Middle East Institute

Reinterpreting Authoritarian Power: Syria's Hereditary Succession

Author(s): Joshua Stacher
Source: Middle East Journal, Vol. 65, No. 2, Richard B. Parker Memorial Issue (Spring 2011), pp.
197-212
Published by: Middle East Institute
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23012145
Accessed: 29-10-2015 20:22 UTC
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Authoritarian

Reinterpreting
Syria's

Power:

Succession

Hereditary

Joshua

Stacher

When Hafiz al-Asad died in 2000, his son Bashar became Syria's president. By
examining an unresolved inconsistency in the leading accounts about Syria's suc
cession, this article reveals the limitations of single-person rule analysis as the
explanation for Syria's hereditary leadership selection. I provide an al
ternative explanation by emphasizing the role of senior elites informing regime

causal

consensus

around

Bashar

al-Asad's

candidacy.

there

successions,

Hereditary

continuity rather than one likely to end

fore, reveal an instance of authoritarian

in regime breakdown.

al-Asad died on June 10, 2000 after nearly 30 years at the helm of one of the
Middle East's most volatile regimes. Syria witnessed 15 successful coup d'etats be
tween 1949-1970,' external wars with Israel (1948, 1967, and 1973), vicious Pan-Arab
competition with regional states,2 and a near civil war between 1976-1984.3 Al-Asad
Hafiz

slowed the raucous domestic political upheavals by stitching together a "hard" state
compared to its regional counterparts.4
Much of the literature on Syria seems to suggest that the country requires a strong,
repressive leader to offset the state's early proclivity for regime turnover.As Flynt Leverett

argues, al-Asad transformed a coup-ridden "semi-state into a veritable model of authori

tarian stability."5The country's politics are often explained through a sectarian lens, since
al-Asad hailed from Syria's minority Alawi sect.6 Other accounts describe al-Asad's polit
ical dominance through the "personalized rule" framework.7 Using this framework, how
ever, influences how central events such as presidential succession are explained.

Professor in the Department of Political Science at Kent State University. He

is currently completing a book that compares institutions and co-optation to explain authoritarian durability
in Egypt and Syria. The author wishes to thank Jason Brownlee for his instructive suggestions on previous
Joshua Stacher is an Assistant

comments
drafts of this manuscript. Also, Lisa Anderson's
improved this article immensely.
reditary Succession
Its Practice

1. James T. Quinlivin,
national

Security,

Kerr, The Arab

2. Malcolm
University

Press,

3. Raymond
CO:

4. Steven

Press,

University

5. Flynt Leverett,
Press,

2005),

6. Nicolas
Ba'th

7. Patrick

MIDDLE

Seale,

I.B.
Asad:

Power

Authoritarian

and Consequences
A Study of Ideology

MESA

in the Middle
in Politics

panel

on He

East,"

Inter

(London:

Oxford

Authoritarianism
Press,

1999),

Syria:

The Struggle
Tauris,

and

State

Formation

in Ba'thist

and

Social

Conflict

Trial by Fire (Washington,

DC:

Brookings

in Syria:

Institutions

1946-1970

pp. 18-22.

Bashar's

for Power in Syria:

pp. 62-71.

Politics

and

Society

Institution

under Asad

and

the

1979),

The Struggle

for the Middle

East

(Berkeley,

CA:

University

1988).
EAST JOURNAL VOLUME

(Boulder,

Syria

291-299.

pp. 281-286,

Inheriting

p. 28.
Van Dam,

Party (London:

Press,

1990),

Heydemann,

Cornell

Cold

p. 134.
War 1958-1967:

at the 2008

1967).
Hinnebusch,

Westview

(Ithaca:

"Coup-Proofing:
Vol. 24, No. 2 (1999),

as discussant

65, NO. 2, SPRING 2011

DOI: 10.3751/65.2.11

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

of California

198 MIDDLE

EAST JOURNAL

Al-Asad's death in 2000 gripped the region. The leader was widely rumored to
be preparing his son, Bashar, for the presidency. Some, however, speculated that his
offspring's succession was far from certain.8 Israeli intelligence learned of al-Asad's
death five hours before the media reported it but "held back" public reports so as not
to invite a contentious transfer of power on its border.9 Instead of a contested succes
sion process in a potentially unstable environment, Syria seamlessly became the first
hereditary republic in the Arab world.
The day that al-Asad's death was announced, Parliament amended the constitution
to lower the eligibility age for presidential candidates, while the security forces closed
airports and sealed the Syrian and Lebanese borders to prevent outside opposition fig
ures from entering the country to challenge the process. During the next 48 hours,
the ruling Ba'th party's leadership inserted al-Asad's son at the top of its command
structure as the military promoted and named him the armed forces' commander-in
chief. The interim President dutifully oversaw Parliament's unanimous nomination of
Bashar as the lone candidate for a national referendum. On the one-month anniversary

of his father's passing, Bashar received over 97% of votes cast in the referendum. The
inauguration occurred a week later. In order to anoint him, senior elites from across the

political establishment proved swift in their decision-making and capable of sustaining

the uncontested execution of consensus over a period of five weeks.
Rather than focus on the elites' coordinated

response across the institutions of

the
and
the military, scholars emphasize
Parliament,
ruling party, security services,
the personalized character of Syria's hereditary succession. Since Hafiz al-Asad pre
sumably designated his son as heir, his incomplete preparation appears irrelevant. The
implication is that al-Asad's servants of power unhesitatingly installed his son. The
President's dominating political reach appeared as extensive in death as it had been
in life. Egyptian intellectual Sa'ad Eddin Ibrahim quickly coined the term, "Jumali
kaya," which combines the Arabic words for "republic" and "monarchy" to describe
the

event.10

The

personalized

rule

narrative

continues

to prevail

as

the

literature's

ex

planatory norm over ten years after Syria's succession. This article contends that this
narrative is at best a partial explanation.
An alternative narrative emerges after reviewing the single-person rule accounts
of Syria's hereditary succession as well as examining information supplied by regime

elites since the event. This article unpacks the puzzle of why elites settle on hereditary
successors using the case of Syria. The argument is that senior elites" from different
state institutions'2 cooperate in forming a consensus during autocratic leadership selec

8. Douglass
Jehl, "Aide Says
York Times, August 6, 1999.
9. "Israel

'Held

Back'

Report

the Possibility
on Assad

of Succession

Death,"

BBC

News,

of Assad's

Son is Undecided,"

June 12, 2000,

The New

http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/

hi/world/monitoring/media_reports/787840.stm.
10. Sa'ad Eddin Ibrahim, "How I Spent my Summer
ture by the Professor of Sociology
11. By "senior elites," I mean
This would include, for example,

Vacation: Diary of a Prisoner of Conscience"

(lec
University in Cairo, Cairo, Egypt, September 2000).
the individuals
that occupy leadership
in state institutions.
positions
members of the ruling party's regional command,
min
government
at the American

isters, heads

of intelligence
and senior military generals.
agencies,
12. By "institutions,"
I mean state structures that contribute to the security and bureaucracy
of
In the case of Syria, this includes the institutions of the Ba'th Party, the military, security
governance.
services, and Parliament.

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SYRIA'S

HEREDITARY

199

SUCCESSION

tions. Rather than invite a struggle for power that may threaten the regime's survival,
senior

elites

will

and

bandwagon

to preserve

compromise

the system.13

Re-conceptualizing Bashar's succession as a process guided by senior elites acti

vates their role in the collective consensus-making process. Because such elites operate
and

are

by the

supported

state's

various

the structures

institutions,

become

instruments

of ensuring that the regime consensus is implemented. As hereditary succession is a

phenomenon on the rise,14 injecting notions of elite consensus and collective decision
making contribute to explaining how power functions during autocratic leadership suc
cessions. These findings extend beyond Syria and apply to other authoritarian regimes
confronting hereditary leadership selections.

I pursue this inquiry by reviewing the theoretical developments within authoritar

ian studies before relating them to single-person rule accounts of Syrian politics. Then,
a discussion of Syria's succession exposes the inherent contradictions in personalized
rule frameworks. This is followed by a theoretical examination of hereditary succession
before returning to an explanation of why Syrian elites consented to a hereditary suc

claims for other authoritarian

cession. The article concludes by providing generalizable

political systems based on the Syrian experience.

THEORETICAL

CONCERNS

The literature on non-democratic governments outlines different types of autocra

cies.15 Although existing theories explore party dictatorships,16 military regimes,17 and
bureaucratic-authoritarianism,18 the literature on authoritarianism historically focuses
on a system's personalized character or the blending of a leader's personality with a
state's institutions. Both classifications emphasize the absolute weakness of authori

tarian institutions. While scholarship on other regions has advanced, personalized or

single-person rule remains the predominant theoretical staple of authoritarian studies
in the Middle East and Africa.
Rosberg and Jackson's book Personal Rule in Black Africa aptly characterizes this
branch

of literature.

ernment,

where

They

that

argue
take

persons

such

precedent

maintain

regimes
over

where

rules,

"non-institutionalized
the

gov

is not

officeholder

effec

in monarchical
with Herb's
13. This argument draws similarities
study on "elite bandwagoning"
Revolu
transitions in the Arabian Gulf. See Michael
Herb, All in the Family: Absolutism,
leadership
NY:
in
the
Middle
East
SUNY
and
Press, 1999).
tion,
(Albany,
Democracy
in the past 14 years. Until the political uprisings
14. There are six cases of hereditary succession
would be
of the Arab world began in January 2011, it was thought that such hereditary successions
attempted

in Egypt, Yemen,
still remains

rial Guinea
15. Paul
lian Press,

Brooker,
2000),

16. Samuel

pp. 24-25,

Huntington,

and Clement

Huntington
of Established

One-Party

17. Amos

Perlmutter,

and Revolutionary
18. David
sity Press,

primed

Collier,

Government,

& Politics

(London:

Macmil

37-58.
and Institutional

"Social

Systems

The Military
(New

York:

(New

Basic

of One-Party

Dynamics

eds., Authoritarian

Henry Moore,

Soldiers

Theory,

Regimes:

of Equito

transfer of power.

to attempt a hereditary

Non-Democratic

case

only the non-Arab

in the near future. Currently,

and Libya

Politics

Books,

in Modern

in Modern

Times:

CT: Yale

University

Press,

The New Authoritarianism

Society:

in Samuel

The Dynamics

1970).

and Politics

Haven,

Systems,"

in Latin America

On Professionals,

Praetorians,

1977).
(Princeton,

NJ: Princeton

1979).

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Univer

200 MIDDLE

EAST JOURNAL

tively bound by his office and is able to change its authority and powers to suit his own
or political

personal

...

needs

the state

of men

is a government

not laws."19

and

Scholars

continue to recast this argument. When autocrats undermine institutions and strengthen
the state they merge state and regime. Barely constrained by other actors or agencies,
such rulers personify the state. This produces a "sultanistic regime."20 As Chehabi and

Linz argue, "Sultanistic leaders do not conceal the highly personalistic nature of their
rule. Outwardly this personalism has two facets: a pronounced cult of personality around
the leader or a tendency towards dynasticism."21 Although ruling parties, militaries, or
ministries represent the state and are present, they do not serve as sites for political
contestation. Rather, these institutions exist as flimsy facades to placate Western gov
ernments.22 Such institutions and political systems are understood to be inherently weak
and prone to collapse if confronted with a challenge or moment of uncertainty.

An example of the second scholarly branch is neo-patrimonialism. Neo-patri

monialism focuses on an institutional type of personalism. Bratton and van de Walle
explain neo-patrimonialism as "political systems in which the customs and patterns of
co-exist with, and suffuse, rational-legal institutions. As with classic
patrimonialism, the right to rule in neo-patrimonial regimes is ascribed to a person
rather than to an office, despite the official existence of a written constitution."23 While

patrimonialism

the authors mention institutions, the latter serve as exploitable fagades without vested
political power. Personalized rulers rely on the institutions as safety valves to relieve
social tension or overcome challenges. A neo-patrimonial institution, therefore, is not
well positioned to defend itself against a power-hungry dictator wishing to appropriate
the appearance

of structural

from

autonomy

the executive.

Legions of scholars use the theory of neo-patrimonialism to examine various pro

cedural aspects in authoritarian regimes. These works focus on the many legal and
institutional manipulations autocracies pursue to maintain power. Diamond's concept

of "hybrid regimes" is particularly prominent in the literature. Hybrid regimes main

tain "the existence of formally democratic political institutions, such as multi-party
electoral competition, that mask the reality of authoritarian domination."24 Competitive
authoritarianism examines how "formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as
the principle means of obtaining and exercising political authority."25 Elections, leg
islatures, judiciaries, and the media become areas of contestation where "opposition
forces may periodically challenge, weaken, and occasionally even defeat autocratic
incumbents."26 Such regimes fall into governing purgatories because

19. Robert
Prophet,

H. Jackson

Tyrant (Berkeley,

and Carl

G. Rosberg,

and Linz,

23. Michael

Bratton

tions in Comparative
24.

Larry

Diamond,

Rule

in Black

of California
Press, 1982),
University
and Juan Linz, eds., Sultanistic
Regimes

20. Houchang
E. Chehabi
kins University Press, 1998), pp. 10-11.
21. Chehabi
and Linz, Sultanistic
Regimes,
22. Chehabi

Personal

CA:

Sultanistic

Regimes,

and Nicolas

Perspectives
"Thinking

About

Africa:

Prince,

Autocrat,

p. 10.
MD:

(Baltimore,

Johns Hop

p. 13.
p. 18.

van de Walle,
(Cambridge,

they are neither

Democratic

UK:

Hybrid

Experiments

Cambridge

Regimes,"

University

Journal

in Africa:
Press,

of Democracy,

Regime

1997),
Vol.

Transi

p. 62.
13, No.

(April 2002), p. 24.

25. Steven
mocracy,

Levitsky and Lucan Way, "The

13, No. 2 (April 2002), p. 52.

Vol.

26. Levitsky

and Way, "The

Rise

Rise

of Competitive

of Competitive

Authoritarianism,"

Authoritarianism,"

Journal

p. 54.

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of De

SYRIA'S

HEREDITARY

201

SUCCESSION

fully democratic nor fully authoritarian.

A number of studies examine the role of elections and parties in the abstract.
For example, Schedler's electoral authoritarianism concept "takes seriously both the
authoritarian quality these regimes possess and the electoral procedures they put into
practice."27 This authoritarian type is distinct from single-person regimes because "it
limits the degree of personalism" since organizations are at the center of even asym

metrical electoral competition.28 In this theory, the analytic focus is between the state,
citizens, and the opposition parties. Senior elites within state institutions are assumed
to be part of the leader's circle. As such, the state's political elites are passive actors. A
chief criticism of this literature is that it fails to show how surrounding actors and institu
tions affect significant events and decisions. Recently, scholars have been reconsidering
the importance of senior elites and state institutions in authoritarian political systems.
Academic works that explain the durability of authoritarian regimes from insti
tutional or elite power-sharing perspectives are gaining traction in authoritarian stud

ies.29 In these works, personalities operate within a structural framework that constrains
their options and shapes their preferences.30 Institutions become "the nerve center of
authoritarianism"31 because they explain regime collapse and survival. Institutions, such
as a ruling party, maintain non-personalized attributes that encourage and facilitate elite
cooperation. As Brownlee argues, "ruling parties underpin durable authoritarianism by
providing a political setting for mediating elite disputes and preventing defections to
the opposition."32 Slater agrees, and observes that institutions limit a ruler's governing
abilities. As he argues, "Highly institutionalized authoritarian regimes also typically
exhibit regularized succession mechanisms and collective decision-making procedures
that curtail

a ruler's

personal

power."33

Scholars previously viewed authoritarian institutions as weak because they were

personalized. Yet, as the case of Malaysia reveals, "Unlike democracies, authoritarian
regimes can be highly personalized and highly institutionalized at the same time."34 The
institutions of authoritarian governments are gaining importance within the academy
as units of analysis. Consequently, such institutional analysis, which focuses on how

27. Andreas

in Andreas Schedler,
"The Logic of Electoral
Authoritarianism,"
ed., Elec
The Dynamics
CO: Lynne Rienner Pub
(Boulder,
of Unfree Competition

Schedler,

toral Authoritarianism:
p. 5.
28. Schedler,
"The

lisher, 2006),
29.

Dan

Democratization

Comparative
"Power

and Adam

Political

Sharing

30. Ellen

2 (April

UK:

Press,

32. Brownlee,
33. Dan
Power

2007),

Cambridge

in Malaysia,"
"Iron

"Iron

Cage

Comparative
Cage

2007),

in Authoritarian

pp.

Regimes,"

of

and the Regeneration

2 (December
and

Institutions

11 (November

Asia

2, No.

2006),

the Survival

1-22;

of Autocrats,"

Milan

W. Svolik,

Journal

of Political

1279-1301;
American

pp.

pp. 477494.
Conflict

in the Arab

University

Press,

World:

Incumbents,

Opponents,

and Institu

2005).

in the Age of Democratization

(Cambridge,

UK:

Cambridge

p. 10.

Authoritarianism

Slater,

34. Slater,

Structuring

Authoritarianism

31. Jason Brownlee,

"Authoritarian

Dynamics
2009),

Vol.

of Democracy,

Vol. 40, No.

Studies,

Lust-Okar,

tions (Cambridge,
University

Przeworski,

and Leadership

Vol. 53, No.

Science,

Journal

Taiwan

Theory,"

Jennifer Gandhi

p. 14.
Southeast

Authoritarianism,"
Logic of Electoral
"The Architecture
of Authoritarianism:

Slater,

in the Age of Democratization,

p. 42.
Institutions
Authoritarian

in an Iron Fist:
Politics,

Vol. 36, No.

1 (October

2003),

and the Personalization

p. 81.

in an Iron Fist," p. 84.

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of

202 MIDDLE

EAST JOURNAL

senior elites develop and execute their consensus, is more useful in explaining au
thoritarian durability than personalized accounts. Conceptualizing institutions as such
makes them vehicles that support the system's agents and help to explain authoritarian
durability. As Gandhi argues, "By now, it should be evident that dictators do not rule

alone. They govern with institutions that are particular to their type."35
Despite this shift in the literature, some analysts continue to describe the workings
of authoritarian regimes based on a regime's personalized character. The case of Syria
is a clear example of this. Research employing historically-grounded, institutionally
based, or path-dependent approaches remains underutilized when discussing Bashar
al-Asad's succession.36 Rather, Syria's hereditary succession reinvigorates descriptions
of a personalized political order. Indeed, a number of publications that explain suc

cession and ongoing political struggles only consider the personality of Bashar or the
"new guard-old guard" frame.37 Interviews carried out in Syria between 2003-2005
also show that even many opposition analysts understand the country's politics in such
terms.38

As

the

unfolding

tions of how power works or succession

SYRIA'S SINGLE-PERSON

such

illustrate,

arguments

accounts

are

incomplete

presenta

unfolded in Syria.

RULE

With an overly invasive personality cult, which Wedeen's scholarship masterfully

chronicles,39 the Syrian government portrayed Hafiz al-Asad as the state. The scholarship
on Syria also disproportionately reflects on his personality. Few will easily forget the
powerful anecdotes that Seale shares in his exhaustive biography on al-Asad. The most
striking incident occurs during the climax of a near coup in 1984. When the paramilitary
units of al-Asad's brother (Rifa'at) encircle the capital during his standoff with al-Asad,
the president unleashes the starkest of statements. As Seale wrote, "the brothers were at
last face to face. 'You want to overthrow the regime?' Asad asked. 'Here I am. I am the
regime.'"40 In addition to Kissenger's descriptive41 and Friedman's sensationalist42 ac
counts, many understand Syria's politics and stability though al-Asad's personality.
In works that examine the state's institutions, such as Perthes' important book, al
Asad is positioned above any institutional constraints in an "authoritarian presidential

35. Jennifer Gandhi,

Press,

36. Raymond

Hinnebusch,

Authoritarianism
University

Political

Institutions

Under

York:

(New

Dictatorship

Cambridge

University

p. 34.

2008),

in Syria;

Press,

37. Volker

Revolution

Syria:

David

Waldner,

from Above

State Building

(London:

and Late

2001);

Routledge,

Heydemann,

(Ithaca,

Development

NY:

Cornell

1999).

Perthes,

"The

Political

'Abd

al-Hamid

Economy

of Syrian

Succession,"

Survival,

Vol. 43, No.

1 (2001),

pp. 146-148.
38. Ammar
Syria, December

1, 2003;

Syria electronic

newsletter),

39. Lisa
Syria

40. Seale,
41. Henry
42. Thomas

of al-Thawra

28, 2003;

interviews

and March

Project),
2, 2005.

by the author, November

interviews
Ayman

9, 2003

Politics, Rhetoric,
of Domination:
of
Press, 1999).
University
Chicago
Asad:
The Struggle for the Middle East, p. 435.

Wedeen,

(Chicago:

(co-founder

December

Ambiguities

Years of Upheaval
Little, Brown
(Boston:
Kissenger,
L. Friedman,
From Beirut to Jerusalem
(New York:

by the author, Damascus,

'Abd al-Nour

and December
and

Symbols

and Co.,

1982),

Farrar, Straus,

(Editor

of All 4

22,2003.
in Contemporary

pp. 431-436.
and Giroux,

pp. 76-105.

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1989),

SYRIA'S
system

with

distinct

traits."43

neo-patrimonial

HEREDITARY

Senior

elites

and

203

SUCCESSION
structures

matter

only

second to the President, despite suggesting that the regime is de-emphasizing his cult of
personality. Throughout the book, the President remains the consummate puppet mas
ter managing feckless political elites. As Perthes argues, "The Party was transformed
... In addition, an institutional frame was built which, if needed, would allow Asad to
balance

the

party

other

against

forces."44

political

Works

antithetical

or neo-patrimonial readings of Syrian politics are either overlooked

when explaining Syria's succession.45

to personalized

or not considered

In the academic

literature as well as the popular media, there is an overwhelming

consensus that Hafiz al-Asad "groomed" his son to take over the presidency. Journalists
contemplate the reforming image of the younger al-Asad because he is an ophthalmolo
gist who lived in London before returning to Syria after his brother (Basil, the original
heir apparent) died in a car accident in January 1994.46 Rather than make his own deci

sion, the President's son is always described as being "recalled" or "summoned" by his
father to start the process of assuming power.47 Other journalists focus on the details of
the son's ascent within the Syrian military as well as the personnel purges conducted in
the years prior to his becoming President.48 The consequence of either narrative confirms
and reinforces the elder al-Asad's position as the state. Such analysis suggests that Hafiz
al-Asad unilaterally managed succession with minimal consultation from his elites.
The academic explanation of the country's impending hereditary succession also
reflects on Syria's personalized system. Zisser published extensively on al-Asad's push
to make his son President. He argues that al-Asad's succession plans for Bashar were
an "open secret" after Basil's death, credits the President with overseeing the ousting
of the "old guard" in the army and intelligence services, attacking the remnants of his
brother's loyalists, and transferring the important "Lebanon folder" to his heir's pur
view.49 Al-Asad's desire for his son to follow him comes at the expense of the country's
other pressing issues. As Zisser argues, "Syria reached an impasse in the final decade
of his rule. To make matters worse, this decline took place at a time when the regime
found itself faced with many urgent issues: succession, socioeconomic
crisis, global
ization,

ferment

in Lebanon,

and

relations

with

Israel.

In a word,

al-Asad

left his

son

a country in total decline."50 Although Bashar is not formally installed when his father
dies, he becomes president "as smoothly as though his father were still alive,"51 which
transmits al-Asad's omnipotent political reach.
Zisser is industrious in his scholarship

43. Volker

Perthes, The Political

44. Perthes,

The Political

45. Gandhi,

Political

46. Derek

Brown,

47. James Bennet,

Commonwealth

Economy

Economy
A Family

"The Enigma

Office, "Middle

Under Asad

Under

of Syria
Under

Institutions

"Syria:

of Syria

and he reiterates this version of events

Asad,

(London:

I.B. Tauris,

1995),

p. 133.

p. 135.

Dictatorship.

Business,"

of Damascus,"

The Guardian,

June 12, 2000.

The New York Times Magazine,

East & North Africa:

Syria," revision

as of Sept.

July 10,2005;
17,2010,

Foreign

http://www.

fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/country-profiles/middle-east-north-africa/syria?profile=politics&pg=7.
The New York Times, May
Son as his Successor,"
48. Douglas
Jehl, "Syrian President Positions

9,

1999.
49. Eyal Zisser, "Will Bashshar al-Asad Last?," Middle
al-Asad
50. Zisser, "Will Bashshar
Last?," p. 10.
51. Zisser,

"Will

Bashshar

al-Asad

Last?"

East

Quarterly,

Vol. 7, No. 3 (2000),

p. 12.

This content downloaded from 192.188.55.10 on Thu, 29 Oct 2015 20:22:12 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

pp. 8-10.

204 MIDDLE

EAST JOURNAL

in subsequent
but

the

peer-reviewed publications.52 In each rendering, the narrative develops

state's

remains

character

consistent.

Zisser

First,

whether

questions

the

new

President will survive in power because he lacks his father's toughness.53 In another
article, Bashar is portrayed as lacking control of the Ba'th party, intelligence services,
or the military. As he states, "it is not clear who is running Syria or where the country
is headed."54 The difference between the father and the son is linked to personality.
As Zisser argues, "if any difference does exist between the two men, it has less to do
with their policies and outlooks than with the fact that the father was perceived as an
authoritative and powerful leader, while the son's image remains that of an upstart."55
Many of the other scholars that write about Bashar's Syria uncritically accept Zisser's
personalized model and echo his assumptions.
Although nuances and differences exist, books by Leverett and Lesch use the
leader's personality to explain the political system. Institutions, such as the party and
military, exist in these works but they do not contribute in constraining the Syrian presi

dent. Leverett is explicit about Hafiz al-Asad's centrality and describes him as standing
above the institutional arena. This leads to al-Asad's failure to "develop a succession
mechanism that was not completely personalized" as well as a political system without

the "substantive capabilities of a modern executive."56

Lesch's book is devoid of judgments about the younger al-Asad's intentions. Yet,
there are signifiers that point to personalized politics. For example, Lesch compares
Bashar to the Michael Corleone character in the Godfather films. Just as Corleone is
a reluctant leader of a mafia family, so is Bashar a reluctant president drawn into the
"family business."57 He notes that "there was only a facade of institutionalism present
at the time of Hafiz al-Asad's death, and the constant reference to how the institutional
apparatus brought Bashar to power is disingenuous, and, at best, wishful thinking."58
Lesch ultimately admits that had Syria had an institutional process, succession would
have likely been a "much more ugly affair."59
The intellectual production based on the theory of personalized rule constructs a
restrictive framework for understanding Syrian politics despite these scholars' useful
contributions. Al-Asad's patrimonial rule dominates the political landscape so entirely
that even after his death, the senior elites in the ruling party, bureaucracy, military, and
intelligence services do his bidding. They ensure hereditary succession and the estab
lishment of a family's ruling dynasty. As Leverett argues,

52.

In addition

Transition
Syria?,"

(New
Middle

to the aforementioned
York:

East

Zisser,

York

Quarterly,

In or Out of the New

Eyal

New
World

Commanding

Vol.

East

al-Asad

see,

2001);

1 (2003),

Middle

Bashar

please

Press,

10, No.

Order?,"

Syria:

article

University

Eyal

Eyal
pp.

Quarterly,

and the First

15-23;
Vol.

Asad's

Zisser,

Zisser,

"Does

Eyal

Zisser,

28, No.

Years

Legacy:

Bashar

"Bashar

3 (2005),

in Power

Syria

al-Assad

(London:

al-Assad:

pp.

115-131;

I.B.

Tauris,

2007).
53. Zisser,

"Will

Bashshar

54. Zisser,

"Does

Bashar

55. Zisser,

"Bashar

56. Leverett,
57. David

al-Assad:

Inheriting

Lesch,

al-Asad
al-Assad

Syria,

Last?,"

p. 10.

Rule

Syria?," p. 23.
In or Out of The New World

Order?,"

p. 115.

p. 28.

The New Lion of Damascus

(New

58. Lesch,

The New

Lion

of Damascus,

p. 80.

59. Lesch,

The New

Lion

of Damascus,

p. 80.

Haven,

CT: Yale University

Press, 2005),

This content downloaded from 192.188.55.10 on Thu, 29 Oct 2015 20:22:12 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

in

Rule

pp. 2-3.

SYRIA'S
this [grooming]

Through
within

the Asad
in the end,

deed,

convenience
smooth

process,
the inner

family,

there seemed

between

Bashar

HEREDITARY

not a hint of opposition

circle,

or the military

to be a fairly well
and the key pillars

SUCCESSION

to Bashar
and

understood
of Hafiz's

was

security

heard

from

apparatus.

arrangement
regime

205

In

of mutual

that facilitated

transition.60

The ramification of such an explanation is that senior elites exist only to carry out
an autocrat's directives. Thus, these elites are shown to be faceless and voiceless in the
process of a hereditary succession.

SYRIA'S LEADERSHIP

SELECTION

the succession with tremendous discipline. As

Bashar's
succession ritual before Hafiz was even in the
Quilty reports, "They began
what
was
not
the work of elites unconsciously following a
ground."61 Yet,
transpired
dead president's command. The evidence indicates that leading elites from the central
Syria's

senior elites executed

regime branches united behind Bashar's candidacy unanimously. The elites came to
a decision about al-Asad's successor and then returned to their home institutions to
ensure that the consensus

was executed without disruption or dissent. The elites, who

derived power bases from their positions within these institutions, consulted with each
other in the lead-up to selecting Bashar and then delivered the party, Parliament, mili
tary, or intelligence services' support.
After the President's death was pronounced officially on June 10, 2000, Parlia
ment convened immediately to glorify his reign. The assembly unanimously voted to
amend constitutional Article 83 to lower the age of an eligible president from 40 to
34, which was Bashar's age. The constitutional amendment's precision is notable as
Bashar's younger brother, Mahir, was 33 at the time. While Mahir neither made public
claims to the presidency nor was visibly groomed, the regime's caution appears linked
to his position as a colonel in the elite Republican Guard.
The
secured

security
in Syria

services
and

and

Lebanon.62

military

went

In reference

on high
to any

alert

as airports

unauthorized

and

borders

or unscreened

were
presi

dential contenders, Ba'thist leader and parliamentary speaker 'Abd al-Qadar Qadora
stated that no individual would be permitted to "affect the security situation in the
country."63 The Ba'th party's Regional Command nominated al-Asad's son for presi
dent on the same day. The next day, Vice President and Interim President 'Abd al-Halim
Khaddam promoted the son to the position of the armed forces' Commander-in-Chief
following the military's recommendation.
The succession process formally continued at the 9th party congress held June
17-20, 2000. As a journalist covering the event recalls, "The death of Hafiz al-Asad
the previous week undermined the original agenda, and the congress was hurriedly
transformed into a forum to legitimize the heir apparent."64 Bashar al-Asad was elected

60. Leverett,

Inheriting

63. Jarrah, "Changing

64. Quilty,

"The

p. 68.
June 30, 2000.
of Mourning,"
Middle East International,
Middle East International,
June 16, 2000.
the Guard in Damascus,"

Syria,

61. Jim Quilty, "The Politics

62. Najm Jarrah, "Changing

the Guard

Politics

in Damascus."

of Mourning."

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206 MIDDLE

EAST JOURNAL

to his father's former post of party Secretary-General. The congress also named him
"leader of the party and people." Despite the grandiose propaganda that advertised that
the first Ba'th congress in 15 years would introduce reform, continuity reigned. As
Quilty remarked, "the old guard was not overturned, but supplemented."65
Parliament formally voted to nominate Bashar al-Asad for president on June 26.
Rather than wait 90 days to conduct a national referendum, the Vice President sched
uled it for July 10. The sole candidate obtained 97.2% of the vote. Some observers
noted that the high percentage did not reflect public support. Rather, the support mani
fested the approval of the elite's institutional bases of the military, intelligence services,

ruling party, and bureaucracy.66 One week after the referendum, on July 17, Bashar was
inaugurated, establishing the firsthereditary succession in an Arab republic.
Did Hafiz al-Asad want his son to succeed him? Possibly, but his personal wishes

did not predetermine the outcome. The events suggest that top elites from different
parts of the state developed a consensus on Bashar's candidacy. This required leading
elites in the military, intelligence services, and ruling party to cooperate in forming a
consensus as well as delivering their institution's support. It is in this respect that elites
had to agree and subsequently act to prevent elite dissent and factionalism. As Hin
nebusch

concludes,

"The

actual

than an institutional-mediated

outcome

was

remarkably

smooth

but

something

less

succession:

the party and army elite closed ranks and,

to prevent a power struggle, ratified the process Hafiz had began, but not completed."67
This explanation differs from the personalized rendering of Syria's succession. Instead,

the alternative analysis activates the role of senior elite participation. Suggesting that
Syria's institutions determined who succeeded Hafiz al-Asad is inaccurate. Yet, the
oretical blind spots unsurprisingly remain because the predominant interpretation of

Syrian politics relies on single-person rule accounts.

The fact that power is expressed non-violently during a delicate and uncertain
event such as a presidential selection indicates that, while institutions do not operate in
accordance with a classic definition,68 top elites require institutional platforms to actu

alize the political processes. Elites, privileged by the virtue of their command of these
institutions, are positioned to guide and preside over the power transfer. Otherwise,
these individuals would have had no status or ability to act in this way.

THE PARADOX OF PERSONALISM

In the accounts of single-person rule, intuition about how succession operates asks
scholars to accept incredible assumptions. For example, the fruits of Hafiz al-Asad's
labor and engineering explain the son's succession. One could anticipate that his prema
ture death may have invited elites to struggle for control. One of the chief arguments that

Chehabi and Linz make is that personalistic regimes tend to break up as the leader fades
from the arena. In their words, "A sultanistic regime can endure a long time, but experi

65. Quilty, "The Politics of Mourning."

66. Correspondent,
Bashar," Middle
"Consolidating
67. Raymond
"Modern Syrian Politics,"
Hinnebusch,
68.
UK:

Douglass

Cambridge

North,

Institutions,

University

Press,

Institutional

East

International,

History

Compass,

and

Economic

Change

July 14, 2000.

Vol. 6, No.

1 (2008),

Performance

1990).

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

p. 274.

(Cambridge,

SYRIA'S

HEREDITARY

SUCCESSION

207

ences show that most end in more or less a chaotic way,"69 particularly because such
regimes "disintegrate" when "faced with a serious challenge."70 And yet, succession oc
curs as if al-Asad's

hand is on the tiller throughout the installation. Upon closer review,

a paradox in the personalized account of Syria's hereditary succession stands out.
Zisser's work is illustrative of the fallacies in single-person treatments of authori
tarianism. Since his early and numerous publications serve as the scholastic foundation
for others,71the description of the Syrian state as built solely on personalized institutions
is problematic. In the same publications that detail the President's meticulous and focused
preparation for his son to follow him, al-Asad is also portrayed as a detached and sick
ened leader who is incapable of leading. Numerous examples elucidate the inconsistency
of a dying leader who is also subjugating any and all elite and institutional politics.
The decline of al-Asad's health during the 1990s features prominently in person
alized accounts. Zisser refers to him as the "hidden" president. He notes that al-Asad
only delivers two public speeches between 1994 and 2000 because of his health.72 Al
mental prowess is also characterized as in steady decline. At the March 2000
al-Asad-Clinton presidential meeting in Geneva, the Syrian leader purportedly had so
much trouble speaking as his medication wore off that his translator was compelled
Asad's

to finish his sentences.73 By such an account, he appeared incapable of conducting the

business of state. This leads to the speculation that "During the final months of his life
Asad appeared to become more aware of, or more concerned with, the deterioration of
his health, prompting him to accelerate the process of his son's succession."74 Herein
lies the narrative's stark and irreconcilable contradiction.
The time period when al-Asad's health is at its worst coincides with when his
most urgent presidential attention to senior elite maneuvers was required. On one hand,
the President is obsessed with his son's succession to the extent that he is ridding Syr
ian institutions of powerful elites and potential obstacles while carefully reshuffling the

cabinet and promoting his heir through the system. This includes convening the first
Ba'th party congress in 15 years. And, yet, he is so ill that he cannot make basic public
appearances or complete rudimentary tasks such as verbalize his thoughts intelligibly
during

a meeting.

in which

scenario

a president's

trusted

elites

are

aware

of his

di

minishing facilities and remain idle in the face of an uncertain or incomplete leadership
succession is hard to imagine.
Two assumptions about the process can be drawn from personalized rule ac
counts. Firstly, Syria's elites accept the leader's decision without debating, interacting,

or challenging it. Secondly, the elites willingly directed the regime's survival to match
the position of a dying dictator's ultimate ambition. Not only does this analysis seem
impractical, it suggests that Syria's political elites are passive agents. By reducing he
reditary succession to a leader's personality, personalized authoritarian interpretations

69. Chehabi

and Linz,

Sultanistic

Regimes,

70. Chehabi

and Linz,

Sultanistic

Regimes,

71. Both
when

works

discussing

by Leverett

Hafiz's

and Lesch

succession

plans.

p. 37.
p. 40.

cite Zisser's
Also,

Svolik

scholarship
and Gandhi

numerous

times in their chapters

both credit Zisser's

in their works.
72. Zisser,

Commanding

Syria,

73. Zisser,

Commanding

Syria,

p. 1.
p. 4.

74. Zisser,

Commanding

Syria,

p. 5.

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scholarship

208 MIDDLE

EAST JOURNAL

incompletely explain the outcome. Such accounts also fail to untangle the contradic
tions produced in the literature or address the under-conceptualized logic.
Scholars seeking to explain uncertain leadership selection in autocracies can con
ceptualize a process that activates the role of elite collective decision-making. Additional
ly, recognizing that institutions in authoritarian arenas can be highly disciplined as well as

personalized contributes to a more beneficial theoretical model. While Syria's powerful

elites were responsible for deciding who would succeed al-Asad, they needed to use the
institutional arena to ensure it became a political reality. I will now turn attention to the
conclusions of the hereditary succession literature to see how it informs the Syrian case.

THE CONTEXT OF SUCCESSION

Hereditary succession is emerging as a research area of inquiry that descends
from the literature on autocratic leadership selection.75 While many newspaper articles
on inherited republics appeared first,76they lacked penetrating depth to explain the

increasing trend. Brownlee's work, however, established a theoretical foundation for

understanding the phenomenon. As his data reveals, the world has witnessed the ge
netic transfer of executive power once every 2.5 years since 1994.77 This includes au
tocracies across regions and cultures and includes North Korea (1994), Syria (2000),
Azerbaijan (2003), Singapore (2004), Togo (2005), and Gabon (2009).78 Speculations
were mounting that such transfers may occur in Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Equatorial
Guinea although recent events in Egypt, Libya, and now Yemen seem to have fore
closed on that possibility.
Instead of citing an authoritarian leader's personal ambition, Brownlee points to
the other commonalties among the diverse cases experiencing hereditary republican
ism. Building on Tullock's work, he agrees "The benefits of hereditary succession ...
spread beyond the immediate ruler and successor, ensuring continued status for extra
familial elites."79 Hereditary leadership selection, therefore, becomes the most preferred

option for regime continuity because it benefits the system's core agents. As Brownlee
notes, "While many a ruler may dream of founding a dynasty, a son's rise hinges on the
response of the broader ruling elite. Those elites are more prone to abet hereditary suc
cession when they lack an orderly precedent for leadership selection and are wary of a
leadership vacuum."80 Senior elites must agree on a consensual candidate that provides
the greatest opportunity for their continuation. This option, by far, seems to outweigh a

potentially regime-threatening factionalized

75.
sage

Such

struggle for the presidency.

efforts to explain leadership

selections
Studies in Political
Succession
(New

in autocracies

of Power:

Succession

"Leadership

4 (1979).
76.

See

and Louis

Brian
Delvoie,

77. Jason

and Policy

Whitaker,
"Inherited

Brownlee,

4 (2007), p. 595.

78. Jason Brownlee,

Power

"Hereditary
"A New

Republics

Makes

Generation

include

Academic

Republics,"

in Arab

a Comeback,"

Succession

Vol. 14, No. 1 (2007), pp. 73-85.

79.

in Soviet

Innovation

"Hereditary

York:

in Modern

of Autocracy

Robbins

Press,

1974)

Comparative

Politics,

States,"

The Guardian,

Options

Politiques

Autocracies,"
in Egypt,"

Burling, The Pas

and Valarie Bunce,
Vol.

August

11, No.

28, 2001,

2002).
(July-August
World Politics, Vol. 59, No.

Brown

Brownlee,

"Hereditary

Successions

in Modern

Autocracies,"

p. 597.

80. Brownlee,

"Hereditary

Successions

in Modern

Autocracies,"

p. 598.

Journal

of World Affairs,

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

SYRIA'S

HEREDITARY

209

SUCCESSION

Cases where hereditary succession fails because of inter-regime fighting further

suggests that senior elites outweigh a sitting autocrat's patrimonial dominance. Re
gime elites in Paraguay blocked the hereditary succession of Alfredo Stroessner's son
in 1989. In this example, a long-serving autocratic leader in declining health split the

political elite because of an uncertain succession process.

Political fragmentation among the civilian parties led the Paraguay Colorado party
to invite a 42-year-old Air Force General, Stroessner, to assume power in 1954. He re
mained president for 35 years. With the support of his colleagues in the military, Stroess
ner melded the party, military, and state into an indistinguishable entity. Stroessner's Par
aguay exhibits many of the characteristics of Hafiz al-Asad's Syria.81 As Roett argues,
Through

a judicious

emerged

as the undisputed

more

grew

popular,

office in 1988,
was

simple.

of Paraguay.

With

of his uncontested

By the time the general

few seemed
He

and paterfamilias

repression

leader

on the evidence

of the republic.

president

power

mix of bribes,

to bother

and his cronies

was

... The

counting
co-opted

politics,

Stroessner

years,

the general

the passing
reelection
reelected
general's

potential

every

few years

for an eighth
formula

opposition

as

term of

for retaining

or repressed

it,

often brutally.82

The succession crisis is attributed in part to Stroessner's declining health. As

Roett recalls, "Rumors circulated in 1998 that a palace 'gang of four'... were plotting
to consolidate their personal position by using an ailing and visibly aging Stroessner
as a shield."83 Elites within the Colorado party factionalized between "militants" and
"traditionalists." As Harder Horst observed, "Serious disagreements between the mili
tantes, who planned to install Stroessner's son Gustavo when Stroessner was gone, and
the traditionalisms, who favored a political opening, divided the Colorado party."84
The traditionalists, led by the Supreme Court's former President, as well as Stroess
ner's closest confidant, General Andres Rodriguez, resisted Gustavo's succession. Con
fronted with competing elites that would potentially replace them, Rodriguez's fac
tion launched a coup against Stroessner in February 1989. Rodriguez, whose faction
enjoyed the military's support, became President. The militant faction's leaders were
purged from their positions and sentenced to prison. The former firstfamily was exiled
to Brazil where Stroessner died in 2006 at the age of 93.
Without an institutional mechanism for selecting a head of state, elites in Para
guay stepped into the political void to preempt regime fragmentation or collapse. The

comparison's evidence suggests that leadership selections depend on the ability of

elites in authoritarian systems to cooperate when the state is at its most vulnerable.
Sometimes this produces a hereditary succession and other times an alternative mem

81.

Al-Asad

of Defense
against

and

the Ba'th

leagues,

particularly

cal system

during

82. Riordan

Stroessner's

a period

during

party's radically
Mustafa
Tlas,

his 30-year

Roett,

"Paraguay

83. Roett, "Paraguay

84. Rene
ville, FL:

biographies

D. Harder

University

similarly.

An

Air Force

General

and

Minister

al-Asad
carried out a coup
upheavals,
political
faction in 1970. With the help of his military col
ideological
the politi
the regime's
al-Asad
developed
pillars and stabilized

reign.
after Stroessner,"

after Stroessner,"
Press,

Foreign

Affairs, Vol. 68, No.

2 (1989),

p. 128.

p. 137.

Horst, The Stroessner

of Florida

read

domestic

of tumultuous

2007),

Regime

and Indigenous

Resistance

in Paraguay

p. 138.

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(Gaines

210 MIDDLE

EAST JOURNAL

ber of the elite as president. This type of analysis activates the role of elites and injects
politics into the process.

Elites in authoritarian political systems operate within state institutions. While

such institutions cannot be characterized as acting autonomously, it is impossible for

states

to govern

without

structures.

Structures

collect

the masses

of personnel

that are re

sponsible for carrying out a system's consensus. In this respect, authoritarian institutions
can

be

understood

Allison's

through

of government

conceptualization

structures.

As

he

argued, "a 'government' consists of a conglomerate of semi-feudal, loosely allied orga

nizations, each with a substantial life of its own. Government leaders do sit formally, and
to some extent in fact, on top of this conglomerate."85 The semi-feudal, loosely-allied
linkages remain important for understanding the execution of elite consensus.
Even in personalized authoritarian arenas, a person's position within an institu
tion influences elite behavior and encourages cooperation. As Gandhi and Przeworski

argue, "Autocrats maintain institutions to solicit cooperation or to extend their tenure

in power... whenever they need to, autocrats govern with political institutions."86 In the

case of a hereditary leadership selection in autocracies, elites develop a collective con

sensus before overseeing compliance in the institutional arena. Such organs encourage
political compliance

and structurally advantage the political system against dissent.

WHY SYRIAN ELITES CONSENTED

TO BASHAR

Senior elites are important in authoritarian systems because they are anchored in
state institutions with networks of support. This provides them with opportunities to
network with one another and gives them ready-made clientelist systems. With an ail
ing president that may or may not have been mentally competent, elites appear to have
"anointed" Bashar more than the family patriarch did. These elites consulted each other
and came to a consensus on his candidacy. In this sense, we see the influence of elites
in the selection process. Before Bashar's appointment as the Ba'th party's Secretary
General (a post previously held by his father), then-Minister of Defense Mustafa Tlas
stated before the congress convened, "Bashar al-Asad will be secretary general. There
is unanimity for him."87 While this may not suggest that a backdoor meeting of elites

occurred, other quotes by Tlas do. In one interview, Tlas suggests that elites from dif
ferent institutions convened and agreed al-Asad's son would be the next president. As
Tlas said at the time:
With Assad's
Khaddam

death,

were

we began

worthy

of the fact that all of us were

in which

every

the conclusion

85. Graham
ence

Review,

86. Gandhi
87. "Syria's

year

we

and Przeworski,
Bashar

Edges

seventy

have

was

"Conceptual
63, No. 3 (1969),

the shoes

past

would

that Bashar

Allison,
Vol.

to think that either

of filling

indeed

Models

of age,

years

to change
worthy

we were

the country's
of succeeding

and the Cuban

President

Missile

Abd

However,

president.

afraid

leader

in view

of a situation
... We

his father:

Crisis,"

al-Halim

reached

after all, that

American

Political

Sci

p. 698.

"Authoritarian
Towards

I or Vice

of the dead

Power,"

Institutions

and the Survival

BBC

June 18, 2000,

News,

of Autocrats,"

p. 1293.

http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/

middle_east/794454.stm.

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

SYRIA'S
had been

the will

of his father, Hafiz

While the conclusion

HEREDITARY
to whom

al-Assad,

owes

Syria

*211

SUCCESSION
so much.88

statement reinforces a personalized interpretation

of succession, the first part suggests that an inter-elite debate occurred. Tlas indicates
that options other than Bashar were considered before the elites settled on the young
er al-Asad.

Further

of Tlas's

supporting

evidence

that

an

elite

consensus

installed

Bashar

has

emerged since 2000.

Former Vice President 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam retired from politics at the Ba'th
party's congress in June 2005. He went into exile to Paris in December 2005. He then
conducted a series of interviews with Arabic newspapers and satellite channels about
his personal relationship to Hafiz al-Asad, the al-Asad family's possible role in the
Hariri assassination, and the succession process. Al-Arabiya and al-Sharq al-Awsat
conducted the most detailed interviews. In the former, Khaddam mentions that a "co
operative decision among us [elites] was taken to hand over power [to Bashar] in order
to protect Syria."89 Khaddam's post-defection interviews explain that elites supported
candidacy primarily because the alternative could have invited a leadership
a struggle produced fear among the elites that the regime may have col
Such
struggle.
lapsed. As Landis analyzes, "Khaddam implies that he wanted to take power but could

Bashar's

not. Presumably, this is because the other branches of regime were sitting there with
a gun to his head. Or conversely, he may have felt obliged because the country would
slip into chaos and perhaps civil war without a smooth succession."90 Who actually was

in the room does not matter. The key point is that senior elites cooperated to develop a
regime-wide consensus when faced with fragmentation.
The preceding evidence suggests that senior elites, not the ailing President, were
the final arbiters of succession. This framework emphasizes the participation of elites
and reveals that they are necessary requisites for regime cohesion and stability in mo

ments of uncertainty. Reviewing the events after Hafiz's death reveals that succession
was an elite-guided process. Just as it seems improbable that a leader oversees a state
by utilizing various levers from a single corridor of power, it is as unlikely that leader
ship selection processes are monolithic and static political occurrences.

CONSENSUS

AND CONTINUITY

UNDER AUTHORITARIANISM

When Bashar al-Asad's presidency emerged as the most preferable option among
the elites, the political arena seemed to drift towards an informal oligarchy. Some have
argued that Syrian elites accepted Bashar to bolster their positions within the system
because they held influence over him. Ayman 'Abd al-Nour, a former consultant to
the new president, argued that a regional precedent already existed. As he observed,
"Bashar's presidency is similar to Sadat's. He is either going to carry out a coup against

88. Zisser,
89. "Majlis
Assembly

"Does

Bashar

al-Sh'ab

Request

al-Assad

al-Suri

Khaddam

Yutalib

rule Syria?,"
b-Mahakma

be Charged

p. 17.
Khadam

with High

http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2005/12/31/19936.html.
90. Joshua Landis, Assistant Professor of History,

b-Tihma

Treason"],

Oklahoma

al-Khiana"

Al-Arabiya,
University,

["Syrian
December

e-mail

People's
31,

2005,

to author, Novem

ber 14, 2008.

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

212*

MIDDLE

EAST JOURNAL

them [the senior elites] or else he will be a toy in their hands."91 Bashar's consolidation
period indicates that political power was redistributed among the elites that elevated
him to the presidency. As Hinnebusch argued shortly after the younger al-Asad became
president, "He almost certainly lacks the personal stature to govern except as a consen
sual leader."92 Ammar Abd al-Hamid, the exiled civil society activist, described this as
the son being "one of the equals while his father was firstamong them."93 Michel Kilo,
another civil society activist, quipped that the difference between the Hafiz and Bashar
presidencies was that, "it is no longer the Syria of al-Asad."94 While Bashar al-Asad
could inherit the presidency, he did not inherit the full powers that accompanied the
office when his father served at the helm. This partially explains why it took Bashar
nearly five years to rid the system of his father's elites.
A close reading of the academic literature produced after al-Asad's death sug
gests that his son's weak personality explains Syria's redistributed political power. In
this respect, such readings demonstrate theoretical continuity with the portrayals of
Syria's hereditary succession. They fail to explain senior elites' calculations or con
sider how elites implemented the regime consensus. Senior elites have occasionally
used institutions to limit Bashar's objectives and slow his consolidation.95 Most of the
literature on Syria continues to rely on personalities as the causal variable to explain the
at its nexus
country's politics. Yet, the single-person rule narrative that emerges is
and
As
this
article
demonstrates, the literature
inherently self-contradictory
incomplete.
on Syria has not been engaged rigorously.
As succession loomed, elite cooperation and consensus showed that there was more
to autocratic political systems than a leader's personality. Elites bargained over Bashar's
selection and then returned to their institutional conglomerates to execute that consensus.

While next-to-no political debate occurred within the institutions, they nevertheless con
tributed to a smooth transfer of presidential power that created a hereditary republic. In
political

systems

to have

thought

personalized

and

"weak"

institutions,

it is worth

recon

sidering that the senior elites are active agents that drive change and condition political
outcomes through personalized but also highly disciplined state structures.
Studying leadership selections in autocratic regimes remains an analytical concern

worthy of continued inquiry. The evidence indicates that the longer an autocratic leader
remains in power, the more likely such a regime will experience a hereditary succession.
Rather than rush to attribute this to the ultimate personalization of political power, deeper
consideration uncovers that greater agency for elites and structural characteristics are also
factors in determining these political outcomes. As long as elites can agree on a consen
sus and maintain an ability to execute it throughout the state's institutions, such cohesion
not
advantages the system's ability to endure. The role of senior elites
just a leader's

will have to be considered as who

personality operating in an unconstrained space
primarily develops and implements consensus in the process of authoritarian leadership
succession.

91. Ayman

'Abd

92. Hinnebusch,

al-Nour,

93. Ammar

Abd

94. Michel

Kilo

(civil

95. Joshua

Alan

Stacher,

Syria"

(PhD

al-Hamid,

dissertation,

interview

by the author, Damascus,

November

3, 2003.

Revolution

Syria:

from Above, p. 165.

interview by the author, Damascus,

society

activist),

"Adapting

University

interview

Authoritarianism:

of St. Andrews,

October

by the author, Damascus,

2007),

Institutions

8, 2003.
September

and Co-optation

pp. 106-108.

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

30, 2003.
in Egypt

and