Professional Psychology: Research and Practice

1990, Vol. 21, No. 4, 264-270

Copyright 1990 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.

0735-7028/90/$00.75

The Scientist-Practitioner Connection:

A Bridge in Need of Constant Attention

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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Frederick H. Kanfer
University of Illinois
Recent criticisms of the methods and mission of science and the sufficiency of an empirically
based epistemology extend to the scientist-practitioner model of practice because of its foundation
in the traditional view of science. Applied psychology should draw on basic research, but it must
blend this knowledge with technology and heuristics that relate it to the practical problem at hand.
The development of guidelines translating robust implications of scientific knowledge into heuristics for professional use has been much neglected. Bonding of science and practice, from both
directions, requires support of an organized group of specialists whose primary tasks are (a) to
explore the utility of basic theories and research for practice and to develop rules of when to use
which theory or data set for specified situations and (b) to formulate research questions arising from
practice-based observations and speculations.

The practice of professional psychology in the United States

has been heavily influenced by various training models. The
dominant training model for clinical and counseling psychology was first proposed at a conference on training in Boulder,
Colorado, in 1949. It was a sketch of a world in which professionals trained in scientific methodology and in assessment
and intervention methods would simply apply the concepts and
data of psychological science to solve the problems encountered
in their daily practice. At a time when logical positivism was the
dominant philosophy and "the standard view" of science
(Schemer, 1967), there was little question that only scientific
knowledge could be trusted. This view focused attention on
data derived from observations of person-environment interactions, rather than intrapersonal events. During the days of the
growing dominance of behavioral approaches in clinical psychology, this view made the practice of psychotherapy appear
scientific and respectable.
Recently, psychologists have increased the debate about the
mission of psychology as a science in its own right or an enterprise in the service of society (Bevan, 1980). Manicas and Se-

FREDERICK. H. KANFER received his PhD from Indiana University in

1953. He is currently Professor and Director of the Clinical/Community Training Program at the University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana. His research interests include self-regulatory and motivational
processes and their role in clinical and social interventions. He recently co-authored Guiding the process of therapeutic change (1988)
with B. Schefft and co-edited Helping people change (4th edition, in
press) with A. P. Goldstein.
BECAUSE OF the author's area of specialization, examples are taken
from clinical and counseling psychology. The same principles, however, should be equally useful in most other specialties of applied psychology.
THE AUTHOR THANKS Howard Berenbaum and Ruth Kanfer for their
critical reading of an earlier version of this article.
CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING THIS ARTICLE should be addressed to
Frederick H. Kanfer, Department of Psychology, University of Illinois,
603 E. Daniel Street, Champaign, Illinois 61820.

264

cord (1983) proposed a distinction between the task of the scientist and the professional: "The former practices science by
creating at least partially closed systems; the latter uses the
discoveries of science, but . . . also employs a great deal of
knowledge that extends beyond science" (p. 412). Psychologists
have also criticized the scientific method as an infallible approach to the accumulation of knowledge. The standard view
of science has come under attack from different quarters. In
particular, the utility of natural science methodology for counseling and psychotherapy has been challenged on various
grounds (Frank, 1987; Koch, 1981). Frank (1987) suggested that
the main power of any scientific approach to psychotherapy
has been derived less from its contents and methods than from
its strong position that any enterprise labeled science has in the
American culture. The development of alternative views concerning the rules for obtaining empirical knowledge, the increased emphasis on the impact of values and ethics in the
applied enterprise, and the role of observer bias in distortion of
presumably objective data have further weakened the image of
counselors and therapists as applied scientists. The scientistpractitioner model thus has been questioned by attack on both
its scientific foundation and the suitability of its roots in science
for everyday application.
Numerous surveys have suggested that the Boulder training
model has not been successful in creating persons who practice
their profession on a scientific basis (Swan & MacDonald,
1978). For example, clinicians are not avid readers of research
publications. Barlow, Hayes, and Nelson (1984) concluded that
most practitioners are not influenced by research. Rather, they
typically use strategies that are based on individual choice of an
approach, on personal experience, and on persuasiveness of
colleagues and teachers. Strupp (1981) attributed the educational shortcomings partly to the lack of appropriate role models. He asked, "How many supervisors are intimately familiar
with the frontiers of current research?" (p. 218). He deplored
the fact that students are not trained "to become thinking clinicians who c^> effectively apply quality control in their daily
practice" (p. 218). The most common distortion of the Boulder

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THE SCIENTIST-PRACTITIONER CONNECTION

Model has been the focus on science in graduate school and on

practice in later professional activity. In other words, a successive rather than a simultaneous adherence to the scientist-practitioner concept is frequently adopted. Nevertheless, the
achievements in psychotherapy and other areas of applied psychology during the past 40 years, in which the Boulder Model
was dominant, suggests that it would be a pity if the recent
increase in criticism of the scientist-practitioner model led to a
return to reliance on appealing but untested theories and plausible but unfounded explanatory constructs as a basis for professional operations. In this article, the problem is re-evaluated
through the question "What are some inherent limitations in
the use of psychological science for practice?" I then suggest the
need for training some psychologists as "translators" who (a)
devote systematic attention to research and dissemination of
practical implications and methods derived from various domains of the social sciences and/or (2) formulate professional
problems in "basic science" language and collaborate with (or
act as) scientists whose expertise encompasses the domain in
which these researchable questions are phrased.
Science-Based Resources for Clinical Action
We consider applied psychology a problem-solving activity.
In counseling and clinical work (D'Zurilla & Goldfried, 1971;
E H. Kanfer & Schefft, 1988; Urban & Ford, 1971), the professional assists the client to assess a problematic situation, to
define intervention goals, and to find ways that would remedy
the client's distress by altering ineffective behaviors, thoughts,
emotional reactions, or environmental factors. To formulate a
problem and select treatment strategies, individual case parameters (eg., resources or settings) must be taken into consideration. But, in addition, the practitioner must skillfully blend
three major cognitive components:
1. A framework for organizing knowledge about the relationships between psychological events, their settings, their correlates, and their antecedents. There are two central questions
associated with this component: (a) Which of the many belief
systems about human nature do we choose? This involves a
choice of a general philosophy, a perspective that gives priority
to some dimensions and phenomena over others in explaining
the major forces that shape and maintain human actions, emotions and attitudes, (b) How do we know for sure? More elegantly put, which data can we accept as a basis of our knowledge, and what rules do we follow in developing reliable and
valid operations for obtaining such data and for translating
them into general guidelines?
2. A technologythat is, a series of guidelines for action to
achieve specific outcomes within the limits of the existing conditions and implements. The main concerns relate to the justification for the use of various techniques for effective diagnosis
and treatment. In contrast to the theoretical domain, utility
rather than validity is the essential criterion in this area. Issues
in this and the first components are closely related. Choice of a
theoretical framework sets limitations and provides guidelines
for selection and organization of observations and tools.
3. A set of guidelines on how to relate the theoretical models
and substantive knowledge about human behavior to decisions
and actions in work with individual clients. This third compo-

265

nent has been given much too little attention. Which minitheory, what body of scientific knowledge, and which treatment
method are relevant to the problem at hand? What data domain
and which level of analysis should be selected for the client's
presenting problem? Barber (1988) phrased this as the lack of
guidelines on how to use models and how to map problems.
Boehm (1980) stressed the "real world" problem as the starting
point for research and knowledge utilization in a conceptual
model for organizational practice. Maher (1983), in a cogent
formulation of the relationship between a parent theory of human beings and a theory of practice, emphasized the reliance of
the latter on principles of the former in developing operational
guidelines for dealing with data that are gathered in therapy
sessions.
The movements of integrative and eclectic psychotherapy
have advocated and advanced the combination of methods (and
even theoretical constructs) from different schools of therapy
(e.g, Norcross, 1986). However, only sporadic efforts have been
devoted to relate limited science subdomains and clinical practice (e.g, Brewin, 1988; Fbrsterling, 1988, among others).
Procedures and knowledge from any research domain may
be transformed into professional interventions if they have relevance for the problem to be solved. But they must also be transposable to operations with variables that realistically can be
modified and that have a sufficiently large effect to make a
difference in the person's day-to-day activities and experiences.
Monitoring the effects of the operations is informative with
regard to the utility of the transformation. Furthermore, practical experiences can feed back to generate research toward refinement of the underlying theory and improvement of techniques, which would yield greater ecological validity of the
theory and increased or differentiated effectiveness of methods. The continuing interplay between attribution theory and
cognitive-behavioral treatments of depression (Alloy, Abramson, Metalsky, & Hartlage, 1988; Beck, 1967,1983; Heider,
1958; Weiner, 1980,1986) nicely illustrated this reciprocal and
iterative cross-fertilization between theory and practice.
The current cognitive-behavioral approach to depression is
among the best examples of the productive interplay between
researchers and practitioners. The exaggerated self-blame, lack
of positive goals, low belief in one's ability to control events, and
low expectation of positive outcomes have long been observed
in depressed patients (Beck, 1967). The development of laboratory-based paradigms of helplessness (Peterson & Seligman,
1984; Seligman, 1975), insufficiency of positive reinforcement
(Lewinsohn, 1975; Lewinsohn, Sullivan, & Grosscup, 1980),
and self-regulation (E H. Kanfer, 1970) was enriched by the
clinically based approaches such as those of Beck and his coworkers (eg. Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Beck & Young,
1985) and Rehm (1977) and his co-workers (eg, Rehm, Kaslow,
& Rabin, 1987). In turn, the clinical observations resulted in
refinement of the paradigms, such as inclusion of attributional
factors (E H. Kanfer & Hagerman, 1981). Studies by these and
other researchers yielded a more differentiated explanation of
the psychopathological mechanisms of depression that more
readily fit clinical observations and enlarged the practitioner's
store of therapeutic operations. These integrations necessitate
both the practitioner's familiarity with research-based models
and the researcher^ sensitivity about which factors in clinical

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266

FREDERICK H. KANFER

populations must be considered to guarantee appropriateness

and sufficiency of the theoretical model.
The recent literature on empirically based counseling and
psychotherapy has many examples of this translation from laboratory procedures and theoretical generalizations to professional practices. What is lacking is a generic road map on how
to mine the treasures of basic research for the compact wisdoms: the principles that have wide utility for professional
practices. Specific guidelines and examples on how to select
well-established experimental paradigms and robust generalizations for particular clinical events would substantially aid
the practitioner and encourage utilization of research. It is by
such a process, though not deliberately organized, that various
paradigms (e.g., conditioning, attribution, self-regulation, selfefficacy, information-processing, and problem solving) are increasingly being incorporated into applied psychology. These
ubiquitous principles of human activities and experiences are
not limited to the few characteristics that are often referred to
as the common elements in all therapies (Frank, 1985; Goldfried & Newman, 1986). They occur in most human interactions and can be systematically employed in pursuit of different
practical goals.
Examples of specific robust findings that have been incorporated in clinical and counseling tactics are the consequences of
mood states on memory (Bower, 1981), actions (Isen, 1984), or
evaluative judgments (Schwarz & Clore, 1988); the conditions
most favorable for developing intentions to act (Azjen & Fishbein, 1980; Fazio, 1986; E H. Kanfer & Karoly, 1972; Petty &
Cacioppo, 1986); the motivational effects of emotional arousal
(Greenberg & Safran, 1987); the effects of automatic versus controlled processing on action (E H. Kanfer & Schefft, 1988; E H.
Kanfer & Stevenson, 1985; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977); or the
relationship of current concerns to goal-directed action
(Klinger, 1977,1987). Some findings suggest that the professional's activities may be influenced by common biasing effects
in making judgments about clients or reacting to a client's behavior (e.g, Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Turk & Salovey,
1988). They must be noted as well.
To date, practitioners have tended to select and directly apply
procedures that have been described for broadly equivalent
complaints or diagnostic categories, without much consideration of other parameters. In current practice, for example,
counselors often use the initial complaint to select a theory (e.g,
about the etiology or mechanisms in alcoholism) and then
search for data in an individual case to match the theory. Some
even proceed without such a search. Prescriptive treatments for
obsessive-compulsive clients, for withdrawn clients, for agoraphobic clients, and for clients with other syndromes have been
reported in the literature. Although such standard procedures
certainly are among the possible interventions for a client, it
makes little sense to apply a priori one method to all.
In bridge building, as an example of another applied science,
an engineer does not design a bridge by appealing solely to
general principles of physics. Whether the bridge is to be built
in an arctic climate or in the tropics, is to be built over a wide
and slowly moving river or a swift and narrow stream, is exposed to heavy truck traffic or occasional pedestrian traffic,
and has to withstand strong winds or not will determine the
body of knowledge and the special technology applicable in the

individual case. In the social sciences, self-constructing and

developmental aspects (Ford, 1987) and self-regulatory functions of human beings (E H. Kanfer, 1984) enlarge the bridge
model to include the constant shifts in the "terrain" that are due
to cultural differences (Draguns, 1985; Triandis & Draguns,
1980), such new trends as the use of pharmacological agents to
alter treatment procedures and even life-styles, and advances in
telecommunication to alter employment patterns and job requirements.
With these changes, old theories and even robust principles
require reassessment to test their sufficiency and appropriateness for the application to a current problem situation. Thus the
path from theory and research to practice has serious limitations in many situations. Therefore, the heuristic that I suggest
for the application of scientific principles to practice proceeds
in exactly the opposite direction. The first step begins with the
client. A critical assessment is made of societal, psychological,
and biological processes that are operating in the present situation. The specification of critical variables in the individual
case should then direct the professional to search for theories
and data that are relevant to the specific psychological, social,
or biological processes and parameters that constitute the problem components rather than to the contents of the complaint
alone.
The translation from theory to application must be enriched
by consideration of the realities of the context in which therapy
occurs because reliance on a unidimensional, person-focused
model, be it a conditioning paradigm or a psychodynamic personality theory, is simply inadequate and unrealistic. Contrary
to common graduate training, this perspective suggests that
students not only be taught in didactic courses but also be tutored to analyze actual cases in terms of psychological processes and contextual parameters first and then to select theories and methods from the relevant subdomains of psychology.
Steps in Relating Practice to Basic Science
A sequence of steps can be outlined to assist the psychologist
in utilizing available scientific knowledge for intervention in a
particular case. The professional must begin with a formulation of the problem. Having ascertained what factors may be
relevant, what hypotheses can be derived from extant theories,
and what variables can be manipulated, the professional can
select appropriate strategies and techniques. The approach can
be summarized by the following heuristic:
1. Obtain a statement of the current complaint and the factors that seem to contribute to it.
2. Translate this information into the language of psychological, biological, or social processes and structures.
3. Scan the field for principles, literature, and research relevant to the problem as it has been reformulated in the language
of science. Examine the relevance of variables in adjacent data
domains, such as those related to the social, cultural, or ethnic
context and the biological or sociopolitical factors, as noted in
the individual case.
4. Describe, at the conceptual level, the desired outcomes
and the psychological processes that need to be influenced.
Formulate an intervention strategy that is based on these considerations, defining the level (size of unit) of intervention.

THE SCIENTIST-PRACTITIONER CONNECTION

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5. Search for a technology and define specific parameters that may limit or enhance the feasibility and utility of the
methods.
6. Apply the method. Monitor the effects and compare them
against outcome criteria.
7. If desired effects are not obtained, recourse to Steps 1,4, or
5, as needed.
This heuristic is iterative in that it needs to be followed not
only for the overall intervention strategy but also for smaller
segments of the intervention process, ranging from brief interactions to the span of several sessions.
Bridge Building Requires Knowledge of
How the Shores Differ in Terrain
There are a number of differences between the worlds of
science and practice that need to be understood in any attempt
to build bridges across these worlds (E H. Kanfer, 1985,1989).
Only when we consider the scientific domain as a resource in
selecting problem-solving strategies and techniques and not as
the stage on which the intervention is played can laboratory
research and generic principles contribute to solving real-life
problems. To facilitate the translation, it helps to note some
important differences in orientation and demand characteristics of experimental and applied settings.
Source of Data Inputs
In contrast to the scientist, the practitioner can neither
choose in advance what events to observe nor limit the range of
responses that a client can make. Without the filtering of information that occurs in the laboratory, the relevance of various
components of the total input must be determined on the spot
by the professional. Although a professional psychologist may
make some a priori decisions about what he or she will attend to
or disregard, unexpected information may seduce him or her to
shift attention. Furthermore, in contrast to laboratory researchers, practitioners attend and respond not only to external
sources of information but also to their own reactions. Awareness of these biases can aid a practitioner, not to eliminate those
reactions but to recognize their effects, neutralize disturbing
biases, and accept those biases that can expedite an effective
intervention process (Arkes, 1981; Kahneman et al, 1982; Turk
&Salovey,1988).
Purpose and Focus
The scientist starts with a testable hypothesis. The constructs
are anchored to data by operationalization and by a clear statement of measures to be taken. The scientist can freely select a
problem and predict the implications of a particular outcome
for support or refutation of a hypothesis. Data collection follows hypothesis generation. Post hoc hypotheses are occasional
by-products of research, but personal experiences and experimental data are clearly separated. In practical situations, the
contexts tend to blend. Observations precede hypothesis formation, and tests are then set up to verify the reliability and
validity of these observations. Furthermore, the purpose of the
intervention is dictated by the nature of the client^ problem,
the context, and practical constraints on both client and practi-

267

tioner. Indeed, the development of a goal and purpose of the

enterprise is in itself part of the problem-solving process. In
addition, in clinical interventions the very change that occurs
early in therapy will frequently result in successive re-evaluations and alterations of the purpose of therapy and its goals. In
industrial settings, early assessment of common practices and
functions of the organizational components often leads to modification of the project's original mission.
Success Criteria
Well-established criteria are used for evaluating the outcome
on an experiment. Use of statistical methods guards against
biases and chance occurrences that may distort the conclusions. The concurrence with predicted outcomes and the fit of
results with an underlying theory are the criteria for the success
of an experiment. In practical situations, different criteria have
been applied. But in all cases, the utility of the intervention, in
accordance with its goals and theories, is the main criterion. An
intervention that has a statistically significant effect may unquestionably demonstrate a relationship in the laboratory. But
it may be trivial in actual practice if it does not result in attainment of the desired goal. Kazdin (1977) suggested social validation as a means of evaluating utility. When outcome is the only
criterion, there is little opportunity for improvement of the
methods because the entire complex of the underlying theoretical framework, case formulation, and implementation of procedures remains unanalyzed. These ingredients must be studied separately to yield improvement. Furthermore, utility is often determined not only by the practitioner's activities and the
client's behavior but also by the client's social environment and
its reaction to any change. As a result, utility may change during
the course of an intervention and therefore needs to be continually defined with respect to methods, goals, and subgoals. Although utility is the ultimate criterion, it must be applied dynamically to processes and components, rather than to the
whole intervention package.
Language
A characteristic of scientific communication is the unequivocal definition of terms so that an object or an event can be
clearly identified or replicated, regardless of the person's theoretical persuasion or personal characteristics. Authors of scientific theories coin terms unique to the theories' domain. The
meaning of terms and their objective referent are shared by all
workers in the area. Furthermore, technical terms are used to
avoid misinterpretation or surplus meaning often found in popular terminology.
Professionals tend to describe events at a data level in which
they use everyday popular language because client inputs are
given in everyday language. They are often equated with descriptions of psychological processes and psychological constructs, even though it is usually only the words but not the
meaning that is common to the two languages. Careful transformation of the client's report or actions into technical language or theoretical terms is frequently needed to handle the
statements in a form that is usable and compatible with a scientific framework. But these translations involve personal judg-

268

FREDERICK H. KANFER

ments and biases of the professional because no general rules

have been developed for such transformations. Similarly, translations of psychological concepts and of the practitioner's framework into the client's language are needed. These efforts at establishing a common conceptual base in early meetings are
regarded by some as a prerequisite for an effective collaboration
(Beck et al, 1979; E H. Kanfer & Grimm, 1980; Meichenbaum,
1977).

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Size of Data Units

In the laboratory, specific events and their determinants are
deliberately isolated and divided into small components so that
a microanalysis of psychological processes can be undertaken.
In fact, a specific response is observed during a short time interval in order to reduce contamination by noise and extraneous
fluctuations in the person's activity. In contrast, the practitioner
deals mostly with macro-units of behavior. Analysis of interpersonal relationships, family systems, or symptoms include behavioral patterns that extend over a wide domain, over different
situations, and over an extended period of time. Except for techniques in which strict laboratory analogs are used, such as classical or operant conditioning, chunking of responses is a rule
rather than an exception in clinical and counseling practice.
Research is guided by a conceptual framework in which one
examines phenomena that are bounded in their extent and
time. The subject matter of an experiment may be an emotional
process, a memory process, a social interactional process, and
so forth. In each case, the domain is limited by the minitheory
that covers some small portion of human behavior. By contrast,
psychotherapy deals with not only the richness, diversity, and
complexity of the individual but also with subject matters such
as conflicts with sociocultural environments, intrapersonal
conflicts, and emotional reactions to biological changes,
among myriads of other areas. What may be a central event in
an experiment may be only a tiny component in the total pattern presented to the professional. Some psychotherapy theories present a single, central mechanism to account for the
changes during the intervention process. Even in such theories
for example, those based on the conditioning paradigmthe
interplay between conflicting intra- and interpersonal variables, the irrationality of a client's thinking, and the relationship context (with a therapist or others) by necessity transcend
the domain in which the simple model has been developed and
substantiated by research.

Ethics
In experimentation, the paramount ethical concern is the
scientist's faithful report of his or her operations. Ethical principles include the societal rules for dealing with live subjects and
the concern that no harm be done by the experiment. In the
application of science to everyday life, a different set of ethical
problems arises (Hutchinson, 1983). The practitioner's primary
obligation to assist clients often conflicts with personal interests and with institutional or societal rules of conduct (KeithSpiegel & Koocher, 1985). Long-term benefits or harm must be
weighted against the expenditure of effort and other resources
in the enterprise. As Perrez (1989) pointed out, a therapeutic
enterprise requires justification for use of a method in terms of
expected outcome, acceptability of the method itself, possible
side effects, and cost. Legitimatization of an intervention procedure is often based not on its immediate effect but on a com-

parison to what is given up, either in the use of other approaches or in treatment of other persons, when a commitment
is made to the specific procedure. Although basic research may
ultimately have some utility in everyday life, justification for
the practitioner's methods is demanded even as their application is contemplated.

Static Versus Dynamic Nature

Basic psychology has often been faulted for its disregard of
one of the most critical variables in human behavior: time
(McGrath, 1988). Whereas most psychological models are relatively static, frameworks for psychotherapy and for educational,
industrial, or sociopolitical interventions extend along a historical time dimension. The dynamic aspect further involves the
continuous change in interrelationships among components of
the person-environment system. In contrast to the laboratory
setting, the everyday world is not fixed. Historical accidents,
predispositions, cultural changes, and just the mere passage of
time affect the client and the intervention process. Change begets further change. As a result, static models, linear predictions, and cross-sectional analyses of processes and relationships are limited tools for research and practice in psychotherapy (F H. Kanfer & Busemeyer, 1982) and most other applied
fields.

Thoughts on Continued Bridge Maintenance

In a recent development in the physical sciences, attention
has been called to the possibility that orderly processes may
lead to discontinuity or chaos and that these processes can be
studied for better understanding and prediction of apparently
spontaneous phenomena (Glass & MacKey, 1988; Gleick,
1987). When nonlinearity at a microlevel of a system continues
over time, it can eventually affect observations at the macrolevel and make them appear inexplicable, unpredictable, and
chaotic. Tiny differences in input can quickly become overwhelming differences in output. Chaos theory highlights the
relativistic position of a behavioral analysis: namely, that the
observer's description of a phenomenon will depend not only
on his or her perspective but also on the distance from the
phenomenon and the scope or unit size selected for analysis.
Chaos theory seems to be particularly appropriate to the task of
the professional psychologist in predicting what seem to be
unique events. For example, a sudden outburst of violence by an
apparently quiet, stable person might be understood better by
analysis of small but consistent behavioral, emotional, and cognitive reorganizations and inputs, noticeable only when their
total effect emerges at a higher level of analysis. The research on
hassles has suggested that an analysis of major life events is less
predictive of some stress reactions than the analysis of small but
consistent daily hassles (DeLongis, Coyne, Dakof, Folkman, &
Lazarus, 1982).
To complete our Utopian scenario of the scientist-practitioner, I point out that the other side of the coin is the need to
encourage researchers to focus attention on phenomena and
problems encountered by practitioners. To illustrate: Cacioppo,
Petty, and Stoltenberg (1985) examined the implications of their
elaboration likelihood model for clinical operations, hypothesizing that high motivation and ability to think about an issue
results in relatively more enduring attitudes (the central route to
attitude change) than do low motivation and low ability to think

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THE SCIENTIST-PRACTITIONER CONNECTION

about a professional's recommendation (processed by the peripheral route). Moreover, a poorly motivated client would initially respond more to environmental and ostensible cues, such
as the superficial features of the therapist. Attitudes induced by
the peripheral route, however, are less enduring. Cacioppo et al.
made several suggestions for effective communication in therapy, which were based on their model and laboratory research
of other variables such as the communicator's credibility and
the client's prior information. Schneider (1985) offered suggestions for training high performance skills (e.g., aviation control)
on the basis of his research on automatic and controlled processing. R. Kanfer and Ackerman (1989) and R. Kanfer (in press)
discussed the implications of their research on ability-motivation interactions for training skills on complex jobs. Basic research in decision theory has helped psychologists to understand and improve practical decision processes and problemsolving strategies in applied psychology, medicine, and
industry (e.g, Elstein, Shulman, & Spraf ka, 1978; Kahneman et
al, 1982; Turk & Salovey, 1988). Such continued attempts by
scientists to sketch the implications of their work for practical
situations would encourage better and more research on applied problems, testing, and improving the ecological validity
of laboratory-based theories. They would also offer guidelines
for continuous improvement of practice. Perhaps such an implication statement (ideally developed by the author after observations of current practices and discussions with practitioners) should accompany any major theoretical paper, much
like research proposals, if we believe in the obligations of
science to contribute to society's welfare.
The spirit of the Boulder Model would be best maintained if
a group of psychologists would set as their primary tasks (a)
posing research questions on the basis of their observations
made during their professional activities and (b) exploring and
continuously testing the utility of various "basic" minitheories
and research data for potential practical operations. These activities are already carried out by some individuals. However, in
contrast to the organizational structures that facilitate communication and collaboration of large groups of researchers in
various subfields of applied psychology, there is currently only
minimal support for groups that devote themselves systematically and primarily to strengthening the bonds between practice and scientific knowledge. Formal graduate programs and
internships or apprenticeships for research that specialize in an
applied area would strengthen the cadre of "bridge builders" by
giving them both (a) the skills, the perceptivity, and the pragmatism of the professional and (b) training in the methods and
exposure to the skeptic-empiric attitude of the researcher. By
individual contributions, researchers and practitioners who believe that effective practice must firmly rest on the data and
theories of psychological science have already changed the
practice and the thinking of psychologists in all applied areas.
A failure to resolve the "scientist-practitioner crisis" not only
would lessen the potential impact of advances in psychological
science on practice but would also endanger the credibility of a
psychological profession by dismantling its most substantial
foundation.
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269

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Received October 9,1989

Revision received March 5,1990
Accepted March 9,1990