Ends, Ways and Means

By Ehsan Honary - Friday, May 25, 2007

:: 3 Comments ::
:: Strategy, Real-world example

The primary nature of any strategy, whether it is military campaign, business,

marketing or games, is the relationship between ends, ways, and means. Here, ends
is the objective, such as global conquest, maximising market share, neutralising a
crisis, etc; ways is the form through which a strategy is pursued, such as a military
campaign, diplomacy, or economic sanctions; and means is the resources available
such as armies, weapons, international influence and money. It is critical to make sure
that the relationship between ends, ways and means is fully understood and thought
out. It must be logical, practical, and clearly established from the outset. If this
relationship is vague, the entire campaign is seriously flawed and you might be at risk.

As stated by Clausewitzs, war is ultimately a political act and any strategy should
reflect the political side of your objective. What is it you really want to get and how
does that relate to ends, ways and means? In an attemp to answer this question, you
can understand the effect of your strategy on your circumstances.
The components are as follows:

Ends or objectives explain what is to be accomplished.

Ways or strategic concepts or courses of action explain how the ends are
to be accomplished by the employment of resources.

Means or resources explain what specific resources are to be used in applying

the concepts to accomplish the objective.

Ends, ways, and means often get confused in the development or analysis of a specific
strategy. The trick is to focus on the questions. It is the objectives that you should
focus on when answering the questions.
Remember, concepts always explain how the resources will be used. Resources always
explain what will be used to execute the concept. Again, as with any successful system
that tries to capture the essence of a strategy, the model poses three key questions for
strategists:

What is to be done?

How is it to be done?

What resources are required to do it in this manner?

Attempting to answer these questions will guide you towards your ultimate effective
strategy. A strategic outcome will have a profound effect on your circumstances. It is
likely to be sudden, and will dramatically alter the state of affairs. It can change the
balance of power, who controls what, and so on. A strategic outcome represents the
ideal end-state of any action, regardless of its magnitude. For example, in the context
of Risk, a move to attack your neighbour can have huge consequences. Your neighbour
may not be pleased at all, even if the attack was insignificant. He may decide to shift
his forces towards you for a long campaign. This may not have been what you
anticipated when you attacked his small country. Hence, you always need to pay
attention to the end before you use your means, no matter what your means are.
However, there is more. Perhaps another item needs to be added to the list that glues
the three concepts together:

Risk explains the gap between what is to be achieved and the concepts and
resources available to achieve the objective. (Of course Risk represents chance
here, though you may also want to believe that the Risk game itself glues
everything together. Risk is great, isn't it!)

The system of ends, ways and means has been used in many contexts. An article on
strategy (PDF: Making Sense of War: Strategy for the 21st Century) has an
interesting analysis of the concepts and provides topical examples from the current
political climate such as the situation in Iraq. It suggests that the objectives (ends)
were not considered thoroughly in both of the Gulf Wars and forces (means) were
mobilised efficiently (ways) before a full scale analysis was carried out on the global
objective.
Are ends, ways and means applicable everywhere? An interesting example is their use
in knowledge strategies in the information age. This article suggests that the
technique should be applied to information technology as knowledge-based economies
are prospering and new methods should be employed to protect them and their new
assets (knowledge) from hostile threats. Interestingly, after a thorough analysis it
concludes that:
"In sum, it is difficult to apply the ends, ways, and means paradigm of strategy to
information age security. Unlike traditional means, knowledge is relatively cheap and

easy to balance with ends and ways. Unlike conventional ways, cyberwar defies the
military principle of mass. And its primary objectives are control and paralysis. Unlike
the clearly articulated ends of Cold War security strategies, national objectives in a
globally networked information age are more difficult to define and thus to achieve.
Clearly, we need a new framework for formulating information age knowledge
strategies."
We are moving to new paradigms and with the incredible progress of information
technology, new challenges confront us. This is a fascinating topic in which, as it has
been the case so far, it is difficult to predict the effect of free information flow on the
future of civilizations. Access to more freely available knowledge has profound social
and behavioral impacts. Nevertheless, examining the topic in detail may shed light on
future developments and needs of societies which is always an exciting topic affecting
everyone.
Even if techniques are not applicable directly, it serves us by asking the right questions
and it helps us to focus on the solutions instead. So, go ahead, use ends, ways and
means to identify your needs in the game and aim to win systematically.
http://www.totaldiplomacy.com/Home/tabid/67/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/224/En
ds-Ways-and-Means.aspx

THURSDAY, JULY 29, 2010

ENDS = WAYS + MEANS

Recently there has been a lot of talk by pundits, politicians, analysts, and the general public about
our involvement in Afghanistan. It has been energized by the downsizing of our Iraq footprint, the
change of command there (Patraeus over McCrystal) and the realization that we have been there
nine years with rising casualty rates and significant dollar outlays with little positive impact after the
first of those nine years. I believe that this talk is generally unstructured and would suggest that
using the same analysis model used by the military and civilian national security community at the
strategic level would be helpful.
The model is known as ends, ways, and means, where ENDS = WAYS + MEANS. Ends are defined
as the strategic outcomes or end states desired. Ways are defined as the methods, tactics, and
procedures, practices, and strategies to achieve the ends. Means are defined as the resources
required to achieve the ends, such as troops, weapons systems, money, political will, and time. The
model is really an equation that balances what you want with what you are wiling and able to pay for
it or what you can get for what you are willing and able to pay.
Regarding Afghanistan, if you solve the equation from left to right, stating specifically the end your
desire, you then must identify what ways and means would be required to achieve that end. (One
basic question in addressing the ends is whether we are conducting counter terrorism or counter
insurgency operations.) You would have to identify how many U.S. casualties you are willing to suffer
(to date 1064 KIA), how much money you are willing to spend (now at $7 billion per month), how
reliable the Karzai government is as a partner, and what role the Taliban, Pakistan, India, and our
allies are willing and able to play and for how long. Solving the equation from right to left, you would
identify the ways and means you are willing and able to generate and thus establish the end they
are able to achieve.
I would submit that a rigorous, intellectually honest exercise of this model explains the frustration
we now feel with Afghanistan. If we state unambiguously a worthy end, we may be unable or

unwilling to generate the ways and means to achieve it. If we honestly state the ways and means we
are willing and able to generate, the end they deliver may be suboptimal at best and an outright loss
at worst. Two questions then may emerge. One, do we want to lose sooner or do we want to lose
later? Two, do we want to lose big or do we want to lose small? Referencing Alexander the Great,
Britain, and Russia, Afghanistan has never provided happy endings.
http://mglaich.blogspot.com.au/2010/07/ends-ways-means.html