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International Journal of Ethics.
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INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
OF ETHICS.
1896.
JANUARY,
VOL. VI.-No.
Io
138
Internationaljournal of Ethics.
himself,
or professionalscientistsbeyond the narrowpositivism
of a Littre. We have seen very recent illustrationsof this
danger in the discussions which have arisen on several occasions between men of lettersand scientistsover the so-called
" bankruptcyof science." Those who have maintainedthis
thesishave employedsubtle tactics: they have arrayedon the
one hand the positive resultsof special sciences,-they have
confinedthemselvesin the meanwhileto physical and natural
sciences,-and then, on the other hand, they have pointed
us to religions with their replies all ready to the problems
of lifeand conduct. The scientists,in theirturn,have vaunted
the benefitsof science, and its discoveriesin the materialand
industrialorder,as if moralitywere a mere question of physical well-beingor of pure hygiene. We should indeed be led to
conclude that a philosophy or a systemof ethics had never
existed unless in theologies and mythologiesof all descripphysics,and physiology. This would
tionsor in mathematics,
too
cheap a disposition of history; it would
be making
erase at a singlestroke of the pen the sciences,so justly called
moral, from,psychology and ethics to philosophy proper.
Most certainly,if it be true that physics and natural history,
as such, ever engaged to furnisha philosophy of the world
and of life,we should be justified in concluding that these
sciences have bankrupted themselves,that they have meddled with that which in no way concerns them. In the
same way, chemistrywould bankrupt itself,should it pretend
to explain the movementof the stars,the precession of the
equinoxes, the eclipses of sun or moon. And by the same
reasoning,theologywent into bankruptcywhen it presumed
to decide that the sun moves around the earth,since Joshua
once stopped its course. Every usurpationof one science on
a domain foreignto it, is sure to end in such discomfituresas
these. These bold adventures,it is true,are too common on
the part of scientists,who, in the pride of theirspecial discoveries,imagine sometimes that they have discovered the unithese scientists do not constitute
versal secret; fortunately,
science. Should all bankers become insolvent,arithmetic
as ever. Perfectlylegitimateas
would still be as trustworthy
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reduced to individual isolation,-if such isolationwere possible,-would be about as incapable of science as the beast;
he would have only a germ of it, imperfectly
developed by a
restrictedexperience. Science impliesa societyof consciousnesses which are exercised reciprocallyand towards exterior
things; it is a tripleharmonywith each and with the whole.
The idea of an " organization by science" can merit only
universal assent, because, as we have just seen, everyscientificdiscoveryis an enlargementof the social consciousness,
and at the same time of social sympathyand social synergy.
It remainsnow to ask, whether the individual sciences are
sufficientto found the true "cerebral unity" of the human
race. This problem,whichso profoundlyengages thethought
of to-day,is in the main exactly the one which Comte offers
in the law of the "three estates." Man, as they say, dies
when he sees his own ghost; thus,according to Comte, theology sees its ghost in metaphysics and dies; and metaphysics then sees its ghost in science and dies in its turn.
In this difficult
problemthreehypothesesare possible; we
may admit,eitherthattheology and metaphysicswill eventually be absorbed in positive science, or thattheywill continue
to co-exist with science; but that theywill have a domain
more and more circumscribed,an influencemore and more
restricted,or that,while confiningthemselvesmore and more
to theirown domain,without infringingupon science,they
will increaseproportionably
with the increaseof science itself;
so much so, thateach scientificprogresswould not be a reduction, but an extensionof true metaphysicsand of true theology, or if you will, of true philosophyand of true religion.
There is a developmentby negation and destruction;there is
also a developmentby affirmation
and construction; there is
finallya developmentby the synthesisof the two into a single
more comprehensiveidea. It is in this methodthat true evolution consists,and the dialectic of Hegel is here in accord
with the evolutionismof Spencer. If by metaphysicsyou
mean the explanation of the factsof experienceby means of
entities and of causes which cannot be verifiedby experience or established in a definiterelationwith it,then it is
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III.
Does it followfromthe foregoingdefinitionsand distinctions that science will have the moral hegemonyof humanity?
Purely objective science, no; science at once objective and
subjective,with philosophy as its indispensable crown, yes.
But when we affirmthat philosophyand science must have
the moral and intellectualhegemony in futuresocieties,we
do not mean by that to deny the influencewhich must also
belong to sentiment,especially to the religioussentiment. In
the firstplace, great philosophical and scientificideas are
accompanied by aestheticaland moral sentimentswhich give
them their practical worth. Then, again, practice is not
merelythe applicationof a theory; it is still more a complex
action; it is a new synthesis in view of a new end, in some
sort,a new theory; it is obliged indeed to take into account
other elements than the merely intellectual. Scientificand
philosophical knowledge,remaining,as these always must do
limited,therewill always exist beyond them a sphere which
is open to beliefswhich are based on intellectualvaluations
and on sentiments. Hence what we call moral faith,which is
the foundationof all religious faith.
According to Bossuet, " when the reason which forces our
assent is in the object itself,this is knowledge; . . . when
the reason forbelievinga propositionis derivedfromhim who
proposes it, thereresultsbelief or faith." The criterionof all
faith,according to this early theory,would be affirmation
on
the testimonyof others. But,even then,faithis onlyan application of knowledge. The reasons which determinethe assent
are always objective; the other individuals,theirmoral and
intellectualvalue, theirown relationto the factwhich is to be
established,theircompetence,theirimpartiality,
etc.,all this is
the object of our judgment,whetherthis be probable or certain,but the object,in fine,of scientificjudgment.The " assertions without proofsof the wise and experienced man," says
Aristotle,have great value, chieflyin moral questions; but,as
has been answered,thisis not because these assertionsare actually withoutproof,but because he who affirmsthemhas expeVOL. VI.-NO.
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heritage in those questions which concern others and ourselves. In this sense,itwill oftenbe much betterforhim who
does not pretendto be a philosophical innovatoror creatorto
follow the dictates of his heart, not to break too suddenly
withthe " wisdom of nations." The philosopherhimself,who
has learned fromSocrates and Kant how circumscribedour
knowledge is, will hesitate to elevate his personal opinion
above the universal conditions of the society in which he
lives. In this sense, faithis most legitimate;but nevertheless
this legitimacyis still foundedon reason: assurance of a sum
of truthinherentin the moral and social discipline,assurance
assurance of the impotenceof abstract
of individualfallibility,
reasoningwhen exercised on problemsthat are too complex,
etc. Moral belief remains here, nevertheless,the rationabile
obsequiumn.
In questions,even,which do not concernmorality,we cannot
always analyze all; a man of business who launches himself
into an enterprise,acts according to a belief,that is to say,
according to a probabilitywhich carrieswith it some risks.
He sees reasons forand reasons against; it seems to him that
the "fors carryit," perhaps because his desire is on this side;
and he ventures. But is the conclusion fromsuch reasoning
against science? If we could only have a veritablescience in
all practicalaffairs,we should all act scientifically. Because
we lack this,we all act just as intelligentlyas we can, and
there, where intelligencebecomes silent,we follow our instinctivesentimentswhich are intelligencestored up by life;
among these instinctivesentiments,it is always surerand more
rational to give the preferenceto the altruistic,which have
been formedby the experience of the ages themselves,and
which representthe action upon us of entire society. A
" good sentiment"is collectivereason,instead of being reason
in detail; but it is none the less reasonable for never having
been reasoned out. Can you explain to a child all the reasons
of what you enjoin upon him? When this is possible, you
ought to do it; but is this always possible, his mental status
considered? When you have him learn Latin towards the
age of nine or ten, can you make him understandall the good
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he will derivefromclassic studies? Does he possess the elementsnecessaryforthe solution of the problem? Likewise,
these grownchildrenwhom we call the people, can they begin in the morningby doubtingeverythingin orderto act for
the rest of the day in the full glare of the goddess Reason ?
We must shed abroad as much light as possible, but what if
we cannot make it penetratetherewhere that other formof
light,heat, exists? Will you extinguishthe firesidebecause
this warms the whole body but does not especiallydazzle the
eyes ? Belief is also very oftenan esthetic sentiment,with
its own peculiar evidence which it is impossible to explain
in detail. Can you prove mortegeometricothat the Venus
of Milo is beautiful? Suppose a negro should prefera HottentotVenus, by what train of reasoning will you be able
to convince him? Correctness of taste, trustworthinessof
judgment in thingsof art go as littleby systematicreasoning
as does the marksmanwho strikesthe target.
It was in this sense that Pascal could correctlysay, " The
heart has reasons which the reason knows not of." But
whose heart? The heart of the savage cannibal? The heart
of the civilizedman ? The heart of the Mussulman? or that
of the Christian? All depends on the degree of intelligence in this heart,eitherin the reflectiveconditionor in the
condition of heritage received by tradition and education.
The pretendedconflictbetween intelligenceand the heart is
in realitythe conflictof one formof intelligencewithanother,
of the reflectivewiththe spontaneous. By itselfand in itself,
the word heart has no meaning: sentimentwithout intelligence has no definitecontents. Only blind corporalappetite,
like that of hungerand thirst,can dispense with intelligence
and with much more! The true reasons of the heart can,
therefore,become intelligibleto the reason itself,doubtless
not to the mere abstractreason,but to the reason whichtakes
into account all the real data of a problem,that is to say, the
data of all the reasons. Because we cannot always enumerate, one by one, these complex and profoundreasons which
present themselves so tumultuously to the inner glance,
and are none the less reasonable for that, must we con-
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of Ethics.
ALFRED
FOUILLE'E.