The phenomenology

of

religion concerns

the experiential aspect

of religion, describing religious phenomena in terms consistent with the

orientation of the worshippers. It views religion as being made up of different
components, and studies these components across religious traditions in
order to gain some understanding of them. The phenomenologicalapproach
to the study of religion owes its conceptualization and early development to
Pierre

Danil

Chantepie

de

la

Saussaye

(1848-1920), William

Brede

Kristensen (1867-1953) and Gerardus van der Leeuw (1890-1950).

The philosophy of religion addresses not only the perennial question Is there
a God?, but also the questions If there is, then what is he like? and, most
important of all, What does that mean for us?
These are questions that everyone should ask themselves at some point in
their lives. This site attempts to demystify the philosophy of religion, and so
to help people to reach views on these questions.
Is There a God?
The first section of the site, Arguments for the Existence of God, explains the
classic arguments for a positive answer to the question Is there a God? The
debate concerning Gods existence has, of course, been going on for
millenia. That does not mean, however, that no progress has been made.
Some of the classic arguments for Gods existence have been largely
abandoned, others have been refined, and new arguments or points about
arguments do regularly appear. The search for an answer to the question of
Gods existence should not be written off as futile simply because the
question is an old one.
If There is a God, then What is He Like?
If they are successful, then none of the classic arguments for Gods existence
proves exactly the same thing. The ontological argument, for instance,
purports to prove the existence of a perfect being; the cosmological
argument purports to prove the existence of a necessary or eternal Creator;
the teleological argument purports to prove the existence of a Creator
concerned with humanity. Each of these arguments, then, bears not only on
the question of Gods existence, but also on the question of his nature, of
what he is like.
The same can be said of many of the arguments for atheism, explained in
the second section of the site. Many of these arguments seek to exploit a
perceived incoherence in the traditional doctrines concerning Gods nature,
raising questions as to how those doctrines are best formulated. The
challenge If God is just, then how can he also be forgiving?, for instance, has

led theists to understand both Gods justice and his forgiveness in ways that
can be reconciled. The challenge If God is all-knowing, then how can our
choices be free?has prompted a similar approach to divine omniscience and
human freedom. The arguments for atheism, then, no less than the
arguments for theism, influence the way that theists conceive of God, so
contribute to the project of answering the question If there is a God, then
what is he like?
What Does that Mean for Us?
The third question, What does that mean for us?, is asked less often than the
previous two, and so is covered less explicitly by this survey of the
philosophy of religion. What follows is admittedly an oversimplification, but
is, I think, an accurate representation of common responses to this question.
The implications of classical theism, if it is accepted in all of its details, are
clear enough: If God exists then we were created for a purpose; we are
valued, loved. If God exists then we also have an incentive, not to mention a
moral duty, to fulfil this purpose; our eternal fate hangs on whether we follow
God, as we were created to, or rebel against his authority. Classical theism is
therefore often felt to restrict our freedom, but to do so not because we are
unimportant but rather because we are important and so have a duty of care
to ourselves and to others. Theism thus affirms our value even as it
constrains our freedom.
Atheism, plausibly, exerts pressure in the opposite direction: it affirms our
freedom but, it is often thought, threatens to compromise our value. In
general, those who have lacked belief in a next life have thought that this
makes our choices in this life all the more important. Sartre, for instance,
thought that the absence of a divine Creator who defines who we are gives
us absolute freedom to define ourselves. Because there is no God, there is no
God-given human nature, and so each of us is, in a sense, his own Creator.
We are free to be who we want to be.
Atheism has also, rightly or wrongly, been associated with a pessimistic view
of human value. If we were not placed here on purpose, but are the
accidental product of random processes, and if we came from the dust and
will return to it, then in what sense are we important? There are, broadly
speaking, two ways to respond to this question. Atheists can, on the one
hand, argue that value is about what we are, rather than why or how we got
here. They can thus affirm that we are special despite our inauspicious
origins. Or they can, on the other hand, accept that we have no special
value, but argue that it is better to reconcile oneself to this fact than it is to
deceive oneself with religious belief.
Whatever conclusions we reach about these questions, the time spent
answering them is time well spent. Religious belief or unbelief underpins the

way that we live our lives. The more clarity and confidence we have in our
beliefs on these issues, the better.