He
shall mark up the HAZOP drawings accordingly. Nodes should include all parts of
the existing facilities where a change in process conditions is caused as a result of
the modification. Likewise the operator shall analyse the applicability of existing
procedures to the modification and the applicability of any modified procedures to
the modifications as well as to the existing plant.
information on existing, affected systems
Sufficient design and operating information must be available for all common
systems (vents, drains, etc) as well as the existing plant local to the tie-in points
liable to be affected by the new development.
design codes and standards

If the design codes and practices differ for the existing and new plant the
consequences must be fully understood and screened. A particular problem with
major modification projects is the potential compatibility problems between old and
new design codes and project standards. The scope of the application of new codes
and standards should be established as part of the project philosophy. The HAZOP
should focus on ensuring that the philosophy is consistently applied across the
modifications.
intermediate design and operation

The design must clearly identify and address intermediate operating cases whilst
the new plant is being constructed and commissioned. Sufficient information must
be available to the HAZOP team to assess the intermediate operating case risks.
On brown-field projects there is often a concern to minimise disruption and lost
production, with commissioning of new equipment in parallel with the existing
equipment. This may result in a series of short-term hook-up arrangements which
are potential sources of hazards. Consideration should also be given to the
increased numbers of personnel likely to be required during modification projects.
The intermediate phase of the change-over from old to new systems should be
treated as a separate operating phase. This may mean that the modifications
require a number of individual HAZOPs to ensure the inter-stage steps of the
revamp work are adequately considered.
3.7
INTERFACE WITH THE HSE CASE
There is a relationship between a HAZOP study (or any other HEMP study) and an HSE
Case. This is best considered separately for existing facilities and new developments.
New developments
An HSE Case is likely to be planned for any significant new development. As a means of
commencing the process of compiling the HSE Case, but particularly part 5 - the Hazard
Register - an HSE-HAZID study may have been performed. Alternatively during the
initial design phase a separate study or process may have been put in place specifically
to collect information for the Hazard Register.
This information may thus be available to the HAZOP team as part of the information
pack, ie as an inventory of the HSE hazards pertinent to the development. It should be
noted however that the Hazard Register may not at this stage have identified all the
hazards inherent in the design, nor assessed hazards in any significant depth.
There are no specific guidelines on the process of documenting the HSE Case as a
project design matures, however it is most likely that the HSE Case will evolve either
progressively or step-wise throughout the engineering phase, and be published around
the time of plant start-up. The HSE Case (Hazard Register) may then contain reference
to HAZOP study findings, and/or transcribe/summarise from the HAZOP report
information on the safety critical equipment, systems and procedures, in order to
comprehensively demonstrate management of hazards. It may include such items as the
sequential analysis and protection measures discussed in the HAZOP report for a
particular deviation from design intent, ie where the consequence of that deviation
presents significant risk. The HAZOP study therefore performs the function of one of the
information sources to complete the HSE Case.
Existing Facilities
For existing facilities the compilation of a HSE Case may indeed be the cause of the
HAZOP study, ie as a means to demonstrate adequate assessment of the hazards
inherent to the process. In such situations the HSE Case will also refer to or transcribe
information from the HAZOP report. Even if this is not the case, the relationship
between HSE Case and HAZOP report is similar.
Modification Projects
Where a plant is undergoing modification or revamp, the HAZOP study should draw on
the HSE Case as part of the information pack, and similarly on completion of the study
the results of the HAZOP should be incorporated into the HSE Case.
Figure 3.3
HAZOP duration assessment
Predicting the time required for a HAZOP study depends to a large extent on the particular circumstances of the study. This
calculation method will give a first approximation suitable for schedule planning and budgeting purposes.
Total Time Required = Preparation + Study + Report (Tp + Ts + Tr)
Factors affecting time estimation = Size of the team, Leader's experience, No of nodes
Size of the Team (Factor S) - The size of the team is usually a factor of the complexity of the study but also includes the
involvement of engineering contractors, subcontractors and vendors.
A major green/brown-field
team>12
development with contractor/vendor
involvement
S = 1.25
An internal project, existing plant or team - 5 to 12

a modification
S=1
A minor plant change
S = 0.75
team < 5
Leaders Experience (Factor L)
Inexperienced
equivalent studies)
(lead 0 to 2
L=2
Average
equivalent studies)
(lead 2 to 5
L=1
Experienced
than 5 equivalent studies)
(lead more
L = 0.75
Number of Nodes (Factor N) - Experience has shown that the number of nodes is often difficult to predict. The best approximation
comes from assessing the number of engineering packages being studied. For complex packages Pc (process trains, packaged
equipment, major utility systems) an average number of nodes per system is 8. For simple packages Ps (minor utilities, distributed
injection systems, etc) an average number is 3.
N = Pc*8 + Ps*3
Total Study Time (Ts) - The average time per node over a large study has been found to be 1.5 hours. The first node always takes
much longer (four times as long), as a number of general issues are discussed and the team has to become established. Apart
from the smallest studies it is also normal to allow 3 hours at the beginning of the meeting for the project and the HAZOP
procedure to be introduced.
Ts = 3 +(N+3)*1.5*S*L
Preparation Time (Tp) - The preparation time for the Leader is estimated as a base load of 20 hours with an additional load based
on the number of systems.
Tp = 20+ Pc*2 + Ps*1
Report Time (Tr) - The report preparation time for the Leader and the Secretary is also estimated as a base load (15 hours) and
as a function of the number of systems in the study.
Tr = 15+ Pc*2 + Ps*1
Throughout the study, the Leader and Secretary will spend 33% more time than the team in reviewing the team's comments on the
draft minutes and updating the worksheets to formal issue status. For example, if the team meet for 6 hours a day, the Leader and
Secretary will work for 8 hours in order to maintain progress issuing agreed/approved minutes throughout the study. If the minutes
are not issued for review by the team at the end of each day but produced as a batch at the end of the study, this time, Ts*0.33 will
have to be added to the report preparation time.

HAZOP RECORDING AND REPORTING
4.1
RECORDING THE RESULTS OF MEETINGS
4.1.1 MINUTING
Roles and responsibilities
It is the Secretary's role to record the minutes of the HAZOP study meetings. The
Leader may provide support and guidance to ensure that full concise minutes are
produced. The main requirement is that someone not at the meeting should be able to
read the minutes and fully understand all the potential hazards discussed by the team
(including those where the protection is adequate) and especially the concerns and
recommendations of the team. During the study, each member of the team should review
the draft minutes to ensure that they are an accurate record of their comments; however,
responsibility for the accuracy of the minutes lies ultimately with the study leader.
Worksheet
The structure of the worksheet follows the sequence of the HAZOP brainstorming and
analysis technique. Each of the technique stages is recorded in columns of the
worksheet. The deviation is described, causes are identified by brainstorming, and
then the consequences and protection are assessed, leading to recommendations for
action. A typical worksheet is shown in Figure 4.1. The final columns show who will
respond to the action, the priority and the number of each action point.
Responding individuals
Allocation of action points to individuals or departments for resolution is usually left to
the project team after the meeting but may be allocated by the team during the study as
follows:
companies
The widest allocation of responsibilities is to companies, eg contractor, client,
construction subcontractor, etc.
departments
The most usual method is for action points to be allocated to departments within
the design engineering company or Opco.
individuals
It is unusual to give ownership of the action points to specific individuals. They will
usually be selected by the project manager after the meeting.
Priority
The priority of any action is usually allocated between 1 = major, 2 = important and 3 =
minor. This is a qualitative judgement based on the importance of any issue as
recognised by the team or the urgency of the action response.
4 HAZOP Recording and Reporting
Figure 4.1 Typical HAZOP worksheet

If a serious issue is discovered during the meeting which has far-reaching consequences
for the plant, the Leader should report it immediately to the project manager rather
than include it in the minutes with the others where the importance may not be
recognised. Priorities for action include:
serious risks
issues affecting equipment yet to be purchased

These should be made a high priority for action in order to minimise project cost
and rework
recommendations for design philosophies
decisions that affect the design of the whole plant and may have a general
application should be minuted as general issues.
4.1.2 USE OF THE HAZOP WORKSHEET

The description below shows the stages in the completion of an example HAZOP minute.
The individual sections of the worksheet are shown at each stage and the completed
minute is given as Figure 4.2. In this example the HAZOP node is an off-spec
hydrocarbon storage tank.
G.WORD
No
DEVIATION
Flow
The team are discussing the parameter Flow and the deviation No Flow.
Intention
The first item to be established is the intention of the parameter as it applies to the
node. This should be minuted during the initial discussions describing the node. If
relevant the following information should be included:
brief description of the node
typical operating and design conditions
method of operation and maintenance, and requirement for operator intervention.
PARAMETER
FLOW
INTENTION
Tank 29-TA-301 is used as a hold-up facility for off-spec condensate and also as
a receptacle for hydrocarbon liquids collected in the knock-out pots and
maintenance flare.
Causes
All the potential causes of the deviation should be identified by the team brainstorming.
The Secretary will record each separate cause as it is identified by creating new rows on
the worksheet. Typically, causes will fall into one of three categories:
human error
equipment failure
external events.
CAUSES
High level trip in tank 29-TA-301 shutting inlet due
to excessive off spec production or operator failure to
drain tank and recycle liquid.
In this example the cause is a possible combination of a primary human error (failed to
regularly recycle the off-spec hydrocarbon) or an equipment error (excessive production
of off-spec hydrocarbon).
Consequences
The consequences should be defined in terms of the potential hazards and operability
problems. If appropriate a chronological sequence of events following the initial cause
should be recorded.
CONSEQUENCES
Possibly unable to blowdown
plant as liquids cannot be
removed from flare knock-out
drum via route to 29-TA-301.
The consequences can be inside the node or, as in this case, elsewhere in the plant. A full
off-spec storage tank closes the route from the knock-out drum, giving a potential
problem during blowdown.
Protection
The protection column should describe the team's evaluation of the hazard or operability
problem presented by the consequences. It typically describes the protection that is
already in place. Typical existing protective measures may include:
process control system responding to the deviation
alarms to alert the operator to intervene manually in the process
plant trips and shutdowns
relief systems being activated.

PROTECTION
There may be adequate

volume in the flare knock-out
drum negating the
requirement to transfer
liquids to the off-spec tank
during blowdown.
Figure 4.2 Typical completed HAZOP worksheet

In this case the protection may be offered by redundancy in the system. If there is
sufficient capacity in the knock-out drum, the unavailability of the route to off-spec
storage is not critical to a single blowdown action.
Recommendation
It is vital to ensure that the recommendations are clear, concise and stand-alone. The
responding engineer (who may not have been at the meeting and may only be acting on a
single item) must have a clear understanding of the teams concern as well as the
objectives and limits of the recommendation.
This is an example of an open recommendation. The responding engineer is being asked
to determine if a problem exists and if so consider the best method of solving it. A
possible closed recommendation for this case would say Provide adequate blowdown
capacity in the knock-out drum.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Determine if there is adequate liquid
volume in the knock-out drum for
blowdown scenarios. If not, consider ways
of providing adequate liquid storage
capacity during blowdown.
By
It is usual to allocate the actions either to individuals or departments. It is easier to
record the minutes using an initial type system, eg PE for Process Engineering.
Priority (P)
It is possible to set priorities on each of the recommendations. This can be done based on
the severity of the consequences and the potential likelihood of the occurrence (see 2.8).
BY
No:
PE
Number (No:)
It is essential to provide a unique number for each recommendation to allow adequate
Quality Assurance measures to be applied to the action responses.
Response
The response to HAZOP action recommendations is discussed in 4.6. Figure 4.3 shows
the response to this example minute.
4.2
COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
4.2.1 COMMERCIAL HAZOP PACKAGES

There are several commercial HAZOP packages of various levels of sophistication. Most
have the following components:
HAZOP preparation
The software is able to create the session details and node lists and then include
the node details and process parameters for each node.
minute-taking
The main scope of the packages is to provide a clear method of recording the
minutes of the meeting. If the Secretary is unfamiliar with the commercial
packages, or finds them difficult to use, then a simple word-processing application
may be preferable.
automatic prompts for parameters and guide words

The Leader is able to program his selection of parameters and guide words, which
will then automatically be prompted to ensure all nodes are fully studied.
risk ranking and prioritisation

In some packages it is possible to prioritise the actions using simple priority
classification or risk ranking techniques.
action lists and data extraction

The packages usually come with database capabilities which allow lists of action
points to be produced for named recipients and to record the progress towards
completion of the responses.
NB : Currently, of the various commercially available applications, SIPM recommend

the Lihou 'HAZOP' package as an inexpensive, user-friendly and fairly comprehensive
system for documentation and follow-up. A more common application from Primatech
'HAZOP-PC is also recommended. It is more comprehensively supported, but more
expensive and somewhat less capable of follow-up of HAZOPs. For simple studies it is
possible to create a MS Word template for recording purposes. This is recommended, in
view of its low cost and ease of use (only familiarity with MS Word required). An
example is the Baker Jardine MS Word template (with built-in macro facilities) used on
the P-282 Leading HAZOPs course. Consideration is being given to combining HAZOP
follow-up with other audit and Hazards and Effects Management Process (HEMP)
review follow-up and managing it with one application (yet to be developed). It must be
recognised that software product functionalities change and these recommendations
could thereby be affected.
4.2.2 MINUTE-TAKING AND DISPLAY

Minuting and display
It is useful to record the minutes using a PC and one of the commercial software
packages and also to display the minutes on a wall screen using an overhead projector
and tablet. The benefit is that all the team can see the minutes as they are being
generated, which helps with the derivation of the action items and to prevent changes
being required before formal team approval. Care should however be taken that this
does not stifle the necessary brainstorming process. (This can be managed simply by
projecting the minutes after each main point of discussion).
There may be a conflict between using an overhead display, which requires subdued
light, and making full use of the wall-mounted drawings. This can be solved by the
correct selection of room and lighting arrangements. An alternative for a small team is
to connect the PC to several screens which may be placed so that all team members can
clearly see one screen.
4.3
HAZOP LEADER'S REPORT
The HAZOP report is an important document describing the objectives and success of
the whole study. The report should form the basis of a reviewer's understanding of the
completeness of the study and the confidence that can be put in the results.
HAZOP meetings can be very long and complex. Important issues can be lost in a
formidable pile of worksheets and the report serves to highlight the important issues
that need to be addressed quickly.
The draft final report should be reviewed by team members prior to formal, timely issue.
The HAZOP report should contain the following sections:
introduction
quality of the study
areas of potential weakness
comments applicable to the whole plant
major and priority findings
further studies required (QRA, FMEA, Reliability)
highlight areas for next HAZOP
reports and comments for other safety meetings
appendices (including the worksheets and drawings).
4.3.1 INTRODUCTION
The introduction to the HAZOP report should contain short descriptions of the following:
background
The background to the project and the scope of the HAZOP.
purpose
The purpose and achievements of the meeting should be described.
terms of reference
The terms of reference given prior to the HAZOP and other safety studies or
HAZOP minutes used for reference.
timing the schedule of the meeting
team composition
The composition and affiliation of the team including the attendance of part-time
members at each session.
study method

Any variations on normal HAZOP practice adopted for the study.
areas not covered

Parts of the plant not covered because they were outside the scope of the study or
documentation or key personnel were not available.
description of facility and project

The description of the plant, usually derived from the project manager's briefing at
the beginning of the study.
4.3.2 QUALITY OF THE STUDY

It is important that the quality of the meeting should be assessed in terms of the
composition and experience of the team and their performance. The Leader has a
responsibility to the project to make an objective assessment of the quality of the study
and the reliance which may be placed on the results.
4.3.3 AREAS OF POTENTIAL WEAKNESS

Areas of potential weakness such as a lack of specialist knowledge or incomplete
drawings should be noted.
4.3.4 COMMENTS APPLICABLE TO THE WHOLE PLANT

The general issues discovered should be listed and introduced, together with their
significance for the progress of the project.
4.3.5 MAJOR AND PRIORITY FINDINGS

Complex HAZOP meetings may produce very large numbers of action points. Obviously
they cannot all be addressed at the same time and the project may have to progress
whilst they are being dealt with.
The main study findings should be discussed in the report. A list of the (top ten or so)
major issues is helpful to the response co-ordinator in expediting the important ones
first.
4.3.6 FURTHER STUDIES REQUIRED

If the team recommends that QRA or other studies (FMEA, Reliability) are required
these should be listed for easy reference and priority action.
4.3.7 HIGHLIGHT AREAS FOR NEXT HAZOP

Identification of areas that are unresolved should be made for use by the Leader of
subsequent HAZOPs or by the project safety co-ordinator.
4.3.8 REPORTS/COMMENTS FOR OTHER SAFETY MEETINGS/STUDIES

The HAZOP report should give details of issues or action points that in the opinion of
the team have a direct relevance to other project safety meetings.
4.3.9 APPENDICES
The appendices should contain the following information:
list of guide words used
node list
worksheets
drawings (master set)
list of background reference documents.
4.4
FOLLOW-UP
4.4.1 IMPLEMENTATION/REJECTION
Follow-up is the responsibility of the project manager. Compliance with HAZOP
recommendations is not mandatory but an auditable, fully documented record of all
actions taken, decisions and alternative solutions is required.
As follow-up may continue quite some time after the study, and may also involve parties
not involved in the study, it is imperative that the minutes adequately describe issues.
4.4.2 COMPLETION STATEMENTS

The responding engineer should always explain completely the reasoning and
justification for his decision. Completion statements should be specific and
unambiguous. Comments such as the following are not acceptable:
not company policy
risks deemed acceptable
installed.
Use of the word installed is an example of a lack of reference point being given. A
drawing reference and revision number or a drawing change notice, etc are required.
Passing the recommendation forward, eg 'will be included in detail design', is also not
acceptable as it does not close the action and hence is not auditable.
Poor minutes can also compound this problem, eg 'check size of relief valve' can instigate
the response 'checked' or 'being checked' where it is not clear what the outcome was. The
minute should read 'confirm the size of the relief valve (RV-123) for the maximum
operating case of 10,000 bbl/day' and the response 'relief valve RV-123 confirmed for
maximum flow rate as quoted'.
4.4.3 OVERLAPPING RECOMMENDATIONS

It is possible that some recommendations on the same or separate nodes will overlap
with others. The implementation of these issues should be handled carefully and may
need to be resubmitted to the next HAZOP meeting.
4.4.4 CONFIRMATION
It is important to get formal acceptance of the response from the responsible parties. In
the case of a design contractor on a major project it is usual for a number of specified
signatures to be required.
4.5
IMPLICATION FOR VENDOR, CONTRACTOR AND CLIENT
In the past, HAZOP action points have often been regarded as an increase in scope for
vendor or contractor. This is obviously unsatisfactory. From the point of view of the
project, compliance with agreed HAZOP recommendations should be included in the
vendors original scope of supply. From the point of view of the HAZOP, contractual
issues should not be allowed to interfere with the development of recommendations.
4.6
ACTION RESPONSE
Action Response Forms

All HAZOP action recommendations should be copied onto individual action response
forms. The design of these forms usually presents the individual HAZOP minute on the
top of the sheet, leaving space for the responding engineer to write the answer. These
forms involve a lot of additional paperwork but allow the question and answer to be
presented on the same document, together with references to supporting documentation
and approval signatures. This has been found to aid greatly in understanding the action
point response and confirmation of the close-out of the action.
All response forms should be expedited from issue through to full approval status.
Several software packages are able to extract each action item on its own form to
facilitate the action response. As an example, the response to the recommendation given
in 4.1.2 is shown in Figure 4.3.
Progress assessment
The same process may then be used to keep track of the progress in clearing the
responses to the action points.
Figure 4.3 Typical completed Action Response Form
4.7
AUDIT/REVIEW OF THE HAZOP PROCESS AND FOLLOW-UP
All HAZOP and response documentation should give a full audit trail from the meeting
through to the implementation or rejection of the action points.
An internal project verification system should be developed to confirm the quality of the
HAZOP process and periodically audit the HAZOP follow up. This should form the basis
of an audit/review either as part of an HSE audit or as part of the normal project quality
verification. The review of the process should typically address the following points:
assessment of the team size and composition
duration of the HAZOP meeting
content and quality of the worksheets
examination of the Leaders report.
The audit of the follow-up process would additionally cover:
is responsibility for the actions clearly defined?
are the action responses adequately recorded and monitored?
do the actions address the primary concern of the HAZOP recommendation?
are the actions consistent with the intent of the original basis for design, and
operating and maintenance philosophies?
has a schedule been set for the close-out of action items?
is the action close-out schedule compatible with the project schedule?
have the project change control procedures been applied to the actions?
have full or partial HAZOPs been performed on significant changes resulting from
the main HAZOP?
4.8
CLOSE-OUT OF ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS
A formal system of review and authorisation should be instigated for the close-out of
HAZOP action recommendations. As well as the engineer who prepared the response
(HAZOP action party), this may include elements of the following hierarchy:
The HAZOP Action Party Supervisor
He is required to sign to indicate that the normal departmental quality assurance has
been achieved.
The Project Manager
He is required to approve the action taken, to provide the funds if necessary and to
confirm that it has been (rather than will be) implemented on the project.
Implementation usually means inclusion on the relevant master drawings rather than
actually built and installed. For a HAZOP action on an existing plant, implementation
should mean actually built and installed.
Asset Holder
For modifications to existing plant, the approval of the asset holder may be required.
Client Representative (if appropriate)
For a HAZOP with design contractor (or vendor) and client involvement, the client
representative should also agree that the response is acceptable. This may involve
approval to release funds for additional scope. The Client HAZOP Co-ordinator may also
act as the focal point to ensure co-ordination between all the parties involved in the
close-out of the action.
HAZOP Leader
An approval is required to show that the action taken actually does address the
intention of the action point and deals with the concern of the team. Ideally this will
come from the HAZOP Leader, but in some cases this may not be possible. In these cases
the Project Manager should liaise with the HAZOP team to ensure the issues have been
addressed.

ROLE OF THE HAZOP LEADER AND SECRETARY
5.1
HAZOP LEADER
The role of the HAZOP Leader can be broken down into the following sections:
preparation
chairing the meetings
writing the report
approval of actions.
5.1.1 PREPARATION
The HAZOP Leader's responsibility for the study starts significantly before the meetings
occur. For a large study, the preparation usually starts approximately one month before
the study. The aim of the Leader's preparation work is to ensure that the team has
access to all the information required and to make sure that the study is conducted in
appropriate detail. The objectives are to:
establish the scope/definition of the HAZOP study with the project manager
ensure all the relevant drawings and background documents are available
ensure all the relevant documentation has been made available to the team in a
pre-reading information pack
confirm the suitability of the team members
plan the study depth and to identify operating cases/life-cycle issues
break the system down into the study nodes
identify the first node and the general plant-wide issues
plan the individual sessions and the overall timing of the study
ensure adequate facilities (meeting room, etc) are made available.
5.1.2 CHAIRING THE MEETING

The Leader's role during the meetings is to guide the team through the HAZOP
technique, ensuring full and adequate coverage of all areas of the plant.
Introductory address
The introduction to the meeting is important in that it should ensure that every member
of the team has a common understanding of the scope and objectives of the study. The
Leader's introductory address should cover the following issues:
the purpose and objectives of the study
the position and importance of the study within the overall project
5 Role of the HAZOP Leader and Secretary
the expected role of the team members
a discussion of the HAZOP technique to be used
a description of any meeting-specific details, such as the schedule, node allocation,

potential general hazards and the minutes approval mechanism to be adopted.
Management of the meeting

The Leader has to manage the meetings, making sure that the technique has been
correctly applied to ensure that all hazards and operability problems have been
identified, discussed and minuted. At the end of the study the Leader has to be confident
that the study has been conducted correctly and completed and that he has managed the
meeting to get the best performance out of the team. The tasks for the Leader during the
meetings include ensuring that:
detail is sufficient to discover all hazards and operability problems
the minutes are clear and complete
complex cause/protection issues have been covered systematically
each of the team members has made appropriate contribution to the study
if necessary, the number of operating cases and life-cycle issues to be discussed has
been identified at the start of the meeting and the method of handling agreed.
Quality of the study

The Leader must be prepared to postpone the HAZOP or ask for a strengthened team or
more information if he has reason to be concerned about the quality of the study.
Common problems may be insufficient information, insufficient time, or the team lacking
the necessary experience.
5.1.3 LEADER'S REPORT

The objective of the Leader's report is to give a full account of all discussions during the
study highlighting the concerns raised. Formal audit requirements must also be met.
Anybody reading the report who was not involved in the study should be able to
understand easily the concerns of the team. The Leader's report should follow the basic
format outlined in 4.3.
5.1.4 ACTION RESPONSE FOLLOW-UP

HAZOP action item response is generally the responsibility of the Project Manager.
However, the HAZOP Leader may be asked to determine if the response acceptably
addresses the intention of the action item and adequately deals with the concerns of the
team. It may be that the Leader is only asked to comment on action items where there is
an element of doubt.
As a design progresses through the various phases, it is important to ensure that all the
hazards identified are recorded. The complete register should be available to those
responsible for the construction, operation and abandonment of the plant. The
information will subsequently be incorporated in the HSE Case for the facility.
Therefore, HAZOP findings which are considered to be in this category shall be recorded
in the Hazards Register which will be referred to in the preparation of the HSE Case.
The Project Manager will state in the Action Response Form whether the finding will be
incorporated in the Hazards Register.
5.2
SECRETARY
The major role for the Secretary is to record the minutes of the meetings on the
worksheet. This requires significant skill and engineering knowledge because the
important points for the minutes need to be distilled from the wide-ranging discussion.
The record of each point must be complete and unambiguous and the action point, if
there is one, clear. Use of purpose-developed word-processing software and overhead
screen projection has eased the secretarial task in recent years. The Secretary should
give careful consideration to the following:
timing
The minutes for that day should be issued by the Secretary at the end of the day or
at the start of the next to allow the team to make any comments whilst the
arguments are fresh in their minds. By this means, effective and essential approval
of the minutes by the team is achievable.
quality
Minutes must provide a complete record of points discussed (not just a record of the
recommendations). The minutes should be of sufficient quality to provide
unambiguous information and recommendations on identified hazards, their effects
and management within the project. If something is discussed and found not to be a
concern, but is not minuted, there is no way of later knowing if the point was
missed or discussed and rejected, and if so, why.
potential subsequent use of minutes

The HAZOP minutes may provide key input for HSE Case development and any
documented submissions that may be required by legislation. Minutes should also
be able to withstand scrutiny during an audit or accident investigation.
5.3
COMPETENCE
HAZOP Leader
The role of HAZOP Leader is a complex one combining technical knowledge and
experience with man-management skills. In order to ensure that HAZOP Leaders are
competent and efficient the following selection criteria should be adopted:
experience

A Leader should have sufficient experience in the oil and gas industry or an
equivalent process industry. Experience should be gained in both the theoretical
and practical application of the design and operation of oil and gas
production/processing facilities. A Leader's experience should be wide-ranging
enough for the Leader to have gained a knowledge of the equipment, procedural
and human failures that can lead to major incidents, with a sound appreciation of
process design and safeguarding.
training
A Leader should have had adequate training in both the HAZOP and management
techniques. This should have been gained on a recognised HAZOP leadership
course. Formal training should also be supplemented by on-the-job coaching under
the supervision of a competent Leader. This may not be practicable for external
HAZOP consultants, in which case previous experience should be reviewed and
their performance observed by company mentors.
In order to assess the competence of a HAZOP Leader consideration should be given to:
HAZOP skills
These include correct application of the parameter and guide word combinations;
acting as a facilitator for the team; checking that complex problems are fully
understood by all members; ensuring full use is made of all the expertise and
knowledge within the team; getting the appropriate person to give details and then
summarising for the others.
time management skills

These should include the ability to plan the study in depth and estimate the time
required for the HAZOP. During the meeting the Leader has to keep the team to
schedule and not lose time on unfocused discussions.
communications/motivation skills
The Leader must be able to keep the team working together and motivate all
members of the team. The Leader should form a good working relationship with the
Secretary and supervise the Secretary's work to ensure that adequate minutes are
recorded. The Leader should also be able to produce a full Leader's report.
The competence of potential HAZOP Leaders should be judged using the criteria
described above. A scheme should also be developed for formal training, on-the-job
coaching, registering and monitoring the competencies of Leaders. The register of
competent HAZOP Leaders and secretaries should be established and maintained
within the Opco.
Appropriate selection for each study
The competency management system will include the level of expertise for each Leader.
This will vary from being approved to lead small studies within the local Opco to being
nominated as suitable to lead major studies for any Opcos. External consultants should
also be registered using a similar classification. The project manager is responsible for
specifying the level of independence required for the Leader, which will depend on the
size and importance of the project. In all cases the Leader should be selected from
outside the project team and, in a project involving a design contractor, from outside the
contractor's team.
The selection of a Leader for a given HAZOP should be based on:
the type and complexity of the facilities to be studied
the HAZOP and project experience of the rest of the team
availability of a suitably qualified Leader. A suitable Leader should be selected

from the following:
within the Opco
cross Opco Leader (from another Opco)
SIPM specialist
SIPM accredited consultant
locally accredited consultant.
HAZOP Secretary
HAZOP secretaries should have training and experience similar to that required by the
Leader. The Secretary should also be able to take minutes in a concise, accurate manner
using plain language.

VARIATIONS ON THE HAZOP TECHNIQUE
6.1
BATCH PROCESSES
The HAZOP method for batch processes deals with each part of the plant in exactly the
same manner as the more familiar method for continuous processes. Differences occur
when the team examines the changes in plant configuration as the steps in the batch
process are progressed.
Preparation
The preparation for the meeting involves considerably more effort than for a continuous
process. The status of the system changes frequently and in order to perform an
adequate study, the valve positions and process conditions must be adequately described
for each separate stage. As these are normally cyclical operations, a simple line diagram
alone gives a very incomplete picture and it may be necessary to prepare diagrams
showing the status of each line and vessel throughout the process. Operating
instructions, including logic diagrams or instrument sequence diagrams, are essential in
understanding the steps. For operator actions or procedures where they are physically
involved in the process (eg in charging vessels), rather than simply controlling the
process, their activities should be represented by means of process flow charts.
Timing
This is a variance on the meeting style only and should be undertaken at the same time
as the normal HAZOP studies of the plant.
Scope and purpose
As for Main HAZOP with the following additions: the processes are usually multi-stage;
the individual units multi-purpose; and the plant as a whole multi-product. Therefore
there is likely to be a large number of possible interconnections between units. The
operators may take part physically in some of the process activities such as removing
product from filters.
Documentation
As for a main HAZOP but including operations, valve configurations, and control issues
for the batch processes. Operating instructions are vital. Tables are required giving the
operation sequence, with charts showing the states of equipment during the cycle and
flow charts showing the operator's movements.
Sequence diagrams (batch processes)
For batch processes or where some complex procedures are being examined, it may be
appropriate for several copies of some PEFSs to be available. These should be marked up
to show the configuration of the valving, etc during the phases of a batch process or the
stages of the process.
6 Variations on the HAZOP Technique

Where the plant is computer-controlled, diagrams showing the steps of the computer
program are required.
Techniques
Time-dependent concepts (sooner/later) are added to the guide words. The method is
the same as normal but examines the changes in plant configuration as the steps in the
batch process are progressed.
Other additional general parameters which may be used include:
addition
maintenance
instrumentation
reaction
testing
sampling
service.
Team
As for Main HAZOP but with increased operator involvement.
Results
As for Main HAZOP.
FIGURE 6.1 BATCH PLANT GUIDE WORDS
GUIDE WORD
MEANING
EXAMPLE
NO
The activity/stage in the process is

not carried out or ceases
No reactant charged to the

process
MORE
Quantitative increase in stage or

activity
Longer batch time
LEES
Quantitative decrease in stage or

activity
Shorter batch time
AS WELL AS
A further stage or activity occurs in

addition to the original intention
Additional, unplanned process

operation
PART OF
The incomplete performance of a

stage or activity
Missing component
REVERSE
Inversion of the stage or activity
Heat rather than cool
SOONER/LATER THAN
A stage or activity occurring at the

wrong time relative to others
Batch discharged before

reaction completed
OTHER THAN
Something else happens
Wrong material charged
6.2
ACTIVITY BASED HAZOP
Definition
The activity HAZOP technique consists of the systematic critical search for deviations
and hazards applied to activities and the facilities involved in operations. The technique
examines sequences of mechanical and manual handling operations.
Timing
This is a type of meeting that can be held at any time in the project, the level of detail
and meeting technique being dependent on the timing selected.
Scope and purpose
Most EP facilities are continuous processes with relatively little operator control.
Activity-based studies may however be required for the small number of potentially
difficult activities that are not continuous, and do not form a part of the daily operations
workload. Such activities may be:
drilling
unloading at a jetty
well workover
shutdown.
Documentation
Drawings of the same quality as the Coarse or Main HAZOP are required, including,
where appropriate, PEFS and Cause and Effect diagrams. Descriptions of the
mechanical actions and operator activities for each phase of the operation will also be
needed.
Technique
The basic technique is the same as for other HAZOPs. Specific activity guide words, etc
are used. These include incorrect activity and the time/movement elements of movement
and early/late operation. Additional parameters included are: time, decision and
position.
Team
The core team is essentially the same as for normal HAZOP, although the Project,
Process and Instrument engineers may not be required full time and more operating
specialists are required.
Results
The recommendations from an activity HAZOP are not necessarily limited to the
operating procedures. Changes both to the design of the equipment and the operating
procedures may be suggested.
6.3
PROCEDURES HAZOP
Definition
The inclusion of procedures into a HAZOP study can be done either implicitly or
explicitly. During a normal study, procedures are considered implicitly as causes of
deviations along with other physical causes. Certain procedures can also be considered
as part of the protection (allowing for human error). This inclusion of procedures in a
normal study is not exhaustive and may lead to potential hazards and operability
problems being overlooked. Safety-critical procedures should be explicitly studied as a
primary document, with guide words applied directly to the steps in the procedure.
Timing
Procedures are unlikely to be available in sufficient detail until the Main or even Final
HAZOP. Procedures HAZOPs may be particularly beneficial for an existing (older) plant.
Scope and purpose
Procedures HAZOP meetings may include any operating procedure written for a plant
and may be conducted in addition to the normal HAZOP for that equipment item or
dealt with separately. They are usually conducted however on the activities such as:
commissioning
pigging
inspections
start-up
maintenance
plant testing
safety critical operating procedures.
The standard guide words of No, More, Less, As Well As, Part of, Reverse and Other
Than take slightly different meanings. These are described in Figure 6.2.
Team
The core team is essentially the same as for normal HAZOP but all the operating
specialists are required.
Results
The results will specifically affect the operating procedures and in some cases may have
an impact on the design of the equipment.
Figure 6.2 Meaning of procedures guide words

GUIDE WORD
NO
MEANING
The step in the procedure is not done
MORE
More is done than intended (eg valve fully instead of partially

opened)
LESS
Less is done than intended (eg purging time is reduced)
AS WELL AS
Other activities are carried out as well (eg several valves are opened
instead of one)
PART OF
The procedure is not fully performed (eg only single block is used
instead of double block)
REVERSE
The opposite of the intent (eg opening instead of closing a valve)
OTHER THAN
Something completely different (eg opening the wrong valve)
Procedures have a time element which is not explicit when considering continuous
operations. It may be necessary to increase the parameters and guide words that are
used to ensure that full consideration is given to the procedures under study (Figure
6.3).
FIGURE 6.3 ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES GUIDE WORDS
GUIDE WORD
MEANING
HOW
How is the step to be accomplished, eg are there adequate facilities

and instructions?
WHY
Is there a logical reason for the step, eg is it really needed?
WHEN
WHO
CHECK
When is the step undertaken relative to the rest of the process, eg is

the timing of the step important?
Who is to undertake the step and is he trained?
How can the completion of the step be checked and verified?

GLOSSARY
A glossary of commonly used terms in HSE is given in both EP 95-0100 HSE
Management Systems and EP 95-0300 Overview Hazards and Effects Management
Process.

Ep 95-0313 Hazop

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Descrizione originale:

Titolo originale

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Ep 95-0313 Hazop

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

General Foreword to EP HSE Manual

13 October 19950EP 95-0313

EP HSE Manual Amendment Record Sheet

General Foreword to EP HSE Manual

General Foreword to EP HSE Manual

EP HSE MANUAL OVERVIEW

a route map to more detailed references with guidance on their application

STRUCTURE AND CONTENT

General Foreword to EP HSE Manual

USING THE MANUAL

'may' indicates a possible course of action

RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER SYSTEMS

General Foreword to EP HSE Manual

DEPs and standards

BACKGROUND TO THE EP HSE MANUAL

General Foreword to EP HSE Manual

DEVELOPMENT OF EP HSE MANUAL

HSE Manual EP 95-0313 HAZOP

EP 95-0313 Revision 0 13 October 1995

HAZOP METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW

HAZOP TECHNIQUE OVERVIEW

HAZOP STUDY TECHNIQUE

NODE DEFINITION AND INTENTION

RISK ASSESSMENT RANKING (RISK MATRIX)

USE OF DOCUMENTATION DURING A STUDY18

2.10 TIME REQUIRED PER NODE AND STUDY DURATION

2.12 THE TEAM

2.12.1 TEAM SIZE

2.12.2 TEAM COMPOSITION

2.12.3 TEAM EXPERIENCE

THE ROLE OF HAZOP IN THE PROJECT LIFE-CYCLE

THE TIMING OF HAZOP STUDIES WITHIN THE PROJECT LIFE-CYCLE

3.2.1 TIMING AND DOCUMENTATION

3.2.2 SCOPE AND PURPOSE

3.3.1 TIMING AND DOCUMENTATION

3.3.2 SCOPE AND PURPOSE

3.4.1 TIMING AND DOCUMENTATION

EP 95-0313 Revision 0 13 October 1995

HSE Manual EP 95-0313 HAZOP

MINOR CHANGE (MINI-) HAZOPS

3.6.1 PLANTS IN OPERATION

3.6.2 REVAMP/MODIFICATION PROJECTS (BROWN-FIELD DEVELOPMENTS) 34

INTERFACE WITH THE HSE CASE

HAZOP RECORDING AND REPORTING39

RECORDING THE RESULTS OF MEETINGS39

4.1.2 USE OF THE HAZOP WORKSHEET

4.2.1 COMMERCIAL HAZOP PACKAGES

4.2.2 MINUTE-TAKING AND DISPLAY

HAZOP LEADER'S REPORT

4.3.2 QUALITY OF THE STUDY

4.3.3 AREAS OF POTENTIAL WEAKNESS

4.3.4 COMMENTS APPLICABLE TO THE WHOLE PLANT

4.3.6 FURTHER STUDIES REQUIRED

4.3.7 HIGHLIGHT AREAS FOR NEXT HAZOP

4.3.8 REPORTS/COMMENTS FOR OTHER SAFETY MEETINGS/STUDIES

4.4.2 COMPLETION STATEMENTS

4.4.3 OVERLAPPING RECOMMENDATIONS

IMPLICATION FOR VENDOR, CONTRACTOR AND CLIENT 51

AUDIT/REVIEW OF THE HAZOP PROCESS AND FOLLOW-UP

EP 95-0313 Revision 0 13 October 1995

CLOSE-OUT OF ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS

ROLE OF THE HAZOP LEADER AND SECRETARY 57