Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
The Making of the Hungarian Postcommunist Elite: Circulation in Politics, Reproduction in the
Economy
Author(s): Szonja Szelnyi, Ivn Szelnyi and Imre Kovch
Source: Theory and Society, Vol. 24, No. 5, Special Issue on Circulation vs. Reproduction of Elites
during the Postcommunist Transformation of Eastern Europe (Oct., 1995), pp. 697-722
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/657848
Accessed: 18-10-2015 03:52 UTC
REFERENCES
Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/657848?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents
You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Theory and Society.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 03:52:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Vilfredo Pareto once argued that "historyis a graveyardof aristocracies."'Ruling elites are unable to reproduce themselves over long
periods, because their membersare subjectto cyclical circulation.On
the surface,the fall of communismin CentralEurope appearsto corroboratePareto'sclaim.The highlypublicized(re-)burialof ImreNagy,
the public execution of Nicolae Ceau?escu,and the political backlash
against Erich Honecker collectively sent a clear message across the
world about the defeat of the old bureaucraticorder and the victoryof
a new politicalelite. Was this message merelysymbolicor did it reflect
a more fundamentalreorganizationof the class structureof postcommunist societies? This question has generatedintense theoreticaland
politicaldebatesin CentralEurope, as well as in the successorstatesof
the formerSovietUnion.
This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 03:52:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
698
series of managementbuy-outs.5Likewise, Staniszkisargued that the
currenttransformationof CentralEuropeis best describedas a form of
"politicalcapitalism"because changesin the class structureof Central
European societies resemble those observed in post-colonial Africa
where the bureaucracy used its political position to accumulate
wealth.6
This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 03:52:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
699
Count Bethlen,is the nephew of IstvanBethlen - a conservativePrime
Ministerduringthe 1920s, who died in a Sovietjail afterWorldWarII.
Beyond this anecdotalevidence, thereare at least elementsof a "prototheory"of the circulationof elites thesis in Hungary.Ivan Szelenyi,for
example, proposed the theory of "interruptedembourgeoisement"in
tryingto identifythe social origins of the new entrepreneurialclass in
The key claim of this theoryis that an "embourgeoisement"
Hungary.10
was
process
interruptedin 1949 with the transitionto communism,
and that the same process resurfacedin the late 1970s or early 1980s
when the second economy began to take hold. The former entrepreneurs, after hiding in "parkingorbits" during the socialist era,
reentered the bourgeoisification trajectory,as new entrepreneurial
opportunitiesreopenedin Hungary.
Although this theory was advancedand empiricallycorroboratedwith
survey data on Hungary'sagriculturalpetty bourgeoisie, it can be
generalized to questions concerning elite recruitmenttoday. Such a
"circulationof elites"theory would suggestthat conversionof assets is
difficult and often unsuccessful. Thus, with a change in the social
formation, one would expect to see significant downward mobility
among those who possessed only those assets that were key to elite
status under the old regime.In the transitionfrom capitalismto communism,the former business elite became completely de-classe:some
emigratedto neighboringmarket economies, others hid in "parking
orbits,"and others still were proletarianized.Only the most successful
members of the old business elite were able to transformtheir economic capitalinto culturalassets, and thus remainin lower elite positions. Given the implications of this theory, we would expect that
during the transitionto postcommunism,most members of the elite
whose privilegeswere based on political assets will be removedfrom
the elite;only a few amongthem will succeed in convertingtheirpolitical assets into economic capital.
Finally,the thirdtheory that is relevantfor our argumentsuggeststhat
analysesof the class structureshould focus theirattentionprimarilyon
class positions and not on the characteristicsof the individualswho fill
these positions.1 Proponentsof this theoryarguethattheirapproachis
correct because classes are "... 'empty places' in the social structure
which are filled by individuals,"'2 but that are not determinedby the
actual characteristicsof their incumbents.For example, in a critical
commentaryon social mobilityresearch,Poulantzaswrote:
This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 03:52:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
700
In essence, this bourgeoisproblematicof the social mobilityof groups and
individualspresumes:... that the principalquestionabout "socialstratification,"or even about its origins,is that of the "circulation"or "mobility"of
individualsbetween strata.However, it is clear that, even on the absurd
assumptionthatfromone dayto the next, or even fromone generationto the
next, the bourgeoisiewould all take the places of the proletariatand vice
versa, nothing fundamentalabout capitalismwould be changed, since the
places of bourgeoisie and proletariatwould still be there, and this is the
principalaspectof the reproductionof capitalistrelations.'3
This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 03:52:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
701
Hungary.First,unlikeany other communistregime,the Hungarianwas
quite successful at coopting the intelligentsiaby promoting them to
elite positions under the old government.Because of this, the communistregimein Hungaryenjoyedsubstantiallegitimacyeven as late as
1989. In addition,the size of the counter-elitein Hungarywas rather
insignificant;as a result,there was only a modest supply of alternative
personnelto replacethose alreadyin positions of power.Clearly,then,
to understandpatterns of elite recruitmenttoday, it makes sense to
examinethe uniquehistoricalprocesses that have shaped the character
of the Hungariannomenklatura.
The Hungarianregime entered a reform trajectoryearlier and implemented reformsmore consistentlythan any other country in Central
Europe. In 1963, the Kadar regime dramaticallychanged its course.
After years of repression and social confrontationthat followed the
1956 popular uprising,Kadairand his allies in the CommunistParty
moved toward a policy of concessions and compromises.While this
policy had its ups and downs (a major step ahead in 1968, a partial
retreatin 1973, a new wave of reformsbeginningin 1977, and another
conservativeturn in 1984), nonetheless, it began the transitionto a
marketeconomy and, at the same time, it also managedto reshapethe
natureof class relations.
Beginningwith 1963, the communistregimein Hungaryexperimented
with social reforms by offering a series of complex packages to different stratain society.16Kadair,who had populisttendencies,offered a
"deal"to the working class; this later became known as the "second
economy."'7This deal began in the countryside.At the same time as
Hungarycollectivizedagriculturein the early 1960s, it also adopted a
highly flexible policy toward family production. Other collectivized
economies typicallytried to preventfamilyproduction.But Hungarian
agricultureworked differently:agriculturalproductionon family plots
and the "familyresponsibilitysystem"in the collective sector was at
firsttolerated,and later encouraged.18
This approachto socializedproductionprovedto be so successfulthat,by the early 1970s, it startedto
be copied in industry.Hungariansinvented the equivalentof family
plots (or the individualresponsibilitysystem)in industryby permitting
complex subcontractingarrangementsto growwithinfirms.19
These concessions to workersdid not go unnoticedin the literature.In
fact, commentatorsfrequentlyexplained cross-nationaldifferencesin
working-classattitudestowardthe communistregimeby directlycom-
This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 03:52:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
702
paringthe conditionsof workersin Hungaryand Polandduringthe late
1970s. Specifically,they arguedthat because the Polish workingclass
did not get the concessions that the Hungariansreceivedin the form of
the second economy,it clashedwith the bureaucraticorder and, in the
end, had little alternativebut to join hands in collective action against
the regime.20Using Hirschman'sterminology,in other words, the
Polish working class opted for "voice"over "exit"and "loyalty:"21
it
became politicized and entered into a battle with the regime.By contrast,it never occurredto Hungarianworkersthat they could organize
unions for themselves in order to fight the bureaucracy.With the
second economy, they were effectively fragmentedand quickly individualized:they learned their way around the second economy, and
started to believe that it offered to them a unique opportunityfor
upward social mobility.22Using Hirschman'sterminology,one might
say thatHungarianworkersopted for "exit"over loyalty:they were willing to ignore the state economy as long as they could make a good
livingafterhoursin theirprivateor semi-privateeconomic activities.
From the point of view of our analyses, however, the second social
compromise- the one that Kadarmade with the intelligentsia- is of
greaterconsequence.Duringthe 1960s, severalof the socialistbureaucracies that had lost legitimacywith Stalin'sdeath attemptedto regain
their popularityby recruitingmembers of the intelligentsiainto positions of power and privilege.23This process was initiated by Nikita
Khrushchevin the Soviet Union. Unexpected successes in science,
research,and technology during the late 1950s and the early 1960s
raised morale, and served as a basis to redefine socialism.During the
classical Stalinistperiod, communismlegitimateditself with the charisma of the leader, and emphasizedthe importanceof class struggle.
Beginningwith Khrushchev,however,an attemptwas made to reinterpret socialismas a "scientificproject."In this new definition,socialism
was presentedto the masses as a rationalorder;one that was destined
to outdo capitalismbecause of its superioreducationalsystem,its ability to develop technologyin a more efficientmanner,and its success at
avoidingthe anarchyof the market.24This vision of a scientificsocialism appealed to the professional class in many countries:in Russia
under Khrushchev,in Hungaryafter 1964, in Czechoslovakiaduring
the Prague Spring,in Poland duringthe early years of Gierek, and in
East GermanyunderHonecker.25
One of the uniquefeaturesof the Hungariandevelopmentwas that this
social contract with the intelligentsiawas carried further,and it was
This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 03:52:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
703
also more consistentlyapplied than in other countries.Beginningwith
the mid-1960s, the HungarianSocialistWorkers'Party(MagyarSzocialista Munkaspdrt,or MSZMP) made a concentratedeffort to recruit
In fact,
people with high culturalcapital into positions of authority.26
the Partywas so determinedto recruitfutureleaders from among the
most highly-educatedsegmentsof society thatit was willingto abandon
the idea that people in positions of authorityhad to join the MSZMP,
or that they had to express their loyaltyto the principlesof MarxismLeninism.As long as the technocraticintelligentsiadid not challenge
the two taboos of socialism(namely:the "leadingrole of the party"and
the "alliancewith the SovietUnion"),they werebasicallyfree to say and
write whateverthey wanted.If they were willingto make these limited
gesturesof personalloyalty,membersof the technocraticintelligentsia
were amply compensated by the regime with high levels of income,
markeddegrees of autonomy,and considerableamounts of power in
decision-making.
When under Soviet pressure,Kdair was forced to crack down on dissent in 1973, he wisely decided to take oppressive measures only
against a small group of highly visible philosophers and sociologists;
the most famous case being the crackdownon the BudapestSchool.27
In publiclypersecutingthese individuals,the Kadarregimesatisfiedthe
wishes of its Soviet allies. But, at the same time, it also made sure that
economistsand engineerswere handledwith a velvetglove.
Ironically,Kadar'spragmaticattitude toward the technocraticintelligentsia may have unintentionallyplayed a role in weakeningthe legitimacy of the socialist system. The new technocracythat moved into
positions of power did not believe (nor was it requiredto believe) in
socialism.Not surprisingly,therefore,it did not take long before they,
too, began to choose "exit"over "loyalty"as their approach to the
socialist state. Led by large-enterprisemanagers,the new technocracy
placed the idea of property reform on the MSZMP's agenda in the
early 1980s. Whatthey presentedto the MSZMPat this stagewas not a
full-fledged program of privatization,but a simple solution to the
"propertyvacuum"problemthat plaguedall socialisteconomies.28It is
now clear that,with this maneuver,the technocracybegan to move the
Hungarianeconomy in the directionof capitalismand large-enterprise
managersbegan slowly to renegotiatetheir propertyrights.Managers
were granted considerablepropertyrights under socialism, but these
rightswere ratherimplicitand were often restrictedto mere possession:
they were not permittedto inherit or alienate state property,but they
This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 03:52:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
704
obtained significantcontrol over what to produce and how to invest
state capital.In addition,the bonuses that were paid to managersat the
end of each fiscal year could be interpretedas a form of profit-sharing;
albeitin a socialistdisguise.
Beginningwith the 1980s, the "newtechnocracy"made an attemptto
legalize its property rights by extending them beyond mere possession.29At first,membersof the bureaucratic"oldguard"foughtagainst
this change,but duringthe summerof 1989 they were defeated by the
new technocracy.From this point onward, the new technocracywas
free to complete the transformationof propertyrelationsin Hungary.
In a matterof months,legislationwas passed to createthe legal frameworkfor spontaneousprivatizationor managementbuy-outs.
From our point of view, these developments are importantbecause
they serve to illustrateour claim that the new technocracythat came to
power during the "thirdstage"of socialist development30was competent, but it was not committedto socialism.In other words, the new
technocraticelite made a concerted effort to "exit"socialism and, in
this sense, it may have pursued the project that Hankiss attributedto
them:thatis, to transformthemselvesinto a grandbourgeoisie.
This high degree of cooptation of the Hungarianintelligentsiadelayed
the developmentof dissent,and suspendedthe formationof a counterelite. The first weak step in this direction was a letter expressingthe
solidarityof the Hungariandissidentswith Charter77. This was the first
occasion when a substantialnumberof intellectualswere ready to use
"voice,"rather than "exit."Next came the emergence of the underground press; in particular,the regularpublicationon the periodical
Beszel6. But the institutionalizationof the counter-elitehad to wait.
Not until 1987 were the first formal dissident organizationsestablished:this began with the formationof the "Networkof Independent
Initiatives,"followed by the Alliance of Young Democrats (Fiatal
Demokratdk Szdvetsege,or FIDESZ), the Hungarian Democratic
Forum (MagyarDemokataFdrum,or MDF), and, finally,the Alliance
of Free Democrats (Szabad Demokratdk Szovetsege, or SZDSZ). Once
This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 03:52:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
705
Although our story, so far, provides strong support for the reproduction thesis, history does not alwaysunfold so neatly.As the electoral campaign of 1990 got off the ground, the opposition parties
gainedmore and more self-confidence.The conversionof the MSZMP
into the SocialistParty (i.e., MagyarSzocialistaPart,or MSZP) on the
one hand, and the Social Democratic Party (i.e., MagyarSzocialdemokrataPart,or MSZDP) on the other provedto be a total disasterfor
the communists.Neither of these parties was able to make a clean
break from their communist past and, as such, both were viewed as
historical heirs of the MSZMP.Unfortunatelyfor these parties, the
name of the game during the election campaignswas anti-communism.33
Since the electoral campaignswere fought on these symbolicgrounds,
anti-communistsbegan to play an important role in politics. Once
MDF formed a coalitiongovernment,it began to arguefor the removal
of communistsfrom positions of power and privilege,the termination
of all instancesof spontaneousprivatization,and the creationof a loyal
civil-service body. In spite of this rhetoric, however, old communist
cadres often remained in positions of authority;particularly,if they
were willingto change their political loyalties.Perhapsfor this reason,
therefore,many former communists became the most radical opponents of social-democraticpolicies, and the most dedicated defenders
of the free-marketeconomy.This, in itself,could be considereda moral
counter-selection:former communistswho had personal and political
integrity (in the sense that they continued to support communist
ideology) were much more likely to be dismissed from their positions
thanwerethe "turn-coats."
This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 03:52:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
706
grandchildrenof the formergenteel middle class for politicaland civilservicejobs:they are consideredto be politicallysafe and ideologically
loyal supportersof the new regime.In this manner,the class structure
of pre-socialistHungaryis graduallybeing restored;this restorationis
particularlyevidentamongthe ranksof the new politicalelite.
Empirical results from the Hungarian elite survey
This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 03:52:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Table 1. Demographic characteristics of the old (1988) and the new (1993) elites in Hungary
All elites
Economic elites
Old
New
Old
New
Variables
(N=662)
(N=783)
(N=82)
(N=489)
Gender
Man
Woman
87.3
12.7
92.1*
7.9*
93.9
6.1
93.3
6.7
13.1
31.6
36.7
15.1
3.5
12.4
38.7*
36.7
9.8*
2.4
3.7
26.8
56.1
13.4
0.0
11.0*
46.6*
37.6*
4.1*
0.6
* p < 0.05.
Note. Percentages may not sum correctly because of rounding error. Missing values were not includ
for the construction of all the variables that are included in this table.
a Year of incumbency refers to 1988 in the case of the old elite and to 1993 in the case of the new elit
This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 03:52:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7able 2. Family origins of the old (1988) and the new (1993) elites in Hungary
Economicelites
All elites
Variables
Old
(N = 662)
New
(N =783)
Old
(N=82)
New
(N=489)
Father'seducation
Primaryschool
Secondaryschool
Tertiaryschool
51.2
25.8
23.0
34.5*
29.6
35.9*
63.4
19.5
17.1
36.6*
34.8*
28.6*
Father'soccupation
Culturaldecision-maker
Economicmanager
Politicalofficial
Lower-levelmanager
Professional(supervisor)
Professional(rank-and-file)
Routinenonmanualworker
Skilledmanualworker
Unskilledmanualworker
Agriculturallaborer
Not in the laborforce
Deceased
1.2
1.7
2.0
9.2
3.6
8.8
15.9
24.5
7.6
13.6
5.4
6.6
1.3
2.3
2.4
14.0*
8.9*
10.9
16.5
19.8*
5.4
8.7*
3.7
6.1
1.2
1.2
1.2
7.3
2.4
3.7
18.3
34.1
4.9
9.8
7.3
8.5
1.0
2.7
1.8
15.1*
8.0*
8.0
16.0
24.3
4.5
10.2
2.7
5.7
Father'sparty(MSZMP)membership
Neverjoined anyparty
Nevermemberof MSZMP
MSZMPmember
58.0
13.1
28.9
56.8
13.4
29.8
56.1
17.1
26.8
58.9
9.6
31.5
p < 0.05.
This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 03:52:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Table 3. Educational background of the old (1988) and the new (1993) elites in Hungary
All elites
Economicelites
Old
(N= 662)
New
(N=783)
Old
(N=82)
New
(N=489)
0.3
5.1
94.6
0.0
4.3
95.7
0.0
0.0
100.0
0.0
5.9*
94.1*
No tertiaryeducation
No Marxistmajor
PartlyMarxistmajor
Only Marxistmajor
5.4
69.3
25.1
0.2
4.3
84.3*
11.2*
0.1
0.0
70.1
29.3
0.0
5.9*
81.2*
12.9*
0.0
Humanitiesmajorb
No tertiaryeducation
No humanitiesmajor
Partlyhumanitiesmajor
Only humanitiesmajor
5.4
68.3
24.0
2.3
4.3
73.8*
19.5*
2.3
0.0
86.6
13.4
0.0
5.9*
83.6
9.6
0.8*
Technicalmajorb
No tertiaryeducation
No technicalmajor
Partlytechnicalmajor
Only technicalmajor
5.4
35.8
45.5
13.3
4.3
24.0*
46.6
25.0*
0.0
4.9
74.4
20.7
5.9*
4.5
55.6*
33.9*
Variables
Education
Primaryschool
Secondaryschool
Tertiaryschool
Marxist majorb
* < 0.05.
p
Note.Percentagesmaynot sum correctlybecauseof roundingerror.Missingvalueswerenot includedin the calcu
all the variablesthatareincludedin thistable.
a Theselevelsof educationpertainto attendance,
andnot necessarily(althoughincluding)completion.
b See Appendixfor the precisecodingof thesevariables.
This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 03:52:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
libhle4. Political characteristics of the old (1988) and the new (1993) elites in Hungary
All elites
Economicelites
Variables
Old
(N=662)
New
(N=783)
Old
(N =82)
New
(N =489)
IMSZMP
membershipa
Neverjoined any party
Nevermemberof MSZMP
Formermemberof MSZMP
MSZMPmemberin 1988
13.3
3.3
22.2
61.2
28.7*
13.8*
17.6*
39.8*
9.8
3.7
26.8
59.8
29.9*
3.7
17.6
48.9
8.2
18.9
11.2
55.4
6.3
5.9
37.2*
30.3*
22.6*
4.1
7.3
24.4
25.6
42.7
0.0
7.0
33.1
29.2
25.4*
4.7*
Partymembershipin 1993
Neverjoined anyparty
Not partymemberin 1993
CenterRight
Liberals
Socialists
Communists
Otherparties
13.3
71.1
0.8
0.2
11.9
2.0
0.8
28.7*
58.7*
5.7*
3.2*
2.8*
0.4*
0.4
9.8
80.5
1.2
0.0
7.3
1.2
0.0
29.9*
65.0*
1.2
0.6
2.2
0.4
0.6
* < 0.05.
p
Note.Percentagesmaynot sumcorrectlybecauseof roundingerror.Missingvalueswerenot includedin the calcu
all the variablesthatareincludedin thistable.
a MSZMP
refersto the HungarianSocialistWorkers'Party.
(MagyarSzocialistaMunkdspart)
h See Appendixfor the precisecodingof thesevariables.
This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 03:52:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Table 5. Occupational characteristics of the old (1988) and the new (1993) elites in Hungary
All elites
Economicelites
Variables
Old
(N =662)
New
(N=783)
Old
(N- 82)
New
(N-=489)
Occupationin 1988
Culturaldecision-maker
Economicmanager
Partyofficial
Stateofficial
Lower-levelmanager
Professional(supervisor)
Professional(rank-and-file)
Worker
Not in the laborforce
5.1
10.0
16.5
31.6
15.9
7.9
6.5
0.9
5.7
2.9*
20.8*
3.3*
5.6*
37.4*
10.1
14.6*
3.7*
1.5*
0.0
56.1
7.3
3.7
28.0
1.2
1.2
0.0
2.4
0.2
30.9*
2.2
1.6
49.7*
4.9*
4.9*
4.7*
0.8
Occupationin 1993
Culturaldecision-maker
Economicmanager(public)
Economicmanager(private)
Stateofficial
Lower-levelmanager
Professional(supervisor)
Professional(rank-and-file)
Worker
Not in the laborforce
2.9
6.6
2.9
7.6
24.0
7.6
11.2
4.5
32.8
2.7
22.2*
17.2*
16.7*
25.4
7.2
3.2*
1.3*
4.1*
0.0
20.7
8.5
0.0
18.3
0.0
4.9
0.0
47.6
0.2
34.4*
27.2*
0.2
31.7*
1.0*
0.4
1.8*
3.1*
* < 0.05.
p
Note.Percentagesmaynot sum correctlybecauseof roundingerror.Missingvalueswerenot includedin the calcu
all the variablesthatareincludedin thistable.
This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 03:52:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
712
elites by examiningtheir demographiccharacteristics,family origins,
educationalbackground,politicalparticipation,andoccupationalhistory.
The "reproduction"
thesis
Withinthe currentliteratureon elites in Hungary,there is widespread
agreementthat membersof the old nomenklaturamanagedto remain
at the top of the class structureduring the transition to post-communism.38Up to now, however, these arguments have not gained
extensive empirical support because the studies that have promoted
them obtained their informationeither from nonrandom samples of
firms or from anecdotal evidence.39With representativedata on
Hungarianelites from the SSCE survey,we are in a good position to
submitthe reproductionthesis to a more rigorousempiricaltest. If the
thesis is correct, we would expect to find relativelylittle difference
between the old and the new elites along a number of key socioeconomic variables.40A casual observerexaminingthe resultsthat are
presentedin Tables 1 through5 mightbe temptedto conclude that the
reproductionthesis is not supported by data from the SSCE survey.
This is because a comparisonof columns 1 and 2 in all of our tables
shows markeddifferencesin the socioeconomic characteristicsof the
two elites.41However,when we disaggregateour two samplesinto different typesof elites,threedistinctpatternsof elite recruitmentemerge.
This way of looking at our data revealsthat the economic elite samples
offer the strongestpossible case for the reproductionhypothesis.To be
sure, even in these samples we find some differences in the basic
characteristicsof the old and new elites.Membersof the new economic
elite, for example,are significantlyyoungerthan were membersof the
old elite in 1988 (compareColumns 3 and 4, Panel 2, Table 1). They
are also more likely to have had fatherswho completed tertiaryeducation (Panel 1, Table 2) and who worked in lower-levelmanagerialor
professionaljobs (Panel 2, Table2). In terms of schooling,we find that
members of the new elite are notably less educated than their older
counterparts(Panel 1, Table 3). At the same time, however,it is also
clear that their trainingis of higher quality,given that a much smaller
percentageof them completed their universityeducationwith a Marxist major (Panel 2, Table 3). Finally,our measuresof political participation show only slight differences between the two sub-samples:
although members of the new economic elite were clearly less supportiveof the MSZP in the 1990 elections (Panel2, Table4), they were
This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 03:52:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
713
just as involvedin the CommunistParty (MSZMP)prior to the fall of
communism(Panel 1, Table4), and they are similarlyreluctantto participatein contemporarypoliticallife (Panel3, Table4).
Notwithstandingthese differences,thereis some evidence of reproduction in Hungary.Table 5 shows, for example,that a striking31 percent
of the new economic elite held economic commandposts in 1988, and
another 50 percent held lower-level managerialjobs in the state
economy (Column 4, Panel 1). Likewise, 30 percent of the old economic elite survivedas economic leadersin 1993 (see Column3, Panel
2); but none used their political assets to enter the ranks of the new
culturalor the political elite. While these results clearly support the
reproductionthesis,they do so only in a partialsense. This is because a
rathersignificantfraction of the old economic elite obviously did not
fare so well under post-communism:a sizeable proportion of them
(23.4 percent) experienced downward mobility, and an even larger
percentageof them (47.6 percent)were "forced"into earlyretirement.42
The "circulation"thesis
Turningnow to a discussion of political elites, we see an entirelydifferentpatternof recruitmentemergingfromthe data.Unlike in the previous case, the similaritiesbetween the two political sub-samplesare
remarkablyscarce:both elites are staffedmainlyby men and they are
also aboutthe sameage (compareColumns5 and 6, Table1).Withthese
two findings,however,the commonalitiesbetween the old and the new
elites cease and what we observe, instead, is a marked circulationof
personnelbetween 1988 and 1993. This circulationis fairlysystematic.
To begin with, the social originsof the 1993 politicalelite are dramatically differentfrom those of their communistcounterparts.Whereas
the overwhelmingmajority of the old political cadres came from
working-classfamilies(Panel 2, Table2), those in positions of political
power today are more likely to be the descendantsof highly educated
and professionalfathers (Panels 1 and 2, Table 2). To put the matter
more sharply,the results in Table 2 indicate that a much larger percentage of the new political elite is composed of "secondgeneration"
professionals.This constitutesa majorshift in the selection of elites in
Hungary:the class-based quotas that favored childrenfrom workingclass and peasantfamiliesin the recruitmentof political leadersunder
communism43have now been replaced by a much greater degree of
closureat the top of the social hierarchy.44
This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 03:52:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
714
Furtherdifferencesbetween the two sub-samplesare evident in Table
3, which shows that the educationalcredentialsof the old and the new
elites are quite dissimilar.Membersof the new elite are distinctlymore
educated than their communistpredecessors(Panel 1, Table 3), but a
smallerpercentageof them completed a Marxistmajor(Panel 2, Table
3), and fewer were trainedin technicalfields (Panel 3 and 4, Table 3).
Once again, these results reveal a significantdeparturefrom earlier
patterns of elite recruitment.Unlike the old regime, the post-communist political order does not favor technocrats;instead, it actively
solicitsthe participationof humanisticintellectuals.45
As one might have guessed, our results also show that the political
loyalties of the two elites are different.Members of the new elite are
manifestlynon-socialist in their political orientation:a much smaller
percentageof them ever joined the CommunistParty (Panel 1, Table
4), fewervoted for socialistpartiesin the 1990 elections (Panel2, Table
4), and only a minutefractioncurrentlybelongs to the MSZP (Panel 3,
Table4). On the other hand,it is also clearthatmanymore membersof
the new elite have endorsed either Center Right or Liberal partiesin
1990 (Panel 2, Table 4), and a significantpercentage of them are
actually members of these parties today (Panel 3, Table 4). These
findingsspeak directlyto one of our earlierpredictionsby showingthat
a new form of "counterselection"structuresthe composition of the
new political elite. Whereasbefore, commitmentto communismwas
expected from those who aspired to nomenklaturapositions, today
anti-communistsentiments are required for entry into the political
elite.
Finally,the most obvious change in the makeup of the two elites is
revealedin Table 5. According to the results that are presented here,
only one-third of the new elite held command positions in 1988
(Column 6, Panel 1) and a spectacular78 percent of all communist
politicalleaders experienceddownwardmobility(Column 5, Panel 2).
Thus, it is clear that the transitionto post-communismhas produceda
remarkabletransformationin the compositionof the Hungarianpolitical elite.
This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 03:52:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
715
four tables show only minute differencesbetween the two subsamples;
thus hintingat the possibilitythat the culturalelite successfullyreproduced itself in the post-communistworld. However,when we turn to
Table 5, we see that nothing could be furtherfrom the truth.Only 30
percent of the contemporaryculturalelite held commandpositions in
1988 (Column8, Panel 1), and a striking91 percentof the old cultural
elite either experienced significantdownwardmobility or retired by
1993 (Column7, Panel 2). From this it follows thatthe fall of communism broughtwith it a significantpersonnelchange in the ranks of the
culturalchange.But, unlike in the case of the political elite, it did not
alter the criteriaby which individualswere selected into the cultural
elite. In this sense, therefore,the "emptyplaces"thesis comes closest to
explainingthe overallmakeupof this segmentof the Hungarianelite.
Conclusion
This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 03:52:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
716
Finally,in the case of the culturalelite, we found very little evidence of
change. To be sure, our results show considerable circulation in
personnelwithinthe culturalelite. Given the age distributionof the old
elite, however,we think that this circulationis likely to have been produced by normalretirements,ratherthan by a politicalbacklash.Most
importantlyperhaps for present purposes, the individualcharacteristics of the old and the new elites haveremainedmuchthe same with the
transitionto postcommunism.Thus, while the individualsoccupying
these positions may have changed,the "emptyplaces"at the top of the
culturaloccupationscontinued to recruitthe same type of personnel.
The fact that nothing has changed in the recruitmentcriteriafor the
cultural elite is not surprising.After all, the transitionto post-communism intended to reform the economy and political life, but it left
the culturaldomainuntouched.
Notes
1. V. Pareto, Sociological Writings(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966), 249.
2. 1. Szelenyi and S. Szel6nyi, "Az Elit Cirkulaci6ja? A Tarsadalmi Szerkezet Valtozasai Koz6p-Eur6paban a Posztkommunizmusba Val6 Atmenet Kordban" [The
Circulation of Elites? Changes in the Social Structure of Central European Societies During the Transition to Post-Communism], Kritika 10 (October 1991):
8-10.
3. E. Hankiss, East European Alternatives (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).
4. It is important to point out that Hankiss formulated his theory of elite recruitment
well before the complete disintegration of the communist regime.
5. E. Szalai, "Az Uj Elit [The New Elite]," in E. Szalai, Gazdasdg es Hatalom (Budapest: Aula, 1990), 169-176; E. Szalai, "Ismet az Uj Elitr6l" [The New Elite Revisited], in E. Szalai, Gazdasdg es Hatalom, 181-186.
6. J. Staniszkis, "The dynamics of breakthrough in the Socialist system: An outline of
problems," Soviet Studies 61 (October 1989): 560-573; J. Staniszkis, "'Political
capitalism' in Poland," East European Politics and Societies 5 (Winter 1991): 127141; J. Staniszkis, The Dynamics of Breakthrough in Eastern Europe (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1991).
7. This perspective is fashionable not only in the halls of academia, but also among
Hungarian populists. In one of his rousing speeches delivered over the radio, Istvan
Csurka questioned the practice of describing the events of 1989 as regime change
by noting that the transition to post-communism has provided individuals with
limited opportunities for upward mobility. He said: "the story today is that the old
proprietors remain in their places in the name of privatization." See I. Csurka,
VasdrnapiJegyzetek [Sunday Notes] (Budapest: Piiski-Magyar F6rum, 1991), 49.
8. D. Stark, "Path dependence and privatization strategies in East Central Europe,"
East European Politics and Societies 6 (Winter 1992): 17-54.
9. For an extended discussion of these (and other) conversion strategies, see I.
Szel6nyi and S. Szel6nyi. "The making of a new elite in postcommunist Central
Europe: An outline of a dynamic model of social spaces," paper presented at the
This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 03:52:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
717
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 03:52:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
718
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
inequalities among workers. See: I. R. Gabor and P. Galasi, "A Masodlagos Gazdasag: A Szocializmusbeli Magdnszf6ra Nehany Gazdasag-Szociol6giai Kerdese"
[The Second Economy: A Few Questions for Economic Sociology Raised by the
Private Sector Under Socialism]," Szociol6gia 6 (1978): 329-344; T. Kolosi, "A
'Mellekes' Nem Mell6kes" [The "Secondary" [Income] is Not Secondary], 1let es
Irodalom (March 1980): 5; I. Volgyes, "Hungary: The lumpenproletarianization of
the working class," in J. F. Triska and C. Gati, editors, Blue-Collar Workers in
Eastern Europe (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), 224-235.
G. Konrad and I. Szelenyi, The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power (New York:
Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich, 1979); I. Szel6nyi, "The prospects and limits of the
East European new class project: An auto-critical reflection on The Intellectuals on
the Road to Class Power," Politics and Society 15/2 (1986): 103-144.
I. Szelenyi, "Eastern Europe in an epoch of transition: Toward a socialist mixed
economy?' in V. Nee and D. Stark, editors, Remaking the Economic Institutions of
Socialism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 208-232; S. Szelenyi,
"Socialism," in E.F. Borgatta and M.L. Borgatta, editors, Encyclopedia of
Sociology (New York: Macmillan Press, 1992), 1856-1863.
The Czech support for this vision is not surprising. After all, one of the major
ideologues of the Prague Spring was Radovan Richta, who favored exactly this type
of technocratic vision of socialism. See: R. Richta, Civilization at the Crossroads
(White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1969); C. Harman,
Class Struggles in Eastern Europe 1945-83 (London: Bookmarks, 1988).
S. Szel6nyi, "Social inequality and party membership: Patterns of recruitment into
the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party," American Sociological Review 52
(October 1987): 559-573.
A. Arat6, "The Budapest School and actually existing socialism," Theory and Society 16 (July 1987): 593-619.
F. G. Casals (P. Campeanu), The Syncretic Society (White Plains, N.Y.: M. E.
Sharpe, 1980); J. B6r6cz, "Kett6s Fiigg6seg 6s Tulajdonvakuum: Tarsadalmi Atalakulas az Allamszocialista Felperif6rian" [Dual Dependency and Property Vacuum:
Social Change in the State Socialist Semiperiphery], Szociol6giai Szemle 3 (1992):
3-20.
E. Szalai, "Elites and systematic change in Hungary," Praxis International 10 (April
and July, 1990): 74-79.
S. Szel6nyi, "Social mobility and class structure in Hungary and the United States,"
dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin-Madison. (Ann
Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, No. 8826077,1988).
I. Szelenyi and S. Szel6nyi, "The vacuum in Hungarian politics: Classes and
parties," New Left Review 187 (May/June 1991): 121-137.
A. R6na-Tas, "The selected and the elected: The making of the new parliamentary
elite in Hungary," East European Politics and Societies 5 (Fall 1991): 357-393.
I. Szelenyi and S. Szel6nyi, "The vacuum in Hungarian politics."
T. Kolosi, personal communication.
P. Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1984).
I. Szelenyi and D. J. Treiman, Social Stratification in Central Europe: Hungarian
Elite Survey [MRDF]. Budapest: MEDIAN K6zv6lemeny- es Piackutat6 Kft.
[producer]. Los Angeles, California: Department of Sociology, University of California [distributor], 1993.
See Appendix at the end of this article for a full specification of the variables used
in the analyses.
This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 03:52:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
719
38. D. Stark,"Privatizationin Hungary:From plan to marketor from plan to clan?"
East European Politics and Societies 4 (Fall 1990), 351-392;
D. Bartlett, "The
Age in 1993
Under 40
40-49
All old
elites
0.5
2.8
Economic
elites
Political
elites
0.0
2.6
0.8
3.8
Cultural
elites
0.0
0.0
50-59
23.5
25.6
27.8
8.9
60-69
70 or above
57.1
16.1
69.2
2.6
57.9
9.8
44.4
46.7
217
39
133
44. For discussionsof the various forms of class closure, see: P. Sorokin, Social and
CulturalMobility(New York:Free Press, 1964); P. M. Blau and 0. D. Duncan, The
American Occupational Structure (New York: The Free Press, 1967); F. Parkin,
This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 03:52:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
720
1974. "Strategies of social closure in class formation," in F. Parkin, editor, The
Social Analysis of Class Structure (London: Tavistock, 1974), 1-18.
45. Arguably, however, this is only a temporary phase in the development of the
Hungarian class structure. The new political elite seems to be dedicated to passing
economic power over to private entrepreneurs. If it succeeds in doing this, it is
likely to eliminate itself as a political class. The current post-communist revolution
resembles, in this sense, the famous Russian revolution. In 1917 a group of intellectuals constituted themselves as a political class in a peasant country in order to
lead a "proletarian revolution" without a proletariat, but with the express purpose
of creating a proletariat. In 1989, a fraction of the intelligentsia seized power in
Central Europe, their intention is to lead a bourgeois revolution without a bourgeoisie, but with the express desire to create a bourgeoisie. For more on this, see
I. Szel6nyi and S. Szel6nyi, "The making of a new elite in post-communist Central
Europe."
46. See E. Hankiss, East European Alternatives; J. Staniszkis, The Dynamics of Breakthrough in Eastern Europe.
Appendix
Our principal objective in this article is to characterize the social composition of the
Hungarian elite at two time points in history: prior to the collapse of the communist
regime (in 1988) and immediately after the transition to a market economy (in 1993).
We identified elites on the basis of our sampling frame; this allowed us to distinguish
not only between the old and the new elites, but it also permitted us to disaggregate our
two main elite categories into specific types of elites (i.e., the economic, the political,
and the cultural elite).
Demographic characteristics: We begin our analyses by surveying the gender and age of
our respondents in the various elite categories. Age is measured in the year of incumbency; thus it pertains to 1988 in the case of the old elite and to 1993 in the case of the
new elite. Our age categories are spaced at ten-year intervals, beginning with age 40.
Given the nature of our sample, there are too few respondents in the youngest age
group to warrant greater detail.
Family origins: Attention is also paid to the family origin of our respondents, as indexed
by their father's education, occupation, and party membership. Father's education is a
combination of the father's (highest) level of education completed and the type of
school he attended. It is coded in the following manner: primary school (no schooling,
less than 4 years of elementary school, 4 years of elementary school, 6 years of elementary school, 4 years of "bourgeois" school, 8 years of elementary school), secondary
school (apprentice school, vocational school, technical secondary, academic secondary), tertiaryschool (college, university). Following a long tradition in social stratification
research, father's occupation is measured at the time when the respondent was 14 years
old, and father's party membership was designed to capture whether the respondent's
father ever joined the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkdspdrt, or MSZMP).
This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 03:52:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
721
Educationalbackground:For substantivereasons,we constructedtwo measuresof educationalattainmentfromthe completehistoriesthatare availablein the elite survey.The
first one of these, education,is a combinationof level of educationcompletedand the
type of school attended.It is coded in the following manner:primaryschool (special
school, elementary school, bourgeois school, primary school), secondary school
(apprentice training, vocational school, technical secondary school, academic high
school), and tertiaryschool (teachers traininginstitute,college, university,other tertiary).Giventhatthe overwhelmingmajorityof our respondentshavecompletedat least
some tertiaryeducation,we thoughtit mightbe usefulto distinguishamongthem on the
basis of the type of trainingthat they receivedat the tertiarylevel. For this reason,we
have included a number of variablesin our analyses that indicate their major at the
tertiarylevel: MarxistMajorsinclude specializationin public administration(dllamigazgatds), armed forces (fegyveres testiilet), and Marxism-Leninism (Marxismus-Leniniz-
Political characteristics:
Throughoutthe analyses, we use three separate variablesto
measurethe politicalcharacteristicsof the respondents.MSZMPMembershipwas constructedfrom the politicalhistoryof the respondents.Its purposeis to identifyrespondents who neverjoined the CommunistParty,those who joined but left before 1988,
and those who were still membersin 1988. Votein the 1990 Electionsis designed to
capturerespondents'partypreferencein the first free elections in Hungary.It is coded
in the followingmanner:did not vote, centerright(HungarianDemocraticForum,the
IndependentSmallholders'Party,the ChristianDemocraticParty),liberals(Alliance of
Free Democrats, the Alliance of Young Democrats), socialists (HungarianSocialist
Party), and other parties. Party Membership in 1993 is coded in the same way as "vote in
This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 03:52:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
722
perfectmeasureof elite membership.This is because elite position and occupationare
not in all instances the same. Consider, for example, members of the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences.Membershipin the Academy is not consideredto be a job and,
for this reason,it is not reportedin our occupationalhistorytable.
This content downloaded from 77.105.25.9 on Sun, 18 Oct 2015 03:52:14 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions