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Self-Deception and Survival: Mental Coping Strategies on the Western Front, 1914-18
Author(s): Alex Watson
Source: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Apr., 2006), pp. 247-268
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30036385
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@ 2006 SAGEPublications,
London,ThousandOaks,CAand
of Contemporary
Journal
History
Copyright
New Delhi,Vol41(2),247-268. ISSN0022-0094.
DOI:10.1177/0022009406062063
Alex Watson
248
Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 41 No 2
intensely disempowering. This caused extreme strain, for, as modern psychologists assert, 'people have a need to predict the future and control events'.5
Claustrophobic trenches and heavy artillery fire, which, according to contemporary German research, caused 76 per cent of all wounds by 1917,
engendered severe feelings of helplessness, as soldiers were unable either to flee
or actively defend themselves.6
Historians have generally argued that these conditions left combatants
cognitively overwhelmed and vulnerable. Peter Knoch suggests that men typically experienced 'paralysis before the all-powerfulness of war'. Eric Leed
portrays soldiers as incapable of processing the monstrous machine warfare
raging about them and Modris Eksteins asserts that 'men stopped asking questions, deliberately. They ceased to interpret.'7 Yet statistics for nervous disorders contradict these statements: in the German army, 613,047 men, 4.57
per cent of those mobilized, were treated for such diseases. The British recruited more than five million soldiers, yet paid only 120,000 pensions for
psychiatric ailments after the war. Even allowing for diagnostic inaccuracies
and contemporary ignorance of mental disease, most men clearly overcame
battle stress extremely successfully."
How did men cope? This article will argue that at the root of soldiers'
resilience lay a number of perceptual filters and psychological strategies which
presented them with a distorted, overly-optimistic but beneficial view of their
surroundings and personal chances of survival. The first section will investigate how men adapted to harsh frontline conditions. It will examine their
changing attitudes towards risk assessment and explain the psychological
strategies enabling them to face their awful reality without being overwhelmed
III/Fiisilier Regiment 86, more than 1000 of its 1200 soldiers became casualties when defending
against a French attack in June 1915. See the diary of Captain O.P. Eckhard, quoted in M. Brown,
The Imperial War Museum Book of the Somme (London and Basingstoke 1996), 123 and
Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv Freiburg [hereafter BA-MA Freiburg], MSg 1/690: Feldzahlmeister
Ohlmann, letter to Frau von Meding, 9 June 1915. Due to German privacy laws all the surnames
of German soldiers quoted in this article are pseudonyms.
5 S. Joseph, 'Attributional Processes, Coping and Post-traumatic Stress Disorders' in W. Yule
(ed.), Post-traumatic Stress Disorders. Concepts and Therapy (Chichester 1999, 2000), 51-70.
6 Sanitiitsbericht iiber das Deutsche Heer (Deutsches Feld- und Besatzungsheer) im Weltkriege
1914/1918 (Deutscher Kriegssanitiitsbericht 1914/18). Die Krankenbewegung bei dem deutschen
Feld- und Besatzungsheer im Weltkriege 1914/1918, ed. Heeres-Sanitatsinspektion des Reichskriegsministeriums (3 vols, Berlin 1934) iii [hereafter Sanitiitsbericht III], 71.
7 P. Knoch, 'Erleben und Nacherleben. Das Kriegserlebnis im Augenzeugenbericht und im
Geschichtsunterricht', in G. Hirschfeld, G. Krumeich and I. Renz (eds), Keiner fiihlt sich hier mehr
als Mensch ... Erlebnis und Wirkung des Ersten Weltkriegs (Essen 1993), 211-12; E.J. Leed, No
Man's Land. Combat and Identity in World War I (Cambridge 1979, 1981), 130-3 and M.
Eksteins, Rites of Spring. The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age (London, New York,
Toronto, Sydney and Auckland 1989), 174.
8 Sanitiitsbericht III, 145 and B. Shephard, A War of Nerves. Soldiers and Psychiatrists 19141994 (London 2000, 2002), 328. For the problems of interpreting first world war psychiatric
casualty statistics, see E. Jones and S. Wessely, 'Psychiatric Battle Casualties. An Intra- and
Interwar Comparison', British Journal of Psychiatry, 178 (2001), 242-3.
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Watson:Self-deception
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by fear or despair. Not only did men develop strategies allowing them to function at the front, but also, as the second section demonstrates, they displayed
an amazing and, indeed, unrealistic level of optimism about their chances of
survival. The section explains this optimism by studying how soldiers used
religion and superstition to impose an imagined structure of security, sense
and control on their chaotic environment. In the final section, however, it will
be suggested that men's optimism was not exclusively imaginary but was also
founded on highly positive perceptions of reality. By concentrating on shortterm risk and overestimating personal control, soldiers were able to convince
themselves that they would survive.
It was an impressive fact in the great war to note the extent to which the ordinary man was
capable of adapting himself to active war conditions.9
The outbreak of hostilities in August 1914 wrenched men away from their
peacetime lives and forced them to confront the novel horrors of industrial
warfare. As many recent historiographical works attest, they were by no
means fully unprepared for the ordeal. Most went willingly, convinced of the
necessity of fighting. Peacetime societal influences may, as J.G. Fuller and John
Bourne have argued, also have helped to ready them for the trenches.'0
Nonetheless, front conditions remained both unfamiliar and demanding.
Men's only hope of survival lay in quickly adapting, a process which at its
heart consisted of learning to recognize danger and assess risk.
Unsurprisingly, troops new to the front were especially inclined to assess risk
inappropriately. On both sides, wartime training of recruits was short and
often of poor quality." Many men consequently arrived in the line astoundingly ignorant of modern weaponry's power. One British soldier, for example,
described shells as being initially 'quite a novelty' and said that he did not feel
frightened because 'I didn't know anything about them'.12Such naivety could
lead to inappropriate or dangerous behaviour: another man recorded that on
first facing shellfire, he and his company 'didn't realise at first the danger we
9 F. Dillon, 'Neuroses among Combatant Troops in the Great War', The British Medical
Journal, 8 July 1939, 66.
10 See J.G. Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture in the British and Dominion Armies
1914-1918 (Oxford 1990) and J. Bourne, 'The British Working Man in Arms' in H. Cecil and
P.H. Liddle (eds), Facing Armageddon. The First World War Experienced (London 1996),
336-52. For soldiers' willingness to fight, see P. Liddle, 'British Loyalties. The Evidence of an
Archive' in the same volume, 524-5 and A. Lipp, Meinungslenkung im Krieg. Kriegserfahrungen
deutscher Soldaten und ihre Deutung 1914-1918 (G6ttingen 2003), 11.
11 P. Simkins, Kitchener's Army. The Raising of the New Armies, 1914-16 (Manchester and
New York 1988), 313 and BA-MA Freiburg, W-10/50900: Ueberblick uber Organisation und
Regelung des Mannschaftersatzes fur das deutsche Heer wahrend der Weltkrieges. I. Von der
Mobilmachung bis zum Herbst 1916, 21.
12 Imperial War Museum, Department of Documents, London [hereafter IWM], Misc. 99 Item
1515: Diary of unknown soldier, 21 November 1915.
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Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 41 No 2
werein, and stood up and laughedat the thing'.Onlywhen one shell burstover
anothercompany,killingtwo soldiers,did the event become'a very pannicky
Insufficientpreparationwas only one cause of recruits'
[sic] experience'.13
complacency.Fearof appearingafraidand havingtheirmanhood questioned
could prompt men to take unnecessaryrisks, often with fatal consequences.
Officerswere particularlyproneto such behaviour:one of LieutenantEdward
Chapman'scolleagues, for example, was a 'quite fearless' subaltern, who
'would not take any notice of flaresor snipers,and was shot dead, the bullet
going from ear to ear'.14
Otheruntriedsoldiersdisplayedintensefear.A studyof Britishtroops fighting in Salonikafound that signs of nervousness,including'palpitation,nightmare and brokensleep' were common even beforethe baptismof fire."'New
men walked stooped in quiet sectors, ducked constantlyand sufferedgreat
anxiety.ErnstHuthmacherdescribedhis first five days at the front as 'horrenIf the baptism
dous' and told his wife, 'I know now what mortalfearmeans'.16
occurredin heavy action, such feelingswere still more extreme.PrivateD.L.
Rowlands, who had the misfortuneto experienceshellfirefirst during the
Third Battle of Ypres, admitted to being 'absolutelyfrightenedto death!'
during the ordeal.17After such a scare, initial nervousnessoften receded
slowly: the psychologistCharlesBirdobservedthat 'for weeks the men suffer
from intense fright as comradesare killed or horriblymutilated'."8
Chapman
admittedthat this initialperiod 'nearlybroke me'."19
Some soldiersdid indeed
collapse. Robert Gaupp, a psychiatristattachedto the GermanXIII Corps,
observed that for some individuals 'a single experience of horror .
. .
cleared
Researchundertakenon Bavarian
the way for psychotraumaticsymptoms'.20
psychiatriccasualties found that most hystericaldisordershad manifested
themselvesduringpatients'first experienceof war.21
13 IWM, 84/22/1: B.O. Dewes, diary, 27 November 1914.
14 IWM, 92/3/1: E.F. Chapman, letter to mother, 27 August 1916. Cf. Sir John Goodwin in
Report of the War Committee of Enquiry into 'Shell-Shock', ed. War Office (London 1922) [hereafter RWOCIS], 13 and L. Scholz, Seelenleben des Soldaten an der Front. Hinterlassene
Aufzeichnungen des im Kriege gefallenen Nervenarztes (Tiibingen 1920), 128.
15 See RWOCIS, 202.
16 Deutsches Tagebucharchiv, Emmendingen [hereafter DTA], 930: E. Huthmacher, letter to
wife, 12 March 1915. Cf. W. Ludwig, 'Beitrige zur Psychologie der Furcht im Kriege' in W. Stern
and 0. Lipmann (eds), Beihefte zur Zeitschrift fiir angewandte Psychologie. 21. Beitriige zur
Psychologie des Krieges (Leipzig 1920), 137 and Chapman, letter to mother, 20 August 1916.
17 IWM, 93/20/1: D.L. Rowlands, letter to girlfriend, 5 February 1918.
18 C. Bird, 'From Home to the Charge. A Psychological Study of the Soldier', The American
Journal of Psychology, 28, 3 (July 1917), 333.
19 Chapman, letter to mother, 14 February 1917.
20 R. Gaupp, 'Schreckneurosen und Neurasthenie' in K. Bonhoeffer (ed.), Geistes- und
Nervenkrankheiten. Erster Teil (Leipzig 1922), 72.
21 K. Weiler, Arbeit und Gesundheit. Sozialmedizinische Schriftenreihe aus dem Gebiete des
Reichsministeriums. Heft 22. Nerv6se und seelische Storungen bei Teilnehmern am Weltkriege,
ihre iirztliche und rechtliche Beurteilung. Erster Teil. Nervbse und seelische Storungen psychogener und funktioneller Art (Leipzig 1933), 190.
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Watson:Se/f-deception
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In order to survive the front both mentally and physically, soldiers thus had
to learn to judge risk without being overwhelmed by it. Contemporaries reported that newly drafted troops often exhibited curiosity, indicative of an attempt
to gather information about their environment and respond to it.22Gradually,
they habituated to the frightening sights and sounds of the front and developed
what Franz Schauwecker, an ex-front officer turned amateur psychologist,
termed Dickfiilligkeit ('thick-skinnedness').23Survival skills were also acquired.
Another ex-officer and psychologist Paul Plaut observed that after one or two
months soldiers could judge shells' size and direction from their noise.24They
also learnt to employ the landscape to their advantage: 'Every depression or
elevation is immediately considered from a utilitarian standpoint and afterwards used', he wrote.25Such skill not only provided soldiers with the knowledge necessary to counter imminent mortal threat but also increased their
ability to operate effectively on the battlefield by raising their self-confidence. It
was calmness and self-control in peril which, according to Plaut, distinguished
the well-adjusted veteran from the naive recruit: 'Even in the moment of direct,
imminent danger', he wrote, 'an almost unexplainable cold-bloodedness and
emotional intransigence makes itself noticeable.' Soldiers' testimonies concur.
In an emergency, as Private William Tait observed, 'only the old hands really
kept their heads'. While other troops 'got the wind up a good bit', experienced
soldiers would be 'watching each shell, predicting where it would fall & then
scuttling'.26
As soldiers developed greater awareness of danger, they became more fatalistic about the possible consequences of their risk-taking. In a survey of
German combatants' coping strategies undertaken by the psychologist Walter
Ludwig, 44 of the 200 men questioned reported that they or their comrades
adopted this mindset at the front.27Letters and diaries also testify to the widespread adoption of fatalism, particularly in extreme adversity. 'One becomes a
fatalist. If it comes, it comes', wrote Leutnant Wilhelm Lithje during the
German army's final traumatic retreat.28'I think we are all Fatalists here
believing in the preordained order of things', observed Private Arthur Wrench
22 See Scholz, op. cit., 128 and Ludwig, op. cit., 155. Cf. IWM, 69/25/1: G. Donaldson, letter
to mother, 31 May 1916; IWM, 96/29/1: S.A. Knight, letter to girlfriend, 27 February 1915 and
IWM, P 239: W.B. St Leger, diary, 27 September 1916.
23 F. Schauwecker, Im Todesrachen. Die deutsche Seele im Weltkriege (Halle 1921), 12.
24 P. Plaut, 'Psychographie des Kriegers' in W. Stern and 0. Lipmann (eds), Beihefte zur
Zeitschrift fiir angewandte Psychologie. 21. Beitriige zur Psychologie des Krieges (Leipzig 1920),
31.
25 P. Plaut, 'Prinzipien und Methoden der Kriegspsychologie' in E. Abderhalden (ed.), Hand-
Abt. VI:Methodenderexperimentellen
buchderbiologischenArbeitsmethoden.
Psychologie.Teil
C/I (Berlin and Vienna 1928), 650.
26 Plaut, 'Psychographie des Kriegers', op. cit., 24-5 and IWM, PP/MCR/161: W.H. Tait, diary,
2 November 1914. Second world war studies also support these observations. Cf. S.A. Stouffer et
al., The American Soldier. Combat and its Aftermath (2 vols, New York 1949, 1965) ii, 283-4.
27 Ludwig, op. cit., 168-9, 172.
28 BA-MA Freiburg, MSg 1/ 2797: W. Liithje, diary, 3 October 1918.
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Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 41 No 2
As LeutnantHans Muhsaldiscovered,two
on the otherside one yearearlier.29
roads led to this attitude:'Eitherone is completelydulled or makes oneself
Men noted that 'one seemsto lose
acceptthat the troublehas to come again.'30
all depth of feeling and take things just as they come out here', yet they also
attemptedto cultivatefatalism by repressingdisturbingthoughts or memories.3'On both sides,soldiersagreedthat 'if you did ruminatemuch on the real
meaningof the thingsyou do and the thingsthat are done to you, your nerves
would crackin no time' and correspondinglybecame'determinedto forget'.32
They avoided 'tellingthe worst part of this war' and instead,particularlyon
the Britishside of the lines, used euphemismssuch as 'knockedout' or a 'trying time' to avoid acknowledgingtraumaticor painfulfacts.33
Often, fatalismwas skewed. Plaut referredto the 'elation of being able to
die in the middleof wantingto live' and CaptainH.W. Yoxall similarlyfound
that in the trenches 'while life becomes more desirable death seems less
Undersuchcircumstances,a certainamountof indifferenceto death
terrible'.34
could be a blessing,negatingsome fear which would otherwisehave caused
greatmentalstrain.The middleway betweenexcessiveanxietyand total indifferencewas, however,difficultto maintain.As Ludwigobserved,'the impression [of fatalism]is often so strong or of such long influencethat the will to
Men
live is crushedand makesway for a mindlessapathyand resignation'.3s
could enter a state similar to that described by modern psychologists as
Soldiersworn down by mentalor physicalexhaustion
'learnedhelplessness'.36
becamepassive, indifferentand so 'callous'that they 'took very little trouble
Such a condition was extremely dangerous: as
to protect [themselves]'.37
Scholzremarked,'he who does not fear deathwon't yearnlong for it'."
29 IWM, 85/51/1: A.E. Wrench, diary, 25 October 1917.
30 BA-MA Freiburg, MSg 1/ 3109: H. Muhsal, diary, 5 February 1917.
31 IWM, P 317 Con Shelf: H.W. Yoxall, letter to parents, 25 December 1916. Cf. IWM,
87/56/1: O.H. Best, letter/diary, 2 October 1914.
32 Respectively, Yoxall, letter to family, 1 June 1916 and IWM, 82/26/1: A.R. Williams, letter
to Dolly Gray, 31 December 1915. Cf. IWM, 83/6/1: V.S. Braund, letter to brother, 2 July 1915
and BA-MA Freiburg, MSg 2/ 2735: H. Genscher, letter to friend, 9 March 1916.
33 IWM, 97/37/1: A. Cornfoot, letter to 'Winnie', 3 September 1915. For euphemisms see IWM
Con Shelf: R.P. Harker, letter to Ethel, 16 December 1914; Yoxall, letter to mother, 18 June 1916;
Wrench, diary, 14 November 1916 and 9 April 1917; Chapman, letter to mother, undated but
written between 28 and 30 April 1917. Also, P. Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory
(New York and London 1975), 174-87.
34 Plaut, 'Psychographie des Kriegers', op. cit., 66 and Yoxall, letter to mother, 30 January 1917.
35 Ludwig, op. cit., 168.
36 A state of 'learned helplessness' is described as a situation in which there is non-contingency
between the person's actions and outcomes, an expectation that future outcomes will not be contingent and passive behaviour. Individuals in this state suffer from 'low self-esteem, sadness, loss
of aggression, immune changes and physical illness'. See C. Peterson, S.F. Maier and M.E.P.
Seligman, Learned Helplessness. A Theory for the Age of Personal Control (New York and
Oxford 1993), 8-9.
37 J.F.C. Fuller in RWOCIS, 29. Cf. Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage (London 1945,
1966), 71 and Scholz, op. cit., 128.
38 Ibid., 159.
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Watson:Self-deception
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Alternatively,contemporariesobservedthat veteranssometimesreturnedto
a state of intense fear: 'Some soldiers, and particularly officers, ... disappear
254
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Watson:Self-deception
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256
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in action. Still more surprisingin warfare characterizedas chaotic, unpredictable and intensely disempowering,36 soldiers found that Erwiigungen
iiber dem Graddes m6glichenUbels ('considerationof the degreeof possible
unpleasantness')providedreassuranceunder fire. Perhapsmost astounding,
given the dangerat the front, no fewerthan 17 expresseda firm beliefin their
own invincibility."9
That these men were unexceptionalis confirmedby the
historianBenjaminZiemann,who has found that Germansoldiers'lettersand
diariesbetraya 'widespreadillusion... that one personallycould not be killed
or wounded'.60British soldiers appear to have been no less unrealistically
optimistic. Bird observedthat most possessed an 'innerconviction that they
themselveswill not be killed' and the psychiatristC. StanfordRead posited
that 'each [soldier]mostly thinks that there is a good chance that he himself
will be spared'.'1Many a Britishsoldier believed,like LieutenantChapman,
that 'I'm a luckysort of chap, I am'.62
Historianshave explainedaway this unrealisticoptimismas stemmingfrom
a human inabilityto imagineone's own demise. Ziemannsuggeststhat men
automaticallyrepressedany notion that they might be killed, while Niall
Fergusonquotes Freud'sassertionthat 'no instinctwe possess is ready for a
belief in [our own] death' to explain the phenomenon.63
Psychologistswho
(unlikeFreud)had servedin the front line acknowledgedthat soldiersdid have
difficultyinvokingconcreteimagesof themselvesno longerexisting.However,
they also observedthat, in contrast,thoughts of dying were often extremely
vivid:
One can certainly think of death but not feel it. Death is quiet. In contrast, we suffer with the
wounded man: we see his need and hear his complaints. And thus it is less the picture of
death, which makes even the brave tremble, than that of dying; dying in pain.64
Watson:Self-deception
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Watson:Self-deception
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FaithlessBritishsoldiers,like their Germancounterparts,did grope for meaning and securityin the chaos of the trenches.As the BritishThirdArmy'schief
censor observed,'The Army is essentiallyreligious- not necessarilyin outward expression,but in the widest senseof an inwardfaith and trustin Divine
The supernaturalprotectorto whom such men turned,however,
guidance.'83
was not usuallya ChristianGod. For many, 'luck' became a form of ersatz
personaldeitycontrollingevents.Boththe religiousand non-believersreferred
to it and it is not uncommon to find men hedging their bets when giving
thanks for deliverance.ArthurWrench,for example, attributedhis 'repeated
miraculousescapes'variouslyto 'luck', 'God' and 'fate' at differentpoints in
his militarycareer.84
Faith in an abstractomnipotentbeing was often supportedby relianceon
physical objects believed to possess supernaturalpowers. Often these were
amuletsof a religiousnature,such as crucifixes,scapulars,AgnusDei and consecratedcoins.85Wrenchrecordedthat many men carrieda New Testamentin
their breastpocket in the hope that it might stop a bullet from enteringtheir
hearts. That metal objects might have stood more chance of doing this was
irrelevant;Wrenchwas emphaticthat 'it has to be a bible [sic] even if its only
other use is for a convenientpiece of paper to light a cigarette'.86
So-called
letters
with
or
formulae
to
Schutzbriefe,
religious magical
designed protect
81 Rowlands, letter to girlfriend, 5 February 1918 and Brophy and Partridge, op. cit., 17. Cf.
Fuller, op. cit., 156-7.
82 Pfeilschifter, op. cit., 249.
83 Hardie, Report on Complaints, Moral, etc., 23 November 1916, 10.
84 See Wrench, diary, 22 April 1917, 9 September 1917, 28 February 1918, 26 March 1918
and 19 April 1918. Cf. Yoxall, letter to family, 29 May 1916, IWM, 76/121/1 & Con Shelf: C.S.
Rawlins, letter, 12 October 1915; Muhsal, diary, 6 May 1917 and 31 May 1918.
85 Plaut, 'Psychographie des Kriegers', op. cit., 78 and IWM, 96/29/1: J. McIlwain, memoir
based on contemporary diary, 33.
86 Wrench, diary, 21 July 1917. Such beliefs may have been encouraged by wartime propaganda: see 'Some Mascots and Trifles that have Saved Lives', The War Illustrated. A PictureRecord of Events by Land, Sea and Air, 2, 28 (February 1915), 47 and Schmahl, 'Die Gewehre der
europaischen Machte', Illustrierte Geschichte des Weltkrieges 1914/15. Allgemeine Kriegszeitung,
30 (n.d.), 100.
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sonal fate to the individual,negatingthe damagingfeelings of disempowerment arisingfrom the front's objectiveuncontrollability.It is significant,for
example, that a Britishtank crewman,capturedby the Germansin August
1917, attributedhis deliverancefrom dangernot directlyto God but to the
fact that he had prayed incessantly throughout combat.95Similarly, the
Germansoldierwho, wounded and capturedby the French,blamedhis fate
not on the objectiveineffectivenessof his Schutzbriefbut on his own foolishness in losing faith in the letterfor 15 minutesand thus negatingits protective
powers, at leastfelt in control of his own fate.96
By looking beyond their own disempoweringand dangerousworld to the
supernatural,soldiers were able to impose structureand certainty on the
surroundingchaos. Belief that God, Providenceor luck would shield them
from death providedsecurityand reassurance.Even faith that a loving deity
was behind the bloodshedand destructionimposed some sense on an otherwise unpredictableand frighteningworld. Amuletsand rituals,both Christian
and pagan,becamepopularbecausethey went furtherstill in helpingto satisfy
the human need 'to predict the future and control events'. Protectedby a
loving God, suppliedwith a set of ruleswhich appearedto guaranteesurvival
and imbuedwith a sense of power over theirfate and their surroundings,it is
perhapsunsurprisingthat many soldierswere able to remainhighlyoptimistic
about their abilityto cheat death.
You won't be hit by any bullet, you're immune.97
Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 41 No 2
262
Dewes, diary, 29 November 1914. Cf. IWM, 78/4/1: T.H. Cubbon, diary, 29 September
1914.
BA-MA Freiburg, MSg 2/ 5458: J. Kohler, 2 March 1916.
Harker, 28 December 1914 and Nawrath, letter to parents, 24 January 1915.
IWM, 92/3/1: O.P. Taylor, diary, 10 September 1916.
Wrench, diary, 30 August 1917.
Plaut, 'Psychographie des Kriegers', op. cit., 64. Cf. Fussell, op. cit., 131-5, in which he
explains how superstition and peace rumours came together in the mythology surrounding the
leaning Golden Virgin at Albert.
105 Hardie, Report on Moral, etc., III Army, 1 January 1917.
106 Ziemann, op. cit., 84-5 and Fuller, op. cit., 72.
100
101
102
103
104
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Watson:Self-deception
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it seems years and years since I came out to France, at the moment it is only
like yesterday while Sunday seems too far away to be real.""7More common
and less likely to affect fatalistic attitudes adversely was the practice of unit
rotation. In normal trench warfare, British battalions usually spent only ten
days per month in the line.108The recognition that combat, however awful,
was only a temporary state greatly helped soldiers through the more stressful
periods of action. The rumour of relief after almost a month at Verdun in
1916, for example, strengthened Kurt Reiter's resolve to endure: 'Hurrah!', he
wrote at the end of June, 'it is said, that we will definitely be relieved on the 7
July. We are all looking forward to it! If only it were true. One must simply
not lose hope.'109
Belief in an imminent end to hostilities, or at least the immediacy of rest,
was helpful in maintaining both men's mental stability and army discipline
because it encouraged soldiers to focus on short-term rather than cumulative
risk. If such a perspective were adopted, then hopes for survival were by no
means unjustified, for deaths on the Western Front usually came in a slow
trickle rather than a flood. Analysis of casualties suffered by the 1/5 Durham
Light Infantry, a not untypical Territorial battalion with an initial strength of
1031 men, shows that outside 'battle' periods (as defined by the official
history) a man was killed in action on average only once every six days. The
risk of death rose dramatically during battles when, on average, six men per
day were killed. However, such intense action was extremely rare: of the
approximately 1300 days in which the battalion was in France, only 63 were
spent in a major battle."o Providing that a man ignored cumulative risk and
concentrated on the short term, it was thus perfectly reasonable to believe that
survival was highly likely. The benefits of this perspective were elucidated by
Lieutenant-Colonel McTaggart in a postwar military journal article. Noting
the signs of mental strain increasingly exhibited by men employed on nightly
carrying duties who feared that their luck was running out, he suggested that
they should be educated to think only of short-term risk. Estimating the
chance of being hit on such a carrying party at 3000 to one, he suggested that
'if
men were taught to think of the chances in their favour each time they
went up it would considerably lessen their apprehension'.111
Most commonly encountered in letters and diaries, however, are not estimates of men's own short-term chances of survival but rather of whether the
next shell or bullet would hit; the extreme inefficiency of first world war
107 Wrench, diary, 7 December 1916. Cf. IWM, 96/29/1: S.H. Steven, letter to family, 10
August 1915 and Chapman, letter to mother, 18 November 1916.
108 G. Corrigan, Mud, Blood and Poppycock. Britain and the First World War (London 2003),
89-91. For German patterns of rotation, see Ziemann, op. cit., 77.
109 K. Reiter, diary, 29 June 1916.
110 Calculated from casualty lists in A.L. Raimes, The Fifth Battalion. The Durham Light
Infantry 1914-1918 (No Place 1931), 204-12. For the battalion's initial strength, see 222.
111 M.F. McTaggart, 'Danger Values', Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 66, 462
(May 1921), 290.
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some men.126
Otherspreferredsomethingmore orchestral:when a bombardment opened on enemylines close to FranzBrussig'sdugout, 'all at the same
time Hoffmannbeganto play his concertina,Tuhnert& Decker gave a concert on the mandolinas well as they could and Hiib[ner]along with several
other comradeslet themselvesbe heardon harmonicas.Thustherewas a concert until the bombardmentcame to an end.'27
In normaltrenchlife, however,soldiersdid possessa modicumof influence
over their own fates. Mortar bombs could be dodged, enfiladedsections of
trenchcould be identifiedand avoidedand, as previouslynoted, men learntto
distinguishthe directionand type of shellsby sound.Interestingly,combatants
tended to overestimatethe control which these skills gave them, not just initially but even afterthey had becomegrizzledveterans.Thus, alreadyafterhis
first experienceof trenchwarfare,Yoxall observedthat 'barringthe shells it's
purely a contest of wits'. Sevenmonths later, he had also learnt that artillery
fire could be countered,commentingthat it was 'extraordinary'how men
gained a 'senseof shelling- the knowledgewhereto go and wherenot to go,
when to lie down and when to run, & c.'.'28Other soldiersalso emphasized
that they were relativelysafe from artilleryfire providingthat they could take
adequatecover quickly.ErnstBerner,for example,derivedcomfort from the
fact that althoughit was impossibleto predictexactlywhereshellswere going
to land, 'mostly one has a trench or a hole into which one can throw himself'.129
Donaldson actuallytook pride in his prowess in taking cover: 'I was
well satisfiedwith the rapiditywith which I got into that infernallymuddy
ditchwhen I heardthe beggarcoming',he wrote of a shellthat had just missed
him.'30Even actions objectivelyless likely to ensure survivalcould be interpretedby soldiersas part of their repertoirefor cheatingdeath. It is difficult,
for example, to see how white-hot shrapnelfalling from the sky could be
dodged, yet on finding himself in this situation,Wrenchrecorded'[making]
sure my tin hat was squareon my head and my legs in good runningorder'."'
In the light of this evidence, it seems reasonableto suggest that soldiers'
unrealisticoptimism about their personal chances of survivalin the unpredictable, dangerousand disempoweringworld of the trenchesdid not stem
solely from faith in an imaginedsupernaturalorder or confidencein a divine
protector.Rather,men simply refused or were unable to recognizethe high
level of unresponsivenessand danger of their surroundings.Instead, the
environmentwhichthey perceived,althoughnot pleasant,offereda far greater
likelihood of survivalthan the reality. Shells and bullets rarely found their
targets and, when they did, wounded instead of killed, thus providing a
126 Ibid., 160.
127 Brussig, diary, 21 February 1916.
128 Yoxall, letters to family, 1 June 1916 and to mother, 10 January 1917 (mistakenly dated
'1916').
129 BA-MA Freiburg, MSg 1/1941: E. Berner, letter to mother, 3 April 1918.
130 Donaldson, letter to mother, 1 June 1916.
131 Wrench, diary, 28 February 1918.
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As was shown in the first section of this article, the means by which a man
assessed risk were crucial to both his mental and physical survival. Soldiers ignorant of immediate threat underestimated risk, exposed themselves needlessly
and were consequently often killed. Poorly-trained recruits were particularly
prone to such mistakes. On the other hand, veterans with enough experience of
active service to realize their own impotence were also inclined to endanger
themselves unnecessarily, becoming either apathetic and careless or obsessed
with fear, vastly overestimating risk and suffering mental collapse. In order to
maintain both physical and psychological health, it was thus necessary for men
to develop strategies enabling them to cope with the horrendous sights, sounds
and emotional stimuli of life at the front. Their solutions were not dependent on
national culture, race or religion, although sometimes coloured by these factors;
rather, they were basic, universal human responses to a situation of intense
danger and uncontrollability. In both the British and German armies, men
reinterpreted and confronted their fears through black humour, irony and
sarcasm. By such means, they steered a middle way in their assessment of risk,
recognizing danger without becoming overwhelmed by it.
There is, however, a potential paradox here, for as the second and third
sections demonstrate, the risk assessment which this 'middle way' entailed was
by no means realistic. Even experienced combatants were normally convinced
that they would survive the horror of the trenches unscathed. Two phenomena
appear to account for this largely unjustified belief. Firstly, soldiers used
religion and superstition to impose sense and structure on their environment.
Many believed that they were protected by a loving God. For others, the
thought of such a figure behind the chaos gave some order and sense to the
bloodshed, making it less threatening. The widespread adoption of amulets
and rituals added further structure to the environment, as they placed in
soldiers' hands the apparent means to determine their own fate. Secondly, the
feelings of security these beliefs encouraged were furthered by men's own view
of the front, which incorporated a strong optimistic bias. They eagerly identified the positive aspects of their situation, insisted that the war was coming to
an end and believed that their own martial skill would ensure their survival in
the interim. So equipped, they looked forward confidently to peace.
Was this unrealistic optimism useful or damaging for combatants? Certainly, the example of new recruits, whose overconfidence often led to unnecessary
fatalities, implies that it was a highly dangerous mindset. However, other,
more compelling, factors militate against this opinion. Firstly, the fact that
soldiers themselves believed that optimism was crucial in the trenches does
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