Emergency Management - Australia and NZ

Australian & New Zealand Disaster and
Emergency Management Conference

16 - 18 April 2012 | Brisbane Exhibition & Convention Centre
EARTH: FIRE AND RAIN
In association with
Australi
Aust
r an & New Zea
aland
la
Mental Healt
Mental
ealth
lth A
Associiatio
ation
ti n
w w w.anzdmc.com.au
Disaster and Emergency Management

Conference
Conference Proceedings
ISBN: 978-0-9808147-4-3
Publisher Details
Publisher AST Management Pty Ltd
Contact Cathryn Gertzos
Address PO Box 29, Nerang QLD 4211
Telephone +61 7 5502 2068
Fax +61 7 5527 3298
Email: conference@anzdmc.com.au
Table of Contents
NON-PEER REVIEWED PAPERS
Chris Ainsworth
Developing the next generation of Emergency Managers: a 202vision
Martin Anderson
Integrating social media into traditional emergency management command and control
1
18
structures: the square peg into the round hole?

Tran Tuan Anh
Likelihood of Innovative Construction Techniques to strengthen Housing for Disaster Mitigation
35
in Central Vietnam
Haydn Betts
The case for a changed flood warning paradigm
41
Kate Brady & Jolie Wills
Across the Ditch: Exploring the Partnership between the Australian and New Zealand Red
75
Cross in Disaster Recovery.

Paula Claudianos
The role of insurance in building resilient communities: Lessons from recent catastrophic
104
weather events in Australia

Heather Clay & Candace Bobier
The Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service Response to the Christchurch Earthquakes:
124
Have we recovered yet?

Emiliyan Gikovski
Rebuilding After the 2010/2011 Victorian Floods A Roads Perspective
177
Karleen Gribble & Nina Berry
Emergency preparedness for those who care for infants in developed country contexts
192
Karen Kimpton
Bushfire Awareness and Preparedness of Frail Older and Vulnerable Residents in Yarra
205
Ranges
Ian Manock
Examining the resilience of rural communities to flooding emergencies
241
Ram Roy
Shipping Disaster of The Rena in the New Zealand Waters: Looking into the Possible Causes
336
and Ongoing Recovery Operations?
PEER REVIEWED PAPERS

Helen Boon et al.
Lifestyle at risk? The case of Ingham
59
Axel Bruns & Jean Burgess
Local and Global Responses to Disaster: #eqnz and the Christchurch Earthquake
96
Jennie Cramp & Jennifer Scott
Adapting to increasing bush fire risk: Multi-dimensional bush fire risk reduction strategies
132
Neil Dufty
Learning for disaster resilience
149
Ruth Fuller, David Cliff & Tim
Optimising the use of an incident management system in coal mining emergencies
166
Catastrophic Work / Life Balance: Emergency Responder Role Conflict and Abandonment
225
Horberry
Greg Linsdell
Implications for Managers

Nigel Martin & John Rice
Emergency Communications and Warning Systems: Determining Critical Capacities and
254
Capabilities in the Australian Context

Leanne McCormick
The Core Volunteer
272
Joanne Millar et al.
Individual and community resilience to natural disasters: a comparison of bushfire and drought
285
events in Victoria
Mr Brentyn Parkin
A new way forward: A Community Sector Response Establishing a relationship that is based
301
on capacity, the building of trust, and the security in working together.

Kithsiri Perera & Ryutaro Tateishi
Satellite data based semi-real time media contents to promote public awareness of natural
318
disasters
Paul M. Salmon et al.
New perspectives on disaster response: the role of systems theory and methods
353
Bob Stevenson et al.
Recovery from disaster: A case study of individual and community resilience in the face of
368
cyclones
Suzanne Vallance
Urban resilience: Bouncing back, coping, thriving
387
Akama Y et al
Design-led strategies for bushfire preparedness
407
Developing the next generation of Emergency Managers:

a 202vision
Mr Chris Ainsworth MBS CEM Fulbright Alumnus

Program Manager, Public Safety Leadership Development Program
Australian College of Community Safety
RTO 1093
Principal: raemec australia
International Association of Emergency Managers

Oceania Council
Vice President
Australian National Representative
Chair Professional Development Committee
Paper presented at
Australian & New Zealand Disaster and Emergency Management Conference
Brisbane 16 18, April 2012
Chris Ainsworth, 2012

Do not cite or reference without the express written consent of the author.
Developing the next generation of Emergency Managers:

a 202vision
Abstract:
Emergency Management has traditionally been implemented and managed ad hoc.
Professionalism within the sector is increasing, forced by past events, with formal
recognition of Emergency Management moving towards professional status,
remaining obscure.
For the sector to grow and mature, we all need to look to the future and determine
how current practioners see the next generation of emergency managers evolving,
and the next generations expectations of the current practioners?
How do we design and develop and maintain a "cultural environment" which
promotes development in capability and capacity to deal with disasters, maintain
functionality and return to pre-impact conditions for our next generation of
Emergency Managers.
Using personal experiences, and examples from Hurricanes Katrina and Ike,
Queensland floods. and Christchurch earthquakes, will demonstrate the role
networks play in building "safe environments" which can lead to enhanced
capabilities.
A Sand Box provides an environment where we can develop greater capability
within teams and increase group capacity during events and incidents.
Critical and honest review of after actions of events and incidents assist us to build
and expand trusted networks. The Sand Box provides the medium for us to play,
investigate and develop new skills, capability and capacity safely.
Emergency Management will evolve into a profession over the next decade,
however:
Will the next generation of Emergency Managers push the drive for change?
Will the current Emergency Manages reflect on the past and identify the need for
change?
Will events of the past force change?
Keywords: emergency management, knowledge management, incident
management, emergency managers, Incident Command Systems
Introduction
Key questions need to be considered and answered in light of this presentation.
Many long serving and experienced Emergency Managers are reluctant to progress
down the verification of skills pathway, while a few embrace the opportunity?
How many Emergency Managers who hold any formal Emergency Management
qualification gain exposure to incidents?
As the field of emergency management assumes greater recognition and respect as
a profession, are academic programs evolving to meet the changing needs of a new
generation of Emergency Managers?
Will organisations accept academic programs as the benchmark in meeting the
challenges facing Government agencies and organisations, NGOs, as well as the
private sector?
Image 1 A visual perspective

3
Question
As we progress through the presentation, can you identify the relationships between
these two images and your organisation?
Experiences within Disasters

Hurricanes Gustav and Ike (USA)
Victorian Bushfires
Queensland Floods and Cyclone Yasi
Christchurch earthquake
Japan earthquake
LESSONS LEARNED
Organisational Leadership Sustainability
As the field of emergency management assumes greater recognition and respect as

a profession, are Leadership opportunities emerging to meet the changing needs of
a the next generation Emergency Managers?
Will organisations accept academic programs as the benchmark in meeting the

challenges facing government agencies, NGOs, as well as the private sector?
Project 2008
To increase professional respect between full time and volunteer
emergency management staff through equitable access to sustainable
leadership opportunities
Ike . in a snapshot
Image 2 Ike viewed from the International Space Station
Hurricane Ike was the third most destructive hurricane to ever

make landfall in the United States. It was the ninth named
storm, fifth hurricane and third major hurricane of the 2008
Atlantic hurricane season
Ike Statistically
Formed:
September 1, 2008
Texas mobilised:
September 8, 2008
Crossed Texas
coast:
September 13, 2008
Dissipated:
September 14, 2008 (Iceland)

Impacted the United States for 56 hrs
Highest Winds:
230 km/h (145 mph) Cat 4
Fatalities:
103 direct, 92 indirect, 34 missing
Damage:
$28.7 billion (2008 USD) Sept 2008
Areas Affected:
Turks and Caicos, Bahamas, Haiti,

Dominican Republic, Cuba
Florida Keys, Mississippi, Louisiana,
Texas (24 hrs) Mississippi Valley, Ohio
Valley, Great Lakes region
Eastern Canada
What Dallas Mega Shelter Operations achieved in 48 hours?

A dormitory with a capacity of 1500 guests had been set up mainly by volunteer
groups including:
American Red Cross, Tzu Chi Foundation (a Buddhist Compassion Relief
organisation), Salvation Army, Scouts, Dallas CERT to name a few;
Fully manned American Red Cross registration centre
Full established meals distribution area managed by the Salvation Army
Dining area capable of seating 1000 people at a single sitting
Portable purpose built showering facilities provided by the Baptist Men
Grey water storage by the City of Dallas Sanitation
Portable toilets contractor supplied
Waste disposal bins (several hundred) by the City of Dallas Sanitation
A 20 bed Medical Centre staffed by rotating shifts of volunteers from Parkland
Hospital and other hospitals and medical agencies
Pharmacy services provided by Walmart located inside the Medical Centre
10 Bed Psychological Services Unit Professional practioners and support groups
from the City of Dallas area
Dallas Fire and Rescue
Dallas Police Department
Animal shelter operated by the City of Dallas Animal Control Services
Texas National Guard
Texas Medical Reserve
Texas National Food Bank
Dallas Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT)
Victim Relief Ministries (Yellow Shirts)
to name just a few.
This was a City of Dallas team effort in which everyone who was asked, willingly
contributed to the success of the establishment of the shelter.
An important aspect of the shelter management was partnering with the media in
keeping the community informed. Each of the OEM staff provided the face of the
Shelter Operations supported by the City of Dallas public relations / media team
The journey home every guest who came to Dallas were returned to their homes,
or the place where they chose to resettle.
Image 3 Lessons from the field
Why did the City of Dallas succeed in establishing the largest mega
shelter in the US?
Two key factors stand out. The City of Dallas key Emergency Managers have some
formal qualifications, some are University trained, others have industry qualifications,
and regardless all are recognised as having the necessary skills to undertake their
functional role. All City of Dallas Office of Emergency Management staff are well
trained and practiced in the Incident Command System.
In Texas everything is bigger. Dallas, lived up to its motto, just doing it better.
Dallas can certainly be used as a model for all.
Common links
Qualifications
Professionalism
Mutual respect
Whilst in Dallas I was unable to clearly identify the common threads that linked their
success. Researching factors which influenced and affected the organisational
sustainability through access and equity to professional development, training and
recognition.
Complexity of Communications
Emergency Service responders are have a good reputation for responding to the
now incidents, however many have difficulty in forecasting for the next operational
period. This is due to the fact that in most instances, the incident they respond to is
may generally be over in minutes or hours. Increasingly, which require a 1st
responder to manage a significant time lined is becoming more frequent, forcing
organisations and agencies to reconsider some levels of training.
Communities, particularly Gen x and Gen Y who are influencers of communication
strategies, demand to be connected and know instantly when something affects
them.
Is this a change in which our Emergency Managers can deal with now?
Communication and public information in a technology world is challenging at best.
Facebook
Twitter
iPhone Apps
Andorid Apps
Communities are beginning to demand information, and in many cases, information

often that has not been brought to the attention of the Emergency Manager or
Incident Controller / Coordinator.
Such is the speed in which information flows throughout the community, it is difficult
to disseminate the difference from legitimate information and background noise.
Such information overload makes it difficult to determine appropriate actions for any
given incident.
Issues with the current system
Image 5 Modified PESTEL framework
Economic: Health and direction of the economy(ies) in which the firm competes.
Relevant variables: GDP levels, inflation, interest rates, money supply,
unemployment, disposable income. Scan linked economies; monitor currency
fluctuations and exchange rates
Social: Demographic variables: population size, age structure, geographic
distribution, ethnic mix, income distribution. It also includes tastes, fashions,

attitudes, and values. These are the cornerstone of society and often drive all other
macro categories.
10
Technological: Primary new products, processes, and materials. Includes the
institutions and activities involved in creating new knowledge and translating it into
new outputs, products, processes and materials. Government support and initiatives
can be very influential.
Environmental: Reflects concern for the sustainability of the physical
environment. Issues include; greenhouse effect, CO2 emissions, genetic

engineering, Factors for consideration include environmental policies, waste
disposal, and energy consumption.
Legal: Factors include employment law, health and safety, product safety,
monopolies, and mergers legislation.
Political: Issues: government stability, alignments at the international level,
taxation and fiscal policies, foreign trade regulation, social welfare policies, attitudes
towards competition and state ownership,. All governments policies are to further
their own countries interests.
Media: An increasing important influence on business, politics and society as
opinion former and shaper. The media is affecting outcomes in ways unascribable to
other macro-drivers.
(Angwin, 2008)
Organisational Silos
Image 6 Silos are they an issue
11
The questions need to be asked do we operate in siloss? and do we support

separate cultures and structure?
These questions are posed, not in answering them, but in promoting discussion
within an open forum.
Are we in an era where guardians of entry. Are these the road blocks preventing the
integration and sharing of knowledge. How do we break down these barriers?
The forum will be a component of the presentation and post conference follow up
which will endeavor to address these complex questions.
Key Leadership Issues

What are the key leadership issues we have to address to improve our ability to
respond to emergencies?
Has any of the Royal Commission / Coronial reports sporned real change within the
sector?
Has it improved the decision making process?
When was the last time you stood back and looked at the big picture during an
incident, or were you engulfed in the issues of the moment.
How often do you allow your team to stand back and look at the strategic picture?
Do you have the resources and skill to look from above?
How do we transition from the role of 1st responder to Emergency Manager?
Can we actually quickly transition from one role to another?
Are there any barriers preventing this?
12
Image 7 Brining it together
Communication - what new challenges face us in the technology rich environments

we live in?
How often do we stand back and look around and follow the 360 thinking process
Leadership: what does it mean to you ?
Networks: how important are they
Knowledge Management: How do you manage and control the vast amount of
knowledge that passes through, particularly during a major even or disaster?
13
Spiral Pathway Theory - Leadership Sustainability 2009 - 2010

Research findings from the Fulbright Scholarship undertaken in the United States
during the 2008 Hurricane season which resulted in the formal response to three
sever weather impacts affecting Texas Hurricanes Dolly, Gustav and Ike. The
project investigated relationships between operational efficiency and the access and
equity to professional development and training for all emergency personnel both
full time and volunteers and compared the outcomes to experiences back in
Australia as a volunteer with two South Australian Emergency Agencies.
The Next Challenge
What will the next generation of emergency managers look like?
Will emergency management educational programs grow and develop?
Will emergency management be influenced by the backgrounds that diverse
students bring from other disciplines and other professions?
As the new breed of students emerge from our programs, we can hope that, with
successful guidance from our educators / mentors, they will carry a new energy and
ultimately influence changes in the practice of emergency management itself.
Image 8: Spiral Pathway Theory Leadership Sustainability Model Overview
14
Emerging Players
Leadership professional development and training opportunities are extremely
limited in Australia, with very few emergency services organisations committing to
sustainable leadership development programs. Most organisations are relying on
the current Productivity Places program or the Australian Emergency Management
Institute for the delivery of Professional Development Programs.
The Australian College of Community (ACCS) is a leading Registered Training
Organisation (RTO) delivering Leadership Programs for Certificate IV through to the
Advanced Diploma Public Safety level Australian Quality Training Framework
(AQTF) qualifications.
ACCS identified gaps within the current training programs and has collaborated with
the New South Wales (NSW) Department of Primary Industries RTO TOCAL College
and TAFE NSW Riverina Institute to establish a Public Safety Training Network. The
Network offers Agencies, Organisations and individuals, both paid and volunteer
emergency services operatives, a single career training development pathway for
those requiring Public Safety qualifications within their career advancement.
Currently no other RTO in Australia can offer career pathways in Leadership,
Community Safety, Emergency Management and Fire Fighting streams.
The philosophy behind the initiative is to integrate training into organisational
programs and operational demands, realizing that no two organisations operate in
the same manner. Through recognising the strengths of each organisations, the
programs bring together a diverse range of students who are learning the skills for
their role and the roles of other emergency service organisations and private
industry.
This philosophy has proven effective in the recent multi state / country disasters in
which the region has experiences over the past few months. Interstate and overseas
deployments mean that emergency service operatives require a diverse range of
skills when operating in foreign environments.
.
15
Increasingly, operatives are also looking for peer recognition through professional
organisations and associations. The International Association of Emergency
Managers is the only Emergency Management professional body in the world which
recognises professional skills and credentials individuals through a comprehensive
peer review process
The Associate Emergency Manager (AEM) for non degreed operatives and the
Certified Emergency Manager (CEM) for degreed operatives.
The future is bright for Australian Emergency Service operatives in paid and
volunteer roles to achieve their personal and professional goals through a lifelong
supported career pathway.
16
References
Angwin D, Cummings S, Smith C, 2008 The Strategy Pathfinder: core cases and
macro cases, Blackwell Publishing, pp 1 - 29
Lea, A, 2008, Enhancing Tasmania SES Volunteer Recruitment and Retention,
Research Report, Andrew Lea Director State Emergency Service Tasmania, Hobart
September 2008
Guest, D (1986), Whats new inMotivation, in Landy, F.J. Readings in Industrial
and Organisational Psychology, The Dorsey Press, Chicago, pp.177-183.
Henning, K , 2008, What will the Next Generation of Emergency managers Look
Like?, IAEM Bulletin, vol. 25, no.102, October 2008, p.8 continued p14.
Pearce, T, 2009, Education and Leadership Support the Effort to Have Emergency
Management Seen as a Profession, IAEM Bulletin, vol. 26, no. 2, February 2009,
pp.3-4.
Scholtes, P. (1987), An Elaboration of Demings Teachings on Performance
Appraisal, Joiner Associates Inc, Madison WI.
Wood, J., Zeffane, R., Fromholz, M., and Fitgerald, J. (2006), Organisational
Behaviour: Core Concepts and Applications, Brisbane: Wiley.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mentor, viewed September 2009
http://www.disaster-resource.com/articles/08p_062.shtml Public/Private
Partnerships Help Iowa Respond and Recover, Alison Dunn viewed July 2009
http://www.innovateonline.info/index.php?view=article&id=690 Preparing Graduate
Students for Virtual World Simulations: Exploring the potential of an Emerging
Technology, Anne M Hweitt, Susan Spencer, Danielle Mirliss, Riad Twal, viewed
August 2009
http://www.stopdisastersgame.org/en/home.html UN/International Strategy for
Disaster Reduction, viewed June 2009
17
Integrating social media into traditional emergency

management command and control structures: the square
peg into the round hole?
Martin Anderson
Digital Media Manager, Strategic Communications
CFA (Country Fire Authority), Victoria, Australia
Paper Presented at
Brisbane 16-18 April 2012
18
Integrating social media into traditional emergency

management command and control structures: the square
peg into the round hole?
Abstract
How can emergency services adapt to a world where ordinary members of the
community can exchange information more quickly and effectively with each
other than seems possible within traditional emergency management
command and control structures?
Can a system that traditionally relies on linear information flow and strict
authorisation processes adapt and stay relevant in a world where photos of
disasters can be circulating around the world before emergency service
personnel have even left the station?
Victoria's emergency services have been grappling with this problem since
Black Saturday and for the first time this bushfire season began the process
of formally integrating social media into their incident management structures
both at agency level and in Victorias State Control Centre.
This paper will give a first hand account of the competing viewpoints on how
social media should fit into the emergency management process and explores
the cultural implications, opportunities and risks of the move to embrace the
open, transparent, and honest nature of social media.
It will also look at the practical steps that have been taken in Victoria to try to
bridge the gap between those competing viewpoints including the hosting of a
multi-agency training exercise using a social media crisis simulator called
FireBell.
Keywords: social media, communication, technology, mobile
19
Introduction
The 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission established the critical need
for improved information flow between emergency services and the
community during major emergencies, calling on agencies to place as much
value on warnings as they do on fire suppression.
The 2010/11 Victorian Flood Warnings and Response Review called on
agencies to actively pursue the use of social media as part of their emergency
warning and public information system and undertake further trials to explore
the opportunity for greater use of social media as a credible source of
information to and from the public during an emergency.
While some members of the community, including individual emergency
service members, used social media to communicate and share information
on Black Saturday, it was not used in any official emergency capacity.
(CFA had established a Facebook page in November 2008 but by February
2009 it was only being used to share general news and community education
content, not emergency warnings or other incident information.)
Subsequent disasters around the world, in particular the Haiti earthquake in
2010 demonstrated how effective social media combined with mobile
communication devices can be during emergencies.
Haiti allowed us to glimpse into a future of what disaster
response might look like in a hyper-connected world.
Paul Conneally, International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies (TED Talk, Feb 2012)
Adapting to the speed and perceived loss of control that social media seems
to involve has proved a difficult cultural challenge for emergency service
organisations (ESOs) around the world.
20
How can ESOs adapt to this new mobile world where ordinary community
members can exchange emergency information with each other more quickly
than seems possible within traditional emergency management
communication structures?
Can a system that traditionally relies on linear information flow and strict
authorisation processes adapt and stay relevant in a world were photos of
disasters are circulating around the world before emergency services have
even responded?
This paper will argue that social media has an important role to play in
creating resilient communities by helping to transform the relationship
between ESOs and the community from one of command and control to one
of collaboration and joint responsibility.
Accepting reality
If you cant get the skeleton out of the closet, you might as
well make it dance.
George Bernard Shaw
There now seems to be a general acceptance within ESOs that social media
is a reality that isnt going away. It has to be accepted and dealt with but the
debate over what exactly that will mean for traditional emergency
management culture has still to be resolved.
Some see the social media revolution as something to fear and believe the
only way to manage the risk is to try to constrain it within official command
and control structures.
Others see it as an opportunity to move away from command and control
structures and generate a more open, transparent, honest and collaborative
approach to emergency management.
21
The debate has raised many questions.

Can, or even should, emergency service organisations try to compete or
engage with the various unofficial sources of community information on social
media channels?
If official emergency service channels are not always the best source of
information for the community what does that mean for agencies relevance /
credibility?
How do agencies provide quality emergency warnings and information without
creating a passive community incapable of making decisions for itself?
Can the tools of social media and the growth of mobile technologies provide
an opportunity to develop effective emergency communications and warnings
systems without disempowering the community?
Test and learn Victorias experience
The grassroots has been strengthened through the
social power of sharing and they are challenging the old
models, the old analog models of control and
command.
Paul Conneally, TED Talk, Feb 2012
For those used to working within linear command and control structures the
shift in mindset required to make effective use of networked communication
platforms like social media can be difficult.
There is a tendency to apply traditional static website (Web 1.0) principles to
the dynamic information streams of social media (Web 2.0).
One-way social media?
22
A common argument is that emergency agencies should use social media to

push official information out to the community but not respond or engage as
this could lead to the release of incorrect, inconsistent, or unauthorised
information.
In traditional communication terms this would be the equivalent of phoning
someone to tell them an important piece of information and then hanging up
as soon as they asked a question.
In a paper for this conference Dr Yoko Akama highlights how simply pushing
out official information reinforces the power-dynamics of control, making
audiences passive.
This perpetuates the disempowerment felt by communities
who are not engaged in a dialogic process, further broadening
the gap between expert fire authorities with knowledge and
experience of bushfires and the community as non-experts.
Dr Yoko Akama, Design-led strategies for Bushfire Preparedness, 2012
By using social media effectively, emergency managers have the ability to

break this power dynamic by creating a more collaborative approach to
emergency management.
By engaging with the community in real-time via social media, agencies can
help foster an understanding that both the community and emergency
services have an important role to play in all four phases of emergencies
(Planning, Preparation, Response and Recovery).
You got to go with the hypothesis that the publics not a
liability, they are a resource... if information is coming from the
public, we need to see it.
Craig Fugate, Federal Emergency Management Agency Administrator,
USA, Jan 2011.
23
The one-way social media argument also fails to understand the significance
of the changes that this new form of networked communication entails.
While almost everyone in crisis communications understands
that these changes are big, Id like to suggest that they are
much bigger than most realise. Crisis communication in the
social media era is not even the same game as it was before
Gerald Baron (2011), Social Media & Crisis Communications
The potential of social media as a tool for gathering community intelligence
that could inform operational decision-making is developing rapidly thanks to
academic research and the development of various crowdsourcing tools.
The potential for intelligence gathering has been recognised in Victoria by the
establishment of a Social Media Monitor role within the State Control Centre
structure.
Authorisation processes
One of the key recommendations by Queensland Police after their widely
praised use of social media during the floods and cyclone of 2010/11 was to
rethink clearance processes trust your staff to release information. (QPS
Social Media Case Study 2011)
This is difficult for organisations that traditionally require information to be fed
up through the chain of command, verified, authorised and then fed back
down again for dissemination to the community.
This linear information flow does not encourage the timely dissemination of
critical information but the risks of releasing inaccurate information are often
seen as more significant.
It has been identified that emergency service culture often resulted in
personnel waiting until they have all the information they feel the community
24
might need and are 100% sure of its accuracy before any information was
released.
Victorias Fire Services Commissioner specifically addressed this issue when
he introduced new requirements for timely, relevant, and tailored emergency
warnings and advice.
The choice of words, and their order, emphasised that timeliness is now
considered the most important factor when it comes emergency information.
A 100% perfect warning (if such a thing exists) after the threat has passed is
useless.
In Queensland the police media director sat in on briefings to Premier Anna
Bligh and tweeted new information directly from those meetings. This ensured
the latest information was being provided to the media and community.
Victorian fire services have attempted to address the authorisation dilemma
in social media by developing a close relationship between the Social Media
Officer and the State Duty Officer (who can authorise the release of
information).
The Social Media Officer has also been physically seated next to the Public
Information Section Leader to ensure the latest information can be released
via social media as soon as it is available. This also allows community
intelligence from social media to be fed back into the system as efficiently as
possible.
Templates, templates, and more templates
The need to post potentially large numbers of emergency warnings as quickly
as possible has been addressed in Victoria by integrating social media into
the One Source, One Message (OSOM) tool.
25
OSOM was created after Black Saturday to enable information officers around
the state to publish warnings simultaneously to multiple mediums agency
websites, emergency broadcasters, Victorian Bushfire Information Line etc.
The integration of social media into the OSOM system means that all
warnings are automatically posted to agency Twitter and Facebook accounts
as soon as they are issued.
Sample warning tweets from OSOM:
Sample warning post to Facebook from OSOM:
26
However, while this ensures warnings are posted in a timely fashion, it also
means information can be repetitive and users have said this makes the
warnings less effective.
The format of the message is being reviewed to consider including more
useful information on social media channels rather than directing readers to
agency website links. Its worth noting that many mobile users cant access
the web if they dont have credit on their phone but have free access to
Facebook and Twitter.
In the meantime, the issue is being addressed by posting additional
information manually and by monitoring and responding to any questions
posted to official social media platforms.
There has also been a desire to generate standard templates / statements for
common questions that are asked on social media to ensure consistency and
accuracy.
Once again this has led to repetitive messages and, on occasions, a lack of
the personal, conversational style that is more effective on social media.
One way of addressing that would be to allow experienced social media
officers to be more personal in their engagement and not require them to cut
and paste pre-prepared responses.
Removing old social media posts
When the decision was taken to post official emergency warnings on Twitter it
was argued that old tweets should be removed once a warning expires, just
as old warnings are removed on the static agency website.
When this was implemented it quickly became clear that removing old tweets
caused serious confusion and anger among Twitter followers.
27
Users clearly understood Twitter as a chronological stream of information and

were confused when agencies tried to whitewash old tweets from history.
Taking a traditional media example, the deleting of old tweets is the
equivalent of trying to gather up all the old copies of yesterdays newspaper
and burning them to stop anyone getting out of date information.
It also became clear that users look at an accounts history as a way of
establishing its veracity and to identify the sort of information they can expect
to receive if they follow the account.
The two-way nature of social media allowed agencies to quickly identify this
issue and the deleting of tweets was stopped.
The language of open, honest and transparent engagement vs command and
control
In order to take best advantage of the benefits of social media and break
down the us and them mentality, emergency services need to be open about
their limitations and honest about their mistakes.
For those from the command and control tradition, who believe it is important
to preserve the authority status of their emergency agency, this can be
difficult to accept.
This fire season, in Victoria, official social media spokespeople have
welcomed community reports of issues, inconsistencies, and inaccuracies
with official warning information and acted quickly to correct issues.
This has led to a much more collaborative approach that has allowed
agencies to improve their communications and gain credibility with the online
community.
28
The number of unconstructive negative comments has reduced while the

number of constructive reports of issues and suggestions for improvements
has increased.
By providing quick responses and resolving issues agencies demonstrate that
they arent afraid to accept their mistakes and are committed to working with
the community to fix them.
Practical steps to smooth integration
Building trust
Social media advocates within the Victorian emergency services have
delivered a series of presentations to senior operational staff across the
various stakeholder agencies in an effort to build trust and understanding of
the potential benefits for emergency management.
These sessions have given those with concerns the opportunity to ask
questions and provided reassurance that measures are in place to address
those concerns.
A one-page guide was also produced for State Control Centre State Duty
Officers to explain their important role in ensuring effective social media
engagement.
29
Policies and procedures

Social media and emergencies are both unpredictable and dynamic
environments that can change rapidly. As such, it is difficult to develop
detailed policies and procedures to cover every eventuality.
But producing policy, guidelines and procedures has proved useful in
providing reassurance to those from a command and control background.
The development of social media procedures and a social media manual has
also provided useful guidance to the less experienced social media officers
who have filled the role during extended emergencies this fire season.
Training - FireBell social media crisis simulation
The FireBell exercise was the first of its kind in Australia, with three primary
overarching objectives of informing, identifying and improving capacity and
capability in the use of social media for emergency situations.
The exercise provided a series of key learnings for the State Control Centre
and the emergency service organisations involved.
The exercise was an invaluable tool for training staff in the use of social media
during an emergency, allowing participants to develop an understanding of
the threats and opportunities without the risk of using live social media
accounts.
It also allowed those unfamiliar with social media the opportunity to see it in
action in realistic emergency scenarios.
The exercise evaluation report by the Victorian Emergency Services
Commissioner said its success was a result of a combination of the following
factors:
30
Collaborative approach of organisations involved
Effectiveness of social media responses including appropriate, concise

and efficient language
Leadership qualities displayed on a range of levels
High sense of responsibility amongst participants
Conclusion
Concerns about the risks of new communication technologies are nothing new
and have been a predictable cultural aspect of technological advancement
throughout history.
We are dealing with an old story rather than a new one.
Although the computer and satellite have reduced time to a
picosecond, an instantaneous present, and the globe to a
point where everyone is in the same place, this is simply the
latest chapter in an old tale.
James Carey, Communication as culture: essays on media
and society (1998)
Social media advocates within the emergency services need to be conscious
of the historical perspective and work to build trust in the new technology by
understanding the concerns and addressing the risks.
The urge for emergency managers to try to apply command and control
principles to social media and mobile technologies is understandable but it is
neither possible nor desirable when the technology and its benefits and risks
are fully understood.
Social media provides an unprecedented opportunity to help transform
emergency communications from a top down, broadcast function into a
collaborative, empowering force for both the community and emergency
managers.
31
The planning myth that any crisis management operation is best organised
in a military-styled command and control mode is being challenged on a
number of fronts.
Effective responses in such extreme circumstances are
necessarily improvised, flexible and networked (rather than
planned, standardised and centrally led) the internet and its
social networking sites have added a whole new layer of
opportunities as well as complications in organising
communication and meaning making in times of crisis, which
needs to be addressed and not willed away in crisis planning
processes.
(Boin and t Hart, The Australian Journal of Public Administration, vol. 69,
no.4 2010)
The biggest challenge of all may be for emergency service organisations to

accept that in a hyper-connected world they are no longer the only source of
authority when it comes to emergency information.
Tapping in to community information contained on social media channels may
not only provide emergency managers with a useful source of intelligence but
it also has the power to help transform the relationship between emergency
services and the community.
32
References:
Akama, Dr Yoko, Design-led strategies for bushfire preparedness, 2012 Australian &
New Zealand Disaster and Emergency Management Conference paper.
http://anzdmc.com.au/abstractsaccepted/Abstracts_view.php?editid1=244
Baron, Gerald. Senior Advisor, OBriens Response Management, Author of Now is
Too Late 2: Survival in an Era of Instant News
Social Media & Crisis Communicaions - Its a Whole New Game
http://youtu.be/MFt7NXDhcmE
Boin, Arjen and t Hart, Paul. Organising for Effective Emergency Management:
Lessons from Research, The Australian Journal of Public Administration, vol. 69,
no.4, pp. 357-371
Carey, J. (1998) Communication as culture: essays on media and society - Google
Books http://bit.ly/y2lGWA
Conneally, Paul. Public communications manager for the International Federation of
the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. (TED Talk Feb 2012)
http://www.ted.com/talks/paul_conneally_digital_humanitarianism.html
Firebell Training Exercise Evaluation Report, Emergency Services Commissioner,
February 2012. (to be published March 2012).
Fugate, Craig. Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), USA
Haiti: the importance of Social Media Use During a Disaster
http://video.esri.com/watch/163/haiti-the-importance-of-social-media-use-during-adisaster
Using the Mobile Platform to Push Critical Information to Disaster Victims
http://video.esri.com/watch/164/free-the-data-using-the-mobile-platform-to-pushcritical-information-to-disaster-victims
33
Queensland Police Service Social Media Case Study (2011)

http://www.police.qld.gov.au/services/reportsPublications/other/socialmedia.htm
34
Likelihood of Innovative Construction Techniques to strengthen

Housing for Disaster Mitigation in Central Vietnam
Mr Tran Tuan Anh

PhD candidate, RMIT University
Australia
Email:
tuananh.tran@husc.edu.vn ; s3340684@student.rmit.edu.au
Phone: 0423609054
Paper presented at
Australia & New Zealand Disaster and Emergency Management Conference
Brisbane, 16-18, April 2012
[Type text]
35
Likelihood of Innovative Construction Techniques to strengthen Housing

for Disaster Mitigation in Central Vietnam
Abstract: Disaster mitigation for marginal communities has become one of the
most significant development goals of the 21st century. Vietnam has been
reported one of the five most vulnerable nations in the world to climate change
and so serves as a useful case study in developing appropriate housing solutions
after disasters. In addition, some local communities in rural areas of Vietnam still
keep strong vernacular traditions in their housing which need intense
consideration before employing any new techniques of disaster mitigation on
them. Perceptions on how to develop a sustainable housing solution for such
communities, therefore, is still controversial with very few useful options
developed to date.
The paper investigates the existing unsafe conditions of traditional houses of a
local community in central Vietnam, exposed to disasters, together with an
identification of traditional features of this housing that would be needed to
preserve in future construction. Some important gaps of these traditional houses
in terms of disaster risk reduction are then displayed to show opportunities where
new construction techniques have a high possibility to perform against extreme
climate events.
Keywords: disaster, housing, construction
Introduction
Reconstruction often reproduces vulnerability to future disasters (Wisner
et al., 2004). The complex relationship between human interactions and climate
crisis require aid agencies to re-consider their ways or approaches to disaster
mitigation in the future (Suarez et al., 2008). Inappropriate design solutions and
badly constructed houses have been known as one of the root causes of
increased disaster risks (Davis, 1978). It is noticed that addressing local patterns
and responsive characteristics in housing reconsolidation or rebuilding is
necessary to provide a so-called normal house for a given community (Davis,
1978). Solutions of housing, both technical and non-technical, are seen as
responsive or appropriate once they not only meet shelter needs but also bring
about non-housing outcomes for inhabitants (such as family stability, better
homework and educational performances, healthy living practices etc.) (Fien et
al., 2008).
However, one of the most common failures in recent post-disaster housing
reconstruction is the exclusive concentration on physical and visual aspects of
36
buildings with little or no attention to peoples normal activities (farming, crafting,

fishing, etc.) and communitys meanings, symbols, or traditions (Audefroy,
2010). These defects may create conflicts or rejections from inhabitants towards
proposed mitigation measures (Audefroy, 2010) and subsequently lead to
unsuccessfulness of housing programs. In most of housing reconstruction
projects in central Vietnam, their excessive focuses on technical issues to
provide robust buildings has led to inadequate responses to local contexts and
potentially created unacceptance of people. One of main causes originates from
evaluation of successfulness of housing reconstructions mostly based on
physical outcomes (visible buildings or facilities), whereas the key criteria of
assessment absolutely come from peoples acceptance and adoption towards
their proposed measures (Gharaati, 2009). In addition, the common approach to
post-disaster reconstruction by applying one-size-fits-all solutions for
geographically and culturally different locations may create greater severity of
post-disaster built environment (Esther, 2011).
Sustainable housing reconstruction comes into existence as a result with
the central focus on achieving the best long-term results of post-disaster
reconstruction (UNEP and SKAT, 2007). It will not only ensures technical stability
of buildings, better construction quality, but also offer a plenty of social,
economic, and environmental benefits for disaster prone regions in the future
(UNEP and SKAT, 2007). Climate change and complicated occurrences of
climate events in recent years have highly supported the promotion of
sustainable design solutions for vulnerable regions all over the world (Suarez et
al., 2008).
Vietnam has been known as one of the most vulnerable countries to global
climate crisis with different types of climate extremes. Flood and typhoon expose
the most frequent and awful occurrences, affecting approximately 80-90% of
Vietnams population (VIetnamese Government, 2007) and causing enormous
losses of human life, livelihood, and property (Nhu et al., 2011). In central
Vietnam, the most disaster prone region of the country (Tinh et al., 2010), the
provision of appropriate housing is more important and urgent, especially when
most past and current programs of housing face similar problems regarding
cultural appropriateness and local adaptation.
Existing traditional houses on stilts (2010)
Inappropriate (unfamiliar) new houses nearby
(taken by author in 2010)
37
Methodological Approach
Sustainability in housing strengthening or shelter rebuilding is the key aspect of
this study. It is a long-term strategy dealing with many different but interrelated
factors. It will not only include technical aspects of housing but also address
unseen important factors in terms of social, economic and institutional issues.
The consultation with target groups in community at certain stages is critically
important in line with an adequate understanding of local contexts to effectively
apply new construction methods or techniques for disaster mitigation.
By 2010, a reconstruction project funded by IFRC to provide 650 shelters for

affected populations in central Vietnam after typhoon Ketsana (2009) was
initiated with the participation of DWF organisation as the professional consultant.
The author was employed by DWF as an architect to propose housing design
options for two in seven beneficiary provinces of central Vienam. The focus on a
case study community in Gia Lai province of central Vietnam based on the above
approach has come up with certain achievements in practice.
38
Results
Existing Conditions:
Many traditional timber
houses-on-stilts were
seriously damaged by
typhoon Ketsana in 2009.
Initiation:
Site visits, field survey,
consultation with people in
need.
The investigations
showed that people still

wanted to live in
traditional houses on
posts but stronger
structures.
Finalisation:
Based on an in-depth
understanding of local
context together with
community consultation,
the author came up with
the final design with the
utilisation of reinforced
concrete for skeleton and
timber for covering in the
traditional typology of
housing on stilts.
This helped to harmonise

with existing housing
patterns of the villages
and created employment
opportunities for locals.
Outcomes:
The new houses on stilts
effectively resist next
disasters and highly
respond to local contexts.
They actually make
people happy to settle in.
39
Conclusion
The re-utilisation of traditional form of house-on-stilts did familiarise local people
with their new houses. The replacement of timber structures by reinforced
concrete (RC) skeletons provides safer houses in future disasters. It also
contributes to the reduction of deforestation for the need of construction materials
as previously in the region. The employment of local craftsmen in installing
wooden surrounding walls onto RC structures offer local people plenty of jobs
and help them better understand the importance of applying new construction
technology to promote valuable local characteristics in disaster risk reduction.
This significantly improves current construction practices and perceptions on
housing construction in terms of disaster mitigation in the region.
These outcomes may be used as a useful case study to develop housing
solutions for other vulnerable minority groups who are living in wooden houses
on stilts in central Vietnam or in other countries. However, community
consultation with target groups (home owners, local builders, local
representatives, etc.) before initiating design solutions is required for
development of appropriate and sustainable housing for a certain community.
Refercences
1. AUDEFROY, J. F. 2010. Post-disaster emergency and reconstruction experiences in Asia
and Latin America: an assessment. Development in Practice, 20, 664-677.
2. DAVIS, I. 1978. Shelter after Disaster, Oxford, Oxford Polytechnic Press.
3. FIEN, J., CHARLESWORTH, E., LEE, G., MORRIS, D., BAKER, D. & GRICE, T. 2008.
Towards a design framework for remote Indigenous housing. Australian Housing and
Urban Research Institute.
4. GHARAATI, K., M. 2009. Knowledge transfer in post-disaster reconstruction: The
problem of post-post-disaster reconstruction. Ph.D, McGill University.
5. NHU, O. L., THUY, N. T. T., WILDERSPIN, I. & COULIER, M. 2011. A preliminary
analysis of flood and storm disaster data in Vietnam. Ha Noi
6. SUAREZ, P., SUANDERS, G., MENDLER, S., LEMAIRE, I., KAROL, J. & CURTIS, L.
2008. Climate-related Disasters: Humanitarian Challenges and Reconstruction
Opportunities. Climate Change and Place, 20, 62-67.
7. TINH, B. D., TUAN, T. H., PHONG, T., THE, B. D. & TAM, B. T. 2010. Local Vulnerability
and Adaptation to extreme climate events along the central coast of Vietnam. Climate
Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction: An Asian Perspective Emerald.
8. UNEP, U. N. E. P. & SKAT, S. R. C. A. C. F. D. 2007. After the Tsunami: Sustainable
building guidelines for South East Asia [Online]. UNEP and SKAT. Available:
http://www.skat.ch/.
9. VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT, V. 2007. National Strategy for Natural Disaster
Prevention, Response and Mitigation to 2020. Ha Noi: Vietnamese Government.
10. WISNER, B., BLAIKIE, P., CANNON, T. & DAVIS, I. 2004. At Risk: Natural Hazards,
People's Vulnerability and Disasters, London and New York, Routledge.
40
Dr Haydn Betts
Industry Lead, Flood and Emergency Management, Asia Pacific
Kellogg Brown & Root Pty Ltd
Paper presented at
41
Abstract (no more than 150 words please):

Counter disaster plans often incorporate a series of prepared warning messages that
are released during various stages of an impending crisis. The paper proposes
improvements to the way such messages are structured and there is a need for
engineers and disaster managers to engage with other professions.
It is postulated that how these are received, translated, understood and acted upon
depends on the psychological place of both the sender and receiver and their
mental preparedness and pre-conditioning prior to an impending disaster. These
reactions depend on trust and confidence in those within the communication
processes and the communitys participation in the preparedness process.
The paper recommends that the chain of communication pathways need to be
developed by technologists, adult educators and psychologists having regard for
languages phonological and gestural characteristics and an understanding of how
the brain processes information.
Research of consumer need is required at the consumer level.
Keywords: warning messages, language, trust, psychologists,
Introduction
An essential and probably the most important element of floodplain management is
communications; not only within the disaster management group, but at all phases of
the information flow. This paper examines some of the elements of communication
but pays particular attention to the communication needs of the community.
Counter disaster plans often incorporate a series of prepared warning messages that
are released during various stages of an impending crisis. The paper proposes
improvements to the way such messages are structured and there is a need for
engineers and disaster managers to engage with other professions.
Preparing for a flood emergency does not commence with the onset of heavy rain,
but involving the community at risk in their own communication and decision making
processes. For a community to gain maximum benefit, it will need to be informed of
the issues by a respected and knowledgeable team, and by continued reinforcement
and updating with new information.
It is postulated that how new information and data are received, translated,
understood and acted upon depends on the psychological place of both the sender
42
and receiver and their mental preparedness and pre-conditioning prior to an

impending disaster. These reactions depend on trust and confidence in those within
the communication processes and the communitys participation in the preparedness
process.
The paper recommends that the chain of communication pathways need to be
developed by technologists, adult educators and psychologists having regard for
languages phonological and gestural characteristics and an understanding of how
the brain processes information, sets memory and how memories can be
strengthened. This implies a need for psychologists and professional adult educators
to be part of community awareness programs.
Background
A local authority is required to establish a Disaster Management Group (DMG)
having members with technical, logistic, emergency and community expertise. The
DMG is usually lead by the Mayor or his delegate. It is required to follow a Local
Disaster Management Plan and manage a Disaster Management Centre containing
operational and support staff. The DMG might be fortunate enough to be supplied
information by its own technical flood group as well as receiving information from the
Commonwealth Bureau of Meteorology (BOM). The BOM is authorized to publish
official weather and flood forecasts1 (Section 6, Meteorology Act, COA, 1955) and
these take precedence over any other groups meteorological and hydrologic
predictions.
The role of the technical flood group is to interpret the Bureaus forecasts and advise
the DMG of the forecasts implications at a local level. Keys and Cawood (2009)
strongly emphasize the importance of this role as it adds meaning to a Bureau
forecast to inform both the DMG and local residents of local impacts. This advice
must include information on the nature of the threat, current and forecast flood levels
at locations meaningful to the community, warnings as to when escape routes might
become impassable, evacuation arrangements, and sources of more information.
For the initial purpose of identifying the problem, consider the emergency response
organization that might be set up in a medium sized or large local authority in
Queensland, such as displayed in Figure 1. This figure highlights the writers
perception of a communication process during a flood emergency based on his
observations of flood emergency exercises. It not only displays the organizational
aspects, but the communication flow paths and also depicts to some extent the
value-adding to raw information. The green box suggests a scope for a decision
support system.
These are water level forecasts for a defined location but do not indicate the extent, depth and impact at a local level.
Defining the latter is the responsibility of the local authority.
43
Figure 1 Flood response communication within Queensland, Australia, (Betts, 2009)
The figure displays a series of pink arrows that depict potential communication
failures by inaccurate transfers or misinterpretations of information: between the
BOM spokesperson and Councils flood advisor, between the BOM spokesperson
and the DMG, and between the flood advisor and the DMG. Further
misinterpretations can occur as the message completes its information cycle. EMAs
Manual 17 for Multi-Agency Incident Staffing (COA, 1998b) sets out the requirement
for the reporting and communication structure, but by omission must assume that
communication is both accurate and is understood.
The release of the report of the 2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission (Teague
et al, 2010) has reinforced some of the above communication principles, i.e. the
need for a policy approach for warnings in they must satisfy, as far as it is possible
to do so, the full range of events that are directed to as many people and
communities as possible.
Flood warnings
The flood information to be provided by hydrologists needs to be considered
carefully. Too much information can lead to people feeling overwhelmed whilst too
little information could be disastrous. The important things are to provide just enough
information at the right time, and to do this when people are receptive and have the
44
capacity to receive, understand and take appropriate action. So advisors need to ask
themselves:
how can the presentation of rainfall and flooding information be made more
efficient and effective to improve lead-time and the advice to the community?
how should flood information be structured to encourage evacuation?
what tests should be applied when faced with flood information that is outside
their expectation?
The key indicators are: the spatial extents of flooding, current water levels, rate of
rise of floodwaters, critical water levels, flood velocities, critical durations and flood
volumes.
The advice should be accompanied by maps, pictures, key indicators that have
meaning for residents and descriptions of areas under threat (COA 2009, Keys and
Cawood 2009). If authorities are fortunate, the community will respond in an
appropriate manner.
The purpose of generating flood warnings and providing advice is to seek a reaction
from those being warned to take defensive measures to protect their loved ones and
property, and to assist others where possible. How people react to warnings
depends on a number of factors and the reaction may not be what is intended by the
authorities.
Flood warnings need to be developed that match the communitys needs from the
community perspective of what it thinks is necessary from the emergency

experts, and
the experts perspective of what they think the community needs.
These expectations may not coincide, and are probably unlikely to coincide unless a
dialogue is developed between the community and the flood management authority.
The difficulties facing effective communication between flood forecasters and
emergency managers and then to the community, are the differing vocabularies, and
quite often the communitys inexperience of flooding (COA, 1998a). This leads to
misunderstandings or lack of comprehension of warning messages, only receiving
messages second or third hand, and delaying responses until it is too late or unsafe
to take meaningful action. If individuals are flood aware, or have had first-hand
experience, people react to warning messages in a competent manner.
Generally, without first-hand experience to generate Gestalt2 type reactions,
members of the community do not understand or readily accept warning messages
(Ariely and Carmon, 2000). For example, advice of a future flood peak without an
explanation of what is might mean, may result in action. In such circumstances,
2
perceived organised whole that is perceived as more than the sum of its parts (COD, 1982).
45
flood warning officials and emergency managers need to rely on public awareness
programs or vicarious experiences of other disasters gained through the media.
Further research is required to determine how the effectiveness of official advice can
be improved, and to determine how the disruptions to effective communications can
be diminished.
Figure 2 Factors contributing to community actions (Betts, 2009)
Figure 2 indicates the flow of information from a flood warning through a media
centre, its interpretation of the message, the message provided which leads to a
communitys reaction to the message, and the actions the received message might
engender. Its the authors contention that the messages effectiveness can be
disrupted through community dissemination and the communitys expectations of the
emergency management system. The challenge then arises for emergency
managers to improve the effectiveness of the warnings through awareness programs
that are directed to improving community understanding and responses.
There is a need to understand the process by which people receive warnings so
warnings can be prepared, issued and understood in a manner that will effectively
minimise reaction time, thereby increasing the time available for damage mitigation
measures.
Mileti (1995) makes the case that effective public warnings must provide for public
interaction and foster searches for additional information as well as to receive
warnings. He points out that low-probability/high consequences disasters, of
46
whatever type, cause similar social psychological processes that direct public
response. Mileti believes that public warning response is a social process and that
public reactions to warnings are typically not characterised by stimulus response
models. People go through a common process before they take protective action:
hearing a warning
forming a personal understanding of what was meant by the warning
developing a level of belief in the risk information conveyed in the warning
personalising the risk or perceiving it to be someone elses problem and
deciding what if anything to do, responding in ways thought to be appropriate for
the risk personally faced.
There is a need to understand how people make decisions under stress, including
assessments of group psychological abilities (such as cognitive, personality, or
attitudes); and pre warning perceptions).
Public involvement
Public involvement in risk management occurs when an entity, usually government
or other organisation (separately or together), is engaged with the community at risk
to achieve a reduction in vulnerability to a hazard. It is a fundamental part of the risk
management process. This engagement allows participation and input with the goal
of producing a plan that represents the collective will and consensus of the
community.
For a community to fully participate, it must not only understand the context of the
area into which it is drawn, but be able to meaningfully contribute to the engagement.
This implies a willingness to be engaged in something it may or not may understand.
That understanding will only come with awareness programs, education and
mentoring.
Among the many components of safety is a requirement that individuals and their
communities become aware of the risks to which they are exposed and can take
actions or are prepared for those emergencies (Enders 2001, Cottrell 2005)). The
objective of preparedness is to reduce the adverse impacts if risks become
dangerous and an emergency arises. Enders claims there is comparatively little
information on awareness and preparedness of communities for emergencies and
suggests three research questions:
How aware is the community of emergency risks?

What steps have members of the community taken to maximise their safety?
How confident do they feel about emergency actions?
Flood awareness and public education programs are required to enhance the ability
of a community to reduce flood damage during the continuum from the onset of
severe weather to the evacuation of affected residents. The single most important
47
aspect in reducing overall flood damage and impact is considered to be an informed

and educated community.
Communication cannot occur until there is a shared experience or a shared point of
reference between the community and disaster managers. The community will not
react unless they understand the language in which warnings are couched and
paradigms are available or have been created through interaction between the
community and disaster managers. It is postulated that flood damage and the
adverse impacts of flooding can be minimized if both the givers of flood warnings
and recipients of those warnings are aware of the risks faced, and each understands
the socio-psychological processes faced by the community as a flood emergency
develops.
Public reactions to warnings are typically not characterised by stimulusresponse
models, but reactions can be modified and accelerated through a series of steps in a
public awareness and education program. As people perceive and understand risk in
different ways, education programs need to present flood risk issues appropriate to
the different perceptions. It is vital that further research is undertaken that will link
different perceptions of risk with effective flood risk education and empowerment
programs.
Sociologic examinations of potentially affected communities are required to
determine the levels of experience and understanding of flooding that will inform
future engagement processes. The transfer of information from government to
communities has generally been undertaken by the engineering and emergency
services fraternity and most likely without the benefit of advice from psychologists.
The writer believes such advice is needed to enhance not only community
awareness programs but the nature of warning systems and the building of
resilience. Similar comments are applicable to advice from sociologists.
Community expectations
The expectations of community members can vary in a number of ways: participation
in government (Arnstein, 1969); involvement in floodplain development planning
(Betts 2001); expectation of self destiny in the hazard mitigation planning (Burby
2001), expectations of risk communication (prior to a flood) and crisis communication
(during a flood) (Reynolds and Seeger, 2005), which are underpinned by the
emergency management precept that people have a right to know (COA, 2004).
In researching this section, the writer found great difficulty finding non-government
directed literature regarding community expectations of flooding. In fact most of the
government literature takes a top-down approach advising what it thought the
community needed, rather than reporting what the community said it needed.
This is a major research gap and should be investigated. Much of the nongovernment literature is more than 15 years old and from other readings, it is
48
apparent that the expectations of communities have changed. Communities do

expect more from their governments and the government literature reinforced that
view. So is the government literature self fulfilling, or do communities expect
something else? Unless they become involved in the decision making process and
become aware of the nature of flood risks, how can communities advise
governments on what they (the communities) need or expect?
There are two sources of community disaster information needs which are important
as much data was unsolicited and not prompted at the time it was gathered. Two
major disasters in Australia: the Victorian Bushfires of 2009 and the Queensland
floods of 2011 both resulted in the establishment of a Royal Commission in Victoria
and a Commission of Inquiry in Queensland. The public were invited to make
submissions to both investigations and initial readings of some of these submissions
indicate that they will partially satisfy that research gap. The findings of the two
Commissions should be compared to determine whether there are different
responses for flood and bushfire that will inform updates of Emergency Management
Australias manuals and guidelines.
There is a plethora of literature on why flood warnings are ignored and not
understood, but it seems very few seem to have addressed the sciences of
education and psychology. We engineers have our own peculiar views of the world,
generally dealing in numbers and logic, and unfortunately many of us do not
understand the needs of the majority of the community.
Psychological processes
A persons psychological processes ascribe meaning to information, whether it is
good, bad, safe, unsafe, healthy, etc., and influence the way people react to flood
warnings or unpleasant advice or direction and making decisions. Much of this is
done subconsciously. If these processes are understood, then it may be possible to
deliver messages in such a way that the adverse aspects of the psychological
processes might be avoided, and lead to greater efficiency when evacuation is
required. Meanings are founded on our memories: our ability to store, retain and
recall information.
Simon (1996) believes that with age, we accumulated a number of cognitive
templates, or patterns that provide a powerful mechanism for successful cognition.
Damasio et al (1996) argued that thought is made largely from images broadly
construed to include perceptual and symbolic representations, while Finucane et al
(2002) suggested the application of markers that would react to stimuli and influence
the decision making process. These ideas are supported by Goldberg (2006) who
postulated that memory of facts, figures, events and solutions are in the form of
patterns.
Goldberg considers that when confronted with an apparent new problem or
information, an older person seems to search for similar situations or patterns, rather
49
than undertake the difficult analysis processing activities in the front of the brain. As
the brain ages, it moves from problem solving to pattern recognition and changes the
way the different parts of the brain contribute to the process. The cortex is used less
while there is increasing dependence on sub-cortical machinery.
This also affects the working memory and somatic memory, our ability to learn new
facts, our brains ability to switch from one mental process to another, and attention
can be selective. Each unique memory could be seen as being accompanied by
metadata that provides a key for pattern searching, in much the same way as
primary and secondary keys are used in database navigation. Goldberg describes
these cognitive templates that enable pattern recognition as attractors, each with a
unique property so that a broad range of inputs would enact the same neural
constellation automatically.
Conscious processes occur during the short term memory phase when several
things are held in memory and the prefrontal cortex seeks to define relationships or
ascribe meaning to the information. Problems need to be fragmented in bite size
pieces and presented in such an order they can be processed and lead the reader to
the desired decision.
Upon receipt of information, people classify it according to paradigms, schema or
heuristics as sensemaking as used by Sellnow & Seeger (2001). Let us then
assume that in this sensemaking process, the brain develops relationships between
its existing memories and the new information, sorting it by what might be needed
and for what. This basic pattern then needs an attractor (database table key
equivalent), or develops a mental metaphor that might simplify the information for
later personal decision-making scenarios. This has significant implications for
individual decision making during a flood emergency. Individual community members
need to be primed, by providing them with information beforehand when the brain is
not under stress and when it can process the information, classify and store it along
with its database keys or perhaps its heuristic metaphors.
Damasio et als (1996) somatic marker hypothesis suggests the marker stimulates
responses at several operational levels that might be done consciously or
unconsciously. Damasio argues that thought is made largely from images broadly
construed to include perceptual and symbolic representations. Johnson (2004)
describes a somatic marker as some bodily state which is generated as a
consequence of some mental process. This state is then re-perceived by the mind
and as a consequence, the mental state is changed. Finucane et al (2002) postulate
that over time, these images become marked by positive or negative feelings that
increase the accuracy and efficiently of decision processes.
Another aspect to be considered is whether it is possible to modify the way
subliminal markers are attached to warning messages so influencing the way people
react. It has been stated (Finucane et al, 2000) that the sub-conscious application of
50
affect3 acts as a marker to assist reaction and influence the decision making
process. They observed an inverse relationship between perceived risk and
perceived benefit and postulated that observers subconsciously included an
adjective before viewing an object.
Epstein (1994) raised these concepts in his work on cognitive-experiential selftheory, which suggested two levels of information processing, where conscious
processing functions differently than at the subconscious level. These serve to
mitigate extreme behaviour generated by one processing function or the other.
Epstein further reasons that resulting actions are subliminally dependent on
personality and a persons belief system. If a conclusion seems unpleasant at the
subconscious level, the brain forces analytical thought at the conscious level.
The introduction of a subliminal marker in a warning message would introduce a bias
in the warnings which in some circumstances could have unfortunate consequences,
such as if a person acted on a warning later found to be unnecessary and suffered
an unfortunate incident. An emergency managers defence that the warning was
issued in the context of the greater good may not yet have been tested in court.
Effective decision making is also built on knowledge of the manuals and guidelines
published by EMA and state government authorities, which emergency managers
and planners are expected to and should base their contingency planning upon.
Many of these manuals were first written over ten years ago and whilst they are
being progressively updated there is an opportunity to modify the messages within.
Emergency managers need to understand the implications of recent research that
has been demonstrated through modern brain imaging techniques. Many of these
techniques were not developed, nor had their research capabilities and implications
been understood, until after the publication of many of Australias emergency
management manuals. The implication is that the manuals have not been tested for
their effectiveness through neurological methods. It may be possible that memory
markers or memory joggers can be included in the manuals that will trigger a
response or reinforce memory.
Neurological research in combination with psychological research could assist
emergency managers to fine tune their warning messages and how, as individuals,
they interact with others within the emergency management centre. Unfortunately,
emergency managers and decision makers are rarely exposed to their specialist field
until brain development has passed into its mature stage. It would be useful if risk
analysis, risk management and emergency planning were available for study in
tertiary institutions.
3
The authors use the word affect to mean a feeling state that people experience, such as happiness or
sadness. It may also be viewed as a quality (e.g. goodness or badness) associated with a stimulus. These two
concepts tend to be related.
51
Language
Language is essential for transferring information and can add value or detract from
message content. In its most basic form, language has grammar (word forms and
endings), syntax (arrangements of words) and phonology (sounds) and each of
these affect message reception and understanding. The use of language must also
consider cultural differences and the impact of gesticulation when delivering
messages.
For clarity there must be a fundamental relationship in the way words are put
together and the words themselves must have meaning. Language allows us to
generate true/false statements. Our brain has inbuilt truth filters with an ability to
categorise things, events and impressions. Statements such as there will be a flood
yesterday are obviously wrong. By learning vocabulary and the conceptual nature of
language, we can develop an understanding of complex hierarchical relationships.
Although speech is a prime method for conveying information and facial expressions
can enhance the transmittal of message. If speech is accompanied by hand and arm
movements the comprehension process can be unclear and confused (Skipper et al,
2009). If those hand and arm gestures are not meaningful, messages may be
confused. DAusillio et al (2009) had a slightly different focus but concluded a nexus
existed between speech and motor circuits not directly concerned with speech. This
has severe implications for the delivery of warning messages if the speaker in an
interview situation does not have effective control of face or limb movements.
Metaphors are widely used in language and are a valuable tool to explain: adding
meaning to situations and tapping into the creative sources within the brain. They
may also facilitate copying mechanisms at a sub-conscious level to achieve the
pattern recognition proposed by Goldberg. A metaphor is defined as an application
of name or descriptive term or phrase to an object or action to which it is
imaginatively but not literally applicable (Pearsall et al, 1982). It could be said that a
metaphor is a language allegory to a somatic marker.
Hyman (1974) considers metaphors are deliberate and useful, they enrich our
language, and develop new ways of viewing situations. Are raging floodwaters the
result of torrential downpours? Do rivers run? Rivers do not run in the literal
sense, but run is a shortened way of saying that a river has water that flows.
Metaphors and adjectives add to the colour of language, and probably aid memory
through the attachment of somatic markers.
However, there is a risk that metaphors and adjectives can unconsciously introduce
bias or be pejorative by applying incorrect roles or categorising participants, such as
describing an emergency decision maker as an unnamed government official, or to
the public as isolated, or as unfortunate evacuees, or as long-standing
residents. Positive metaphors can facilitate action, such as residents can seize an
52
opportunity to rebuild above the flood line, or take positive action to regroup their
families.
It is essential that all members of the DMG are good communicators to explain and
discuss problems with each other, and to engage with the community to convey the
meaning of complex situations in simple language. This is a skill that needs to be
learned, but is not yet considered a major part of an engineers professional
continuing development program.
When we engineers learn to write our reports, we tend to avoid hyperbole,
metaphors, similes and adjectives but we know that in verbal language, vocal
expression and gestures add to the message and are key parts of oratory and
explanation. If messages are to be more readily accepted, then the tone of the
language must accord with the gravitas of the flood situation. When converted from
written word to speech, it must be done so in a form that will be accepted by the
listening public. It is those listeners who will discuss and seek validation from others,
and/or be in a position to interpret or pass on warnings to those who do not hear or
do not understand the official message.
The translation of written word (often prepared by engineers) to a formal official
announcement should be made by a person, such as a trained television
newsreader or journalist who translates official advice into digestible and useful
information. Hand and arm gestures can reinforce messages or confuse or distract
from the message. This is not usually a problem for television presenters, but it
could be an issue for door-step explanations given by emergency managers or
politicians commenting on a worsening flood situation.
Learning principles
Learning is the opposite of teaching, where the transmission of ideas and information
is received and understood by the student. Hyman (1974) identifies four concepts for
teaching:
the student believes that what he/she needs to know is held by someone else
teaching is the activity that brings about the accumulation of knowledge
the teacher has the knowledge or can guide the student
the teacher can transmit the knowledge.
Connell et al (1962) outlined a series of learning principles that can be applied to

community education programs:
a. Motivation:
There is a greater likelihood of learning taking place when an
individual is motivated, or when the learner is subject to some pressure or has a
need for information.
b. Practice: Repetition facilitates learning. Different relationships may be perceived
when information is re-presented. This reorganisation of ideas can provide
different views or perceptions.
53
c. Past experiences:
Past experiences contribute to efficiency in learning. A
differentiation has to be made between meaningful and meaningless material.
The former, will enhance memory connections within the brain, and have to
potential for connections to be made with new experiences.
d. Level of maturation:
Learning is accomplished more readily and tends to be
more enduring when the activity involved is appropriately geared to the learners
physical and intellectual level of development.
e. Activity: Learning is an active process. Learning has to be accomplished by the
learner, who has to internalise the information.
f. Reinforcement: The possibility that learning will occur is greater when different
ways of responding or behaving are followed by different conditions. The different
conditions are effectively different stimuli on earlier subject matter. These provide
different neural connections within the brain, thereby strengthening existing
memory and either developing Gestalt type reactions or subliminal markers.
g. Transfer of Learning: Behaviour or responses learned in one situation may
transfer to, that is, be available for use in other situations. Connell et al (1962)
also consider it important to demonstrate the underlying principles and provide
opportunities to recognise and/or apply the principle in varied and increasingly
complex situations.
In learning or encountering a new situation, people will try and make sense of the
situation and create a harmony among the ideas formed. Learning emergency
might be effective if biased to Gestalt type paradigms because they seem to be more
closely aligned to sensemaking and somatic marker thinking, as described earlier.
Implications for emergency planning
The forgoing seven learning principles can be applied to disaster management
training for those involved in the preparation for disasters, and then be applied to
community education programs. Training has to be directed at two levels: facilitating
the work of emergency planners and managers, and ensuring the community is
prepared to react to warnings.
A pre-condition for effective disaster management is a willingness of the population
at risk to accept the advice. This requires a community to trust the information
provided, have an understanding of emergency management policies and know the
appropriate sequence of actions when the events leading to a warning are triggered.
In formulating public policy, information flow should be reciprocal, where both the
public and the authorities are teachers and students. For emergency planning, the
local authority has to explain the flood risk, possible flood scenarios and then glean
from the public its need for the publics pre-flood planning and the information to be
provided to it by the DMG during the emergency.
During emerging disasters, the public generally has no choice but consider that the
local authority has the expertise and knowledge and implicitly accepts a subordinate
54
role for the knowledge transfer. When time is available, community members will
challenge government supplied information if that information is deemed
unacceptable.
Gestalt psychologists believe that the whole is different from the sum of its parts
and developed a set of principles to explain how parts could be organised into a
whole. They consider that perception is an individuals own restructuring of the
sensory field (Connell et al, 1962) and learning occurs when all relationships are
formed into an organised pattern. One of the Gestalt laws is that of pragnanz where
a group of objects is organised in the simplest form possible.
In learning or encountering a new situation, people will try and make sense of the
situation and create a harmony among the ideas formed. When this understanding or
harmony is reached, learning is said to have occurred.
Conclusions
1. Sociologic examinations of potentially affected communities are required to
determine the levels of experience and understanding of flooding that will inform
future engagement processes.
2. The transfer of information from government to communities has generally been
undertaken by the engineering and emergency services fraternity and most likely
without the benefit of advice from psychologists. The writer believes such advice
is needed to enhance not only community awareness programs but the nature of
warning systems and the building of resilience. Similar comments are applicable
to advice from sociologists.
3. Further investigation is required into examination of what information the
community believes it should be provided rather than what government thinks it
needs. The community submissions into the Victorian Royal Commission inquiry
of its 2009 bushfires and the Queensland Commission of Inquiry into the 20102011 floods should be examined by both disaster managers and psychologists to
better inform communities in the future
4. There is an opportunity to modify the education and warning messages by the
inclusion of memory markers or memory joggers in EMA manuals and
information that is released to the public. The advancement of neurological
imaging provides an opportunity to link neurological psychology to emergency
management. Research is needed to determine how this can be best effected.
5. Research is required to determine how knowledge of both psychological and
neurological processes can lead to accelerated learning processes, improved
concentration, avoidance of brain overload and hopefully lead to greater
effectiveness in stressful situations.
6. The effectiveness of training will depend upon the application of the psychology
of education, and an understanding of how the brain receives and processes
information.
55
7. Education and awareness programs should be developed by a team comprising

technologists (who have hydraulic knowledge), specialists in adult education, and
psychologists who can advise on how best to present the information for
maximum impact.
8. Preparing and delivering flood warning messages is a complex process that is
not well understood. Barriers to warning effectiveness include language,
gestures, phonology, the message giver and the mode of delivery.
9. Language has grammar (word forms and endings), syntax (arrangements of
words) and phonology (sounds) and each of these will affect message reception
and understanding. The nature of the words used to convey messages is
fundamental to the success of warning messages.
10. Metaphors are an essential part of language and can add value to warnings by
imprinting markers to the information set within memory. However they must be
used with care, as they can attach unfortunate meanings which are not only
inappropriate but can be misleading and confuse the message being delivered.
References
Ariely, D. and Carmon, Z. (2000) "Gestalt Characteristics of Experiences: The
Defining Features of Summarised Events", Journal of Behavioural Decision Making,
2000 (13) 191-201.
Arnstein, S. (1969) "A ladder of citizen participation", Journal of the American
Institute of Planners, 35 (4) 216-224.
Betts, H.W. (2009), Floodplain Management, An examination of factors that affect
decision makers prior to and during a flood emergency, thesis submitted in fulfilment
of the requirements of the degree of Doctor or Philosophy, 2009.
Betts, H.W. (2001), An Outline of Gold Coast City Councils Nerang River Flood
Mitigation Project, NSW Floodplain Management Authorities Conference,
Wentworth 8-11th May 2001.
Burby, R. J. (2001) "Involving citizens in hazard mitigation planning: making the right
choices", The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, (Spring) 45-51.
Commonwealth of Australia (COA, 2009) Flood Warning, Manual 21, Emergency
Management Australia.
Commonwealth of Australia (COA, 2004), Emergency Management in Australia
Concepts and Principles, Manual 1, Emergency Management Australia, 2004.
Commonwealth of Australia (COA 1998a) Manual 4 Australian Emergency
Management Terms Thesaurus, Emergency Management Australia.
Commonwealth of Australia (COA, 1998b), Multi-Agency Incident Management,
Manual 17, Emergency Management Australia (1998).
Commonwealth of Australia (COA 1955) Meteorology Act.
56
Connell, W.F., Campbell, W.J., Debus, R.L., Howie, G., Miller, T.W.G., MacLaine,
A.G., Neale, M.D., Spearitt, D., Wylie, J.F., Members and Staff of the Department of
Education, University of Sydney and Verco, D.J.A., (1962), The Foundations of
Education, Ian Novak Publishing Company, Sydney, (1962).
Cottrell, Alison (2005) Sometimes it is a big ask, but sometimes it's a big outcome:
community participation in flood mitigation, Australian Journal of Emergency
Management, 20 (3). pp. 27-32. ISSN 1324-1540.
DAusilio, A., Pulvermuller, F., Salmas, P., Bufalari, I., Begliomini, C., & Fadiga, L.,
(2009), The Motor Somatotopy of Speech Perception, Current Biology, Volume 19,
Issue 5, 381-385, 12 February 2009.
Damasio, A.R., Everitt, B.J., Bishop, D. (1996), "The Somatic Marker Hypothesis and
the Possible Functions of the Prefrontal Cortex", Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. (1996):
1413-20.
Enders, J., (2001), Measuring Community Awareness and Preparedness for
Emergencies, Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Spring 2001.
Epstein, S., (1994) `Integration of the cognitive and psychodynamic unconscious',
American Psychologist, 49 (1994), 709724.
Finucane, M. L., Alhakami, A., Slovic, P. and Johnson, S. M. (2000) "The Affect
Heuristic In Judgements or Risks and Benefits", Journal of Behavioural Decision
Making, 2000 (13) 1-17.
Goldberg, E., (2006), The Wisdom Paradox How the Mind Can Grow Stronger As
Your Brain Grows Older, Gotham Books, 2005, ISBN 1-592-40187-2, February
2006.
Hyman, R.T., (1974) Ways of Teaching, second edition, Harper & Row, pubs, ISBN
0-397-47301-X, 1974.
Keys, C., and Cawood, M., (2009), Identifying and reducing inadequacies in flood
warning processes: an Australian perspective, Journal of Flood Risk Management
2 (2009) p190-197.
Mileti, D. S. (1995) Factors related to flood warning response, U.S. - Italy Research
Workshop on the Hydrometeorology, Impacts, and management of Extreme Floods,
Perugia (Italy), November 1995.
Pearsall, J. & Trumble, W. (Eds.), (OERD, 1996), The Oxford English Reference
Dictionary, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 1996.
Reynolds, B. and Seeger, M.W. (2005), Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication
as an Integrative Model, Journal of Health Communication, 10:43-55, 2005, ISSN:
1081-0730 print online DOI: 10.1080/10810730590904571.
Sellnow, T. L. and Seeger, M. (2001) In Communication Studies. West Lafayette,
Vol. Summer 2001, 52, pp. 153.
57
Simon, H.A., (1996), The Science of the Artificial, third edition, Cambridge, Mass.,
MIT Press, 1996.
Skipper, J., Goldin-Meadow, S, Nusbaum, H.C. & Small, S., (2009), Guestures
Orchestrate Brain Networks for Language Understanding, Current Biology, Volume
19, Issue 8, 661-667, 26 March 2009.
Teague, B., McLeod, R. & Pascoe, S., (2010), 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal
Commission Final Report Summary, Parliament of Victoria, ISBN 978-0-98074081-3, July 2010.
58
Lifestyle at risk ? The case of Ingham

Dr Helen Boon, PhD, BSc (Hons), PGCE, Senior Lecturer, James Cook University,
Australia
Brenton Clark, BA (Hons), James Cook University, Australia
Dr Alison Cottrell, PhD, MSPD, BA, GCTT, Senior Lecturer, James Cook University,
Australia
Professor Bob Stevenson, PhD, M.S., BA, Dip Nat Res, Dip Ed, James Cook
University, Australia
Dr Joanne Millar, PhD, BAgrSci, Senior Lecturer, Charles Sturt University, Australia
Associate Professor David King, PhD, BA (Hons), PGCE, James Cook University,
Australia

Brisbane, April 16 18, 2012
This work was funded through the National Climate Change Adaptation Research
Facility, which is an initiative of, and funded by the Australian Government
Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, with additional funding from
the Queensland Government, Griffith University, Macquarie University, Queensland
University of Technology, James Cook University, The University of Newcastle,
Murdoch University, University of Southern Queensland and University of the
Sunshine Coast. The role of NCCARF is to lead the research community in a
national interdisciplinary effort to generate the information needed by decisionmakers in government and in vulnerable sectors and communities to manage the
risk of climate change impacts.
The views and opinions expressed in this publication not necessarily the views of the
Commonwealth, and the Commonwealth does not accept responsibility for any
information or advice contained herein.
59
Lifestyle at risk? The case of Ingham

Abstract
This report presents findings about community responses to the 2009 floods
experienced in Ingham, North Queensland. Two consecutive floods occurred in
Ingham in 2009 which were both predominantly riverine and exacerbated by
prolonged rainfall. Emergency Management Queensland estimated that 65% of the
Hinchinbrook Shire or around 2,900 residences and businesses were affected by the
February 2009 floodwaters with fifty homes experiencing inundation.
The
Queensland Premier estimated infrastructure damage at $120 million and the
Insurance Council of Australia recorded a total cost of $19 million in insurance claims
following the event.
The aim of the case study was to explore factors which sustained the community and
helped community members adapt after the floods. Data was collected through a
series of interviews conducted during 2010. A total of 77 participants representing a
range of organisations, interest groups and demographics were interviewed in a
series of focus group and individual interviews. Interviewees were asked about their
experiences of the flood, including who and what helped them, who was most or
least affected and why they chose to continue to live in the community.
Bronfenbrenners conceptual framework of influences was used as the theoretical
lens with which to analyse participant responses.
Results suggest that residents and organisational units such as the hospital and
local council quickly responded with strong, effective leadership to ensure
appropriate help was available to community members. Strong cohesive social
networks, prior experiences with floods, a sense of place and commitment to the
community underpinned the response phase of the disaster and maintained the
community efforts during the recovery period. Although the economic fabric of the
community was severely impacted by the floods and subsequent mismanagement of
some relief efforts, locals were adamant that the desirable lifestyle offered by the
community was a strong motivating force to sustain their recovery and support their
adaptation.
Implications of the findings for disaster management and recovery highlight the need
to ensure that local organisations and the council have clear and up to date
emergency plans in place, including a range of local individuals able to lead the
response and recovery phase in consultation with state emergency services and
federal government organisations. Community networks need to be developed and
existing ones need to be maintained and strengthened since they play a key role in
community cohesion, which in turn is critical for the effective communication and
response to all phases of a disaster, including preparedness and recovery.
Effective community disaster response takes place when all agencies, government
and private, all individuals and households are engaged in awareness education and
preparedness, and respond collaboratively.
Keywords: disaster, community, flood, adaptation, risk perceptions
60
Introduction and background

The worlds climate is experiencing marked changes. For Australia, climate change
has a wide range of projected impacts. At minimum, a wetter and warmer to drier
and warmer Australia is foreseen, with an increased frequency and severity of
droughts, heat waves and natural disasters such as cyclones and floods (IPCC
2007). With predictions of hightened climatic uncertainty brought about by global
climate change, there is an urgent need to examine disaster impacted communities
to find out what has supported their sustainability and adaptation to living in natural
hazard prone areas.
When a natural hazard overwhelms a community, the consequent disaster shuts
down many services and impacts upon the capacity of local institutions to function.
An unprepared community might be pushed into crisis. It is during the immediate
period before a natural hazard impact, during the passage of the hazard, and in the
days immediately following, that communities must rely on their own knowledge and
adaptive capacity to prepare, survive, cope and recover. Community surveys in
Australia underscore a lack of preparation for a range of gradual onset hazards such
as floods (ABS 2008; GNS 2007), bushfire (Bushnell, Balcombe and Cottrell 2007),
and cyclones (Anderson-Berry and King 2005).
Emergency management responses and strategies within this context face many
challenges. Data on disasters and disaster risk reduction are often lacking at the
local Australian level, which can constrain improvements in local vulnerability
reduction (IPCC 2012). In an effort to design effective adaptation and risk
management strategies it is critical that government, especially local government
and emergency management examine best practice: what strategies increase
effective responses to natural hazards, reduce vulnerability to hazard impact and
enhance community recovery in specific contexts? Post-disaster recovery and
reconstruction processes do not only provide an opportunity for reducing weatherand climate-related disaster risk and for improving adaptive capacity locally, they
also provide valuable knowledge and lessons for application more broadly,
increasing the capacity for longer-term planning and policy changes for sustainable
development nationally and internationally.
The Ingham case study
The town of Ingham is located on the Herbert River floodplain and there are a
number of natural watercourses that distribute floodwaters through the town during
major flood events (Bureau of Meteorology (BOM), 2009). Two consecutive floods
occurred in Ingham in 2009 which were both predominantly riverine, exacerbated by
prolonged rainfall periods (Bureau of Meteorology (BOM), 2009). The initial flood
occurred between the 12th and 13th of January 2009 and the second between the
29th of January and the 8th of February 2009 (Bureau of Meteorology (BOM), 2009).
The Herbert River reached 12.25m at the Gairloch Bridge on the 3rd of February
2009. This was classified as a major flood by the Bureau of Meteorology, and the
river remained at this height until the 7th February 2009 (Bureau of Meteorology
(BOM), 2009).
61
Impact on the Community

Forty people were evacuated from their homes to an emergency centre established
at the Ingham High School (Department of Emergency Services, 2009). Many
residents were isolated by floodwaters causing them to be trapped in their homes for
a week.
Emergency Management Queensland estimated that 65% of the
Hinchinbrook Shire or around 2,900 residences and businesses were affected by the
February 2009 floodwaters with fifty homes experiencing inundation specifically in
living areas (Bureau of Meteorology (BOM), 2009). The Queensland Premier placed
initial estimates of infrastructure damage at $120 million (ABC News, 2010).
Furthermore the Insurance Council of Australia recorded a total cost of $19 million in
insurance claims following the event (Ratz, 2010, email 10 September).
The Community Recovery Centres housed up to 108 people and operated for ten
days with an average of 54 people per night (Australian Red Cross, 2009). The
Australian Red Cross was active for a month and its operations involved one
hundred and ten staff and volunteers (Australian Red Cross, 2009).
The flooding had a deleterious impact on Inghams primary industry sector, and to
businesses associated with this major industry. Ingham relies heavily on the sugar
cane industry. The flooding destroyed the sugar cane crop, and affected crop yields
in the following years, which has had a massive impact to the whole community. This
has placed significant pressure on the people of the Hinchinbrook Shire both
financially and emotionally, pressures which continue to be felt to the present time.
It is of interest therefore to explore the community of Ingham to find out what has
supported the community through the disaster.
Disaster community
Community has been defined in many different ways from diverse disciplinary
perspectives (Kumar 2005). A community can be a group of people coming together
in physical, environmental, economic, relational, political or social ways (Kumar
2005). For the purposes of this research community is defined in three ways: those
who live in a similar region; those who relate to each other as a community; and
those who come together in response to an issue such as a disaster. Focusing on
disasters, many researchers tend to identify the physical location where a disaster
took place along with its name as synonymous with a disaster community. The
assumption is that a common set of disaster behaviours might exist which supersede
local cultural differences. In other words, one expects a common set of community
level patterns of disaster behaviours. With specific reference to communities
impacted by a disaster therefore, Allen (2006) defines community as the population
living within the territorial bounds of a town or village administrative unit, which is
considered to be exposed to a relatively high degree of environmental hazard risk
(p. 84).
Disasters are also significant social constructs, formed within a particular social
context (Kirschenbaum 2004; Quarantelli 1998). From this, it follows that any
individual or family who has links through diverse social networks to others involved
in a disaster becomes part of the disaster community. Geographic physical
destruction remains important because the extent of physical damage, by creating
economic, environmental and human losses, also has an impact on the social
networks of interactions in such communities (Kirschenbaum 2004). A disaster
62
community therefore has a specific geographic disaster epicentre but is perceived

and experienced through a complex web of social networks. Importantly, these social
networks can affect collective community behaviour which might have an impact on
community responses and adaptation to disasters. Studies have suggested social
networks impact on, among other things, local governance (Beall 2001; Schafft and
Brown 2000), health levels (Berkman 2000), child survival (Adams, Madhavan and
Simon 2002) and even happiness (Fowler and Christakis 2008).
Bronfenbrenners conceptual framework provides a structure and possible
mechanism through which one might examine the influences of this complex of
networks which support individuals in a disaster impacted community.
Bronfenbrenners bioecological systems theory
Bronfenbrenners bioecological systems theory (1979; 1989) (Figure 1) is useful for
organizing factors that individuals cite as helpful because each factor can be placed
around an individual according to the proximity of the factor in relation to the
individuals ecosystem. Using this framework we can evaluate within person
characteristics, such as adaptive coping and optimism as well as factors that are
external to the person, such as family support, neighbourhood networks, health
provision, state government financial support, federal government financial support
and so on. This type of factor categorization facilitates the evaluation of existing
policies and provides a rationale for formulating future interventions to support
individuals and communities (Boon et al. 2012).
Macrosystem
Chronosystem
Societal, Cultural, Political,
Exosystem
Welfare,
Community
hospitals
Economy
family
Media
based
services
Individual
Mesosystem
Microsystem
neighbourhood
workplace
church
Figure 1 Conceptual scheme of Bronfenbrenners systems and their interactions (Diagram

constructed by authors to illustrate Bronfenbrenners theories)
Bronfenbrenner structures an individuals social context into five areas (

Bronfenbrenner 1989):
63
a. Microsystem where the individual participates directly.

b. Mesosystem microsystem member interactions independent of the central
individual
c. Exosystem entities and organisations that might be accessed by the individual or
their family
d. Macrosystem the politics, views and customs that represent the cultural fabric of
the individuals society.
e. Chronosystem the elements of time as they relate to events in the individuals
environment.
The processes and experiences that the individual is exposed to either directly or
through proximal interactions with the various systems above are thought to interact
with their predispositions to structure their perceptions and responses, their
behaviours, their adaptation and their acquisition of knowledge and skills
(Bronfenbrenner and Ceci 1994).
Prior research
Communities in flood prone areas fare best when there is strong community
cohesion, a perceptions of a sense of place and community involvement by the
community members (Chang 2010). Collective efficacy, a construct defined as the
shared belief that a group can effectively meet environmental demands and improve
their lives through concerted effort, has also been found to be beneficial (Benight
2004). Benight noted that people responded successfully to a variety of problems
after the floods by creating an organised crisis committee to speak, decide, and act
on behalf of their small rural community, demonstrating collective efficacy by way of
community cohesion and a high level of involvement.
Mitchell et al. (2010) explains that the flood prone community in Kaitaia, NZ, was
supported by several factors and processes. A key issue is early communication to
community members about the potential disaster risks and the levels of risks
inherent in their response strategies. City council planning for a coordinated
response to flooding, involving active participation of community members and
organisations and leadership, helps to respond to a disaster, and promotes
community resilience to the disaster. Smith (2010) concurred, showing that a
disaster prone community is helped by pro-active planning and quick execution of a
city council community recovery plan. In Australia, Gissing, Keys and Opper,
(2010) examined flood research and argued that flood prone communities must be
prepared. This includes taking note of flood warnings, emphasising that
preparedness for flooding can save up to 80% of potential flood damages.
In relation to the factors that influence people to reside in flood prone localities, a
number of studies show that while the experience of flooding has a deleterious effect
upon peoples physical and emotional health and attachment to a place (Tapsell and
Tunstall 2008), a sense of place connecting individuals with communities transcends
the negative impacts that a disaster can impose (Chamlee-Wright and Storr 2009;
Manning 2005). Others argue that despite apparent known flood risk, which Masuda
and Garvin (2006) view as socially constructed, influenced by cultural factors and
perceptions of the world, people make conscious decisions to reside and/or remain
in areas that are flood prone, because they meet their lifestyle needs (Vogt, Willis
and Vince 2008).
64
Research aims
The aim of this research was to gather community perceptions about what assisted
in the response to and recovery from the 2009 floods in Ingham. Of interest is also
the issue of sustainability, the continuing adaptive functioning of a community.
Hallegatte, Henriet and Corfee-Morlot (2011) conceptualise this in terms of economic
adaptive capacity. While many definitions exist for a sustainable community, Geis
(2000) proposes that a sustainable community not only aims for improved quality of
life for all its residents by applying ecologically defensible strategies, but also
supports local resources to sustain and promote the local economy. We were,
therefore, also interested in the factors which influenced Inghams economic
recovery.
Methods
In the case study two different groups of participants were recruited to be
interviewed. The first group included key informants, comprising various categories
of disaster emergency (e.g., state emergency management services, emergency
medical services) and recovery respondents (e.g., community welfare agencies,
mental health professionals) who were involved in assisting the community during
and after the event. The second group comprised a cross-section of community
residents (e.g. business owners, farmers, womens groups) determined from a
demographic profile of Ingham, and conversations with key informants and
community representatives of various organisations. Members of these groups were
not mutually exclusive as many of those engaged in disaster response were also
members of the affected community.
A semi-structured interview of open questions was developed for common use with
both key informants and community residents. Questions to informants and the
community addressed the kinds of assistance that helped both during the event and
after the event and the impact on the community. Although the original intent was to
mainly conduct focus group interviews with community members, the difficulty of
scheduling people at the same time led to some paired interviews, with the result
that the number of focus groups varied from two to nine and the length varied from
around 30 minutes to two hours. Interviews were conducted between August, 2010
and February 2011. A total of 77 participants were interviewed from a range of
organisations and demographics (Tables 1 and 2 below); interviews were taped and
transcribed and notes were taken and later expanded.
A team of researchers participated in the process for triangulation of researcher
coding and debriefings (Ezzy, 2002; Hay, 2005). Transcribed tapes from interviews
were open coded in which the main issues that emerged were first identified and
coded. These codes were then categorised into themes or recurrent patterns.
Common themes were identified within each of the Bronfenbrenner categories of
scale: microsystem, exosystem (local, regional, state, national) and macro system.
Interview questions used were:
Tell me what helped you during the event?

What sort of things helped you recover after the event?
What keeps you living in the community? Have you ever thought of moving
from this community?
65
Participants
Organisation
Queensland
Health
(Ingham Hospital) (QH)
Local
Chamber
of
Commerce (CC)
Hinchinbrook Community
Support
Organisation,
Public
Housing
Organisation (PH)
Local
Community
Support
Organisation/
Self-employed
agricultural sector (CSO)

Queensland
Police
Service (QP)
Department
of
Communities (DoC)
Hinchinbrook
Shire
Council (HSC)
Participant
Occupations
Director
Nursing/Facility
Managers
President
of
Social Worker
Business
advocacy
Welfare support
Social Worker/Cane
Farmer / Manager and
Social Worker
Welfare support
and counselling
support
Police Officer
Emergency
response
Welfare support
Coordinator
Manager/ Councillors
Emergency Management
Queensland (EMQ)
Local Aged Care Facility
(Canossa Hospital) (CH)
Small Business (B)
Manager
and
Education Officer
Senior Nurse and
Administrator
Small
Business
Owners
Government (MP)
Local
Government
Member
Local
(GP)
Medical
Centre
Flood
Event
Involvement
Health provision
Corporate
and
economic
support
Response
and
recovery
Health provision
Goods
and
services
provision
Community
support
and
assistance
Health provision
Doctor
Table 1 Key Informant Interviewee characteristics
Focus Group
Community Health (inc. Indigenous Health) Focus Group
(HFG)
Low Income Focus Group (LIFG)
Sugar Cane Focus Group (SCFG)
Local Business Focus Group (LBFG)
Youth Council Focus Group (YCFG)
Disaster Managers Focus Group (DMFG)
Emergency Responders Focus Group (ERFG)
Non-governmental Organisations Focus Group(NGO FO)
Real estate representatives (RE)
Governmental Welfare Providers Focus Group (GWFG)
Retirees /Disabled (R)
TOTAL
66
Number
Participants
6
5
9
6
6
8
15
2
2
2
2
63
of
Table 2 Focus Group Participants
Findings
Theme analysis identified several factors as helpful during and after the event. The
themes reported here were reflected in responses of the vast majority of the
participants.
Prior knowledge and experience with floods ensured appropriate

preparedness
Strong, effective leadership by the council and hospital to ensure appropriate
help was available to community members.
Strong cohesive social networks ensured help was distributed across the
community
Commitment to the community by local and national businesses and sense of
place
Prior knowledge and experiences with floods ensured appropriate preparedness

There was a keen awareness from the participants in the days prior to the event that
flooding would occur. Participants began stocking up on food and other essentials
before the event. A number of participants stated that prior knowledge regarding
local weather patterns was enough for them to realise that flooding would occur.
Bronfenbrenners classification of these individual level factors leading to adaptive
coping are clearly essential to response, recovery and adaptation to a disaster. As
noted in the literature (e.g., Smith 2010; Gissing, Keys and Opper 2010) prior
experience with floods and a high level of preparedness is an important factor in
meeting the challenges of the disaster.
Like my mothers generation, I grew up here, and we all knew, we live thirty five
ks out of town and we knew that come to wet season we were going to get cut off
because we do.....we have a bridge across the road, so you stock up your food,
you stock up your essentials, your dry essentials you do all of that, and if the flood
doesnt come, no problem. (SCFG)
And
You know every year there is a potential for floods, people still remember the
1967 floods, the 77 flood, the 83 flood and all that sort of thing so it is very real to
them. So the whole town gears up towards these major events. (QH/HFG)
Supporting prior experience with and knowledge of flooding, clear and timely
communications were very important in alerting residents and responders to prepare
for the flood. Participants relied on the use of technology to find out about the event,
which was supplemented by local knowledge and past experiences. The radio, the
television and the Internet were used extensively. Through the use of the Internet
participants could monitor expected rainfalls and the water levels of local river
systems. Technology was supplemented with more traditional methods such as
physical checks of rivers, and reliance on local word of mouth for some older
residents.
67
Strong, effective leadership by the council and hospital to ensure appropriate help
was available to community members.
The hospital, Mayor, council and essential services such as electricity and water
were reported as exemplary in their leadership and dedication to support the
community, endorsing prior findings (Smith 2010). Their efforts resulted in there
being no reports of undue hardship experienced by community members. These
exosystem functions, amenable to intervention and future policy amendments, were
essential for the wellbeing of the individuals in the community.
A lot of the nursing staff stayed here (in the hospital) for ten days....it was very
humbling really because they had families at home under water quite often but
they were here with us. It was really strong community commitment (QH)
The council here done a mighty job to give a hand in the clean up, to get rid of all
the stuff, they did that as hard as they could to repair the roads. (R)
...even the Mayor like he always kept us informed about what was happening and
even with the water to make sure we were OK so to fill up all our containers so we
got that any sparebecause you know we may lose water. So everybody was
aware of what to expect. (HFG)
After the floods we (the Council) set up particular recovery sub groups to engage
with the community. They covered a range of social and infrastructure
issues...and they wound up by September last year after the flood which was in
February and there was a lot of work done...trying to get financial assistance for
schools ...especially farmers I suppose, but business generally, and that was a bit
of a struggle and it took till about June to get that happening. (LDMG)
...(what helped our recovery was ) the Hinchinbrook Shire officers in charge of the
water treatment plant and the sewerage treatment plant in Ingham. We didnt lose
water... it was extraordinary, they were extraordinary circumstances and they kept
those services for the district. Can you imagine if you had widespread power,
water and sewerage shut downs during that long ten-day period when we were
flooded and isolated? The efforts of the local council staff that were able to keep
water and sewerage going and the efforts of those Ergon Energy operators who
were able to keep the power on for the district most of the time... was just
extraordinary. (MP)
Strong cohesive social networks ensured help was distributed across the community
The community is viewed by respondents as very tightly knit through family and
friend networks and through the Lions Club and other local associations involving
many of the residents. These social networks would be termed mesosystem
connections using Bronfenbrenners conceptual framework. They support the
perceptions and comments of participants of strong loyalty to the community and a
sense of connectedness, echoing findings in prior research (Benight 2004). NonGovernmental Organisations and charity groups provided significant counselling and
financial support to the community. Special mention by key informants was given to
groups such as Lifeline, the Red Cross, the Lions Club, St Vincent De Pauls, and the
local community organisation, the Hinchinbrook Community Support Centre.
...flood time is a really good time for me, it is a very social time, everyone goes
68
around and looks at the water and chats to the neighbours... it pretty much defines
our identity in this town anyway it really does I have never been somewhere that is
so frequently flooded, and is so accepting of flooding. (GP)
Well it is a small town, seventy percent of the town have strong Italian heritage
and the reason I mention that specifically is that there is strong interfamily ties.
Plus in adversity, people tend to have that Dunkirk spirit we help each other,
because we have always helped each other. That really comes to the fore at times
of great adversity here, particularly amongst the hospital community.(QH)
Some people dont ask, some people dont like asking, but there is help there if
you want it, all you have to do is say you need help, and someone will be around
to see what you need doing. (R)
I think having meetings for the whole town in the recovery phase and knowing that
everyone can feed into that it just helps. We learn our shortcomings and we know
how to improve on those shortcomings for the future instances ...I did notice even
among the businesses they were helping each other with staffing if somebody
(shop assistant) couldnt get through to their shop. (HFG)
You cant rely on the government or the council or everyone to look after you, if
youre living in a street and you hear your neighbours well you look after each
other so they do that yeah. (B)
Commitment to the community by local and national businesses and sense of
place
Local and national businesses (exosystem facilities) who were seen as aware of
the needs of the community remained open and available to supply the
community with what they needed even though they were also affected, as
individuals, by the disaster.
I guess I spent a lot of time at the local shop. It was still open. It was quite a good
outlet because you could still get to talk to other people. I think people
congregated at the pub (at Lucinda) or the shop. I guess it was a bit of a social
outlet. Just sharing what was happening in their life at the time. (SCFG)
Coles was actually really good ... they gave us supplies ....they actually opened up
on a Sunday, which they would usually be closed but they opened up for us and
they actually rang and said look we can meet you at such and such come in pick
up what you need and the manager sort of, yeah it was good. (CH)
Residents reported a sense of place motivated them to support the community and
remain there, a finding which was noted in prior research (e.g., Chang 2010;
Chamlee-Wright and Storr 2009; Manning 2005). A conscious and deliberate lifestyle
decision after weighing up the risks seems to keep residents in Ingham, mirroring the
findings of Vogt, Willis and Vince (2008).
But Ingham is a great place to live it is a very good place to bring up kids you
know who you are... its a lousy place if youre a young person who wants to run
amok and sew your wild oats and that sort of mischief, its like a gold fish bowl and
everyone knows what you are up to but its a good town when you have gotten
69
over that stage and raise a family. (GP)

..apart from some people who lost things and get tired of it and complain about it
so many others say oh well that is Ingham and I take them to a house and say this
house is in a flood area and you will find that you have got water about a foot high
underneath in a major flood and they say 'oh thats alright I have lived here all my
life that is ok Im used to that.(RE)
Family connections, even if I had the financial freedom I would still stay. Yes. I
think also because of my cultural heritage umm I have got the connection here.
(HFG)
However, there was some mismanagement of relief efforts noted by the community.
The organisation of the response phase was deemed to be too centralised and as a
result the lack of local knowledge meant that the relief was inefficient; an example of
exosystem functions that should have been devolved to microsystem organisations.
They [EMQ] had some real challenges. Our eldest daughter was moved over to
the SES coordination because she works for the council. It was challenging,
logistically. You had non-locals coordinating the distribution of food to areas they
didnt understand. What we saw in this flood was everyman to himself mentality. I
mean we were flying choppers here when the rain stopped we were taking food
out, my husband was flying, and he said he was frustrated in that he did a trip
from to town to Longpocket carrying dog food and then he would come back to
town and he would be given an emergency parcel of medicine to go to farmer on
the same path he had just gone on. For a couple of boxes of milk an EMQ
chopper, which costs probably 8 or 9000 an hour, to drop a little item. (CC)
The distribution of the State relief funds was also deemed to be poorly coordinated
for those in need and the employees of the government agency.
...well the way it worked I feel wasnt the best way, because we had so many
people sitting in rows of chairs all very traumatised, and the Department of
Housing people, the Department of Communities people, and the other people
sitting at the tables there at the other end of the high tower and these people they
had to gradually, one seat by one seat, move up until they got to the front and
they would shepherd them up to see these people to talk about their trauma. It
was awful... there was elderly people who couldnt walk and you had to help them
move it was just traumatic for them and for myself, and it was hot and it was
steamy. (PH)
The financial relief offered by the State and Federal Governments by way of grants
was greatly appreciated. But when settling claims, insurance companies were
regarded as not supporting local businesses making financial recovery, in the wake
of the global financial crisis, difficult for the community. By contrast NonGovernmental Organisations and charity groups provided significant financial
support to local businesses as they bought their charity goods from them; this
assisted the financial recovery of the community, enhancing the sustainability of the
community (Hallegate et al. 2011).
It all (post-flood insurance claims and business) went down south... so that the
70
loss of those twenty days ...nothing made that up so there was no bounce back no
recovery. You dont only lose that ...theres the replacement of stuff that gets
replaced by insurance companies that goes for about a period of six months...we
are not getting that business, that business was going out of town. ...for me and
my business when we replaced the fridge we know that fridge was in the house
for 16 years so we cant make that again so thats taken a whole slab of business
from my business for the next 12 to 18 to 24 months because all this stuff that
people get new here it was never supplied through our business it was supplied
through Sydney outlets and Brisbane outlets. That will now affect my business for
the next ten years until we get on that rotation again. (LBFG)
I still honestly think we are seeing the combined effect of the floods and the GFC
still here today and businesses are just hanging on by their finger tips. I have had
businesses say to me that they have been in town for thirty years and it has never
been tougher then these past two years. Even the more successful people like
the ----- family, who did the massive redevelopment and put the Woolworths
complex in and updated the Mitre 10... they are locals and they are telling me, we
have never had it this tough. (CC)
Conclusion
Ingham floods regularly but the 2009 event was unusual because two floods
occurred in succession. Residents had just cleaned up only to have to do it again,
causing more distress than in past floods. Despite the differences between the 2009
flood and previous floods, Ingham residents appear to have been well prepared.
Local knowledge, communication technology and social networks were all reported
as being instrumental in assisting residents for a timely preparation for the flood
event. Those historically more vulnerable, the elderly, the socially disadvantaged,
single mothers and newcomers were less likely to be prepared and more likely not to
take heed of locals advice to prepare; they remained complacent in the face of the
unfolding event. This was also remarked in relation to some younger groups who
were perceived to share a culture of help me.
The lifestyle that the residents of Ingham have chosen, a lifestyle noted for being
close-knit, family centred and highly networked, is precisely what seems to have
helped the community recover and adapt. The conscious choices made prior to the
disaster, weighing up potential risks and the lifestyle offered by the community, were
upheld post-disaster.
Strong microsystem connections have been the glue sustaining the community.
Microsystem level factors such as family, friends and neighbours banded together to
help during the event, adding to the perception that there is community cohesion and
cooperation in the community. Highly instrumental to the recovery efforts were
exosystem factors, the community leadership, with the Mayor, Lions Club President,
and other local businessmen taking up active roles. The council committee structure
was established quickly in response to the event and provided leadership to help the
recovery process and establish responsibilities for future events. Local volunteers
groups helped to organize response for coordination of goods, services and support.
71
Charity organisations as well as a government-established recovery centre were very

active and aided the recovery process. Financial assistance by way of grants to
individuals, and business groups, a macrosystem factor, was deemed to be helpful,
though some mismanagement issues were also reported by key informants and
respondents.
Overall, it is unclear whether recovery is complete two years post the event. Various
reasons are proposed for this, including the global financial crisis and the tendency
for insurance claims to be contracted out of the community, leaving local businesses
out of the rebuilding effort. In addition, the reliance on the sugar industry as the
primary local industry placed some additional financial burdens on the community,
especially if those who 'forward sold' were unable to meet contracts. Nonetheless,
the community deemed themselves to be in a better position than the community of
Victoria which was affected by fires a little after the flood events; Ingham passed on
relief money to fire affected Victoria.
Mitigation efforts for future events include renewed building codes and regulation to
prevent new housing from being built in flood prone areas, and also the building of
levee banks.
An issue of great concern was the sense of powerlessness that locals reported
during the response phase of Emergency Management Queensland (EMQ). EMQ
were deemed inefficient because of a lack of local knowledge, and because they did
not consult with locals to improve their performance, refusing to devolve power.
Participants reported a belief that if local knowledge and expertise had been utilised,
EMQs efforts would have been both more effective and efficient.
These criticisms were noted by the local council, who in collaboration with EMQ has
now implemented a flood warden scheme, which will see power devolved to local
community members. They will disseminate information and act as a key point of
contact in the case of future flooding events. There is considerable enthusiasm
within the community regarding these efforts, showing the strong social cohesion and
commitment and sense of place the community has. In all there are enormous social
networks operating in the community, illustrating the mesosystem links between
microsystems.
Respondents interviewed continue to live in Ingham in the face of recognised future
risk of weather disasters because, while financial and economic factors shape their
lifestyle choices, a sense of place and belonging binds them to Ingham, showing the
importance of microsystem factors in shaping individuals decision making.
References
ABC News. 2010, Ingham floods recede but more rain on way [Online]. Available:
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/02/06/2484393.htm [Accessed 7
September 2010].
Australian Bureau of Statistics .2008, Social Trends 2008. Available online
www.abs.gov.au Adams, A.M., Madhavan, S. and Simon, D. 2002, Womens social
networks and child survival in Mali, Social Science and Medicine, vol. 54, pp.165178.
72
Allen KM. 2006, Community-based disaster preparedness and climate adaptation:

Local capacity-building in the Philippines, Disasters, vol.30, no.1, pp.81-101.
Australian Red Cross. 2009, North Queensland Floods [Online]. Available:
http://www.redcross.org.au/QLD/services_disresp_nqfloods2009.htm [Accessed 7 September
2010].
Anderson-Berry, L. and King, D. 2005, Mitigation of the Impact of Tropical Cyclones
in Northern Australia through Community Capacity Enhancement. Mitigation and
Adaptation Strategies for Global Change , vol. 10, pp. 367-392. Springer
Beall , J. 2001, From social networks to public action in urban governance: where
does benefit accrue?, Journal of International Development, vol.13, pp.10151021
Benight, C.C. 2004, Collective efficacy following a series of natural disasters,
Anxiety Stress Coping, vol.17, no.4, pp.401420
Berkman, L.F. 2000, Social support, social networks, social cohesion and health,
Social Work and Health Care, vol.31, pp.314
Boon,H.J., Cottrell,A., King, D.,Stevenson, R.B. and Millar, J. 2012,Bronfenbrenners
bioecological theory for modelling community resilience to natural disasters, Natural
Hazards, vol.60, no1, pp.381408.
Bronfenbrenner, U. 1979, The Ecology of Human Development: Experiments by
Nature and Design, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Bronfenbrenner, U. 1989, Ecological systems theory, Annals of Child Development,
vol.6, pp187249.
Bronfenbrenner, U. and Ceci, S. J. 1994, Nature Nurture reconceptualised in
developmental perspective: a bioecological model, Psychological review, vol.101,
no.4, pp.568-586.
Bureau of Meteorology (BOM). 2009, Herbert River Floods: January and February 2009.
Australian Government.
Bushnell, S., Balcombe, L. and Cottrell. A. 2007, Community and fire service
perceptions of bushfire issues in Tamborine Mountain: whats the difference?
Australian Journal of Emergency Management, vol. 22, no.3, pp.3-9.
Chamlee-Wright, E. and Storr, VH., 2009, Theres No Place Like New Orleans: Sense Of
Place And Community Recovery In The Ninth Ward After Hurricane Katrina, Journal of Urban
Affairs, vol.31, no.5, pp.615-634.
Chang, K. 2010, Community cohesion after a natural disaster: insights from a
Carlisle flood, Disasters, vol. 34, no.2, pp. 289302.
Department of Emergency Services, 2009, Emergency: The official publication of the
Department of Emergency Services. Queensland Government.
Ezzy, D. 2002, Qualitative Analysis: Practice and Innovation. Allen and Unwin.
Fowler, J.H. and Christakis, N.A. 2008, Dynamic spread of happiness in a large
social network: longitudinal analysis over 20 years in the Framingham Heart Study,
British Medical Journal, vol.337, :a2338. doi:10.1136/bmj.a2338
Geis, DE. 2000, By Design: The Disaster Resistant and Quality-Of-Life Community,
Natural Hazards Review, vol.1, no.3, pp.151-160.
Gissing, A., Keys, C. , and Opper, S. 2010, Towards resilience against flood risks,
Australian Journal of Emergency Management, vol.25, no.2, pp.39-45.
GNS. 2007, Flood risk perceptions, education and warning in four communities in
New South Wales, Australia results of a questionnaire survey, 2005. GNS
Scientific Report 2007/30.
Hallegatte, S., Henriet, F. and Corfee-Morlot, J. 2011, The economics of climate
change impacts and policy benefits at city scale: a conceptual framework, Climate
Change, vol.104, pp.5187.
73
Hay, I.(ed ) 2005, Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography(2nd Edition), Oxford
University Press.
IPCC. 2007, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Parry, M.L., Canziani, O.F.,
Palutikof, J.P., van der Linden P.J. & Hanson, C.E. (Eds.). Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
IPCC, 2012, Summary for Policymakers. In: Managing the Risks of Extreme Events
and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation [Field, C.B., V. Barros, T.F.
Stocker, D. Qin, D.J. Dokken, K.L. Ebi, M.D. Mastrandrea, K.J. Mach, G.-K. Plattner,
S.K. Allen, M. Tignor, and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. A Special Report of Working Groups
I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, UK, and New York, NY, USA, pp. 1-19.
Kirschenbaum, A. 2004, Generic sources of disaster communities: a social network
approach, International Journal of Sociological and Social Policy, vol. 24,
no.10/11, pp.94129
Kumar C. 2005, Revisiting 'community' in community-based natural resource
management, Community Development Journal, vol.40, pp.275-85.
Manning, SC. 2005, Riding Out The Risks: An Ethnographic Study Of Risk
Perceptions In A South Louisiana Bayou Community, MS thesis, Louisiana State
University, Louisiana.
Mitchell, A., Glavovic, B.C. , Hutchinson, B. , MacDonald, G., Roberts, M. and
Goodland, J. 2010, Community-based civil defence emergency management
planning in Northland, New Zealand, Australasian Journal of Disaster and
Trauma Studies, vol.2010-1.ISSN:1174-4707, viewed Nov 1 2010,
<http://www.massey.ac.nz/~trauma/issues/2010-1/mitchell.htm
Quarantelli, E.L. (ed).1998, What is a disaster? Perspectives on the question.
Routledge, London
Schafft, K.A. and Brown, D.L. 2000, Social capital and grassroots development: the
case of Roma self-governance in Hungary, Social Problems, vol.47, no.2, pp.201219.
Smith, G. 2010, Lessons from the United States: Planning for post-disaster
recovery and deconstruction, Australasian Journal of Disaster and Trauma
Studies, vol.2010-11, ISSN:1174-4707, viewed Nov 10, 2010,
http://www.massey.ac.nz/~trauma/issues/2010-1/smith.htm.
Tapsell, SM. and Tunstall, SM. 2008, I wish Id never heard of Banbury: The
relationship between place and the health impacts from flooding, Health and Place,
vol.14, no.2, pp.133-154.
Vogt, M., Willis, K., and Vince, J. 2008, Weighing up the risks the decision to
purchase housing on a flood plain, The Australian Journal of Emergency
Management, vol. 23 no. 1, pp.49-53.
74
Across the Ditch

Exploring the Partnership between the Australian and New Zealand
Red Cross in Disaster Recovery.
Kate Brady (National Recovery Coordinator, Australian Red Cross)

Jolie Wills (Community Recovery Advisor, New Zealand Red Cross)
Paper presented at
75
Across the Ditch

Exploring the Partnership between the Australian and New Zealand Red Cross in
Disaster Recovery.
Authors: Kate Brady (National Recovery Coordinator, Australian Red Cross) and Jolie Wills
(Community Recovery Advisor, New Zealand Red Cross)
This paper has been written to complement the ANZDMC conference presentation in April 2012.
Risk is a dominant cultural theme of our age be it climate change, increased urbanization,
population growth, environmental degradation or terrorism. We live in an increasingly risk-prone,
uncertain and interconnected world. While the Australian and New Zealand Red Cross societies
have worked together in a number of ways historically, this new age of risk demands new
approaches. Foremost is the scaling up our partnership in order to leverage off each others
capacities and resources so we can do more and reach further as a Red Cross movement.
Collaboration must be stepped up - the global challenges we are facing demand it, as do the
natural disasters occurring in our own countries. The focus of this paper will be looking at how
the two organisations have worked collaboratively in recent emergency events, following the
2011 Queensland Cyclone Yasi and the February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake.
Background
Australian Red Cross was formed in 1914, nine days after the start of World War I. Red Cross
activities began in New Zealand during the same period. In 1915 New Zealand activities were
consolidated within a single branch of British Red Cross before forming the New Zealand
society in 1931. Both organisations are members of the International Federation of the Red
Cross, and share the movements seven fundamental principles:
Humanity
Neutrality
Independence
Impartiality
Universality
Unity
Voluntary service
The Australian and New Zealand Red Cross societies have had a long standing relationship and
have worked closely together in many emergency events, other than facilitating public appeals
for the others emergency events until 2011 this relationship has almost exclusively focused on
assisting a third party, for example sending personnel to countries in the Asia-Pacific region that
have needed emergency assistance, or working on development projects within the region.
76
Within both organisations, this falls into the scope of the international programs department.
Rarely has this partnership extended to the domestic services program work.
In January 2011, following nearly two months of solid activation as a result of the Queensland
and Victorian floods, WA bushfires and tropical cyclone Yasi, Australian Red Cross accepted an
offer from the New Zealand team to send 12 personnel to assist incident management teams.
From the Australian side, this was a welcome offer resources had started to become stretched
as a result of such a prolonged activation around the country. Andrew Coghlan, National
Manager Emergency Services for Australian Red Cross commented on the offer of assistance.
When we got the call from the Kiwis, it was welcome. We knew theyd be prepared and trained,
and as they were coming from another national society, we knew they would understand where
we were coming from without having to explain the organisational context. Having fresh people
to help at that time was fantastic. It worked well, and we would definitely look at using their
teams in a response again if the situation called for it.
From a New Zealand perspective, it offered an opportunity for personnel to gain international
experience they might not otherwise have had access to. Stephen Manson, Emergency
Management Officer, South Island recalls being a somewhat apprehensive about the amount of
system information the New Zealand crew would be required to learn before they could be of
assistance to the Australian team.
We expected the systems, structures and guiding legislation to be foreign and pretty different
from the New Zealand context, but in reality the structure was about 95% the same, which was
helpful. Their AIIMS structure is very similar to the New Zealand CIMS structure, and the
workplace standards are shared between Australia and New Zealand.
The kiwi crew stayed to assist for 34 days before returning home. Unfortunately, Australia was
given the opportunity to repay the favour sooner than anyone would have liked when the
February 22 6.3 magnitude earthquake struck the Canterbury region of New Zealand, resulting
in 185 deaths, and widespread impact on people, property and infrastructure. The Australian
Red Cross sent 12 personnel with experience in Operations, Media and Communications to
support.
In remarkably similar circumstances to the Australian experience following the 2009 Victorian
Bushfires, New Zealand Red Cross recognised the need to deliver longer term recovery
programmes as part of their domestic emergency management work in response to the
Canterbury earthquakes. Elizabeth McNaughton was appointed to the role of Recovery
Manager in April 2011, and soon after came to Australia to gather information and lessons
learned about the recovery work that had been undertaken there, including the work following
the 2006 East Coast Tasmanian fires, the 2008 Mackay floods and the 2009 Victorian bushfires.
This information fed into initial planning for the New Zealand programme, and three Australian
Emergency Services personnel were sent to Christchurch in the second half of 2011 to support
the start of the Canterbury recovery program while the team was being recruited.
Loren Hackett, one of the Australian Red Cross personnel sent to New Zealand talked about her
experience.
Our main purpose there was to support the New Zealand crew to develop a personal support
program that went beyond their normal response. We were able to offer the systems and
training that we had in place, and to help the New Zealand team modify our tools to fit their
context. We helped pilot the training there and supported Elizabeth with the planning work that
77
she was doing. It was also a good opportunity for us to tell them about some of the challenges
we had faced when we set up the Victorian bushfire recovery team. It can be overwhelming if
you feel like youre on your own. I think one of the main jobs we had when I was over there was
to make sure their team felt like they had support they could call on if they needed it.
In December 2011 and again in February 2012, Australian Red Cross sent recovery personnel
to first support the induction of the appointed New Zealand recovery team, and then to provide
support to staff around the anniversary of the February earthquake. While the intention was for
the Australians to provide support, the information flow was two way and the Australian Red
Cross is currently looking at how they can implement a number of pieces of work being
undertaken by the New Zealand team.
Working together in both response and recovery builds internal capacity, strengthens the
resilience of both organisations and enhances services to affected people.
Principles of a good alliance

There has been a lot of research undertaken regarding partnerships between not for profit
organisations, and may help to explain the success of the relationship between the two
organisations. Ashman (2001) describes effective collaboration as involving:
-
equitable and genuine partnerships that grow out of mutual respect and trust
compatible purposes, strategies and values
a two way exchange of information, ideas and experience.1
In their 2005 working paper for the Overseas Development Institute, Blagescu and Young state
that Partnerships are neither rigid nor static, but fluid dynamic relationships which develop with
time. In practice, there are two main barriers to effective partnerships (i) inequality / power
imbalances, and (ii) the partners internal management systems.2
Unwin (2005) examined the components of successful partnership within the practical context of
ICT4D (information and communication technology for development) project partnerships. Key
practical elements identified as critical for successful partnerships included:
- trust
- a clear focus
- enthusiastic leaders within both parties
- sustainability, derived from ensuring a long term focus
- communication
- transparency and a sound ethical basis3
Such research helps to explain why the partnership between New Zealand and Australian Red
Cross in emergency management has been successful to date. The collaboration is based upon
the same end purpose, vision, principles, temperament and values.
1
Ashman, D. (2001). Strengthening North-South partnerships for sustainable development. Non-profit and
Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 30 (1), 74-98
Blagescu, M. & Young, J. Partnerships and Accountability: Current thinking and approaches among agencies
supporting Civil Society organisations Overseas Development Institute, Working Paper 255: August 2005
3
Unwin, T (2005) Partnerships in development practice: evidence from multi-stakeholder ICT4D partnership
practice in Africa, Paris: UNESCO (UNESCO Publications for the World Summit on the Information Society)
78
One of the main contributing factors to the success of the partnership is the equal relationship
between the two organisations, meaning that there has not been a power imbalance to
overcome.
Relationships have been built between both teams which embody trust, communication and
transparency, and this model of working collaboratively has been embraced enthusiastically by
the leadership on both sides of the Tasman. The power in the relationship has been balanced
as both of us have needed help from the other at different points, and have been able to take
lessons learned and apply them to our own context. The systems that we work within, while
different in some ways, are generally very similar and translation between the two contexts is
relatively straight forward.
Benefits of working together

There have been numerous benefits of working together.
As a movement we have joint policies, standards, guidelines and disaster preparedness and
response tools. Working in partnership allows us to expand on these commonalities. We have
been able to share tools, such as planning guidelines, saving time and resources thereby
making us more nimble in responding to domestic response and recovery needs.
Working in emergency management is stimulating and rewarding, but can also be emotionally
and physically taxing. Robust self-care strategies are required to recognise and manage stress.
Self-care is extremely important in order to be able to best support, as an individual, team and
organisation, affected individuals and communities. Having colleagues from across the Tasman
who are sufficiently removed from the situation, but who have been there themselves and
understand how the team members might be feeling at different stages, is invaluable.
Reminders of the importance of caring for ourselves in order to stay the distance, recognising
that recovery is an endurance feat, have been greatly appreciated.
79
Surge management
This surge management diagram describes a useful way of working together and
conceptualising how two organisations can collaborate to optimise each others capacity to
respond to emergencies.
At the top of the helix is the high level of capacity emergency management services have when
there is no emergency to respond to in their territory. The bottom points represent the position
an organisation is in when their personnel and resources are utilised to full capacity when in
response and recovery phase.
To provide the optimal service during emergency situations, the scenario where when one
organisation has large demands and the other organisation is waiting to respond can be utilised
to best advantage. Considering the similarities in our training and principles, it makes good
sense to collaborate and assist each other during times of high need.
A window of opportunity exists to reflect on each collaborative effort; to jointly examine lessons
learned and to reaffirm the partnership.
The helix has an upward trajectory for good reason this represents the overall increase in
capacity for both organisations as a result of working in this collaborative way, due to increased
opportunity for practical experience and shared learning. Each time a disaster is faced at home
there is a stronger base upon which to draw as a result of the experience of working in the
trans-Tasman context.
From the New Zealand Red Cross perspective, the practical experience and learning
opportunities afforded from assisting during the Queensland floods and Cyclone Yasi increased
capacity and ability to respond to the February earthquake. For example, previously the New
Zealand team had rostered responders according to the number of days they were available,
80
which varied and made rostering difficult. The Australian experience highlighted how efficiency
could be gained by rostering in set five day slots (five on, two off), reducing stress and freeing
up time and resources. This concept was applied with great benefit after the February
earthquake.
This model of working assists both organisations to most effectively respond to emergencies as
well as continuing to build emergency management knowledge and capacity on both sides of
the Tasman.
Exchange of information
With regard to the benefits of knowledge sharing, the old adage two minds are better than one
applies. We can learn and build capacity quickly if we can pool knowledge, skill bases and
experience taking each from the pool what will work best for our own situations.
By both organisations sharing and exchanging knowledge and information openly, we each
improve capacity resulting in an ultimate improvement in the quality of our respective services.
We can review each others guidelines and query how similar situations have been handled
across the Tasman, thereby adding value and improving all we do. Through collaboration, both
organisations can better meet their visions to best serve the populations we support. Ultimately
we both have the same goal in our recovery work to support people who have been affected
by emergencies to cope with the disruption it has caused.
Five examples of where Australian and New Zealand Red Cross recovery teams have
exchanged or are exchanging information are below:
1. Anniversaries
In the lead up to the first anniversary of the February earthquake, the New Zealand Red Cross
was able to add to the information and feedback they were providing to Christchurch City
Council with research from the United Stated States, United Kingdom and Australia by inviting
Kate Brady to the meeting they were having with the council. By providing a neutral, outsiders
perspective, Brady was able to relate stories and experiences from her research internationally
and the experiences she had witnessed in Australia. This input assisted New Zealand Red
Cross to verify the information they were presenting, and allowed New Zealand Red Cross to
easily promote themselves as an access point to international experience and best practice.
Additionally, Brady supported the New Zealand staff and volunteers by providing a briefing
about what they might experience during the anniversary based on her personal experience of
working on anniversaries in Australia.
2. Impacts on personnel who are directly affected in large scale events
As a result of the Canterbury earthquakes, New Zealand Red Cross have experience supporting
their own personnel who have been personally and professionally impacted by an emergency.
While this has happened on a smaller scale in Australia, it has not happened to the extent that it
has in Christchurch and the lessons that staff and management are identifying are invaluable for
Australian Red Cross in planning for this. Should a similar event occur in Australia, we will be
relying heavily on the New Zealand experience.
81
3. Methods of needs assessments

Both New Zealand and Australian Red Cross acknowledge the need for continuous needs
assessments in recovery work, and both understand the challenges that this presents. New
Zealand Red Cross are currently trialing a way of gathering information through their first aid
teams, which is a method that could have direct applicability for the Australian Red Cross in a
similar event.
The New Zealand Red Cross First Aid training team train between 900 1200 people in
Christchurch per month in first aid, and since the earthquake have identified that the course
often raises issues and memories for participants relating to the immediate impacts of the
earthquakes including being injured, seeing people with injuries or assisting people who were
injured. In the first instance, the recovery team provided the first aid team with personal support
training. The aim was to better equip the First Aid trainers for the scenarios where people
wanted to tell their stories.
The recovery team is now planning to partner with the first aid team to gather information on the
views of the Christchurch population about ongoing recovery needs. The Australian Red Cross
recovery team has not used this approach before and could have direct applicability for their
future work.
4. Youth digital projects
Following the 2009 Victorian Bushfires, Australian Red Cross developed a series of recovery
resources targeting young people, including a set of audio files recoded in a radio show format,
made available on pre-loaded MP3 players. New Zealand Red Cross is adapting the Australian
project framework and delivery mechanism to the Canterbury context. The Australian Red
Cross creative initiative has been further extended by the New Zealand team who are
developing an additional smart phone application, with Australias support and input. All further
ideas and gained knowledge will then be available to Australian Red Cross for future scenarios.
5. Bereaved support
New Zealand Red Cross has recently been asked by the Royal Commission to continue the
support of those who lost a loved one in the Christchurch earthquake. To best explore the
possible options to support the bereaved, New Zealand Red Cross will be seeking and exploring
reflections and lessons learned by both Australian Red Cross who were involved in the
organization of support groups following the Victorian bush fires and directly from an advisory
group of the bereaved themselves.
These are only five examples of many for example we are looking to share evaluation
guidelines, lessons from the different funding models we both use, and developing similar
training.
With the freely flowing information comes the flow of ideas. This translates to the ability of both
organisations to be increasingly creative and innovative in our strategies and services.
82
Shared knowledge alters start points, resulting in faster progression for both
organisations
One of the most important benefits of knowledge sharing is the resulting alteration in start
points. Rather than beginning from zero, the Australian and New Zealand Red Cross can pick
up on each others processes, knowledge and initiatives and thereby begin from an advanced
point and build further. This has immense advantages for the organisation which does not have
to start from scratch, and it has benefits for the partner who is sharing their initiative as further
progress is made which can then be capitalised upon in the future.
It should be noted that the overlap between the arrows in the figure above recognises that it
would be inappropriate to directly transfer, in an unthinking way, an initiative from one context to
another. This overlap therefore illustrates the need for consultation with community and
stakeholders to determine whether such an initiative would be appropriate, useful and required.
In this way duplication with existing local initiatives can be avoided. Time is then taken to
redevelop the concept to account for local context and needs.
Where can we go from here?
While currently both organisations are using each others work to transfer ideas and adapt them
for the local context, there is more opportunity to work together on joint projects.
The population flow between the countries is considerable. It is difficult to calculate an exact
number of Canterbury residents migrating to Australia following the earthquakes. Some
estimates of the population flow to Australia from people affected are more than 50,000 456 with
around 3300 people moving in June 2011 alone7. Large scale events, such as the Canterbury
earthquakes, present an excellent opportunity for both national societies to support people
affected by emergencies moving to the other country. We know that our philosophy, approach to
support and training are similar, we have an excellent relationship, and already have a good and
frequent, if informal, communication flow. The opportunity for us to create formal support
systems across the Tasman is enormous.
4
http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/business/6527731/Kiwis-will-return-from-Australia-Key
http://www.interest.co.nz/news/53277/jump-people-leaving-christchurch-mainly-australia-turns-netpermanent-migration-nz-negati
6
http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/population/Migration/IntTravelAndMigration_HOTPFeb12.aspx
7
http://www.news.com.au/world/kiwi-migration-to-australia-hits-record/story-e6frfkyi-1226079403310
83
Another area where partnership provides added strength is advocacy.

The frequency of disasters is increasing. These challenges require a clear direction combined
with new ways of working, new skills, reflection and learning. We need to work together to make
disaster risk reduction a global, national and local priority and to build a culture of safety across
the region. (McNaughton, 2009)8
It is essential to work together to advocate in order to ensure that todays hazards dont turn into
tomorrows disasters. New Zealand and Australia are key players in advocating for disaster risk
reduction and our partnership demonstrates an example of finding new way of working to
respond to this era of risk and the increased frequency of disasters.
Another example of where our partnership could have direct relevance is in promoting
partnerships in developed countries through the International Federation of the Red Cross.
Traditionally many partnerships have formed between developed and developing countries, or
between developed countries who are jointly seeking to support a developing country. In this
instance, the partnership consists of two developed countries supporting each others domestic
recovery operations of comparable size. While this is certainly not an exclusive example of this
type of partnership, the way in which we are working together could have relevance for other
national societies in developed countries.
Conclusion
Given that both organisations are national societies of the Red Cross movement, we share the
same fundamental principles and ultimate goals of our work. The similarity in governance and
organisational structure, common language, similar government arrangements and (while in
many ways different) comparable national cultures, have been helpful. While these factors have
undoubtedly contributed to the success of the partnership, it has taken more than that.
The openness and willingness of both organisations to communicate honestly and to give the
other open offer to ideas, feedback and free access to documentation and intellectual property
has contributed directly to our successful relationship. The need for transparency, trust and the
assumption that both parties have something to offer to the other cannot be understated and is
the foundation to the success of this partnership.
There is genuine respect and trust between the two organisations from the senior leadership
to the on the ground level. We celebrate each others wins, commiserate and dissect the
challenges, use each other to bounce ideas off without fear of looking stupid or un-strategic, ask
for help on big and small things, keep in touch regularly both formally and informally, learn each
others systems and figure out what we can replicate and adapt, offer to review the documents
McNaughton, E. G. (2009). A practical guide to advocacy for disaster risk reduction. Geneva:
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.
84
that no one else will and provide professional and personal support in a line of work that can
often be draining or overwhelming if you feel isolated.
In the truest sense of the often misused line, we are in this together. To date we have shared
personnel, equipment, uniforms, ideas, feedback, contacts, research, resources, meals and
accommodation. If either organisation identifies something that works well, or trials a way to
navigate a common problem, its mutually beneficial to people impacted by emergencies. In this
way we literally become more than the sum of our parts.
For more information, please contact:
Elizabeth McNaughton
Recovery Manager, New Zealand Red Cross
elizabeth.mcnaughton@redcross.org.nz
Jolie Wills
Community Recovery Advisor, New Zealand Red Cross
jolie.wills@redcross.org.nz
Kate Brady
National Recovery Coordinator, Australian Red Cross
kbrady@redcross.org.au
85
Local and Global Responses to Disaster:

#eqnz and the Christchurch Earthquake
Associate Professor Axel Bruns

a.bruns@qut.edu.au
ARC Centre of Excellence for Creative Industries & Innovation
Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia
Dr Jean Burgess
je.burgess@qut.edu.au
Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia
Paper presented at
86
Local and Global Responses to Disaster:

#eqnz and the Christchurch Earthquake
Axel Bruns and Jean Burgess

http://mappingonlinepublics.net/
Abstract Building on innovative frameworks for analysing and visualising the tweet
data available from Twitter, developed by the authors, this paper examines the
patterns of tweeting activity that occurred during and after the Feb, 2011
Christchurch earthquake. Local and global responses to the disaster were organised
around the pre-existing hashtag #eqnz, which averaged some 100 tweets per minute
in the hours following the earthquake. The paper identifies the key contributors to the
#eqnz network and shows the key themes of their messages. Emerging from this
analysis is a more detailed understanding of Twitter and other social media as key
elements in the overall ecology of the media forms used for crisis communication.
Such uses point both to the importance of social media as a tool for affected
communities to self-organise their disaster response and recovery activities, and as
a tool for emergency management services to disseminate key information and
receive updates from local communities.
Keywords: Twitter, Christchurch, earthquake, crisis communication, social media
87
Background
The first months of 2011 were marked by a series of devastating natural disasters,
from widespread flooding in the Australian state of Queensland during January to the
earthquake and tsunami which hit the eastern coastline of Japan in March. The role
of social media in disseminating news of these events, supporting the immediate
disaster response, and tracking efforts at relief and rebuilding, has already been
highlighted by a number of researchers (see e.g. Hughes & Palen, 2009; Mendoza &
Poblete, 2010; Palen et al., 2010; Starbird & Palen, 2010); and in Bruns et al. (2012),
we examine the use of social media by emergency authorities in the Queensland
floods. This paper examines the use of social media, especially Twitter, in another
major crisis: the earthquake which destroyed significant parts of the New Zealand
city of Christchurch on 22 February 2011.
The February earthquake in Christchurch turned out to be particularly destructive.
While it may have been, technically, only a major aftershock (magnitude 6.3) of the
magnitude 7.1 earthquake that had occurred on 4 September 2010, which had
already substantially weakened building structures in the area, the February
earthquake and its aftershocks exacerbated that damage and caused a large
number of Christchurch buildings to collapse. Additionally, the February tremor
occurred at a relatively shallow depth of only 5 km, magnifying its effect on surface
structures. The quake caused nearly 200 fatalities, affected a substantial percentage
of the local population, and has been estimated to have generated some NZ$15
billion in reconstruction costs (Rotherham, 2011).
The earthquake occurred at 12:51 local time, and in keeping with patterns observed
in other recent disasters and other breaking news stories, social media played a
significant role in disseminating early reports and information, including first-hand
reports from affected local residents and journalists. In this paper, we specifically
examine the use of Twitter in this process; here, we focus first on the central Twitter
hashtag #eqnz (Earthquake New Zealand hashtags are brief keywords or
abbreviations, prefixed with the hash symbol #, which users can include in their
tweets to make these messages immediately visible to others following the hashtag)
which fast emerged as the main mechanism for coordinating messages related to
the event.
The rapid emergence of this hashtag, and the relatively limited use of other,
alternative hashtags, is due not least to the fact that the February earthquake
followed on so closely from the September tremor. In the September quake, there
was confusion early on about which of several competing hashtags to choose (with
#christchurchquake, #chch, #christchurch, #nzquake all making an appearance; and
different hashtags being used by different authorities see Seitzinger, 2011 for an
account of the rapid progress of this hashtag war, which saw rapid-fire lobbying of
the emergency authorities by Twitter-savvy locals and observers). Once consensus
had been achieved and adoption by leading accounts had occurred, however, #eqnz
88
became the dominant, quasi-official hashtag for the September 2010 and all
subsequent earthquakes to occur in New Zealand; and further iterations (e.g.
#eqnzcontact, #eqnzaccom) were built on this convention.
In 2011, the conventions (especially the hashtag #eqnz) established in that earlier
crisis remained accessible to local residents and authorities as part of their available
repertoires for crisis communication, and could now be activated again. There was
no need for lengthy discussions over which hashtag to use, and a sense of what
major Twitter accounts were likely to provide important information about the event
and indeed, that Twitter would be a useful communications tool at all was also
already established.
Methods
Our analysis in this paper builds on a dataset of #eqnz tweets which we began
gathering at 13:28 local time (some 37 minutes after the earthquake itself). The
tweets were captured using a customised version of the open source tool
yourTwapperkeeper, which accesses the Twitter Application Programming Interface
(API) to retrieve all publicly available tweets containing specific hashtags and
keywords, as well as capturing various ancillary forms of metadata about these
tweets.
yourTwapperkeeper and similar tools are especially useful for the study of Twitter
discussions which use a consistent hashtag (as is the case with #eqnz), or reliably
contain specific keywords. At its most basic, the study of an individual hashtag
enables researchers to examine the activities of an ad hoc issue public which has
formed around that particular hashtag (cf. Bruns & Burgess, 2011a); individual
studies can later be combined to explore the overlaps and interactions which occur
between these specific publics if bridging tweets contain multiple hashtags. It should
be noted that many other Twitter users may also discuss issues relevant to the
hashtag, but (deliberately, or because they are unaware of it) refrain from including
the appropriate hashtag; in the following discussion, therefore, we make no claims
that what we observe is all the discussion of the Christchurch earthquake that
occurred on Twitter; but it is the most visible part of that discussion.
We processed the dataset using the tool Gawk, with a range of custom-made scripts
that extract key patterns of activity from the overall data (a detailed discussion of
these scripts, and the scripts themselves, are available on our project website at
http://mappingonlinepublics.net/; see esp. Bruns & Burgess, 2011b).
Key Patterns of Twitter Use in #eqnz
First, we established the overall volume of tweets using the #eqnz hashtag (fig. 1):
89
Fig. 1: #eqnz tweets during the fortnight following 22 February 2011
Twitter coverage of the earthquake spikes within the first hours of the event, at about
7500 tweets/hour (or just over two tweets/second) this is the phase when locals
and more distant onlookers alike are likely to be tweeting and retweeting the first
reports emerging from the disaster area, in order to demonstrate their concern, or
simply share the breaking news with their own followers. Within two or three days of
the initial disaster event itself, however, the overall use of the hashtag has declined
markedly. At this point, we hypothesise, the global newsworthiness of the event and
therefore international interest in the topic may have decreased, but the hashtag as a
coordinating mechanism is still valuable for directly affected local users.
Following this logic, the initial spike may provide a very clear illustration of what
Alfred Hermida and Alex Burns have both described as Twitters role as a medium
for ambient journalism (Hermida, 2010; Burns, 2010): in day-to-day practice, it may
be used for largely non-journalistic purposes, but it is ready to spring into action at a
moments notice as a major tool for news dissemination and discussion. The analogy
here is to ambient music styles: there, too, the music is designed to remain in the
background for the most part, only occasionally drawing in the listener for more
concentrated attention.
The sudden increase in reports about an earthquake in New Zealand (expressed for
example by the appearance of relevant hashtags and keywords in Twitters trending
topics) acts as a mechanism to draw the attention of increasing numbers of Twitter
users from around the world to the event even if they are not directly affected by it
90
, and also leads some of them to participate in the #eqnz hashtag itself (if perhaps
only by sharing and retweeting other users tweets), at least for some time. As the
full situation becomes widely known and less novel, however, and as genuinely new
updates become less frequent, these activities slow down. In this, Twitters own
coverage of the event probably does no more than mirror the patterns of news
coverage in other media: during the first hours following the tremor, for example,
many television channels may also have interrupted their scheduled programming in
favour of continuous live coverage, but gradually the volume of news updates from
Christchurch would similarly have declined in favour of restoring a broader balance
of news stories. What remains after these first hours and days of intensive coverage
should be expected to exhibit some markedly different characteristics, then both on
Twitter and in other media.
Fig. 2: percentage of #eqnz tweets containing URLs, (manual) retweets,

and @replies, against total volume, 22 Feb.-7 Mar. 2011
This pattern is also evident in the types of tweets being tagged with the #eqnz
hashtag. As fig. 2 shows, some 60 per cent of all #eqnz tweets during the first few
days of the crisis are (manual) retweets of existing messages in the form RT
@sender [original message], possibly with further comments added by the
retweeting user.1 This percentage declines markedly over the following days, to
1
yourTwapperkeeper does not enable us to capture retweets made using Twitters retweet button,
which results in verbatim, uneditable retweets; these are not included here, therefore. Further, beyond
the standard RT @sender [original message] format for retweets, a number of much less widely
used alternatives also exist e.g. [original message] (via @sender]) (cf boyd et al., 2010). These
91
around 40 per cent by early March, indicating an emphasis on sharing original

information rather than passing along only a handful of key messages. Further, it is
also notable that the overall percentage of tweets containing URLs remains relatively
constant, at an average of 48 per cent over the two weeks examined here: in
combination with the continuous decline in retweets (that is, in messages containing
more or less identical content), this means that the diversity of URLs being shared
increases over the course of this fortnight, indicating that users are seeking out and
sharing a wider variety of information.
Fig. 2 also indicates that over the course of the two weeks, the percentage of tweets
containing genuine @replies (not counting retweets, which constitute a special kind
of @reply) remains relatively steady, if at a relatively low average of 13 per cent of all
tweets. This should not be taken to indicate that #eqnz constitutes a group of Twitter
users who all post individual messages and retweets to the hashtag space, but fail to
engage with one another; however, it points to the observable fact that in many
cases, responses to #eqnz messages no longer themselves contain the #eqnz
hashtag, and are therefore no longer captured in our data. By analogy, by leaving
out #eqnz from their follow-on messages, users who have found one another on the
public forum created by the hashtag are taking their conversation to a somewhat
more quiet space (where they nonetheless remain publicly visible, of course, unless
they resort to using Twitters private direct-messaging functions).
Identifying Key Actors
Taken together, these statistics on tweets, retweets, and @replies also enable us to
identify the most active and most visible participants in the #eqnz hashtag
community, then. Clearly emerging as the most active single account contributing to
#eqnz is @CEQgovtnz, the official Twitter account of the New Zealand governments
Canterbury Earthquake Authority which was established after the first major
earthquake in September 20102; this account alone is responsible for nearly 2500
tweets during the first fortnight after the 2011 tremor, as fig. 3 indicates (amounting
to nearly 180 tweets per day, on average). Other highly active accounts if nowhere
near as active as @CEQgovtnz represent a diverse group of Twitter users, from
government (such as the Christchurch City Council, @ChristchurchCC) to news
organisations (radio station @NewstalkZB, newspaper @NZHerald) and volunteer
efforts for gathering information about the areas affected by the earthquake
(including @eqnz_live, which operated a crowdsourced map of the Christchurch
area) and providing advice to survivors (like @operationSAFE, which offered
guidelines for parents of traumatised children). A large number of the accounts
represented here, however, are run by individuals pitching in to help disseminate
information from major and minor celebrities like New Zealands Next Top Model
have not been counted here. Our data on retweets is therefore likely to underestimate the total
number of retweets in #eqnz.
2
The Canterbury Earthquake Authority has since been renamed as Canterbury Earthquake Recovery
Authority, and now tweets as @CERAgovtnz
92
TV show judge Colin Mathura-Jeffree (@NZTopModelColin) and New Zealand

ocean racing blogger @sailracewin to private accounts.
Fig. 3: 25 most active accounts participating in #eqnz, 22 Feb.-7 Mar. 2011

(total number of tweets, broken down into original tweets, genuine @replies, and retweets)
Activity patterns for these accounts are necessarily varying widely, depending on
their ability to provide first-hand information. While leading account @CEQgovtnz is
a major source of original information, for example (some 80 per cent of its tweets
are non-retweets), all but eight of the second-placed @sailracewins 910 tweets
during the first fortnight were (apparently verbatim) retweets, and the same is true for
a great number of the other leading accounts. Most likely, such users are engaging
in their retweeting activities not primarily with the #eqnz community in mind, but are
instead passing along what they believe to be the most important messages they
have seen within the #eqnz space to their own group of Twitter followers, many of
whom may not also follow #eqnz itself.
They act, in other words, as amplifiers of #eqnz-tagged messages, connecting this
dedicated space for sharing information related to the disaster with their more
amorphous, person-centred networks; in doing so, they serve as a discovery
mechanism alerting their own networks of followers to the breaking news story and
to the existence of dedicated hashtag coordinating the further dissemination and
discussion of news about the event. This retweeting activity is precisely the point at
which news shared on Twitter no longer remains an ambient commodity, passing by
most users without being recognised, and instead turns active, recommended for
greater attention by one or more of the users in ones personal network of Twitter
93
connections. While the retweeting activities by @sailracewin and other similar users
add little new information, they substantially boost the visibility of existing news
items, and the potential for the events covered in those news items to become major
points of attention.
What follows is that the question of whose tweets are shared (as well as responded
to) is important for understanding the information flows of major events on Twitter.
This can be measured by examining the originating users mentioned in retweets and
@replies in #eqnz (fig. 4). Here, news accounts (@NZHerald, Fairfax subsidiary
@NZStuff, @TVNZNews, as well as the Australian @abcnews) and government
accounts (@CEQgovtnz, @ChristchurchCC, as well as @NZcivildefence and
@NZRedCross) clearly dominate the field; @NZHeralds 634 tweets during this
fortnight received over 9100 retweets and @replies, for example (an average of 14
per message).
Fig. 4: retweets of and @replies to the 25 most visible accounts

participating in #eqnz, 22 Feb.-7 Mar. 2011
Mobile telecommunications operators @TelecomNZ and @vodafonenz are also

featured prominently here; both posted widely retweeted advisories on how to
minimise the strain on their compromised networks shortly after the initial
earthquake. Both accounts also received a comparatively high number of @replies
(as distinct from simple retweets), containing both praise and criticism for their efforts
at restoring normal services.
94
Such patterns are broadly comparable with what we have observed in the context of
the January 2011 Queensland floods (Bruns et al., 2012), with the exception of the
predominance of the @NZHerald account. In Queensland, the Twitter account of the
Queensland Police Service (@QPSmedia), rather than a media organisation, led the
field. The prominence of the New Zealand Herald account in this case may point to a
greater level of interest and concern by Twitter users further afield for example, by
the large New Zealander diaspora in Australia , who may be expected to search for
(and retweet) media reports more than advisories from local authorities; additionally,
the online coverage by the New Zealand Herald (and its own use of Twitter to
disseminate this information) also lent itself well to generating such further
amplification. Of the Heralds ten most retweeted messages containing links, four
pointed to pages containing blog-style news update feeds for 23-26 February, two
presented image galleries, and one linked to a special earthquake section on the
papers Website. The most-retweeted @NZHerald messages with links, however,
pointed to external resources: Googles people finder Web application, a YouTube
eyewitness video of the quakes immediate aftermath, and the New Zealand Prime
Ministers appeal for donations. Retweets of the messages mentioning Googles
Web application, in fact, accounted for nearly 2,400 of all tweets mentioning
@NZHerald.
Various personal accounts are prominent for more idiosyncratic reasons:
RT @georgedarroch: Incredible image of Christchurch, from the hills,
moments after the quake. http://i.imgur.com/0vZbD.jpg #eqnz
was frequently retweeted, as were:
RT @anthonybaxter: Google has people finder up for #eqnz #christchurch
http://bit.ly/i0aAle please RT widely
and comedian Stephen Frys message of support:
RT @stephenfry: Oh dear, poor Christchurch. Another horrific earthquake.
http://t.co/S5nL3lq #chch #eqnz http://t.co/plUcmcP
Additionally, while in fig. 4 @operationSAFE appears to have received an unusually
large number of @replies, in comparison to retweets of its messages, this is largely
because one of its messages was widely shared without using the customary
retweet format:
#eqnz The world is with you! Help your family cope with quake stress with
these tips. http://bit.ly/bGneSz #opsafe #DT @operationSAFE
From News to Recovery: #eqnzs Changing Nature
The overall patterns outlined so far only describe the uses of the #eqnz hashtag in
an aggregate form. Fig. 1 shows substantial spikes in Twitter use during the first few
95
days of the crisis, followed by lower but more sustained volumes of activity, pointing
to the fact that the nature of #eqnz as a space for sharing and discussing information
changes significantly over time. It is useful, therefore, to introduce a necessarily
somewhat arbitrary distinction between the first phase of the crisis, unfolding
during 22 to 24 February 2011, and the rest of the fortnight until 7 March. During the
first three days, which also represent a period of heightened news attention to the
disaster, #eqnz activity reached more than 1,000 tweets per hour on multiple
occasions; later, Twitter discussion continued at a much reduced level (or, as is also
likely, diversified into a number of additional hashtags and follow-on conversations
which are not included in our dataset). There was another brief spike above 1,000
tweets per hour in the evening of 1 March, as another major aftershock rattled the
city, but this remains the sole exception.
A comparison of retweet and @reply patterns across these two periods clearly points
to the differences between them (Table 1). In the immediate aftermath of the
earthquake, news organisations, mobile communication providers, and a handful of
individuals sharing first-hand images and advice are central; once this first phase of
the event has passed, emergency and civic authorities become significantly more
important sources of information, with @CEQgovtnz and @ChristchurchCC both in
the top three, while the first individual Twitter user, @NZTopModelColin, is ranked
only eleventh of the most retweeted accounts. The stronger focus on public advice
and information during this second phase of the response is also documented by the
presence of a number of other more specific sources: unofficial earthquake alert
system @nz_quake, Earthquake Commission @EQCNZ, airline @FlyAirNZ, and the
@BritishRedCross. Additionally, the presence of donation site Virgin Money Giving
(@VMGiving), @NZLotteries, @Run4CHCH, and @redandblackday points to the
fundraising and charity efforts which had already emerged during this time.
22-24 Feb 2011
25 Feb. - 3 Mar. 2011

Retweets
@replies
Retweets
@replies
nzherald
5748
713
CEQgovtnz
3349
121
NZStuff
1736
312
nzherald
2227
447
AnthonyBaxter
1590
62
ChristchurchCC
1830
272
TVNZnews
1503
208
NZcivildefence
561
72
georgedarroch
1399
55
NZStuff
532
173
TelecomNZ
1289
592
NewstalkZB
431
43
abcnews
1131
127
operationSAFE
399
547
StephenFry
1094
44
nz_quake
350
22
vodafonenz
1071
559
TelecomNZ
314
163
CEQgovtnz
689
137
VMGiving
277
rgoodchild
577
125
NZTopModelColin
271
128
ChristchurchCC
573
211
georgedarroch
270
NewstalkZB
554
44
NZRedCross
268
207
SocialMedia_NZ
491
26
eqnz_live
240
29
HuffingtonPost
478
25
3NewsNZ
200
28
96
NZRedCross
466
314
EQCNZ
169
25
smh_news
457
13
kalena
156
49
NZTopModelColin
451
97
rgoodchild
155
115
publicaddress
405
41
nz_arukikata
154
ZMonline
380
81
NZLotteries
116
44
sunriseon7
354
91
Run4CHCH
109
79
operationSAFE
305
456
redandblackday
69
101
NZcivildefence
299
506
flyairnz
63
127
safeinchch
168
815
britishredcross
44
174
NZhe
412
tweetbeat
177
Table 1: retweets of and @replies to the 25 most visible accounts

in #eqnz, 22-24 Feb. / 25 Feb.-7 Mar. 2011
These changes point to a fundamental, if gradual, shift in how #eqnz is used: during
the first few days, largely as a space for sharing and commenting on the news from
Christchurch, and involving a greater number of users and, presumably, a larger
percentage of users from further afield. The lack of verifiable geolocation information
for partipating users on Twitter prevents us from assessing this assumption more
thoroughly, but it is also notable that (as fig. 5 shows) the total number of unique
users participating in #eqnz drops considerably after the first few days, from some
20,000 on 22 February 2011 to a base level of 2,500 or less from 26 February
onwards (with a brief spike above that level again on 1 March).
Fig. 5: numbers of tweets and unique users in #eqnz during 22 Feb.-7 Mar. 2011,
and breakdown of tweeting activity into percentiles of more and less active users
It is also instructive to divide the total participating userbase into a number of distinct
groups of more or less active users. While such divisions are necessarily arbitrary,
here we apply the widely used 1/9/90 rule, creating three subsets of the total user
community: a lead group containing the one per cent of most active contributors to
#eqnz (having posted more than 49 tweets over the two weeks examined here); a
97
second group with the next 9 per cent of second-most active users (with more than
seven but less than 50 tweets over the same fortnight); and a group containing the
least active 90% of contributors (with seven tweets of less over the two weeks).
Fig. 5 also shows the respective contributions made by each of these groups to the
total #eqnz tweet stream, and notable changes between the first few days and the
rest of the fortnight are once again apparent. During the immediate information
sharing phase, the least active group of users (two-thirds of whose contributions are
retweets) generate more than one third of all tweets; on 22 February itself, they
account for over 48 per cent of the nearly 50,000 #eqnz tweets, and given the
overwhelming amount of retweets they post play a crucial role in rapidly
disseminating news and updates across the Twittersphere, well beyond the #eqnz
hashtag itself. By 25 February, their contribution has diminished to just over one
quarter, and continues to decline further towards the end of the fortnight.
Correspondingly, the two groups of leading users become more important: at the
end, the top one per cent of most active users posts more than half of all tweets.
In combination with the reduced number of overall users, this may be understood as
a gradual disappearance of more casual onlookers who were mainly sharing the
news at the start of the crisis, but have limited interest in tracking recovery efforts in
similar detail; what is left as they retreat from the conversation is a smaller hard
core of users who continue to use Twitter and #eqnz as an effective channel for
sharing information that may be of relevance only to directly affected locals.
The 22 February 2011 Earthquake in Context
A longer-term perspective comparing the use of Twitter by Christchurch locals and
authorities across multiple crisis events is useful, both to place our observations of
Twitter use during the February 2011 earthquake in context, and to make some
further observations about how the social media system learns over time. The two
obvious points of comparison for this purpose are the first major earthquake of the
recent series, a magnitude 7.1 quake which struck early on 4 September 2010 and
caused widespread structural damage but no immediate loss of life, and the further
major aftershocks on 13 June (magnitude 6.4) and 23 December 2011 (magnitude
6.0). Here we compare the overall levels of Twitter activity after each event: fig. 6
shows the number of unique users participating in #eqnz for each day of the
respective fortnights following the four quakes.
It is self-evident from fig. 6 that the 22 February 2011 quake found the greatest
resonance on Twitter, by a substantial margin; this is also likely to be an indication of
a notably greater participation in #eqnz by non-local Twitter users, especially during
the first days of the crisis. Additional contributing factors are: the magnitude of the
catastrophe (with substantial loss of life, and lengthy rescue operations): its timing
(at lunchtime in New Zealand and mid-morning in Australia, leading to a greater
immediate media response than the September 2010 quake at 4:35 a.m.): and the
98
resultant amount of live coverage on television and in other media. The lower level of
resonance for the following aftershock on 13 June 2011, and a yet lower level for the
quake on 23 Dec. 2011, can be explained in part by the waning attention by
international Twitter users and mainstream media, and by the significantly more
limited impact on Christchurch residents and infrastructure.
By contrast, the relatively low level of Twitter use after the initial earthquake on 4
September 2010 requires further explanation. In spite of the significant structural
damage caused by that quake, Twitter use on the first few days following the
disaster remains comparatively minor (only some 2,800 unique users participate on
4 September 2010 itself, posting 8,200 tweets); however, it increases after day two,
and remains comparatively strong throughout the first week after the disaster. This
may point to a new and rapid increase in community understanding of the value of
Twitter as an additional channel for crisis communication, in the aftermath of the
quake itself a process of adoption which lays the groundwork for the much more
sophisticated and substantial use of Twitter during the following earthquake event in
February.
Fig. 6: number of unique users in #eqnz during the fortnights following the
4 Sep. 2010, 22 Feb. 2011, 13 June 2011, and 23 Dec. 2011 earthquakes in Christchurch
This more limited use of Twitter in the aftermath of the September quake also makes
the volume of activities following the February disaster appear significantly more
impressive: on 22 February 2011, by comparison, nearly 20,000 unique users
participated in #eqnz, generating nearly 50,000 tweets. Indeed, the effects of
experiencing (limited, but successful) Twitter usage after the September quake as
well as similar, widely publicised experiences of using Twitter in crisis
99
communication, including the January 2011 Queensland floods (see Bruns et al.,
2012) and cyclone Yasi should not be underestimated here: it is likely to have led a
much greater number of Twitter users engaging with #eqnz in February 2011.
Beyond these overall numbers, it is also notable that over the course of these
events, a more diverse ecosystem of leading accounts takes shape, and that these
leading accounts are gradually assuming more important roles within the overall
#eqnz communication process. Returning to the three groups of lead, active, and
less active users determined by the 1/9/90 rule, it becomes evident from fig. 7 that
the average daily percentage of tweets contributed by each of the top two groups
during the fortnights following the four quakes has gradually increased with each
subsequent event; this is most pronounced for the top one per cent of most active
users. Where they accounted for an average of nine per cent of all #eqnz tweets
during the 4 September 2010 event, by the 23 December 2011 quake they posted an
average of over 17 per cent of all tweets; combined, the average contribution made
by the top ten per cent of most active users grows from 47 to 57 per cent of all #eqnz
tweets each day.
Fig. 7: percentage of tweets per day by each of the three user groups, averaged over each
fortnight, for the earthquakes on 4 Sep. 2010, 22 Feb. 2011, 13 June 2011, and 23 Dec.
2011
Finally, it is also instructive to examine the comparative performance of the most

visible accounts in each #eqnz event. Here, we focus on those Twitter accounts
which received the most @replies and retweets during each fortnight (a valuable
measure of visibility both within #eqnz and through retweets also well beyond it),
100
and track the relative positioning on that leaderboard of all those accounts which
were placed in the top twenty on at least three out of four occasions (fig. 8). This
analysis again makes visible the relative difference of Twitter communication around
the 4 September 2010 earthquake from the other three events: only five of the eight
prominent accounts which we track in fig. 7 were active during that first crisis at all;
accounts important during subsequent events, such as those of the Christchurch City
Council (@ChristchurchCC) or the Canterbury Earthquake Authority (@CEQgovtnz)
later renamed to the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (@CERAgovtnz)
, either did not exist at all yet, or failed to participate.
By contrast, by the time of the 22 February 2011 earthquake, a clear lead group of
prominent Twitter accounts involving both government authorities, media
organisations, and communications provider @TelecomNZ has become established,
remaining in place also for the 13 June aftershock. The composition of that lead
group changes again in the 23 December event, with news site @NZStuff and the
renamed @CERAgovtnz remaining comparatively less visible, but all of the eight
best-established accounts remain in the top twenty. Newcomers to this lead group in
the most recent event include news-related Twitter accounts @BreakingNews,
@3NewsBreaking, and @BreakingNZ, and the earthquake-specific Twitter feed of
news site Project 7, @Project7NZ_eqnz, as well as the accounts of local electricity
provider @OrionNZ and New Zealand earthquake update Twitter bot @geonet;
should there be yet further major earthquakes in the Christchurch region, it remains
to be seen whether any of the new accounts present in the top twenty during this
latest event will be able to maintain their position, and should therefore be seen as
genuine additions to the Twitter-based crisis communication ecosystem in
Christchurch and New Zealand.
101
Fig. 8: ranking of leading Twitter users by visibility in #eqnz (counting @replies and retweets
received), for the earthquakes on 4 Sep. 2010, 22 Feb. 2011, 13 June 2011, and 23 Dec.
Overall, what has emerged since the September 2010 disaster is a persistent group
of Twitter accounts which will continue the process of sharing and discussing
information in #eqnz even after more casual users cease to contribute to a significant
extent: these leading accounts have become part of the overall emergency
communication infrastructure, and their contributions are made widely visible,
beyond #eqnz itself, especially through retweets of their messages by other users. It
is likely that many users including both directly affected local residents as well as
others elsewhere in New Zealand or overseas with a continuing interest in news from
Christchurch are now directly following a selection of these accounts, or continue
to track the #eqnz feed. Beyond this, the greater awareness of these tools for crisis
communication also means that even users who may have temporarily unfollowed
#eqnz or its key contributors are able to quickly re-follow them in the event of a
further disaster.
102
References
boyd, danah, Scott Golder, and Gilad Lotan. (2010) Tweet, Tweet, Retweet:
Conversational Aspects of Retweeting on Twitter. Paper presented at
HICSS-43,
Kauai,
Hawaii,
6
Jan.
2010.
Available
at:
http://www.danah.org/papers/TweetTweetRetweet.pdf (accessed 8 Jan.
2012).
Bruns, Axel, Jean Burgess, Kate Crawford, and Frances Shaw. (2012) #qldfloods
and @QPSMedia: Crisis Communication on Twitter. Brisbane: ARC Centre
of Excellence for Creative Industries and Innovation, 2012.
, and Jean Burgess, (2011a) The Use of Twitter Hashtags in the Formation of
Ad Hoc Publics. Paper presented at the European Consortium for Political
Research conference, Reykjavik, 25-27 Aug. 2011.
, and Jean Burgess. (2011b) Gawk Scripts for Twitter Processing. v1.0.
Mapping
Online
Publics,
22
June
2011.
Available
at:
http://mappingonlinepublics.net/resources/ (accessed 8 Jan. 2012).
Burns, Alex. (2010, May) Oblique Strategies for Ambient Journalism. M/C Journal,
13(2).
Available
at:
http://journal.mediaculture.org.au/index.php/mcjournal/article/view/230 (accessed 8 Jan. 2012).
Hermida, Alfred. (2010, May) From TV to Twitter: How Ambient News Became
Ambient Journalism. M/C Journal, 13(2). Available at: http://journal.mediaculture.org.au/index.php/mcjournal/article/view/220 (accessed 8 Jan. 2012).
Hughes, A.L., and L. Palen. (2009) Twitter Adoption and Use in Mass Convergence
and Emergency Events. International Journal of Emergency Management,
6(3-4), pp. 248-260.
Mendoza, M., B. Poblete, and C. Castillo. (2010) Twitter under Crisis: Can We Trust
What We RT? Paper presented at the 1st Workshop on Social Media
Analytics (SOMA 10). Washington, DC: ACM.
Palen, L., et al. (2010) Twitter-Based Information Distribution during the 2009 Red
River Valley Flood Threat. Bulletin of the American Society for Information
Science and Technology, 36(5), pp. 13-17.
Rotherham, Fiona. (2011) Quake Rebuild Will Eat into GDP. NZ Stuff, 10 May
2011.
Available
at:
http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/rebuildingchristchurch/4984173/Quake-rebuild-will-eat-into-GDP (accessed 8 Jan.
2012).
Seitzinger, Joyce. (2010) Social media use in a crisis #eqnz which hashtag
prevails? Cats Pyjamas, 4 Sep. Available at: http://www.catspyjamas.net/2010/09/social-media-use-in-a-crisis-eqnz-which-hashtagprevails/ (accessed 28 Jan. 2012).
Starbird, K., and L. Palen, 2010. Pass It On?: Retweeting in Mass Emergency.
Proceedings of the 7th International ISCRAM Conference. Seattle: ISCRAM.
103
The role of insurance in building resilient communities: Lessons

from recent catastrophic weather events in Australia
Paula Claudianos
Charles Sturt University, Australia
Charles Sturt University Masters of Emergency Management

104
The role of insurance in building resilient communities: Lessons from recent

catastrophic weather events in Australia
Abstract
Following the 2010/11 flood and cyclone events, many Australian householders
found themselves uninsured or underinsured. The various definitions of flood
between insurers meant that some claimants were successful in obtaining insurance
payments, while their neighbours were not. Combined with publicised cases of poor
claims handling and a lack of communication with policy holders, the implications
amounted to a broad market failure. This paper highlights the conflict that has
developed between the aims of the National Disaster Resilience Strategy and recent
recommendations by the National Disasters Insurance Review (NDIR) for Federal
Government intervention in the insurance market. This paper explains the
appropriate roles of the public and private sector and role of charitable funds, and
accordingly cautions against the NDIR recommendations to force insurers to offer
flood cover, to establish Government funded premium and reinsurance discounts
and to provide a reinsurance scheme also guaranteed by the Federal Government.
International experience in flood insurance from developed countries similar to
Australia is highlighted in order to communicate lessons for Australian policy makers.
Those lessons are the importance of enhancing resilience through mitigation action
and avoiding the moral hazard that arises through risk transfer to the Government.
Where the national policy objective is the promotion of resilience, it is not appropriate
to distort the risk mitigating effects of actuarially sound premiums. Accepting those
recommendations made by the NDIR will impede the building of communities
resilient to the risk of flood and increase public exposure to flood losses.
105
Introduction
Whilst insurance plays an important role in enabling rapid physical recovery following
a disaster event, it should be viewed as a risk management tool of last resort behind
mitigation efforts. Wherever possible, policy makers should endeavour to reduce the
exposure of Australians to flood risk, before transferring it on to a third party as risk
transfer does not deal with the problem itself, nor does it prevent losses from
occurring, or increasing, in the future. Prioritising mitigation makes sense because it
looks at preventing similar events from causing damages in the future and allows
communities to learn from the past. Despite the logic in the desire to try to avoid
losses before insuring against them, a greater role for the public sector in providing
catastrophe financing is often widely debated following disaster events (ABC, 2012)
This paper reviews this debate following the flooding that occurred throughout
Australia from November 2010 to February 2011 (2010/11 events). While the
Natural Disasters Insurance Review (NDIR) recommended that insurers offer flood
cover, the Federal Government fund premium and reinsurance discounts, and
establish and guarantee reinsurance scheme, this paper considers that combined
with current amendments to the regulation of the Insurance industry and
improvements to flood mapping, a focus on mitigation efforts, strengthened land use
planning and concerted public private partnership to raise awareness of flood risk,
would be more appropriate measures in responding to flood risk. The reason for this
is that it will not encourage resilience, but will reduce incentives on voluntary
mitigation action. An examination of the many reviews and inquiries1 that followed
the 2010/11 events will highlight the existence of gaps and inconsistencies in claims
handling regulations, the problems with the definition of flood, and both the
availability of quality of flood mapping. This paper further argues there is no evidence
of a broad market failure to provide insurance that would justify government
intervention in the market. Beyond identifying the lack of justification for mandatory
cover, a perusal of relevant international experience provides a stark warning to
policy makers seeking a greater role for Government in the flood insurance market.
Where the national policy objective is the promotion of resilience, it is not appropriate
to distort the risk mitigating effects of actuarially sound premiums. Accepting those
recommendations made by the NDIR will impede the building of communities
resilient to the risk of flood.
Summer of Disasters
The amount of natural disasters to hit Australia and the wider Pacific region over the
period November 2010 to February 2011 was unprecedented. The numerous events
Treasury Consultation Paper, Reforming Flood Insurance: Clearing the Waters
http://www.treasury.gov.au/contentitem.asp?ContentID=2039&NavID=; Queensland Floods
Commission of Inquiry http://www.floodcommission.qld.gov.au ; Natural Disasters Insurance Review
www.ndir.gov.au ; House of Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs
Inquiry into the operation of the Insurance Industry during disaster events
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/spla/insurance/index.htm
1

106
overwhelmed not only communities and governments at all levels, but significantly
stretched the capacity of some insurers to respond efficiently and effectively. A
particularly strong La Nia event led to widespread flooding across much of Eastern
Australia. In Queensland all 73 Local Government Areas (LGAs) were disaster
declared. A large number of Victorian and New South Wales LGAs also experienced
long lasting flood events which isolated many communities. Whilst many towns
remained submerged, Queensland was impacted by Tropical Cyclone Yasi. Before
the end of this summer of disasters Western Australia had experienced flood events
in Carnarvon and bushfires in the peri-urban areas of Armidale and Kelmscott. A
significant 58 463 residential and commercial claims were made across eight of the
largest insurers 2 in the period up to 24 November 2011 as a result of the flood
events alone (QFCoI Final Report, 289).
National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (NSDR)
It is widely acknowledged that continuous development in the urban periphery and
on the Australian coastline is placing many homes in locations of increasing
exposure to natural disasters (Smith, 2011; Kunreuther 2009; GPDRR, 2011). This
was most recently demonstrated in the Victorian bushfire events of 9 February 2009
where many homes had been developed/built in areas of unacceptably high
bushfire risk (VBRC, 2010). It is estimated that by 2050, 70 per cent of the worlds
population will live in coastal zones placing more and more homes at risk of extreme
weather events (GPDRR, 2011). Worldwide, the cost of disasters has been
increasing dramatically in recent decades stretching both private and public sectors
in their capacities to respond (Kunreuther, 2009). On 13 February 2011, the Council
of Australian Governments (COAG) released the National Strategy for Disaster
Resilience (NSDR).3 Developed by the Ministerial Council for Police and Emergency
Management (MCPEM), the NSDR is based on the growing understanding that the
cost of financing disaster recovery is increasing at a rate beyond which governments
can guarantee fast and effective recovery efforts (Arnold, 2008). The NSDR is to be
followed in 2012 with an Implementation Plan for moving Australia towards becoming
a more resilient nation when faced with natural disasters.
In the context of emergency management, resilience describes the strength and
ability of an entity, whether it be an organisation, community or individual, to bounce
back from a challenging event or adverse situation. Rogers describes it as a
framework which includes every action undertaken to ensure a swift return to
equilibrium that is more stable than that existing prior to perturbation (Rogers, 2011,
p. 54). Resilience involves adaptability, the capacity to maintain stability in the face
of a natural or anthropogenic disaster (Folke .et al 2005). A prepared community will
be able to bounce back from a disaster event more quickly which in turn facilitates
2
Allianz, CGU, RACQ, Suncorp, Comminsure, QBE, AAMI, NRMA.

http://www.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting_outcomes/2011-0213/docs/national_strategy_disaster_resilience.pdf
3

107
faster psychosocial recovery. When considering resilience, actions taken to reduce

the consequences of a natural disaster, known as mitigation, allow speedy recovery.
The National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (NSDR) defines a disaster resilient
community as one that works together to understand and manage the risks that it
confronts (NSDR, 2011ar 3). It notes that to achieve disaster resilience
communities, individuals and households need to take greater responsibility for their
own safety and act on information, advice and other cues provided before, during
and after a disaster (NSDR, 2011 at 3). A resilient community is one where
individuals, businesses and local government levels are risk aware, prepared both
psychologically and physically for the impact of a hazard event, and have effective
mitigation strategies in place or undertaken mitigation initiatives wherever possible.
Shared responsibility is integral in the move towards resilience. It is discussed in the
NSDR and is based on the understanding that communities must take a more active
role in mitigating the disaster risks they face. Whilst further exploration of shared
responsibility is warranted, the principle seeks to move governments at all levels
towards encouraging pre-disaster mitigation at the individual and community level. In
doing so it aims to reduce the vulnerabilities and post-disaster fiscal burdens
otherwise and increasingly absorbed by governments.
Public/private partnership
The public and private sector both play important, mutually beneficial roles in flood
risk management. The next section outlines the relative roles played by the
Government and private insurers in flood risk management across the areas of land
use planning, flood mapping, risk communication and risk financing.
The public sector plays a particularly important role in regulating land use planning.
The Queensland Flood Commission of Inquiry (the Commission) has made a range
of recommendations to strengthen land use planning in Queensland (QFCoI, 2012).
Numerous submissions to the NDIR and the Commission noted issues with land use
planning that must be rectified in order for insurance to be able to play its role in risk
mitigation (Queensland Board for Urban Places, 2011). It is not reasonable to expect
insurers to offer flood cover in areas where inappropriate development has occurred.
Before resorting to forcing insurers to offer flood cover, Governments must focus on
strengthening land use planning on a catchment by catchment basis.
To enhance resilience both public and private sectors must be involved in improving
risk awareness. Improving the quality and consistency of flood mapping will benefit
both insurers and governments at all levels. With appropriate flood mapping, the
private insurance market can accurately price risk and set premiums to signal the
level of hazard associated with habitation in certain areas (Crichton, 2008). Greater
certainty may reduce premiums or raise them in areas where repetitive losses are
likely to occur. Where local governments work in partnership to prevent ongoing

108
purchases in high risk areas there will be a gradual reduction in community exposure
to flood risk.
The NDIR recommended insurers be forced to offer flood cover to enhance the
uptake of flood insurance across Australia. Yet a wide range of stakeholders
identified a better first step would be to improve flood mapping. The Federal
Attorney-Generals Department is currently working to identify the problems
associated with flood mapping in Australia. The Insurance Council of Australia (ICA)
notes flood insurance coverage is already on track to increase across Australia to 84
per cent by 2012 (ICA NDIR Submission 2011, p 8). In line with this projection
numerous insurers including CGU and AAMI, have announced that they will
voluntarily expand their coverage to include flood insurance. Unlike the situation in
Canada where residential flood cover is practically non-existent, the evidence does
not suggest a market failure to provide flood cover to Australian homes provided they
are not in areas of high risk.
Forcing insurers to increase their exposures to flood is not necessary. Nor is it
advisable to provide insurance to what would be likely to be repetitive loss homes,
just for the sake of increasing the availability of insurance. The Commonwealth
Government needs to keep in mind its commitment through the NDRS to enhancing
resilience. Where there is a clear pathway to improve flood mapping, it cannot be
said that mandatory cover is being recommended as a last resort. Better mapping
will ensure premiums continue to reflect risk and provide appropriate signals to those
considering mitigation.
Governments regulatory role
Governments benefit from the role insurance plays in facilitating community recovery
and must enable the effective operation of the industry through both prudential and
market regulation. To understand the important role government plays in ensuring a
fair and efficient market for insurance, it is necessary to outline the regulatory
framework within which the Australia insurance industry operates. The Australian
Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) and the Australian Securities and
Investment Commission (ASIC) regulate the Australian insurance market.
APRA monitors insurers to check they have retained sufficient capital to meet their
obligations to policy holders. Insurers are responsible for assessing the risk of an
event occurring, and use this information to determine their capital requirements and
underwrite policies appropriate to the amount of exposure they can carry without
affecting the survival of their company (known as the exposure to loss ratio). ASIC
works within the insurance industry to monitor compliance with relevant legislation
including the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) and Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
and Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (ASIC Act).
ASIC investigates and acts on systemic issues as they arise.

109
Within the insurance industry significant players provide disaster insurance under a
range of brands. Insurers, brokerage firms and their agents must abide by the
Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth). All members of the Insurance Council of
Australia must abide by the General Insurance Code of Conduct and must hold an
Australian financial service licences (AFSL) in order to sell insurance.4 Under the
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), insurers, as financial service providers, must be
members of certified external dispute resolution services. 5 The Financial
Ombudsman Service (FOS) is the major provider of these services. It is set up as an
independent entity to assist in the resolution of insurance disputes and to report any
systemic issues to ASIC. Neither ASIC nor the FOS have noted any systemic issues
arising from the 2010/11 events although there may be some issues regarding lack
of visibility of these entities in certain communities (HOR, 2012).
Reports and Inquiries following the Floods
On 4 March 2011, the Commonwealth Government established the Natural
Disasters Insurance Review (NDIR). The intention of Government was to assess the
issues related to current availability and affordability of disaster insurance in
Australia with a view to determining whether changes were necessary. On 30
September 2011, the NDIR submitted its final recommendations to the Federal
Government. The key recommendations included:
the mandatory inclusion of flood insurance in homes building insurance

policies to be subsidised by Government on the basis of on affordability
threshold, and
that the Federal Government offer subsidised reinsurance, set up a
reinsurance and premium discounting facility, and guarantee any shortfall as it
arises (NDIR, 2012).
It is not automatically clear from its recommendations that the NDIR has had
appropriate regard to risk mitigation before resorting to risk transfer.
Having regard to the evidence provided to the NDIR it is disappointing that the Panel
did not follow their own Terms of Reference, which required the Panel to be guided
by the principle that government intervention is only required where there has been
clear market failure, and that mitigation should be a primary objective. 6 Upon
examination of the evidence presented to it, it can only be concluded that this did not
occur. It appears only a selection of evidence provided in submissions informed the
interventionist position taken the final report. The NDIR final recommendations were
based on a market failure that did not actually occur and instead demonstrated a
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), S 912A; ASIC Regulatory Guide 165, Licensing: Internal and external dispute
resolution.
5
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), S 1017G.
6
http://www.ndir.gov.au/content/Content.aspx?doc=tor.htm

110
determination by the Panel to affect structural changes beyond those that were
justified by the evidence supplied to it.
On August 11, 2011 in response to the Treasurys consultation paper, Reforming
Flood Insurance: Clearing the Waters, (Treasury Consultation) the Government
announced steps to: remove the exclusion of the General Insurance Code of
Practice (the Code) following natural disasters, to implement standard definition of
flood, and enhance product disclosure by insurers through a mandatory Key Facts
Statement. A four month time limit has been suggested for a decision on an
insurance claim following a disaster event. In response to both the Treasury
Consultation and NDIR recommendations, in November 2011 the Federal
Government released a further discussion paper seeking comments to be made on
proposed changes by 31 March 2012.
On 28 February, 2012 the release of the report by the House of Representatives
Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs Inquiry into the Operation of
Insurance Industry during Disaster Events also identified problems associated with
claims handling as a significant cause of consumer discontent following the 2010/11
Flood events. A series of recommendations have been made and steps underway to
remove the exclusion of the Code of Conduct following natural disasters. Further, a
lack of adequate communication has been identified and accepted by the insurance
industry as requiring improvement.
The evidence provided to the Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry (the
Commission) does not demonstrate a market failure to provide insurance but further
confirms HOR Inquiry findings that the 2010/11 events highlighted issues in claims
handling, flood definition, flood mapping and land use planning. When the
Commission released its final report on 16 March 2012, it acknowledged it did not
receive sufficient evidence from claimants to make broad conclusions on the
performance of the industry. However it acquired statistics from insurers and was
able to reflect the reality relating to timeframes for claims processing. Testimony
provided to the Commission demonstrated instances of poor communication with
policyholders (QFCoI, 2011, p. 4559). Despite these issues, the Commission noted
that evidence provided by insurers was contradicted media representations of
significant delays (QFCoI, 2012 at 296). The majority of claims were efficiently dealt
with within 2-3 months. The Commission acknowledged current steps to remove the
exclusion of the Code of Conduct following disasters will enhance communication
and other claims handling issues.
Convincing the public that it is unnecessary to intervene in the market will be difficult
with the media portraying a situation of market failure. It cannot be said that the
media has provided balance to the debate surrounding the performance of the
insurance industry following the 2010/11 events (Roberts, 2011). Given the role of
governments in regulation of this industry, it has become yet another political issue
to be debated in advance of elections in a number of Australian jurisdictions. Yet
111
neither ASIC nor the FOS have been inundated with complaints raising systemic
issues. 7 The key message of the FOS is not of broad market failure requiring
government intervention, but that early and ongoing communication by insurers with
their policyholders would significantly reduce the level of complaints (FOS, 2011).
Definition of flood
Variations in the definition of flood between insurers encouraged public perceptions
of market failure following the 2010/11 events. Whilst it is comparatively easy to
identify where a bushfire has destroyed a home, it is more difficult to identify whether
damage has been caused by flood or storm waters. Decisions are often time
consuming, may require expert advice and may take many months to be challenged
in internal and external dispute resolution processes. The Federal Government
proposed standard definition when implemented, should eliminate variation in claims
decisions where policyholders have flood cover with different insurers. As noted by
the FOS, there will continue to be disagreements between whether an event itself is
a flood or a storm (HoR, 2011). A measure of media understanding is necessary to
identify that this is not a reflection of a broader systemic issue or market failure
requiring a Government role in providing subsidised insurance, but a result of the
similar nature of flood and storm events.
The evidence provided to the many reviews and inquiries established over the past
year have not proven a market failure occurred. They have demonstrated issues with
claims handling and the definition of flood. Work is underway to resolve these issues
and policymakers must give the changes time to have an effect before considering
last resort market intervention.
Rationale for avoiding intervention
The proposal that the Federal Government should finance reinsurance and offer
wide premium subsidies would involve it taking on an unacceptable level of moral
hazard. Moral hazard occurs where one party insulates another to some extent for
the negative consequences associated with a particular risk. In this case the
consequences of living in high risk areas are insurance premiums or disaster losses.
By reducing the negative consequences of habitation in these areas, the Federal
Government would be diminishing incentives on mitigation action.
Although the Federal Government could provide the financial backing to enable
speedy recovery, this would do nothing to prevent a growing dependency on postdisaster assistance. This position, which the head of the NDIR, John Trowbridge, is
advocating widely in the media, is not in the long-term interests of Australia
(Thompson and Solomons, 2012). It is also in contrast to international moves
towards more equitable catastrophe risk sharing by governments and communities.
7
According to information received by the FOS on 25 January 2012, until November 2011 there had been a
total of 900 natural disasters related disputes.

112
The NDIR founded their position that all insurers should offer flood cover, on the
basis of what they termed as a consumers disaster insurance paradox. That is,
that if other perils are currently covered, floods should also be covered (NDIR, 2011,
p 2). Insurers must set their premiums on the basis of annual average loss
expectancy (AAL) for each exposure therefore this argument is not persuasive.
Instead it demonstrates a simplistic view of how insurance works. As Clark notes,
the insurance industry needs to be able to achieve a reasonable management of the
environmental risks that it covers by controlling the number and size of flood claims
to which it is subject (Clark, 1998 p. 336). There are strong reasons why floods are
not treated as other risks. Globally between 1970-1994 storms and floods were
responsible for over 90 per cent of total economic costs of extreme events
(Kunreuther et al, 2009). By 2001, flood amounted to approximately 29 per cent of all
natural hazard damage making it the most costly Australian hazard (Bureau of
Transport Economics, 2001).
Kunreuther and Pauly have argued that bundling exposures into insurance contracts
may raise the perceived probability of loss threshold sufficiently to encourage greater
uptake of insurance. They argued for this solution by demonstrating that unbundled
premiums for certain events are often perceived to be at rip-off levels and are
avoided by consumers (Kunreuther and Pauly, 2004, p. 18). However, the negative
implications of mandatory bundling of flood cover would outweigh any potential
increase in consumer incentive to insure. Forcing insurers to offer flood cover may
have negative long-term implications for policyholders. Where insurers have not
already exited the market an event may lead to insolvency due to overexposure.
Additionally the costs of obtaining sufficient capital where insurers may be
overexposed are likely to be passed on to consumers. Where the Government
provides discounted and guaranteed reinsurance, it will be taxpayers who suffer the
financial risk of these increasing exposures.
According to Kunreuther, the effect of mandatory offering of flood cover is likely to be
a reduction in the overall supply of insurance (Kunreuther et al. 2009). This would be
likely to reduce competition in the market (Kunreuther et. al, 2009). Where the supply
of insurance is low, it is more difficult to classify a community as resilient as there will
be less liquidity available for accelerated recovery (Smith, 2011). It might not be a
problem for larger insurers to be forced to offer flood cover, but for the smaller
entities, the risk of remaining in the market may be too high. When the Florida
legislature intervened to force insurers to continue to offer Hurricane insurance
following Hurricane Andrew in 1992, the result was a mass exodus from the market
(McTigue, 2007). Even for larger insurers the likely concentration of policies in
hazard prone geographical areas combined with the known difficulty of calculating
probability of loss for flood risk would lead to increased prudential concerns.
Government subsidies

113
Subsidies should be avoided as they prevent price signals from operating effectively
ad for habitation in high risk zones (Midelmann, 2008). The NDIR proposed a system
of flood subsidies based on an affordability threshold that would be phased out over
time. However, Australia is likely to struggle similarly to how the United States has
when it comes time to encourage politicians to remove them. The eventual reduction
of subsidies will inevitably be highly unpopular and well publicised. The NDIR has
been unable to put forward any firm timeline of when these subsidies would be
phased out apart from stating that they would be reviewed from time to time.
Although the Australian Institutes of Actuaries (AIA) conceded a set of premium
subsidies may be necessary as a temporary measure, international experience
provides some insight as to the difficulties associated with their removal.
Research has already shown that homeowners largely fail to mitigate losses due to a
general inability to justify the upfront costs relative to the perceived benefits
(Kunreuther et al, 2009). Lowering the price of insurance further reduces the
incentives for voluntary mitigation action as the perceived cost of inaction will be
even lower. When it comes to premiums, there are sound reasons why they may be
are unaffordable in some areas. The appropriate role of insurance in enhancing
resilience comes down to a question of policy objectives. As there has not been a
persuasive case for market failure, Policymakers aware of the need to enhance
resilience, should avoid subsidies in favour of mitigation efforts.
International Experience
Although NDIR representatives have noted most developed countries have some
form of government insurance mechanism, international experience is actually more
mixed. Rather than moving towards greater government adoption of catastrophe risk
many countries have been working in recent years to reduce their involvement and
growing exposures in favour of moves towards mitigation and self reliance (Klein,
2009). States such as Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom and Italy, have
significant flood risk, but retain a private market model.
When the Association of British Insurers (ABI) entered into a Statement of
Principles agreement with the British Government, it was to provide standard flood
cover in exchange for effective public floodplain management (Niels, 2011). The
United Kingdom faces a policy crossroad where in 2013 this Agreement expires.
Since 2000 the Agreement has ensured flood insurance has been widely affordable
and available for houses that do not face significant (1 in 75 year) flood risk.
However, it is highly unlikely to be renewed. Recently the ABI announced the
Agreement massively distorted the system of flood insurance resulting in problems
such as overexposure by certain insurers and inequitable levels of cross
subsidisation (ABI, 2012). Noting that the Government had not taken adequate
action to address flood risk or maintain flood protection infrastructure, the ABI have
declared they will not renew the agreement when it expires.

114
Although the Canadian Government provides post disaster relief similarly to the
Australian Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements (NDRRA), there is no
provision of insurance for overland flooding for households (Sandink et al, 2010), .
Canada has in recent years experienced increases in the cost of natural disasters
and is moving to reduce post-disaster reliance on government financing (Hwacha,
2005). Swiss Re has called for a public-private partnership approach where the
Government improves public flood risk awareness and mitigation efforts whilst the
private sector insures against all but the highest risk homes. Swiss Re has
acknowledged however, there will be some cross subsidisation. The success of the
scheme would be dependent on the Government acting to fulfil its role in raising
awareness in a way the British Government was unable or unwilling to (Sandink et
al. 2010).
The United States experience is particularly relevant for Australia as it demonstrates
the challenges associated with national subsidies and forcing insurers to offer flood
cover. Long running issues surrounding the United States National Flood Insurance
Programme (NFIP) should provide caution to those advocating for greater
government intervention in the insurance industry. The United States had the
greatest worldwide proportion of disaster losses over the 1970-2004 period and
faces significant annual flood risk (Kunreuther, 2009). In 1968 the United States
legislated to provide for the NFIP as it perceived a market failure in the provision of
affordable flood cover. Although a key aim of the NFIP is to reduce the overall cost
on the taxpayer and encourage mitigation action, the program has had to borrow
heavily from the Federal treasury. There is some evidence that it has reduced annual
rebuilding costs by $1 billion per year through building code reforms etc, however the
level of successful mitigation is contested and uptake of flood insurance remains
extremely low (McTigue, 2007). Since its inception the United States Congress has
struggled to lift premiums to a level that would encourage voluntary mitigation action
or discourage inappropriate habitation of high risk areas (Smith, 2011).
Following Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the United States Government Accountability
Office (GAO) published a report acknowledging the extensive problems with the
NFIP (GAO-06-174T, 2005). The Fund is not self-sufficient, is not actuarially sound
and pays significant amounts out to repetitive loss homes. The United States
Congress passed the Bunning-Bereuter Blumenauer Flood Insurance Reform Act
(2004) in an attempt to build greater resilience into the NFIP. 8 It mandated that
severe repetitive loss homes should be elevated, relocated or demolished or face
higher premiums. These homes account for 1% of all insured homes under the
program yet amount to 25-30% of total costs (GAO-06-174T, 2005). Incredibly some
of the original homes that received initial subsidies following the implementation of
the NFIP in 1968 were still in 2005, draining federal resources as repetitive loss
properties (GAO-06-174T, 2005). Over the past 40 years it is clear that United States
PL 108-264.

115
policymakers have learned that key to successful flood risk management is a strong
primary commitment to mitigation.
At a state level the anti-competitive Government intervention in the Florida market for
Hurricane insurance demonstrates the negative effects of over-regulation. Following
Hurricane Andrew the Florida State Government enacted a law to prevent insurers
from exiting the market (McTigue, 2007). A pro-intervention culture developed which
has allowed the issue of insurance to become crucial to political candidates during
recent elections. In recent years Florida regulators have increasingly intervened in
the market to deny requests by insurers for premium increases. They have also
sought to prevent insurers from isolating their Florida business from the national
market (Kunreuther, 2006). This is clearly a pathway Australian policymakers should
avoid.
The differences in international approaches may be explained as a matter of policy
objective or dominant national philosophy. Klein has noted the link between
philosophies underpinning regulatory systems and their treatment of risk financing
(Klein, 2009). In countries such as the United States, governments play a large role
in providing flood insurance. It appears that the dominant philosophy prioritises
short-term solutions to flood in widely available and affordable protection for homes
and businesses above the implementation of less popular mitigation strategies
towards the creation of resilient communities. As Kunreuther notes, This
combination of underinvestment in protection prior to the event and liberal use of
taxpayers funds after a disaster does not augur well for the future (Kunreuther,
2009). There may be scope for greater regulation of the insurance market in
Australia however if the nation is committed to advancing flood resilience, reforms
must not diminish incentives on mitigation action. Instead policy makers must push
towards greater shared responsibility for risk mitigation and better land use planning
by local governments, businesses and individuals.
International experience with increased government risk transfer for catastrophe
financing begs the question as to why the NDIR has failed to adequately emphasise
the importance of mitigation. While the United States tries to turn back the clock on
its highly distorted system of public flood insurance and the United Kingdom faces
the dissolution of its public-private partnership with its domestic insurance industry,
Australia has the opportunity to avoid such mistakes. Even one of the largest global
reinsurers, Lloyds of London, has cautioned Australian policymakers to keep market
intervention to a minimum (Hartge-Hazelman, 2011).
Instead the Federal Government must identify those properties in the most high risk
areas and target local, state and federal resources into reducing exposure through
elevation or relocation programs. Risk Frontiers has recently estimated that there are
approximately 59,439 residential properties in high risk areas throughout

116
Queensland (Risk Frontiers, 2011).9 With the NSDR firmly focusing public policy in
the direction of reducing exposures, it is critical that governments demonstrate a
genuine commitment to actions that will reduce the risk of loss associated with these
homes. The benefit of mitigation actions is well demonstrated by a 2009 UK study
which found building back better/more resilient (resilient reinstatement) flood affected
homes in Cockermouth region cost an average of 34% more. Yet it also found that
upfront investment would be recouped following a single flood event (Rotimi, 2009)
Alternative risk transfer mechanisms
When in 2004, some authors for the OECD advocated for national catastrophe
programs, it was claimed that Governments have deep credit capacities and are the
most logical entity to bear the risk of disaster losses. Since that time a Global
Financial Crisis (GFC) has reduced the availability and increased the cost of capital.
Further, the credit rating of many sovereign nations has been downgraded and in
this economic climate it cannot be so easily assumed that Governments should be
the logical entity to bear the financial risk of natural catastrophes. Particularly in
relation to the recommendation by the NDIR for the Federal Government to act as a
reinsurance facility there are many reasons why it is not appropriate for it to take on
endless financial risk. Blanchard noted in 1917;
Each reinsurer limits the risk which it will assume in order that its own stability
may not be threatened, and requires the original insurer to retain a certain part
of the risk to promote careful selection. The amount ceded to any other single
company depends on the judgment of the reinsurer and the reinsured as to the
risk which can be carried safely (Blanchard, 1917).
The Federal Government is not a bank and it is not prudent to consider resolving the
challenge of catastrophe risk financing through risk transfer to it via reinsurance. Just
as a private reinsurer must limit its risk, so should the Federal Government, so as not
to threaten its own stability.
In this context the role of catastrophe bonds should be explored as a means of
assisting the private insurance market without distorting it, and without threatening
fiscal stability. The rising cost of capital caused by recent natural disasters may open
the door for a catastrophe bond market to flourish in Australia. Catastrophe bonds
were created after Hurricane Andrew where 11 insurers found themselves
overexposed and insolvent (Lewis, 2007). Catastrophe bonds transfer the risk of
natural disasters to investors, who receive a yield in return for agreeing to cover
damages they consider unlikely. (Perry, 2011) Cat bonds as they are known, allow
reinsurers to diversify their risk in broader capital markets and have increased the
capacity of insurers to operate in highly disaster prone areas such as the United
States Gulf Coast (Ward, 2011).
High risk is defined as those with ARI (average recurrence interval) under 100 years.

117
Following the 2010/11 events reinsurance prices have increased significantly. These
prices may return to reasonable levels however if they do not, they may create the
necessary demand for a cat bond market. Cat bond expert John Seo has noted
reinsurance in Australia and New Zealand has until recently been available at
bargain rates (Ward, 2011). Although prices for reinsurance have increased,
whether this indicates a lack of capacity sufficient to trigger the development of a cat
bond market in Australia is yet to be seen. The extent to which risk-linked securities
can alleviate problems of capital requirements on insurers following catastrophic
events is subject to finding willing investors and, being able to price the probability of
default. The Australian Institute of Actuaries (AIA) has noted that the Federal
Government should consider investing in catastrophe bonds (AIA, 2011). Global
reinsurers have called for Australia to turn to catastrophe bonds instead of one off
flood levies (Perry, 2011). The potential benefits to be gained from the development
of a cat bond market suggest further investigation by public and private sectors of
alternative risk transfer mechanisms is warranted.
The impact of charitable relief on resilience
Any discussion of public and private roles in catastrophe financing must include the
role charitable funds play in the promotion of resilience. Whilst in the short term
these funds have enabled a form of resilience in assisting rapid community recovery,
they do not encourage the uptake of insurance or individual responsibility in the long
term (McTigue, 2007). Following the 2010/11 floods approximately $276 million was
raised to assist those most in need including $22 million from State and Federal
Governments10. A sliding scale of need was created by Price Waterhouse Coopers
which identified that those without insurance were most in need. As a result of the
method of determining need there were occasions where those who had not paid
any flood insurance were provided, without any excess payable, with greater
assistance than those who were insured, yet who may not have had an adequate
sum insured.
The Federal Government also provided a range of personal hardship grants, and
other forms of assistance to flood affected individuals. Although Governments must
play a role in protecting the most vulnerable in society, this must be done in a way
that does not embed dependence by rewarding the failure to take up flood insurance
or undertake mitigation actions. Where homeowners know that regardless of whether
they take out insurance they will be compensated, charity assistance presents a
danger of creating a culture of dependence as opposed to resilience.
Creating a risk aware society
Both insurers and Governments have a role to play in creating a resilient risk aware
society. Homeowners are known to have difficulty in opting for even the most
10
In addition to the $7 billion cost of infrastructure recovery to be provided by State and Federal Governments
through the Natural Disasters Relief and Recovery Arrangements (NDRRA)

118
affordable cover for low-probability high-risk events. Kunreuther hypothesised that

this was due to the transaction costs associated with finding out the true probability
of an event occurring (Kunreuther, 2004). Evidence provided to the Commission
demonstrated even where some homeowners had sought Floodwise reports before
purchasing their homes, their ability to appreciate the real level of hazard was not
guaranteed (QFCoI, 22 September, 2011). The Key Facts Statement and
establishment of a flood risk information portal are likely to reduce the amount of
claims based on inadequate disclosure and improve the uptake of flood insurance.
However to enhance resilience information on flood risk must be clear and in plain
English.
The capacity of insurers to provide relief following disasters is dependent on
consumers accurately understanding the risks they face. The reality is the perceived
risk of a hazard capable of encouraging mitigation action is not well correlated to
actual risk (Clark, 1998). Evidence also demonstrates homeowners commonly opt
for the cheapest premium without properly considering the exclusions (Kunreuther,
2006) and without seeking information on the risks associated with living in a
particular area (Huber and Wider 1997). Encouraging preparedness depends upon
lowering the transaction costs associated with acquisition of information and
ensuring that information is unambiguous. To enhance resilience governments at all
levels must invest in communicating to individuals that they have a shared
responsibility to be informed of relevant hazards in their areas and take out
appropriate insurance.
The role of local government in enhancing resilience
As discussed above issues with land use planning must be addressed before resort
it made to forcing insurers to offer flood cover, or the Federal Government to provide
a set of premium subsidies. It is inequitable for local governments to be able to
approve developments without proper consideration of flood risk, and then to blame
insurers when a disaster event occurs. Local councils have a significant role to play
in ensuring the buildings have been built in appropriate locations to minimise flood
losses. Submissions to the NDIR in addition to submissions and testimony provided
to the Commission outlined examples of the failure of certain councils to adequately
plan land use or, properly consider the impacts of development on flood risk levels
for those in downstream areas (QFCoI, p 4567). The Queensland Board for Urban
Places called for more place appropriate building in order to enhance preparedness
and resilience (QBUP, 2011 p. 1). It is not appropriate for the Federal Government to
subsidise risks created by local councils through inappropriate development of the
floodplain.
Internationally New Orleans is an example of a city that has worked hard to create
green corridors where human habitation in high risk areas is prevented thereby
reducing its exposure to loss of life. In 1990 Sweden tied liability for flood losses was
to the local Councils who had approved development applications. As a result in the
119
flood events of 2000 no damage occurred to buildings erected with permits allocated
post the 1990 amendments. Similarly in Scotland, councils work together on a
catchment basis and may be held responsible for poor land use planning decisions.
In order for there to be greater equity in the sharing of risk and appropriate incentives
on mitigation, legislative amendments need to put a greater legal obligation on local
councils to better assess the potential current and future flood risk associated with
development. Where there has been a clear failure to consider aspects of flood plain
risk management such as zoning, minimum floor levels, levees and other
infrastructure, there should be an avenue for the local council or developer, to be
liable as in Sweden. This would ensure a greater responsibility is undertaken by
those creating the risk by tying the negative consequences of disaster recovery
financing to the action creating the vulnerability.
Conclusion
As individual disaster events such as Hurricane Katrina have exceeded $100 billion
in costs, the challenge of deciding who should bear the risk of catastrophe financing
is not faced by Australia alone. Insurance is one of many risk management
strategies that allow communities to rebuild following a disaster event and premiums
can deter inappropriate habitation. However it should never be seen as a panacea to
the risk of natural disasters. If Australia is committed to enhancing resilience as a
priority through the NSDR, the Federal Government should not take on the risk of
financing catastrophe risk as advocated by the NDIR. Certainly both the United
Kingdom and United States experiences intervening in the market have not led to the
development of resilient communities.
The Australian policy agenda now appears set to split in two opposing directions,
one leading towards and the other against enhanced resilience to extreme weather
events. An examination of some of the recommendations made by the recent NDIR
demonstrates the crossroads at which Australia currently stands. Proposing the
compulsory offering of flood cover by insurers, the implementation of a system of
premium subsidies and calls on Government to act as a reinsurer will discourage
competition within the insurance market and prevent premiums from accurately
reflecting risk.
The appropriate role of the Federal Government in insurance is not to provide
subsidies to most medium and high risk homes or to force insurers to offer flood
cover. To enhance resilience the Federal Government must work with insurers to
provide better mapping, enhance the regulatory framework within which insurance is
provided, and to commit appropriate funding towards mitigation. Strengthened land
use planning and a re-evaluation of how charity assistance is provided will also
enhance resilience by ensuring that those creating flood risk or failing to reduce flood
risk are not rewarded.

120
Bibliography
ABC News, Bligh Open to Insurance Rethink, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-01-15/blighopen-to-insurance-rethink/1905950, 15 January 2011 (Retrieved 9 April 2012).
Arnold, M., 2008, The Role of Risk Transfer in Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change
Adaptation. Provention Consortium.
Association of British Insurers, 2012, From Aberconwy to York, Boston to Widnsor ABI
Highlights the Serious Flood Risk Facing Communities in England and Wales, Media
Release, 31 January 2012 http://www.abi.org.uk (Retrieved 8 February, 2012).
Blaikie, P., Cannon, T., Davis, I., and Wisner, B., 1994, At Risk - Natural Hazards, People's
Vulnerability, and Disasters, Routledge, London.
Blanchard, R. H., 1917, Insurance of the Catastrophe Hazard, Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 70, pp. 220-226.
Clark, M. J., 1998, Flood Insurance as a Management Strategy for UK Coastal Resilience,
The Geographical Journal, Vol. 164, No. 3, pp. 333-343.
Consumer Action Law Service and Insurance Law Service, 2011, A Fair Go in Insurance,
Media Release 11 February, 2011. www.consumeraction.org.au/downloads/2011-MRAFAIRGOININSURANCE-010211.pdf, (Retrieved 12 May 2011).
Financial Ombudsman Service, 2011, 2010-11 Annual Review,
http://fos.org.au/annualreview/2010-2011/PDF/FOS-AR2010-2011.pdf, (Retrieved 24
January 2012).
Floodplain Management Association, 2011, Submission to Natural Disasters Insurance
Review,
http://www.ndir.gov.au/content/submissions/issues_paper_submissions/Floodplain_Manage
ment_Association.pdf (Retrieved 2 September 2011).
Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2011, Chairs Summary, Global Platform for
Disaster Risk Reduction and World Reconstruction Conference, 3rd Sess. Geneva, 8-13
May 2011. http://www.preventionweb.net/globalplatform/2011/, (Retrieved 10 December
2011).
Grace, M.F., 2004, Homeowner's Insurance with Bundled Catastrophe Insurance. The
Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 71, No. 3, pp. 351-379.
Hartge-Hazelman, B., 2011, Australia's Insurance Risk Reassessed, Australian Financial

Review, 25 July 2011.
Hwacha, V., 2005, Canadas Experience in Developing a Natural Disaster Mitigation
Strategy: A Deliberative Dialogue Approach, Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global
Change, Vol. 10, pp. 507-523.

121
Insurance Council of Australia, 2011, Submission to Natural Disasters Insurance Review,

http://www.ndir.gov.au/content/submissions/issues_paper_submissions/Insurance_Council_
of_Australia.pdf (Retrieved 10 August 2011).
Ikeda, S., Sato, T., Fukuzono., T., 2008, Towards an Integrated Management Framework for
Emerging Disaster Risks in Japan, Vol. 44, pp. 267-280.
Klein, R.W., 2009. Catastrophe Financing in the United States, The Journal of Risk and
Insurance, Vol. 76, No. 3, pp. 607-637.
Kunreuther, H.S., Pauly, M., 2004, Neglecting Disaster: Why People Dont Insure Against
Large Losses? The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 5-21.
Kunreuther, H.S., 2006, Disaster Mitigation and Insurance: Learning from Katrina, Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 604, pp.208-227.
Lewis, M., 2007, In Natures Casino, New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/magazine/26neworleans-t.html?pagewanted=print
(Retrieved 21January 2012).
McTigue, C., 2007, The Insurance Dilemma: How to Increase the Availability and Use of
Catastrophe Insurance After Katrina, pp. 1-26.
Niels, G., 2011 Why does it always rain on me? A Proposed Framework for Flood Insurance,
Agenda, September, pp. 1-5.
Perry, M., 2011, Australia Urged to Use Catastrophe Bonds as Disaster Risk Rises. Reuters,
10 February 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/10/us-australia-disasterinsurance-idUSTRE7193AV20110210, (Retrieved 20 January, 2012).
Roberts, G., 2011, Insurance Refusal Hits Home for Young Burpengary Family. Courier Mail,
2 August, 2011, http://www.couriermail.com.au/questnews/moreton/insurance-refusal-hitshome-for-young-burpengary-family/story-fn8m0yu3-1226106164924 (Retrieved, 2 August
2011).
Rogers, P., 2011 Development of a Resilient Australia; Enhancing the PPPR Approach with
Anticipation, Assessment and Registration of Risks, The Australian Journal of Emergency
Management Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 54-58.
Rotimi, J., Proverbs, D., Lamond, J., Wassell, P., 2011 An Analysis of the Costs of Resilient
Reinstatement of Flood Affected Properties: A Case Study of the 2009 Flood Event in
Cockermouth, Structural Survey, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp.279 293.
Smith, G., 2011, Planning for Post-Disaster Recovery: A Review of the United States
Disaster Assistance Framework. Public Entity Risk Institute.
Sandink, D., Kovacs, P., Oulahen,G., & McGillivray, G., 2010, Making Flood Insurable for
Canadian Homeowners: A Discussion Paper, Institute for Catastrophic Loss Reduction &
Swiss Reinsurance Company Ltd, Toronto.

122
Thompson, T., and Solomons, M., Queensland Homes Exposed to Flood Losses, Courier
Mail, 11 January 2012, http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/homes-stillexposed-to-losses/story-e6freoof-1226241297118, (Retrieved 14 January, 2012).
Thompson and McKenna, 2011, Flood victims with belated RACQ payouts won't be forced
to repay Premier's Relief Appeal funds, Courier Mail, 4 August 2011,
http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/flood-victims-with-belated-racq-payoutsmay-be-forced-to-repay-premiers-relief-appeal-funds/story-e6freoof-1226107745344
(Retrieved 4 August, 2011).
Trowbridge, J., Minto, J., Berril, J., 2011, Natural Disasters Insurance Review; Inquiry into
Flood Insurance and Related Matters,
http://www.ndir.gov.au/content/report/downloads/NDIR_final.pdf (Retrieved 14 November,
2011).
United States Government Accountability Office, 2005, Challenges Facing the National
Flood Mitigation Program, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03606t.pdf (Retrieved 27
December 2011).
Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission, 2010, 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission
Final Report, http://www.royalcommission.vic.gov.au/Commission-Reports/Final-Report
(Retrieved 10 December 2011).
Ward, M., 2011 Australias Catastrophe Crossroads, Investment Magazine, April, pp. 41-44.

123
The Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service Response to the

Christchurch Earthquakes: Have we recovered yet?
Heather Clay
Social Worker
Canterbury District Health Board
Christchurch, New Zealand
Candace Bobier
Research Associate
Canterbury District Health Board
Christchurch, New Zealand
Paper presented at
124
The Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service Response to the Christchurch
Earthquakes: Have we recovered yet?
Abstract: Canterbury, New Zealand was woken up literally and figuratively on September
4th, 2010 at 4:35 am with a magnitude 7.1 earthquake. Rattled, but largely unscathed, we
rode out the aftershocks and congratulated ourselves on our resilience, utterly mentally
unprepared for the devastation about to be faced on February 22 nd 2011. Further large
events (June and December 2011) and over 10,000 aftershocks have impacted on
psychological recovery. We offer a description of the child and adolescent population
referred to a publically funded mental health services earthquake pathway since July 2011.
Delivered alongside existing services, the earthquake response pathway has been
designed to enable targeted as needed intervention to young people struggling to cope as a
result of the Canterbury earthquakes. We consider how our service wide response has met
the anticipated psychological need and how our experience can inform mental health
preparedness, response and recovery in future natural disasters.
Key words: Earthquakes, disasters, children, adolescents, mental health services,
psychological response
Acknowledgements: We wish to thank Dr Stephanie Moor, Dr Matt Eggleston and Dr.

Caroline Bell alongside Dr. Harith Swadi and Kay Johnston of the SMHS CDHB for initiating
this timely response to the Canterbury earthquakes, Professor Brett McDermott and Dr
Vanessa Cobham of Queensland University for their experience, training and ongoing
support and John Beveridge, SMHS CDHB for his IT and auditing assistance.
125
Background
There is a 100% change of an earthquake today. In fact, on average, worldwide there are
four earthquakes magnitude 5 or greater every 24 hours (U.S. Geological Survey,
www.usgs.gov).
New Zealand sits, along with Japan, California and Chile, on The Pacific Ring of Fire, an
area well known for heightened seismic and volcanic activity. Large historical events have
given New Zealand beautiful mountains, thermal springs, deep volcanic ports and
acceptance of the possibility of future earthquakes. New Zealands position abreast the
colliding Australian and Pacific plates, has resulted in four major fault systems including the
Macquarie Fault to the south, the South Island Alpine Fault, the Marlborough Fault system
and the North Island Fault system). In addition, the country contains a great number of
smaller fault lines including the newly-revealed Greendale Fault in the South Island
province of Canterbury.
The Canterbury Earthquakes
On September 4th, the people of Christchurch and Canterbury were woken quite literally
and figuratively by a magnitude 7.1 earthquake along the Greendale Fault. The shaking
was felt across much of the South Island and some of the lower North Island. Since then,
Canterbury has experienced three further large earthquake events (Feb 2011, June 2011
and December 2011) and over 10,000 aftershocks. The September earthquake occurred in
the very early hours (4:35 am NZ time) on Saturday morning and was centred about 45
kilometres from Christchurch near the rural town of Darfield. There were no deaths, but
there was much damage to brick buildings and chimneys, bridges, and significant
liquefaction in some areas. Rattled, but largely unscathed, we rode out the aftershocks and
congratulated ourselves on our resilience, wearing t-shirts that read tested to 7.1.
Our experience on February 22 was dramatically different. Februarys earthquake was
centred much closer to Christchurch near the port of Lyttelton at a distance of 10 km from
the Christchurch Central Business District and even closer too many of the citys eastern
Suburbs. It was incredibly shallow at 5 km deep and the reverse thrust of the fault resulted
in vertical ground accelerations beneath the central city at a rate twice the speed of gravity
(GNS Science, www.geonet.org.nz). In stark contrast to September, the magnitude 6.3
earthquake occurred during lunchtime on a busy work day resulting in 185 deaths and
many more casualties predominantly due to building collapse. There was considerable
damage to the citys infrastructure, significant displacement of people and permanent
damage to residential and industrial land.
On February 22nd, our shaky city crumbled, we fell apart, and many of us, approximately
15,000, left Canterbury as our central Christchurch city was cordoned off with military patrol
of the newly created The Red Zone. In the suburbs, we welcomed friends and family who
lost homes and we pulled together. Some of us met many of our neighbours for the first
time. We mucked in and helped out. Areas such Bromley required heavy artillery including
support from the Volunteer Student Army and NZ Federated Farmers to clear liquefaction.
Soon liquefaction and designer long drops became the subjects of everyday conversation.
We were getting on with it. But by May, aggravation was setting is as we emptied our
126
camping toilets and battled munted roads to our new port-o-com offices. Then cue June
13, two more earthquakes, M 5.9 and M 6.4, ninety minutes apart centred near the seaside
suburbs of Sumner and Redcliffs. We began to wonder - would this never end?
This was our first experience of a large foreshock and even larger aftershock. After
previous large events the immediate aftershocks were substantially smaller. This new
experience heightened our sense of unpredictability in relation to the earthquakes. Several
people were injured and one elderly resident died. Property, land and infrastructure were
further damaged. Thousands of homes were again without electricity and much of the city
was again required to boil water. Perhaps the most destructive aspect of these earthquakes
was the reality for many that this natural disaster had not ended. Many experienced
considerable demoralisation, fear and a lack of control. But, we used our emergency kits,
skills and community connections gained following the February event to again foster our
recovery. And, we got on with it until our next large sequence of events on December 23rd
(M 5.8 and subsequent M 6.0). Our thoughts went from will this never end to you have
got to be kidding me! These earthquakes were the nail in the coffin for many buildings and
businesses, and many individuals hope in rebuilding.
The Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service response
As a result of the February event, we expected a significant effect on the mental health the
Canterbury population and began planning our response. Previous research had indicated
that it would be 3 - 9 months or longer following a natural disaster before the mental health
needs of the child and adolescent population would become apparent [1]. Further, evidence
suggests that the experience of trauma in childhood or adolescence can interrupt healthy
psychological development [2] and difficulties are likely to persist into adulthood if left
unaddressed [3]. We recognised that specialist services had a role in addressing these
needs. However, local specialist mental health services did not have the immediate
capacity to address the anticipated need without additional training, resources and staffing.
The New Zealand Ministry of Health subsequently awarded funding for 7 FTE to Specialist
Mental Health Services to respond to the mental health effects of the earthquakes. Three
FTE were awarded to child and adolescent services. Two FTE have been utilised for
assessment and triage at the front door to the child and adolescent service (CAFLink) and
one FTE has been split to provide individual trauma focused cognitive behavioural therapy
(TF-CBT) and run a series of group programmes. Funding was initially limited to 12 months
from 1 June 2011, although this may be extended.
In recognition of the many and varied responses and programmes being carried out in the
city and province, it has been important for the child and adolescent service to pitch our
response at that level of specialist clinical care. With limited resource and reduced capacity
due to staff losses, we have not attempted to extend beyond our core business but have
relaxed the criteria for the referral being assessed, if the referral is earthquake related.
The Earthquake Response Pathway
Delivered alongside existing services, the earthquake response pathway has been
designed to enable targeted as needed intervention to young people struggling to cope as a
result of the Canterbury earthquakes [4]. The vast majority of referrals are made by family
doctors and education professionals, although some internal health service referrals are
127
also received. All earthquake referrals are assessed face to face over 1 to 3 sessions to
assess the mental health needs, address immediate safety and risk concerns, and offer
support and treatment options.
Treatment options include brief solution focused intervention, individual TF-CBT [5], group
programmes and referral to specialist outpatient teams for medium to long term individual
case management. Treatment options are offered to best meet the perceived needs of the
individual. For example, individual TF-CBT (6 to 10 sessions) is offered to children and
adolescents who experience a severe reaction to the earthquakes to address associated
mood, anxiety and post traumatic symptoms. Mild reactions requiring assurance and
parenting strategies are often offered as brief interventions (up to 3 sessions). Separate
group programmes (up to 10 sessions) are run for children and adolescents with moderate
to severe reactions consisting of psycho-education and group stress management skills
within a cognitive behavioural framework. A parent only group, Parent Managing
Challenging Behaviour, is also available. This group is run in a public education style with
parents recruited through schools and community groups. Future groups will be provided
based on presenting need and may include a parent only group for anxious parents and a
parent only group for parents of pre-school children.
Children with multiple or complex difficulties which extend beyond their earthquake
experience are referred to specialist outpatient mental health teams within the service for
further assessment and treatment. The service consists of three main specialist outpatient
teams: Child and Family Specialty Service (ages 0 - 12), Youth Specialty Service (ages 13 18), Child and Adolescent Rural Service (ages 0 - 18). Referrals from the earthquake
pathway to these specialist teams generally fit within the expected 1-3% population target
for specialist Mental Health Services.
Referred children and adolescents
We have specifically screened over 200 young people since 1 June 2011 (see Figure 1).
About half of those seen have been referred to the three main outpatient teams (n = 89),
whilst the remainder have attended brief intervention (n = 49), a single session of
assessment and advice (n = 27) and groups or TF-CBT (n = 29). At the time of data
collection (end February 2012), 101 had been discharged from the service, with 20
currently attending brief therapy and 20 currently attending groups or TF-CBT. The
remaining 53 were currently attending outpatient services.
128
Demographic information has generally been consistent with the overall trends for referrals
to the Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service. More children (65%) have been referred
than adolescents (35%) and more females (58%) have been referred than males (42%).
Initial trends for referrals were those of 9 year old boys and 15-16 year old girls. Following
the December 2011 earthquakes, there have been more referrals of younger children (aged
3 6) with a preponderance of 5 year old girls.
Consistent with Christchurch population estimates, the ethnicities of referrals have been
predominantly New Zealand born European (Pakeha, 80%) or non New Zealand born
European (9%); followed by Maori (Indigenous New Zealander, 10%) and other (1%). Most
of the non New Zealand born Europeans are recent immigrants to Canterbury. The socioeconomic situation and domiciliary location of referrals has been diverse.
Questionnaires
A package of questionnaires is utilised at assessment for diagnostic screening and as a
baseline for possible follow up. The Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ) is a
behavioural screening measure of child and adolescent emotional health, conduct
problems, hyperactivity, peer relationship problems and pro social behaviour [6] completed
by parents and by children aged 8 and over [7]. To date, we have seen an overall reporting
trend of high to very high emotional distress with high impact on the childs life, but close to
average overall stress on the family. A smaller number reports high emotional distress and
high behavioural difficulties with high to very high overall stress on the family.
To assess self reported symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder as rated by the older
child or adolescent, the Post Traumatic Stress Disorder Reaction Index, PTSD-RI [8] was
adapted with permission from the National Center for Child Traumatic Stress UCLA to word
earthquake as the potentially traumatic event (Finley, H. P. pers. Comm.., 2011). Additional
measures of post traumatic stress reactions include the parent completed Pediatric
Emotional Distress Scale, PEDS [9], utilised for children aged less than 8 years and the self
report Childrens Revised Impact of Events, CRIES [10]. All completed PEDS
questionnaires met criteria for Traumatic Event Exposure and the majority of the PTSD-RI
and CRIES questionnaires suggest moderate to severe risk of post traumatic reactions.
Although, we have been unable to collect questionnaires for all assessments, available
reports taken together advocate strongly for the value of specialist intervention.
In addition, parents were asked to complete a global measure of their own mental health,
the Kessler-10 [11]. Most parents reported general wellness although some were referred
to adult services following their childs assessment by joint agreement. Parents also
completed the Parenting Reactions after Trauma questionnaire adapted from the 2009
Victorian bushfires Parenting Reactions after Trauma to assess common parenting
reactions after the earthquake (McDermott, B. pers. comm.., 2011).The most commonly
reported reaction was being more protective of my child.
Reactions and recovery children, adolescents and parents
So far most of the primary school aged children have experienced difficulties with sleep,
behaviour, separation and anxiety. Many children already had difficulties and were known
to services. Most children seen by the earthquake response team have lived with property
damage and some degree of disruption since the quakes. The predominantly occurring
129
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder symptom is that of hyper arousal. Reassuringly, many
children have and are showing signs of recovery between seismic events.
The adolescents seen thus far are anxious, withdrawing from their usual activities, unable
or reluctant to attend school and often meet criteria for a mood and or anxiety disorders
with varying degrees of intrusive Post Traumatic Stress Disorder symptoms. They may or
may not have a traumatic earthquake story and they may or may not have experienced
property damage, disruption or displacement. Many are otherwise very high functioning. It
is our sense, that many of these adolescents would not have been seen by specialist
mental health services unless something as terrible as these earthquakes had happened. A
number are not showing signs of recovery and some are deteriorating significantly.
Parents of referred children and adolescents have experienced varying levels of personal
and financial stressors as a result of the earthquakes and seek reassurance, personal
emotional support, and parenting strategies for childrens behaviours. Explanation and
normalisation of the childs reactions to the earthquake along with the earthquake response
teams Fuss Busters brief behavioural intervention has been sufficient to met the current
needs of many families. General advice concerning media exposure of the earthquakes
and other disasters and advice on sensitive future planning with children have also been
well received.
Conclusions
Our service experience is one of many in relation to the Canterbury earthquakes.
We continue to learn from the children, adolescents and parents attending the earthquake
response pathway to better meet their needs. Overall, we have received positive feedback
from families and other health professionals about the timely co-ordinated response
provided by the child and adolescent mental health service. We have found that offering
brief intervention at the font-door of the service appears to be valuable. We have found that
group programmes were most utilised by children and adolescents already engaged in
attending the service. And, we have found that Trauma Focused CBT has been the least
utilised treatment at this early stage of our recovery. Like others post natural disaster, we
have seen anxiety in younger patients generalised to weather and noise [12] and increased
substance use in adolescents [13]. Additional comparisons may emerge, but are presently
difficult to identify due to the ongoing and repetitive nature of the the events. Further,
questions remain as to the level of unseen distress present in the community, the yet to be
seen psychological reactions and the added value of future community outreach. We hope
that our experience may shape future planning of child and adolescent mental health
services post natural disaster.
One year on from our devastating February Earthquake, projects such as Gap filler,
Greening the Rubble, and our CBD shipping container shopping mall have injected colour
and vibrancy in our city and suburbs. It is a very exciting time to be in Christchurch as we
work toward our rebuild and recovery.
130
References
1. Furr, J.M., Comer, J.S., Edmonds, J.M. & Kendall, P.C. Disasters and youth: A meta-analytic
examination of posttraumatic stress. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 2010; 78:
765-780.
2. Franks, B.A. Moving targets: A developmental framework for understanding childrens
changes following disasters. Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology 2011; 32: 58-69.
3. Goenjian, A.K., Walling, D., Steinberg, A.M, Karayan, I., Najarian, L.M., & Pynoos, R. A
prospective study of post traumatic stress and depressive reactions among treated and
untreated adolescents 5 years after a catastrophic disaster. American Journal of Psychiatry
2005; 162: 2302-2308.
4. Moor, S. and M. Eggleston, Proposal for psychosocial recovery post Christchurch
Earthquakes of February 2011: Child and adolescent mental health services. Christchurch:
Canterbury District Health Board 2011.
5. Australian Centre for Posttraumatic Mental Health (2011). Therapist Resource for Traumafocused Therapy Working with Children and Adolescents, 1st Edition.
6. Goodman, A. and R. Goodman. Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire as a dimensional
measure of child mental health. Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent
Psychiatry 2009; 48: 400-403.
7. Mellor, D. Furthering the use of the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire: Reliability with
younger child respondents. Psychological Assessment 2004; 16: 396-401.
8. Steinberg, A.M., Brymer, M.J., Decker, K.B., & Pynoos, R.S. The University of California at
Los Angeles Post-traumatic Stress Disorder Reaction Index. Current Psychiatry Reports
2004; 6; 96100.
9. Saylor, C.F, Swenson, C. C., Reynolds, S.S., & Taylor, M. The Pediatric Emotional Distress
Scale: A brief screening measure for young children exposed to traumatic events. Journal of
Clinical Child Psychology 1999; 28: 70-81.
10. Perrin, S., Meiser-Stedman, R., & Smith, P. The Children's Revised Impact of Event Scale
(CRIES): Validity as a screening instrument for PTSD. Behavioural and Cognitive
Psychotherapy 2005; 33: 487 498.
11. Kessler, R.C., Barker, P.R., Colpe, L.J. et al. Screening for serious mental illness in the
general population. Archives of General Psychiatry 2003; 60:184189.
12. alciolu, E. and Baolu, M. Psychological effects of earthquakes in children: prospects for
brief behavioural treatment. World Journal of Pediatrics 2008; 4: 165172.
13. Rowe, C.L., La Greca, A.M., & Alexandersson, A. Family and individual factors associated
with substance involvement and PTS symptoms among adolescents in greater New Orleans
after Hurricane Katrina. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 2010; 78: 806-817.
131
Adapting to increasing bush fire risk: Multi-dimensional bush fire risk

reduction strategies
Ms. Jennie Cramp

Technical Officer Bush fire
Ku-ring-gai Council, Sydney, Australia
Dr. Jennifer Scott
Sustainability Program Leader
Ku-ring-gai Council, Sydney, Australia
Paper presented at
132
Adapting to increasing bush fire risk: Multi-dimensional bush fire risk reduction
strategies
Abstract
Reducing bush fire risk exposure is a complex, multi-dimensional proposition.
Research indicates hazard reduction burns remain the single-most widely used tool
for managing bush fire risk. However, this method is considered to be a high risk,
resource intensive operation with relatively short-term benefits and a heavy
dependence on favourable weather conditions. Climate change has the potential to
result in longer fire seasons, increased frequency of extreme fire-risk days, and
increased fire intensity thereby reducing the opportunities to undertake hazard
reduction burning. Given this information, it is essential that risk reduction measures
adapt accordingly. Ku-ring-gai Council has strategically reviewed its approach to
bush fire risk reduction through collaborative research partnerships. Initial climate
change adaptation investigations indicated that the existing climate change
adaptation models only went part of the way in addressing risks and did little to
assist in determining feasible actions. Through a joint research partnership with
Macquarie and Bond Universities, Council staff were able to identify tools to more
thoroughly evaluate adaptation options for bush fire. A multi-dimensional adaptive
form of cost-benefit analysis was used for potential adaptation measures and
highlighted the advantages of a number of community resilience initiatives. This
adapted form of cost-benefit analysis took into account social, environmental and
financial variables, and highlighted the potential for Council to strengthen community
capital through a number of innovative social change programs. These initiatives
seek to build on existing communication networks and act as supplementary actions
to augment and mitigate the issues associated with hazard reduction burning.
Council intends to take a more active and participatory role in reducing local bush
fire risk by minimising vulnerability of areas of the urban interface most at risk and
enabling the Ku-ring-gai community to increase its resilience to bush fire.
Keywords: resilience; bush fire; climate change risk; cost-benefit; community hardening
Introduction
In light of the information now available to local Councils on the risks associated with
climate change there is strong incentive to instigate better informed adaptation
strategies. The extreme weather events associated with climate change are not new
and many lessons can be learned from the success and failure in responding to past
extreme weather related events. Climate scientists are becoming ever more certain
133
of the potential for a continuing rise in frequency and intensity of these events.
Traditional responses to extreme weather events have been predominantly reactive,
indeed the benchmark for a worst case scenario has had to be reconsidered in light
of events such as the Black Saturday bush fires in Victoria in 2009 and the
Queensland floods of 2011.
This paper will focus on modelling undertaken by Ku-ring-gai Council that
incorporated local climate change vulnerability and resilience factors to estimate the
residual risk in the event of a major bush fire. A suite of potential adaptations was
then tested to determine their capacity to manage that residual risk and so reduce
the likelihood and consequence of bush fire on the local community. A initial broad
consultation process was undertaken to confirm the residual risks and identify
possible adaptation options. A key objective for the modelling was to create a
method to evaluate adaptations according to their capacity to reduce specific Kuring-gai relevant bush fire related risks for the least cost. Costs were not only
monetary costs but also non monetary costs.
After collaborating with Macquarie and Bond Universities, Council staff completed an
analytical model that provides decision makers with a highly robust community
referenced data set that clearly sets out the expected performance of each
adaptation. Each adaptation has strengths and limitations. Knowing this allows
decision makers to better understand the range of costs involved, the equity
associated with funding such projects and whether unintended consequences will
render the outcome unsustainable. This research has been used to develop a
program that is aimed at strengthening community cohesion in order to enable
communities to be better prepared for and respond to bush fires. It is intended that
this program will assist residents in engaging with risk management strategies and
reduce their dependence on emergency services and the need for disaster recovery
funding.
Traditional fire management methods
Fire plays an important role in the Australian landscape. As Gondwana fractured its
geological bonds approximately 70 million years ago and drifted northward, the
Australian environment became increasingly arid. (Specht and Specht in Dargavel,
2005, Steffen et.al. 2009; Adams and Attiwell, 2011). Since this time, much of
Australias vegetation has had to adapt to drier conditions and an increase in the
incidence of fire.
It is difficult to distinguish the effects of climate from the anthropogenic influences on
fire in the Australian landscape before the arrival of European settlers. Charcoal
deposits provide direct evidence of fire activity that demonstrate a relationship with
the climate and indirectly suggests that the arrival of Aboriginal people also had an
influence on fire. Post European colonisers though attempted to use fire to tame
the bush (Kershaw, et.al. in Bradstock, 2002) which was very different to the
Aboriginal peoples use of fire. Many modern studies have since attempted to
interpret these observations (Flannery, 1994, Ryan et.al. 1995, Benson and
Redpath, 1997, Clode, 2010).
134
Once European settlers had cleared the land, fire prevention became common
practice in settled areas to protect properties and assets altering the long evolved
fire regimes. As a result, when fires did occur they were characteristically more
intense. Although the fire frequency may have steadily declined since 1750 (Ward,
2001 cited in Clode, 2010), dendrochronological studies show the frequency of fires
intense enough to scar trees has significantly increased in this period (Burrows et. al.
1995 in Jurkis et. al. [no date]). With the growth of settlements into towns and cities,
the risk of disaster grew. By the mid 20th century the number of severe fires causing
devastation across Australia had increased. Forest managers abandoned the
practice of fire exclusion in favour of prescribed burning (Jurkis et. al. [no date];
Dexter, 1975).
Hazard reduction burning
Hazard reduction burning relies on fighting fire with fire. This technique uses a
controlled application of fire under specific environmental conditions to reduce fuel
loads in the understorey and midstorey. The likelihood of flames reaching the
canopy is then minimised (Tolhurst, 2003 cited in Adams and Attiwell, 2011; Gould
et. al. 2007). The primary purpose of hazard reduction burning is to protect life,
infrastructure and forest resources. It can also be used for ecological purposes
including site preparation, weed removal and wildlife management particularly where
habitat fragmentation has destroyed the possibility of natural fire regimes (Fernandes
and Botelho, 2003).
The spread and intensity of a bush fire is influenced by a number of factors including
fuel loads, weather and topography (OBryan, 2005). Variability involved in weather,
topography, vegetation structure, composition and fuel moistures means quantifying
the contribution of each factor is difficult. Less difficult to demonstrate is the
relationship between fuel accumulation and fire activity. McArthur (1962) and Dexter,
(1975) demonstrated that a direct proportional relationship exists between fuel load
and rate of fire spread in that, halving the fuel load will result in the rate of spread
being reduced by half (McArthur, 1962 cited in Adams and Attiwell, 2011 and Dexter,
1975).
It is acknowledged that reducing exposure to loss from bush fire is a multidimensional proposition (Scott and Weston, 2011, Simmons and Adams, 2004).
Regardless, hazard reduction burning remains the single-most widely used tool for
reducing fuel and managing fire risk (Fernandes and Bothelho, 2003). An
examination of the full suite of impacts arising from hazard reduction burns and the
capacity of this tool to reduce specific bush fire related risks raises many questions.
Despite some benefits in fuel reduction, the value in terms of a reduction in
community vulnerability to bush fire is highly debated. Many experts advocate an
increase in the area treated by broad acre hazard reduction burning each year as did
the 2009 Victorian Bush fires Royal Commission (VBRC). Recommendations by
VBRC included an increase to at least 5% of public reserves burnt per annum. This
recommendation was not supported by the NSW Government as it encourages a
burn at all costs attitude and fails to strategically prioritise burn placement (NSW
Government, 2010). A strategic approach is supported by research showing the
effectiveness of hazard reduction declines rapidly when extreme weather conditions
are experienced (McCarthy and Tolhurst, 2001 cited in Fernandes and Botelho,
2003). Most recently, research undertaken on house loss in the 2009 Victorian bush
135
fires found the proximity of houses to an area that had been treated by hazard
reduction burning was more important than the total percentage of the landscape
burnt. The research highlights a need to shift the emphasis away from broad acre
fuel reduction to intensive treatments within 40m of the house (Gibbons et. al. 2012).
While a more targeted regime of hazard reduction burning may assist in addressing
some concerns such as ecological impact of broad-scale and frequent low-intensity
burning, hazard reduction burning is a very problematic tool. Operational, social and
environmental issues including its high dependency on favourable weather
conditions, high level risks and resource demands, relatively short-term fuel
reduction benefits, health impacts, traffic disruption and creation of a false sense of
security all render this risk management option as of marginal benefit. (Fernandes
and Botelho, 2003; VBRC, 2010; Brandes, 2003; Cheney 1996 cited in Fernandes
and Botelho, 2003). It is for these reasons Ku-ring-gai Council decided to look more
closely at the potential adaptations for bush fire, realising the need to go beyond the
somewhat simplistic approach of burn more bush.
In a local context, the Ku-ring-gai Local Government Area, located on Sydneys
North Shore has a history of destructive fires. Large scale, intense wildfires impact
the area on average once every 10 years (HKBFMC, 2010). The physical context
including development and demographic characteristics contribute to bush fire
vulnerability. As in other fire prone areas, the period between fires varies greatly.
Over longer periods community complacency to the risk of fire increases (Clode,
2010). Continuing community education and engagement is critical to preparedness
and reducing the potential for destruction in the event of fire (Paton and Wright,
2008). Extreme fire events such as Canberra in 2003 and Victoria in 2009 reinforced
the need for defendable space, more appropriate building and construction design,
the need to leave early if not prepared and that places of last resort should be
provided should other plans fail (Simmons and Adams, 2004; VBRC, 2010).
The wicked and complex nature of problems facing fire authorities, land managers,
scientists and the community surrounding bush fire management are further
exacerbated by the improved level of knowledge regarding the impact of climate
change on bush fire risk (Taplin et al, 2010). The information available on climate
change is sufficient to indicate that due diligence requires better strategic
approaches to reduce risks associate with bush fires (Scott and Preston, 2011).
These approaches need to be factored into future decision making and then actively
pursued to reduce the vulnerability of local community to a future catastrophic fire
event as best as Council is able to.
Climate change and its impact on fire
The timing of fire seasons and ultimately fire-weather risk is determined on a broad
scale by climate. The southeast regions of Australia experience a Mediterranean
climate (Lucas, et. al. 2007). In these regions, the most severe fire danger occurs
during summer and autumn where high temperatures and low rainfall are
experienced (Lucas, et. al. 2007). However, this risk is exacerbated by climate
variability such as that caused by El Nio and La Nia resulting in periodic droughts
and wetter seasons and ultimately by a changing global climate.
136
The evidence for global warming caused by increased greenhouse gas

concentrations as a result of human activities has been documented by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (IPCC, 2007). Climate change
scientists predict that the weather patterns will continue to alter as a result of
increasing CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere in the coming decades (Hennessy,
et. al. 2005). In studies conducted by CSIRO, climate models that combine IPCC
emissions scenarios and historical weather observations indicate that fire weather
conditions are expected to worsen (Hennessy, et. al. 2005). The number of very high
and extreme fire danger days could increase by 4-25% by 2020 and 15-70% by
2050. It is also expected that fire seasons are likely to start earlier and become
longer, further reducing the window of opportunity for conducting hazard reduction
burning. Regional downscaling of climate change models to provide more detailed
and accurate expectations of potential impacts have been produced for NSW
regions. Expected increases in temperature, evaporation and extreme fire danger
days as a result of climatic changes could increase fire frequency and intensity
across the region. (DECC NSW 2008 cited in Taplin, et. al. 2010). Given the
awareness of the potential increase in future bush fire risk as a result of climate
change, Councils have an obligation to acknowledge and assist to reduce the
potential of foreseeable harm from occurring.
Why Climate Change adaptation?
Actions to address climate change include both adaptation and mitigation measures.
However, levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere have now reached a point that
indicate that substantial climate change is inevitable (Stern, 2006) In his Climate
Change Review, Garnaut (2008) notes that mitigation efforts aiming to reduce or
stabilise atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations will not be achieved in a
timeframe to avoid damage from climate change related events. Therefore, while
governments need to continue to implement mitigation measures, adaptation is an
essential response that will assist in reducing the impact of climate change
particularly to those communities and environments that are most vulnerable (Stern,
2006). Adaptation to climate change focuses on reducing the exposure and
vulnerability and increasing the resilience to the adverse impacts. Arrangements for
prevention, resilience planning and preparedness are increasingly being recognised
as a vital part of disaster risk management in terms of climate change planning
(IPCC, 2012). Incorporating these factors into climate change strategies and
emergency management plans will assist in building local capacity and
understanding the strengths and vulnerability of communities (COAG, 2009).
Degrees of uncertainty around climate change make it difficult to precisely predict
the magnitude, timing and location of an extreme weather event (Garnaut, 2008).
However, from a legal perspective, decision makers may be subject to increasing
litigation and legal challenges on the basis of failing to act when the risks are known
(Scott and Preston, 2011; Garnaut, 2008; England, 2007).Similarly, mal-adaptation
inefficient and improper adaptation actions could face comparable scrutiny.
Climate Change Adaptation Modelling
Ku-ring-gai Council climate change adaptation model allows Council to better
understand the risks arising from climate change and the capacity of various
137
potential adaptations to reduce those risks. Initial investigations into the creation of
this model indicated that existing available models only went part of the way in
addressing risks and did little to assist in determining feasible actions (Scott and
Weston, 2011; Taplin. et.al. 2010). Yet the importance of the issue clearly calls for
research to develop models that consider the in detail the costs and benefits of
adaptation. A transparent and well researched model to guide decision making may
assist in reducing the risks of future litigation and legal challenges in relation to
climate change for (Local Government Act 1993; England, 2007, Scott and Preston,
2011). It is the sector of government that is most vulnerable as it is least well
resourced but best placed to cope with climate change impacts (England, 2007,
Bainbridge, 2008). Logically local government should strive to achieve early
adaptation for key risks as an organisational priority.
How to manage risk
To plan effective risk management options, a model needs to be able to evaluate the
capacity an option may have on reducing specific risks, highlight where an option
may result in unintended consequences, trade-offs or unsustainable impacts, inform
whether a response will increase resilience and/or reduce vulnerability across
financial, social and environmental sectors and satisfy due diligence in regard to the
Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD) principles (Scott and Weston, 2011).
Given the very limited funding available to local government, investment in climate
change adaptation should consider the following barriers.
Local government may:
have limited resources to devote to issues outside the re-current budget
items;
have limitations placed on them to raise funds for non re-current budget items;
be reliant on competitive grants to support non-recurrent budget items;
be heavily dependent on external revenue for infrastructure costs;
experience decision making dominated by financial performance;
be restrained in its capacity to enforce legislation;
be devolved responsibility for state legislation with no commensurate increase
in budget allocation;
be already under resourced;
need to mediate disparity between political opinion, strident sceptics and the
expert advice;
suffer from slow, unresponsive and guarded political decision making in the
face of scientific uncertainty;
be more comfortable with tried and tested methods with quantified results;
encounter reporting of unreliable and disingenuous facts on an issue.
With these issues in mind, Ku-ring-gai then investigated what key questions needed
to be answered by an adaptation model. Scott and Weston (2011) developed the
following criteria which helped to refine the Ku-ring-gai model. These criteria have
been used to discuss the Ku-ring-gai climate change adaptation model.
Criteria 1 - How does the model identify risks?
138
Ku-ring-gai Council undertook extensive research on the direct and indirect risks
arising from climate change supported by credible scientific research, such as the
IPCC, CSIRO, Bureau of Meteorology and the NSW Office of Environment and
Heritage (OEH) (formally known as DECCW). To improve model predictions of
climate change forecasts, Council collaborated with Macquarie and Bond
Universities to apply a regional downscaling method that focused on localised
changes in weather that affected bush fire behaviour (Taplin et.al. 2010). The
statistical downscaling of models depends fundamentally on high quality, high
resolution and comprehensive observations to inform statistical approaches and to
confirm error reductions in models (KMC, 2010). The downscaling indicates that Kuring-gai is likely to experience a warmer climate with fewer extreme cold days and
increasing number and duration of extreme heat days. Winters will be drier with
spring and summer featuring increased rainfall, mostly in heavy storm events. Bush
fire weather is intensified, drought periods and water shortages increase and heat
stress will likely impact people during prolonged periods of extreme warm
temperatures.
Council conducted two community workshops to discuss the climate change weather
predictions and the impact of potential consequences on Ku-ring-gai. Participants
were selected from local business, government agencies, emergency services and
non-government organisations. Those involved ranked risks according to the
vulnerability of Ku-ring-gai to a particular change and the magnitude of the
consequence of that change. Bush fire frequency and intensity were identified by
participants as the highest risk and priority for Ku-ring-gai (KMC, 2010).
As mentioned earlier, Ku-ring-gai has experienced numerous fires in the past. Other
factors that make Ku-ring-gai particularly vulnerable to fire include 1,100 hectares
(ha) of Council owned bushland. This area is divided into multiple reserves across
the LGA. Approximately 18,000 ha of additional bushland, the majority of which is
National Parks is contiguous with the LGA. Development in Ku-ring-gai is restricted
to low density residential which is highly concentrated on the ridge tops. These are
divided by steep valleys of dense sandstone dominated forest. There are
approximately 13,700 houses in bush fire prone areas spread over 91km of bushland
interface. Limited road access to these fingers of development is a cause for
concern in terms of evacuation capacity. In addition an ageing population and older
brick and tile housing stock with large gardens containing flammable vegetation
exacerbate the fire risk. Fire agencies located within the LGA include one Rural Fire
Service brigade and one NSW Fire and Rescue unit.
Criteria 2 - Is the capacity to adapt to the identified risks considered?
The workshop participants noted that the risks identified above will have an effect on
human health and safety, the environment, especially critically endangered species,
the local economy and the administration and operation of Council.
Although Council is restrained by its own funding, its community is the least
disadvantaged LGA in Australia according to the Index of Relative Socio-Economic
Disadvantage (SEIFA) (ABS, 2006). This is one of the major factors that make Kuring-gai resilient to the impact of bush fire. Data from the Australian Bureau of
Statistics (2006) and stakeholders involved in community consultation have indicated
139
that among many resilience factors, Ku-ring-gai has higher levels of education,
greater disposable income per capita, high levels of property insurance cover, and
higher volunteer rates in community networks and programs than other LGAs in
NSW. Communication networks and health care systems are also widely accessible
throughout Ku-ring-gai (KMC, 2010).
Criteria 3 - Is there consistency with current reporting protocols?
Local governments are required to maintain an integrated reporting process,
recognising that plans like communities do not exist in isolation (DLG, 2009). The
aim is to capture community priorities for the future and plan strategies to meet these
goals and achieve long-term sustainability objectives. The integrated reporting
framework consists of a 20 year community strategic plan linked to a five year
delivery program and a one year operational plan.
Adaptation planning must ensure that community and organisational objectives and
selected adaptations are consistent. It is essential that Councils recognise that
secondary impacts of climate change can impact communities, the environment,
infrastructure and utilities to name but a few. Through the community strategic
planning process Ku-ring-gai has incorporated its need to mitigate and adapt in
response to climate change. Through a climate change policy Council has initiated
many greenhouse mitigation projects to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and has
identified the risks of climate change and specific actions to reduce the impact
through the climate change adaptation model. The aim is to continue to embed
prioritised adaptations into core functions and work plans.
Criteria 4 - How is uncertainty dealt with?
The Local Government Act 1993 sets out a charter for Councils to follow. Within this
charter lies the application of the Precautionary Principle:
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage, lack of full
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to
prevent environmental degradation. (Cole, 2005).
Given the vulnerability of Council to climate change and its potential ramifications, it
makes sense to analyse potential adaptation options for their capacity to achieve
their intended purpose; that is to firstly reduce risk and secondly limit unintended
effects that occur in every change process. Where potential impacts are sufficiently
uncertain (such as is the case with regional Climate Change modeling) it is wise to
apply the Precautionary Principle (Cole, 2005).
The Ku-ring-gai model required depth to provide a full account of the financial cost
benefit over time, and breadth to encapsulate the triple bottom line and the capacity
to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience. The tools that proved useful from the
collaborative research with Macquarie and Bond Universities were:
-
Poisson Distribution modelling to identify future trends based on historical

records;
140
Bayesian Theory application to supplement the paucity of historical data with

expert opinion regarding the influence of altered weather patterns on bush fire
hazard and impact; and
Borda Count Method to compare potential adaptation against each other to
create a priority ranking according maximum benefit versus monetary and non
monetary cost.
The research team re-evaluated the traditional cost benefit method for use in the
model and found it inadequate to determine non monetary values. The conceptual
basis of cost benefit was applied to different criteria to evaluate the most appropriate
responses to climate change. Firstly, costs were deemed to be the triple bottom line
outcome with the least negative effect occurring from the implementation of each
option. The benefit was the capacity of each option to reduce the risks specific to
each severe weather related event. For bush fire risk reduction performance the
following criteria were used to assess the benefit of each adaptation option:
i. Capacity to reduce or resist radiant heat
ii. Capacity to assist fire fighting ability
iii. Capacity to build knowledge and awareness
iv. Capacity to reduce or resist ember attack
v. Capacity to reduce material flammability
vi. Capacity to improve water supply
vii. Capacity to reduce fuel load and transference of fire into the urban area
viii. Capacity to reduce the destructive effect of fire
Rating each potential adaptation for triple bottom line impact involved the creation of
a set of criteria that reflected the financial, social and environmental values specific
to Ku-ring-gai. Each adaptation was rated according to their potential positive or
negative effect on values cited by the local community as worthy of preservation and
enhancement. Those options that exhibited a capacity to reduce risk across more
than one type of severe weather event emerged as the leading investment option in
many cases. This re-orientation of the traditional cost benefit tools makes it much
more relevant to real life and importantly, to sustainability.
Criteria 5 - How effectively does the model enable action by a local government?
The Ku-ring-gai Model is guided by the community values and aspirations for the
future. A visioning exercise as part of the Community Strategic Plan was intergenerational so the aspirations contained within the Council Vision Report pertain to
both current and future generations. Enabling sustainable change to reduce climate
change risk to the local community means putting adaptation implementation firmly
on Councils operational plan plus using the information from the model to justify
grant submissions to implement targeted adaptations. The limitations of the Ku-ringgai model itself probably centre of the broad scale of analysis which comes at the
expense of in depth analysis. While the Macquarie Bond collaboration with Council
produced an in depth method for financial analysis of investment in climate change,
it proved so resource intensive and highly skilled that only very costly adaptations
warrant such investigation. The Ku-ring-gai Model allows many options to be
141
compared relatively easily but it must be acknowledged that the results cannot
accurately forecast return on financial investment.
The Climate Wise Communities Adaptation Option:
The cost-benefit analysis by the Ku-ring-gai Model highlighted the potential for
Council to strengthen community capital through a number of social change
programs. Some of the high priority actions for Council surrounded the need to
conduct community and agency education programs, and support vulnerable
residents. Community actions that ranked highly included improving the resilience of
housing stock with fire resilient products that meet Australian Standards,
volunteering in community programs, assisting neighbours and building
communication networks to assist with psychological preparedness.
One of the leading adaptation options to emerge from the Ku-ring-gai Model is the
development a community based resilience program. This adaptation option is
designed to work as a house buddy program called Climate Wise Communities
(CWC) involving Council initiated community capacity building. The program will take
advantage of networking opportunities to provide education, resilience and support
services to the wider community in areas identified as likely to be more vulnerable
risks posed by extreme weather events. The aim will be to reduce risk exposure and
improve resilience to three of the four climate change risks in Ku-ring-gai, i.e. storms,
extreme heat and bush fire.
In its first phase the project seeks to identify the most highly vulnerable residents on
the bushland interface, particularly those whose risk exposure is remarkable due to
their location, property/ building type, higher risk demographic (e.g. young families,
impaired physical ability, non-English speaking background), and by high need for
assistance to evacuate.
The CWC program seeks to develop neighbourhood response capacity primarily to
the threat of bush fire but also where appropriate to heat stress and storms. It will be
possible to build resilience to extreme events by:
encouraging neighbourhoods to engage in self assessment and risk
management strategies;
improve efficiency in households with preventative measures;
enhance neighbourhood cohesion and networks;
raise awareness of risks and how to manage these;
reduce the severity and duration of impacts when extreme events do occur;
reduce dependence on emergency services on days where these services
may be compromised due to the scale and nature of the extreme event;
reduce dependence on emergency declaration funding from state and federal
resources.
The CWC program will focus on the development of linkages within the community to
ensure everyone in an at risk location is engaged in building their own resilience
capacity. Resilience capacity will include adopting technology to make their home
more fire resilient, understand how their land management practices put not only
142
themselves but their neighbours at risk, getting to know their neighbours and where
appropriate participating in neighbourhood training exercises to ensure the whole
street is prepared in advance of an event, learn who in the street needs help in
keeping their property hazard free and who may need assistance to evacuate in the
event of the need occurring. In tandem with this program is a secondary program
that seeks to build more resilient, safer and comfortable places of last resort for the
community to retreat to in the event of a disaster. For example Council is currently
doing urban renewal around neighbourhood shopping centres. Many of these
centres are located in bushland interface areas and with some careful design and
capacity building could become a neighbourhood safer place.
There is evidence that communities with strong networks have an integral role in
building resilience to natural disasters (Tompkins, 2005; Paton and Johnston, 2001;
Murphy, 2007; Kim, 2010). The concept of social or community capital has been
discussed by Murphy (2007) who emphasises the role of community members as
active agents in emergency management as their social connections, networks and
involvement in local activities can decrease their vulnerability to natural hazards.
Each year governments invest a significant amount of resources that aim to convince
individuals and households to prepare for disasters. Much of this responsibility falls
to local governments to protect their residents, properties and community facilities.
However, it is up to the individual to make the final decision on their actions during
an emergency. It is essential to recognise that there are practical and psychological
components to preparedness. Preparing for the possibility of a hazard such as a
bush fire initially involves an individual admitting that they could be at risk. Research
suggests people who accept the risk and prepare in advance will better cope with the
stress of a bush fire (APS, 2009).
The psychology surrounding the human response to fire is discussed by Clode
(2010). She relates complex neurological processes linked to ancient survival skills
of flee, fight or defend that kick in during an emergency and prevent us from thinking
through complex problems logically. She concludes that if we dont have a plan for
survival then during a disaster we are less capable of making logical, sensible
decisions that could save our lives (Clode, 2010).
Fire agencies and other emergency management organisations have generally
recognised that reducing the risk from bush fire, or other natural hazards, is greatly
aided by community preparedness (Elsworth et. al. 2008). The importance of
community preparedness is emphasised by the push from all fire agencies across
Australia for vulnerable households to complete a bush fire survival plan. In
completing a bush fire survival plan, key messages include acting decisively,
understanding the level of risk, and documenting plans for leaving early or being
sufficiently prepared to stay and defend. The intention being that people following a
well thought out plan will avoid having to rely on making complex and often poor
decisions at times of high stress.
Research following Black Saturday in Victoria 2009 indicates that there is a large
disparity between peoples intentions and their actual response in the event of an
emergency, even with a written plan (Whittaker and Handmer, 2010). This
emphasises a need for continued education to improve awareness and planning for
143
natural hazards especially for those more vulnerable. It also provides a good
opportunity to utilise existing community networks or social capital to improve
message transference and reach the wider community.
Other successful community programs, that function in a similar way to CWC include
Neighbourhood Watch crime prevention and Meals on Wheels for the housebound.
Both these programs involve volunteers looking out for each other and promoting
closer ties either to minimise preventable crime or by assisting the aged or disabled
to maintain some independence by staying in their homes (Meals on Wheels
Australia, 2012; Neighbourhood Watch Victoria, 2011).
Conclusion
Traditional measures applied to reduce the risks associated with bush fire have
proved inadequate in the face of past large scale, catastrophic fires. The potential for
this type of fire to occur in areas such as Ku-ring-gai is evidenced by a long history of
large scale destructive fires in the area. A catastrophic fire on the scale of the Black
Saturday fires is increasingly possible given the influence of climate change in future
fire seasons. Traditional bush fire risk management strategies require augmenting in
order to deal with this increase in catastrophic risk.
A multi-dimensional adaptive form of cost-benefit analysis has proved instructive in
evaluating the potential of specific adaptation measures and highlights the
advantages of implementing a number of community focused resilience initiatives.
This adjusted form of cost-benefit analysis considers social, environmental and
financial variables, and examines the potential for Council to strengthen community
resilience through a number of innovative social change programs. These initiatives
seek to build on existing communication networks and act as supplementary actions
to augment actions already in place and mitigate the issues associated with hazard
reduction burning. Council intends to take a more active and participatory role in
reducing local bush fire, storm and extreme heat risks before they impact the local
community.
References
ABS 2006. Socio-Economic Indexes for Areas (SEIFA), Australian Bureau of
Statistics, accessed 16 January 2012,
<http://profile.id.com.au/Default.aspx?id=236&pg=240&gid=10&type=enum>.
Adams, M. Attiwell, P. 2011. Burning Issues, CSIRO Publishing, Victoria.
Australian Psychological Society 2009. Psychological preparedness can save lives
during bush fires, media release, accessed 23 January 2012,
<http://www.psychology.org.au/Assets/Files/MR-Psychological-Preparedness25Feb09.pdf>.
144
Bainbridge, M. 2008. Western Australian Local Government Association Submission

to the Standing Committee on Climate Change, Water, Environment and the Arts
an inquiry into climate change and environmental impacts on coastal communities,
viewed 24 May 2010
<http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/ccwea/coastalzone/subs/sub053.pdf>.
Benson, J. S. Redpath P. A. 1997. The nature of pre-European native vegetation in
south-eastern Australia: a critique of Ryan, D.G., Ryan, J.R. and Starr, B.J. (1995)
The Australian Landscape Observations of Explorers and Early Settlers,
Cunninghamia, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 285-328.
Brandes, I. 2003. Burning questions: Australias bush fire policy, The Drawing Board:
An Australian Review of Public Affairs, The University of Sydney.
Clode, D. 2010. A Future in Flames, Melbourne University Press, Victoria.
COAG 2009. National Strategy for Disaster Resilience. Council of Australian
Governments.
Cole, D. 2005. The Precautionary Principle - Its Origins and Role in Environmental
Law, Environmental Defenders Office of South Australia, viewed 28 May 2010
<http://www.edo.org.au/edosa/research/david%20cole%20on%20precautionary%20
principle.doc>.
Dexter, B. D. 1975. From Fire Control to Fire Management, Extract from Victorias
Resources.
DLG 2009. Planning and Reporting Guidelines for local government in NSW,
Department of Local Government New South Wales.
Elsworth, G. Anthony-Harvey-Beavis, K. Rhodes, A. 2008. What should community
safety initiatives for bush fire achieve?, in J. Handmer & K. Haynes (eds.),
Community Bush fire Safety, CSIRO Publishing, Victoria.
England, P. 2007. Climate Change what are local governments liable for?, Urban
Program, Issues Paper 6, Griffith University March 2007, viewed 23 May 2010
<http://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/48566/urp-ip06-england2007.pdf>.
Fernandes, P. M. Botelho, H. S. 2003. A review of prescribed burning effectiveness
in fire hazard reduction, International Journal of Wildland Fire, vol. 12, pp. 117-128.
Flannery, T. 1994. The Future Eaters, Reed Books, Melbourne.
Garnaut, R. 2008. The Garnaut Climate Change Review, Cambridge University
Press Melbourne, viewed 23 May 2010 <www.garnautreview.org.au>.
145
Gibbons, P. van Bommel, L. Gill, M. Cary, G. J. Driscoll, D. A. Bradstock, R. A.

Knight, E. Moritz M. A. Stephens, S. L. Lindenmayer, D. B. 2012. Land Management
Practices Associated with House Loss in Wildfires, PLoS ONE, vol. 7, no. 1 pp. 1-7.
Gould, J. S. 2007. Fire Management An Integral Part of Forest Management, in: J.
Croke, I. Takken, S. Mockler (eds.), Erosion in Forest: Proceedings of the Forest
Workshop. Cooperative Research Centre for Catchment Hydrology.
Hennessy, K. Lucas, C. Nicholls, N. Bathols, J. Suppiah, R. Ricketts, J. 2005.
Climate change impacts on fire-weather in south-east Australia, CSIRO Australia.
HKBFMC 2010. Hornsby Ku-ring-gai Bush fire Risk Management Plan, Hornsby Kuring-gai Bush fire Management Committee.
IPCC 2012. Summary for Policymakers. In: Managing the risks of extreme events
and disasters to advance climate change adaptation [Field, C. B. Barros, V. Stocker,
T. F. Qin, D. Dokken, D. J. Ebi, K. L. Mastrandrea, M. D. Mach, K. J Plattner, G-K.
Allen, S. K. Tignor, M. Midgley, P. M. (eds.)]. A Special Report of Working Groups I
and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University
IPCC 2007. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment
Report, viewed 23 May 2010 <www.ipcc.ch>.
Jurskis, J. Bridges, B. de Mar, P. [No date]. State Forests of NSW Refereed paper,
Fire management in Australia: the lessons of 200 years.
Kim, Y. C. 2010. Communication, neighbourhood belonging and household
hurricane preparedness, Disasters, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 470-488.
KMC 2010. Climate Change Adaptation Strategy, Ku-ring-gai Council.
Local Government Act 1993
Lucas, C. Hennessy, K. Mills, G. Bathols, J. 2007. Bush fire Weather in Southeast
Australia: Recent Trends and Projected Climate Change Impacts, Bush fire
Cooperative Research Centre, Victoria.
Meals on Wheels Australia 2012. Australian Meals on Wheels Association, viewed
23 January 2012, <http://www.mealsonwheels.org.au/Home.aspx>.
Murphy, B. L. 2007. Locating social capital in resilient community-level emergency
management, Natural Hazards, vol. 41, pp. 297-315.
Neighbourhood Watch 2011. Neighbourhood Watch Victoria, viewed 23 January
2012, <http://www.nhw.com.au/Home>.
NSW Government 2010. NSW Government response to the final recommendations
of the 2009 Victorian Bush fires Royal Commission, NSW Government.
OBryan, D. 2005. The Science of Bush fire Behaviour: The Search for Answers
Volume 1, Papyrus Publishing, Australia.
146
Paton, D. & Johnston, D. 2001. Disasters and communities: vulnerability, resilience

and preparedness, Disaster Prevention and Management, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 270277.
Paton, D. & Wright, L. 2008. Preparing for bush fires: the public education
challenges facing fire agencies, in J Handmer & K Haynes (eds.), Community Bush
fire Safety, CSIRO Publishing, Victoria.
Ryan, D..G Ryan, J. E. Starr, B. J. 1995. The Australian Landscape observations
of explorers and early settlers, Murrumbidgee Catchment Management Committee,
Wagga Wagga NSW.
Scott, J. & Preston, J. 2011. When is a climate change adaptation model good
enough to inform public policy? Climate change adaptation risk management in local
government, Local Government Law Journal, vol. 16, part 3.
Scott, J. & Weston, C. 2011. The pitfalls and promises of climate adaptation
planning, Australasian Journal of Environmental Management, vol. 18, pp. 73-87.
Simmons, D. Adams, R. 2004. On the edge: how well do fire mitigation strategies
work on the urban fringe?, The Victorian Naturalist: Fire Symposium Special Issue,
vol. 121, no. 3, pp. 131-135.
Specht, A. Specht, R. L. 2005. Historical biogeography of Australian forests, in J.
Dargavel (ed.), Australia and New Zealand Forest Histories Short Overviews,
Australian Forest History Society Inc.
Steffen, W. Burbidge, A. A. Hughes, L. Kitching, R. Lindenmayer, D. Musgrave, W.
Stafford Smith, M. Werner, P. A. 2009. Australias Biodiversity and Climate Change,
CSIRO Publishing, Victoria.
Stern, N. 2006. What is the Economics of Climate Change?, World Economics, vol.
7, no. 2.
Taplin, R. Henderson-Sellers, A. Trueck, S. Mathew, S. Weng, H. Street, M.
Bradford, W. Scott, J. Davies, P. Hayward L. 2010. Economic Evaluation of Climate
Change Adaptation Strategies for Local Government: Ku-ring-gai Council Case
Study, Macquarie University, Sydney.
Tompkins, E. L. 2005. Planning for climate change in small islands: insights from
national hurricane preparedness in the Cayman Islands, Global Environmental
Change, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 139-149.
VBRC 2010. Final Report Summary, 2009 Victorian Bush fires Royal Commission,
Government Printer for the State of Victoria.
147
Whittaker, J. & Handmer, J. 2010. Community bush fire safety: a review of postBlack Saturday research, The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, vol.
25, no. 4, pp. 7-13.
148
Neil Dufty
Principal
Molino Stewart Pty Ltd, Parramatta, NSW, Australia
Paper presented at
149
Abstract Is emergency management sufficient to build disaster resilient

communities? This paper reviews current research and Australias National Strategy
for Disaster Resilience which indicates that the fields of disaster risk reduction and
community development should be joined with emergency management to form a
disaster resilience-building triumvirate. Using this strategic alliance, the paper then
shows how learning is a critical component of building disaster resilience through
communities of practice. It also investigates how people and communities learn
before, during and after disasters. The paper concludes by outlining a new approach
- Learning for Disaster Resilience - that is designed to develop and activate
disaster resilient learning communities in line with the strategic triumvirate.
Keywords: resilience, education, engagement, communications, learning,

communities
Introduction
I've seen fire and I've seen rain
I've seen sunny days that I thought would never end
I've seen lonely times when I could not find a friend
But I always thought that I'd see you again
-
James Taylor, Fire and Rain
The above verse from the appropriately named song for this conference provides an
entre to the concept of resilience: although there might be ups and downs in life,
the resilient are able to return to normal functioning regardless (a liberal
interpretation, especially on the last line!). And like the song, this paper is about
connections between people - in this case, how communities learn to resist, recover
and improve from, the impacts of disasters.
The paper investigates whether emergency management by itself is sufficient to
build community disaster resilience. As a result, the paper posits that the field of
community development should be integrated with disaster risk reduction and
emergency management to build disaster resilient communities. Based on this
strategic alliance, it argues that disaster resilience learning communities should be
developed and that education, communications and engagement (ECE) programs
run by emergency agencies be re-scoped and further refined to this end.
150
Disaster resilience
The concept of resilience has been in the disaster management literature since the
1980s (Wildavsky, 1988) but has come into vogue as an overriding goal in the past
ten years. This has been mainly due to its importance as a factor in achieving
sustainability (Dovers, 2004), its role as a strategy in climate change adaptation
(Gero, Mheux and Dominey-Howes, 2010), and as a perceived future requirement
for communities based on learnings from disasters such as 9/11 and Hurricane
Katrina (Boin, Comfort and Demchak, 2010).
Like the term sustainability, there are a multitude of definitions of disaster
resilience. The original notion of resilience, from the Latin word resilio, means to
jump back or bounce back. According to de Bruijne, Boin and van Eeten (2010),
In the past decades, research on resilience has been conducted at various levels of
analysis the individual level, the group level, and the organizational or community
level in a wide variety of disciplines including psychology, ecology, organization
and management sciences, group/team literature and safety management.
Several researchers (e.g. Longstaff, 2005) have made an interdisciplinary effort to
further refine the concept of resilience in relation to disaster management. However,
a dilemma for researchers and planners has been whether disaster resilience should
involve the ability of a community to bounce back (i.e. resume its normal
functioning) as per the original notion, or to bounce forward after a disaster
(Manyena et al, 2011). Some researchers such as Paton (2006) opt for the latter
notion arguing that the bounce back idea neither captures the changed reality after
a disaster, nor encapsulates the new possibilities wrought by a disaster.
This paper supports the bounce forward notion based on Patons reasoning. It
defines disaster resilience as the ability of a community to not only resist and recover
from a disaster, but also to adapt to the changes that the event may cause. It
includes the ability of a community to learn from the disaster and to improve its
networks, systems and capabilities for the next event.
Figure 1 shows theoretically what might be the difference between, in this case, a
flood-resilient community and a less resilient community. Note that the y-axis is
community functioning how well individuals and organisations are performing their
normal functions.
As shown in Figure 1, the resilient community will often experience less disaster
impacts to its normal functioning, while the less resilient community will experience
greater impacts to the same level of flooding. It is also clear that the less resilient
community will take longer to recover i.e. to return to normal functioning.
Furthermore, the resilient community will most likely improve its functioning
especially through learning from the flood disaster.
151
Figure 1 - Theoretical differences between a resilient and a less resilient community (modified from
Mayunga, 2007)
Although the academic debate continues on what precisely disaster resilience is

(and its relationship to vulnerability), governments around the world have developed
strategic policies and plans that aim to guide countries toward achieving it. For
example, the Hyogo Framework for Action was an outcome of the 2005 World
Conference on Disaster Reduction held in Kobe, Japan. One of its five specific
priorities for action was building a culture of safety and resilience.
In December 2009, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) agreed to adopt
a whole-of-nation, resilience-based approach to disaster management, which
recognises that a national, coordinated and cooperative effort is needed to enhance
Australias capacity to prepare for, withstand and recover from disasters. The
National Emergency Management Committee subsequently developed the National
Strategy for Disaster Resilience which was adopted by COAG on 13 February 2011.
The purpose of the Strategy is to provide high-level guidance on disaster
management to federal, state, territory and local governments, business and
community leaders and the not-for-profit sector. While the Strategy focuses on
priority areas to build disaster resilient communities across Australia, it also
recognises that disaster resilience is a shared responsibility for individuals,
households, businesses and communities, as well as for governments. The Strategy
is the first step in a long-term, evolving process to deliver sustained behavioural
152
change and enduring partnerships (Attorney-Generals Department website:

www.ag.gov.au).
The Strategy (COAG, 2011) identifies seven groups of actions to build community
disaster resilience in Australia.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Leading change and coordinating effort

Understanding risks
Communicating with and educating people about risks
Partnering with those who effect change
Empowering individuals and communities to exercise choice and take
responsibility
6. Reducing risks in the built environment
7. Supporting capabilities for disaster resilience.
Disaster resilience-building fields
Is disaster and emergency management sufficient to build community disaster
resilience in line with the Strategy? There is widespread recognition, particularly after
recent disasters around the world, that structural and non-structural modifications
related to disaster and emergency management can only provide certain levels of
resilience and that the residual risk is largely carried by the potentially impacted
communities.
Analysis of the seven groups of actions identified in the Strategy suggests that a
community element is required in addition to the fields of disaster risk reduction and
emergency management. For example, the actions of communicating with and
educating people about risks and empowering individuals and communities to
exercise choice and take responsibility call for individual and community
participation. Moreover, the Strategy promotes shared responsibility for individuals,
households, businesses and governments, thus requiring community participation to
build resilience.
Recent research also supports the coupling of community-based processes (here
called community development) with disaster risk reduction and emergency
management. Community development is a broad term that encompasses the
deliberate attempt by community people to work together to guide the future of their
communities, and the development of a corresponding set of techniques for assisting
community people in such a process (Bennett, 1973). A more recently coined and
similar process is community capacity-building.
According to CCS Strategic Management (2008), community development outcomes
can include:
People participating in social activities to overcome social isolation

Mutual support
Individuals developing self-esteem, confidence and assertiveness
153
Increased participation in political and citizenship activities

Heightened community satisfaction
Increased safety and security
More effective community satisfaction.
Psychological, sociological and education actions are required to achieve community

development outcomes specifically related to building disaster resilience.
There has been extensive psychological research in the past ten years into individual
aspects of disaster resilience. For example, Paton et al (2003) developed and tested
a psychological model for individual preparedness that consisted of three
developmental stages. Psychologists have also extensively researched and
developed models for the post-disaster recovery of individuals (e.g. Whittle et al,
2010).
However, according to recent research into disaster resilient communities, not only is
appropriate individual participation required, but also collective action. Several
researchers (e.g. Aldrich, 2010; Chamlee-Wright, 2010) believe that the formation of
social capital is a critical factor in the ability of a community to quickly recover and
bounce forward after a disaster.
Social capital has been defined as the networks, norms, and social trust that
facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit (Putnam, 1995). It is
generally agreed that there are three distinct forms of social capital: bonding,
bridging and linking. Bonding social capital grows from organisations and activities
connecting similar individuals who often live in close proximity to each other.
Bridging activities and organisations, in contrast, bring together individuals from
different neighbourhoods, ethnicities and races. According to Szreter and Woolcock
(2004) linking social capital is composed of norms of respect and networks of
trusting relationships between people who are interacting across explicit, formal or
institutionalized power or authority gradients in society. Where bridging social
capital connects individuals of approximate equal social status, linking social capital
connects those of unequal status, providing them with access to power.
Research into the recovery after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (e.g. Aldrich,
2011a) and Hurricane Katrina (e.g. Boettke et al, 2007) has shown the benefits of
social capital in providing resources for a faster and more efficient recovery.
However, there were some minor negative effects found. For example, in villages in
Southeast India impacted by the 2004 tsunami, although high levels of social capital
reduced barriers to collective action for members of the uur panchayats (hamlet
councils) and parish councils speeding up their recovery and connecting them to aid
organisations, at the same time social capital reinforced obstacles to recovery for
those outside of these organisations such as women, Dalits, migrants, and Muslims
(Aldrich, 2011a).
154
It therefore appears that a triumvirate of disaster risk reduction, emergency

management and community development (with a focus on individual psychological
development and social capital formation) is required to build disaster-resilient
communities. This is strongly supported by Aldrich (2011b) who states, Rather than
imagining that disaster mitigation and recovery are functions of characteristics
external to the community such as aid provided by the government or
nongovernmental organizations, the amount of damage from the crisis, or the
competency of local and national political leaders scholars should recognize that
the level of connectedness and cohesion within the neighbourhood is critical to
recovery. Like two individuals exposed to the same disease, recovery may have
more to do with the quality of the host than the nature of the disease (Aldrich, 2008).
The interrelationship of the three disaster resilience-building fields is shown as a
simple Venn diagram in Figure 2.
Emergency
management
Disaster risk
reduction
Community
development
Figure 2 Interrelationship of the three fields required to build community disaster resilience based on
recent research
Depending on the resilience profile of a community, the importance of each field

can be larger or smaller (i.e. not necessarily equal as shown in Figure 2).
One could argue the value of the disaster risk reduction and emergency
management division shown in Figure 2 when Prevention, Preparedness, Response
and Recovery (PPRR) in emergency management could encapsulate both. One
reason for this is that it distinguishes hazard risk mitigation (prevention) activities
from preparedness activities, the boundaries of which are which are sometimes
155
confused. According to the Topping (2011), Mitigation is distinguished from

preparedness by its emphasis on creating long-term resilience through permanent
modification of physical and other circumstances which create risk and vulnerability.
Yet mitigation is widely misunderstood, often confused with preparedness - and not
just by news media and the general public.
The distinction between disaster risk reduction and emergency management is
demonstrated practically in several parts of Australia through the demarcation of
responsibility and activity. For example, in NSW, floodplain risk management is
primarily the responsibility of local councils, with the NSW State Emergency Service
responsible for flood preparedness and response.
Educationally, the distinction between risk mitigation and emergency management is
also apposite. A common fallacy underpinning the design of some disaster-related
community ECE programs is that risk awareness will directly lead to preparedness
and then appropriate response and recovery behaviours. Research (e.g. Boura,
1998; Rhodes, 2011) has shown that this linear logic process appears to not exist,
and that risk awareness or perception is a part of several psychological processes
leading to preparedness (Paton, McClure and Burgelt, 2006). Thus, ECE programs
should be designed specifically to achieve separate risk awareness and
preparedness learning outcomes.
The intersections between the fields in Figure 2 are relevant to resilience learning in
addition
to
the
fields
themselves.
For
example,
the
emergency
management/community development intersection can include the role of
emergency volunteers in forming social capital. Researchers such as Fahey (2003)
and Wollebaek and Selle (2002) have identified this link and some concerns with its
potency. Hems (2011) feels that the distinction between bonding and bridging social
capital exposes the lack of robustness of the definitions and concepts we utilise in
relation to volunteering. Bridging social capital is most likely to involve formal
volunteering where individuals volunteer through not-for-profit organisations e.g.
helping out at a drop-in centre for the homeless. Informal volunteering is undertaken
on ones own initiative and is most likely to be associated with bonding social capital
e.g. babysitting for a neighbour.
As stated explicitly or implicitly in the groups of actions listed above from the National
Strategy for Disaster Resilience, there is a need for agency and community learning
to help build resilient communities. Central to this requirement is the concept of
communities of practice. According to Wenger (2006), communities of practice are
groups of people who share a concern or passion for something they do and learn
how to do it better as they interact regularly. Examples of disaster-related
156
communities of practice include those interested in finding out about a hazard event
as it unfolds or emergency managers interested in using social media to improve
ECE (e.g. #smem on Twitter). It should be noted that communities of practice may
extend across ethnicities, race and other backgrounds, and not be necessarily
confined to geographic boundaries (e.g. potentially impacted locations - which have
been the sole targets for many emergency agency ECE activities).
The notion of communities of practice or learning communities is not new and has
already been linked to community development activities to form social capital in
communities in a resilience context (Kilpatrick, 2002). Kilpatrick found that learning,
social capital and change are inter-linked. At the micro level of interactions purposerelated knowledge resources and identity resources oil the process of change to
enhance outcomes. The process of change in a community is a learning process,
which simultaneously draws on and builds social capital. Learning and change lead
to more effective outcomes if they are able to use the knowledge and skills of
community members in an integrated fashion.
Some Australian emergency agencies have shown a willingness to develop internal
and external learning communities. For example, as part of one the goals in its
corporate plan, the NSW State Emergency Service will improve its service by
supporting a learning environment through a planned exercise regime, measuring
performance and establishing a best practice Lessons Learned Unit (NSW SES,
2011). However, there is a general tendency of Australian emergency agencies to
provide top-down ECE to communities, rather than considering the psychological
needs and social connections of the learners (Molino Stewart, 2007).
If one accepts the strategic interrelationship of the three resilience-building fields
shown in Figure 2 and that developing communities of practice is an important
mechanism in achieving resilience, it is possible here to define a process that
combines the two. Learning for Disaster Resilience (LfDR) is therefore defined as
any learning process or activity in emergency management, disaster risk reduction
and community development that helps build disaster resilience through
communities of practice.
Social learning for disasters
As LfDR is learner-centred, it is critical to understand the social learning domains
used by individuals and communities before, during and after a disaster. Although,
as noted above, there has been extensive research into the psychological aspects of
preparedness and recovery (and ways to treat psychological problems related to
disasters), there has been relative little educational research into how people learn
through the parts of the disaster cycle.
Goldstein (1984) believes that in terms of unplanned changes such as disasters,
social learning involves the interplay of cognition, emotion and behavior. The
157
importance of personal values and symbols requires attention to the emotional as

well as the thinking and acting aspects of learning.
In a study of Dutch citizens flood preparedness, Terpstra (2011) found two parallel
learning paths cognitive and affective that lead from perceptions to behaviour.
Both paths include multiple dependent variables and indicate how people combine
affect and reason in order to respond to risk (Finucane and Holup, 2006). LfDR
should recognise and assist individual learning within these domains.
Collectively, a participatory approach to learning should be supported by LfDR.
According to Paton (2005), participation in identifying shared problems and
collaborating with others to develop and implement solutions to deal them facilitates
the development of efficacy, sense of community, and commitment to action. That is,
it engenders the development of competencies that enhance community resilience to
adversity. To implement this, Paton suggests that hazard education could be
facilitated by inviting representatives of community groups to review hazard
scenarios in regard to potential challenges, opportunities and threats they could pose
for the community. They would then propose strategies to capitalise on them, or to
manage or contain them.
In a national review of natural hazard community education, awareness and
engagement programs for the Australian Government, Elsworth et al (2009)
identified active community participation as part of their model for effective programs.
They stress that programs would be greatly improved if they involved active
community participation during their development and implementation. Levels of
community participation of this kind that move towards wide consultation,
collaborative development of activities and programs and democratic forms of policyrelated decision-making require conscious design, considerable effort in
implementation and on-going evaluation.
In the participatory LfDR approach, the emergency management agencies assimilate
and support the needs and directions of the community. They thus act as consultants
to communities (e.g. facilitators, resource providers, change agents, coordinators)
rather than directing the change process in a top-down manner. It should be
acknowledged that many Australian emergency agencies are implementing their
engagement activities in this manner.
Implications for emergency agencies
Who should be responsible for LfDR in Australia? As stressed in the National
Strategy for Disaster Resilience, a basic tenet for building disaster resilience is
shared responsibility. The Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission in its Final Report
(2010) uses the expression shared responsibility to mean increased responsibility
for all. It recommends that state agencies and municipal councils adopt increased or
improved protective, emergency management and advisory roles. In turn,
communities, individuals and households need to take greater responsibility for their
158
own safety and to act on advice and other cues given to them before and on the day
of a bushfire.
Shared responsibility does not mean equal responsibility ... there are some areas in
which the state should assume greater responsibility than the community. For
example, in most instances state fire authorities will be more capable than
individuals when it comes to identifying the risks associated with bushfire; the state
should therefore assume greater responsibility for working to minimise those risks.
In line with this explanation of shared responsibility, it is reasonable and practical to
expect that disaster and emergency agencies take the lead in some aspects of LfDR.
For example, agencies should take the lead in communicating warnings to
communities as they are privy to critical emergency intelligence (although this is not
to say that communities cannot be involved in providing feedback and intelligence
e.g. through crowdsourcing). On the other hand, during the preparedness and parts
of the recovery phase agencies and communities can share responsibility of tasks
through participatory learning.
There are several LfDR best practices for agencies and communities to use based
on current research and practice. These include:
As noted above, LfDR ECE programs and activities should be learner-centred

and thus an understanding of the learning community is important in their
design (Elsworth et al, 2009; Molino Stewart, 2007). This can be achieved
through processes such as community profiling, social research and social
network analysis.
As also noted above, LfDR should be participatory (e.g. coordinated through
local committees) and designed for cognitive, affective and behavioural
learning domains.
Learning should be focused on outcomes for disaster risk reduction (e.g.
minimising residual risk), emergency management (e.g. helping to ensure
community safety) and community development (e.g. forming resilience
social capital).
Learning should be aligned with structural and other non-structural methods
used in disaster risk reduction, and with emergency management measures
such as operations and planning (Molino Stewart, 2007).
Learning should be designed for before, during and after a disaster and be
ongoing in delivery as a disaster can occur at any time (Dufty, 2008).
LfDR should help build disaster resilient communities of practice.
LfDR requires a cross-hazard and cross-agency approach to learning (Dufty,
2008).
Program evaluation is a critical requirement of all LfDR activities (Elsworth et
al, 2009). Excellent examples of this have been conducted by the Bushfire
CRC (http://www.bushfirecrc.com).
159
The use of social media should be an important component of LfDR (Dufty,

2012), as well as the more traditional ECE activities (e.g. events, media,
websites, meetings).
Post-disaster learning is important to help stimulate the bounce forward
effect (Molino Stewart, 2007; Dufty, 2008). This learning can be derived from
ECE activities such as de-brief community meetings, community resilience
webinars (used extensively after the 2011 Queensland floods) and social
media discussions.
Conclusion
The above argument for a more holistic LfDR approach is consistent not only with
the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience and current research, but also with the
findings of some major government inquiries into recent disasters. For example, the
Victorian Floods Review (2011) in its final report recommended that the State:
Involve local communities in the development and ownership of community

resilience plans based on a all hazards approach and tailored for the specific
needs of each community
Encouraging local communities to form resilience committees to develop and
administer community resilience plans (Recommendation 93)
However, there are knowledge gaps in the literature that require further research to
validate and refine the LfDR approach. These gaps include:
The practical interrelationships between disaster risk reduction, emergency

management and community development e.g. through community case
studies
How communities learn before, during and after an event
The value of social media in building community disaster resilience
Best practice methods to evaluate community disaster ECE activities
Design of appropriate and effective community disaster resilience learning
plans and programs.
Hopefully, this paper will encourage agencies and communities to move further down
the path to holistic disaster resilience learning. In closing, in the words of Theodore
Roosevelt appropriate for any community around the world:
Americans learn only from catastrophe
and not from experience.
References
Aldrich, D.P., 2008, The Crucial Role of Civil Society in Disaster Recovery and
Japans Emergency Preparedness, Japan aktuell, Vol. 3, pp.81-96.
160
Aldrich, D.P., 2010, Fixing Recovery: Social Capital in Post-Crisis Resilience,

Journal of Homeland Security, Vol. 6, June 2010, pp. 1- 10.
Aldrich, D.P., 2011a, The Externalities of Social Capital: Post-Tsunami Recovery in
Southeast India, Journal of Civil Society, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 81-99.
Aldrich, D. P., 2011b, Between Market and State: Directions in Social Science
Research on Disaster, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 9, No. 1, March 2011 pp. 61-68.
Bennett, A.,1973, Professional staff members contributions to community
development, Journal of the Community Development Society, Vol. 4, pp.58-68.
Boettke, P., Chamlee-Wright, E., Gordon, P., Ikeda, S., Leeson, P.T., & Sobel, R.,
2007, The Political, Economic, and Social Aspects of Katrina, Southern Economic
Journal, Vol. 74, No. 2, pp. 363-376.
Boin, A., Comfort, L.K., & Demchak, C.C., 2010, The Rise of Resilience, in Comfort,
L.K., Boin, A., & Demchak, C.C. (eds.), Designing Resilience: preparing for extreme
events, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh.
Boura, J., 1998, Community Fireguard: Creating partnerships with the community to
minimise the impact of bushfire, The Australian Journal of Emergency Management,
Vol. 13, pp. 59-64.
CCS Strategic Management, 2008, Serpentine Jarrahdale Shire Community
Facilities and Services Plan 2020 Report 5, compiled in association with Geografia.
Chamlee-Wright, E., 2010, The Cultural and Political Economy of Recovery: Social
Learning in a Post-Disaster Environment, Routledge, New York.
COAG, 2011, National Strategy for Disaster Resilience: Building our nations
resilience to disasters, Australian Government.
de Bruijne, M., A., Boin, A., & van Eeten, M., 2010, Resilience: Exploring the
Concept and its Meanings, in Comfort, L.K., Boin, A., & Demchak, C.C. (eds.),
Designing Resilience: preparing for extreme events, University of Pittsburgh Press,
Pittsburgh.
Dovers, S., 2004, Sustainability and Disaster Management, The Australian Journal of
Emergency Management, Vol. 19, pp. 21-25.
Dufty, N., 2008, A new approach to community flood education, The Australian
Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 4-8.
Dufty, N., 2012, Using Social Media to Build Community Disaster Resilience, The
Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 40-45.
Elsworth, G., Gilbert, J., Robinson, P., Rowe, C., and Stevens, K., 2009, National
Review of Community Education, Awareness and Engagement Programs for Natural
161
Hazards, report by RMIT University commissioned by the National Community

Safety Working Group of the Australian Emergency Management Committee.
Fahey, C., 2003, Working with communities to build social capital Reflecting on old
and new thinking about volunteers, The Australian Journal of Emergency
Management, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp.12-17.
Finucane, M.L., & Holup, J.L., 2006, Risk as value: combining affect and analysis in
risk judgements, Journal of Risk Research, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 141-164.
Gero, A., Mheux, K., & Dominey-Howes, D., 2010, Disaster risk reduction and
climate change adaptation in the Pacific: The challenge of integration, ATRC-NHRL
Miscellaneous Report 4.
Goldstein, H., 1984, Social Learning and Change: A Cognitive Approach to Human
Services, Tavistock Publications, USA.
Hems, L., 2011, Building Social Capital volunteering, participation and pro-social
behaviours, blog from the Centre for Social Impact, May 4, 2011
https://secure.csi.edu.au/site/Home/Blog.aspx?defaultblog=http%3a%2f%2fblog.csi.
edu.au%2f2011%2f05%2fbuilding-social-capital-%25e2%2580%2593-volunteeringparticipation-and-pro-social-behaviours%2f
Kilpatrick, S., 2002, Learning and Building Social Capital in a Community of Farm
Businesses, Centre for Research and Learning in Regional Australia, Discussion
Paper D1/2002.
Longstaff, P.H., 2005, Security, resilience and communication in unpredictable
environments such as terrorism, natural disasters and complex technology, Program
on Information Resources Policy, Centre for Information Policy Research, Harvard
University. Available at http://www.pirp.harvard.edu
Manyena, S.B., OBrien, G., OKeefe, P., & Rose, J., 2011, Disaster resilience; a
bounce back or a bounce forward ability?, Local Environment, Vol. 16, No. 5,
pp.417-424.
Mayunga, J.S, 2007, Understanding and Applying the Concept of Community
Disaster Resilience: A capital-based approach, draft paper prepared for the Summer
Academy for Social Vulnerability and Resilience Building, 22-28 July 2007, Munich,
Germany
Molino Stewart, 2007, Roles and Responsibilities for VICSES in Flood Education, a
report commissioned by VICSES. available at:
http://www.ses.vic.gov.au/CA256AEA002EBBF1/Lookup/Emergency-ManagementResearch/$file/Roles%20and%20Responsibilities%20for%20VICSES%20in%20Floo
d%20Education%20Dec%202007.pdf
162
NSW SES, 2011, One SES: NSW SES Plan 2011-2015. Available at
http://www.ses.nsw.gov.au/content/documents/pdf/47777/plan-11-15
Paton, D., Smith, L., Johnston, D., Johnston, M., & Ronan, K., 2003, Developing a
model to predict the adoption of natural hazard risk reduction and preparatory
adjustments, (Research Project No. 01-479): EQC Research Report
Paton, D., 2005, Community Resilience: Integrating Hazard Management and
Community Engagement, School of Psychology, University of Tasmania. Available at
http://www.engagingcommunities2005.org/abstracts/Paton-Douglas-final.pdf
Paton, D., 2006, Disaster resilience: building capacity to co-exist with natural
hazards and their consequences, in Paton, D., & Johnston, D., (eds.), Disaster
Resilience: An Integrated Approach, Charles C Thomas Publishers Ltd, Springfield.
Paton, D., McClure, J., & Burgelt, P.T., 2006, Natural hazard resilience: the role of
individual and household preparedness, in Paton, D., & Johnston, D., (eds.),
Disaster Resilience: An Integrated Approach, Charles C Thomas Publishers Ltd,
Springfield.
Putnam, R., 1995, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American
Community, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 6, pp. 65-78.
Rhodes, A., 2011, Opinion: Ready or not? Can community education increase
householder preparedness for bushfire?, The Australian Journal of Emergency
Management, Volume 26, No. 2, pp. 6-10.
Royal Commission into the 2009 Victorian Bushfires, 2010, Final Report, State
Government of Victoria, Australia.
Szreter, S., & Woolcock, M., 2004, Health by association? Social capital, social
theory, and the political economy of public health. International Journal of
Epidemiology Vol. 33 No. 4 pp.650-667.
Terpstra, T., 2011, Emotions, Trust, and Perceived Risk: Affective and Cognitive
Routes to Flood Preparedness Behavior, Risk Analysis, Vol. 31, No. 10, pp.16581675.
Topping, K., 2011, Strengthening resilience through mitigation planning, Natural
Hazards Observer, Vol. 36, No.2.
Victorian Floods Review, 2011, Review of the 2010-11 Flood Warnings and
Response, State of Victoria, Australia.
Wenger, E., 2006, Communities of practice: a brief introduction, available at
www.ewenger.com/research.
Whittle, R., Medd, W., Deeming, H., Kashefi, E., Mort, M., Walker, G., & Watson, N.,
2010, After the rain - learning the lessons from flood recovery in Hull. Final project
163
report for 'Flood, Vulnerability and Urban Resilience: a real-time study of local
recovery following the floods of June 2007 in Hull, Project Report, Lancaster, UK.
Wildavsky, A.B., 1988, Searching for safety, Transaction, New Brunswick.
Wollebaek, D., & Selle, P., 2002, Does Participation in Voluntary Associations
Contribute to Social Capital? The impact of intensity, scope and type, Nonprofit and
Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp.32-61.
164
Optimising the use of an incident management system in coal

mining emergencies
Ruth Fuller, David Cliff and Tim Horberry

PhD candidate and Supervisors
University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia
Paper presented at
165
Optimising the use of an incident management system in coal mining

emergencies
Abstract
This paper presents ongoing research examining the application and performance of
the Mining Emergency Management System (MEMS). The MEMS is an industry
specific variant of the Australian Inter-service Incident Management System and is
used during emergencies at underground coal mines in Queensland (Queensland
Mines Rescue Service, 2009). Since its introduction in 2005, its utility has been
assessed during annual Queensland mine emergency exercises. These exercises
are realistic emergency simulations staged at a host mine and involve input from
various state authorities. Each year, independent assessors observe the exercise
and make recommendations to improve overall emergency management
performance. Despite the introduction of the MEMS, the recommendations have
remained largely the same each year, indicating that the MEMS is possibly not
sufficient on its own to optimise emergency management performance. This
research proposes that focusing on relevant non-technical skills, via the
development and application of a mining industry Crew Resource Management
(CRM) style program, may improve performance.
Keywords: mining, incident control, Crew Resource Management, CRM, MEMS,
emergencies, decision making.
Introduction
Underground coal mines have the potential to trap, injure or even kill many people in
one incident. A methane or coal dust explosion, fire, an inrush of water or toxic
gases and structural collapse are all ever-present hazards for those working
underground. In November 2010, 29 miners were killed due to explosions at the Pike
River Coal Mine in New Zealand, and only 7 months prior (April 2010), 29 men were
killed when the Upper Big Branch Coal Mine in the U.S. exploded.
Therefore, emergency situations can and do still occur, and Queensland coal mines
have a legal responsibility through the Coal Mining Health and Safety Act 1999, to be
prepared to handle them. In Queensland, if such a tragedy arises again, it will
generally be the mine manager who takes the role of Incident Controller (IC).
However, the previous 14 annual Level 1 mine emergency exercises run
throughout Queensland indicate that mine managers and their supporting Incident
Control Team (ICT) struggle to perform optimally in unfamiliar, fast-paced, stressful
and dynamic emergency situations. In an effort to improve performance, the Mining
Emergency Management System (MEMS) was implemented in 2005. However, even
with the application of MEMS, a number of recommendations from the Level 1
assessors recur annually indicating that further improvements to emergency
response can be made.
Recent Emergency Response at Underground Coal Mines
Recent coal mining history in the US highlights the dangers of emergency response.
At Crandall Canyon Mine (2007), three rescuers attempting to reach six men trapped
in the mine, following an outburst, were killed by a subsequent outburst (United
States Department of Labor Mine Safety and Health Administration, 2007). From
this, some would say they made the wrong decision. However, this is overly
166
simplistic and suffers from hindsight bias (Dekker, 2006). Further, there is more to
determining if an emergency response went badly than simply the occurrence of
further injuries or fatalities, as evidenced by the response at the SAGO disaster in
2006 (an explosion). In this instance, the ICT was cautious about sending rescuers
underground. The resulting delay in activating the crews was blamed, by the
subsequent inquiry, for the deaths of 11 out of the 12 miners who sought refuge
underground while waiting for help to arrive (McAteer et al, 2006).Therefore, this ICT
was also said to have made the wrong decision by some, despite it being the
opposite of that made at Crandall Canyon. Again, those making this assessment had
the benefit of hindsight. Retrospectively assessing the success or otherwise of an
emergency operation is difficult and cannot simply be based on the outcome without
consideration of the circumstances and facts available at the time. Therefore, using
emergency exercises to analyse emergency response performance are extremely
valuable.
The Development of Level 1 Exercises and Introduction to MEMS
Queenslands last deadly coal mining disaster was at Moura in 1994 where an
explosion killed 11 men. This was the last in a series of explosions at Moura that
claimed a total of 36 lives between 1974-1994. As a direct result of a
recommendation from the Wardens Inquiry into the 1994 event, annual Level 1 mine
emergency exercises have been conducted in Queensland since 1998 (Wardens
Inquiry, 1996). These exercises are realistic emergency simulations staged at a
nominated mine. The exercise involves the mine (surface and underground),
external agencies, the Queensland Mines Rescue Service (QMRS), external
services (usually the ambulance service) and often neighbouring coal mines. The
exercises are designed by a confidential exercise management committee in
accordance with the Recognised Standard 08: Conduct of mine emergency
exercises (Queensland Government, 2009).
The exercise management committee which must include at least:
One representative of the mines inspectorate,

One representative from SIMTARS (Safety in Mines Testing and Research
Station),
Three representatives from other mines including at least one mine manager,
One representative from the host mine,
One representative from the QMRS,
One industry safety and health representative, and
Others, such as those designing special effects to ensure it is realistic.
The Level 1 exercise occurs without any warning, but within a disclosed two week
timeframe. Each year assessors monitor all aspects of the emergency exercise,
above and below ground, and provide recommendations in a report which is
provided to the host mine and available to all other mines via a Government website
(Queensland Government, 2011). These exercises provide excellent first-hand and
real-time data to the mining industry regarding decision making and emergency
response performance, whilst also offering the host mine practice in a realistic
emergency situation.
167
In early Level 1 exercises, assessors recommended that a formal incident

management system be implemented to improve decision making and overall
performance. One assessor stated, There is a further need to establish a clear
organisational structure for the management of an emergency, including information
gathering techniques, decision making processes and communication mechanisms.
These are available within professional emergency services organisations and
should be reviewed and considered for adaptation to the mining environment. (Level
1 report, 2003). The following year the statement was made, A mine must have an
established, structured and comprehensive system for managing an emergency with
a trained, disciplined response team, and a further recommendation in the 2004
Level 1 report was to, Implement the Incident Control System (ICS) and particularly
limit the span of control (five resources under the control of one person) of
individuals. As a result of these observations the first version of the MEMS was
rolled out in 2005.
The Use of the MEMS
Use of the MEMS is not mandatory. However, as the QMRS use it, promote it and
offer training in its use, it is well known and respected within the Queensland coal
mining community. The MEMS has been designed using the principles of the ICS as
its framework. The ICS is the U.S. system mandated by the National Incident
Management System (NIMS), and is the system taught and promoted by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The ICS evolved from an incident
management system developed for wildfire fighters in the 1970s following the
devastating Southern California fires (Buck, Trainor, & Aguirre, 2006). The ICS forms
the basis of the Australian Inter-service Incident Management System (AIIMS) and
the New Zealand Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS). These systems
are used by Government agencies and the emergency services in the event of a
disaster. In New Zealand, CIMS was used in the rescue and recovery stages of the
Pike River Coal Mine disaster. The MEMS is directly modelled on AIIMS and ICS.
The MEMS structure involves functional groups reporting to an ICT. The leaders of
the functional groups form the ICT, along with the IC and any other roles identified as
necessary. The functional groups include operations, planning and logistics. The
philosophy behind the structure is command and control, with the IC responsible for
authorising all decisions. Under the MEMS, the IC is responsible for everything that
occurs on the mine site following the declaration of an emergency. The IC is the
senior mine official, generally the mine manager, due to his statutory responsibility
for the mine and all who enter it (Section 150, Coal Mining Safety and Health
Regulation, 2001. The functional group leaders make decisions relating to their
functional area, but decision approval is required from the IC during ICT meetings.
The principal purpose of implementing an incident management system is to provide
coordination when different agencies are working together. During a coal mining
emergency in Queensland, other mines and the QMRS work with the mine.
Implementation of the MEMS means all agencies will use the same system,
facilitating effective communication and maintaining the integrity of the command
and control structure.
As the MEMS is industry specific, it has been customised to provide detailed
guidance on its application within the coal mining industry. The course guide
includes templates for standard items such as incident action plans, changeover
168
information, and function request forms. It also provides guidance on dealing with the
media as, unlike other systems such as AIIMS, the IC at a mine site is more directly
responsible for providing this information, either personally or through a liaison
officer or spokesperson.
However, the application of the MEMS is just as likely to encounter the same general
problems as other incident management systems. Research on ICS and AIIMS
suggests that without comprehensive training and development of interpersonal and
inter-agency relationships these systems are likely to fail. For instance, an analysis
of historical search and rescue case studies, where FEMA taskforces were involved,
found that there was confusion over roles and responsibilities and time delays in
cases where ICS was used but the agencies themselves were not trained and had
no training experience with each other (Buck, et al., 2006). A lack of inter-agency
familiarity and trust was blamed for the poor use of the ICS because in situations
where agencies were well trained in ICS, and had trained together previously, it
worked well as a system (Buck, et al., 2006). Similarly, ICS was found to be
problematic when used by the police for large incidents despite the assertion that
they use ICS on a daily basis. The problem identified was that police incidents rarely
require more than a single police officer, or in terms of ICS, only the IC is required
(Buck, et al., 2006). Therefore, the police experience with ICS is only at its simplest
level, unlike the full version that would be employed in a large-scale emergency
utilising functional groups and inter-agency involvement. A more recent study of the
emergency operation following Hurricane Rita also concluded that more training
would improve the effectiveness of the ICS. However, the goal of the training
proposed would be to provide experience in more typical scenarios rather than the
traditional theoretical type training already on offer (Lutz & Lindell, 2008). Therefore,
without significant practical training, it is likely MEMS may encounter the same
problems.
The MEMS Training
The MEMS training, which is run by experienced QMRS personnel, is a weeklong
residential course. The trainers offer guidance on issues relevant to mining incidents,
such as family interaction. The first two days are mostly theoretical, with the
remainder being more practical, including the use of the MEMS system in
simulations. The theory component includes a four hour session with an external
consultant who covers basic psychology in an effort to help attendees obtain better
control in circumstances involving stress and emotion. Issues such as working
memory capacity, how people behave when fatigued, basic neuropsychology,
attitudes and perception are covered. However, these topics are not yet integrated
with the simulations. During the simulations, attendees are encouraged to take
different roles each time to facilitate an understanding of the roles, responsibilities
and challenges faced by each functional group.
A gas monitoring system is brought in to simulate an incident for the final simulation
on the last day of the training. The technical data from the gas monitoring system
requires interpretation, as it would in real life. Groups are encouraged to move
furniture and set up their functional areas to prevent disturbances and maximise
utility. Real telephone calls are received and are also expected to be made. Actors
receiving calls are often just as obstructive as in real life, adding to the authenticity of
the exercise by introducing some frustration. From this, it can be seen that the
169
QMRS have made a good start at addressing some teamwork and communications
issues, however, this may be able to be improved upon.
Industry Training
As stated previously, the necessity for annual training in emergency procedures was
noted in the Moura Inquiry, and is detailed in the Recognised Standard 08: Conduct
of mine emergency exercises (Queensland Government, 2009). Within this standard,
4 levels of training are prescribed. The Level 1 exercise is the state level exercise
and is held only once a year and only at one mine. Therefore, the other mines must
undertake a Level 2 exercise, which is a whole of mine exercise designed to test
emergency response including the ICT. The guidelines state that the exercise
scenarios must vary annually and that, in some years, the mine manager should not
be involved in the design to ensure that s/he has practice. The QMRS should be
involved in the design and post assessment of the Level 2 exercises. Each year, the
organising committee is required to submit a report detailing the performance,
outcomes and recommendations to the District Inspector and to the Industry Safety
and Health Representative. The purpose of Level 3 exercises is to test the
evacuation plans and self-escape skills of the underground workers. Level 4
exercises involve supporting exercises such as desk-top or semi-practical exercises
intended to meet objectives such as communication, teamwork, troubleshooting and
hazard identification. While there is official auditing of the Level 1, 2 and 3
exercises, there is no official auditing of the Level 4 exercises. The outcomes of
Level 3 and 4 exercises are to be recorded and held at the mine.
Interpersonal and Inter-agency Relationships
A critical evaluation of ICS, which is also applicable to the MEMS, claims that it is a
bureaucratic system that requires certain conditions for it to work well"(p15, Buck, et
al., 2006). This has been acknowledged by others (Bigley & Roberts, 2001) and
seems realistic given that the systems are simply a structure by which to organise
the emergency response. As previously mentioned, it should be noted that the ICS
was developed for wildfire fighters. These are teams consisting of members who
work up through the ranks, learning from their superiors and forming strong
interpersonal relationships. They have practiced in many emergency scenarios
gaining vital experience in the fundamentals of the working environment and learning
tactics helping them to become experts in fighting fires (Klein, 1999). It is therefore
likely that these are the certain conditions required for ICS to work well, and that
the design of ICS and all the variants of it, are based on teams with interpersonal
knowledge, trust and experience in the emergency scenario. Therefore, it is not that
the system itself fails (Buck, et al., 2006), but that perhaps its design is founded on
an underlying assumption that these conditions are always the case when that may
not be correct.
The importance of interpersonal and inter-agency relationships contributing to the
success of an incident management system, and the overall success of an
emergency response, became apparent during the Rescue and Recovery phase of
the Pike River Royal Commission. Poor relationships, between and within agencies,
appeared to contribute to the severe criticism expressed during the Royal
Commission relating to the interpretation and application of the CIMS structure. The
specific CIMS structure that was applied appeared to increase the divide between
170
agencies, negatively impacting on communications and trust, and exacerbating the

poor interrelationships.
It is a common view that implementing a clear working structure will eliminate some
of the ambiguity associated with having human beings involved in a process. Indeed,
this was presumably the driver for the Level 1 assessors suggesting the
implementation of the MEMS. This opinion was also clearly evident at Pike River,
with the resource coordinator highlighting the fact, So when you put emotion and
fatigue into one context youve got a real cocktail of challenges. So you try and
manage that by either sound structure or process, a combination of both actually.
(p1693, Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy - Phase two:
Search and Rescue, 2011)
While this opinion seems logical, the evidence from Pike River indicates that more
than a structure, whether implemented exactly as intended or not, is required for an
incident management team to perform optimally. Furthermore, given that the same
recommendations are being made annually by Level 1 assessors despite the
implementation of the MEMS and its training, it is clear that improvements can be
made. As the assessors comments primarily relate to poor decision making, despite
a defined structure and process, it seems that improvements focussing on the
human factors, rather than the technical or systems issues, may be particularly
beneficial.
Decision Making in Mining Emergencies
Decision making is a key process in emergency response and it is mentioned in
every Level 1 report. Decision making is a tangible concept and easy to evaluate and
comment upon. There may also be an element of hindsight bias leading to the
comments or possibly it is because the assessors know more than the decision
maker does during the exercise. However, decision making processes, and the
factors that underlie them, are complex. As such, the physiological literature on
decision making is vast. Initial research into decision making focussed on analytical
processes, which typically involves gathering information, comparing alternatives
and making the optimum decision (Shanks, Lagnado, & Newell, 2007). Many
researchers have deemed this approach irrelevant to the real world (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974), and more recently, Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) has led
the way in describing how expert decision makers make decisions (Klein, 1999,
2008). However, within mining, some decisions require an analytical approach. The
most important being whether or not to allow re-entry into the mine following an
incident or evacuation.
The re-entry decision is one that the Queensland coal mining community take very
seriously due to the danger posed to rescue workers and the requirement for a
timely response, as highlighted earlier by the U.S. examples. To make the re-entry
decision, complete and accurate data is required to show without a doubt that the
mine environment is safe. Because of the importance and the analytical nature of
this particular decision an Australian Coal Association Research Program (ACARP)
project entitled, Mine Entry Data Management has been undertaken to develop a
system that allows mines to collect and collate critical information about the mine,
such as historical gas readings, prior to an emergency. It has been identified that
approximately 70% of the technical data required in an emergency is available
171
before the emergency arises (Nugent, Devlin, Grieves, Cliff. D., & Brady, 2011).
Having this data identified and stored electronically enables quicker access to the
data in the event of an incident, enabling the decision makers to make a more rapid
assessment of the situation and ultimately a more timely decision.
Some would suggest that all decisions during an emergency response should be
made in such a rigorous and analytical manner and, to some extent, the requirement
for risk assessments ensures some level of rigour. However, the research indicates
that many different types of decision making methods are employed in emergency
response (Rhona Flin, O'Connor, & Crichton, 2008). These range from analytical
decisions to intuitive decision making, where the person is hardly aware theyve
made a decision. The advent, and subsequent development of NDM over the last 15
years has progressed the understanding of how expert incident commanders make
decisions, often using studies of military or fire commanders (Klein, Calderwood, &
Clinton-Cirocco, 1988). There are obvious differences between an expert military
incident commander and a mine manager suddenly involved in an emergency
response, an atypical scenario for him/her. However, research on managers of
offshore oil and gas rigs, and to some extent nuclear control room operators, has
bridged the gap to the mining industry because those in charge are technical
experts, but not necessarily experts in emergency management.
From the incident command literature, the Pike River tragedy and an examination of
the previous Level 1 reports, it seems that decision making cannot be considered
alone in the incident response context. To improve decision making, several other
factors need consideration such as communication, situational awareness,
leadership, teamwork and stress and fatigue management (Rhona Flin, et al., 2008).
These particular skills are the skills identified in the incident management literature
as being critical for effective emergency response and are those common amongst
many industries including aviation, military, nuclear control, maritime, rail, health, fire
services, and offshore oil and gas (see Flin et al, 2007). Increasingly it is these skills,
termed non-technical skills,that are being addressed in incident management
training and may be the key to improving emergency management in the mining
industry.
Non- technical Skills
Non-technical skills have been defined as cognitive and social skills that enhance
technical skills (Flin et al, 2007). It seems likely that these non technical skills may be
at the core of the interpersonal skills that the literature implies are critical for an
incident management system to perform optimally. This is logical because these
non-technical skills seem to address many of the attributes that wildfire fighters
would be expected to have. To address deficiencies in non-technical skills, the
aviation industry developed Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) in the 1980s to
make use of all the resources, human and otherwise within the cockpit (Lauber at al.,
2008 as cited in Rhona Flin, et al., 2008). Today, most of the major international
airlines include CRM as part of their training. It is recommended by both European
and American aviation regulators and is a mandatory component of training for UK
pilots (Rhona Flin, et al., 2008). Research on improving non-technical skills in other
high-reliability industries, such as the health industry (R. Flin et al., 2007),
demonstrates the benefits of CRM, which now stands for the more general Crew
Resource Management. As a result, CRM training and assessment packages have
172
been specifically designed for several industries. It is the focus of this research to
investigate the merits of, and potential development of, a CRM program for the coal
mining industry in Queensland.
Applying CRM to Coal Mining
As part of an ongoing research program by the authors, four iterative stages are
proposed in the development and evaluation of a CRM package for the mining
industry.
Stage 1 - Identifying the problem and the required critical non-technical skills
Stage 2 - Developing initial CRM training package
Stage 3 - Evaluating and refining the CRM training package
Stage 4 - Ongoing evaluation of the CRM package
The first stage involves identifying the key non-technical skills relevant to optimal
performance of an ICT. As stated, several non-technical skills have been identified
as being relatively common between industries. Table 1 lists some past comments
from Level 1 assessors, indicating these non-technical skills are just as relevant to
the mining context, as they are in other industries where CRM is currently being
used.
Table 1: Common non-technical skills and relevant Level 1 assessor comments.
Non-technical skill
Relevant quotes from Level 1 exercise assessors
Decision making
Decisions not being recorded (1998, 1999).
Not having a clearly defined decision making process
(1998, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2005).
Groupthink evident (1999, 2002).
Best with only core ICT members (2003).
Situational awareness Taking the initial decision/scenario or response as the only
one and not considering all alternatives (1999, 2001, 2003).
Communication
Poor communications (1998, 1999, 2000, 2006).
Better communications between CRO and ICT required
(2001,2002,2008).
Some communications not recorded (2002).
Vital information for decision making not getting to ICT
(2005).
Electronic communication went well (2007).
ICT not challenging IC, more input from ICT required
(1999,2001).
Told wrong family next of kin was dead (1999).
Information to ICT was slow and not of high quality (2000).
Information flow needs to be improved (2005).
ICT in the dark (2008).
Teamwork
Confusion regarding roles and responsibilities within the
MEMS (2006).
Rescue team not included in decision making (2000).
Leadership
Goals not clear (1998, 2002, 2001).
IC trying to set own goals (2003).
Better objectives need to be set (2007).
ICT needs to take control of all activities on site once
173
Stress management
Fatigue management
formed (2010).
Decisions are not driven to completion (2001, 2003).
Fatigue affecting decision making (2000, 2001,2002, 2007).
However, further research is required because additional non-technical skills may

need to be addressed to make improvements to emergency response performance
in the mining industry. For instance, previous CRM research in other industries has
indicated that assertiveness may be relevant. This non-technical skill was identified
as critical within the aviation industry (see Rhona Flin, 1996), and the previous Level
1 reports indicate that ICT members sometimes dont challenge the IC about
decisions. Further, personal limitations was found to be critical for offshore
installation managers (see Flin, 1996). Given the parities between this role and that
of a mine manager, it is possible that this might also be critical in the mining context.
Additionally, real life coal mining incidents indicate that skills in dealing with emotions
may be beneficial. Mining is often a family game (Simpson, Horberry, & Joy, 2009).
Fathers, sons, cousins, uncles, nephews and close family friends often working
together. Therefore, in the event of a disaster, some rescuers may have close
friends or family underground in the mine.
To ensure that all of the relevant non-technical skills are identified, a number of
methodologies will be used. The methods that are likely to be used for Stage 1, and
the remaining stages, are outlined in Table 2.
Table 2: Methodologies that will likely be used to develop a CRM program for the
mining industry.
Stage 1:
Stage 2:
Stage 3:
Stage 4:
Identifying the
Developing
Evaluating
Ongoing
problem and CRM training
the CRM
evaluation of
the required
package
training
the CRM
critical nonpackage
package
technical
skills
Document analysis
Questionnaires
Audio or visual
analysis
Direct observation
Case study
Interviews
Behavioural rating
174
scale
These methodologies may be changed over the course of this research, but the use
of multiple research and evaluation methods will help to develop a comprehensive
CRM program for the mining industry.
Conclusions
Managing emergencies in underground coal mines is of vital importance, and the
research program presented here is only in its early stages. However, because of
the improvements recommended to the mining industry following the Moura disaster,
including the Level 1 exercises and the subsequent design and implementation of
the MEMS, there is a significant amount of historical information and industry
knowledge that can be used to assist in the development of a CRM package. In
conclusion, it is hypothesised that implementing a CRM-style training package for
the coal mining industry will improve performance at Level 1 emergency exercises.
Of course, it is sincerely hoped that there will be no need to ever test this hypothesis
in a real incident.
175
References
Bigley, G. A., & Roberts, K. H. (2001). The Incident Command System: High-Reliability Organizing for
Complex and Volatile Task Environments. The Academy of Management Journal, 44(6),
1281-1299.
Buck, D., Trainor, J. E., & Aguirre, B. E. (2006). A critical evaluation of the incident command system
and NIMS. Journal of homeland security and emergency management, 3(3), 1-27.
Dekker, S. (2006). The field guide to understanding human error. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
Flin, R. (1996). Sitting in the hot seat: Leaders and teams for critical incident management.
Chichester: Wiley.
Flin, R., O'Connor, P., & Crichton, M. (2008). Safety at the sharp end. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Flin, R., Yule, S., Paterson-Brown, S., Maran, N., Rowley, D., & Youngson, G. (2007). Teaching
surgeons about non-technical skills. The Surgeon, 5(2), 86-89.
Klein, G. (1999). Sources of power : how people make decisions / Gary Klein. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Klein, G. (2008). Naturalistic Decision Making. Human Factors. , 50(3), 456-460.
Klein, G., Calderwood, R., & Clinton-Cirocco, A. (1988). Rapid decision making on the fire ground (ARI
Technical report 796). Alexandria VA.: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and
Social Sciences.
Lutz, L. D., & Lindell, M. K. (2008). Incident Command System as a Response Model Within
Emergency Operation Centers during Hurricane Rita. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis
Management, 16(3), 122-134.
Nugent, G., Devlin, S., Grieves, J., Cliff. D., & Brady, D. (2011). Emergency response: Mine entry data
management, Australian Coal Association Research Program Project No. C19010.
Queensland Government. (2009). Recognised Standard 08; Conduct of mine emergency exercises.
Queensland Government. (2011, July 2011). Queensland level 1 mine emergency exercise reports.
from http://mines.industry.qld.gov.au/safety-and-health/emergency-excercise-reports.htm
Queensland Mines Rescue Service. (2009). MEMS Course Guide. Dysart.
Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy - Phase two: Search and Rescue, (2011).
Shanks, D. R., Lagnado, D. A., & Newell, B. R. (2007). Straight choices: the psychology of decision
making. Hove, East Sussex: Psychology Press.
Simpson, G., Horberry, T., & Joy, J. (2009). Understanding Human Error in Mine Safety. Aldershot,
UK: Ashgate Press.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science,
185, 1124-1131.
United States Department of Labor Mine Safety and Health Administration. (2007). Report of
Investigation: Underground Coal Mine. Fatal underground coal burst accidents August 6 and
16, 2007 Crandall Canyon Mine.
Report on an accident at Moura No 2 mine on Sunday, 7 August 1994 (1996).
176
Rebuilding After the 2010/2011 Victorian Floods A Roads

Perspective
Mr Emiliyan Gikovski
Manager Program Liaison
VicRoads, Melbourne, Australia
Paper presented at
Brisbane 16-18 April 2012
177
Rebuilding After the 2010/2011 Victorian Floods A Roads Perspective

Abstract
In September 2010 Victoria experienced its worst flooding in 15 years causing
significant infrastructure damage across the state (reported 1:100 for all
events). The destruction was amplified by subsequent flooding events in
December, January and again in February 2011 affecting a large percentage
of the state. Hundreds of road closures, major landslips, bridge washaways
and millions of dollars in infrastructure damage ensued causing disruptions to
the road network and major freight transport routes.
With a massive amount of repair works required, the rebuilding has been a
challenging task. VicRoads and its maintenance contractors continue the
recovery effort, including the management of closed roads, and making
temporary and permanent repairs.
Introduction
The 2010/11 floods have demonstrated the importance of communicating
road closure and alternative routes in managing the communitys
expectations. It has also highlighted the impacts this has on regional
community, hindering access, tourism and freight for many parts of Victoria.
At the height or peak of the flood events (January 2011), 66 arterial roads and
320 local roads were closed. As at January 2012, 60 arterial roads and in
excess of 275 local Council roads have been reopened.
The gross cost of repairs required as a result of the damage caused to arterial
road, rail and bridge infrastructure caused by the September to February
floods is estimated to be in excess of $120 million. The State Government has
provided nominal cash flow amounts to VicRoads to assist with flood recovery
with a heavy reliance on cost recovery through insurance claims.
Image 1 Kerang Township September 2010
178
The Initial Response

Some key events during the recovery and planning period noting that
significant renewal work will be required over the next 2 years to ensure that
roads are kept in a safe and maintainable condition. These events included:
VicRoads managing closed roads and are undertaking permanent

repairs.
Addressing approximately 192 landslips during the flood event, 33 of
which affected the arterial road network.
VicRoads website was the key source of providing road closure
information, including the closure of Council managed roads.
Natural Disaster Support to municipalities was provided, along with
flood recovery teams. This continues with particular respect to
providing support for the evaluation of road infrastructure damage in
municipalities.
VicRoads actively involved in the State Emergency Management
Taskforce co-ordination meetings.
VicRoads provided regular updates to the Emergency Management
Joint Public Information Committee meetings (chaired by Victoria
Police) throughout the flood event. The committees objective is to
coordinate and distributed in a timely and accurate way, in order to
inform community members during an emergency.
VicRoads Traffic Management Centre provided regular updates on
flood affected roads to all media via an alert system.
Traffic update interviews were, and continue to be, conducted with
regional and statewide radio and TV on request.
VicRoads undertaking activities regarding restoration/repair works of
VicRoads roads and bridges.
Provided information and support roles in government committees and
agencies.
Whilst disruptions to vital freight routes were experienced, various
methods of response and recovery were adopted including the
construction of temporary Bailey bridges and alternate routes. For
example, an 8 Span Bridge over Wimmera River was washed away. A
temporary bridge was set up with weight limits. Reducing the need for
lengthy detours reduces time and cost for the freight industry and was
considered a top priority.
Key Tourist areas such as the Grampians, Halls Gap, Wilsons
Promontory and the Great Ocean Road were heavily impacted by the
flood events.
Image 2 Temporary
Bailey Bridge (at Rubicon
River) in Western part of
Victoria
179
Resourcing; VicRoads Traffic Management Centre

VicRoads Traffic Management Centre (TMC) operates 24 hours per day 7
days per week and logs all calls from the community. In addition to this
service, during the floods, VicRoads facilitated information on its website,
issued media alerts across the State to relevant stakeholders, used iphone
application technology to assist with messaging and followed its own regional
Emergency Management Plans.
The TMC operates on a 24/7 basis and provides a number of functions
including:
manned telephone service
initiation and coordination of VicRoads response to incidents and
events
management and operation of electronic traffic management systems,
including fixed variable message signs
coordination of the receipt of incident and road closure information from
across the state.
In addition, the TMC has dedicated resources to provide validation and
consolidation of road closure information and dissemination to the public and
stakeholders on a Monday-Friday, 7am-7pm basis.
The TMC accepts calls from both the public, through the 131170 telephone
number, and stakeholders through dedicated high priority telephone numbers.
This includes emergency services and others.
VicRoads collects road closure information from lead agencies by attending
Municipal Emergency Coordination Centre (MECCs) and Incident Control
Centre (ICCs) and receiving information direct from stakeholders and the
public. All road closures are published primarily through the VicRoads website
and via VicRoads direct involvement with the media. Road closure
information is also available by calling the TMC and VicRoads customer
service centre. An example of the level of customer service provided by the
VicRoads website during flood events could be seen on the weekend of
February 5 and 6 when Melbourne and other parts of Victoria experienced
heavy rains. On that weekend the VicRoads website received over 200,000
visits this compares to an average weekend of approximately 12,000 visits.
While some users may have had trouble with the website, the volume of users
clearly indicated that the information was widely used, including by many
media outlets and other agencies.
The number of phone calls received by the TMC during the January 2010
flood was significant at 37,000. During the first 10 days over 15,000 calls were
answered. This equates to roughly one months worth of calls in a week.
VicRoads had additional staff on duty in the TMC throughout the flood period
to mitigate the significant increase in calls, delays in providing a response to
community inquiries and subsequent coordination activities concurrently being
undertaken in the TMC. This included additional public information resources
180
beyond the Monday-Friday basis to consolidate and disseminate road closure

information.
Table 1 Calls Received by TMC During January 2011
During the peak times of this event the centre operated at full capacity.
VicRoads is aware that during certain periods of the January 2011 flood event
many callers including stakeholders and the public were unable to contact the
TMC by telephone due to the volume of calls.
Unlike other areas that can suspend normal activities, the TMC operation
necessitates it to manage other incidents and events (particularly in
metropolitan areas). As a result, TMC experienced some short-term difficulties
in meeting resource demands. These were managed through careful rostering
and deployment of resources from other areas of VicRoads.
Resourcing; Across the State
Across the state, resourcing of flood response was a significant issue, in
terms of both management and field resources. The flood event commenced
with major flash flooding then transitioned to riverine flooding and field
resources were particularly stretched. Fatigue was a significant issue with
additional external resources engaged.
Signage supplies were also
stretched.
Whilst internal resources were called upon across the state, ongoing repair
works have also been competing for time and resources with the recurrent
works programs.
The flood events have however, generally been managed adequately through
24 hour/7 days per week rostering of staff across the state when and as
required.
181
VicRoads also meets these obligations by attending and actively participating

in State Emergency Management Team meetings and Incident Control
Centres. This includes coordination of road closure resources and
information, state-wide messaging, escorting equipment and plant, road
safety inspections, and recovery and rehabilitation. VicRoads also is a
member of a number of emergency planning committees, including the State
Emergency Recovery & Planning Committee and State Natural Building
Recovery Committee.
VicRoads staff and contractors were made available across the State to assist
with flood planning and recovery. Further it is noted that VicRoads has been
liaising closely with affected Councils and offered assistance where possible.
VicRoads involvement with local government also included the assessment of
Natural Disaster Claims. One issue identified is that of obtaining accurate and
timely local road closure information from Councils was a particular problem.
During the various flood events, VicRoads staff attended the following:
State Emergency Services Headquarters Ballarat ICC
Horsham ICC
Mildura MECC
Epsom ICC
Swan Hill ICC
Bendigo ICC
Bairnsdale ICC
Yarra Ranges MECC
Mulgrave ICC
VicRoads participated in the daily State Emergency Management Team
(SEMT) meetings. The primary objective of this was to be aware of emerging
issues at a state level before, during and after the event, and to coordinate
VicRoads response. During the flood event VicRoads, deployed its own
regional and corporate response teams on an as-needed basis.
VicRoads participation in the various emergency centres included being the
site specific contact to promulgate requests to VicRoads on-road staff to
facilitate road closures, traffic control and remove fallen trees on the arterial
road network. VicRoads role was also to relay road closure details to
VicRoads website staff to enable updating of the Road Closures section on
the website; this also included local road updates.
VicRoads also provided communications and media support to the State
Control Centre over this period of time.
.
182
The Recovery & Prioritisation Approach

Under routine maintenance contract requirements, information is gathered
through:
- contractor hazard and defect inspections
- advice from road users and landowners
- calls to VicRoads TMC & Regional Offices
- advice from council officers
- VicRoads staff inspections of arterial roads (this includes VicRoads
surveillance officers undertaking visual inspections of assets as soon as
practicable after water subsides). Some structural assets such as bridges
may require more detailed inspection by bridge engineers or external
consultants.
- These inspections include pavement (incl shoulders), roadsides and
structures and involves recording observations and taking photos. This
data has been recorded on a master spreadsheet for continued updating
and monitoring with respect to the scope and cost of repairs.
Further, during the flood events, information regarding flood damage is
gathered through:
- advice through calls to VicRoads TMC
- advice through Municipal Emergency Coordination Centres, Incident
Control Centres, Emergency Services and Victoria Police
- VicRoads staff inspections of arterial roads and freeways
- Advice from Routine Maintenance Contractors
- As further details are provided or confirmed this information is refined.
Image 3 Flood Damaged Roads in Northern Victoria (January 2011)
183
The prioritisation process follows the requirements under the Road

Management Act 2004 and therefore VicRoads Road Management Plan (in
consultation with relevant stakeholders). In summary, the process involved:
1st ensure any damage that could impact road user safety was addressed
immediately (eg. closing roads that were inundated).
2nd undertake any immediate emergency works that would result in opening
roads to road users (eg fallen tree removal, addressing blocked pits and
culverts). Priority was given to reinstating access for communities and
individuals who have been cut-off by road closures. Also to provide access
to industry including, freight, agricultural and tourism.
3rd address roads that were causing road congestion / delays (eg roads
which were reduced to one way contra flow were addressed next. Works
included reinstating washed out culverts or pavement material)
4th prepared a monitoring list of sites that had incurred land slips. These
sites were subsequently inspected by geotechnical engineers, to help
prioritise works.
It is noted that all reinstatement of assets at this stage are to current
standards of construction noting the extent of damage, function and form of
asset prior to damage (eg. Destroyed timber bridges).
The use of VicRoads Technical Consulting Group (during and after the flood
events) was also adopted in terms of geotechnical assistance in addressing
landslides, erosion and damaged bridge and culvert foundations. It should be
noted that due to similar requests from municipalities and other government
agencies (i.e. Parks Victoria, V-Line, and Catchment Management
Authorities), this resource was stretched across the State.
Whilst VicRoads has continued to focus and treat flood recovery on the
arterial road network with the utmost priority, it has placed a heavy burden on
resourcing (including materials, plant and contractor resources). This is
expected to remain challenging for the next 2 years. This is a challenge for
VicRoads staff and contractors to identify and commit the works and maintain
expenditure control.
This will involve ongoing liaison with other key
stakeholders such as councils, in order to best prioritise works across the
State.
Further, the defects caused by the floods are constantly changing. As
pavements dry out, the failed areas expand rapidly and further acceleration of
pavement cracking, crack sealing and possible excessive potholing in the
road network. This may lead to further pavement deterioration ie need for
periodic maintenance (reseals/overlays etc.) and pavement rehabilitation
works, if timely crack sealing is not undertaken.
184
Resources include deciding road closures which could be signed only (not
necessarily manned) or manned dependant on the road and closure, including
detour routes involved. However, in some instances where Contractor
resources were fully utilised other contractors (i.e. traffic management
companies) or in some cases i.e. February event, VicRoads Transport Safety
Services personnel were utilised.
Considering the size of the event, the capacity to respond was generally
good. There was some concern expressed generally during the set up of
physical road closures particularly in the first few days of the January event as
there was a shortage of signs at the peak floods. Closure signage was often
provided but detour signage was not available for detour routes. Councils
were able to assist in some cases but faced the same problems affecting their
roads.
Further, for the February flood event VicRoads routine Contractors did not
have adequate numbers of Water On Road signage. Signage and manning
of road closures are prioritised according to road function, with priority routes
inspected
185
Key Learnings/Way Forward

In acknowledgement of the phenomenal effort of recovery across the State
and the work undertaken by staff and contractors alike, an internal VicRoads
debrief was undertaken during March 2011. This debrief formed part of an
overall review of how VicRoads provides information to the public and it has
subsequently undertaken a project to provide map-based road closure
information for all emergencies in addition to the previous list of roads
provided on the website.
This will greatly assist people to find which roads are still open rather than just
the ones which are closed, thus providing and helping the community to select
a route between A and B. It is likely that this will also significantly reduce the
number of phone calls VicRoads Traffic management Centre (TMC).
For the 2010/2011 events, in acknowledging the fast moving event, the
provision of updated mapping wasnt the most practical solution. By the time
information was received to be mapped it would essentially be out of date so
to suggest an up to the minute mapping service was going to solve the
issues of accurate public information wasnt necessarily correct
It is expected that the current review will provide better understanding of the
road closure process is be developed in order to address any future criticism
in the future and to develop ways of being able to present future road closure
information in a more user friendly and informative way.
There was confusion in media circles as to the timeliness of road closure
information on the website. The general community needs to be aware that
there is an official and agreed process with other agencies as to what
constitutes an official road closure or opening and what needs to happen
before its either posted to or removed from a website. This includes a better
understanding of other authorities capability and capacity in general ie.
Victoria Police and SES, including local government would assist this process.
As outlined in the Regional Emergency Management Plan, the role of a
REMO (Regional Emergency Management Officer) is to coordinate response
and recovery activities in the event of a response request from an Emergency
Response Coordinator requiring VicRoads to respond under the State
Emergency Response Plan (SERP).
Specifically, if notification is received by the REMO of an impending or
possible SERP emergency, the REMO will:
1. place appropriate personnel and physical resources on alert and
2. seek information on the nature and scope of the emergency to enable
appropriate resources to be mobilised.
The nature and scope of the impending or possible emergency will determine
whether the REMO activates the Region's Emergency Operations Centre
(EOC) at this time.
186
VicRoads Regional Emergency Management Officers (REMO) attends all

Regional Emergency Recovery Planning Committee & MEMPC meetings
VicRoads agency reports are tabled at each of these meetings.
Victoria Police with executive support provided by State Emergency Service
staff are the lead agency for each RERPC.
Generally each region RERPC has a Draft Implementation and Transition
Paper to create an integrated approach to Emergency Management planning
in the region that will strengthen emergency management preparedness. The
structure complies with the regional response and recovery planning
objectives as detailed in the EMMV Part 5. As well, a Draft Regional
Response Plan is being considered.
Adoption of the Draft Implementation and Transition Paper as referred to
above will provide a mechanism for all the relevant agencies to participate in
their respective element/s of emergency management. Further, VicRoads is
also consulted in the development of other management plans such as
Melbourne Water, Flood management plans.
Further, VicRoads undertake annual reviews of their own regional emergency
response plans (REMP) and provides ongoing training as required. It will also
consider a central repository for the EMPs. It is considered that the extent of
reviewing and exercising conducted is adequate to ensure the effectiveness
of regional response plans. VicRoads has been involved in exercises held by
VicPol which assisted in testing response arrangements. One of the key
issues associated with exercising effectiveness of regional response plans is
a lack of knowledge of all the various players involved including who VicPol
and IFMP interacts with and in what capacity.
Other key findings/discussion points resulting from the review include:
Road closures condition status is vital for emergency planning by the

relevant agencies.
Communities and road users require access to road closure and
alternative route information presented in an appropriate format (ideally
mapping).
Having a presence in the community is important: physical (marked
vehicles and staff), media updates.
Inventory list created and a process implemented that during initial
stages of an emergency the list is distributed to Regions to itemise
what is available. Each business area/region to develop a pool or
resources and provide adequate training.
Current Emergency Management Plans to be placed in the appropriate
databases for access. Ensure each Region has laptops/aircards to be
allocated for emergency purposes.
High volumes of public enquiries to the TMC specifically about route
information. Projects underway to map floods and to improve online
communications to customers and staff.
187
Develop a VicRoads wide communications strategy to keep the

community informed about ongoing works to rebuild/repair the network.
Also to discuss with Victoria Police, the importance of getting accurate
and consistent information about road closures.
Operations Regions to meet local council representatives and
discuss processes for advising of local road closures
Investigate protocol for staff tracking during emergencies including
the investigation of technologies to assist with this. VicRoads lost a few
vehicles during the floods.
Teleconferences to be scheduled daily (or as required) during
emergency events. Development of a template agenda for each
meeting. Development of generic questions commonly asked to help
provide an idea of the information which could be included.
Acknowledgment of the importance of real-time situation reports
(SITREPs) for communication and operational management of the
emergency. Expanding the tools to communicate emergency road
closure information to map based technologies and social media tools
(Twitter).
Need identified for review of the processes for reporting the
opening/closure of local road and the inconsistency when other
agencies report road closure information.
Innovative campaign identified in Northern Region - Well be back
(see below for sign) once the initial quick fix was finished. There is
scope for us to mobilise a more permanent solution. Develop a
VicRoads wide communications strategy to keep the community
informed about ongoing works to rebuild/repair the network.
FLOOD AFFECTED
ROAD
Permanent repairs
are planned
Please be patient
Well be back
Image 4 An Example of the Community Information Provided
188
Emergency Management Mapping Tool

As discussed in the previous section, a review of the response phase of the
flood event suggested that there needed to be some improvements to the
provision of available mapping and detailed information of the flood affected
areas.
This also acknowledged that there were more than 450,000 visits to
VicRoads road closure page during the January floods alone and that
VicRoads remains the sole official source of road closure information in an
emergency.
To this end, the new Road Closures and Traffic Alerts web application has
been newly developed and will not just have emergency road closures, but
will also show all unplanned incidents impacting the Victorian network. The
application
is
accessible
via
the
VicRoads
website
at
http://www.vicroads.vic.gov.au/Home/
Image 5 A Screen shot of the new Road Closures/Alert Page on VicRoads Website
189
To be successful, the application must be accurate and up to date at all times.

To ensure this is the case, VicRoads will be relying on emergency services
and councils to provide this information.
Other key points to note with the new website include;
The application will be high profile during emergencies

VicRoads staff will rely heavily on timely information from emergency
services and local government too ensure the accuracy of information
Features:
It will provide a fully Interactive Google map
Linked to a list (customised)
Updated 24/7
Available on smartphone/mobile technology
Twitter messaging
Updated by anyone in VicRoads via new Situational Report database
and not just communications people
Promotion of the new application across all emergency services is
strongly encouraged.
VicRoads staff and contractors have a

challenging task but an amazing capacity
to help our communities.
190
Reference List
Brown, S, June 2011, Rebuilding after the 2010/11 Floods, a presentation to
the 2011 Victorian Transport Conference
VicRoads, May 2011, Submission to the Victorian Floods Review
VicRoads, 16 June 2011, Flood Debrief Paper, presented to VicRoads
Corporate Management Group
VicRoads. November 2011; Road Closures and Traffic Alerts web
application; presentation to VicRoads internal staff
191
Emergency preparedness for those who care for

infants in developed country contexts
Gribble and Berry
Gribble and Berry International Breastfeeding Journal 2011, 6:16

http://www.internationalbreastfeedingjournal.com/content/6/1/16 (7 November 2011)
192

http://www.internationalbreastfeedingjournal.com/content/6/1/16
REVIEW
Open Access
Emergency preparedness for those who care for

infants in developed country contexts
Karleen D Gribble1* and Nina J Berry2
Abstract
Emergency management organisations recognise the vulnerability of infants in emergencies, even in developed
countries. However, thus far, those who care for infants have not been provided with detailed information on what
emergency preparedness entails. Emergency management authorities should provide those who care for infants
with accurate and detailed information on the supplies necessary to care for them in an emergency, distinguishing
between the needs of breastfed infants and the needs of formula fed infants. Those who care for formula fed
infants should be provided with detailed information on the supplies necessary for an emergency preparedness kit
and with information on how to prepare formula feeds in an emergency. An emergency preparedness kit for
exclusively breastfed infants should include 100 nappies and 200 nappy wipes. The contents of an emergency
preparedness for formula fed infants will vary depending upon whether ready-to-use liquid infant formula or
powdered infant formula is used. If ready-to-use liquid infant formula is used, an emergency kit should include: 56
serves of ready-to-use liquid infant formula, 84 L water, storage container, metal knife, small bowl, 56 feeding
bottles and teats/cups, 56 zip-lock plastic bags, 220 paper towels, detergent, 120 antiseptic wipes, 100 nappies and
200 nappy wipes. If powdered infant formula is used, an emergency preparedness kit should include: two 900 g
tins powdered infant formula, 170 L drinking water, storage container, large cooking pot with lid, kettle, gas stove,
box of matches/lighter, 14 kg liquid petroleum gas, measuring container, metal knife, metal tongs, feeding cup,
300 large sheets paper towel, detergent, 100 nappies and 200 nappy wipes. Great care with regards hygiene
should be taken in the preparation of formula feeds. Child protection organisations should ensure that foster carers
responsible for infants have the resources necessary to formula feed in the event of an emergency. Exclusive and
continued breastfeeding should be promoted as an emergency preparedness activity by emergency management
organisations as well as health authorities. The greater the proportion of infants exclusively breastfed when an
emergency occurs, the more resilient the community, and the easier it will be to provide effective aid to the
caregivers of formula fed infants.
Keywords: disasters, emergencies, infant formula, artificial feeding, breastfeeding, emergency preparedness
Introduction
The World Health Organization and UNICEF Global
Strategy on Infant and Young Child Feeding recommends that infants be exclusively breastfed for the first
six months of life and then continue to be breastfed,
with the addition of complementary foods, for two years
or more [1]. In an emergency situation, infants who are
exclusively breastfed have their health and well being
protected by the food, water and immune factors
provided by breast milk. Breastfeeding also mitigates

physiological responses to stress in both infants and
their mothers, helping them to cope with the stress of
being caught up in an emergency situation [2]. However,
the majority of children in developed countries have
their intake of breast milk partially or totally replaced by
infant formula in their first year of life [e.g. [3-5]]. In
developing country contexts, formula feeding is frequently fatal to the infant [6,7]. In developed countries,
good infrastructure, including easy access to clean
water, electricity and medical care, means that relatively
few infants die as result of formula feeding [8]. The low
mortality rate associated with formula feeding in
* Correspondence: karleeng@uws.edu.au
1
School of Nursing and Midwifery, University of Western Sydney, Locked Bag
1797, Penrith NSW. 2751. Australia
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
2011 Gribble and Berry; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
193

Page 2 of 12
generally provide only non-specific or incomplete information and do not distinguish between breastfed and
formula fed infants. It is common for emergency preparedness materials to simply state that those who care for
infants should take into account their special needs
when packing a disaster preparedness kit or that those
who care for infants should include infant formula in
their disaster preparedness kits [13,14]. For example, the
Emergency Management Australia publication, Preparing for the Unexpected includes in their emergency
preparedness checklist special needs for infants, the
aged and people with disabilities, accompanying the
text with a photograph of an infant feeding bottle full of
milk. As far as the authors are aware, no emergency
preparedness authority in a developed country mentions
breastfeeding continuance as an emergency preparedness activity, nor details the requirements for formula
feeding in an emergency. There is a need to improve
emergency preparedness and the delivery of aid to the
caregivers of infants in emergencies.
The purpose of this paper is to detail the supplies
needed by the caregivers of breastfed and formula fed
infants in an emergency situation where essential services such as electricity and clean water supplies are
unavailable and to discuss some of the practicalities of
caring for infants in emergencies. The amounts provided
for each emergency item are based on the clinical
experience of the authors, the authors trial of the procedures, and the manufacturers instructions. This information is targeted at both emergency management
organisations and individuals who care for infants. This
paper also provides examples of the sorts of messages
that emergency management organisations should provide to those who care for infants prior to an emergency, during an emergency and during the recovery
period.
developed countries contributes to the acceptability of

partial or total formula feeding. However, when an
emergency occurs, any one or all of the aforementioned
resources that makes formula feeding relatively safe can
be severely limited. Thus, in emergencies, those who
care for formula fed infants may be faced with circumstances that make formula feeding extremely difficult
and potentially very dangerous.
Reports from past emergencies have demonstrated the
difficulties faced by those who care for formula fed
infants in large-scale emergencies in developed countries
(unless it is stated otherwise these reports were told to
KG by health professionals who had worked with
mothers during these emergencies). In the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina (New Orleans, 2005), dangerous feeding practices were widespread. Gruich [9] described
finding a large number of infants being fed water alone,
placing infants at risk of life threatening hyponatraemia
[10]. News media [e.g. [11]] and health workers,
reported infant deaths as a result of unavailability of suitable food. In Australia during the 2009 Black Saturday
bushfires, wet nursing was applied when neither a
mother nor the centre to which she was evacuated had
infant formula or other milk available. During the 2011
Queensland flood, cleaning of feeding bottles in evacuation centres was problematic and in one centre mothers
were advised to use small rocks to scarify and clean the
inside of bottles. In all large scale emergencies in developed countries the need to ensure that formula fed
infants have suitable food available to them has been a
high priority of emergency management authorities.
While mothers who are exclusively breastfeeding are
able to continue to provide food to their infants regardless of the stress they might be experiencing and their
own access to food, emergency authorities have not
necessarily understood this. During the 2007 wildfires in
San Diego, California, one organisation was adamant
that breastfeeding women who had been evacuated
should accept the infant formula that they were distributing, regardless of mothers insistence that they did
not need it. The idea that breastfed infants are in a food
insecure situation is reiterated by the US Red Cross and
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, who suggest that breastfeeding mothers store infant formula in
the event that they are unable to breastfeed in an emergency [12]. These expressions of formula feeding as providing food security and breastfeeding as unreliable are
contrary to the experiences of individuals affected by
emergencies and likely arise from cultural beliefs about
infant feeding that are peculiar to developed country
contexts.
Emergency management organisations recognise that
the needs of infants necessitate particular care in emergencies. However, emergency preparedness materials
Emergency kits for the caregivers of infants

Breastfed infants
In order to prepare for an emergency, mothers of exclusively breastfed infants do not need to store any foodrelated items for their babies. Exclusive breastfeeding
could be considered an emergency preparedness activity.
Thus, the only items necessary to store in preparation
for an emergency if an infant is exclusively breastfed are
nappies and nappy wipes. Approximately, one hundred
disposal nappies (diapers) and two hundred nappy wipes
would be sufficient for one weeks emergency supply. In
Australia, the cost of this emergency kit is approximately $50. Figure 1 shows an example of emergency
supplies for the mother of an exclusively breastfed infant
and emergency supplies are summarised in Table 1.
Mothers who are exclusively breastfeeding during an
emergency can continue to feed their infant as they did
194

Page 3 of 12
before the emergency occurred; no special actions are

necessary.
Formula fed infants
Emergency preparedness for exclusively formula fed

infants involves storage of items necessary for feeding
the infant. Different requirements exist dependent upon
whether liquid ready-to-use infant formula or powdered
infant formula is available or chosen for use in emergency preparedness. Whilst there is some overlap in
what is needed and how supplies are used depending on
whether ready-to-use liquid infant formula or powdered
infant formula is stored, each instance is detailed individually for the sake of clarity.
Where ready-to-use liquid infant formula is available
Supplies necessary to prepare to formula feed using

ready-to-use liquid infant formula in an emergency
include: infant formula, water, a storage container, a
metal knife, a small bowl, feeding bottles and teats or
cups, zip-lock plastic bags, paper towels, detergent and
soap, and antiseptic wipes. Nappies and nappy wipes also
need to be stored. The reason for each item and amounts
required for one weeks supply are described below. In
Australia, the cost of the consumables in this emergency
kit is approximately $550. Figure 2 shows an example of
emergencies supplies needed to fully formula feed for
one week using ready-to-use liquid infant formula and
emergency supplies are summarised in Table 1.
Figure 1 Emergency supplies needed to care for an exclusively

breastfed infant.
Table 1 Emergency supplies required for breastfed infants or for feeding infants using ready-to-use infant formula or
powdered infant formula*
Exclusively breastfed
infant
Exclusively formula fed infant with ready-to-use infant

formula
Exclusively formula fed infant with powdered infant

formula
100 nappies
56 single serves of ready-to-use infant formula
2 tins of infant formula
200 nappy wipes
84 L of water
170 L of water
Large storage container
Large storage container
Metal knife
Large cooking pot with a lid
Small bowl
Kettle
56 feeding bottles or cups
Gas stove
56 zip-lock plastic bags
Box of matches or lighter
220 sheets of paper towel

Detergent
14 kg of liquid petroleum gas

Measuring container
120 antiseptic wipes
Metal knife
100 nappies
Metal tongs
200 nappy wipes
Feeding cup
300 sheets of paper towel
Detergent
100 nappies
200 nappy wipes
Estimated cost
$50
Estimated cost of consumables $550
Estimated cost of consumables $250
*Costs are presented in Australian dollars
195

Page 4 of 12
slightly fewer feeds per day, especially if they are also

eating complementary foods.
3) Storage container
A container in which the infant formula and preparation and cleaning implements can be stored is required.
This storage container should have solid sides and a lid
that seals well enough to protect the contents from dirt
and insects. The lid should also be completely removable so that it can be turned over and act as a clean surface for the preparation of infant formula.
4) Metal knife
A metal knife which is sharp enough to cut open the
packages of ready-to-use infant formula is required.
5) Small bowl
A small bowl in which the metal knife can be washed
is needed.
6) Feeding bottles and teats or cups
Figure 2 Emergency supplies required to fully formula feed

using ready-to-use infant formula.
Sufficient feeding bottles and teats or cups to feed the

infant are required. In order to provide eight feeds a
day, 56 bottles and teats, or cups, need to be stored. If
bottles and teats are stored they should be thoroughly
disinfected by washing in hot soapy water and then
allowed to air dry before the teat is sealed inside the
bottle and the bottle sealed in a plastic bag for storage.
If cups are stored they should be similarly cleaned and
dried before being sealed in a plastic bag for storage.
Alternatively, new paper or plastic disposable cups can
be stored. These feeding bottles and teats or cups are to
be used as single use items and disposed of after a single
use. As will be described, cleaning of feeding implements for formula feeding in an emergency requires a
large amount of water and fuel as well as other
resources and if reuse of feeding implements is desired
these resources will need to be stored.
1) Infant formula
The amount of infant formula required will depend
upon the specifics of the product and the intake of the
infant. It is important that sufficient packages of single
serves of ready-to-use infant formula are stored because
once a package is opened it must be used immediately
and any left-over milk discarded. For infant formula
available in Australia, one weeks supply for an infant
who is five months of age would usually be 56 packages
of 250 ml ready-to-use infant formula. It is important to
note that while follow-on infant formula (for infants
older than six months of age) is not suitable for infants
younger than six months of age, starter infant formula
(for infants from zero to six months of age) can be fed
to infants older than six months. Care should be taken
to ensure that stored infant formula has not passed its
expiry date.
7) Zip-lock plastic bags

Fifty six zip-lock plastic bags that are large enough to
contain each feeding bottle or cup are required.
2) Water
Approximately one and a half litres of water per feed
is required for cleaning hands, the knife for cutting
open the packages of ready-to-use infant formula and
the preparation area. Where an infant is having eight
feeds a day this translates to about 12 litres a day and
about 84 litres for one week. Older infants may need
8) Paper towels
Sufficient paper towels for drying hands and cleaning
and drying the preparation surface and washing bowl
are needed. Approximately 220 large sheets of paper
towel are needed. A fabric drying cloth is not
196

Page 5 of 12
5) Feed the baby using the feeding bottle or feeding

cup
Instructions on how to feed an infant using a
cup are available from a number of sources
[15-17]. In addition, lactation consultants and
breastfeeding counsellors commonly have experience in assisting mothers to cup feed infants.
6) Discard any unused reconstituted infant formula
within two hours
Alternatively, the formula can be consumed by
older children or adult members of the family.
7) Discard the used feeding bottle or cup
Used feeding bottles or cups cannot be reused
for feeding an infant. Should sufficient feeding
bottles not be available for use, a reusable cup
should be used which should be washed and
sterilised between uses as described later in the
description of procedure for formula feeding
using powdered infant formula. Under no circumstances should care givers attempt to reuse
feeding bottles in circumstances where water and
power supplies are limited.
8) After feeding, hands should be washed as
described above
9) Wash and disinfect the metal knife
Pour water and detergent into the washing bowl.
Thoroughly wash the knife with soapy water and
dry with paper towel before wiping with an antiseptic wipe and allowing it to air dry. The bowl
should be rinsed in clean water and dried with
paper towel.
10) Return all supplies (except the water) to the storage container and seal the lid.
appropriate because it can act as a vector for contamination.

9) Detergent and soap
A bottle of detergent is necessary for washing hands,
the knife and the preparation surface. Hard soap may
also be stored if preferred for hand washing.
10) Antiseptic wipes
Antiseptic wipes are necessary to assist in ensuring
that the knife used for cutting open the packages of
ready-to-use infant formula and the preparation surface
is disinfected. Approximately 120 wipes are required.
Instructions for using ready-to-use infant formula in an
emergency
In the event of an emergency, the goods that have been

stored should be used in the following way (these
instructions are based on field experience with artificial
feeding in emergency conditions).
1) Clean the preparation surface
It is important that the surface on which infant
formula is prepared is clean. Since clean surfaces
may be difficult to find in emergencies, storing
a clean surface is desirable. The inside of the
plastic or metal storage container provides a
clean surface. The preparation surface should be
made wet with water, squirted with detergent
and then rubbed with paper towel. It should
then be dried with another paper towel and
finally wiped with an anti-bacterial wipe. The
knife for cutting open the packages of infant formula should be cleaned and disinfected prior to
first use (as described later).
2) Wash hands using soap and water
Washing hands is a critical step in the hygienic
preparation of infant formula feeds. It is especially important in emergency situations where
surfaces may be contaminated. Where clean
water is in limited supply, hands should first be
moistened by pouring water onto them. Then
soap or detergent can be rubbed into a lather,
with attention paid to ensure that all of the surfaces of the hands are rubbed clean. Finally, the
soap and dirt can be rinsed off. The assistance of
a second person to pour water onto hands may
be helpful. Once clean, hands should be dried
with clean paper towel.
3) Use the clean knife to cut open a package of
ready-to-use infant formula
4) Pour the required amount of ready-to-use infant
formula into the feeding bottle or cup
Where powdered infant formula is available
Supplies necessary to prepare to formula feed using

powdered infant formula in an emergency include:
infant formula, water, a storage container, a large cooking pot with a lid, a kettle, a gas stove, matches or a
lighter, liquid petroleum gas, a measuring container, a
metal knife, metal tongs, a feeding cup, paper towels
and detergent. Nappies and nappy wipes also need to be
stored. The reason for each item and amounts required
for one weeks supply is described below. In Australia,
the cost of the consumables in this emergency kit is
approximately $250. Figure 3 shows an example of
emergencies supplies needed to fully formula feed using
powdered infant formula for one week and emergency
supplies are summarised in Table 1.
1) Infant formula
The amount of infant formula required will depend
upon the specifics of the product and the intake of the
197

Page 6 of 12
less than 250 mg/L sulphate and less than 50 mg/L nitrate
[18], most bottled drinking water available in developed
countries will meet these requirements.
3) Storage container
A storage container in which the infant formula and
preparation and cleaning implements can be stored is
required. This storage container should have solid sides
and a lid that seals well enough to protect the contents
from dirt and insects. The lid should also be completely
removable so that it can be turned over to act as a clean
surface for the preparation of infant formula. The storage container can also be used as a basin for washing
preparation and feeding implements or alternatively, a
separate container for washing can be stored.
4) Large cooking pot with a lid
This pot is to be used to boil water for sterilising preparation and feeding implements. It needs to be large
enough to be able to completely submerge the measuring container, feeding cup, knife and spoon during the
sterilisation process. It is always recommended that
implements used to prepare and feed infant formula be
sterilised [19], however the need for this process is magnified in emergency situations where surfaces can be
easily contaminated. This cooking pot should not be
used for purposes other than sterilising (for example, it
should not be used for cooking food).
Figure 3 Emergency supplies required to fully formula feed

using powdered infant formula.
infant. For infant formula available in Australia, one

weeks supply for an infant of five months of age would
usually be two 900 g tins of powdered infant formula. It
is important to note that while follow-on infant formula
(for infants older than six months of age) is not suitable
for infants younger than six months of age, starter infant
formula (for infants from zero to six months of age) can
be fed to infants older than six months. Care should be
taken to ensure that stored infant formula has not
passed its expiry date.
5) Kettle
A kettle which can be used to boil water on the gas
stove for reconstituting infant formula is needed. The
kettle is used to heat water for reconstitution of the
infant formula and for washing feeding and preparation
implements. Heating water for reconstitution of infant
formula is necessary because bottled water is not sterile
and because powdered infant formula is commonly contaminated with pathogenic bacteria [19].
2) Water
6) Gas stove
Approximately three litres of water per formula feed is
required to reconstitute infant formula and clean hands,
feeding and preparation implements and the preparation
surface. Where an infant is having eight feeds a day this
translates to about 24 L per day and about 170 L for one
week. Older infants may need slightly fewer feeds per day,
especially if they are also eating complementary foods.
Bottled water may be used for reconstitution of powdered
infant formula depending on the mineral concentration of
the water. In order to be suitable for reconstituting infant
formula water should contain less than 200 mg/L sodium,
A gas stove for the heating of the water needed to

reconstitute infant formula, clean and sterilise feeding
and preparation implements and clean surfaces is
required. The gas stove should be large enough to safely
heat water in the large cooking pot and kettle.
7) Sufficient matches or a lighter
Matches or a lighter are necessary for the lighting of
the gas stove. A lighter may be preferable to matches
198

Page 7 of 12
cleaning. Neither a feeding bottle nor a spouted cup is

appropriate for feeding an infant in an emergency
because of the difficulties associated with cleaning them
in the absence of running water and electricity/gas
plumbing. Infant feeding bottles are particularly difficult
to clean adequately even in the best of circumstances; a
study of bottle cleanliness in the UK found that more
than 60% of cleaned bottles sampled were contaminated with bacteria at a level such that they could not
be considered as clean [20]. In an emergency situation,
where water may be limited and surfaces contaminated,
cleaning feeding bottles and teats adequately may be
impossible, placing infants at a heightened risk of infectious disease. Cup feeding is the recommended practice
when formula feeding is necessary in resource poor settings, including in emergencies [16,21-23].
because of the possibility of matches becoming unusable

if they come in contact with water. Alternatively, waterproof matches may be stored.
8) Liquid petroleum gas
Approximately 14 kg of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)
is required to heat water for reconstituting infant formula and for washing and sterilising. This amount is
based on the following calculation. Energy required to
heat 24 L of water from 15C to boiling temperature at
sea level, that is 100C, is given by the equation Q = m
cp (100-15)K (where Q is the amount of energy
required, m is the mass of water, cp is the heat capacity
of water, that is cp = 4.817 kJ/(kg K) and the numbers
in parenthesis represent the temperature difference).
Then, Q = 23.5 kg 4.817 kJ/(kg K) 85 K = 9621.96
kJ per day of energy required. LPG has a specific caloric
value of 46.1 MJ/kg. However, this energy cannot be
perfectly used to heat water, it is estimated that 90% of
the energy will be lost. Thus the estimate of the amount
of LPG per day required is 2 kg per day or 14 kg for
one week. If the gas stove is to be used for cooking,
additional fuel will need to be stored.
14) Paper towels

Sufficient paper towels for drying hands, the metal
knife and spoon and the cooking pot and wiping the
preparation surface are needed. Approximately 300 large
sheets of paper towel are needed. A fabric drying cloth
is not appropriate because it can act as a vector for contamination.
9) Measuring container
15) Detergent
A heatproof, accurate measuring container is required
for measuring the water needed to reconstitute the
infant formula and for mixing the infant formula. Infant
feeding bottles cannot be used for reconstitution of
infant formula because (as will be discussed) they are
too difficult to clean.
A bottle of detergent is necessary for washing hands,

the feeding and preparation implements and the preparation surface. Hard soap may also be stored if preferred for hand washing. Anti-bacterial wipes may also
be stored for wiping down the infant formula preparation surface.
10) Metal knife

16) Nappies
A metal knife is needed for levelling measured scoops
of powdered infant formula.
One hundred disposable nappies.

17) Nappy wipes
11) Metal spoon.
Two hundred nappy wipes.
A metal spoon is needed to mix the powdered infant

formula and water.
Instructions for using powdered infant formula in an

emergency
12) Metal tongs
In the event of an emergency, the goods that have been

stored should be used in the following way (these
instructions are based on those provided in the publication Safe Preparation and Handling of Powdered Infant
Formula [19]).
A pair of metal tongs is needed to remove sterilised

preparation and feeding implements from hot water.
13) Feeding cup
1) Clean the preparation surface

It is important that the surface on which infant
formula is prepared is clean. Since clean surfaces
may be difficult to find in emergencies, storing
An open ceramic or metal cup is needed for feeding

the infant. The cup should be shallow enough for the
corners to be able to be easily reached by fingers during
199

Page 8 of 12
amount of the reconstituted milk onto a carers

inner forearm where it should no longer feel
warm.
8) Feed the baby using the feeding cup
Instructions on how to feed an infant using a
cup are available from a number of sources
[15-17]. In addition, lactation consultants and
breastfeeding counsellors commonly have experience in assisting mothers to cup feed infants.
9) Discard any unused reconstituted infant formula
within two hours.
Alternatively, the formula can be consumed by
older children or adult members of the
household.
10) After feeding, before cleaning and sterilising preparation and feeding implements, hands should be
washed as described above.
11) Wash and sterilise preparation and feeding
implements thoroughly
Boil sufficient water to wash preparation and
feeding implements. Place a sufficient quantity of
this water and detergent into the storage container or a basin reserved for this purpose. Great
care should be taken to ensure that corners are
thoroughly cleaned. Preparation and feeding
implements should then be rinsed in clean water
and dried with paper towel before storage in storage container (which will also need to be
cleaned and dried if it has been used for
washing).
12) Sterilise preparation and feeding implements in
preparation for the next feed
Preparation and storage implements should be
completely submerged in water in the large
cooking pot and the water brought to the boil on
the gas stove. Care should be taken to ensure
that there are no trapped air bubbles. When the
water is at a rolling boil the gas may be turned
off and the implements left in the water in the
lidded pot until they are needed. Implements
should be removed from the pot just before they
are to be used using the clean metal tongs or, if
this is not practical, returned to the storage container for storage.
13) Return everything except the water, cooking
stove and gas bottle to the storage container and
seal the lid.
a clean surface is desirable. The inside of the

plastic or metal storage container provides a
clean surface. The preparation surface should be
made wet with hot water, squirted with detergent
and then rubbed with paper towel. It should then
be dried with another paper towel. The surface
may also be wiped with anti-bacterial wipes after
washing with detergent and water. Feeding and
preparation implements should be cleaned and
sterilised prior to first use (as described later).
2) Wash hands using soap and water
Washing hands is a critical step in the hygienic
preparation of infant formula. It is especially
important in emergency situations where surfaces may be contaminated. Where clean water is
in limited supply, hands should first be moistened by pouring water onto them. Then soap or
detergent can be rubbed into a lather, with attention paid to ensure that all of the surfaces of the
hands are rubbed clean. Finally, the soap and
dirt can be rinsed off. The assistance of a second
person to pour water onto hands may be helpful.
Once clean, hands should be dried with clean
paper towel.
3) Boil water for reconstituting powdered infant
formula
Boil a sufficient quantity of clean water using the
kettle and allow the water to cool for five
minutes.
4) Measure the required amount of water using
measuring container (sterilised after the last feed)
Place the water into the feeding cup (sterilised
after the last feed).
5) Measure precisely the required amount of powdered infant formula
Dip the scoop into the powdered infant formula,
ensuring that it is filled above the rim. Do not
press or pack the powder into the scoop. Level
the measuring scoop by running the back of a
knife across the rim of the scoop, allowing the
excess to be returned to the tin. Add the powdered infant formula to the hot water in the
feeding cup.
6) Stir to mix with the metal spoon (sterilised after
the last feed).
7) Cool the feed
Ensure that the reconstituted infant formula has
cooled sufficiently before feeding to the infant. If
sufficient water is available, the cup containing
the reconstituted infant formula can be placed
into a container of clean, cool water to speed
cooling. Alternately, vigorous stirring will speed
cooling. The temperature of the feed should be
tested by stirring and then dropping a small
Preparedness for infants older than six months

Infants who are older than six months of age are less
vulnerable than younger babies. They are able to eat
solid foods and can safely consume some water. Their
immune systems are also more mature. Supplies
200

Page 9 of 12
who did not have formula to feed him. The baby was
alive when rescued but later died in hospital. A medical
assessment of the infants mother revealed that she had
breasts engorged with milk, however the possibility of
initiating breastfeeding had not occurred to her.
It should not be taken for granted that mothers who
are breastfeeding do not need assistance; breastfeeding
mothers need support to continue breastfeeding, especially if they are experiencing difficulties. Emergency
authorities should access their local mother-to-mother
breastfeeding support organisation as a resource to both
emergency workers and to mothers. Mother-to-mother
support organisations, while specialising in assisting
breastfeeding mothers, will also be able to help formula
feeding mothers who wish to avoid using infant formula
by re-establishing or increasing breastfeeding. They are
also often a repository of expertise on the cup feeding
of infants. Emergency organisations should ensure that
they have policies and appropriate training in place to
enable good practice in the delivery of aid to those who
care for infants.
required by mothers of breastfed infants older than six

months should include sufficient nappies and wipes and
also some complementary foods. However, should a
mother not have appropriate complementary foods
stored, her infant can revert to exclusive breastfeeding
without harm, as her milk supply will increase in
response to increased demand. Those who care for formula fed infants older than six months of age should
also store complementary foods and the goods previously described as necessary for formula feeding, with
an adjustment based on the intake of the child. Where
appropriate complementary foods are available, the
amount of complementary food can be increased if
infant formula is in limited supply (even replacing infant
formula entirely for a period of time). Infants older than
six months can also be given water to prevent
dehydration.
Providing aid to the caregivers of infants

In a large scale emergency, providing aid to the caregivers of infants, particularly infants who are formula
fed, should be a priority. Infants, particularly the very
young, who do not have access to appropriate food can
become very sick and even die within days. However,
the distribution of supplies needed to formula feed
should be handled by suitably experienced health workers (not food distribution workers) who are able to provide an assessment of the needs of the infant and
provide education on how to prepare formula feeds
using the available resources. Should ready-to-use single
serves of infant formula with disposable bottles and
teats be available, this can be distributed in preference
to powdered infant formula and other resources (it
should be made absolutely clear that any left-over formula should be discarded after each feed and that bottles cannot be reused). Wherever possible, women who
are mixed breastfeeding/formula feeding should be
encouraged to avoid using infant formula - and assisted
to provide for all of their babies nutritional needs by
breastfeeding them very frequently (as often as hourly
should be expected). Enormous care should be taken to
ensure that infant formula is not distributed to breastfeeding mothers; previous experience has shown that
where infant formula is given to breastfeeding mothers
it is frequently used and results in increased rates of
diarrhoeal illness in infants [24]. It should also be considered that mothers of young, fully formula fed infants
may still be lactating and be able to reinitiate breastfeeding fairly easily. In the stressful circumstances of an
emergency, it cannot be assumed that mothers will
think of reinitiating breastfeeding. One of the infant
deaths following Hurricane Katrina was a three week
old fully formula fed baby who had been stranded on a
roof for five days after the Hurricane with his mother
Caring for formula fed infants when resources to

formula feed are not available
In the event that there are formula fed infants, but not
the resources necessary to formula feed, the following
options may be possible. A breastfeeding mother may be
available to share breast milk with the infant, either
directly from the breast or fed expressed milk in a cup.
It should be understood that once breast milk is
expressed it has many of the hazards associated with
infant formula. Thus, breast milk should only be
expressed via hand (there is no place for breast pumps
in emergency response because of the difficulties of
cleaning the pumps) and expressed breast milk should
be fed using a disposable cup (never a bottle). If fresh,
commercial cows milk is available, it may be made suitable as a short term replacement for infant formula for
infants under six months by the addition of water and
sugar (to 100 ml of boiled milk add 50 mls of water and
two level teaspoons of sugar) [17]. It is important that
infants under six months of age not be given water to
drink because of the risk of hyponatraemia, nor undiluted cows milk because of the risk of kidney damage.
Emergency messages
Prior to emergencies, during emergencies and in the
emergency recovery period, emergency management
organisations should distribute messages targeted at
those who care for infants.
Prior to emergencies
Exclusive and continued breastfeeding should be promoted by emergency management organisations as an
201

Page 10 of 12
of infant formula (including from infant formula manufacturers who have historically used emergencies as a
marketing opportunity [e.g. [25]]) should be actively discouraged in all emergencies. On the contrary, monetary
donations will enable the delivery of appropriate aid to
infants. Where infant formula is purchased by aid organisations there is a greater likelihood of the distribution
being carefully managed, which benefits both breastfed
and formula fed infants.
emergency preparedness activity that provides infants

with a safe and secure food and water supply and protection from infection. In areas with seasonal emergencies, communications might include a message such as,
mothers considering ceasing breastfeeding should consider waiting until after the [bushfire/wildfire/cyclone/
hurricane/typhoon/flooding/snowstorm] season. In areas
susceptible to emergencies such as earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, the importance of breastfeeding as a
protective behaviour should similarly be promoted. The
caregivers of formula fed infants should be provided
with information on all of the resources necessary to
formula feed in an emergency. Emergency management
agencies should avoid at all costs communicating the
idea that emergency preparedness for the caregivers of
formula fed infants simply involves storing some additional infant formula. In locations susceptible to emergencies, health professionals should routinely discuss
emergency preparedness with those who are caring for
infants. Those involved in the delivery of aid should be
provided with appropriate training on infant and young
child feeding in emergencies in order to be able to
appropriately manage and deliver aid to the caregivers
of infants.
During the emergency recovery period
The recovery period of an emergency is often a time

when the risk of contracting an infectious disease
increases. During the recovery period, messages should
be targeted to the caregivers of infants highlighting the
importance of exclusive and continued breastfeeding
and the importance of maintaining cleanliness and sterilisation in the preparation of infant formula in order to
prevent infectious diseases such as gastroenteritis and
respiratory disease.
Further information on infant and young child feeding
and the media is available in the resources of the Infant
and Young Child Feeding in Emergencies Core Group
[26]. Examples of media messages suitable at each stage
of an emergency are presented in Table 2.
During emergencies
Practicalities of formula feeding in emergencies

The quantity of supplies required to formula feed in an
emergency, as well as the process of formula feeding in
an emergency as described here, raises the question of
the feasibility of preparing for an emergency if caring
for a formula fed infant. Certainly the volume of supplies means that if the emergency necessitates leaving
the home that it may not be possible to transport the
supplies. Thus, whenever an emergency occurs in a
developed country context it should be assumed that
there will be a significant number of formula fed infants
at immediate risk and identification of these infants and
provision of necessary supplies should be of the highest
priority.
Even where those who care for formula fed infants
have the necessary supplies, the difficulty of the process
of formula feeding itself may leave little room for other
necessary activities and replenishment of supplies may
also be a problem. Should essential services such as
electricity and piped clean water not become available
within a short time, and ready-to-use single serves of
infant formula (with disposable bottles and teats) not be
available, evacuation of formula fed infants and those
who care for them should be considered.
Infants are at greatest risk during the acute phase of

emergencies. Messages should be targeted to the
mothers of breastfed infants outlining the importance of
exclusive and continued breastfeeding, the ways in
which mothers can increase their milk supply and
details of where mothers can obtain assistance if they
are experiencing breastfeeding difficulties. Breastfeeding
women should be exhorted to avoid starting to use
infant formula during the acute emergency and recovery. Messages should also be targeted to those who care
for formula fed infants providing detail on how infant
formula should be prepared and delivered in emergencies, the importance of not giving young infants water
and details of where caregivers can obtain supplies and
assistance with formula feeding.
Emergency management agencies should communicate to the general public the message that while infants
are vulnerable and require assistance in emergencies,
they require a specific, targeted and supported type of
aid. It should be made clear that donations of infant formula are not appropriate and can be harmful. It has
been repeatedly found that in the wake of an emergency,
large quantities of donations of infant formula arrive.
These donations cause logistical difficulties and are
often distributed inappropriately (for example given to
breastfeeding women or to caregivers of formula fed
infants without the other supplies necessary to formula
feed [e.g. [24]]). It is generally accepted that donations
Conclusions
Emergency management organisations recognise the vulnerability of infants in emergencies, even in developed
202

Page 11 of 12
Table 2 Examples of media messages on infant feeding issues at different stages of an emergency
Stage of emergency
Messages
Prior to the emergency
Mothers considering ceasing breastfeeding should consider waiting until after the [bushfire/wildfire/cyclone/
hurricane/typhoon/flooding/snowstorm] season.
Community members should support mothers to exclusively breastfeed their infants in preparation for the
emergency season.
Those caring for infants who are formula fed should store the supplies necessary to formula feed in
situations where power and water supplies are disrupted. These supplies include [list as per outlined in this
paper].
During the emergency and the

emergency recovery period
As a result of this emergency, infants are at risk of serious illnesses like diarrhoea and respiratory infections.
Mothers who are breastfeeding should continue breastfeeding, because it gives the baby clean water and
food and protects them from infection. If your infant is under six months of age, do not give them any other
food or liquid because this will make them vulnerable to infection.
Breastfeeding protects babies during emergencies. Stress does not affect mothers milk supply. Women who
are experiencing difficulties with breastfeeding can find assistance at [insert location or phone number where
mothers can access health professional or peer support for breastfeeding].
Breastfeeding protects infants from infection during this emergency. Mothers can increase their milk supply by
breastfeeding more frequently.
Infants who are formula fed are at serious risk in this emergency. Those who are caring for formula fed
infants should take great care to ensure that water used in formula feeding is clean and that all feeding
implements are thoroughly cleaned and sterilised before each feed is prepared.
During this emergency infant feeding bottles may not be able to be properly cleaned because water and
power are scarce. Feeding bottles that are not properly cleaned can harbour disease. Those who are caring
for formula fed infants are advised to use an easily cleanable cup for feeding.
Support for those who are caring for formula fed infants can be obtained at [insert location or phone
number where care givers can access health professional or peer support for formula feeding].
People who want to help babies in this emergency can do so by donating money to [insert organisations
which are delivering aid to infants]. Please do not donate goods (including infant formula).
Breastfeeding women who are given donated infant formula should not give it to their babies. Giving an
exclusively breastfed baby infant formula can make them vulnerable to infection for weeks. Exclusive
breastfeeding protects babies from infection.
Infants younger than six months of age should not be given water to drink. It can make them extremely ill
and may even be fatal.
Infants and young children are at risk in this emergency. Friends, relatives and neighbours can help babies
and young children by assisting their caregivers in practical ways.
country contexts. However, thus far, the caregivers of

infants have not been provided with detailed information on what emergency preparedness entails. Emergency management authorities should provide the
caregivers of infants with accurate and detailed information on the supplies necessary to care for infants in an
emergency, distinguishing between the needs of
breastfed and the needs of formula fed infants. The
caregivers of formula fed infants should be provided
with information on how to prepare formula feeds in an
emergency. Child protection organisations should ensure
that foster carers responsible for infants have the
resources necessary to formula feed in the event of an
emergency. Exclusive and continued breastfeeding
should be promoted as an emergency preparedness
activity by emergency management organisations as well
as health authorities. The greater the proportion of
infants exclusively breastfed when an emergency occurs,
the more resilient the community is and the easier it
will be to provide effective aid to the caregivers of formula fed infants.
Authors interests
KDG is researcher with an interest in infant feeding
issues. She is a member of the Infant and Young Child
Feeding in Emergencies Core Group and has acted as a
consultant to emergency organisations including UNICEF and the Emergency Nutrition Network in the
development of training and policy materials on infant
feeding in emergencies for the past five years.
NJB has a PhD in public health and holds nationally
recognised qualifications in infant feeding counselling.
In 2009 she coordinated breastfeeding counselling and
artificial feeding programs following Cyclone Nargis in
Myanmar for Save the Children UK.
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Veronica Garea for her assistance with the
calculation of the quantity of liquefied petroleum gas required to prepare
infant formula.
Author details
1
School of Nursing and Midwifery, University of Western Sydney, Locked Bag
1797, Penrith NSW. 2751. Australia. 2Centre for Health Initiatives, University of
Wollongong, NSW, 2522. Australia.
203

Page 12 of 12
24. Hipgrave DB, Assefa F, Winoto A, Sukotjo S: Donated breast milk

substitutes and incidence of diarrhoea among infants and young
children after the May 2006 earthquake in Yogyakarta and Central Java.
Public Health Nutrition 2011.
25. Gribble KD: Many breastfeeding women dont have milk for their
babies: media messages after Cyclone Nargis and the WenChuan
earthquake. Disasters .
26. Media and Communication Resources. [http://www.ennonline.net/
resources/tag.aspx?tagid=122].
Authors contributions
KDG and NJB conceived of the paper and drafted the manuscript together.
Both authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Received: 19 August 2011 Accepted: 7 November 2011
Published: 7 November 2011
doi:10.1186/1746-4358-6-16
Cite this article as: Gribble and Berry: Emergency preparedness for
those who care for infants in developed country contexts. International
Breastfeeding Journal 2011 6:16.
References
1. WHO, UNICEF: Global Strategy for Infant and Young Child Feeding Geneva:
WHO; 2003.
2. Gribble KD, McGrath M, MacLaine A, Lhotska L: Supporting breastfeeding
in emergencies: protecting womens reproductive rights and maternal
and infant health. Disasters 2011.
3. Forde KA, Miller LJ: 2006-07 north metropolitan Perth breastfeeding
cohort study: how long are mothers breastfeeding? Breastfeeding Review
2010, 18:14-24.
4. Bolling K, Grant C, Hamlyn B, Thorton A: Infant Feeding Survey 2005 Leeds:
National Health Service, The Information Centre for Health and Social Care;
2007.
5. Bonati M, Vivarelli P, Brunetti M: Il costo economico del non allattamento
al seno. Quaderni 1998, 6:10-13.
6. Jones G, Steketee RW, Black RE, Bhutta ZA, Morris SS: How many child
deaths can we prevent this year? (Child survival II). The Lancet 2003,
362:65-71.
7. Coutsoudis A, Coovadia HM, Wilfert CM: HIV, infant feeding and more
perils for poor people: new WHO guidelines encourage review of
formula milk policies. Bulletin of the World Health Organization 2008,
86:210-214.
8. Chen A, Rogan WJ: Breastfeeding and the risk of postneonatal death in
the United States. Pediatrics 2004, 113:e435-e439.
9. Gruich M: Life-changing experiences of a private practicing pediatrician:
perspectives from a private pediatric practice. Pediatrics 2006, 117:
S359-364.
10. Moritz M, Ayus J: New aspects in the pathogenesis, prevention, and
treatment of hyponatremic encephalopathy in children. Pediatric
Nephrology 2010, 25:1225-1238.
11. Lipton E, Drew C, Shane S, Rohde D: Breakdowns marked path from
hurricane to anarchy. New York Times, New York; 2005 [http://www.
nytimes.com/2005/09/11/national/nationalspecial/11response.html?
pagewanted=1&ei=5088&en=fb3d95d685b8f2f4&ex=1284091200&partner
=rssnyt&emc=rss].
12. FEMA, American Red Cross: Food and Water in an Emergency 2004.
13. Preparing for an Emergency. , 4[http://www.ema.gov.au/www/emaweb/
rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(FC77CAE5F7A38CF2EBC5832A6FD3AC0C)~Preparing+for
+the+Unexpected+Cover.PDF/$file/Preparing+for+the+Unexpected+Cover.
PDF].
14. Get an emergency kit. [http://www.getprepared.gc.ca/_fl/pub/mrgnc-kteng.pdf].
15. Cup-feeding. [http://www.breastfeeding.asn.au/bfinfo/cupfeeding.html].
16. Lang S, Lawrence CJ, Orme RL: Cup feeding: an alternative method of
infant feeding. Archives of Disease in Childhood 1994, 71:365-369.
17. Emergency Nutrition Network, IBFAN-GIFA, Fondation Terre des hommes,
CARE USA, Action Contre la Faim, UNICEF, UNHCR, WHO, WFP, Linkages:
Infant Feeding in Emergencies: Module 2, version 1.1 for health and nutrition
workers in emergency situations Oxford: Emergency Nutrition Network; 2007.
18. Osborn K, Lyons M: Is bottled water really unsafe for making up infant
formula? Community Practitioner 2010, 83:31-34.
19. WHO, FAO: Safe preparation and handling of powdered infant formula:
guidelines Geneva: WHO; 2006.
20. Redmond EC, Griffith CJ: The importance of hygiene in the domestic
kitchen: implications for preparation and storage of food and infant
formula. Perspectives in Public Health 2009, 129:69-76.
21. World Health Organization: Guiding Principles for Infant and Young Child
Feeding in Emergencies Geneva: World Health Organization; 2004.
22. Linkages Project: Infant Feeding Options in the Context of HIV Washington
DC: Academy for Educational Development; 2004.
23. FAO, WHO: How to Prepare Formula for Cup-Feeding at Home Geneva: WHO;
2007.
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central

and take full advantage of:
Convenient online submission
Thorough peer review
No space constraints or color figure charges
Immediate publication on acceptance
Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
204
Bushfire Awareness and Preparedness of Frail Older and

Vulnerable Residents in Yarra Ranges
Karen Kimpton
Master of Emergency Management Program
Charles Sturt University, Bathurst, Australia
Paper presented at
205
Bushfire Awareness and Preparedness of Frail Older and

Vulnerable Residents in Yarra Ranges
Abstract: Findings from the 2009 project; 'Bushfire Awareness and Preparedness of
Frail Older and Vulnerable Residents in Yarra Ranges' provided an insight into the
rationale of vulnerable persons in responding to Bushfire Risk.
A range of tools were used to identify vulnerable groups and messaging and service
coordination issues across the community care sector.
The aim of this workshop presentation is to provide an overview of the project data
and data analysis related to messaging and the responses of vulnerable persons
and or groups to such messaging.
Fifty five unstructured telephone interviews were completed with vulnerable persons
in high fire risk areas. Seven case studies were documented to highlight service
coordination issues. (Interviewees agreed to have non identifying information
shared). All 55 callers described complex medical, mobility, sensory, or cognitive
factors impacting on capacity.
Of the 55 persons interviewed 45 did not have an adequate bushfire survival plan;
incorrectly believing Council would open Relief Centres on hot days. When advised
Relief Centres would not open on hot days for the purpose of community relocation
callers did not have a contingency plan.
The analysis of the themes and trends presenting in interview findings further
shaped project direction. The project sought to redress the issues identified in the
interviews in the second phase of the project.
Sixty four community care organisations were bought together to workshop identified
issues. Three key community organisations were approached to ensure continuity of
messaging to vulnerable groups.
Three standardised surveys were developed and distributed to Community Care
Providers, Senior Citizens Groups and Community Care Peak Bodies.
Maps were developed to identify vulnerable persons.
Liaison with the Council Home and Community Support unit assisted in quantifying
and targeting vulnerable persons who required supported relocation.
This workshop provides the opportunity for those interested to explore project
analysis and outcomes.
Keywords: Yarra Ranges, vulnerable, bushfire, preparedness
206
Introduction
In May 2008 a 12 month Shire of Yarra Ranges (the Shire) pilot Bushfire
Preparedness project was finalized. The pilot was developed in response to extreme
risk assessments for places of assembly and institutions located within the Shire.
The extreme risk assessment related to wild fires and structural fires. (Shire of Yarra
Ranges, 2007).
The pilot targeted community facilities and community and residential aged care
providers. The bed based services provided support and accommodation to frail
elderly and disabled persons.
Services were in fire risk areas compounded by the possibility of road access issues
should resident relocation be required. The pilot project developed and measured
the effectiveness of strategies to increase fire preparation awareness and strengthen
community education networks to deliver fire safety messages to community
organizations and bed based providers.
The project identified and recommended ongoing work to maintain levels of
preparedness for a separate cohort of frail older and vulnerable residents living
independently in the community.
Findings determined the need to strengthen bushfire preparedness messaging to
this cohort.
Further the Councils Bushfire Season 2009-2010 Action Plan identified strategies
and recommendations to prepare for the coming fire season. Communications and
Fire Safety Education were identified as a high priority in developing and
implementing a range of strategies to support vulnerable groups with fire safety. The
Action Plan recommended appointing a Community Development Officer to support
vulnerable residents with fire safety.
In 2009 the State Government funded a 6 month Bushfire Preparedness Program in
the Shire. There was an identified need for a community development strategy
during the summer season to support bushfire preparedness messaging. The
timelines for the project were September 2009 to March 2010.
The primary objective of 2009 Bushfire Awareness and Preparedness of Frail Older
and Vulnerable Residents in Yarra Ranges project was to identify at risk groups and
embed fire safety messages.
The project was targeted to vulnerable frail aged and residents with a disability living
independently (in their own homes or in a retirement village) within the community.
A Community Development Officer was appointed to project manage in September
2009. The project was completed in April 2010.
207
Context
The impact of the February 2009 fires that devastated communities across the Shire
was significant. The total area burnt was 48,293 hectares or 19.6% of the Shire.
Twelve lives were lost (10 in Steels Creek and two in Toolangi), 161 private
dwellings were destroyed, 416 outbuildings were destroyed and 144 businesses
were affected. (Shire of Yarra Ranges, 2009).
In response Council activated 5 Relief Centres with the support of Shire staff and
employees from other Councils. Council coordinated 229 staff across 616 shifts. The
effort was supported by Centrelink, Department of Human Services, Red Cross and
other Community Care Organisations (CSOs). (Shire of Yarra Ranges, 2009).
Councils experience with the expectations of vulnerable persons and their carers in
relation to the February 2009 Relief Centre caring capacity was expansive. Council
policy prescribed Relief Centres as a building or place to provide basic life support
and essential needs to affected persons. Community expectations were not in
accordance with the policy.
Community anxiety leading into the 2009-2010 Bushfire Season was high.
The broad social and economic impacts from the February 2009 bushfire event
continue to be measured. Councils response to the relief and recovery efforts was
expansive and became a priority work effort across all departments to meet the
needs of dislocated and traumatised residents throughout 2009-2010.
Another key element of the Councils work effort was to meet planning, preparation
and resource commitments for the pending 2009-2010 Bushfire Season.
Council, Emergency Service Organisations (ESO) and state government
departments had revised the approach taken to Bushfire Relief, Recovery and
Preparedness following the events of February 2009.
The flow on effect of the 2009 Victorian Royal Bushfires Commissions investigation
of vulnerable community members stay or go capacity informed direction for
bushfire preparedness messaging. (BVRC, 2009). The Victorian state governments
Prepare, Act Survive campaign was the key driver to Community Education for the
2009-2010 bushfire season.
The 2009 Bushfire Awareness and Preparedness of Frail Older and Vulnerable
Residents in Yarra Ranges project context was defined by the above determinants
and this context shaped the activities of the project.
208
Project Activities
Unstructured Interviews
The project commenced mid-September 2009. At this time the volume of calls and
correspondence to Council from Shire residents in relation to fire preparedness had
increased significantly. Calls to Council Emergency Management Officers (EMOs)
with requests for property inspection and to Customer Service with fire preparedness
enquiries resulted in a substantive increase in workload across departments.
Where callers or correspondents had a range of issues impacting on capacity to plan
and prepare for bushfire, EMOs and Customer Service Officers referred the matter to
the Project Manager.
While calls were broad ranging in content some standardised information was
collected to measure the issues vulnerable, frail aged and disabled persons were
citing as barriers to bushfire preparation. Callers were also asked to describe their
Bushfire Survival Plans.
Fifty five unstructured interviews were completed and assessed.
With caller permission seven anonymous case studies were documented from the
interview process. The case studies were shared with the project Steering Group to
better understand factors impacting on vulnerable persons and bushfire
preparedness.
Project direction and scope was partly defined by the unstructured interviews and
case study analysis.
The interviews provided a framework to measure caller circumstances and bushfire
preparedness. Callers two main presenting issues were around property
maintenance to ensure fire preparedness, or a request to Council for support or
resourcing to relocate on hot days.
All 55 callers described complex medical, mobility, sensory, or cognitive factors
impacting on capacity.
Other identified issues in order of frequency were, self-described social isolation,
self-described low income, concern for domestic animal care and availability of
accessible vehicles to transport from high fire risk areas.
Of the 55 persons interviewed 45 did not have an adequate bushfire survival plan;
incorrectly believing Council would open Relief Centres on hot days. When advised
Relief Centres would not open on hot days for the purpose of community relocation,
only three callers had a contingency.
209
Of those that disclosed their age; 10 were under 65 and disabled, 34 identified they
were between 65 and 80 years and 8 were older than 80 years.
The most concerning theme across the group was the expectation of Council, ESO
and government to provide resourcing to vulnerable persons to facilitate relocation or
emergency supports.
Thirty five persons believed they would be subsidised for relocation expenses, seven
persons expected Council would transport to alternative accommodation, eight
persons expected police would transport in an emergency and ten persons expected
a fire truck would attend where fire threatened their property.
The preferred relocation planning option by the group was to rely on municipal and
state funded service provision. Other relocation contingencies had not been planned.
Barriers to effective messaging were identified as; unrealistic reliance on emergency
service provision, poor help seeking behaviours across personal networks, denial of
risk, ambivalence regarding risk and a sense that factors such as luck or faith would
act to protect from fire risk.
Referral across services was also acting as a barrier to effective messaging.
Analysis identified misinformation from referral sources (government departments,
ESOs and Community Care providers) was compounding community expectations of
Council service provision.
Thirty one of the persons interviewed had been advised to contact Council by a case
managed service, or an ESO for assistance with Relief Centre location, transport,
accommodation and financial support to facilitate relocation arrangements on Code
Red or Extreme days.
The intent of referral generally was for Council to provide case managed care or
resourcing to vulnerable individuals during these episodes of high fire risk. Such
service provision was not within the scope of Council.
Key Stakeholder Liaison - Community Care 2009
Liaison with key stakeholders identified a number of concurrent initiatives to support
vulnerable populations living independently in the community with bushfire
preparation.
Policy development by the Department of Human Services Eastern Metropolitan
Region Disability Program provided direction to disability funded providers and
clients of the department. Supports were put in place to raise awareness about
bushfire preparedness with clients of the program.
The Victorian Home and Community Care (HACC) program provided policy advice
for targeted intervention with vulnerable HACC clients to Local Government. The
210
HACC Summer Guidelines (Health and Human Services Emergency Management,

2009) provided a framework for Councils Home and Community Support (HaCoS)
program to identify and support vulnerable program clients.
Support to Residential Facilities, Retirement Villages and Community Care
The Project was widely promoted by Council in the Shire. Services providing support
to, young disabled, vulnerable or frail aged residents were encouraged to make
contact with the Project Manager.
Residential providers within the Shire sought clarification and advice from Council,
ESOs, Department of Health and Ageing and DHS to redefine policy and procedure
to align with new Fire Danger (CFA, 2009) ratings, particularly in the area of
relocating vulnerable persons.
Retirement Villages in high fire risk areas raised concerns about the vulnerability of
residents, who were in the main, single female 85+ households. The primary concern
was an absence of clear policy direction by owners of Retirement Villages regarding
resident bushfire preparedness. Retirement Village residents are deemed to live
independently in the community. The Retirement Villages (Contractual
Arrangements) Regulations 2006 are silent on the issue of resident relocation.
Representatives from seniors groups, community groups, low income housing and
retirement village residents consulted with the project around equity issues for
vulnerable populations.
The singular common theme was the perceived cost of relocation placed a
disproportionate burden on those with fixed incomes.
Information provision, network development and an information session were
provided by the Project Manager.
Large Community Care providers of packaged care or case managed services had
developed policy to support vulnerable client groups. However providers were
reporting concerns around the parameters of roles and responsibilities for staff
working with vulnerable persons to plan and prepare for bushfire.
Some staff had indicated to employers they would physically relocate vulnerable
persons without employer impromptu or; that clients expected staff to physically
relocate them. Indemnity issues were the primary presenting concern.
All CSOs were expressing the view there was no service coordination arrangement
in place to meet community care planning needs. Multi-agency meetings identified
several relevant bushfire preparedness initiatives.
The CFA commenced development of information products to ensure persons with a
sensory or cognitive disability living independently were provided with FireReady
messaging. (Elliot.2010). The Australian Red Cross REDIPlan materials were
211
providing an all hazards approach to emergency planning with a specific resource for
seniors. (Australian Red Cross, 2009).
The CFA FireReady campaign was underway and CFA Region 13 had scheduled
community meetings across the Shire. The Project Manager attended several of
these meetings and discussed local fire preparedness arrangements with
participants.
Workshops
In November 2009 two Community Care workshops were developed by the Project
Manager. The workshops enabled Council to advise the sector about bushfire
preparedness arrangements for 2009-2010 and clarify Relief Centre operation as a
Recovery function. Sub-planning arrangements (reduced service delivery) during
extreme weather were detailed for the Councils HaCoS program. Council also
provided advice on emergency management arrangements and the roles and
responsibilities of ESOs.
The workshops aimed to address the issues in the Community Care sector related to
bushfire preparation policy development and implementation. For all participants this
body of work was a pressing emerging issue.
Poor referral practice, indemnity related to staff safety and client care, unrealistic
client expectation, gaps in resourcing, reduced service provision in extreme weather
and a lack of a coordinated approach were the key themes noted.
The model of practice presented by key speakers was one in which vulnerable
persons and their personal carers incorporated an ethos of personal responsibility for
bushfire preparedness and community care providers worked to support this
position.
ACCV, (Aged and Community Care Victoria) assisted to develop the framework for
policy development to support the above position.
The rights and responsibilities of frail aged and disabled persons to self-determine
bushfire survival plans and Duty of Care responsibilities by Community Care
providers was the focus of policy context discussion.
Workshop participants were provided with the opportunity to ask questions of panel
members including WorkSafe Victoria, CFA staff leading resource development for
vulnerable persons, other EMO staff and Council.
Participants represented service providers providing a full range of Primary Health,
Rehabilitation, Accommodation, Packaged Care, Mental Health, Disability, Frail
Aged, In Home Support, Case Management, Social Support, Nursing, Telephone
Support and Education services.
212
Participant feedback was mixed. While the majority of participants felt better
informed and more able to communicate with clients they remained concerned about
duplication of effort for shared clients and the care needs of complex clients.
Sixty four participants attended the workshops.
Information sessions - HaCoS Carers
Three information sessions were provided to Council HaCoS carer staff iterating the
findings from the unstructured interviews and workshop themes. Council HaCoS
carer staff provide a range of in-home care services to frail elderly and young
disabled persons and their carers.
The sessions allowed staff to discuss duty of care issues and identify strategies to
better support bushfire preparedness across work groups and for client groups. Staff
expressed concern at these sessions about vulnerable, socially isolated clients with
limited personal support networks.
Where relevant, client referral was made to the HaCoS Community Care Executive
Officer for a follow up interview. (Council was working on a parallel initiative funded
by the HACC program and based on the 2009 HACC Summer Guidelines).
Yarra Ranges Faith Network
An informal information session was provided to Yarra Ranges Faith leadership
group to assist with messaging to parishioners and congregants about differing
values and attitudes across generations with regard to risk. The session was
developed in response to unstructured interview information that indicated faith
constructs influenced decision making in risk situations amongst older cohorts. Faith
was perceived as a protective mechanism against risk.
Further one small rural church had offered the church premises as a relief centre to
church members on high risk fire days. The offer had been made without
consideration to traffic management, parking, fire safety assessment of the premises
or the capacity of the premises to meet local relief centre need should a fire
eventuate.
The faith leadership group was open to ensuring continuity of relocation advice to
vulnerable persons. The offer of the church as a relief centre was withdrawn.
Community Information Sessions
Community Information sessions were provided throughout December 2009 and
January and February 2010. Two Healesville based Probus Clubs, seven rural
Senior Citizens Centres and one Retirement Village participated. Approximately 350
persons attended the information sessions.
213
The sessions provided clarity around Council service provision and enabled the
Project Manager to measure emerging trends in terms of responsiveness to bushfire
preparedness messaging. The sessions were structured to provide information and
advice and included extensive question and answer sessions.
The nature of the sessions differed across groups. Groups located in the Dandenong
Ranges presented with strong rights based views around place based solutions such
as Neighbourhood Safer Places. Risk and subsequent harm from wildfire was a
secondary consideration to the provision of an immediate place based solution.
All groups raised issues related to ageing. Of interest was the consistent anecdotal
theme that neighbours were an unreliable source of support to vulnerable elders
during an emergency.
While many senior participants stated they would not bother their children for support
during relocation, when explored the subtext was fragility around relinquishing a
sense of dependence to their adult children.
Towards the end of February 2010 anecdotal issues started to include perceptions
adult children were harassing older parents and disabled family members to have
bushfire survival plans.
Groups were also expressing strong views that the volume and multiple sources of
paper based information were excessive. Many had not read or discarded the
information. Strong views began to be expressed about the media campaign as
panic driven. The perception was fire risk had been exaggerated.
It had been a relatively mild summer.
Financial risk associated with relocation was generally perceived by all groups as a
greater threat to individuals in terms of their personal risk matrix than fire risk.
Right to stay values and attitudes, without a realistic sense of capacity was prevalent
amongst older males. Female partners expressed concern about this position.
Single female households expressed concern around the complexity of the tasks
related to planning and implementing relocation arrangements. Pet safety was a
significant factor in anxiety about these arrangements in conjunction with the costs
involved.
Rural and remote groups universally raised issues related to Council responsibility
for roadside safety (clearing vegetation), road access and public transport options.
214
Community Radio
Providing community education to socially isolated, vulnerable persons in remote
rural locations was an identified Council concern. A community radio station provided
programming to disabled persons living in rural and remote communities.
The Project Manager led four Community Radio programs with a bushfire
preparedness focus. Two of the sessions were co-presented with Region 13 CFA.
The format of the sessions was designed to reinforce FireReady messaging to those
who might not have the cognitive or literacy skills to plan and prepare for bushfire.
The sessions emphasised the importance of communication with personal carers
and case managers. Personal responsibility for bushfire preparedness was
promoted.
Project Products
Mapping
For the purpose of the project vulnerable persons were defined as frail elderly and
disabled persons living in a Community Care setting.
Maps (Yarra Ranges Council, 2010) were developed identifying wildfire overlay
areas, road access, demographic data (ABS 2006 Census Data) and sites of
residential facilities to provide a notional sense of concentrations of vulnerable
community care populations. (Commonwealth Health and Ageing Residential
facilities were included to eliminate distortions in older cohorts within given postcode
areas).
This information was then used in conjunction with Council HaCoS data. The HaCoS
data identified clients geographically who had been assessed as socially isolated
and/or in receipt of higher than average HaCoS service provision.
This mapping informed project direction and was expanded upon by Councils
HaCoS program in identifying (desk top review) and encouraging or supporting
vulnerable
Shire
residents
to
develop
a
Bushfire
Survival
Plan.
Fliers
To address the issues noted in the unstructured interviews two fliers were developed
in October 2009.
The first flier (Yarra Ranges Council, 2010) aimed to increase help seeking
behaviours by frail and disabled persons with their personal networks. The second
flier encouraged personal carers (family, friends, and neighbours) to support
vulnerable persons be fire prepared.
215
For continuity of message the fliers utilised CFA FireReady materials. Four thousand
fliers were disseminated to HACC clients and personal carers, Senior Citizens
Centres and CSos.
Relocation Kits
These kits (Yarra Ranges Council, 2010) were developed in response to frail elderly
perceptions the existing materials regarding fire safety were too complex and not
being utilised.
Anecdotally Senior Citizens were stating bushfire preparation information was being
recycled or placed in a cupboard or drawer. The FireReady information was not
being read. 100% of one Senior Citizens club reported to the Project Manager
facilitating an Information Session they had discarded FireReady information into
paper recycling without reading it.
When explored why the information had been discarded, the volume of reading was
the key issue. A secondary issue was the group rejected the premise relocation was
a strategy they should adopt during high fire risk periods. Road congestion, the
needs of domestic pets and cost were cited as the barriers to relocating. Other
groups shared like views.
The format of information was concise in Checklist and Tip Sheet format. The
Relocation Kit aimed to enhance FireReady messaging and raise awareness about
relocation on high fire risk days for vulnerable persons and their personal carers.
Two thousand kits provide a Relocation Checklist (A5 magnetised fridge poster), a
Relocation Tip Sheet attached to a small backpack and a pen to encourage people
to personalise bushfire survival plans.
Standardised Surveys
To put mechanisms in place to canvass opinions about factors influencing Bushfire
Preparedness and to gain a sense of emerging trends the Project Manager
constructed three standardised surveys. (Yarra Ranges Council, 2010).
Survey 1: Community Care Providers Bushfire Preparedness Survey
Thirty eight Community Care providers completed this survey. The survey was
disseminated by the Outer East Primary Care Partnership and the EMR to
Community Care providers in the Shire. Response rates are therefore difficult to
determine but are estimated at approximately 25%.
Survey 1 was designed to engage and network with Community Care providers and
create opportunities for future information sharing. It also acted to measure the
activities and opinions of providers regarding bushfire preparedness and vulnerable
populations.
216
Of the 38 respondents 4 did not provide a direct service, but did provide advice or
information to vulnerable frail aged and disabled persons. (5 CSOs did not respond
to this question).
For those 29 CSOs responding that they did provide direct service, 10 (34%)
employed or designated staff members specifically to bushfire preparedness roles
and functions during the 2009-2010 Bushfire Season.
Gr aph: 1 Q.8 Have policy pr oce dur e to s uppor t
bus hfir e pr e par ation and planning for s taff?
7%
14%
79%
Yes
No
Under review
Graph 1 CSO provider staff bushfire preparation and planning policy/procedure
Graph 1 shows that 23 (79%) of the 29 CSOs providing direct service had policy and
procedure in place to support bushfire preparation and planning for staff. Two CSOs
were reviewing procedure.
The remaining four CSOs (7%) were developing or planning to develop policy and
procedure for staff. Although a small sample it reflects duty of care commitment to
workplace safety is a key concern to these organisations.
Survey one identified service provision across the 29 CSOs providing direct care
was to be modified when fire danger ratings were Code Red or Extreme. Twenty six
CSOs (90%) planned to cease/modify service provision on Code Red or Extreme
Fire Danger rating days.
The general trend was service provision would cease in rural and remote (high fire
risk) areas on Code Red days and cease or be modified on Extreme days. The
greater the risk exposure to staff, the more likely services would cease or be
modified.
The survey noted context of CSO policy and procedure. Fourteen (54%) of the 26
CSOs had policy that encouraged client personal responsibility for bushfire
preparedness. Four (15%) were reviewing policy and 7(29%) were developing like
policy.
217
Thirty one CSOs requested further information from Council on bushfire preparation
arrangements and 25 CSOs expressed interest in attending future workshops.
Graph 2: Q.17 Most common source/s of bushfire preparation and
planning information
26
CFA FireReady Information.

14
Yarra Ranges Council Info

11
Dept of Human Services Information.

8
Dept of Health Info

6
Peak Body
Information specific to Organisation

5
Your Organisation's central office

4
Aust Red Cross Rediplan Info
MFB Information
3
Bureau of Meteorology
2
Dept of Health and Ageing

0
10
15
20
25
30
Graph 2 CSO source of bushfire preparation and planning information to clients
Graph 2 shows that 82% (31) indicated that they provided advice and information to
clients about bushfire preparation. The most common source of information was the
CFA FireReady materials for 84% of CSOs. Council information was the second
most common source.
Graph 3: Q.17 Most common format/s of information provision to clients
Letter
19
Flier
12
Info Session
11
Telephone Calls
10
Home Visit
Case Managed Conversation
Posters
Website Info
Information in client waiting area
1
0
10
Graph 3 CSO format of information to clients
218
15
20
Graph 3 demonstrates how bushfire preparation information and advice was

communicated to clients.
The Project Manager noted in conversations with community members at
Community Education and Community Information sessions they had received
written or verbal advice from several government and Community Care providers.
Survey 2: Peak Body - Bushfire Preparedness Policy Development
Survey 2 was designed to canvass the opinions of various peak advisory groups
influencing Community Care policy development. The sample size is small and
therefore difficult to interpret. Only 7 responses were received, representing a
response rate of 31%.
Five of the 7 responses confirmed the provision of Bushfire Preparation policy and
procedure advice to member organisations to support planning for workforce groups.
Four Peaks had formulated policy and procedure information based on client
personal responsibility. Two had not.
Survey 3: Measure fire plans of vulnerable residents (Senior Citizens)
One hundred and twelve households completed this survey. It was disseminated at
three Senior Citizens venues (Yarra Valley, Wandin and Montrose) where the
Project Manager provided a standardised overview of Council function and survey
completion guidelines.
Approximately 70% of participants at the information session completed the survey.
Some surveys were completed by couples.
The survey presented an opportunity to measure the Fire Readiness of Senior
Citizens following an Extreme Fire Danger Rating in Victorias Central Region on 11
January 2010. The Project Manager was scheduled to provide Information Sessions
to three groups shortly after the Extreme rating.
Of the 112 responses 57 households planned to relocate on an Extreme Fire Danger
Rating day. Fifty five households had not planned to relocate.
On 11 January 2010 only 5 of the 112 (4.4%) households actually relocated.
Survey responses came from 37 single and couple households in rural and remote
high fire risk areas.
219
Graph 4: Persons living in a rural area that planned to relocate on an

extreme day, but did not (by age)
50%
43%
43%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
3%
Under 50
5%
5%
0%
50 - 60
60 -70
70 - 80
80 - 90
90+
Graph 4 Age of 37 single and couple households living in rural remote area that planned to relocate
on an extreme day, but did not
Graph 4 shows the ages of the 37 households in rural and remote high risk fire
areas that did not relocate as planned on 11 January 2010. The majority were 60
years or above. (Persons under 50 at the Senior Citizen Centres were young and
disabled or personal carers of frail elderly).
48% of the 37 households that did not relocate on 11 January 2010 were over 80
years old.
220
Graph 5: Persons who planned to relocate on extreme day but did not, and live in rural and remote area
Why not?
I did not think there was a fire risk
35%
Decided to wait and see what would happen
22%
Other
13%
If there was a fire I did not think it would affect me
11%
Forgot about my plan
7%
Did not have the money to relocate
4%
Family assistance was not available on the day
4%
It was too hot to leave
2%
Someone in my family would not go
2%
I was too unwell to relocate
2%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
Graph 5 Reasons 37 single and couple households living in rural remote area planned to, but did
not relocate.
Graph 5 is indicative of reason/s persons in high fire risk areas chose for not
relocating.
Of note is three of the four most frequently cited reasons for not relocating relate to a
perception there was not an imminent fire threat.
Parallel Project Activity
HACC Summer Guidelines Initiative
Councils Executive Officer in Community Care was taken offline during the summer
of 2009-2010. Council identified, interviewed and assessed the needs of HaCoS
clients in relation to bushfire preparedness. Council worked to the HACC Summer
Guidelines for assessment purposes. The Victorian HACC program funded the
initiative.
There were approximately 2,500 Council HaCoS clients reviewed by desktop
assessment.
221
Where high vulnerability was determined, phone and face to face interviews were
undertaken. A register of vulnerable clients was created. For those clients of the
program identified without capacity or personal networks to prepare for bushfire,
Council undertook to provide some resourcing and a relocation option.
Administration of the register remains as work in progress for Council.
Council assessed that only 60 highly vulnerable clients were identified from the
2,500 clients reviewed and only 16 of those clients required full Council support to
plan and prepare for bushfire.
This represents 0.28% of HaCoS clients unable to utilise personal networks for
assistance with bushfire preparedness and relocation arrangements.
The Executive Officer and the Project Manager of the Bushfire Awareness and
Preparedness of Frail Older and Vulnerable Residents in Yarra Ranges worked
closely together. The learning from the projects informed HaCoS sub-planning
procedures for service delivery modification and the monitoring of outreach staff
during high temperatures in Wildfire areas.
Both the Executive Officer and the Project Manager authored project findings in Draft
Report for Council consideration. The reports were amalgamated into a joint Council
Bushfire Awareness and Preparedness report in July 2010. The report was edited by
Vicki Perre, Councils Manager of the HaCoS program.
Conclusion
The majority of vulnerable frail aged and disabled persons living independently in
high fire risk areas did not demonstrate acceptance of bushfire preparedness
messaging. Risk was externalised and personal planning around harm minimisation
relied on external resourcing and high risk place based solutions.
In September, October and November of 2009 presenting issues amplified anxiety
and confusion about bushfire planning arrangements. A mild summer shaped
thinking. In February 2010 vulnerable persons were presenting as disconnected from
bushfire preparedness messaging.
Peak Bodies were working to support policy formation.
Community Care providers were proactive in developing frameworks to support
bushfire preparedness and seek information on ways forward.
Service system resourcing to manage a coordinated approach to meeting the needs
of vulnerable community care populations remained a primary concern of providers.
Workforce development was a priority. Staff safety and staff capacity to appropriately
support vulnerable groups was an identified need.
222
Significant planning information and advice had been provided to vulnerable

persons. Media, the 2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commissions Interim Findings
and the long term impact of the events of February 2009 on local communities were
strident reminders of the need for bushfire preparation.
However anecdotal information and survey findings demonstrate frail aged and
disabled persons were resistant or ambivalent to bushfire preparation planning
arrangements inclusive of relocation.
Functionally, place based options were the preferred option. Cost neutrality for any
relocation option was perceived as critical.
There were a range of complex psychosocial and place based variables that may
have acted as barriers to behaviour change impacting on capacity or willingness to
relocate.
Clearly cost, the logistics of travel, and strong public opinion within communities
promoting Neighbourhood Safer Places strongly influenced thinking.
It was also apparent that the right to self-determine, the valuing of independence and
the perception of capacity to manage obstacles were key determinants for vulnerable
persons in decision making.
In February 2010 embedment of the factors that contributed to risk for vulnerable
Shire residents during the fires throughout February 2009 had not been internalised.
Given the disproportionate harms that came to vulnerable persons during the fires of
February 2009 (2009, BVRC) this is a concern.
While only 0.28% of Councils own vulnerable client group were assessed as unable
to relocate, this project noted the majority of vulnerable persons were unwilling to
relocate.
This raises questions about the capacity of the Community Care service system and
ESOs to support highly vulnerable residents in high fire risk rural and remote areas
where those residents choose not to relocate during extreme weather events.
Assessment of risk was not a demonstrated strength of the vulnerable population.
Ambivalence regarding personal well-being was amplified by age. Neighbours did
not demonstrate, nor were they perceived as a reliable support. Expectation of an
ESO or Council to support fire preparation and or relocation was widespread.
Given these issues initiatives to support messaging need to be long term. Bushfire
preparation for vulnerable persons must be underpinned by improved Community
Care capacity and coordination. Consideration to developing relocation insurance
and realistic travel options for vulnerable frail elders and young disabled persons
relocating from rural and remote areas may assist to support personal capacity to
relocate.
223
Bibliography
2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission, July 2009. Interim Report, Section 7
Stay or Go State of Victoria, Melbourne
Australian Red Cross, 2009, Emergency REDiPlan, Household Preparedness for
Seniors Australian Red Cross, Carlton
CFA, 2009, New Fire Danger Rating State of Victoria, Melbourne
Elliott.C, 2010, Accessible Information Update Issue 2 CFA, State of Victoria,
Melbourne
Health and Human Services Emergency Management, 2009. Summer Strategy for
Home and Community Care Funded Organisations State of Victoria, Melbourne
Shire of Yarra Ranges, 2007. Fire Prevention Plan 2007-2010 Shire Yarra Ranges,
Lilydale. pp. 24-28 of the document specifies an Extreme Risk assessment for
places of assembly and institutions related to a structure or wildfire event. The plan
was the genesis for the 2007-2008 Bushfire Preparation Project.
Shire of Yarra Ranges, 2009. Municipal Recovery Action Plan. Shire Yarra Ranges,
Lilydale. pp. 6-14 provides an overview of the impact the February 2009 fires within
the Shire and Councils Relief Centre activity.
Yarra Ranges Council, 2010 Bushfire Awareness and Preparedness of Frail Older
and Vulnerable Residents in Yarra Ranges Yarra Ranges Council, Lilydale.
Appendices A, B and C describe project products. Appendices D, E, F and G
describe survey templates and findings.
224
Catastrophic Work / Life Balance: Emergency Responder Role

Conflict and Abandonment Implications for Managers
Greg Linsdell
Senior Lecturer
Charles Sturt University,
Australian Graduate School of Policing, Sydney, Australia
Paper presented at
225
Catastrophic Work / Life Balance: Emergency Responder Role Conflict and

Abandonment Implications for Managers
Abstract
No one would seriously question the courage of our emergency responders, or their
loyalty and sense of duty. But what happens when, in catastrophic emergencies,
their duty as responders conflicts with their duty as a partner, parent or child; or in
the case of volunteers perhaps, their duty to other organisations?
These dilemmas can result in role conflict which can detract from performance at
work or result in the abandonment of duty. These phenomena have been
researched, from time to time, since the 1950s but the focus returned after
Hurricane Katrina that hit New Orleans in 2005. During that event, at a time where a
community was in desperate need of police support, 240 of the 1450 strong force did
not go to work, some for many weeks. Of the 240, 51 were later fired for
abandoning their posts. After the storm, another sixty officers resigned and two
committed suicide.
In 2011 the University of Delaware, Disaster Research Centre (DRC), reported the
results of a meta-evaluation of the research done to examine role strain, role conflict
and abandonment in incidents ranging from natural disasters and terrorist attacks to
pandemics. The DRC observed that, methodologically, the research fell into two
categories; behavioural studies that examined actual incidents, and perception
studies that measured what people thought they would do in a hypothetical situation.
The results between the groups varied enormously with perception studies predicting
up to 70% abandonment in some cases but behavioural studies being far more
optimistic to the point that it was suggested that role abandonment would not have a
significant operational impact.
This paper will discuss the manifestations of role conflict in emergency services and
the potential for role abandonment suggesting that, while the likelihood of mass
abandonment is low, there may be a tipping point at which it will occur. The
Victorian fires of 2009 are examined as an event where one might expect evidence
of abandonment. Finally the author will discuss proactive measures that may be
considered during the planning, prevention and response phases of a disaster or
catastrophe to mitigate against role conflict, thereby increasing performance and
reducing the risk of mass abandonment.
Keywords: Role conflict, role abandonment, work/family conflict, volunteers,

emergency responders, fire-fighters.
226
Catastrophic Work / Life Balance: Emergency Responder Role Conflict and

Abandonment Implications for Managers
Introduction
The concept of work / life balance is something we have become increasingly aware
of in recent times. The need to have a life beyond work is seen as not only
desirable but also necessary for proper mental and physical health. Organisations
have responded with more flexible policies around working hours, location of work
and absences. For the most part this revolution in work practice continues, enabled
by technology and pushed by generational change. However, there are times where
emergency response agencies must insist that people be at work. Communities rely
on emergency responders and while routine operations permit flexibility, sudden
emergencies and catastrophic events may require people to put work first. This
paper examines the literature on the conflicting pressures between work as an
emergency responder and other life roles and suggests that under certain extreme
circumstances large-scale role abandonment by emergency responders is
foreseeable. Proactively reducing the pressures associated with role conflict in the
emergency response workforce is likely to increase retention rates, improve
operational performance and defer the tipping point at which large-scale
abandonment is predicted. A number of options and considerations are put forward
to assist emergency response managers and agencies in the management of risks
associated with role conflict.
Role Conflict and Abandonment

Role conflict refers to the times when it is difficult for individuals to meet the
demands of filling multiple roles (Killian, 1952; Westman, 2001). In the context of this
paper we are referring to people who have an occupational role as a as a career,
retained or volunteer1 emergency responder; such as a fire-fighter, rescuer,
paramedic or police officer. These roles require people to face dangers and take
risks that other citizens are not exposed to or expected to confront. Such is the
selfless bravery and sense of duty among these groups that during relatively recent
mega-events, such as the World Trade Centre attacks in New York, the unsolicited
convergence of emergency responders became a problem in itself. (See Tierney,
2003) Emergency responders do this work for a variety of reasons but commonly it is
an intrinsic and altruistic motivation to serve or protect the community and in this way
make a contribution to society. Many make the ultimate sacrifice, losing their lives in
the course of their duty. (For example see Mayhew, 2001; Ridenour et al., 2008,
regarding the health and safety risks of policing and firefighting.)
Career officers are those for whom the emergency response role is the primary occupation, usually
full-time. Volunteer and retained emergency responders are those who make themselves available for
training and call-out to incidents. The difference is that retained officers receive an allowance for
being on-call and may be paid while on duty at a call-out. Volunteers are not paid in this way but the
term volunteer is used in this paper to describe all non-career emergency responders because
remuneration is not a key factor.
227
Of course emergency responders have life roles beyond their profession. They are
parents, siblings and children with interdependent relationships with others. They
have friends and colleagues who may rely on them and, particularly in the case of
volunteers, may have a second primary occupation and perhaps customers and
employees to whom they have various levels of responsibility. Simultaneously
meeting the expectations of these various responsibilities can be difficult. Emergency
responders often work shift work and have unpredictable hours and may be subject
to call outs. In addition, the strains of emergency response work can lead to changed
social and family behaviours that can impact on relationships.
Australian communities are heavily dependent on their 220,000 volunteer fire fighters
(J. McLennan, 2008) but being a volunteer can put pressure on other life roles. In
2007 the average resignation rate for Australian volunteer fire agencies was 7.7%
(McLennan, Birch, Cowlishaw, & Hayes, 2009, p. 40). A study of South Australian
fire services revealed that of those volunteers who resigned between December
2005 and December 2007, 51% left due to work/family needs (McLennan, et al.,
2009, p. 45). The negative impact on work and family roles was described by
McLennan, et al. (2009, p. 45) as the most pervasive of the (notionally) avoidable
reasons why volunteers resign. In addition, research has illustrated the impact on
relationships of absences from home and the subsequent fatigue after duty (See
Greenhaus & Beutell, 1985) as well as other changes in behaviour such as
intolerance and emotional withdrawal. (See Schultz, Cowan, Cowan, & Brennan,
2004; Story & Repetti, 2006) To further exacerbate the impact of volunteer work
there is also the stress crossover effect to the partners of volunteers described by
Cowlishaw, Evans and McLennan (2010). Stress crossover effect is the process by
which stress or strain from work leads to stress or strain experienced by the partner
at home often to detrimental effect. (Westman, 2001)
In addition to the potential for conflict between duty and family there can also be role
conflict between duty as an emergency responder and other employment. This is
especially prevalent in volunteer forces as volunteers are usually responders in
addition to their full time employment or activity2. The Australian volunteer agencies
are experiencing a trend toward the selective release of volunteers depending on the
type of call. For example, like many fire services, the New South Wales Fire &
Rescue Service (FRNSW) have expanded their role to include vehicle rescue and
HAZMAT incidents in addition to traditional fire fighting and associated duties. Some
employers are reported to be making judgments about which call-out volunteers will
be released for based on the nature of the incident, such as fires but not motor
vehicle collisions; or the threat the incident presents to the local community, meaning
within a radius of the local community; or simply refusing to release employees
during work hours. For most volunteers the choice between full time employment
and the provision of volunteer services isnt really a choice and there are increasing
numbers of rural fire stations that are manned by career fire fighters during business
hours. (Brogan, 2012)
2
This is changing in many areas where volunteer ranks are increasingly made up of retirees. (Brogan,
2012)
228
Finally, there is the phenomenon of conflict between duty and duty which occurs
where responders are members of more than one emergency response agency and
is referred to as two-hat syndrome. A study of fire and rescue personnel in Atlanta
revealed that 22.2% also worked for at least one other public safety agency.
(Delinger & Gonzenbach, 2002). There is a general paucity of research in this area
but it is quite likely that it is prevalent in the Australian volunteer services as well
because many country towns and cities have a limited pool of potential volunteers.
The result is multiple memberships that, for the most part, dont create conflict.
Police officers may be volunteer fire officers and volunteer for callouts when they are
off-shift. Paramedics may work as rescue personnel on a volunteer basis. However,
there are times when a conflict may occur. A practical example of this occurred in
central New South Wales where an ambulance officer was called to a serious motor
vehicle accident. This officer was also a Deputy Captain of the NSWRFS and, on
observing the response of the fire service, decided to changes roles during the event
and take control of the fire service response. Naturally this resulted in considerable
confusion and some angst among responders. (Brogan, 2012) Of course it would be
unusual for such decisions to be made on-scene, rather they will occur at the time of
call out, but this demonstrates the potential for multi-agency events to create role
conflict and opens the door to thinking about large-scale multi-agency events which
require large numbers of emergency responders. It is not difficult to imagine a multivehicle collision involving serious injuries and the need to remove people from
wrecks combined with a HAZMAT spill from an involved tanker creating a
requirement to evacuate local residents. The range of emergency responses, from
traffic management, medical, road rescue, hazard management and evacuation
would stretch most regional responses in the first minutes and hours.
Role conflicts, of one type or another, are a part of life for many emergency
responders and perhaps this is one of the less visible burdens carried by people
working in these professions along with exposure to risk and trauma. Those who do
not resign will find mechanisms to mitigate and cope with the demands of competing
roles such that it does not unduly affect their work or their life. Others may
compartmentalize, underperform, delegate responsibility or turn to others for
assistance (See Webb, Beverly, McMichael, Noon, & Patterson, 1999). There are
also links between role conflict and work related burnout as well as a lowered
intention to continue volunteering. (e.g. Lewig, Xanthopoulou, Bakker, Dollard, &
Metzer, 2007) In acute cases role abandonment may occur. Role abandonment is
where a person stops fulfilling the responsibilities associated with a role. It is noted
that the word abandonment is emotionally charged but in this context it is not used
in a judgmental sense. Abandonment behaviours by emergency responders are hard
to imagine, and contrary to the devotion to duty and bravery for which these officers
are known, but it can and does happen. Abandonment happens where officers are
confronted with wicked dilemmas, a stark choice between fulfilling their
responsibilities to the work and their family. Such a dilemma could affect individual
officers from time to time, such as a medical emergency with a family member
requiring immediate, unplanned absence from work. Contemporary emergency
response organisations have matured sufficiently to cope with such an incident in a
supportive manner and without recrimination. However, it is possible to imagine
229
scenarios where large numbers of emergency responders may simultaneously

abandon their occupational role at which time there would be a problem due to
reduced operational capability. Needless to say, the consequence of mass
abandonment may place the communities who rely on emergency services at
increased peril. Considerable research has been done with scenario-based
projections of role abandonment in emergency responders and health care
personnel.
Precursors to Abandonment
Perception studies generate hypothetical scenarios and question people on their
likely responses. The strength of this approach is that it enables wide-ranging whatif events to be explored across large numbers of respondents. These can be events
of a nature or scale that has not yet happened, such as a dirty bomb attack in a
major city. The down side is the artificiality of the exercise and the difficulty in writing
scenarios that are not contrived. Nevertheless perception studies are widely used
and can provide very useful indicators. The results from role abandonment related
perception studies are somewhat alarming. A meta-evaluation of such studies
conducted by the Disaster Research Centre, University of Delaware, found that role
abandonment would be a major problem during many types and intensities of
disaster (Trainor & Barsky, 2011, p. 15) The range of predictions uncovered were
from 20% (Quarantelli, 1978) to as high as 68% (Alexander & Wynia, 2003) with the
higher levels of abandonment expected for events with chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear elements.
In contrast, behavioural studies examine actual incidents either through observation

and interview or the review of official inquiries. The problem of artificiality associated
with perception studies is eliminated because the event has actually occurred, but
there are other limitations. Among these is the fact that the range of events and
access to participants are restricted. These studies have largely focused on natural
disasters such as tornadoes, hurricanes and earthquakes but have also explored
public health emergencies (See Trainor & Barsky, 2011, p. 13). The Disaster
Research Center meta-evaluation concluded that behavioural studies suggest that
the role abandonment will be minimal except under very specific conditions, such as
those that were present in the case of the New Orleans Police Department during
Hurricane Katrina. (Trainor & Barsky, 2011, p. 4). So the question arises, what are
the very specific conditions for large scale and debilitating role abandonment? As
the most well known example of mass role abandonment behaviour, Hurricane
Katrina provides some insight.
Hurricane Katrina killed over 1,800 people, affected 28,000 square miles and left
tens of thousands homeless (United States Congress, 2006). During this megaevent, at a time where a community was in desperate need of police support, 240 of
the 1450 strong police force did not go to work, some for many weeks. Of the 240,
51 were later dismissed for abandoning their posts (Trainor & Barsky, 2011, p. 13).
Depending on which of these figures you use this is an abandonment rate of either
230
3% or 16% - such levels can significantly degrade an organisations ability to

respond effectively and support a community in need. After the storm, another sixty
officers resigned and two committed suicide.
Hurricane Katrina reveals the possibility that there may be circumstances where
large numbers of emergency responders may simultaneously put their duty to their
family ahead of their duty to the communities they are sworn to serve. This event
also lends more credence to the predictions of perception studies which can create
scenarios on the scale of Katrina. But what are the potential elements that may
impact on abandonment behaviour? The proximity of emergency responders families
must surely be one. In the aftermath of Katrina the first few hours of the search and
rescue mission was spent retrieving almost 300 officers from rooftops and attics
(Testimony of Warren J. Riley, Superintendent of the New Orleans Police
Department, 2006) and over 1000 of its 1450 officers lost their homes (Anderson,
2006). Others have suggested that the responders commitment or dedication to
their role will be influenced by the existence of organizational problems or failures. At
the time of Hurricane Katrina the New Orleans Police Department was reportedly
suffering from low morale and chronic understaffing (See Trainor & Barsky, 2011, p.
14). The links between organizational loyalty and role abandonment are not fully
understood but it is likely that this was a factor. Perception studies often explore the
conditions within an event that may contribute to abandonment. These have
revealed two important factors. The first is an absence of mechanisms to care for
children and the elderly in the absence of a responder and secondly the ability of the
responder to communicate with family members during an event (Mackler,
Wilkerson, & Cinti, 2007; Smith, 2007). Both of these factors can be mitigated
through action prior to and during an event.
Other studies reveal that the nature of the event may also be an important factor in
role conflict and role abandonment. Balicer, Omer Barnett & Everly (2006) surveyed
local public health workers and found that nearly half the respondents stated they
would not report to duty during an influenza pandemic. Qureshi et al (2005) found
that health care workers reported that they were most willing to report to work during
mass casualty incidents (86%) and environmental disasters (84%), and were least
willing to report during a SARS outbreak (48%), radiological event (57%), or
smallpox epidemic (61%). Fear and concern for family and self and personal health
problems were the most frequently cited barriers to willingness. (Kushma, 2007)
However, a closer examination of the Hurricane Katrina experience suggests

motivations for abandonment are more elementary. A case that came to represent
the wicked dilemma faced by many officers during that event was that of Paul
Schubert who was one of the officers dismissed for leaving his job as a police officer
shortly before Hurricane Katrina made landfall. During his disciplinary hearing
Schubert said that he needed to take care of his disabled wife, Madeline ONeill.
Madeline required doctors care and medicine for her rheumatoid arthritis, diabetes
and poor eyesight. Schubert was given leave to evacuate his wife, but was absent
for a month as he searched for accommodation, doctors and medicine. During that
231
time he says that he contacted his supervisors at least three times during that period
and was told he should take care of his wife and return as soon as he could.
Schubert was reported as saying I couldnt just abandon her in a hotel room. I would
have been signing her death warrant...it tore me up not being here during the storm.
(Johnson, 2006, p. 1)
Of course this type of individual action is understandable, but when it is widespread it

creates major problems for effective response summed up by the head of New
Orleans Police Association, David Benelli, who was quoted as saying, You know, if
every single officer said he had to take care of family, there would be no one left on
this job. This is not a normal job. Police officers take an oath. They are supposed to
stay. (Johnson, 2006)
If key elements of role abandonment include events of large scale which impact
significantly on the families of emergency responders then the Victorian bushfires of
2009 were an event where one might expect to see evidence of this.
In the last week of January 2009 the Australian state of Victoria was subjected to an
extreme heat wave with temperatures over 43C recorded for three consecutive
days. By February 7th the State was tinder dry and the forecast was for similar
temperatures with strong winds, ideal conditions for wild fire. The fire and other
emergency services prepared for the worst and the public were warned of the
extreme fire danger. On that day 316 fires broke out across the state, 173 people
were killed, 7562 people were displaced, over 2,000 homes were destroyed and
450,00 hectares of land were burned. (Teague, McLeod, & Pascoe, 2010a), Many
fire-fighters were injured physically and psychologically by the fires of 7th February.
Two officers lost their lives but many emergency responders also lost family, friends,
colleagues and their homes. For example, more than 30 Department of Sustainability
and Environment (DSE) staff lost a close family member or their homes (Department
of Sustainability and Environment, 2009, p. 22) and almost 300 Country Fire
Authority (CFA) volunteers and their families were affected by the fires (Volunteer
Fire Brigades Victoria Inc, 2009, p. 14). In terms of the impact on the families of
responders this event is quite high, but does not reach the figures from Hurricane
Katrina.
The Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission did not voice any concerns about the
incidence of abandonment. To the contrary, the Commission declared that it agreed
with the comments of Mr David McGahy, Captain of the Arthurs Creek CFA brigade
and believed they were equally true of the entire state. McGahy had said:
I never cease to be amazed to this day at the absolute bravery and
professionalism of the men and women of my brigade. There were people in
charge of trucks that had no ideathey were from Strathewenwhether their
houses were there, they had no idea if their families were alive, and they
continued to do what was requested of them. They stayed on the line and
232
helped other people. My admiration for the bravery, as I said, of the members
of my brigade knows no bounds. (Teague, McLeod, & Pascoe, 2010c, p. 139)
The prevalence of the responder role over family roles during the Victorian fires is
also evident in the following statement by the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal
Commission, which said that it;
also heard of the impact of volunteering on the family members of CFA
volunteers. On 7 February many were left to wonder if their partner, son,
daughter, mother or father would return home. Family members supported
CFA volunteers by freeing them to protect the community while they stayed to
defend the family home. Further support was provided with catering for
brigades, maintaining households, or running the family business. The
Commission acknowledges the essential role played by the families of CFA
volunteers in enabling the volunteers to give priority to their communities
during emergencies. (Teague, et al., 2010c, p. 138)
Of course the Royal Commission was not looking for examples of the abandonment
of duties during the event though it may be reasonable to assume that if
abandonment had occurred to a critical level it would have been noted. Equally there
is little doubt that there were occasions where fire fighters did abandon their firefighter role in favour of other responsibilities. There was one particularly tragic
example of a member of Victorian Country Fire Authority (CFA) who was reported to
have left his crew to help a relative on 7th February. He was subsequently caught
by the fire (and died) as he tried to leave. (Teague, et al., 2010c, p. 132)
The evidence from the Victorian fires is not sufficient to draw any detailed
conclusions about the incidence of role conflict and role abandonment during that
event other that to observe that both occurred to some extent but may not have had
a significant impact on operational effectiveness. This is consistent with the
conclusions of previous behavioural research and the Disaster Research Centers
overall finding which was that role conflict and role strain are serious and significant
problems across hazards, sectors and time (and that) role abandonment is a rare
outcome that typically does not have a significant influence on response operations.
(Trainor & Barsky, 2011, p. 26) So what should we make of the Hurricane Katrina
experience?
Hurricane Katrina alerts us to the possibility that large-scale abandonment is

possible in certain circumstances, which are not yet fully understood. A useful
starting point may be defining the scale of an event which is extraordinary. The
distinction between a disaster from a catastrophe may be a starting point. In
summary, a disaster become a catastrophe when large areas and communities
experience major threats to life in a short period requiring immediate responses to
restore social order. The result is abrupt and simultaneous interruption of community
and social institutions including emergency organisations necessitating outside
233
support often at national levels. (Quarantelli, 2008, pp. 874-875) Indeed there are
some highly regarded researchers, such as Quarantelli (2008) who suggest that the
abandonment experience of New Orleans was more to do with problems within the
Police Force than with role conflict (See also Anderson, 2006). However, this is not
an entirely satisfactory explanation as organizational dysfunction may actually
contribute to role conflict by reducing the loyalty, and therefore sense of duty, to the
emergency responder role thereby increasing the influence of other roles. Mass role
abandonment did happen during Hurricane Katrina to an unprecedented level,
though Quarantelli (2008) suggests that the behaviour of the St. Croix Police Force
during Hurricane Hugo was similar. What are not understood properly are the
reasons. To conceptualise the trigger to mass abandonment it may be useful to
visualize a tipping point beyond which otherwise inconsequential levels of
abandonment will rise dramatically and possibly to the levels predicted by perception
studies. This tipping point is the point at which the combination of circumstances
shifts the primary duty from emergency response to family or other duty for
substantial numbers of responders.
Prevention and Mitigation

Research suggests that role conflict is a precursor to abandonment, therefore
addressing role conflict will not only result in better performance of those who remain
in their emergency response role, but may also defer the tipping point of mass
abandonment. As discussed, the literature reveals many factors that contribute to
the incidence of role conflict. In summary these are:
1. Impact on responders families this is the essential ingredient of familial
role conflict meaning that the incident must at once require the services of the
emergency responder in their occupational role while simultaneously creating
a demand for them to fulfill a duty in support of others, primarily family. This
concept is discussed in further detail below.
2. Type of disaster perception studies suggest that willingness to work
decreases during disasters involving chemical, biological and nuclear agents.
(Trainor & Barsky, 2011, p. 15) Disasters which meet the criteria of a
catastrophe may increase the difficulties for families thereby increasing their
dependence on the responder.
3. Health of the organization this is the favoured explanation of those who
purport that the Hurricane Katrina case was an exception predicated by low
morale and poor discipline. See Quarantelli (2008, pp. 890-891) The rationale
is that the sense of duty or loyalty to a dysfunctional agency is less and
therefore other roles may take a higher priority.
4. Absence of support mechanisms for the families of responders This is
the most often cited cause of role conflict and stress in responders.
(Friedman, 1986; Qureshi, et al., 2005). According to Trainor and Barsky
(2011, p. 23) emergency workers are less likely to experience role tensions if
they know that their families will be cared for in the aftermath of an event.
5. Inability to communicate with family Emergency responders are less
likely to be distracted from their duties by attempts to make contact with family
or suffer stress and role conflict if they know their families are safe during an
event.
234
6. Prevalence of responders who have a role with another public safety

organization two hat syndrome is a potential issue in this regard but the
full impact is not known. Multiple memberships of emergency agencies is
experienced in Australia but the extent of this needs to be researched and the
potential adverse implications during a catastrophe should be assessed to
inform policy in the future.
For the managers of emergency response agencies this knowledge provides a range
of options to decrease work conflict and increase effectiveness and retention rates
while reducing the residual risk of mass abandonment. Most importantly though is
the need for emergency response managers and agencies to view the management
of role conflict as an organisational responsibility rather than as an individual issue
for officers. Role conflict exists because emergency responders are competent
people with a strong sense of duty who have obligations to others outside of work.
This is not only inevitable it is laudable as it provides balance and a supportive
framework for officers. Therefore it is incumbent on agencies to take this into
account and take steps to design structures and processes that will reduce the
experience of role conflict in its personnel. A range of considerations that require a
careful evaluation of the organization will govern the actions that will work for various
agencies. For example, how many officers have two-hats, what are their roles (Are
they critical or not?) and are there policies or contingency arrangements in place for
the occasion where the services of that person are simultaneously required by both
organisations?
To reduce role conflict the primary area of development should be the facilitation of
improved communication with, and support of, responders families during the
deployment of officers. There are likely to be many ways of avoiding the situation
described Mr David McGahy, Captain of the Arthurs Creek CFA brigade who told the
Bushfire Royal Commission that there were people in charge of trucks that had no
idea whether their houses were there, they had no idea if their families were alive
(Teague, et al., 2010c, p. 139) Such uncertainty will inevitably have adverse affects
on performance in the field (US Department of Health and Human Services, 2005)
and concern for family members is the most significant cause of role conflict
(Qureshi, et al., 2005). To help address observed work / family conflict in volunteer
fire-fighters it has been suggested that there is a need for agencies to facilitate the
development of processes to better support the families of volunteers (Cowlishaw,
McLennan, & Evans, 2008, p. 28) and a family support and safety network was the
primary recommendation of the Disaster Research Center (Trainor & Barsky, 2011,
p. 26). Indeed the foremost recommendation of the Disaster Research Center was
the development of a Family Support and Safety Framework. Such a framework
would:
1. facilitate family preparedness of an event,
2. provide effective channels for communication from and to the family, and
3. help organise and plan for responder families needs. (Trainor & Barsky,
2011, p. 21)
235
Family preparedness may be facilitated through information packages and support.

This will vary according to the prevalent threat, but in a bush-fire area it would mean
ensuring that responders families have made the necessary preparations and have
the resources to deal with a threat or evacuate in the absence of the responder.
Family readiness may be incorporated into an agencies pre-season preparations
with requirements for officers to report back when arrangements are in place.
Support and assistance may be provided officially or through family volunteers.
Regular and accurate communication on the status of loved ones will also mitigate
against role conflict. A manager in the Victoria CFA described how the perceptions of
danger held by family members can be distorted by selective media coverage:
The TV camera will look for the part of the fire thats got flames shooting in the
air, because that gets recognition on the nightly news. Not that ninety-five per
cent of the fire perimeter is black. No, the one bit where theyve got the
flameeven if it was from five hours beforehand. Now the family knows very
little about whats gone on. They know little about what training youve done
because they havent been involved in it. Hence, their view of the world is its
death and destruction. (Cowlishaw, et al., 2008, p. 26)
It is not always possible for responders to call family from the field due to lack of
coverage or the intensity of their role. In catastrophic events the mobile phone
network is also likely to be compromised through overload or damage. The
monitoring of the status of family members is a task that could be undertaken in the
communication centre so that officers can check in by radio, when time permits, and
be assured that they would be informed if they needed to be removed from the field.
This would require a dedicated landline or other communication system (Such as a
redundant service network) for family members to update their status and contact
details. The call taker should also be in a position to advise family members on the
location and condition of the responder. Such a service, albeit a significant
imposition on an already taxed communications room would arguably reap
considerably benefits in operational effectiveness by reducing role conflict and
minimizing the time taken by the officer to independently seek out such information
from the event scene. Group SMS and other communication technologies would
minimize the call time requirements as long as the cellular and data networks remain
active.
Enabling support for families in the aftermath of an event is another measure that will
reduce role conflict. Once again this will depend on the nature of the threat in the
region, but the provision of transport or supplies for isolated elderly or incapacitated
relatives is an example. Provision of shelter facilities for responders families who are
displaced is another. Measures such as these can be incorporated during the
preparation phase so that family volunteers can activate them easily when they are
required. (See Trainor & Barsky, 2011, pp. 21-23 for a discussion of other options in
these areas.)
236
The proximity of responders area of work responsibility to their families location is

another factor that could be examined. What percentage of officers families live and
work in the same geographic area that the responder is likely to be required to
serve? What are the roles of these officers in a catastrophic event? Is it possible to
avoid this risk by ensuring key personnel will respond from outside the affected
area?
In Victoria Police there is an emerging practice to import a senior management
group to manage an emergency thereby relieving the local command team to focus
on the event unencumbered by considerations of affected family, friends and
colleagues. The Western Region of Victoria was subjected to extensive flooding in
January 2011. Recognising the impact on local commanders and the need for those
commanders to show leadership in support of staff and families, an Emergency
Response Team from the regional headquarters was dispatched to manage the
event. This intervention was supportive and collegiate with the local staff providing
support and advice to the Regional team. It was found that this action avoided the
risks of reduced performance by key personnel who may have fears for their own
families or be providing support for staff with similar fears. It is said that fires can
unite communities while floods can divide them. This is partly because floodwaters
can be diverted, contained or released to protect some properties, often at the
expense of others. Decisions to hold water back, build levies or sandbag critical
areas; or release water from containment or demolish existing levies can have
positive results for some and dire results for others. The independent commanders
were not subject to the role conflict that may have been present in local commanders
when it came time to decide which areas would be protected and which would be
flooded. The success of the concept of regional Emergency Response Teams to be
deployed in support of major events has resulted in steps to extend the model across
all regions. (Nugent, 2012) Arrangements to bring in fire fighters from interstate and
New Zealand, although motivated primarily by resource requirements, will have a
similar effect as these officers do not experience the role conflict of local officers
whose families may be in the fire zone.
Conclusion
In conclusion, role conflict is a part of life for emergency responders and can lead to
reduced performance levels during disasters, damaged personal relationships, a
transfer of stress to partners and lower retention rates by agencies. While
emergency response agencies are keeping pace with modern, flexible work
practices there is a limit to which these can be adopted and there will be times,
particularly in crises, where role conflict reaches intense levels. This knowledge
creates an onus on agencies to take proactive measures to reduce role conflict, as
the detrimental effects on capability are greatest during the times of greatest need.
Mass role abandonment is a risk that is not fully understood but there is evidence of
a number of factors that contribute to its likelihood and role conflict is at the top of
this list. There is clearly a need for more research in Australia relating to role conflict
237
and this will occur as awareness of the issue grows. By taking steps to reduce role
conflict it is likely that the residual risk of mass abandonment will also be reduced.
Some of the measures that are available are low cost and others will increase
overheads. In this regard it is worth noting that Australias volunteers, the group of
emergency responders most vulnerable to role conflict, save state and territory
governments 1.5 to 2 billion dollars each year (J. McLennan & Birch, 2005) and noone can take the risk of mass abandonment during a catastrophe.
238
References
Alexander, G. C., & Wynia, M. K. (2003). Ready and Willing? Physicians' Sense of Preparedness For
Bioterrorism. Health Affairs, 22(5), 189-197.
Anderson, W. (2006). "This Isn't Representative of Our Department:" Lessons from Hurricane Katrina
for Police Disaster Response Planning. Disasters and the Law.
Balicer, R., Omer, S. B., Barnett, D. J., & G.F., E. (2006). Local public health workers' perceptions
toward responding to an influenz pandemic. BMC Public Health, 2011, from
http://www.bioedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/99
Brogan, R. (2012). New South Wales Fire Service (Rtd). A/Lecturer in Fire Investigation, Charles Sturt
University. Personal communication 28 February 2012.
Cowlishaw, S., Evans, L., & McLennan, J. (2010). Work-family conflict and crossover in volunteer
emergency service workers. Work & Stress, 24(4), 342-358.
Cowlishaw, S., McLennan, J., & Evans, L. (2008). Volunteer Firefighting and Family Life: An
Organisational Perspective on Conflict between Volunteer and Family Roles. Australian
Journal on Volunteering, 13(2), 21-31.
Delinger, R. F., & Gonzenbach, K. (2002). The Two-Hat Syndrome: Determining Response Capabilities
and Mutual Aid Limitations. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University. John F. Kennedy School
of Government.
Department of Sustainability and Environment. (2009). Annual Report 2009.
Friedman, B. J. (1986). Role Conflict and Role Abandonment in Disasters: A Need for Empirical
Reorientation: University of Delaware Disaster Research Center.
Greenhaus, J. H., & Beutell, N. J. (1985). Sources of conflict between work and family roles. Academy
of Management Review, 10, 76-88.
Johnson, K. (2006). Katrina made police choose between duty and loved ones. Retrieved 15
January, 2012, from http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-02-20neworleanspolice_x.htm
Killian, L. (1952). The Significance of Multiple-Group Membership in Disasters. The American Journal
of Sociology, 42(4), 309-314.
Kushma, J. (2007). Role Abandonment in Disaster: Should we leave this myth behind? Natural
Hazards Observer, 21(5).
Lewig, K. A., Xanthopoulou, F., Bakker, A. B., Dollard, M. F., & Metzer, J. C. (2007). Burnout and
connectedness among Australian Volunteers. A test of the job demands - resources model.
Journal of Vocational Behavior, 71, 429-445.
Mackler, N., Wilkerson, W., & Cinti, S. (2007). Will First-Responders Show Up for Work During a
Pandemic? Lessons From a Smallpox Vaccination Survey of Paramedics. Disaster
Management and Response, 5(2), 45-48.
Mayhew, C. (2001). Occupational Health and Safety Risks Faced by Police Officers: Australian
Institute of Criminology.
McLennan, Birch, Cowlishaw, & Hayes. (2009). Maintaining volunteer firefighter numbers: Adding
value to the retention coin. The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, 24(2), 6.
McLennan, J. (2008). Issues facing Australian volunteer-based emergency services organisations:
2008 - 2010: A report prepared for Emergency Management Australia (EMA: Complex
Decision Research Group, School of Psychological Science, La Trobe University, Bundoora.
McLennan, J., & Birch, A. (2005). A potential crisis in wildfire emergency response capability?
Australia's volunteer firefighters. Environmental Hazards, 6, 101-107.
Nugent, R. (2012). Superintendent, Victoria Police. Personal communciation 26 February 2012.
Quarantelli, E. L. (1978). Structural Factors in the Minimization of Role Conflict: A Re-Examination of
the Significance of Multiple Group Membership in Disasters: University of Delaware Disaster
Research Center.
239
Quarantelli, E. L. (2008). Conventional Beliefs and Counterintuitive Realities. Scial Research: An

International Quarterly of the Social Sciences, 75(3), 873-904.
Qureshi, K., Gershon, R. R., Sherman, M. F., Straub, T., Gebbie, E., McCollum, M., et al. (2005). Health
care workers' ability and willingness to report to duty during catastrophic disasters. Journal
of Urban Health, 82(3), 378-388.
Ridenour, M., Noe, R. S., Proudfoot, S. L., Jackson, J. S., Hales, T. R., & Baldwin, T. N. (2008). Leading
Recommendations for Preventing Fire Fighter Fatalities, 1998 - 2005: National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health
Schultz, P. E., Cowan, P., Cowan, C., & Brennan, R. T. (2004). Coming home upset: Gender, maritial
satisfaction, and the daily spillover of workday experience into couple interactions. Journal
of Family Psychology, 18, 422-445.
Smith, E. (2007). Emergency health care workers' willingnessness to work during major emergencies
and disasters. Australian Journal of Emergency Management, 22(2), 21-24.
Story, L. B., & Repetti, R. (2006). Daily occupational stressors and marital behaviour. Journal of
Family Psychology(20), 139-157.
Teague, T. H. B., McLeod, R., & Pascoe, S. (2010a). 2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission Final
Report, Summary.
Teague, T. H. B., McLeod, R., & Pascoe, S. (2010c). 2009 Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission Final
Report, Fireground Response, Volume 2, Chapter 3.
Testimony of Warren J. Riley, Superintendent of the New Orleans Police Department, 109th Congress.
3 Sess. (2006).
Tierney, K. J. (2003). Conceptualizin and Measuring Organizational and Community Resilience:
Lessons from the Emergency Response Following the September 11, 2001 Attack on the
World Trade Center: University of Delaware, Disaster Research Center.
Trainor, J. E., & Barsky, L. E. (2011). Reporting for Duty? A Synthesis of Research on Role Conflict,
Strain and Abandonment among Emergency Responders during Disasters and Catastrophies:
University of Delaware; Disaster Research Center.
United States Congress. (2006). A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina.
Washington, DC.
US Department of Health and Human Services. (2005). A Guide to Managing Stress in Crisis Response
Professions.
Volunteer Fire Brigades Victoria Inc. (2009). Annual Report: for the year ended 30 June 2009.
Webb, G. R., Beverly, M., McMichael, M., Noon, J., & Patterson, T. (1999). Role Improvising Under
Conditions of Uncertainty: A Classification of Types: University of Delaware Disaster Research
Center.
Westman, M. (2001). Stress and strain crossover. Human Relations, 54, 717-752.
240
Examining the resilience of rural communities to flooding

emergencies
Ian Manock
Lecturer and Emergency Management Courses Coordinator
Charles Sturt University, Bathurst, Australia
(Research team: Dr. Mir Rabiul Islam, Dr. Valerie Ingham, Professor John Hicks, Dr. Richard
Sappey, Mr. Christopher Shirley, Mr. Sam Reid and Mr. Craig Ronan)
Paper presented at
241
Examining the resilience of rural communities to flooding emergencies
Abstract
This paper aims to examine the resilience of an Australian rural community to the
impact of flood emergencies. In the past five years, a number of serious flood events
have impacted Australian communities, resulting in death and injury to people as
well as devastating loss and damage to property and infrastructure. Many inland
rural communities are declining in population whilst the average age of these
communities is increasing. This decrease in population and increase in age reduces
the service functions within those communities which in turn has an impact on the
vulnerability of those communities to the impact of natural disasters such as flooding.
This vulnerability relates to not only the potential increase in susceptibility of those
communities to flooding, but also the decrease in community resilience.
A study of an Australian rural community susceptible to flooding has been conducted

to examine the resilience of that community to flooding and to identify issues relating
to community vulnerability i.e. resilience and susceptibility, that exist within that
community. From this study we hope to be able to identify community resilience
strategies that may help other rural communities better prepare for and respond to
the impact of natural disasters, including flood.
Keywords: resilience, susceptibility, vulnerability, emergency management,

community preparedness, flood emergencies
Introduction
Flooding is a major hazard that threatens a large number of Australian communities
on an annual basis. It has been described as Australias most deadly natural hazard,
with deaths from flooding across the nation between 1788 and 1996 being estimated
to be at least 2213 (Gissing, Morgan & Ronan, 2007, p.1).
Be it localised flash flooding resulting from intense rainfall events such as
thunderstorms, to widespread and long lasting riverine flooding resulting from heavy
rainfall over river system catchments, the results can be devastating in both terms of
human impact and damage and destruction to infrastructure and the environment.
Flooding has been determined to be Australias most costly disaster, with average
annual losses estimated to be in the vicinity of $400 million (Bureau of Meteorology,
nd (b)).
242
The Bureau of Meteorology has stated that in coming decades:

An increase in the number of dry days is expected across the country, but it is likely
that there will be an increase in intense rainfall events in many areas. (Bureau of
Meteorology, 2010, p.6)
We have seen this prediction become reality with the intense rainfall events that
caused the severe flooding in Queensland and NSW in 2010/11 and again in the
severe flooding of southern Queensland and NSW in early 2012, with the rainfall
experienced reported to have been the heaviest in 125 years (Flood evacuations,
2012).
The 2010/11 flooding experienced in Queensland alone resulted in 35 deaths, with
three persons still missing, 2.5 million people affected, 29,000 homes and
businesses inundated by floodwater and the overall cost of the event estimated at
$5 billion (Holmes, 2011, p.20).
One of the recommendations from the Queensland Floods Commission of Enquiry
related to the need for local governments, who are susceptible to flooding, to
conduct community education programs (assisted by the Queensland Government),
providing local information on flood awareness and preparedness (Holmes, 2011,
p.123). Given that public education, awareness and training is an essential part of
the emergency management framework used by all Australian State government
emergency management agencies, the message of this recommendation should be
adopted nationally.
Bangladesh Australia Disaster Research Project
In late 2009, a group of academics and researchers at Charles Sturt University,
representing the fields of emergency management, economics and psychology,
began developing a research project aimed at enhancing the flood awareness and
preparedness of local rural communities.
The project was designed in two phases. Phase 1 was the examination of
community flood preparedness in an overseas developing country at risk from the
types of flooding experienced in Australia. Phase 2 was the examination of an
Australian rural community at risk from flooding. The results acquired from both
phases of the project would then be compared and analysed to identify any
similarities, differences, strengths, weaknesses and lessons that could be drawn
from the way these different communities approached their flood preparedness.
For this first phase, Bangladesh was selected as the focus of investigations. Three
communities within Bangladesh were chosen on their susceptibility to different types
of flooding flash flooding, inland riverine flooding and coastal estuarine flooding.
With the assistance of the Bangladeshi Governments Disaster Management
Agency, a data gathering visit to Bangladesh was undertaken in late 2010 by two of
the CSU researchers.
The second phase, based in Australia, focused on the small community of Molong in
central west NSW, which is susceptible to flooding and has experienced major
flooding on a number of occasions over the past 10 years. A postal survey was
243
distributed to residents in early January, 2012 and followed up in early February

2012 with a community meeting and focus group session.
This paper will focus on Phase 2 of the project, the Molong communitys flood
preparedness and the preliminary findings that have come out of that study to date.
Molong and its flood threat
Molong is a small rural village, located in the central west area of New South Wales
within the Cabonne Shire and on the Mitchell Highway between Orange and
Wellington (see location A in Map 1 below). Molongs population is approximately
1,600 people. Molong was first settled in the early 1830s after being visited by
Australian explorers Charles Sturt and Sir Thomas Mitchell. Molong is located in a
prime farming district, producing sheep, cattle, wheat and fruit as well as grapes for
the local wine industry. (Cabonne Council, 2012)
Map 1 Molong, NSW (Google Maps, 2012a)

Molong is situated on the Molong creek and experiences minor local flood events on
a regular basis resulting from local rainfall. The town is also susceptible to major
flash flooding as a result of heavy rain fall in the upper catchments of the creek
system around Orange and Mt Canobolas. Major flooding of this type has occurred
throughout Molongs history, however extreme events occurred in 1956, 2005 and a
major one in 2010, when the lower part of the towns main street and the Mitchell
Highway were inundated with water up to 1.5 to 2 metres in depth, resulting in the
flooding of a number of residential properties and also a number of business
premises in the towns main street.
Flood Preparedness in Molong
Flood preparedness and response in NSW is coordinated by the NSW State
Emergency Service (SES). The SES are responsible for the NSW State Flood Plan
244
and Local Flood Plans, developed in consultation with Local Government authorities.
In addition to this planning function, the SES also have a community Floodsafe
program, providing information and guides to local communities at risk of flooding. In
addition to community Floodsafe guides, the SES also produce rural, business and
specialist location Floodsafe guides. A specific Molong Floodsafe Guide as well as
Molong Flood Evacuation Plan has been produced for the Molong community by the
SES in collaboration with the Cabonne Shire Council. These guides are provided
online as well as in hard copy to the residents of Molong via letterbox drops and also
through the Cabonne Shire Council offices in Molong (NSWSES, 2011).
In addition to the flood preparedness information and guides, the Bureau of
Meteorology (BOM) in collaboration with the SES also provide specific flood
warnings to communities at risk of floods. These warnings come in the form of flood
alerts, flood watches, flood advice, generalized flood warnings, warnings of minor,
moderate and major flooding, as well as specific river height predictions, (BOM,
nd(a)).
A dam and creek monitoring station at Borenore, just north of Orange and on the
Molong Creek, provide the residents of Molong with warning of potential flash
flooding, with between one and two hours notice. One resident stated, Its not
flooding like western plains flood where you know its coming in about a week. We
get two hours, three hours at the most (Molong resident, 2012)
However, if local heavy rainfall at Molong is also experienced or prolonged rainfall in
the area has saturated the ground, this warning may be reduced to virtually no
warning at all, as occurred in the 2005 flood and again in the 2010 flood. Residents
during a community focus group stated that Sometimes, as in the 2010 flood, the
first warning you receive is when the torrent of water reaches the town and the town
is flooded within an hour or so. (Molong resident, 2012).
Molong Study Preliminary Findings

A community flood preparedness postal survey was distributed to the residents of
Molong in mid January, 2012. Altogether 730 surveys were distributed and so far
approximately 13% have been returned. Analysis of these returns is currently in
process. Additional surveys will be conducted in neighbouring villages throughout
2012 to provide a larger base of data for analysis.
In addition to the postal survey, a community focus group meeting was conducted in
Molong on the 8th February, 2012. Twenty five participants attended the focus group
meeting. These participants represented a cross section of the Molong community
and included home owners, business owners, local government officials and
emergency service representatives. A series of questions relating to community
preparedness, resilience, experiences, and economic and psychological impact of
flooding were asked of the group. The following are the issues and reflections from
community members that came out during the focus group meeting.
245
Community Preparedness
Molong residents rely on the formal flood watch and warning systems that are in
place and managed by the State Emergency Service (SES). Because of the
localized impact area, local SES volunteers carry out a house to house warning
when they can and when they have sufficient warning. Some residents also have an
informal notification system, where they call their neighbours and other family
members when floods are predicted or occur.
The residents rely heavily on this small amount of warning in order to lift furniture
and goods within their homes and businesses to above the 1 to 2 metre flood level.
One resident stated, we had been away and we were coming home and I said to my
husband I think we should lift all the furniture because we had had a lot of rain and
the ground was very wet. So we might have had about three weeks of steady rain,
and I said if we get any more rain we are going to go under because the ground is
just not going to take the water. And of course yes... (Molong resident, 2012).
When discussing the type of warning and amount of notice that they receive, one
resident stated, Well the last flood that we had here which was in 2010, I was in the
SES by that time...but the first I knew about it was about at 7 oclock. My pager went
off, and it said residents of Molong had rang in and said the river was flooding. And
within half an hour the SES came in and were sand bagging, but thats the first we
knew about that flood then. That was our first warning.
One resident stated, When the rainfall is over a longer period of time, the
predictions for future flooding is better and the warnings provide a little more time to
prepare.
Economic Impact of Flooding
Flooding in Molong has had a major economic impact, particularly on the business
community situated in the low lying area of the town and main street (See location A
in map 2 below). Business owners in those locations have stated that locating their
businesses in those areas is very good for attracting customers due to the
proximity to the main Mitchell Highway and the towns main street, Bank Street.
However, the location, due to its proximity to Molong Creek and as it is in the low
part of town also attracts a higher degree of risk from flooding.
246
Map 2. Molong Street Map (Google Maps, 2012b)

When asked what made the 2005 flood worse than the previous floods, one resident
and previous business owner stated: Water was spewing down through the back of
my premises in the main street. The mud was spewing from up on the hill, not from
the bottom end of town, it spewed through the shop in a matter of 20 minutes to half
an hour. And then all of a sudden, maybe in a hour, there was a terrific roar, you
know just like another cloud had burst, and the bloody water was just flowing
everywhere. It seemed like in a matter of minutes....there was no time to do
anything, no time for sand bagging...nothing. It just hit us. And within oh probably an
hour at that, some of the shops experienced 7 or 8 foot of water, something like that.
I could go on for hours, but....it put me out of business, I never went back.
When asked about their ability to recover and restore their businesses after a flood,
one business owner stated, Weve found in the last floods, there was a lot of people
willing to help move things above, but when the flood goes, thats when the hard
work starts. Because its a lot harder to get stuff down and back on the shelves and
get the business running back to normal again. Because we found after the flood
people think oh hes too busy down there, well go somewhere else to get our
goods. And thats when you need the income, after the flood.
Business owners are extremely frustrated and vocal about the impact that flooding
has on their businesses. One businessman stated, The business centre here, has
never recovered. Never recovered since 2005. Um...as a matter of fact any business
thats here and still operative...theyre all hanging. Just hanging.
When asked what the impact of another flood of similar proportions to the 2005 flood
event would have on the town and businesses, one business owner stated, it has
affected Molong to the extent that some parts of the affected street are valueless.
We will end up probably having to give the properties away. Its gotten nearly to that
point with valuation. Valuations on residential in town, it has greatly affected that
247
area whether they are in the flood plain or not....because of Banks on the lendings.
And they have affected the borrowing for people here, to borrow for their properties
to the effect that they cant get money from them.
One business owner, when asked why he remained in the flood affected area of
town stated, As I said before its economic reasons that Im here. I owe the bank
money. I cant go anywhere. We looked at other premises, but where else do you
go? If I go somewhere else Im losing my foot traffic. Like Im right on the highway,
Id lose all my highway traffic. If I move my business Id lose 50% of the business.
Straight off. And I cant afford to do that.
There is also a strong vocal outcry from business owners regarding insurance and
obtaining appropriate compensation/ payments for flood losses. One business owner
stated I lost in the vicinity with businesses and stock, $760,000. I was paid 25% of
that. Thats all I got, and I never went back. I thought bugger it, I dont owe anyone
anything and I got out. But the fact is that I still own the property there. Thats the
nerve-racking thing when you see property developers coming in and want to do
something, and then it comes back to development but theres no re-development in
that area, theyre the things that play on us as property owners, its nerve-racking.
Residents feel strongly about the impact that engineering of local transportation
routes such as the rail and roads has had on the severity of flooding experienced.
Local government has undertaken cleanup works within the Molong Creek to reduce
the impact of flooding along the creek. One resident, commenting about the speed of
the water flow through the creek system during the 2010 flood event stated, One
thing I will say that I think we all will agree had a beneficial effect was getting rid of a
lot of the rubbish in the creek where the water did flow through quicker. A lot of
people will agree in the last one in 2010 the water did flow through a lot quicker than
previous floods. It certainly moved quicker than it did previously.
However, some residents also feel very strongly about the lack of pro-active
measures taken by the local government in the form of construction of levy banks
and other engineering solutions to reduce the impact of the flash flooding on the
town. One business owner stated, The problem......the 2010 flood, what happened
to me, it came up through the drains, not from the river. And thats what you try and
get your head around, is that something thats taking the water away is causing the
problem, because its not taking water away its backing it through, and youre
thinking why? And then you see the flood plans come out, and you see not cost
effective, not cost effective, not cost effective. And a levy bank was gunna cost $2
million and I think, Ive got a business here that turns $2 million over a year, but its
not cost effective to spend $2 million to protect it. And you hear on the radio like this
afternoon there was a flash flood in Brisbane and there is a kid missing. So what do
you call cost effective and what dont you call cost effective? Is a life cost effective?
And that sort of plays on your mind all the time, they say not cost effective but these
pricks, excuse the language, probably dont have a business where there is a flood
zone. And they dont go through the effects of what happened. The just sit in their
ivory towers telling us....and thats what plays on your mind. You know it can be
prevented and its not being prevented.
248
When discussing the communitys perception of lack of action being undertaken by

the local government, one resident stated, the saddest thing coming in here tonight
is the number of people here. This place should be packed, but the reason its not
packed is because everybody knows that nothing is being done. After all the trouble
weve been going through for the last fifteen years to get something done....and
expenditure in water reports and feasibility studies...and its all come to the fact that
nothing can be done.
Psychological Impact of Flooding
When asked about the psychological impact the flooding had caused and whether
any form of psychological support had been offered or received, the responses were
varying.
An interesting comment to come out of the focus group related to the support
provided by Government to residential victims of the 2005 floods and not business
victims. One business owner stated, ....people in the residential side of Molong, they
were offered grants. They got electrical offsets, furniture....given to them. But if you
were in business, you were given nothing. Not even offered a grant at a low term
interest rate or anything.
From discussions it appeared that no psychological care was overtly offered to the
town. The residents stated that they had experienced stress from a variety of inputs.
One resident stated, I mean we went through a lot of bloody stress, and were still
going through it because we cant sell the property.
Another resident stated, I suppose it would be a lot more stressful....someone
coming up and offering you however much money for a house you grew up in and
you want to grow old and die there. To me that would be more stressful than moving.
A lot of those people are elderly, you know if someone came up and said heres
$250000 for your house, get out, Id be upset. Thats your house, thats where
youve been brought up.
Finally, one resident summed up their frustration by offering a humorous, but
unfortunately all too real comment, We took it all out on council. Council were our
psychologists.
Community Resilience
All of those interviewed during the focus group stated that they knew of the flood
risks associated with living in Molong and most had experienced major flooding in
Molong over the past seven year period.
One resident summed it up by stating, I think youll find most of the people who
have lived here for a very long time will always know...they know what the creek is
doing and they you know, are all out looking anyway.
Some residents have taken mitigation measures themselves to reduce the impact of
flooding. One resident when talking about measures his father had taken, stated
Yes, he had looked at all previous flood records, and decided that the house should
249
be built up to a certain height, which he did. And that 2005 flood was the only flood
that I can remember to have even reached the house. It was the only one that
reached the floorboards.
When asked about their own preparedness and resilience to flooding, one resident
stated, Well at this particular point in time, I suppose...I think when we lifted things
up in 2005 at my mothers house, we never put them back down. Most of the stuff in
my fathers shed is still up above the benches, and its never gone back down. So if
the water goes through those sheds again its not going to damage anything.
The residents were also very complimentary about the assistance they received from
the emergency service, particularly the SES and the Fire Services. The SES were
able to provide sandbagging assistance in 2010 and during minor flood events. One
resident found the SES use of black polythene sheeting and sandbags in the
construction of dams around residential properties very effective. Another resident
could only speak praise for the Fire Brigade who during the cleanup after the flood
event were able to use their high pressure fire hoses to wash out affected premises,
thereby easing the stress and efforts required of home owners.
When asked about why the residents stay in Molong, knowing that floods will
continue to occur and that the impact of those floods could be very damaging, one
resident stated, Weve got two schools, a hospital, three doctors, a dental surgeon,
a bank....weve got probably the best climate that I know of. Theres no humidity
here, its a very healthy town, vibrant community, agriculture par excellence, very low
crime. People can still not lock their doors at night. Why wouldnt you want to live
here? Its a great town, its one of the best towns there is.
Residents feel that the town, when it isnt flooding, is their version of paradise. The
location, in proximity to major towns, distance from Sydney, the climate, local
facilities and services make it an attractive place to live.
Another resident stated, Yeah. I travel quite extensively around the state and people
say why do you live in Molong and I say its the closest place to heaven.
One resident discussing their own personal resilience and why they chose to move
to Molong and remain there, even after personally experiencing major flooding
stated, We see floods and fires all around us and it doesnt matter where you live. I
came from a place called Bowen Mountain at Kurrajong. When I bought up there
people said you must need your head to be read. Fire will go through there and there
is only one road out. But the floods arent here all the time. My little house is 120
years old and the floorboards havent gotten rotten yet. But you know, it passes
quickly. There is always the clean up, but it goes, it doesnt stay for three days or a
week. It doesnt stop us, we just get back into it.
250
Conclusions
The community in general appears to be very much aware of the types of flooding
that Molong faces and the impact that such flooding produces in the short, medium
and long term. However, given this flood threat and the known impact it will have,
residents are still willing to remain in Molong for a variety of reasons. Some stay
because they have to for financial reasons, whilst the majority remain because the
simply love their town and its location, climate and the community spirit that
pervades there.
Residents recognize that the worst flooding occurs as flash flooding caused by
extensive and heavy rainfall in the hills around Orange, which then cause a flood of
water to flow down the Molong Creek system. They thus rely heavily on the relatively
short warnings that they receive from the upstream dam monitoring stations, the
BOM and the SES.
There appears to be a resignation to the fact that floods will continue to occur and
that properties will be inundated, with main street businesses and low lying areas
suffering the most effects. Business owners in the lower end of Bank Street (main
street) and the Mitchell Highway appear to be caught in an unforgiving loop, in that
they need to continue in business in those areas of town because the location not
only attracts the greatest customer numbers, but also enables them to maintain
mortgage and loan repayments to the banks. However they also recognize that by
staying in those locations, they will suffer greater impact from floods in the future, if
flood mitigation works on the creek system are not undertaken.
Flooding in the Molong township affects the towns economic stability, with major
flooding (such as occurred in 2005 and more recently in 2010) having devastating
effects on the main street and highway businesses located in the eastern, lower end
of town.
Residents of Molong love their community and see the floods as a hazard that can
be reduced. They recognize the positive impact that recent cleanup works in the
Molong creek system by local government have had, but they still believe that their
flooding risk can be greatly reduced with the construction of a levy system along the
Molong Creek banks on the eastern side of the township.
It is recommended that the Cabonne Shire Council work together with the community
and continue to examine the feasibility of a levy system on the Molong Creek in
order to improve the resilience of the community to flooding and the long term
viability of main street businesses.
It would appear that the residents, particularly the business community impacted by
severe flooding over the past seven years, are experiencing high degrees of stress.
This has been caused not only be the actual physical impact of the floods on their
businesses, but also by the long term effects that the floods have had on their
financial security.
251
It is recommended that the Cabonne Shire Council, SES and NSW Ministry of Health
work together with the community to develop strategies for the implementation of
short, medium and long term psychological support to those Molong community
members affected by floods.
Even though the local community appears to be generally resilient to the impact of
flooding, they rely on the support and assistance that they receive from the
emergency services during and after floods (particularly the SES and Fire Services).
Without this support, the impact of the flooding and its cleanup afterwards would be
far more devastating.
252
References
Bureau of Meteorology, nd(a), Flood warning services, Viewed online 28 January
2012, < http://www.bom.gov.au/hydro/flood/flooding.shtml>
Bureau of Meteorology, nd(b), Floods, Viewed 27 January 2012,
<http://www.bom.gov.au/climate/c20thc/flood.shtml>.
Bureau of Meteorology, 2010, State of the climate, Bureau of Meteorology,
Canberra.
Cabonne Council, 2012, Cabonne Country - Molong, Viewed 27 January 2012, <
http://www.cabonnecountry.com/site/index.cfm?display=109378>
Flood evacuations after Sydney dam spills, 03 March 2012, Herald Sun. Viewed 03
March 2012, <http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/more-news/state-of-high-alert-aswater-rises-across-nsw/story-fn7x8me2-1226287988115>.
Gissing, A, Morgan, M & Ronan, C 2007, Planning for the inevitable Emergency
planning for floods in NSW, Conference paper for the 47th NSW Floodplain
Management Authorities Conference, Gunnedah, 2007.
Google Maps 2012(a), Molong street map. Viewed 27 January 2012,
http://maps.google.com.au/maps?hl=en&gs_nf=1&cp=8&gs_id=r&xhr=t&q=molong+
nsw&rlz=1R2SUNC_enAU422&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_qf.,cf.osb&biw=1280&bih=6
02&wrapid=tljp1331861022890014&um=1&ie=UTF-8&sa=N&tab=wl
Google Maps 2012(b), Molong street map. Viewed 27 January 2012,<
http://maps.google.com.au/maps?hl=en&rlz=1R2SUNC_enAU422&bav=on.2,or.r_gc
.r_pw.r_qf.,cf.osb&biw=1280&bih=602&wrapid=tlif133178614646110&q=Molong+str
eet+map&um=1&ie=UTF8&hq=&hnear=0x6b1027bc28e0d069:0x40609b490437b80
,Molong+NSW&gl=au&ei=tnFhT6PsFqqkiAeXND4BQ&sa=X&oi=geocode_result&c=
title&resnum=1&ved=0CB8Q8gEwAA>
Holmes, CE 2011, Queensland floods Commission of Enquiry Interim report,
Queensland Floods Commission of Enquiry, Brisbane.
Molong resident 2012, focus group interview, 08 February
New South Wales State Emergency Service, 2011, Floodsafe. Viewed 28 January
2012, < http://www.ses.nsw.gov.au/community-safety/floodsafe/
253
Emergency Communications and Warning Systems: Determining

Critical Capacities and Capabilities in the Australian Context
Dr Nigel Martin
Senior Lecturer
Australian National University, Canberra, Australia
Dr John Rice
Senior Lecturer
Griffith University, Gold Coast, Australia
Paper presented at
Brisbane 1618, April 2012
254
Emergency Communications and Warning Systems: Determining Critical

Capacities and Capabilities in the Australian Context
Abstract: The occurrence of emergencies and natural disasters continues to

threaten communities. Importantly, Emergency communications and warning
systems (ECWS) allow people to make decisions and take actions across the event
lifecycle. This study used expert stakeholder analysis coupled with structured data
coding techniques to identify the major ECWS capacities and capabilities. Findings
showed that a broad range of ECWS are deployed in Australia. These ECWS
capabilities come with social or technological limitations that suggest the importance
of an integrated or systems based approach for their construction and deployment.
Also, while critical infrastructure vulnerabilities reinforced the argument for integrated
systems, it demonstrated the pressing need to build resilience and redundancy into
domestic infrastructure networks. In addition, educating and informing users of
ECWS was highlighted as a key to successful emergency or disaster response.
Finally, new and highly innovative ECWS technologies and solutions should enable
improved emergency or disaster management in the future.
Keywords: communications; emergency; stakeholders; systems; warnings.
255
Introduction
Fire, water and governments know nothing of mercy (Proverb)
The propensity for natural and human-inspired emergencies and disasters to
negatively impact communities provides the motivation and impetus to look further
into the needs for Emergency communications and warning systems (ECWS). In
recent times, disciplinary authors and experts have sought to raise the profile of
various information and communications systems as a mechanism for changing how
we inform impacted entities and react to various emergencies and disasters (see
Van De Walle et al., 2010). Importantly, our study builds into this cumulative tradition
of research and practice in the disaster prevention and management discipline, and
assists in creating a greater understanding of the varying communications needs of
emergency and disaster stakeholders (Van De Walle and Turoff, 2007). Accordingly,
the aim of our study was to examine and analyse the critical capacities and
capabilities of ECWS that might be used to deal with adverse events.
In our study of ECWS, we used the opinions, experience and knowledge from expert
stakeholders who offered their written views to a federal government inquiry into
communications networks and emergency warning systems (Commonwealth of
Australia, 2011). This inquiry followed one of the most dangerous summers (20102011) in Australias history with massive floods in Queensland, New South Wales and
Victoria, Cyclone Yasi devastating North Queensland, and bushfires destroying
homes and property in Western Australia. Our research methodology used a
qualitative data collection and structured coding technique to identify and present the
important capacities and capabilities of ECWS. In doing this, we have sought to
answer five major questions:
1. What critical capacities and capabilities must ECWS possess to be effective in
providing pre-emergency and disaster warnings, operations during the emergency or
disaster period, and supporting workforces during the recovery period (i.e.
emergency/disaster lifecycle)?
2. What is the nature of the impacts of power outages on ECWS?
3. What is the likely impact of emergencies and natural disasters on current and
planned future infrastructure that enable ECWS?
4.
What scope exists for improved education of ECWS users to enable better
emergency preparation and response?
5.
What new and emerging ECWS technologies could assist communities with
handling emergencies and natural disasters?
Our study will attempt to answer these questions, while also contrasting the practical
and theoretical aspects of ECWS. The balance of the paper will review some
256
relevant ECWS literature, outline and describe the studys methodology, discuss the
major findings, and present our concluding statements.
ECWS related literature
Our study takes the opportunity to survey some of the relevant background literature
related to ECWS. An observation of the literature in this area suggests a broad range
of studies and theories that cover different system types, technologies, applications
and socio-technical issues and factors (Botterell and Addams-Moring, 2007; Carver
and Turoff, 2007; Palen et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2008). Some prominent studies and
programs look to determine the value and utility of different types of systems, such as
decision support, resource management, early warning, communications, and interagency enterprise systems (Kapucu, 2006; Kurita et al., 2006; Thompson et al., 2006;
Troy et al., 2008). For instance, some Decision support systems (DSS) research
argues that the delivery of shared mental models and understanding provides the
basis for communication and coordination of actions across emergency and disaster
events and functions (Thompson et al., 2006; French and Turoff, 2007; DAntonio et
al., 2009). In addition, other investigations assert the value of composite and agile
systems that can undertake various scanning, reporting and information sharing
functions in largely chaotic operating environments (Belardo and Karwan, 1986;
Bharosa and Janssen, 2010). Accordingly, this suggests that the type of system
deployed can have a significant impact on the way that the event is handled.
Studies of various Information and communications technologies (ICT) examine how
the use of the technology can make an impact on the emergency or disaster lifecycle
(Troy et al., 2008). As an example, research programs suggest that Geographic
information systems (GIS) can play a pivotal role in alerting and updating
communities on emergency and disaster events (Billa et al., 2004; Kapucu, 2008).
Other studies argue the utility of mobile, Internet and social network technology
(Arnold et al., 2004; Jaeger et al., 2007; Palen et al., 2007; Van De Walle et al.,
2010), commercial and amateur radio stations (Coile, 1997; Collins and Kapucu,
2008), televisions and video networks (Kurita et al., 2006; Patricelli, 2009), and widely
available database and open access systems (Iakovou and Douligeris, 2001; Currion
et al., 2007; Troy et al., 2008) for collecting and distributing verifiable and relevant
information related to an adverse event. This specific technology research suggests
that ICT can play a positive role in the handling of emergencies and disasters.
The application of different systems and ICT for emergency and disaster events has
also been studied in some detail. As an example, practical investigations have
explored and examined the capabilities and advantages of various systems for peerto-peer, inter-agency, intra-agency and inter-country communications (Quarantelli,
1988; Trim, 2004; Kapucu, 2006; Botterell and Addams-Moring, 2007). Other studies
have highlighted the value of using modern systems and technologies for business
continuity operations, victims management and tracking, and recovery process
logging in various disaster and emergency contexts (Arnold et al., 2004; Boin and
257
McConnell, 2007). Hence, the application of enabling systems and technologies can
provide assistance to communities and workforces seeking to manage emergencies
and disaster events.
The socio-technical issues and concerns that surround ECWS have also been a
fertile ground for studies and research programs. Scholars and practitioners have
engaged in applied and theoretical research targeted at determining the capacity of
ICT systems to engender trust and mutual understanding (Kapucu, 2006; Carver and
Turoff, 2007, Jaeger et al., 2007), build system user interest and receptivity (Perry
and Nigg, 1985; Mendona et al., 2007), create social capital (Jaeger et al., 2007),
support adoption of the technology and/or systems (Perry and Nigg, 1985; Manoj and
Hubenko Baker, 2007), and sponsor actor interactions (Pearce, 2003; Chen et al.,
2008; Troy et al., 2008), under emergency and disaster conditions. Thus, these types
of studies depict how we might use ECWS to address the complex social and
technical issues in a more meaningful and effective manner.
Overall, the ECWS foundation literature is extremely broad and deep in its scope.
However, we would assert that a logical extension of this body of work is to
simultaneously consider a number of these issues and factors in a combinative study
of ECWS against a backdrop of recent floods, cyclones and bushfires. The
integration of these types of systems capacity and capability issues should provide a
further accumulation of knowledge and understanding in this important area of
disaster prevention and management.
Research Method
Data Source and Collection
The individual and organization inputs were collected on 18 June 2011 from the
Parliament of Australia web pages that were established for the inquiry into the
capacity of communication networks and emergency warning systems to deal with
emergencies and natural disasters, conducted by the Senate Standing Committee
on Environment and Communications (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011). The
committee was tasked to investigate and report on the effectiveness of
communication networks (including radio, telephone, Internet and other alert
systems) across the disaster or emergency lifecycle, having regard to the cyclone,
bushfire and flood disasters during the Australian summer 2010-2011; the impact of
extended power outages on warning systems and users; the impacts and
implications from emergency and disaster events on future communications
networks, particularly Australias National Broadband Network (NBN); the scope for
educating users in the operation of communications equipment when responding to
an emergency or disaster; and, new or emerging technologies, including
communications spectrum, that could be used in warnings and response to
emergencies or disasters (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011). Importantly, the scope
of the inquiry provided an aggregate source of stakeholder data for our study.
258
The 43 written stakeholder inputs to the inquiry (available from the inquiry webpage)
were collected and compiled into a single document folder for structured coding and
analysis (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011). Stakeholder inputs were received from
17 government organizations (i.e. state and local governments, law enforcement
agencies, emergency and fire services, geological and meteorological agencies,
telecommunications
authorities);
11
non-government
organizations
(i.e.
telecommunications industry groups, land management groups, education and
research providers, disability advocates, psychology practitioners); 9 public and
private companies (i.e. television and radio broadcasting, warning systems
technology, communications equipment manufacturers); and 6 private citizens (i.e.
male members of law enforcement or emergency services organizations that have
extensive experience with ECWS). Collectively, these stakeholders have extensive
exposure to emergency and disaster events within the Australian domestic and
broader international contexts.
Research Technique and Analysis
The studys research method used a qualitative technique to collect, structure, code
and analyse the written stakeholder submissions (Miles and Huberman, 1997; Denzin
and Lincoln, 2005). In this respect, the study has been conducted in the tradition of
other stakeholder inquiries where inputs and statements concentrate on a primary
issue of concern (Freeman, 1984; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman et al.,
2004). The data structure created for this study mirrors the scope of the government
inquiry and is co-matched with the five research questions outlined earlier in the
paper (Corley and Gioia, 2004; Commonwealth of Australia, 2011).
In order to analyse the data, we created a project (titled ECWS Project) using the
QSR NVIVO Version 9 analytical software (Walsh, 2003). The written stakeholder
submissions were ordered sequentially and transferred to the internal documents
folder of the NVIVO project. A tree node structure was developed with ECWS
capacities and capabilities assigned as the apex node, and the five capacities and
capabilities issues as major branch nodes (see Figure 1).
Submission statements (299 in total) were matched, coded and crosschecked
(reviewed for consistency) by the researchers within each major branch node to
maintain and assure issue integrity The coded statements were then axially
collapsed and transformed into summaries for each ECWS capacities and
capabilities issue, which are presented in the discussion of results (Miles and
Huberman, 1997; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). A summary of the project nodes,
number of submissions, and coded statements are displayed in Table 1.
Discussion of Results
The following sections of the article provide summaries and discussion of the coded
stakeholder submissions that were provided to the government inquiry
259
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2011). Each section of the discussion has addressed

the studys five aforementioned research questions.
QSR NVIVO
ENVIRONMENT
ECWS Capacities and

Capabilities
APEX
BRANCH 1
BRANCH 5
Node 5
BRANCH 2
Node 1
BRANCH 4
BRANCH 3
Node 4
Node 2
Node 3
Figure 1 - QSR NVIVO Node Structure ECWS Capacities and Capabilities

Number of
Submissions*
Number of
Coded
Statements
Node 1: ECWS Capacities and Capabilities effectiveness

across the Emergency and Disaster Lifecycle
35
159
Node 2: The nature of impacts of power outages on

ECWS
20
28
Node 3: The likely impacts of Emergencies and Disasters

on Infrastructure that enables ECWS
23
36
Node 4: The scope for improved ECWS user education for

better warnings and response
20
32
Node 5: New ECWS technologies that support the

handling of emergency and disaster events
31
44
Apex Node
Major Branch Nodes
ECWS
Capacities and
Capabilities
* Note: Some submissions did not comment on all five issues under inquiry
Table 1 - QSR NVIVO Nodes, Submissions and Statements ECWS Capacities and Capabilities
260
Effective ECWS capabilities for the disaster and emergency lifecycle

The stakeholder submissions allowed us to extract and code 159 distinct statements
that covered the three parts of the emergency and disaster lifecycle. The collective
message from 96 per cent of these node 1 statements highlighted that, while a large
number of ECWS are commonly utilized at various times preceding, during, and after
an emergency or disaster (e.g. television, radio, Internet, satellite, two-way radios,
fixed and mobile telephony, call centres) each system possesses social or
technological limitations within the deployment context. These limitations suggest that
a combination of coordinated ECWS should provide the effective capability to deliver
messages and information in multiple channels, while further consideration of resilient
system designs and redundancy measures in the medium term is merited. Some
notable examples were provided in the submissions and are outlined as follows.
The Emergency Alert (EA) system provided by the federal and seven state and
territory governments (excluding Western Australia who use their own StateAlert
warning system) operates on the public telephone networks and sends an emergency
warning to fixed telephone numbers using a location based number store (Emergency
Alert, 2011). The EA system is currently being upgraded to send warnings to mobile
telephones within the emergency area. However, while the system has been used
successfully for a number of domestic emergency situations, the Australian Mobile
Telecommunications Association and the Communications Alliance noted that the
technical links and human communications processes of the system need to work
for EA to be effective (submission 33) (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011).
Accordingly, in this case any impacts on public telephone network infrastructure, poor
warning systems execution, or the inability to physically pick up the telephone and
receive the message, may render the EA system capability less effective (ACT
Government, 2011).
The Northern Territory Police, Fire and Emergency Services (NTPFES) agencies
operate the ESi Acquisition Incorporated WebEOC incident management suite of
software (ESi, 2011). The WebEOC system has been deployed for the purposes of
handling emergency situations, including damaging cyclones, floods and bushfires,
and is used as a DSS and situational analysis tool for field commanders.
Notwithstanding these positive outcomes, in its own submission to the inquiry,
NTPFES noted that the system requires public telecommunications networks and
supporting utilities to be effective (submission 5) (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011).
Hence, in this example any disruptions to these linked system elements may inhibit
the effectiveness of the NTPFES WebEOC capability.
Earth observation data systems that employ satellite imagery and sensor
technologies are operated by Geoscience Australia (GA). The observational systems
collect and process data on impacted geographic areas, thereby providing timely
information and increased situational awareness for various governmental agencies
officers, businesses, and the general public (Geoscience Australia, 2011). While the
261
satellite systems worked adequately during the emergency events of the Australian
summer 2010-2011, GA offered some important insights (submission 3)
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2011). First, there is a lack of high speed
telecommunications infrastructure between the Alice Springs (NT) satellite ground
station and the Canberra information processing centre. This typically results in
information processing and dissemination delays of a day or more, and can slow the
speed of emergency response. Second, government agencies undertaking
emergency or disaster relief work tend to do so using the Internet as an information
sharing medium. Importantly, the human processing of information is dependent on
web technologies and the technical mechanisms to keep them operating. Thus, this
example shows that even modern satellite systems can be subjected to data and
information bottlenecks and limitations that may render their capabilities less
effective.
The Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC) plays a primary role in broadcasting
emergency information and disseminating disaster warnings to cities and regional
communities (ABC, 2011). Critical information from external agencies, such as the
Bureau of Meteorology (BOM) or GA, is typically transmitted using ABC television
and radio channels, and its Internet sites. Despite the effectiveness of these systems,
the Australian Communications Consumer Action Network (ACCAN) highlighted that
these forms of communications and warnings must be tailored to the needs of those
in the community who have disabilities or limited English language skills (submission
4) (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011). Insufficient visual captions, voice-overs, and
sign language interpretations may render these forms of national warnings less
effective for vulnerable members of communities. In the ACCAN example, a mix of
social and technological factors may limit the effectiveness of the systems
capabilities.
In summary, the stakeholders presented a mosaic of ECWS capabilities that may be
very effective in some circumstances, and possibly less effective in others. This
suggests that no one ECWS can be solely relied on when dealing with an emergency
or disaster. We would contend that the collective stakeholders message that a one
size fits all ECWS is less likely to be effective is well made. Indeed, the deployment
of various coordinated ECWS, using an integrated or systems based approach, to
deliver an effective combinative capability, may ultimately support a better and more
holistic warning, response and recovery environment for communities.
The nature of impacts from power outages on ECWS
In relation to the nature of impacts on ECWS due to the loss of power, we coded 28
specific stakeholder statements. The overwhelming message drawn from the
statements is that most emergencies and disasters, particularly floods, fires,
earthquakes, tidal surge and storms in the Australian context, will typically result in
the loss of mains power and ECWS capabilities. As an example, the New South
Wales State Emergency Services (NSW SES) stated that:
262
not only would mains power impact ECWS capabilities, but that it is now
time to examine the need for adequate redundancies in the power grid,
including alternate electricity routing, equipment supplies and logistics,
and the capability to replace or supplement hot fuelled generators
(submission 17) (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011).
In addition, over 60 per cent of the coded node 2 statements opined that alternate
power units using solar array technology, rechargeable batteries, uninterrupted power
supply units, and fuelled generators should be a critical consideration for current and
future ECWS.
It was also noted that, where mains power was unavailable for operational
communication systems, 30 per cent of the node 2 statements considered emergency
and law enforcement radio networks as an integral and resilient element of the ECWS
environment. For example, the Northern Territory, Tasmanian, South Australian, New
South Wales and Victorian governments stated their dependency on the government
radio networks that could operate continuously for up to 18 hours before requiring
recharging (submissions 5, 9, 17, 23, and 28) (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011). In
a further application of radio technology, the Northern Territory government uses a
radio telemetry system for building fire monitoring and alarm, coupled with battery
and generator back-up power systems (submission 5) (Commonwealth of Australia,
2011). Accordingly, as shown in these examples, some battery powered ECWS may
support limited periods of emergency response in the absence of mains power.
In essence, these stakeholder views highlight two major issues for consideration.
First, the likelihood of mains power losses suggests that a coordinated group of
ECWS, that use various power sources and back up options, may be more effective
in handling an emergency or disaster. This is consistent with our earlier discussion of
the integrated ECWS capability and multi-channel messaging. Second, the utilities
infrastructure that underpins ECWS should not be considered in isolation. In an
emergency or disaster situation, power and telecommunications infrastructure and
assets (including auxiliary and back-up systems) must be considered as an important
and integral part of the ECWS capability. This underscores the need to review current
and future critical utilities infrastructure redundancy arrangements and designs.
The likely event-related impacts on current and future ECWS enabling infrastructure
The submissions allowed us to code 36 specific statements related to the current and
future infrastructure required to support ECWS. In addressing this aspect of the
inquiry, stakeholders frequently used the terms hardened, toughened and damage
resistant infrastructure in order to focus attention on the need for utilities
infrastructure resilience. As an example, the ABC submission stated that in several
regional areas, there was no back-up programming, messaging or power systems in
place should extreme bushfire or flood emergencies eventuate (submission 35)
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2011). Pivotally, this severely inhibits the capability to
263
fulfil its role as a national emergency broadcast agency. In a similar example, the
Lake Macquarie City Council voiced concerns that mobile communications towers
and control equipment are extremely vulnerable to bushfires in their regional setting
(submission 26) (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011). The message from stakeholders
was that current critical infrastructure, particularly in regional areas, is insufficiently
robust and lacks adequate protection from bushfire, flooding and storm or cyclone
events.
In looking to future telecommunications infrastructure developments, it should be
noted that over 25 per cent of the node 3 statements reflected reservations about the
construction and deployment of Australias NBN (Department of Broadband,
Communication and the Digital Economy, 2011). A range of statements argued that
the future NBN would be adequate for commercial operations but lacked the
hardened designs required to withstand extraordinary emergency and disaster
events. As an example, in its assessment of NBN utility for emergency operations,
the NSW SES asserted that:
consideration must be given to alternate and hierarchical communications
routing, single point of failure removal, network decentralization, auxiliary
power systems for optical fibre operations, improved replacement
equipment and logistics strategies, and robust service level agreements for
the NBN (submission 17) (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011).
Thus, stakeholders are commending that future national infrastructure must be
designed and constructed in line with the potential risks and events that emerged
during the Australian summer of 2010-2011.
Overall, the stakeholders statements send a warning of national infrastructure that is
extremely vulnerable to emergencies and disasters, particularly in regional or isolated
areas. This outcome adds further weight to our earlier proposition that current and
future critical utilities infrastructure resilience and redundancy arrangements should
be reviewed; and, where possible, remediation works initiated in the medium term.
Improving ECWS user education for preparedness and response
The 32 coded stakeholder statements universally argued for improvements to
emergency and disaster communications education in support of better warning and
response outcomes in communities. The NTPFES stated without equivocation that:
education and preparedness of the public is the key to success
In addition, over 22 per cent of the node 4 statements argued that broad based
education covering all sectors of the community, particularly disabled or non-English
speaking persons, should be a priority for government agencies. A strong example of
commitment to emergency and disaster education (including the use of ECWS) was
264
provided by the South Australian government that, following the devastating Victorian
Black Saturday Bushfires of 2009 (i.e. 173 fatalities and over 5,000 injuries; with
2,029 homes and over 450,000 hectares of land destroyed) (ABC, 2009), established
a four year, $12.9 million Prepare-Act-Survive emergency education program
(submission 9) (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011). The collective stakeholder
response emphasizes the importance of ongoing community awareness and
education programs in all areas of emergency and disaster management.
New and emerging technologies for handling disasters and emergencies
The 44 coded stakeholders in this area of the inquiry confirmed that new technologies
to support emergency and disaster management in the Australian setting are
emerging, while noting three main issues raised by the stakeholders. First,
commercial industry and businesses have developed a range of innovative ECWS
and technologies that support the needs of cities and regionally concentrated
communities (4 technology submissions, and over 15 per cent of coded node 5
statements). Some examples of these systems and technologies include Sentinel
Alert (i.e. a warning system that uses global positioning systems, satellites and radio
transmitter networks to issue location based emergency warnings) (Sentinel Alert,
2011); Yellow Bird (i.e. a warning system that uses emergency alert tone triggers,
radio messaging and global positioning systems capabilities to issue location based
emergency warnings) (Advance Alert, 2011); and Field Secure (i.e. a warning system
that fuses data from various public information sources and sensor networks in order
to provide location based emergency warnings) (Fieldsecure, 2011). Collectively, the
stakeholders offering (and supporting) these types of communications solutions have
displayed the innovative capacity to create useful systems and technologies as part
of the combination of ECWS that support emergency and disaster management
operations.
Second, the evolution of current generations of mobile and fixed communications
technologies represent important emergency and disaster systems capabilities. As an
example, over 20 per cent of node 5 statements in this area of the inquiry argued for
the development of more Fourth generation (4G) Long term evolution (LTE) systems
that supported enhanced mobile broadband for voice, data and video delivery
(International Telecommunication Union, 2010). Despite the earlier noted limitations
in some mobile telephony infrastructure and coverage across Australia, Telstra stated
in their submission that:
4G LTE networks provide significant new opportunities to enhance the
communications within and between emergency services organisations.
These opportunities include new applications, greater security, increased
availability, reduced costs, and increased interoperability so that
emergency services are better informed and able to respond more quickly
and effectively in the event of an emergency or natural disaster
265
Hence, stakeholders statements suggest that the ongoing development and

evolution of currently available systems and technologies will provide a valuable
component of the combined ECWS in the future.
Third, over 30 per cent of the coded node 5 statements show support for the use of
Australias Digital Dividend (700MHz) and Reallocated Free-to-air television
(2.5GHz) communications spectrum for emergency and disaster operations
(Australian Communications and Media Authority, 2011). In essence, the termination
of analogue television services broadcasting (known as the Digital Dividend), and the
reallocation of Free-to-air television spectrum for best use wireless access services,
provide opportunities for shared use of the communications spectrum by commercial
and public interests. Also, Telstra stated that the use of digital dividend spectrum
should be harmonized with the ITU resolution 646-1/WRC-03 (International
Telecommunication Union, 2003) that recommends using frequencies in the 700MHz
band for advanced public (emergency) protection and disaster relief solutions in the
Asia-Pacific region (submission 31) (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011). Accordingly,
the stakeholder statements suggest that it would be in the national interest to
consider repurposing unused and available spectrum for emergency and disaster
support activities.
Conclusions
In concluding the study, we acknowledge that the size of the data collection and
analysis is limited in its scope. However, the written stakeholder submissions were
provided by experts and practitioners in the field of emergency and disaster
management, and are based on a broad range of accumulated knowledge and
experience related to emergency and fire services, law enforcement, emergency and
disaster broadcasting, technology and communications equipment, technical and
regulatory matters, community education, and disability services. Accordingly, the
limited size of the data set is compensated to some extent by the quality and
collective experiences of the participating stakeholders.
Based on the results, the study raises four important issues for consideration. First,
the construction and deployment of several ECWS in the Australian context come
with noted social and/or technological limitations. Hence, no single ECWS solution is
likely to be effective in all situations. This offers an opportunity to consider the
development of more combined, coordinated and integrated groups of ECWS that
deliver multiple channels of information and messages (Paton and Moore Johnston,
2006; De Walle et al., 2010). Importantly, this systems based approach for the ECWS
capability (Prencipe et al., 2005; Hitchins, 2007; Meadows, 2008) may render
improved warning and response outcomes for widespread and regional communities
as typified in the Australian context.
Second, the underlying critical infrastructure required to support and enable ECWS
capabilities should be continually reviewed and analysed for adequate resilience and
266
system redundancy. The ongoing viability and availability of critical power and
telecommunications infrastructure for maintaining the delivery of ECWS capabilities
suggests that damage resistance and systemic redundancy and resilience of
infrastructure are pivotal issues, particularly in relation to improved integrated
systems and design (Shinozuka, 2004; Manyena, 2006; Paton and Moore Johnston,
2006; Boin and McConnell, 2007; McEntire et al., 2010). This is especially important
when considering less resourced regional communities or isolated areas as depicted
in some Australian examples.
Third, the ongoing delivery of education programs and awareness campaigns for
ECWS users should remain an important plank in the handling of emergencies and
disasters. Other studies have reinforced the opinions of expert stakeholders used in
this research, and argue that education and awareness can support sound decision
making and actions that ultimately avert loss of life (Faupel and Styles, 1993; Shaw et
al., 2004; Shiwaku et al., 2007; Shiwaku and Shaw, 2008). Given the large number of
widespread and regional communities in Australia, adequate penetration of these
programs and campaigns should remain a public sector priority.
Finally, the capacity for new ECWS technologies to support and enable emergency
and disaster response is evident. The ongoing development of satellite, wireless,
mobile and radio based communications technologies should allow ECWS
capabilities to expand and grow, subject to any limitations imposed by less resilient
supporting infrastructure. In looking forward with optimism, we would hope that future
research might examine the use of promising new technologies as part of the ECWS
capability here in Australia, and possibly more broadly around the world.
Acknowledgements
The authors gratefully acknowledge the kind support of Senator Mary Fisher,
Chairman for the Federal Government Inquiry, and the Australian Senate Standing
Committee on Environment and Communications for their timely provision of
stakeholder data and public statements that are presented in this paper.
References
Arnold, J. L., Levine, B. N., Manmatha, R, Lee, F, Shenoy, P, Tsai, M-C, Ibrahim,
T.K., OBrien, D.J. and Walsh, D.A. (2004) Information-sharing in out-ofhospital disaster response: The future role of information technology,
Prehospital and Disaster Medicine, Vol. 9, pp. 201207.
Advance Alert (2011). Yellow Bird Alert - Automatic Link to Emergency Radio
Transmissions, available at http://www.yellowbirdalert.com/ (accessed 1
October 2011).
Australian Broadcasting Commission (2009). Black Saturday, available at:
http://www.abc.net.au/innovation/blacksaturday/#/stories/mosaic (accessed
20 July 2010).
267
Australian Broadcasting Commission (2011). ABC Emergency, available at:

http://www.abc.net.au/emergency/ (accessed 20 July 2010).
Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Government. (2011) Use of Emergency Alert
during
the
Mitchell
Hazardous
Material
Fire,
available
at:
http://esa.act.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/Report-on-the-use-ofEMERGENCY-ALERT-for-Mitchell-fire-September-20111.pdf
(accessed 5
October 2011).
Australian Communications and Media Authority (2011). Allocation of the 700MHz
(digital
dividend)
and
2.5GHz
bands,
available
at
http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD/pc=PC_312315 (accessed 21
September 2011).
Belardo, S. and Karwan, K.R. (1986) The Development of a Disaster
Management Support System through Prototyping, Information and
Management, Vol.10, pp. 93-102.
Bharosa, N. and Janssen, M. (2010). Extracting Principles for Information
Management Adaptability during Crisis Response: A Dynamic Capability
View, in the Proceedings of the 43rd Hawaii International Conference on
System Sciences, Koloa, Kauai, Hawaii, 2010, IEEE Computer Society,
Washington DC, pp 1-10.
Billa, L, Mansor, S. and Mahmud, A.R. (2004) Spatial information technology in
flood early warning systems: an overview of theory, application and latest
developments in Malaysia, Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 13
No. 5, pp. 356-363.
Boin, A. and McConnell, A. (2007) Preparing for Critical Infrastructure
Breakdowns: The Limits of Crisis Management and the Need for Resilience.
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Vol 15 No 1, pp 50-59.
Botterell, A and Addams-Moring, R. (2007). Public Warning in the Networked Age:
Open standards to the rescue, Communications of the ACM, Vol. 50, No. 3,
pp 59-60.
Carver, L and Turoff, M. (2007). Human-Computer Interaction: The Human and
Computer as a Team in Emergency Management Information Systems,
Communications of the ACM, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp 33-38.
Chen, R., Sharman, R., Rao, R. H. and Upadhyaya, S. (2008). Coordination in
Emergency Response Management. Communications of the ACM Vol. 51,
No.5, pp 66-73.
Coile, R.C. (1997) The role of amateur radio in providing emergency electronic
communication for disaster management, Disaster Prevention and
Management, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp.176 185.
Collins, M.L. and Kapucu, N. (2008) Early warning systems and disaster
preparedness and response in local government, Disaster Prevention and
Management, Vol. 17 No. 5, pp.587 - 600
Commonwealth of Australia. (2011) Inquiry into the capacity of communication
networks and emergency warning systems to deal with emergencies and
natural disasters, Senate Standing Committees on Environment and
Communications, 2011, available at:
268
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/ec_ctte/emergency_communication
s/index.htm (accessed 18 August 2011).
Corley, K.G. and Gioia, D.A. (2004). Identity Ambiguity and Change in the Wake of
a Corporate Spin-Off. Administrative Science Quarterly Vol. 49, No.2, pp 173
208.
Currion, P., De Silva, C and Van De Walle, B. (2007). Open source software for
disaster management, Communications of the ACM, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp 6165.
DAntonio, S., Romano, L., Khelil, A., and Suri, N. (2009) INcreasing Security and
Protection through Infrastructure REsilience: The INSPIRE Project, Critical
Information Infrastructure Security, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2009,
Vol. 5508, pp 109-118.
Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. (2005). The Handbook of Qualitative Research 3rd
Edition. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA.
Department of Broadband, Communication and the Digital Economy (2011) NBN
Empowering Australia, available at http://www.nbn.gov.au/ (accessed 5
October 2011)
Donaldson, T. and Preston, L.E. (1995) The Stakeholder Theory of the
Corporation: Concepts, Evidence and Implications. Academy of
Management Review Vol. 20, pp 6591.
Emergency Alert (2011) Emergency Alert. Be Warned. Be Informed, available at
http://www.emergencyalert.gov.au/ (accessed 30 September 2011)
ESi Incorporated (2011) ESi Boundless Collaboration WebEOC Professional,
available at
http://www.esi911.com/esi/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=37
7&Itemid=377 (accessed 25 September 2011)
Faupel, C.E. and Styles, S.P. (1993) Disaster Education, Household
Preparedness, and Stress Responses Following Hurricane Hugo,
Environment and Behavior, Vol. 25 No. 2, pp 228-249.
Fieldsecure (2011) Field Secure Emergency Warning and Safety Management
available at http://www.fieldsecure.com/ (accessed 20 September 2011)
Freeman, R.E. (1984). Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. Pitman,
Boston, MA.
Freeman, R.E., Wicks, A.C. and Parmar, B. (2004) Stakeholder theory and the
corporate objective revisited. Organization Science, Vol. 15, pp 364369.
French, S and Turoff, M. (2007). Decision support systems, Communications of
the ACM, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp 39-40.
Geoscience Australia (2011) Satellites and Sensors, available
http://www.ga.gov.au/earth-observation/satellites-and-sensors.html
(accessed 4 October 2011)
at
Hitchins, D.K. (2007). Systems Engineering A 21st Century Systems Methodology.

John Wiley & Sons, West Sussex, UK.
269
Iakovou, E. and Douligeris, C. (2001) An information management system for the

emergency management of hurricane disasters, International. Journal of Risk
Assessment and Management, Vol. 2, No. 3/4, pp 243-262.
International Telecommunication Union (2003) Resolution 646 (WRC-03) Public
Protection and Disaster Relief, available at
http://www.itu.int/oth/R0B06000014/en (accessed 20 June 2004)
International Telecommunication Union (2010) ITU paves the way for next
generation 4G mobile technologies, available at
http://www.itu.int/net/pressoffice/press_releases/2010/40.aspx (accessed 22
December 2010)
Jaeger, P.T., Shneiderman, B., Fleischmann, K.R., Preece, J., Qua, Y., and Wu, P.F.
(2007). Community response grids: E-government, social networks, and
effective emergency management. Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 3, No. 1011, pp 592-604.
Kapucu, N. (2006). Interagency Communication Networks During Emergencies :
Boundary Spanners in Multiagency Coordination, American Review of Public
Administration, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp 2072225.
Kapucu, N. (2008). Collaborative emergency management: Better community
organising, better public preparedness and response, Disasters, Vol. 32, No.
2, pp 239262.
Kurita, T., Nakamura, A., Kodama, M. and Colombage, S.R.N. (2006) Tsunami
public awareness and the disaster management system of Sri Lanka, Disaster
Prevention and Management, Vol. 15 , No. 1, pp 92-110
Manoj, B. S and Hubenko Baker, A. (2007). Communication Challenges in
Emergency Response, Communications of the ACM, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp 5153.
Manyena, S.B. (2006). The Concept of Resilience Revisited, Disasters, Vol. 30,
No. 4, pp 433-450.
McEntire, D, Gilmore Crocker, C. and Ekong Peters, M.P.H. (2010) Addressing
vulnerability through an integrated approach, International Journal of
Disaster Resilience in the Built Environment, Vol. 1 No. 1, pp.50-64
Meadows, D.H. (2008). Thinking in Systems. Chelsea Green Publishing Company,
White RiverJunction, VT.
Mendoca, D., Jefferson, T and Harrald, J. (2007). Collaborative adhocracies and
mix-and-match technologies in emergency management, Communications of
the ACM, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp 45-49.
Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M. (1997). Qualitative Data Analysis An Expanded
Case Book. 2nd ed. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA.
Palen, L, Hiltz, S.R. and Liu, S.B. (2007). Online forums supporting grassroots
participation in Emergency Preparedness and Response, Communications of
the ACM, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp 54-58.
270
Paton, D. and Moore Johnston, D. (2006). Disaster Resilience: An Integrated

Approach. Thomas Books, Springfield, IL.
Patricelli , F., Beakley , J. E., Carnevale, A., Tarabochia, M. and von Lubitz, D. K. J.
E. (2009) Disaster management and mitigation: the telecommunications
infrastructure, Disasters, Vol. 33, pp 2337.
Pearce, L. (2003) Disaster management and community planning, and public
participation: How to achieve sustainable hazard mitigation, Natural Hazards,
Vol. 28, pp 211228.
Perry, R.W. and Nigg, J.M. (1985) Emergency Management: A Challenge for Public
Administration, Public Administration Review, Vol. 45, pp. 72-77
Prencipe, A, Davies, A. and Hobday, M. (2005). The Business of Systems
Integration. Oxford University Press, New York, NY.
Quarantelli, E. L. (1988). Disaster crisis management: A summary of research
findings. Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 25, pp 373-385.
Sentinel Alert (2011) Intelligent Public Warning Systems,
http://www.sentinelalert.com.au/ (accessed 1 October 2011).
available
at
Shaw, R., Kobayashi, K.S.H. and Kobayashi, M. (2004) Linking experience,

education, perception and earthquake preparedness, Disaster Prevention and
Management, Vol. 13 No. 1, pp 39 49.
Shinozuka, M. (2004). Resilience of integrated power and water system. Research
Progress and Accomplishments, 200304. MCEER, Buffalo, NY.
Shiwaku, K. and Shaw, R. (2008) Proactive co-learning: a new paradigm in disaster
education, Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 17 No. 2, pp 183 198.
Shiwaku, K., Shaw, R., Kandel, R.C., Shrestha, S.N. and Dixit, A.M. (2007) Future
perspective of school disaster education in Nepal, Disaster Prevention and
Management, Vol. 16 No. 4, pp 576 587.
Smith, W., and Dowell, J. (2000). A case study of co-ordinative decision-making in
disaster management. Ergonomics Vol. 43, pp 11531166.
Thompson, S.J., Altay, N, Green, W.G., and Lapetina, J. (2006) Improving disaster
response efforts with decision support systems. International Journal of
Emergency Management Vol. 3, pp. 250263.
Trim, P.R.J. (2004) An integrative approach to disaster management and planning,
Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 13 No. 3, pp.218 - 225
Troy, D. A., Carson, A., Vanderbeek, J., and Hutton, A. (2008). Enhancing
community-based disaster preparedness with information technology.
Disasters, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp149-165.
Van De Walle, B. and Turoff, M. (2007). Emergency Response Information
Systems: Emerging Trends and Technologies, Communications of the ACM,
Vol. 50, No. 3, pp 29-31.
Van De Walle, B, Turoff, M. and Hiltz, S.R. (2010). Information Systems for
Emergency Management, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY.
Walsh, M. (2003). Teaching qualitative analysis using QSR NVivo. The Qualitative
Report Vol. 8, No. 2, pp 251256.
271
The Core Volunteer
Leanne McCormick
Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
Paper presented at
The Core Volunteer
Leanne McCormick, Monash University

272
The Core Volunteer

Abstract
Trained, highly skilled and committed volunteers are of critical value to government
and community organisations responsible for coordinating disaster recovery
programs in Australia. There are significant challenges in recruiting, training and
retaining motivated volunteers, specifically in maintaining capacity and optimal
service delivery both during times of peak activity, and quieter periods. Given the
absence of financial remuneration, management strategies derived from
organisational behavioural science models may benefit the organisations in
attracting and retaining suitable volunteers.
The purpose of this study was to measure the level of affective and normative
organisational commitment (as an indicator of volunteer engagement), and if a
relational psychological contract (the basis of the volunteers relationship with the
organisation) influences the level of organisational commitment of unpaid volunteers
associated with a large Australian not-for-profit organisation.
This study has quantitatively tested the level of attitudinal constructs of
organisational commitment and a relational psychological contract, as held by
volunteers within a large service delivery organisation in Australia. A cross-sectional
anonymous survey was conducted in 2011, using psychometrically valid scales. The
relationships between antecedents and commitment outcomes, as well as the
influence of the relational psychological contract, were assessed using multiple
hierarchical regression analysis.
In terms of preliminary findings, hypotheses were generally supported. A positive
and significant relationship was found for role scope, personal importance,
organisational support, and need satisfaction for affective commitment; likewise
socialisation for normative commitment. A relational psychological contract was
found to partially mediate levels of affective and normative commitment.
Understanding the key predictors and implications of the commitment and
psychological contract constructs may assist organisations dependent on volunteers
tap a deeper and more enduring level of connection with their individual volunteers
and assist with maintenance of service delivery outcomes in the longer term.
Keywords: volunteer, psychological contract, organisational commitment,

organisational development
The Core Volunteer

273
Introduction
As a critical component of the contemporary not-for-profit (NFP) organisation, the
volunteer workforce is both economically, and socially significant (Van Vuuren, De
Jong & Seydel 2008:315). Moreover, the utilization of human resource management
(HRM) and organisational behaviour (OB) principles by NFP management groups,
within volunteer programs, supports a broadening of the OD function, in support of
volunteer performance and retention (Netting, et al. 2004).
This paper extends the psychological contract (PC) construct (Rousseau 1989) to
include volunteers, and specifically how a relational psychological contract (RPC)
might influence outcomes of organisational commitment (OC) affective (AC) and
normative (NC), as modelled by Allen & Meyer (1990) on the part of volunteers.
Research questions sought to quantitatively confirm important antecedents of AC
and NC as well as testing for the mediating influence of a relational psychological
contract (RPC) on respective commitment outcomes.
The concepts of PC and OC are both applicable to volunteers. Affinity has been
established between a RPC and AC, on the basis of socio-emotional need fulfilment
and positive work experiences (Allen, et al 1990; Aselage & Eisenberger 2003;
Coyle-Shapiro & Conway, 2005; Guerro & Herrback 2008; Rousseau, Ho &
Greenberg 2006). The linkage of RPC with NC has also been noted (see Farmer &
Fedor 1999:351; Meyer, Irving & Allen 1997; Rousseau & Wade-Benzoni 1994).
However to date, empirical research examining the PC of volunteers remains
negligible (Farmer et al. 1999; Vantilborgh et al. 2010).
Background
OC reflects an individuals acceptance of organisation goals, and intent to actively
contribute in support of those goals or organisational well-being (Mowday, Porter &
Steers 1982).
Affective Commitment
AC, or the want to stay factor is particularly relevant to volunteering, volunteers being
intrinsically motivated to contribute time, energy and expertise, in exchange for nonmonetiseable, socio-emotional need fulfilment, and a positive work experience (Van
Vuuren et al. 2008). In terms of identifying key antecedents (independent variables)
in relation to volunteer commitment, selection was based on previous empirical
research which had established a positive relationship between the individual
elements and AC. Role scope, role clarity, personal importance, perceived
organisational support (dependability), and need satisfaction, have been firmly
established for paid employee relationships (Allen, et al 1990; Eder & Eisenberger
2008; Rhoades & Eisenberger 2002), and to a more limited extent, for volunteers
(Boezeman & Ellemers 2007; Clary, Snyder & Ridge 1992; Greenslade & White
2005; Luthy & Schrader 2007; Shin & Kleiner 2003; Stephen, Dawley & Stephens
2004; Tidwell 2005; Van Vuuren et al. 2008).
With regard to the individual antecedents, role scope (RS) refers to the number of
different tasks required of a job, and the frequency with which those tasks are
repeated. The greater the number of individual components, the more challenging
The Core Volunteer

274
the role is perceived to be (Hackman & Oldham 1976). Role clarity (RC) or
ambiguity reflects the degree of uncertainty respondents feel about what actions are
required to fulfil a role (Meyer et al 2002).
A sense of personal importance (PI) (Allen & Meyer 1990) reflects the level of
respect volunteers perceive from the organisation in relation to donations of their
time and energy. It is primarily assessed through feedback and participation in
decision making. These aspects contribute to a volunteers perception that they are
valued, appreciated, and celebrated (Boezeman, et al. 2007; Shin, et al. 2003).
Perceived organizational support (POS) is the belief of employees concerning the
degree to which the organization values their contributions and cares about their wellbeing (Eisenberger, et al 1986), and the extent to which individuals can rely on the
organisation for support that is a sense of dependability (Farmer & Fedor 1999). A
higher level of POS is positively associated with commitment, for both employees
(Eder & Eisenberger 2000) and volunteers (Boezeman & Ellemers, 2007).
Personal characteristics fall into demographic and dispositional categories. In this
study demographic items (age, tenure, gender and education), were used as control
variables. In terms of dispositional factors, need satisfaction (NS) (Clary, et al. 1992)
was identified as the most relevant independent factor, with individual elements of
value and esteem.
It was thus hypothesised that in relation to the AC of volunteers:
a) role scope will be positively related
b) role ambiguity will be negatively related
c) personal importance will be positively related
d) organisational support will be positively related
e) need satisfaction will be positively related
Normative Commitment
NC is the perceived need to stay on the part of the individual, and is generally judged
on the basis of reciprocity (Meyer, Bobocel & Allen 1991), and with particular
reference to the volunteer context; socialisation experiences (SE) (Allen et al. 1990).
The validity of SE as an antecedent of NC is based on the assertion that the social
experience (prior to and on organisational entry) is highly valued (Allen & Meyer
1990). Commitment levels of volunteers and paid staff alike are positively associated
with group norms, reinforced by the social environment (Boezeman, et al. 2007; Eder
& Eisenberger 2008; Wymer, et al, 2001).
It was thus hypothesised that in relation to the normative commitment of volunteers:
f) socialisation experiences will be positively related
Psychological Contract
The Core Volunteer

275
The PC is defined by Rousseau (1989) as individual beliefs in reciprocal obligations

between contract parties. The PC provides a framework for understanding
employee-organisation linkages (McFarlane Shore & Tetrick 1994); its interpretive
role well established (Rousseau & Wade-Benzoni 1994) in the context of traditional
employees with established linkages to job satisfaction, performance, commitment
and retention (Grimmer & Oddy 2007).
Research interest in the PC has recently broadened, from traditional employees to a
range of stakeholders, including volunteers (Farmer et al.1999; Netting et al. 2004;
Liao-Troth 2001, 2005; Starnes 2007; Thompson & Bunderson 2003; Vantilborgh et
al. 2010).
The features of an individuals PC will assume a position along the transactional
relational continuum (Atkinson 2007; Rousseau 1990). Transactional contracts
consist of specific, close-ended, easily definable terms (Atkinson 2007:228),
typically financial compensation linked to quantifiable employee outcomes. By
contrast, relational contracts are more developmental, open-ended, pervasive,
socio-emotional, and value-laden in nature, and embedded in a broader network of
social concerns such as interpersonal relationships, reputation, and justice (Atkinson
2007:228).
Just as the combination of intrinsic motivation and socio-emotional fulfilment has
been positively linked to the level of OC and RPC (Grimmer et al. 2007) held by
traditional employees, the psychological contract of volunteers is also held to be
relational (Penner 2002). Moreover, volunteers tend to be intrinsically motivated,
their intentions infused with social justice (Greenslade et al. 2005) or other
ideological priorities that align with the mission and values of the organisation.
A predominately theoretical relationship has been established between PC and both
AC (Bellou 2007) and more traditionally, NC (Farmer et al, 1999; Meyer et al., 1997;
Rousseau 1989; Rousseau 1995; Rousseau & Wade-Benzoni 1994), although very
recent literature suggests that interest is rapidly expanding.
Linkages remain tenuous at present, lacking empirical support. For example, role
clarity, an important antecedent of AC, is held to be important in ensuring stability of
the PC (Rousseau & Wade-Benzoni 1994). Decision-making involvement, a
significant component of personal importance, is also associated with the PC (Bellou
2007). Likewise, POS provides a powerful means by which to capture the relational
social exchange dimension of the contract as opposed to the short-term
transactional one (Guerro & Herrback 2008). In reference to need satisfaction, the
identification of subconscious needs (such as security; enhancement of self-esteem;
and just treatment) (Schneider & Bowen 1995) of an individual may enable
development of an appropriate PC (Bellou 2007), and thereby influence how a
volunteer might engage with an organization. These aspects have not been
specifically tested in a volunteer context.
NC is particularly associated with a RPC (Meyer et al., 1997; Rousseau & WadeBenzoni 1994). SE (as previously discussed) will influence the nature and direction
of the PC. Organisational promises will be validated in the context of observations
of other staff or volunteers attitudes and behaviours, potentially within a relatively
fluid environment in terms of social expectations and organisational values
The Core Volunteer

276
(Stephens, et al. 2004:484). Sufficient mission and value alignment, will enable
negative organisational incidents to be forgiven (Farmer et al. 1999), with individuals
working harder and contributing more to the organization (Stephen, et al. 2004).
Accordingly it was hypothesised that a relational psychological contract will mediate
the relationships between:
g) role scope, role clarity, personal importance, organisational support, need
satisfaction; need satisfaction; and the affective commitment of volunteers,
and
h) socialisation experiences and the normative commitment of volunteers.
Method
Self-completed anonymous surveys provided the required data for analysis. Nearly
4,000 volunteers were invited to participate, from a single Australian not-for-profit
organisation, during a 4 week period in 2011. Responses were returned direct to the
researcher by post or through online submission.
Measures
Included measures for the continuous variables were psychometrically valid, and had
been used in other published studies. While many of the scales were necessarily
derived from paid staff literature, with some minor word substitution, scales used for
volunteers were utilised where possible.
To assess AC and NC the respective 6 item Affective Commitment Scale (ACS) and
Normative Commitment Scale (NCS) (Meyer and Allen 1993) were used. Scale
validity has previously been reported as acceptable with Cronbachs alpha (
ranging from .74 to .90 (Allen & Meyer 1996).
To measure the relational psychological contract, an adapted version of Millward and
Hopkins (1998) Psychological Contract Scale (PCS) was used, specifically the 12
items of relational character, with Cronbachs equalling .84 (Millward & Brewerton
1999).
Role scope used a 12-item subset of Hackman and Oldhams (1974) Job Diagnostic
Survey (JDS), covering task identity, skill variety, task significance and feedback.
The scale is still a widely used perceptual measure of job scope (Goris 2007:740),
used in a number of recent studies (Goris 2007; Goris, Vaught, & Pettit, 2003;
Schaubroeck et al., 2007) with Cronbachs equalling .86 (Van de Vegt 1998).
Role ambiguity was measured through the 6-item reverse scored Job-Related Strain
Index (Rizzo, House and Lirtzman (1970), which was formulated to evaluate role
ambiguity in all types of organizations (Yoshie et al. 2008:114), and as used by a
number of other studies (see Mukerjee & Malhotra, 2006). The scale has also been
used in other published studies (see Foote et al. 2005; Trembley & Roger 2004).
Cronbachs has been established as .85 (Mukerjee & Malhotra 2006).
Personal importance was measured through use of a composite measure derived
from another volunteer commitment study (Boezeman & Ellemers 2008), which used
a limited number of items from each of the Autonomous Respect Scale (Tyler &
The Core Volunteer

277
Blader 2002), the Volunteer Satisfaction Index (Galindo-Kuhn & Guzley 2001), and
the modified (Teas et al 1979) participation in decision making scale (Vroom 1963).
Cronbachs was .80 (Boezeman & Ellemers 2008) for the combined scale (9
items).
POS was measured using the 6-item SPOS (Eisenberger, Lynch and Armelli 1997),
the latest modification of the original 36 item scale (Eisenberger, Huntindon et al.
1986). Cronbachs was .90 (Rhoades & Eisenberger 1986).
Need satisfaction used two distinct 5-item subscales of the Volunteer Functions
Inventory (VFI) formulated by Clary, Snyder, et al (1998), namely values orientation
and esteem enhancement. The scales have been used in a number of studies
examining volunteer motivations and continuance (Clary & Snyder, et al. 1998;
Stukas & Clary, et al 2006), with reliability rated at .80 and .84 respectively.
Socialisation was measured using a 20-item Organisational Socialisation Inventory
(OSI) developed by Taormina (1994, 2004). Cronbachs was rated at .89
(Taormina 2004).
Analysis
Data cleaning and screening, and basic descriptive statistical analysis was
undertaken to ensure the data set met the requirements of regression analysis
(Tabachnick & Fidell 2007). All responses (continuous variables) were converted to
mean scores for comparative purposes and data and analysis was managed through
SPSS.
Multiple hierarchical regression analysis was the principle method used to assess
the direct effect between the independent variables (role scope and ambiguity,
personal importance, organisational support, and need satisfaction) and AC, as well
as NC (IVs being socialisation and mission/values congruence), using SPSS
software. Simple mediated regression using the test of joint significance (see
MacKinnon 2007), rather than the traditional Baron and Kenny (1986) technique,
was then used to establish whether a RPC exerted any influence on commitment
outcomes.
Results
An overall response rate of 29% was achieved with 900 individual responses
suitable for further analysis (on the basis of pairwise deletion). In terms of
respondent profile, over 60% of responses were from females, age was highly
skewed with 83% of respondent nominating their age as 50 years plus, educational
level was a relatively even mix between high school, trade certificates, and university
qualified; and average length of involvement with the organisation ranged from 4-10
years.
In terms of the direct relationship between the independent variables and AC, 6
antecedents (out of 10 detailed above) were found to make a significant contribution
(Table 1). In order of importance, they are: personal importance (Beta = .21), role
scope (Beta =.17), perceived organisational support (Beta =.11), need satisfaction esteem based (Beta =.09), and role ambiguity (Beta =-.07). Education was the only
control variable of significance (Beta =-.09).
The Core Volunteer

278
Variable
Significance (p) <.05
Standardised beta co-efficient (Beta)
.004
.000
.000
.026
-.09
.17
.21
.11
.74
.90
.78
.006
.09
.88
-.07
.78
Education
Role Scope
Personal Importance
Organisational
Support
Need Satisfaction
esteem
Role Ambiguity
.026
Table 1
Variables which made no contribution to affective commitment included age, gender,

tenure, and need satisfaction value based, for the tested sample.
In terms of the direct relationship between the independent variables and NC, 2
antecedents (out of 5) were found to make a significant contribution (Table 2).
Socialisation had a beta value of .28. Education was the only control variable of
significance (Beta =-.11).
Variable
Standardised beta co-efficient (Beta)
.000
.000
-.11
.28
Education
Socialisation
Table 2
.88
The remaining control variables of age, gender and tenure made no contribution to
NC for the tested sample.
Introduction of the RPC as an indirect or mediating effect (M) between X
(independent variables) and Y (dependent variables of AC and NC), as a simple
mediation model, confirmed that the RPC partially mediates the relationship for a
number of variables for both AC and NC (Table 3). For AC, a significant and partially
mediated relationship was established for role scope, personal importance,
organisational support, and need satisfaction value based rather than esteem. For
NC, socialisation was partially mediated by RPC.
Variable
Role scope
Personal importance
Organisational support
Need satisfaction values
Socialisation

.000
.048
.049
.004
.007
Standardised beta co-coefficient (Beta)

.16
.104
.09
.08
.10
Table 3
As a means of testing the direct relationship between outcomes of affective and

normative commitment and predictor variables, a number of hypotheses were
proposed. Hypotheses a, c, and d were confirmed, with role scope, personal
importance and organisational support all found to have a positive and significant
relationship with affective commitment. Item b, role ambiguity was confirmed as
having a negative relationship with AC. The result for e (need satisfaction) was
mixed; esteem-based was confirmed as significant and positive, however valuebased was not significant.
In terms of NC, the hypothesis regarding socialisation (f) was confirmed as positive
and significant.
The Core Volunteer

279
In relation to the mediation hypothesis (g), it was confirmed that a RPC partially
mediated the relationship between AC, and individual antecedents of job scope,
organisational support, and personal importance. In regard to role ambiguity, no
significant relationship was found. For need satisfaction, results were mixed. A RPC
was found to partially and positively mediate the relationship between need
satisfaction (esteem-based) and need satisfaction (value-based), but was only
significant for value-based need satisfaction.
For mediation of NC, the hypothesis (i) was confirmed. A RPC partially mediated
socialisation experiences in relation to the NC held by volunteers.
Discussion
During, and in the aftermath of emergencies and disasters, small professional teams
of paid staff are generally supplemented by large cohorts of regular volunteers
(many of who claim distinct skill sets and expertise in their own right) such as
firefighters in the Victorian Country Fire Authority or response units in the State
Emergency Service, or even the local chapter of welfare and charity groups. In terms
of outcomes for the regular, dedicated volunteer, and those newer volunteers that an
organisation wants to keep engaged and retain, there are some clear implications
arising from this study.
Three antecedents were confirmed as particularly important in relation to
organisational commitment of volunteers. A sense of personal importance on the
part of the volunteer was the most significant and positively related variable with
regard to AC. For NC, socialisation experiences values were found to be significantly
and positively related.
For volunteer coordinators and organisations dependent on volunteers for service
delivery, and wishing to enhance the OC of their volunteers, attention to these
aspects through tangible mechanisms should support strengthened commitment
levels.
For example, a sense of personal importance is more likely when a volunteer feels
part of the decision making process, and that their contribution is making a difference
to the organisation or its service recipients; that volunteers are valued. Consultation
of volunteers, and listening to informed opinions, in relation to service delivery or
policy decisions, particularly where the decision is likely to affect the frontline
volunteer interface, can assist in a decision ultimately being better targeted, as well
as accepted. Newsletters or other communications publicly recognising volunteer
contributions, also assist, particularly in circumstances where volunteers have little
opportunity for contact with other volunteers, or central operations.
In terms of socialisation, many organisations now have training programs for new
volunteers which assist with role clarity, expectations management and performance,
as well as the increasing legislative and compliance requirements. However, it is the
relational aspects - how other volunteers made them feel welcome, how staff were
friendly and competent, how all the implicit elements of the environment were
communicated that appear to ensure new arrivals feel supported, and assist in
converting initial engagement to a felt obligation to stay.
The Core Volunteer

280
The PC construct offers scope to understand and improve volunteer management by

exploiting the positive relationship between OC and volunteering (Tidwell
2005:454), as well as providing key insights into volunteer behaviour (Farmer et al.
1999:350). The role of a confirmed relational psychological contract, and its partial
and positive influence on volunteer commitment outcomes, has been a key outcome
of this study. Identifying the key aspects of the psychological contract for an
organisations volunteers offers an opportunity to leverage the relationship of
individual volunteers with the organisation, not only in a consistent, positive and
additive manner, but in alignment with strategic goals.
Conclusion
While volunteer commitment has attracted research interest, and resulted in a
number of recent empirical studies, the psychological contract of volunteers has
received far less scrutiny, despite its potential value to volunteer management
methodology.
Data from this study confirmed that the PC of volunteers is relational, and the preeminence of perceived personal importance as an antecedent of AC specific to the
volunteer context. Socialisation results regarding NC also confirm previous findings,
with ongoing implications for Australian organisations in the recruitment and
maintenance of their volunteer workforce. Of course, these results are correlational
only; the associated relationships would benefit from further research.
A substantial number of organisations involved in frontline disaster management
service delivery are heavily dependent on the contribution of volunteers to meet their
service objectives. The right sort of volunteer is no longer so plentiful that an
organisation can afford to take volunteer recruitment and retention for granted.
Understanding the key predictors and implications of the commitment and
psychological contract constructs enables organisations dependent on volunteers to
potentially tap a deeper and more enduring level of connection with their individual
volunteers. Organisations with this understanding will have the capacity to better
define, and operationalize the promissory expectations and aspects of need
satisfaction that are most typical of volunteers and leverage this knowledge to
increase the level of want or obligation to stay on the part of their volunteers.
The Core Volunteer

281
References
Allen, N & Meyer, J 1990 The measurement and antecedents of affective,
continuance and normative commitment to the organization, Journal of Occupational
Psychology, vol. 63, pp. 1-18
Amos, E & Weathington, B 2008 An Analysis of the Relation Between EmployeeOrganisational Value Congruence and Employee Attitudes, The Journal of
Psychology, vol. 142, no. 6, pp. 615-631
Aselage, J & Eisenberger, R 2003 Perceived Organisational Support and
Psychological Contracts: A Theoretical Integration, Journal of Organisational
Behaviour, vol. 24, no. 5, pp. 491-509
Atkinson, C 2007 Trust and the psychological contract, Employee Relations, vol. 29,
no, 3, pp. 227-246
Bellou, V 2007 Shaping Psychological Contracts in the Public & Private Sectors: A
Human Resources Management Perspective, International Public Management
Journal, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 327-353
Boezeman, E & Ellemers, N 2007 Volunteering for Charity: Pride, Respect, and the
Commitment of Volunteers, Journal of Applied Psychology, vol. 92, no. 3, pp. 771785
Clary, E Snyder, M & Ridge, R 1992 A functional strategy for the recruitment,
placement and retention of volunteers, Nonprofit Management and Leadership, no.
2, pp. 333-350
Coyle-Shapiro, J & Conway, N 2005 Exchange relationships: examining
psychological contracts and perceived organisational support, Journal of Applied
Psychology, vol. 90, no. 4, pp. 774-781
Cunningham, I 2000 Managing Employee Commitment in the UK Voluntary Sector:
A Frontier for Further Research, Management Research News, vol. 23, no. 9-11, pp.
45-47
Eder, P & Eisenberger, R 2008 Perceived Organisational Support: Reducing the
Negative Influence of Coworker Withdrawal Behavior, Journal of Management, vol.
34, pp. 55-69
Eisenberger, R Huntingdon, R Hutchison, S & Sowa, D 1986 Perceived
organizational support, Journal of Applied Psychology, vol. 71,no. 3, pp. 500-507
Farmer, S & Fedor, 1999 Volunteer Participation and Withdrawal: A Psychological
Contract Perspective on the Role of Expectations and Organisational Support,
Nonprofit Management & Leadership, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 349-366
Greenslade, J & White, K 2005 The Prediction of Above-Average Participation in
Volunteerism: A Test of the Theory of Planned Behavior and the Volunteers
Functions Inventory in Older Australian Adults, The Journal of Social Psychology,
v145i2, pp.155-172
The Core Volunteer

282
Grimmer, M & Oddy, M 2007 Violation of the Psychological Contract: The Mediating
Effect of Relational Versus Transactional Beliefs, Australian Journal of
Management, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 153-174
Guerro, S & Herrbach, O 2008 The affective underpinning of psychological contract
fulfillment, Journal of Managerial Psychology, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 4-17
Liao-Troth, M 2001 Attitude differences between paid workers and volunteers,
Nonprofit Management and Leadership, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 423442
Liao-Troth, M 2005 Are they here for the long haul? The effects of functional motives
and personality factors on the psychological contracts of volunteers Nonprofit and
Voluntary Sector Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 510530
Luthy, M & Schrader, R 2007 Volunteer Satisfaction: An Analysis of Contributing
Factors Among Hospice Workers, Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies
Journal, vol. 11, pp. 51-64
MacKinnon, D Fritz, M Williams, J & Lockwood, C 2007 Distribution of the product
confidence limits for the indirect effect: Program PRODCLIN, Behaviour Research
Methods, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 384-389
McFarlane Shore, L & Tetrick, L 1994, The psychological contract as an explanatory
framework in the employment relationship, Trends in Organizational Behaviour, vol.
1, no. 91, pp. 91-109
Meyer, J Irving, P & Allen, N 1997 Examination of the combined effects of work
values and early work experiences on organizational commitment, Journal of
Organisational Behaviour, no. 19, iss. 1, pp. 29-52
Meyer, J Bobocel, R & Allen, N 1991 Development of organizational commitment
during the first year of employment: a longitudinal study of pre- and post-entry
influences, Journal of Management, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 717-733
Meyer, J Stanley, D Herscovitch, L & Topolnysty, L 2002 Affective, Continuance,
and Normative Commitment to the Organisation: A Meta-analysis of Antecedents,
Correlates and Consequences, Journal of Vocational Behaviour, vol. 62, pp. 20-52
Mowday, R Porter, L Steers, R 1982 Employee-Organisation Linkages: The
Psychology of Commitment, Absenteeism, and Turnover, Academic Press, New
York
Netting, F Nelson, H Borders, K & Huber, R 2004 Volunteer and Paid Staff
Relationships: Implications for Social Work Administration, Administration in Social
Work, vol. 28, no. 3/4, pp. 69-88
Penner, L 2002 Dispositional and Organisational Influences on Sustained
Volunteerism: An Interactionist Perspective, Journal of Social Issues, vol. 58, no. 3,
pp. 447-467
Rhoades, L & Eisenberger, R 2002 Perceived Organizational Support: A Review of
the Literature, Journal of Applied Psychology, vol. 87, no. 4, pp. 698-714
The Core Volunteer

283
Rousseau, D 1989 Psychological and implied contracts in organizations, Employee

Responsibilities and Rights Journal, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 121-39
Rousseau, D 1995 Psychological Contracts in Organizations. Understanding Written
and Unwritten Agreements, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA
Rousseau, D Ho, V & Greenberg, J 2006 IDeals: Idiosyncratic Terms in
Employment Relationships, Academy of Management Review, vol. 31, no. 4, pp.
977-994
Rousseau, D & Wade-Benzoni, K 1994 Linking Strategy and Human Resource
Practices: How Employee and Customer Contracts Are Created, Human Resource
Management, vol. 33, iss. 3, pp. 463-489
Schneider, B & Bowen, D 1995, Winning the service game, Harvard Business
School Press, Cambridge, MA
Shin, S & Kleiner, B 2003 How to manage unpaid volunteers in organizations,
Management Research News, vol. 26, no. 2-4, pp. 63-72
Starnes, B 2007 An analysis of psychological contracts in volunteerism and the
effect of contract breach on volunteer contributions to the organization, The
International Journal of Volunteer Administration, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 3141
Stephen, R Dawley, D & Stephens, R 2004 Commitment on the Board: A Model of
Volunteer Directors Levels of Organisational Commitment and Self-Reported
Performance, Journal of Managerial Issues, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 483-504
Tabachnick, B & Fidell, L 2007 Using Multivariate Statistics, Pearson, Boston, MA,
Ch. 4 & 5
Thompson, J & Bunderson, J 2003 Violations of Principle: Ideological Currency in
the Psychological Currency, Academy of Management Review, vol. 28, no. 4, pp.
571-586
Tidwell, M 2005 A Social Identity Model of Prosocial Behaviours Within Nonprofit
Organisations, Nonprofit Management & Leadership, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 449-468
Van Vuuren, M De Jong, M & Seydel, E 2008 Commitment with or without a stick of
paid work: comparison of paid and unpaid workers in a nonprofit organisation,
European Journal of Work and Organisational Psychology, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 315326
Vantilborgh, T Bidee, J Pepermans, J Huybrechts, G & Jegers, M 2011 A New Deal
for NPO Governance and Management: Implications for Volunteers Using
Psychological Contract Theory, Voluntas, vol. 22, pp. 639-657
Wymer, W & Starnes, B 2001 Conceptual Foundations and Practical Guidelines for
Recruiting Volunteers to Serve in Local Nonprofit Organisations: Part 1, Journal of
Nonprofit & Public Sector Marketing, vol. 9, no. 1/2, pp. 63-96
The Core Volunteer

284
Individual and community resilience to natural disasters: a

comparison of bushfire and drought events in Victoria
Dr Joanne Millar
Senior Lecturer, Environmental Planning and Policy
Charles Sturt University, Albury, NSW, Australia
Dr Helen Boon
Senior Lecturer, School of Education and The Cairns Institute
James Cook University, Townsville, Australia
Professor Bob Stevenson

The Cairns Institute and School of Education,
James Cook University, Cairns, Australia
Dr Alison Cottrell and Associate Professor David King

Centre for Disaster Studies
James Cook University, Townsville, Australia
Anne Stelling and Maureen Rogers

Research officers, Charles Sturt University, Albury, NSW, Australia
Paper presented at
285
Individual and community resilience to natural disasters: a comparison of

bushfire and drought events in Victoria
Abstract
This paper compares individual and community resilience to bushfire and drought
events in Victoria. Qualitative research was conducted using focus groups and key
informant interviews in two Victorian case study areas in 2010. A totaI of 68
interviewees were asked about their experiences of each event, including those most
or least affected, the effectiveness of support services and whether communities
were better prepared for future events. Bronfenbrenners conceptual framework of
influences was used as the theoretical lens with which to analyse participant
responses. The bushfires generated individual and community resilience whereas
the drought tested individual resilience but did not appear to build community
resilience. We conclude that there is a need to build community networks before and
during times of drought, and to focus on the well being of town residents not just
farmers. In bushfire prone areas, newcomers need to be identified and offered
support before, during and after a fire event.
Keywords
bushfire, community, disaster, drought, resilience, women
Introduction
This paper describes research findings into community experiences of Victorian
drought and bushfires as components of a project funded by the Commonwealth
Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, led by James Cook
University. The research aims to investigate individual and community beliefs,
behaviours and policies that support community resilience to disaster events. Case
studies of cyclone and flood events in Queensland were also researched (see Boon
et al. 2012; Stevenson et al, 2012 in these proceedings).
Resilience has been variously defined depending on the level of analysis, for
example, individual, community or ecological system. Most definitions incorporate a
stressor and the notion of adaptation and return to pre-stressor levels of functioning
(Norris et al. 2008).Because climate change impacts involve both rapid and slower
onset stressors, the resilience definition adopted here is: a process linking a set of
adaptive capacities to a positive trajectory of functioning and adaptation after a
disturbance (Norris et al. 2008: 130). This definition can be applied to either
individual or community resilience.
Conceptually, the simplest and most common level of investigation is individual
resilience. Most studies indicate that individual resilience is partly a trait and partly a
dynamic process and is promoted by two groups of generic factors: 1) personal
attributes such as social competence, problem solving, autonomy, self efficacy and
sense of future or purpose and 2) contextual, environmental influences such as
peers, family, work, school and local community (Boon et al. 2012). In contrast to
individual resilience, community resilience is described differently in various studies
and defined more loosely. Adger (2000) defines social or community resilience as
the ability of communities to withstand external shocks to their social infrastructure.
286
Social resilience like individual resilience must take into account the economic,
institutional, social and ecological dimensions of a community (Adger 2000).
However, Norris et al.(2008, p. 128) argue a collection of resilient individuals does
not guarantee a resilient community.
Bronfenbrenners bioecological theory (2005) provides a suitable framework of
analysis to explore resilience at individual and community levels because resilience
has repeatedly been found to rest on relationships between social and community
infrastructure factors (Luthar 2006; Walker and Salt 2006). The use of this framework
enables the consideration or measure of influences of microsystem, mesosystem,
exosystem and macrosystem factors upon an individuals resilience, irrespective of
whether it is seen as a trait or as a process (Figure 1). Furthermore, these traits can
be explored in the context of different disaster events. Bronfenbrenner (2005)
structures an individuals social context into five areas;
(a) Microsystemwhere the individual participates directly.
(b) Mesosystemwhere members from different microsystems interact with each
other independent of the central individual.
(c) Exosystementities and organisations that might be accessed by the individual
or their family.
(d) Macrosystemthe politics, views and customs that represent the cultural fabric
of the individuals society.
(e) Chronosystemtime as it relates to events in the individuals environment.
Macrosystem
Chronosystem
Exosystem
Welfare,
Community
hospitals
Economy
family
Media
based
services
Individual
Mesosystem
Microsystem
neighbourhood
workplace
church
Figure 1 Conceptual scheme of Bronfenbrenners systems and their interactions (Boon et al, 2012)
287
Most empirical studies relate to single natural disaster events such as earthquakes,
hurricanes, floods, tsunamis, landslides, fires, and drought (Alston 2006; Carroll et
al. 2011; Chamlee-Wright and Storr, 2009; Chang, 2010; Sharp et al. 2009). Few
studies have compared community and individual experiences of different types of
disasters. Rapid onset events such as bushfire generate an immediate emergency
management response, as well as mandated mitigation strategies to build
community resilience (Bushnell and Cottrell 2007; Erikson and Gill, 2007; Stelling et
al. 2010). Slow onset events such as drought may allow an individual or community
the opportunity to more readily adapt to impacts as the event unfolds (Alston and
Witney Soanes 2008; McEachern 2009). Hence, there may be distinct differences in
how individuals and communities respond or adapt to different natural disasters.
Berger (2005) used Bronfenbrenners framework to develop an application to build
community resilience and reduce trauma in disaster-affected individuals. Berger
(2005) concluded that adopting a multi-systemic approach was effective, not only in
dealing with individuals and families, but also in changing the mood and functioning
of the community. This paper compares community experiences of rapid onset of
bushfires and the slower onset of drought in Victoria, using Bronfenbrenners model
to compare individual and community resilience to both events.
Bushfire and drought case studies
Bushfires
Southeastern Australia including the state of Victoria is acknowledged as one of the
most fire prone areas in the world (Bradstock et al. 2012). Prior to the 2002/03 fire
season, two of the defining fire events in Victoria were Black Friday in January 1939
and Ash Wednesday in February 1983. To this list are now added the Eastern
Victorian Fires of 2003 (Indian, 2007), the Tolmie/Mansfield fires of 2006 (Sharp et
al. 2009) and the devastating fires on Black Saturday, February 7, 2009, where
many lives were lost (North and Bainbridge 2010).
The bushfire case study centres on Beechworth in North East Victoria where rural
communities experienced major fire events in 2003 and 2009 (Figure 1). Beechworth
district lies within the Shire of Indigo, a predominantly rural area, including the
townships of Beechworth and Yackandandah, and localities of Eldorado, Stanley,
Bruarong and Wooragee which were all affected by the bushfires (Figure 2).
Although towns were spared, there was considerable loss of property, livestock and
wildlife, and two human deaths.
Drought
The drought case study was focused around the regional town of Bendigo, 150 km
northwest of Melbourne, in north central Victoria (Figure 1). It is the third largest
urban centre in the State. The City of Greater Bendigo, like many areas across
Australia, had experienced a significant dry period over 13 years with some of the
harshest water restrictions in Australia. According to the City of Greater Bendigo
Drought Impact Survey (Kippen and Talbot, 2009) irrigation farmers were struggling
with the drastically reduced irrigation water entitlements, while dryland farmers were
repeatedly faced with crop failures due to lack of follow up rains. Rural landholders
interviewed in 2008 (Thwaites et al 2008) were making a conscious effort to cope
288
with reduced rainfall and water availability. They were identifying new water supplies
such as groundwater bores, capturing more surface water by cleaning out and
expanding existing dams, installing tanks and improving water use efficiency by
installing pipes and troughs. The pressures of drought create financial and emotional
stress which can result in a reluctance to get involved in community activities, which
in turn leads to increased isolation and depression (Alston and Whitney Soanes
2008). According to Alston (2006) women experience the stress of drought in very
different ways to their men folk, and they are often invisible in their struggle to cope.
Beechworth
Bendigo
Figure 1
Figure 2
Location of Bendigo and Beechworth case study areas

(Map Source: wwp.greenwichmeantime.com)
Beechworth district areas affected by fires in 2003 and 2009
289
Methods
Qualitative research was conducted in 2010 involving 20 key informant interviews
and 8 focus group interviews with 48 people, (a total of 68 people) across the two
sites as shown in Table 1. Key informants were selected from various government
and non-government organisations experienced in disaster management including
emergency management, human services, health and welfare, financial counselling,
community development and environmental management. Key informants were
interviewed first to assist the research team identify key issues and relevant groups
to interview based on their experiences with the fire and drought events.
Women made up the majority of respondents due to the positions they filled in
government services, local businesses, and community groups. Some of the focus
groups were mainly women due to their interests and availability during the day. This
provided an opportunity to explore the role and responses of women in disaster
preparation and recovery.
Sector
No of people
No of people
Gender
Beechworth
Bendigo
(F/M)
(BC)
(BD)
Council
3F/4M
Business
6F/3M
(health, 3
emergency
9F/3M
12
Community group reps (eg 3

Sustainability,
Landcare,
Neighbourhood centre)
5F/2M
Property owners
23
10
22F/11M
33
Total
40
28
45F/23M
68
Government
welfare,
environment)
Table 1
Totals
Interviewees by location, sector and gender
Using semi-structured, open questions, interviewees were asked about their

experiences of each event, including who and what helped them, those most or least
affected and whether in their opinion, communities were better prepared for future
events. Interviews went for 1-2 hours, were recorded and transcribed. Data were
analysed by identifying, coding and categorising the primary themes (Bryman, 2004;
Hay, 2005).
In the results below, respondent quotes are coded as (KBD* or KBC*) for Key
Informants and (FGBD* and FGBC*) for Focus Group respondents. BC=Beechworth,
BD= Bendigo and *= number of respondent or group.
290
Results
The fire events built individual and community resilience at all levels
The qualitative findings showed that over the two fire events of 2003 and 2009,
individuals and communities had built resilience to coping with bushfires at all levels
(micro, meso, exo and macrosystems). Peoples experiences of the bushfires around
Beechworth generated a consensus that individuals and families (the microsystem)
need to be self sufficient to stay and fight fires. Even if there is plenty of support at
the exosystem level from fire brigades, police, health services or insurance
companies, the view was that one could not rely on them to be there at crucial
moments. This meant having the capacity to be self sufficient when utilities fail, with
reliable equipment to defend properties. People spoke of having battery operated
radios, old style telephones, good fire pumps and water supplies, tough clothing and
boots. Taking preventative action, having prior warning of the fire, and time to clean
up and move animals were all part of tackling the fire with confidence.
I think its better to be self reliant. You can trust yourself, you know where things
are. You know how to deal with all those things... (FGBC2)
...if youre not experienced enough or capable enough, I mean in our case with my
husbands state of health we would have been a potential burden. They would feel
they would have to come and try and save us, whereas they could let the house
go... (FGBC1)
Prior experience with fires was seen as an important factor in having individual
resilience to such events at the microsystem level. Knowing what to expect gave
people a sense of confidence and allowed them to relax somewhat even during the
event;
We knew we were fine. Weve been through it before and know what to expect,
what to do (KBCI2)
The people who coped best were the people who have done the preparation to be
aware of what may happen and can take some action to alleviate the situation. The
people that I found have been the worst affected emotionally hadnt had experience
with fires before and had no preparation. (FGBC4)
Long term farmers were described by most respondents as resilient due to their prior
experience and practical skills. According to some respondents, farmers see fire as a
part of life, something that comes and goes, as do floods, droughts and storms. They
are used to looking after themselves and they just get on with it.
I grew up on a farm and you know, you were told; keep an eye out on those days,
and dont leave the property. Its a sort of responsibility; for yourself, your family, your
community, your livestock. We had a different way of thinking. We took it very
seriously. So, you grew up and it was a part of your life. (KBCI8)
Those seen as most vulnerable to fire events were newcomers, the elderly, children
and those in the direct front of fighting fires. New landholders from urban areas were
291
thought of as lacking rural knowledge and skills, and being needier. ...they have a
different way of thinking more likely to be expecting someone to come and help
than the farmers (KBCI6) Community services interviewees also identified those
people who were unable to process their experiences as less resilient;
... we see a lot of people where once the adrenalin rush is over they start to move
into that second stage of coping, which is quite stressful. The first stage is just got to
get something done, whatever youve got to do. Once you actually get out of that,
its got something to do with the long term focus on recovery. Some people stay in a
very heightened sort of mind set, so their anxiety and everything stays quite
heightened, and I think that those people dont start coping until that stops...
(FGBC4)
Many interviewees felt that the help and support of family, friends and neighbours
(micro and meso system) during the fire event was crucial. Not only did physical help
make it possible to save their homes and farms from burning, but the presence of
others gave them opportunities to sleep, eat and relax during the days of watching
and waiting.
...we had some friends and (friends) dad and uncle. They were fighting the fire and
I was back at the house with the girls filling their fire trucks and making sure
everything was right at the house... (FGBC2)
Community support (emotional and physical) was vital to recovery of individuals and
small towns (meso and exosystems). There was agreement that communities had
strengthened as a result of fires, with better communication, improved response and
risk reduction strategies, and a stronger community spirit.
Personality wise, friendship wise, even people that youve hardly met and talked
together, were closer because weve got things to talk about and a commonality. I
think thats made us stronger... (FGBC3)
Phone calls and messages of goodwill from outside the community (the exosystem)
were also greatly appreciated, giving people a psychological boost and allowing
them to counter some of the negative media affecting the region.
... there were people ringing and checking that Beechworth was okay and that I was
okay, and that was very humbling... It was also a good opportunity for me because
being in the Chamber (of Commerce) and the Chamber is very involved in getting
the message out to the community that Beechworth - to the tourists in Melbourne so Im using these networks to say Please spread the news that were okay,...
(FGBC3)
Many participants had attended some form of state government funded Fire
Recovery activity, such as community barbeques, concerts or trips away (exo and
macrosystem influences). Although the subsequent spending of the Bushfire
Recovery funding was severely criticised, most people expressed their appreciation
of the activities which brought people together, encouraging them to talk and to
share an enjoyable experience.
292
I went on one of those weekends down to Lorne and it was lovely... it was three
hundred women and I enjoyed it very much, and it was very sobering for me
because everybody I spoke to had lost their home... (FGBC2)
Service provision at the macro and exosystem levels following the most recent 2009
fires was seen as having improved considerably compared to the 2003 fire event.
The 2009 fires and the Bushfires Royal Commission resulted in many legislated
changes to planning and operations from CFA to local, state and federal government
levels. One example given was the Country Fire Authority realigning its management
boundaries to coincide with local government boundaries for smoother operations.
The creation of Emergency Management Teams including police and emergency
services, local council and state agencies such as the Department of Human
Services, means that responses are now co-ordinated across agencies, with
responsibilities clearly defined.
One particular tool that highlights the influence of macro and exosystems on
individual and community resilience is the Vulnerable Persons Register. It provides
support for vulnerable people, their carers and families to plan and prepare for fire,
and enables a rapid response when emergency action such as evacuation is
necessary.
...its a strategic thing, also if theres a bad weather week they will be contacted by
an appropriate person for the council or whatever and say Have you enacted your
plan? And if they havent got a plan I think the program was to contact the carer or
contact the relatives and say We havent got a plan. This is your mum and dad, or
whatever, do you think we need something?. (FGBC4)
Respondents were unanimous that most individuals and communities affected by the
fires are now better prepared to face future fire events. Individuals and households
have upgraded their equipment, their management systems and their fire plans as a
result of their fire experiences.
... weve put in a wall phone now, weve put another tank in for the bore water and
weve got them both full, weve got generators. Weve got generators to make power
in the house so we can have some light - we had nothing. Weve put sprinklers on
the roof all as a result of this... (FGBC1)
The 2009 Black Saturday fires and the Bushfires Royal Commission had resulted in
significant improvements to community infrastructure such as fire refuges and
neighbourhood safer places, the equipment, operation and management of the CFA,
and communications capacity. Community members lobbied successfully for
improvements to telecommunications infrastructure, in particular the new Stanley
communications tower.
Were better prepared, like to spend more money on the infrastructure of the CFA.
And the communications people spent money on phones to improve those... I think
were better prepared because the ABC and the communication people are working
on the shortcomings... (FGBC3)
293
Local government and state government agencies have shifted their focus to fire
awareness campaigns reduce, more timely responses, maintaining community
mental health and creating a more co-ordinated big picture approach.
Drought tested individual resilience but did not build community resilience
The Bendigo interviews revealed differences in individual and community resilience
to drought compared to fires in relation to Bronfenbrenners spheres of influence. At
the microsystem level, individuals were coping with prolonged water restrictions, loss
of gardens, lack of feed for livestock, reduced finances, emotional stress and a
feeling of losing control.
When people saw dead trees, or noticed that the quality of the sports ground was
deteriorating, it depressed them. There was a sense of lost control, that they no
longer had the ability to maintain their garden the way they wanted to (KBD21)
It just went on and on, it used to break my heart every morning to look out and see
that it was another clear sunny day and the ground was just so barren (FGBD1).
For some urban residents, it significantly increased their workload. A great deal of
time and effort was devoted to capturing every drop of water and carting it to save
plants and water livestock. There was an increase in back and shoulder problems
caused by the carting of water particularly with elderly people (and women more
specifically). Having to keep water up to stock also meant that people couldnt get
away from their properties for a break. People had to buy more mulch, water tanks,
and the cost of replanting took its toll.
One key informant talked about people who had bought lifestyle properties, thinking
they would invest their superannuation in it and get a small return from some
agricultural enterprise. But it had gone horribly pear shaped because of the drought.
They might have been growing vines, olives etc, and the drought meant they had no
water and all their hopes and superannuation disappeared. (KBD11)
According to those working in welfare roles, the impact of the drought on farmers,
small towns and businesses had been enormous. Most respondents thought that full
time farmers were impacted heavily by the prolonged financial and emotional stress.
Several landholders talked about having to destroy stock, and the emotional impact
that had on them and their families. It is really stressful if you love your stock and
care for them (FGBD4). One ex-farmer talked about the impact of the drought on
children. They found it difficult to afford education as they did not qualify for support
We had quite a fight for Austudy when our children went to Uni. Things were very
tight, and they were saying, but you youve got all that land, you have to make an
income off that land. We ended up in a court case in Melbourne to fight our case
(FGBD4)
People didnt openly seek personal support because they didnt want to be seen as
dependent. As one respondent said a lot of families had never had to confront an
emergency and admit that they werent coping, and we knew they werent coping
(KBD9). Despite these issues, people with a farming background were thought to
294
have a greater level of resilience and capacity to weather the tough times, as we
found in the fire case study.
I think its the resilience of the Australian people, theyve had it pretty tough in the
past and it comes through. The farming community particularly, and Bendigo is really
full of farmer people, and theyve all had to tough it out. (FGBD3)
Interviewees talked about how people adapted to the drought with support from local
community organisations, council and state government (meso, exo and
macrosystem support). The smaller landowners, particularly those with shared
interests such as horses, helped each other source fodder and to cover the cost of
transport. For farmers, there was support from all levels. A livestock feed cooperative (mesosystem level), saw it as our job to source fodder for our members
(KBD1) as part of their ethos to support its members through the tough times. The
co-operative supported a lot of our commercial farmer members through the drought
financially by way of giving them things that they needed and carrying the debt until
they could come good. (KBD1) The experience of the co-operative was that not one
of their customers failed to pay their debts.
The Rural Financial Counsellor interviewed pointed out that one of the most
important programs for the farming community was interest support it kept banks
from foreclosing on properties (exosystem). The counsellor also talked about the
importance of the $20,000 grants that were given to irrigation communities. The
grants in irrigation communities were relatively easy to get but was critical to the
economic survival of small businesses in the community (FGBD2)
People sought information on how to manage gardens, which species were drought
tolerant, how to feed stock, where to access feed, and how to manage paddocks.
The Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE) ran Smartwater
workshops for gardeners and weed management workshops for landholders
(exosystem), the Bendigo Equine Industry Cluster (mesosystem) ran workshops on
how to feed stock in the drought. Some residents changed to drought tolerant
gardens with support from gardening clubs (mesosystem). According to a health
service key informant, women got a great deal of satisfaction out of learning about
natives plants.
The group members were mostly women in their 70s. They saw their native
gardens as being part of a network that supported the wider environment, created a
refuge for native plants and animals. They created a corridor through Bendigo which
isnt really recognised (KBD2).
In 2000, the Victorian Department of Primary Industries hosted a program called
Smart Gardens which provided urban communities with information on water
regulations, rain water reuse, using tanks and grey water (exosystem). The severity
of the restrictions had left people stranded and they wanted all the information they
could get. As one respondent indicated, Three hundred people turned upthe
department was shell shocked! (FGBD2).
295
Overall, most people interviewed felt that individuals had become more resilient to
drought. People changed the way they garden, the way they manage their
properties, and the way they view water as a resource.
Weve had drought, fire and now flood. Had the lot. It doesnt get easier having
experienced these things before, it just tests your resilience (FGBD1).
Although the drought had been a focus for collective action in all sorts of ways
gardening groups and neighbours supporting each other, not everyone felt they had
become more connected as a result of the drought. There was government and
private sector support at the exosystem and macrosystem levels, but less evidence
of collective, community resilience than the fire case study. Respondents explained
that it was difficult to maintain community groups and networks due to the constant
workload at home.
It was difficult to run meetings because people wouldnt come on watering night, or
they would have to leave early to get home to water, which was affecting peoples
lives and careers. How those watering restrictions ran our lives! (FGBD3)
The nature of the drought, grinding on from year to year makes it difficult to maintain
community support networks and consistent services from government. For
example, during the drought years from 2000, the number of rural counsellors in the
region increased from three to eight. Because the drought went on for so long,
government funding had a stop-start effect on employment, resulting in a high level
of turn over as contracts ran out and counsellors moved on. The issue of building
trust within a community was continually being compromised. Smaller landholders in
particular appeared to fall through the government support net, being ineligible for
financial assistance and not seeking counselling. The council officer responsible for
drought relief said;
I didnt come across these people at work, probably because theyre not networked
in as much. I dont think they came in to counselling and we didnt go out to them
(FGBD4)
In terms of being better prepared for future droughts, there were mixed responses.
Whilst some respondents thought individuals were more aware; If it happens again
well all have a sense of how far our water will go we probably wont do things
differently but we wont get so paranoid about running out of water (FGBD2), others
werent sure that systemic change had occurred across the community. Some felt
things would slip back when water was abundant again.
According to the Rural Financial Counsellor, the farming community is better
prepared, because more farmers now have business plans that include risk
management. However, people were more likely to leave their properties as a result
of drought than fires. Some people have been hanging on and hanging on, waiting
for that change, and finally realised they had to sell (FGBD3). I personally didnt
think of leaving, but I know several farmers who have left farming as a direct
consequence of their experience of the drought. It was just too hard. (FGBD4).
296
Conclusions
Our research has shown that fire events can quickly generate community cohesion
which supports resilience during and shortly after the natural disaster. The influence
of support services at the meso and exosystem levels is crucial to enabling local
communities to respond and recover. Carroll et al. (2011) and Sharp et al (2009)
also found that fires often act as a galvanizing influence on communities. However,
these studies also reported social conflict and loss of trust arising from
dissatisfaction with agency decisions and actions, some of which persisted several
years after the fire event. Boon et al. (2012b) also report community criticisms of
emergency organisations that did not consult with local people during the Ingham
floods in 2006.
Although this was not significant in the Beechworth case study, there were remnants
of disagreements with approaches taken in the 2003 fires. The improvements made
at the exosystem level in emergency management response to the 2009 fires were
highly appreciated by local communities and provided a stark contrast to what
happened in 2003. This change gave people a feeling of confidence in their ability to
manage future fire events.
Individual resilience to bushfires appears to build more slowly over time as people
learn how to prepare, respond and recover from fires. At the micro and mesosystem
levels, support from friends and family are paramount to enable individuals to cope
with major fires. This was also the case with the drought case study and cyclone
case study (Stevenson et al. 2012). Conversely, newcomers who lack close support
networks were seen to be more vulnerable and less resilient to both fires and
drought. In bushfire prone areas, newcomers need to be identified and offered
support before, during and after a fire event.
The drought severely tested individual resilience over a long period of time but did
not appear to build community resilience despite numerous government support
programs, conferring with Norris (2008) that individual resilience does not
necessarily build community resilience. We conclude that although slow onset
disasters like drought allow more time to adapt practices, people are less likely to
seek help and join community networks due to fatigue and potential depression from
the relentless conditions. Hence, efforts need to be made to build and maintain
community networks before and during times of drought, and to focus on the well
being of town residents not just farmers.
297
References
Adger WN (2000) Social and ecological resilience; are they related? Progressive
Human Geography 24(3):347364.
Alston, M. (2006) Id Like to Just Walk Out of Here: Australian Womens
Experience of Drought. Sociologia Ruralis Vol 46:2, p154-170.
Alston, M. and Witney-Soanes, K., (2008) Social impacts of drought and declining
water availability in the Murray Darling Basin. Institute of Land, Water and
Society, Charles Sturt University, Wagga, NSW.
Berger R (2005) An ecological community-based approach for dealing with traumatic
stress: a case of terror attack on a Kibbutz. Journal of Aggressive
Maltreatment Trauma 10(12):513526.
Boon, H..J., Cottrell, A., King, D., Stevenson, R.B. and Millar, J. (2012a)
Bronfenbrenners bioecological theory for modelling community resilience to
natural disasters, Natural Hazards, vol.60, pp.381408.
Boon, H.J., Clark, B., Cottrell, A., Millar, J., Stevenson, R. King, D. (2012b) Lifestyle
at risk ? The case of Ingham. Proceedings of the Australian & New Zealand
Disaster and Emergency Management Conference Brisbane,
Bradstock, R. A., Gill, M. and Williams, R.J. (eds) (2012) Flammable Australia : fire
regimes, biodiversity and ecosystems in a changing world. CSIRO Publishing,
Collingwood, Victoria, Australia.
Bronfenbrenner, U. (2005) Making human beings human: bioecological perspectives
on human development. Sage, Thousand Oaks
Bryman, A. (2004) Social research methods (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University
Press, UK.
Bushnell, S. and Cottrell, A. (2007) Increasing community resilience to bushfire
implications from a north Queensland community case study. The Australian
Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 22 No. 2 pp. 3-9.
Carroll, M. S., Paveglio, T., Jakes, P.J., Higgins, L.L. (2011) Non-tribal community
recovery from wildfire five years later: The case of the Rodieo-Chediski Fire.
Society and Natural Resources, 24:672-687.
Chamlee-Wright, E. and Storr, VH., 2009, Theres No Place Like New Orleans: Sense Of
Place And Community Recovery In The Ninth Ward After Hurricane Katrina, Journal of
Urban Affairs, vol.31, no.5, pp.615-634.
Chang, K. 2010, Community cohesion after a natural disaster: insights from a
Carlisle flood, Disasters, Vol. 34, no.2, pp. 289302.
Cottrell, A. 2005 Communities and bushfire hazard in Australia: More questions than
answers. Environmental Hazards, 6, 109-114. ISSN: 1747 7891.
Eriksen, C. and Gill, N., (2010) Bushfire and everyday life: examining the awarenessaction gap in changing rural landscapes. Geoforum, 41, 814825.
Hay, I. (ed) (2005) Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography (2nd
Edition), Oxford University Press.
298
Indian, J. (2007) The Use of Local Knowledge in the Australian High Country during
the 2003 Bushfires . Australian Journal of Emergency Management,
Vol.22(4), p.27-33
Kippen, S. and Talbot, L. (2009) Report of the drought impact survey. City of Greater
Bendigo.
Luthar S.S.(2006) Resilience in development: a synthesis of research across five
decades. In: Cicchetti D, Cohen DJ (eds) Developmental psychopathology:
risk, disorder, and adaptation, vol 3, 2nd edn. Wiley, Hoboken, NJ, USA, pp
739795.
McEachern, S. (2009). How do communities respond to reduced water supply? The
relationship between climate change and social change in regional Victoria. In
Martin, J., Rogers,M. Winter, C. Climate change in Regional Australia: Social
learning and adaptation. VURRN press, Ballarat, Australia.
Millar, J. (2010) Land use planning and demographic change: mechanisms for
designing rural landscapes and communities. Chapter 8 in Luck, G., Black R
and Race D (eds) Demographic change in rural Australia: implications for
society and environment. Springer, USA. Pp. 86-100
Nelson DR, Adger WN, Brown K (2007) Adaptation to environmental change:
contributions of a resilience framework. Annual Review of Environmental
Resources 32:395419
Norris FH, Stevens SP, Pfefferbaum B, Wyche KF, Pfefferbaum RL (2008)
Community resilience as a metaphor, theory, set of capacities, and strategy
for disaster readiness. American Journal of Community Psychology 41:127
150
North, L. and Bainbridge, J. (2010) The Victorian bushfires and extreme weather
events: media coverage, crisis and communication. Media International
Australia incorporating Culture and Policy, Issue 137, p.67(4).
Sharp, E., Thwaites, R., Millar, J. and Curtis, A. (2009) Factors Affecting CommunityAgency Trust in Bushfire Management: Community Member Perspectives.
Report No. 51. Institute of Land, Water and Society, Charles Sturt University,
Albury, NSW.
Stelling, A, Millar, J., Boon, H., Cottrell, A., King, D. Stevenson, B. (2011) Recovery
from Natural Disasters: Community experiences of bushfires in North East
Victoria 2003 to 2009 ILWS Report No. 65. Charles Sturt University, Albury.
Stevenson, B., Boon, H.J., Clark, B., Cottrell, A. King, D. Millar, J. (2012) Recovery
from disaster: A case study of individual and community resilience in the face
of cyclones. Proceedings of the Australian & New Zealand Disaster and
Emergency Management Conference Brisbane
Thwaites, R., Curtis, A., Mazur, N., and Race, D. (2008) Understanding rural
landholder responses to climate change. Report No 23 Institute for Land,
Water and Society, Charles Sturt University.
Walker B.H, Salt D (2006) Resilience thinking: sustaining ecosystems and people in
a changing world. Island Press, Washington
299
Acknowledgements
risk of climate change impacts. The views and opinions expressed in this publication
not necessarily the views of the Commonwealth, and the Commonwealth does not
accept responsibility for any information or advice contained herein.
300
A new way forward: A Community Sector Response

Establishing a relationship that is based on capacity, the building of trust,
and the security in working together.
Mr Brentyn Parkin, M SocSc (Itl Dev), B.Ed (Primary), B.A (Itl Dev)
Managing Director,
Community Central
www.communitycentral.com.au
Paper presented at
301
A new way forward: A Community Sector Response

Establishing a relationship that is based on capacity, the building of trust, and the
security in working together.
Abstract
This paper proposes a new way to engage locally with the most vulnerable people
through the Community Sector. Importantly, it demonstrates the willingness and
capability of the Community Sector to play a central role in responding to community
needs in an emergency, and provides practical tools to:
understand the Community Sector, their networks and structures
understand the Community Sector resources
provide a framework of how the government and the Community Sector can
work together.
The most vulnerable people in our community are connected to Community Sector
Organisations, Associations and groups who are happy to help, especially in an
emergency.
Based on extensive consultation across regional Queensland, there is an urgent
need to include the Community Sector into the Emergency Management Framework
and to develop a strategic and important relationship with the Community Sector. By
exploring the Community Action Framework, access to local networks, structures and
resources, the new paradigm can be achieved.
Keywords: Community Action Framework, Community Sector participation, social
capital, community networks, new emergency management paradigm
Introduction
In Australia and New Zealand, federal/state and local governments have spent considerable
resources developing community resilience frameworks to support local communities during
an emergency. However the Emergency Management Framework1 has failed to engage the
Community Sector effectively severely reducing the effectiveness of the community
resilience programs and emergency responses. This failure has two serious consequences:
The additional strain on Community Sector resources during an emergency places
their vulnerable clients in an even more vulnerable position.
The inefficient use of local community resources places an unnecessary additional
burden on local emergency management agencies.
The legislated Australian Emergency Management Framework and the Zealand CDEM (National Civil Defence
Emergency Management) framework
302
An Inclusive Emergency Management Framework2 that engages the Community Sector

takes full advantage of the existing local infrastructure that supports the most vulnerable
people in a community. The need to formally include the community sector was raised in
more than 30 workshops during the research project (see Attachment 1) across Queensland
over two and a half years. It ensures that local responses effectively meet local needs, and
enhances an emergency response while minimising the detrimental impact on Community
Sector service delivery.
Changes to the current Emergency Management Framework need to be made. It is
important to acknowledge that the Community Sector provides the majority of support for
vulnerable people in an emergency. Many organisations within the [Community Sector
which includes the] not-for-profit sector provide services to individuals and groups that
government and for-profit organisations cannot or will not consider (Keast, Mandell,
Waterhouse, 2011). There is also a broad recognition that a more coordinated public
sector/private sector relationship is required (Quarantelli, 2000) to improve communities
ability to respond in an emergency situation however very little progress has been made.
At first glance it may seem like the Community Sector has been engaged in the Emergency
Management Framework, with several community organisations actively involved in an
emergency response through Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) with government. The
MoU outlines agreed upon services that are provided on behalf of government to meet the
community expectation. The remaining organisations in the Community Sector have no
formal involvement.
In recent disasters3 there have been organisations with MoUs to provide emergency
services however areas in their organisations not covered by the MoU are disengaged from
the Emergency Management Framework. Hence, the broader client group that these
organisations assist may find their services are disrupted as the focus of the organisation
shifts from their regular operations to providing an emergency response function.
This paper proposes a new way to engage locally with the Community Sector and
importantly demonstrates the willingness and capability to play a central role in responding to
community needs in an emergency. This paper also provides practical tools to:
understand the Community Sector, their networks and structures
understand the Community Sector resources
provide a framework of how the government and the Community Sector can work
together.
How well do we engage the Community Sector?
Ask yourself:
How much time do we spend planning to respond to local disasters?
How much of that time is working with the Community Sector?
What proportion of that time is spent with actual community organisations,
associations, community groups that know and work with vulnerable people every
day?
Local responses to emergencies have a long history. Since the 1930s formal emergency
management structures have been emerging within the government. The structures have
always engaged individuals as volunteers through a government program such as the State
Emergency Service (SES) or Rural Fire Brigade. As my grandfather, a farmer who lived
2
3
A legislated framework that formally includes the Community Sector

In Queensland (2008 Mackay Floods, 2011 Queensland Floods, Cyclone Yasi)
303
through the 1934, 1939 and 1965 Gippsland floods and fires often spoke about our individual
responsibility; he said We knew that we needed to help each other if we were going to
protect our property.4 He knew the limits of what the government could do and he spoke of
his individual responsibility to help himself and his neighbours. The formalisation of the
current Emergency Management Framework began in the 1970s and more recently the
amendments to the legislative framework provide legal responsibility to local and
federal/state government. By subsuming this responsibility critical parts of the Community
Sector who would be well-placed to contribute have been disempowered.
During times of severe weather events such as cyclones, floods and earthquakes, there is
still an expectation that people take personal responsibility however the most vulnerable
people experience difficulty in preparing and if necessary, evacuating to a safer location.
Most vulnerable people living in the community are in regular contact with Community Sector
organisations. Very few organisations have a MoU with local government, and do not have a
formal role in the Disaster Management Framework which limits their ability to respond in an
effective and coordinated way5.
A new way forward The new Paradigm
The new paradigm acknowledges the work of local people and engages individuals through a
formal engagement with the Community Sector. The new way forward engages the
Community Sector with the support of local government to, where possible, continue to
provide support to the most vulnerable people within our community. This new paradigm is
only possible by using a common framework that allows an emergency response to use local
structures to access community resources.
Recent examples demonstrate the need to strengthen the local relationship between the
Community Sector and government and formally including the Community Sector into an
Inclusive Emergency Management Framework.
2008/2009 Victorian fire season highlighted and acknowledged the role the Community
Sector played in providing much of the support to vulnerable people prior to, during and
throughout the recovery period.6
2011 Queensland floods highlighted the importance of communication with the
Community Sector7 and the significant levels of support the Community Sector provided
by responding to the needs of vulnerable people without any direction by government8
2011 Christchurch earthquake - emphasised the role that the Community Sector
organisations played and the solutions based approach that they applied to their
activities.9
These reports demonstrate a significant gap between the Community Sector and
government roles within the Emergency Management Framework. This gap is particularly
evident when the majority10 of the Community Sector managers cannot explain the reporting
4
Ernie Parkin, Farmer, Voluntary Capitan Rural Fire, Country Fire Authority, Gippsland, Victoria (1915-2009)
Data collected over two and a half years in focus groups and workshops (see Attachment 1)
6
Clark and Arnold (2010) There when needed: Victorias responsive community organisations, Office for the
Community Sector Department of Planning and Community Development State Government of Victoria
7
Queensland Flood Commission Report Submissions made by Queensland Council for Social Service and
Volunteering Queensland
8
Queensland Flood Commission, the Community Sector Organisations began looking at what is needed to
support local communities and the recommendations to provide better communication.
9
A review (Vallance, 2011) of the New Zealand disaster response queried where the state was government was
unwilling to or unable to effectively engage with the Community Sector during an emergency without a prior
relationship needs to be further investigated.
10
Focus Group discussions (between April 2011-Jan 2012) revealed that over 90% of participants could not
explain how the Emergency Management system worked, the key PPRR concepts or what they could do to
support the Emergency Management System during information sessions after Cyclone Yasi in North Queensland.
5
304
structures within the Emergency Management Framework, the core roles government
agencies perform during an emergency or the key concepts of prevention, preparedness,
response and recovery (PPRR). Unless the Community Sector is engaged, the vulnerable
members of our community become more vulnerable.
The challenges of formally involving the Community Sector in the Disaster Management
Framework and emergency recovery effort have been documented widely. Obviously local
government and local community organisations need to be able to work together and need a
relationship prior to an emergency. Observations previously made (Ward, Becker, Johnstone,
2008; Olshansky, Jonson and Topping, 2006) have highlighted the difficulty of developing a
participatory approach in the lead up to or directly after an emergency. Therefore
establishing strong, local sustainable, ongoing relationships that are useful in an emergency
must be developed as part of the emergency preparedness process.
Emerging from research, the new paradigm has been developed to provide a clear structure
for the Community Sector during an emergency. This new paradigm recognises and values
the different roles that the Community Sector and the government play in an emergency and
focuses on establishing a relationship that is based on capacity, the building of trust, and the
security in working together. The very nature of the Community Sector, which consists of
thousands of organisations and a diverse range of activities, has been a significant barrier to
including the Community Sector formally into the Emergency Management Framework.
Through a better understanding of the Community Sector, the diversity becomes strength.
The diversity of the Community Sector can be better understood by examining three major
components of the sector: networks, structures and resources.
1. Valuable Networks (Types of organisations), relationships and knowledge
Existing Community Networks
There are many different views and debate within the Community Sector about how the
sector is defined. The traditional methods of defining the Community Sector are:
organisation type (funded or non-funded)
legal status (unincorporated associations, incorporated associations, companies
limited by guarantee or for profit companies);
structure (local, regional, national)
service provision (direct or indirect)
service type (face to face, online or referral);
A new and important definition, particularly in the Emergency Management Framework is
defining organisations by the function they provide in a local community. A large organisation
may provide several different functions within its community with different activities and
different target groups.
305
FIGURE 1 Functions of the Community Sector

COMMUNITY SECTOR FUNCTIONS
Broad Community
1 Local activities for
the broad community
Examples
Local
Community
activities
A
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
Specifically
funded direct
activities
Sporting activities
Recreation activities
Festivals
Progress Associations
Show Societies
4 Local service
delivery for the broad
community
Examples
Low income services

Family services
Domestic violence services
Arts and cultural services
Neighbourhood centres
Community centres
SES
Surf Lifesaving
7 Regional Activities
for the broad
community
Collaborative
Examples
and network Community radio
activities
Unions activism
Social activism
Environmental activism
Target
Specific Interests &
Needs
specific interest and
needs
Examples
Hobby groups
Clubs
Self-help groups
Arts groups
Historical/Cultural Societies
Neighbourhood Watch
Environmental groups
Organisation /
Networks
organisations and
networks
Examples
Chambers of Commerce
Service Clubs and Groups
Community Sector
Interagency meetings
Small Business
Associations
Credit Unions
Community Banks
Cooperatives
5 Local service
delivery for identified
(often vulnerable)
individuals
6 Local Service
Delivery through
organisations and
networks
Disability services
Child care services
Allied Health services
In home services
Employment services
Counselling services
Targeted information
Referral services
Preventative health
Examples
8 Regional /National
Activities for specific
interest groups
Examples
Religious Groups
Environmental activities
Lobby Groups
Volunteering Groups
Professional Bodies
Examples
9 Regional /National
Activities for
organisations and
networks
Examples
Peak bodies
Policy groups
Regional development
Sector development
Collaborative groups
Community development
The Figure 1 matrix shows the connection between target groups and focus of activities. This
delineation provides a clear understanding of what functions a community organisation
delivers and provides an easy reference for determining which organisations are best placed
to assist depending on the emergency.
For example, if evacuation is necessary;
and there is a period of warning time,
- emergency management personnel would focus on working with
organisations providing services to the most vulnerable (quadrants 4,5 and 6)
and work with organisations that may be able to provide resources in the
306
evacuation (quadrants 1,2 and 3) through local networks, structures and

resources.
and there is little or no warning,
- emergency management personnel would focus their attention on assisting
organisations who provide direct support to the most vulnerable people
(quadrant 5) and asking the organisations to link with their networks where
possible.
During the prevention, and recovery phase emergency management personnel would focus
on developing relationships across all quadrants with support to organisations to build
resilience (quadrants 3, 6 and 9).
Existing Community Knowledge
One of the obvious benefits of working with the Community Sector is local community
knowledge. The majority of the Community Sector (quadrants 1,2,3,4,5 and 6) is involved in
local activities or local service delivery with the remaining organisations (in quadrants 7,8 and
9) involved in either regional or national activities.
Quadrant 4 is particularly interesting. These are organisations that support the broad
community through targeted activities for the period of personal crisis. Of this group (of
organisations in quadrant 4), Neighbourhood/Community Centres play a unique role as a
natural community hub. Several significant reports11 have highlighted specific emergency
management arrangements that could be made to include Neighbourhood/Community
Centres formally in an Inclusive Emergency
Management Framework to strengthen their role.
The Neighbourhood/Community Centres already
provide a wide range of local programs, work with
vulnerable people, support local volunteers (and
staff), encourage local networks, and access local
resources (Caniglia & Trotman 2011). West End
Community House played a key role in their local
community during the 2011 Brisbane Floods,
providing a base for people to work from and
conduct extensive outreach in areas that were most
severely impacted (West End Community House,
As a volunteer it was good
2011).
It is also important to note the relationships and
networks between organisations that already exist.
The relationships within the Community Sector
consistently change and the current relationship, be
it cooperative, coordinative or collaborative will
impact the response (Keast & Brown, 2003),
especially in an emergency.
2. Valuable Structures
Community Sector organisations are governed
using a similar structure to a typical business. This
structure supports the chain of command and
centralised coordination through the Emergency
Management Framework and provides structure to
11
to be working with a
community organisation that
knew what they were doing
they checked my details to
make sure that it was OK to
work with kids keeping
everyone safe
2011 Brisbane Floods
West End Community House (2011) Strengthening people and place: the role of community and
neighbourhood centres.
307
allow the Community Sector and the government to work together with confidence.
Figure 2 Community Sector structures
There is clearly a local management structure

(see Figure 2) in all Community Sector
organisations whether they are local, regional or
national. The large organisations duplicate their
structure across regions and local areas,
however in every organisation there is a local
decision maker, the Local Manager who is able
to make local decisions. Roles in the Community
Sector are not defined by remuneration as the
Local Manager may be a volunteer. The
structure is predictable and simple and only
requires contact with the Local Manager. It is the
Local Manager who is responsible for
communicating messages internally to Staff /
Volunteers or through line management in larger
organisations.
Existing Administrative Structures
One of the biggest challenges in an emergency
is providing flexible administrative functions
which already exist in the Community Sector.
The Community Sector administrative structures
keep people safe by providing policies,
procedures and rules with specific understanding
of:
Regulations (working with children /

people with a disability or older people)
Safety (OHS requirements)
Protection (accident insurance, public

liability insurance)
The administrative functions provide capacity to
support the directions of the local government in
their coordination role.
Existing People (Staff/ Volunteers)
308
There was so much that

needed to be done we just
had no idea how we could
help
2011 Yasi Recovery
Ive got skills and I did

register as a volunteer but
with so many volunteers
nobody got back to me. I
checked with other people
but they didnt seem to know
what was going on I am
happy to help
2011 Cairns - Yasi Response
The Health Care and Social Assistance Industry (of which the Community Sector is a primary
component) currently employs 11.4% of the Australian Workforce, making it Australias
largest employing industry. One out of every 72 people in Australia work specifically in the
Community Services Sector (Norton, 2010).
It is important to consider the level of flexibility in the workforce and the existing management
structure to support volunteers. The Community Sector operates in an environment of
constant change. Over time, the Local Manager and Staff / Volunteers have developed the
ability to quickly adapt to changes as they occur as long as the expectations are clear.
Another important capability is the structure to support Volunteers. Approximately 28% of the
Australian population who currently volunteer are actively involved in the Community Sector
(Volunteering Australia, 2010). By engaging the Community Sector, an alternative model to
directing individuals to a centralised system or
portal where they are hard to deploy, linking
people back to local community organisations
We have staff and a bus
builds capacity, provides a stronger local
we just dont know where it
response and provides help where it is most
needed.
is needed
Volunteering Queensland (2011), observed in
Brisbane, approximately 6% of the population
offered to volunteer12 through the volunteer portal
with others volunteering directly. Further research
is needed to identify how many of these
volunteers were active and for those that were not,
could they be linked to the Community Sector and
provide longer term help. Spontaneous volunteers
may have a short term desire to volunteer. A
week after registering on the database, a vast
majority that were contacted were not prepared to
volunteer (Volunteering Queensland 2011:5).
Further research is needed to identify ways where
spontaneous volunteers can be engaged where
they are best suited; either directly on the
emergency effort or other service delivery as
needed. Identifying organisations who work with
highly vulnerable people (Figure 1, quadrant 5
and 6) or support organisations that support
targeted programs for the broad community
(partially Figure 1, quadrant 4) and building their
capacity to manage volunteers in a structured way
provides a valuable resource during an
emergency that is also useful to the organisation
in general operations.
3. Valuable Resources
Limited information is available about the
combined value of Community Sector assets,
however in 2006-07, new capital expenditure by
12
2011 Brisbane Floods
Its less about who pays

and more about respect
and not having to wait to
hear what is happening from
the radio
2007 Cyclone Larry
When we heard that people

were being evacuated and
the council were in charge
I hope they know where
Susan is and that they
remember her medication
2011 Cairns Yasi Response
Estimates based on Population Dwelling Profile, Brisbane City Council (The State of Queensland
(Queensland Treasury, 2012) the total registrations registered through (Community Response to
extreme Weather) 65% of CREW Registrations reported in the Flood Commission Report that
included registrations across Queensland.
309
economically significant13 organisations was approximately $8.8 billion (ABS, 2009). This
does not include all community organisations (especially organisations in Figure 1, Quadrant
1,2,3 and 6).
Additional research is needed to identify the value and types of physical resources that would
be available, and under what conditions these resources could be useful in an emergency.
Initial work in the area suggests that resources available locally and the development of an
online data warehouse to catalogue physical resources is needed.
Arguably more important than physical assets is the social capital that has been built over
time. Hawkins and Maurer (2009) outline three categories of social capital that the
Community Sector has developed which include Bonding, Bridging and Linking. This capital
provides resources as needed. Norris et al (2007) outlines four important capacities which
include information and communication, community competence, social capital and
economic development. While these capacities are not asset based, they provide structures
that leverage assets as needed. Both of these concepts show how the networks and
relationships provide various forms of social capital and access to resources that may not be
owned or controlled by a community organisation but available during an emergency.
Social capital also includes trust. It has been widely documented that in a disaster, the
Community Sector has a higher level of trust (especially by vulnerable people) than local
state/federal government.
Will collaboration pay off?
Understanding the value proposition using program logic
Over the past few years, considerable investment have been made in communication tools
(including radio, SMS, social media, sirens and television) with the messages designed to
assist in helping individuals and families prepare for emergencies.
The Community Sector needs different information to consider what support they can provide.
The Local manager needs to consider:
the potential impact of the situation
who may need assistance
what they could do to assist the most vulnerable people they work with
what capacity they have and if they will need external assistance
what resources might they need to check everyone is safe.
With the right information, the Community Sector is able to quickly assess needs and provide
the support where necessary. Communication has been one of the key challenges. However
with the rollout of new technology platforms (such as Community Alert14 through the My
Community Directory platform15) these key challenges have been addressed and it has
become easier to communicate directly with the Community Sector.
The core challenge is the formal engagement of the Community Sector into an Inclusive
Emergency Management Framework. The new paradigm needs to be adopted consistently
across the Emergency Management Framework because of the diversity of the community
sector.
13
Economically significant has been defined as an organisation that employ at least one staff
member and are not for profit organisations. Many organisations in Figure 1, Quadrants 1,2,3 and 6
are not included. This figure also excludes For profit service providers who currently deliver
approximately 20% of services delivery in Australia
14
See www.communityalert.com.au
15
See www.mycommunitydirectory.com.au
310
Some of the clear benefits of collaboration are:

Empowerment of community organisations by providing clarity about their role in the
Emergency Management Framework and engaging them, their networks, structures
and resources
A quicker response during an emergency by working with existing local structures to
find solutions
Lower cost responses by using local resources rather than duplicating them
Long term resilience in local communities by working together during prevention
preparedness, response and recovery phases of an emergency
Investment in local communities and supporting existing structures and networks
Increased trust by local people
Local responsibility by the Community Sector and the local people they work with.
There may be disadvantages if a relationship is not maintained which may include:
loss of understanding
distrust, resentment and anger
withdrawal of support if commitments are not made and followed through.
The following program logic chart was developed based on discussions with local
government and Community Sector organisations
Figure 3 Program Logic Local Communities
Vision
Goal
Outcome
Output
Inputs
Local communities are

resilient and are able to
reduce the impact of
disasters by
so all key stakeholders
work together to...
Accessing resources (including skills and

experience) when and where they are
needed to stay safer
So to support the most

vulnerable people in a
community we need to...
So we experience
stronger relationships built
on...
Which depends on.
Support the most vulnerable people in our

communities in prevention, preparedness,
response and recovery
Establish a relationship that is based
on capacity; build trust and security in
working together.
Better communication and understanding
of key stakeholders networks, structures
and resources.
Including the Community Sector in
the Emergency Management
Framework
Well-articulated local policy
Development of a communication
platform
Development of a community
protocol
Adoption of the Community Action
Framework
Strengthened governance within
the Emergency Management
Framework
Working together in the new paradigm also has a cost. It can be a drain on time, money and
other resources (Berkhout, Dtting, & Sogge 2010 ).
311
What is required to work together?

With literally thousands of organisations across each region, engaging the sector needs a
policy framework that is national (ideally international) and based on capability and trust.
To work with the Community Sector there needs to be clarity about what each party expect
by working together. The current process, negotiated through MoUs has not engaged the
wider Community Sector and has limited engagement to providing outsourced government
services. A working relationship with the Community Sector needs more flexibility than the
MoU process provides if the Community Sector is going to be engaged. A greater
commitment is required.
Recent legislative requirements for local government to be able to identify vulnerable people
in the community has created an imperative to develop a relationship with the Community
Sector to support local government to meet its obligations and improve the quality of its
response in an emergency.
The minimum commitment required
Government Commitment
We, the Local Government will do all we
can within our means to provide what the
Community Sector need to support
vulnerable people in prevention,
preparedness, response and recovery
Community Commitment
We, a community organisation will do all we
can to use our networks, structures and
resources to help support vulnerable people
in prevention, preparedness, response and
recovery activities.
In every emergency the types of support are different. The Community Sector may need
access to people, resources or reimbursement for costs under schemes available to support
local government.16
A common understanding of vulnerability
Another challenge in the Emergency Management Framework is supporting the most
vulnerable people in the community. One of the key areas of expertise within the Community
Sector is to identify and prioritise support needs for vulnerable people. The levels of
vulnerability cannot be identified prior to an emergency because depending on the
emergency, different people will need different types of support. Some of the factors include
location, severity, type and length of emergency.
It has been recognised internationally17 that keeping registers of vulnerable people by local
government up-to-date is not practical because peoples vulnerability changes rapidly. By
engaging the Community Sector, privacy concerns can be managed and specialised support
provided for people who need it most. There is an inherent high level of risk involved in
keeping registers of vulnerable people, managing this information and maintaining currency
and security. An Inclusive Emergency Management Framework will collect information as
needed from the Community Sector.
How will we work together?
The Community Action Framework and Plan18 is based on probing questions to identify the
information needed to work together and understand roles.
The purpose of this framework:
Create a common understanding between the Community Sector and government
16
Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements (NDRRA)

Civil Contingencies Secretariat February 2008 Identifying People Who Are Vulnerable in a Crisis
Guidance for Emergency Planners and Responders.
18
See www.communityactionplan.com
17
312
Identify and verify the Community Sectors capacity prior to, during and throughout
the recovery period
Identify the communication needs (tools, methods and process) by the Community
Sector to allow this methodology to be developed.
Figure 4 Community Action Framework

Local Groups
Community Organisations
Local Action Plan
Organisational Action Plan
(Families / Neighbours & Friends)
(People who access services)
Our Stakeholders
Our Stakeholders
Local Government
Local Government Action Plan
Our Stakeholders
(The public)
Our People
Our People
Our People
Our Organisation
networks,
structures and
resources
Our Community
Our Organisation
networks,
structures and
Resources
Our Community
Our Organisation
networks,
structures and
resources
Our Community
Our Future
Our Future
Our Future
(Warden / Volunteer)
(Our Local area)
(As a community)
(Staff / Volunteers)
(Our service area)
(To provide quality services)
(Staff)
(Our Region)
(To provide quality services)
Brentyn Parkin 2003 revised 2011

The Community Action Framework outlines the key action areas for Local Groups,
community organisations and local government providing clarity about responsibilities of the
key players in an Integrated Emergency Management Framework.
The Local and Organisational Action Plan provides a common framework for assessing the
needs of vulnerable people:
Step 1 Our Stakeholders The Local Manager needs to assess what support is
needed by the most vulnerable people
Step 2 Our People The Local Manager needs to assess what Staff are available to
assist and how much assistance they can provide
Step 3 The Organisation The Local Manager needs to assess the capacity of Our
Organisation to meet the needs of Our Stakeholders and what support may be
needed from existing networks, structures or resources
It is only when Community Organisations have completed these three steps (in order), they
can work with other organisations and local government to support the most vulnerable
people in our community.
At the same time, the local government is involved in providing emergency services:
Step 1 Our Future Local government needs to assess what is needed to continue
to provide essential services
Step 2 Our Community The Local government needs to assess what the general
community needs may be and how they can keep people
Step 3 The Organisation The Local government needs to assess the capacity of
Our Organisation to meet the needs of Our Stakeholders and what support may be
needed from existing networks, structures or resources
It is only when the local government has considered Our Future, Our Community and Our
Organisation they are able to assess their ability to provide support to the Community Sector.
313
As the needs are assessed the Community Sector and Local government can progress to
Step 4, Step and 5.
The Community Action Framework has led to the development of Community Action Plans.
These plans are currently being developed in Cairns/Townsville and Bundaberg. The initial
response has been:
closer working relationships between community organisations
an efficient, cost effective communication tool that enhances relationships
identification of vulnerable sectors of the community in regards to preparedness,
response and recovery
In conclusion, there have been a range of positive and negative experiences when engaging
the Community Sector in the Emergency Management Framework and without a clear
commitment about how the government and the Community Sector are going to work
together, the vulnerable are more vulnerable.
There is a clear benefit in Community Sector engagement; however it is based on a
relationship which requires regular communication. Rather than developing individual local
strategies a national approach is required.
By working with the Community Sector and using the Community Action Framework it is
easier to identify capacity and link with local networks, structures and resources. Adopting
the Community Action Plan Framework allows community organisations and the government
to begin working together, based on the assumption that we have a broad agreement that
the actions taken will be directed locally and supported by resources where possible. While
there is broad acknowledgement that there needs to be engagement, neither the government
or the Community Sector have embraced a framework that supports engagement.
There are two clear challenges: The government needs to make a commitment to support
the Community Sector, and the Community Sector need to take responsibility and engage
with the government to do all they can to support vulnerable people during an emergency.
314
References
ABS (Australia Bureau of Statistics), 2008 - 1998, Not for Profit Organisations, 2006-07, Cat.
no. 8106.0, Reissue, Canberra.
Berkhout, Dtting G., Sogge D., The Dynamics of NGO collaboration, Civil Society Building
Woking Paper Series 1/2010 pp4
Brown, K. and Keast, R. (2003) Citizen-Government Engagement: Community
Connection through Networked Arrangements, Asian Journal of Public
Administration 25(1), 107-132.
Caniglia F., Trotman, A., 2011 A Silver Lining: Community Development, crisis and belonging
(accessed online http://www.communitydoor.org.au/A-Silver-Lining)
Civil Contingencies Secretariat (2008), Identifying People Who Are Vulnerable in a Crisis
Guidance for Emergency Planners and Responders. (accessed online
Cottrell, A. (2005) Communities and bushfire hazard in Australia: More questions than
answers. Environmental Hazards, 6, 109-114. ISSN: 1747 7891.
Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations, 2011 Australian Jobs 2011.
Hawkins, R., & Maurer, K., (2009) Bonding, Bridging and Linking: How Social Capital
Operated in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina: British Journal of Social Work Volume:
40, Issue: 6, Publisher: BASW, Pages: 1777-1793: ISSN: 00453102
Keast, R., Mandell, M., & Waterhouse, J., 2011, Big, Bigger, Best? The impact of Reforms on
the Not-for-Profit Sector in Queensland PMRA Conference Paper
Clark, M., & Arnold, S., (2010) There when needed: Victorias responsive community
organisations, Office for the Community Sector Department of Planning and Community
Development State Government of Victoria
Norton, M., (2010) The Queensland Community Services Sector (2010) Commissioned by
the Queensland Council of Social Service pp52.
Volunteering Queensland (2011) Submission to the Queensland Floods Commission of
Inquiry. [Accessed online http://www.floodcommission.qld.gov.au/]
Queensland Flood Commission of Enquiry, Queensland Flood Commission of Enquiry
Interim Report [Accessed online http://www.floodcommission.qld.gov.au/]
Queensland Council of Social Service (QCOSS), 2011 Submission to the Queensland
Floods Commission of Inquiry. [Accessed online http://www.floodcommission.qld.gov.au/]
Victorian Fire Commission
Vallance, S., (2011) Early Disaster Recovery: A guide for Recovery Australasian Journal of
Disaster and Trauma Studies, Volume 2011-2 pp 19
Volunteering Australia (2010) National Survey of Volunteering Issues 2010 [Accessed online
http://www.volunteeringaustralia.org/files/VXN9WD0EWD/NationalSurvey10_web_final.pdf]
315
Ward, J., Becker, J. & Johnston, D. (2008). Community participation in recovery planning : A
case study from the 1998 Ohura flood, GNS Science Report 2008.
West End Community House (2011) Strengthening people and place: the role of community
and neighbourhood centres [accessed online
http://www.westendcommunityhouse.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/StrengtheningPeople-and-Places-Vers.pdf]
Olshansky, Robert B., Laurie A. Johnson, Kenneth C. Topping, Rebuilding communities
following disaster: Lessons from Kobe and Los Angeles, Built Environment 32(4): 354-374,
2006.
Quarantelli, E.(2000) "Emergencies, Disasters, and Catastrophes are Different Phenomena".
Preliminary Papers. University of Delaware Disaster Research Center.
316
Attachment 1 Project Acknowledgement

The findings of this paper are based on extensive community consultations on emergency
management conducted over the past two and a half years. Assistance was provided
through the Commonwealth Governments National Disaster Resilience Program (NDRP)
and funding from the Queensland Governments Building Rural Communities Program - Blue
Print for the Bush Program, providing over $40,000 and an estimate of over $35,000 in kind
support by the Community.
More than 30 workshops and focus groups across Queenslands regional centres and towns
involved over 400 participants including senior and operational state government emergency
management staff, local councils and staff from community service organisations providing
services to vulnerable people.
The research was conducted through the generous participation of people in the following
Council areas:
Cooktown Shire Council
Tablelands Regional Council
Cairns Regional Council
Cassowary Coast Regional Council
Mt Isa City Council
Townsville Regional Council
Mackay Regional Council
Central Highlands Regional Council
Bundaberg Regional Council
Fraser Coast Regional Council
Gympie Regional Council
Brisbane City Council
In conversations based around communication (and Volunteer Alert
www.volunteeralert.com.au) Participants shared practices that are currently working,
described gaps in operations during recent disaster events and identified processes,
structures and ways that we could work together to improve support provided to the most
vulnerable people in the Community.
Volunteer Alert was supported by our key partners Far North Queensland Volunteers and
Volunteering North Queensland this project would not have been possible.
More information about Volunteer Alert can be found at www.volunteeralert.com.au
317
Satellite data based semi-real time media contents to promote

public awareness of natural disasters
Kithsiri Perera
Lecturer
Faculty of Engineering and Surveying and Australian Centre for Sustainable
Catchments,
University of Southern Queensland, West Street, Toowoomba 4350 QLD Australia,
perera@usq.edu.au
Ryutaro Tateishi
Professor
Centre for Environmental Remote Sensing (CEReS), Chiba University, 1-33 Yayoi-cho, Inage-ku,
263-8522, Japan.
Paper presented at
Brisbane: 16 18, April 2012
318
Satellite data based semi-real time media contents to promote public

awareness of natural disasters
Kithsiri Perera* and Ryutaro Tateishi
*Faculty of Engineering and Surveying and Australian Centre for Sustainable Catchments,
University of Southern Queensland, West Street, Toowoomba 4350 QLD Australia, perera@usq.edu.au
Centre for Environmental Remote Sensing (CEReS), Chiba University, 1-33 Yayoi-cho, Inage-ku, 263-8522,
Japan.
Keywords: Disaster mitigation, Media-GIS, MODIS, Semi-real-time, Mobile contents
Abstract:
Natural disaster mitigation is a collective effort of; forecast, assessment, and encouraging the public
participation in disaster mitigation. This study focused on the rarely addressed aspect, the value of public
awareness on natural disasters. The promotion of public awareness can be linked to the better public
participation in disaster mitigation efforts. This study used satellite data and Geographic Information Systems
(GIS) to produce semi-real-time Media-GIS contents to widen the public awarness. The methodology to
produce Media-GIS contents is based on; fundamentals of GIS, satellite images, and data extracted from
Google Earth. Hence contents carry inherent characters of GIS and different from conventional graphics use
in media. Also the graphical variables like, size, value, texture, hue, orientation, and shape, were optimized
to match with target content users (age group, social group) and medium (print, TV, WEB, mobile), while
minimizing the cost. With the brake of the disaster news, MODIS (250m) satellite data can be extracted in
GeoTIFF and KLM (Keyhole Markup Language) formats. The KML file was overlayed on Google Earth, to
extract spatial information of the disaster site. Then, in ArcGIS environment, GeoTIFF file was transferred
into Photoshop for production of the graphical image map content. This Photoshop content can be used
independently or as a new KML file in ArcGIS. The resulted KLM file will be the GIS media content for TV,
WEB, mobile, or for print media. When public get these location based semi-real time information of the
disaster, they start to pay a greater attention due to various links they have to the respective disaster hit
region or similarities of own region and disaster hit region. This situation will support to increase the public
awareness of the disaster, and indirectly help to attract more public support in disaster mitigation programs.
Two cases studies; Brisbane flood disaster occurred in early 2011 and the on-going disastrous flood in
Bangkok, are presented in the study.
1. Introduction
In modern world Media in all mediums are having a tremendous impact on every
aspect of our daily life. While it is a massive business, media plays as the prime
controlling tool in all forms of propaganda to address general mass. Media (the plural of
"medium") is a truncation of the term "media of communication," referring to dissemination
of facts, opinions, entertainments, and other information, through newspapers, magazines,
outdoor advertising, film, radio, television, the World Wide Web (WWW), books, CDs,
DVDs, videocassettes, computer games, and other forms of publishing
(newworldencyclopedia, 2008). With the arrival of electronic media, digital printing, and
WWW, a constant demand pushed to invent innovative developments in content
production of media. In this background, reports related to natural disasters are playing a
prominent field in media topics, since disasters are directly related to people, economy,
and natural environment. The victims of earthquakes, hurricanes and tsunamis are
perceived as 100% blameless and get a bigger sympathy from the content viewer, while
the victims of wars do not enjoy such absolute status (Stroehlein A., 2010). The
requirement of high speed relief assistances, immediate damage assessments, and
disaster mitigation efforts have a relation with media contents on the respective disasters.
This is due to the high impact of media contents on the public in the modern society.
However, the lack of location based fresh information and maps in these media reports
make a significant limitation in contents. Two WEB based news report samples from 2011
Queensland and Thailand flood disasters are presented in figure 1. This study examined a
large amount of disaster news articles in web and found nearly all these reports are mainly
319
carry local photos, few maps, but very rarely carry semi-real-time information acquired
from satellites.
Figure 1. Two typical samples of disaster news articles in WEB posted by one of the top
rank news companies (source: BBC news), but with no support from freely available
satellite images.
These news items are travelling around the world through WWW and other electronic
and print media, where people even dont have proper understanding of the relative
location of the disaster. When news travels around the world at lightning speed using
satellite communication systems, its beneficial for readers to have information on location
and any semi-real-time pictorial information of the disaster. The application of satellite
images, especially semi-real-time satellite images can be a very effective addition for
reporting of most of the natural disasters (USGS, 2011; Altan at el, 2010; Nakya et al,
2007, Perera & Pathirana, 2006). The use of the term semi-real-time in this report
represents the time factor related to real-time satellite images and processing and
production time of the disaster content based of the particular satellite image. With regard
to natural disasters, this time factor should not exceed the arrival of satellite to take same
image frame again.
GIS (Geographic information systems) can be successfully used to build a link between
disaster news and location based semi-real-time information derived from satellite images.
GIS uses a computer-based process to collection or capture, maintain, store, analysis, and
distribute spatial data and associate attributes (Nationmaster.com 2010). In application,
GIS is widely used in scientific investigations, resource management, and development
320
planning. For example, a GIS program might be allowed emergency planners to calculate
emergency response time in a natural disaster, or find wetlands that need protection from
pollution (USGS Geography Publications, 2008). The present study firstly focuses on basic
level GIS application for media contents, in order to promote a new sub-division of GIS,
media-GIS. Secondly, the study discusses the link between location based semi-real time
media contents and value of these contents to promote public awareness on natural
disasters. El-Masri and Tipple (2010) emphasized the value of development of a better
understanding of the interaction between human and natural systems and their
environmental and socioeconomic dimensions, with regard to natural disaster mitigation
plans. Also, the public participation in government decision making is becoming an
important component, in order to achieve a better local level participation in disaster
mitigation activities. When the public has a better awareness of natural disasters,
mitigation plans can be convinced with better productivity (Weichselgartner, 2001;
Jayawardane, 2005; Godschalk, at el, 2010). Pearce in his study discussed the public
participation as a key to success of government disaster mitigation plans, using number of
studies conducted in Australia and New Zealand (Pearce, L., 2003). These all works
clearly indicate the value of public participation in disaster mitigation. Under this
contextual, the present study focuses on production of semi-real time location based
media content as a tool to promote the said awareness. In the paper, the methodology for
production of semi-real-time natural disaster contents is presented using two case studies.
2. Media-GIS and Image Maps

2.1 Media GIS
The power of a GIS comes from its capability to relate different information (data) in a
spatial context and to reach a conclusion about relationships among used data layers
(USGS Geography Publications, 2008). Any natural disaster contains the character of
location reference information, relates to a certain location on the earth. As an example,
when a flood disaster hit, it is important to know where the extreme rainfall was recorded,
directions of flood flow, and affected infrastructures. In most of the cases, satellite images
of flood incidents are fully covered with clouds, however, these could images are showing
some level of information about the degree of the rainfall. When the flood is becoming
prolonged, its possible to obtain clearer images to show flood extent, enabling to display
first-hand information taken from the space. The level of involvement of these imagebased products in the natural disaster contents clearly increases the commercial and
information value of the news item. Figure 2 simplified this situation with three cases, i.e.,
extensive, partial, and non-existence of location based image contents in news.
Figure 2. The value of natural disaster content can be upgraded through the use of image
maps.
321
When the spatial character in natural disaster is transferred into GIS database, a new
set of application potentials are emerging including contents and possible display portals.
The whole range of activities can be labeled as Media-GIS, a sub-division of GIS. As a
sub-division of GIS, Media-GIS contains number of basic GIS components as describes in
figure 3. If we isolated single media-GIS content, it starts with the brake of natural disaster
news. As the concept of production flow presents (figure 3), content maker should search
and collect relevant data including archived information, when it is applicable to the
incident. Content production and relay it to the customer or viewer through appropriate
media platforms ends the process. In order to maximize the commercial and graphic value,
this content production process must maintain number of standards which will discuss in
section 3.
Figure 3. The simplified production flow of media-GIS
2.2. The image maps
Image maps, the primary product in Media-GIS, are geometrically registered satellite
images or aerial photographs. They are extensively use in various situations, from private
GIS users, academics, to large organizations like NASA to; present, and explore land
surface information in greater details (Short, 2010; Sultan et al, 2008). Georectified image
maps can be included into a GIS system to conduct further analyses or present as a
graphic content. Scientific background of production of image maps is coming under
spatial data visualization. In spatial data visualization, there are three major objectives, i.e.,
data presenting, data analyzing, and data exploring (Kraak, 1999). While a bulk of mediaGIS graphic contents use to present information, some of them may analyze the incident
or explore related information further. However, optimizing the main graphical variables
like, size, value, texture, hue, orientation, and shape, is vital when the Media-GIS content
prepared for the publishing media (print, TV, WEB, mobile) and target market (age group,
social group), while minimizing the cost. Especially, size, hue (colour) and shape of the
graphic elements are critical for the target media market. Under the case study section, the
322
presentation aspect will be visualized with multi-temporal (the GIS component)images

maps of two major flood events occurred in 2011.
3. The concept of Media-GIS contents
Media-GIS explains in this report can be considered as a computer-based system that

explore, collect, maintain, store, analyze, and distribute, graphic contents of natural
disasters and other spatially located significant incidents to electronic and print media, with
a high esthetic quality. Media-GIS produces graphic contents or image maps for media
with a considerable academic authorization at semi-real-time phase. The ultimate goal of
media-GIS should be to enrich the user understanding with spatial information of the
incident and increase the awareness of the disaster, while improving the quality of media
business. Here, media-GIS content production focuses on five basic qualities or standards
(Perera & Tateishi, 2008), i.e.; accuracy, high esthetic quality, speed, low cost, and
reusability. Content maker must have some level of basic knowledge and skills in; GIS,
remote sensing data handling, and graphic production, to maintain these standers.
3.1. Accuracy
Since contents are passing firsthand information to general public, the geographical
and informative accuracy of the contents is paramount. For this purpose, its easy to
maintain a substantial accuracy of the product, if the GIS database is registered with
proper base map products, which are georectified MODIS image products, the major data
source we utilized in this study. Geographical accuracy is very important, when data layers
merge and also to use the contents through the archive. However, if the content is paying
a bigger attention on informative accuracy, geographic registration may get a lesser
importance. When graphics import and export between remote sensing and graphic
software packages, producer has to retain the geographic reference in data files
(explained further in Table 3).
3.2. High esthetic quality
The use of colors (hue), fonts (size and color), and symbols in media graphics must be
carefully selected to meet the technical requirements of the respective media, and target
viewers including age groups. Graphics should not hinder the original information in image.
Font sizes must be large enough to read easily, and priorities of words on the content must
be carefully balanced to maintain the informative and visual quality. For web media,
graphics must have smaller file size (JPG/GIF file formats) to maximize the download time.
For TV media, full color heavy TIF graphic products can be created, but easy to read and
less complicated graphics must be used. The content producer has to study new
technological developments, regularly, and tailoring graphics into various media platforms
is not discussed in depth here in this paper. Specially, web based data visualization and
presenting methods are facing a very radical development always (Friedman V., 2007;
Ostrow, A., 2007). All graphic products in original TIF format with all image layers must be
systematically archived for future use.
3.3. Production speed
Speed can be maximized at three different levels. The first is data mining, downloading,
and converting into the GIS database. The second is graphic production process, which
mainly controls in ArcGIS, Photoshop, and Google Earth environments. Here, graphic
skills and experience in Photoshop as well as basic knowledge in other software packages
are necessary. Speed of the content production has a direct relation to the commercial
success of the product. If the media company is demanding contents without very high
geographic accuracy, the content producer has to entertain such requests positively to
323
balance the market/customer requirements. Thirdly, media content itself must have the
correct file size (in kilobyte) to enhance the speed of data mobility in respective media
portal.
3.4. Low cost
Minimizing the overall cost can be linked with the use of freely available of MODIS
satellite data. Initial cost for ArcGIS will be a significant limitation, but producer can explore
the applicability of functions in any other remote sensing and GIS software package which
can be a substitute. Google Earth functions are freely available through internet. Initial cost
for Photoshop is relatively low compare to its one time investment; an older CS version is
between US$350 to US$650 over the internet. Older versions are cheaper and strong
enough to produce excellent graphics.
3.5. Reusability
All media-GIS contents must be systematically archived. Here, final content as well as
interim products can be archived by topic, geographic region, and date. Some endproducts can be reused without any additional change, to display historic conditions and
comparison presentations. A proper archive system of contents and customer feed-back
information (see figure 3) will directly lower the overall production cost in long-run.
4. Data and Methodology
4. 1. MODIS data
MODIS (MODerate-resolution Imaging Spectrometer) data became available for scientific
to successfully conducted a large number of application studies on earth surface and
atmosphere. (Barnes et al., 2003, Friedl et al., 2002; Hall et al., 2003; Zhan et al., 2002).
Data products such as MODIS NDVI (MODIS web, 2010; Perera & Tsuchiya, 2009; USGS,
2007) and true color image data (MODIS web, 2012; NASA Rapid Response, 2012;
Gumley et al., 2003) are freely available through NASA for researchers. The sensor
characteristic and temporal and spectral resolutions of MODIS data are fully documented
in MODIS official web site (MODIS web, 2012). Rapid production of graphic contents for
media-GIS can be benefitted from these freely available pre-processed NASAs MODIS
products. Table 2 summarized important information of MODIS data with respect to MediaGIS content production. The content producer must aware the possible file sizes,
depending on the sub-scene and image format, before download data. A large sub scene
in tiff format may exceed 80 MB in file size and takes a substantial time to download if the
network connection is slow. Figure 4 shows the USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS)
sub-scene layout, which covers images used in the case studies of this research. MODIS
images are acquiring two times a day (see table 2) and the definition of semi-real-time is
open for discussion. However, MODIS has the capability to show at least some of the
widespread disaster incidents within 24 hours of time span.
Table 2. MODIS information useful for media contents (compiled from information available
in MODIS sites).
Element
Orbit
Information
705 km, 10:30 a.m. descending node (Terra) or 1:30 p.m.
ascending node (Aqua), sun- synchronous, near-polar, circular
Swath Dimensions
2330 km (cross track) by 10 km (along track at nadir)
Spatial Resolution
250 m (bands 1-2), 500 m (bands 3-7), 1000 m (bands 8-36)
Available file (image) Geo-TIFF, JPG, and KMZ (Keyhole Markup Language Zipped format
file format needed for Google Earth overlay).
Available ready to use
Aerosol Robotic Network (AERONET)
324
sub-scenes
Available image products
Data access
USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) (see figure 4)

Fire Information for Resource Management System
(FIRMS), Antarctica, Arctic, Other
MODIS True color image. Band 1 (Red), 4 (Green), 3
(Blue) give natural looking image of the land surface.
Band 7 (Red), 2 (Green), 1 (Blue) combination, shows
water in black or dark blue. Water clearly standouts in
green vegetation. Enhancing floods.
NDVI image intends to use in vegetation studies.
Free through the internet (NASA Rapid Response, 2012.)
Figure 4. Geometrically and radiometrically corrected MODIS image subsets cover most of
the natural disaster-prone areas of the world. The FAS subsets are displayed here.
FIRMS, Antarctica, and Arctic subset frames are not included (source: NASA Rapid
Response, 2012).
4.2. Methodology and production process
The Methodology is explained is table 3 using different action steps which focused on
production process of natural disaster contents based on MODIS images. Here, the
process discusses the methods used in case study presented in this study. However,
media-GIS graphic contents are not limited to use of MODIS data, and open to any other
georectified graphic or map layer as the base data set.
Step
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Table 3. Working steps of a media-GIS content.
Element
Brake of natural disaster news
Check the MODIS image availability
Search historical images if comparison is needed
Search other GIS data files and local information
Action
NEWS investigation
Data mining
Data
collection/generation
GeoTIFF and KMZ image sub-scene of the location Image download
(file name example; image.tiff and image.kmz)
Read MODIS GeoTIFF image into ArcGIS and select Image
reading
and
the Area Of Interest (AIO), or the disaster hit area clipping
(image01.tiff)
Produce the raster world file( image01.tfw) through; Image processing
data management -> raster -> rater properties
Produce the KMZ file(image01.kmz) for initial data Image processing
mining using ., image01.tfw
325
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Read GeoTIFF image (image01.tiff) into Photoshop

Display downloaded KMZ image (image.kmz) in
Google Earth
The Media-GIS graphic content and save with a new
file name (image02.tiff). The content at this stage is
suitable for print media and can be developed into
mobile content.
Import the graphic content into ArcGIS and rename
the already produced raster world file as the new
graphic content TIFF file (e.g. image02.tfw)
Register the new content file using define projection
in ArcGIS.
Produce the new KMZ file, image02.kmz
Image exporting
Data exploring
Graphic
content
production.
Use in print media.
Image importing,
Image processing
Image processing
Content
display
preparation
Open the KMZ file in Google earth (which has a poor Content
display
image quality due to the KMZ file format compress).
preparation
Open image overlay tool in Google Earth and Creation of final KMZ file
visually overlap the graphic content image02.tiff over
image02.kmz
Remove image02.kmz from the temporary folder in Creation of final KMZ file
Google earth.
Save the final product, or the image03.kmz file for Content
presenting.
use in TV and WEB media. This file can be displayed Store
graphics
in
on Google Earth.
archive.
According to the level of skills in image processing and graphics, the data processing
routings to produce media content may be varied from the process listed in Table 3.
However, firm registration of data into a GIS database ensures the higher level of spatial
accuracy. Media-GIS content images include in this report are the images at image02.tiff
(step 11 in Table 3) stage of production.
5. The case studies

5.1 Data
MODIS images were acquired after investigating the images covering entire disaster
period, for both case studies. Table 4 listed the downloaded MODIS products used to
produce Media-GIS contents included in this report.
Table 5. Acquired MODIS products for case studies
MODIS file name

Case Study 1 - Queensland
Case Study 2 - Bangkok
Australia6_2010019_aqua_721_250m.tiff
FAS_Indochina_2011189_terra_721_250m.tiff
Australia6_2010019_aqua_721_250m.kmz FAS_Indochina_2011189_terra_721_250m.kmz
Australia6_2011011_terra_721_250m.tiff
Australia6_2011015_terra_250m.tiff
Australia6_2011015_terra_721_250m.tiff
Australia6_2011015_terra_721_250m.kmz FAS_Indochina_2011335_terra_721_250m.tiff
FAS_Indochina_2011307_terra_721_250m.kmz
5.2 Case Study 1 - Queensland floods, 2011
A massive flood has devastated the Southeast region of Queensland and Australia's 3rd
largest city, Brisbane in early 2011. The Queensland area recorded averaged rainfall of
121.17 mm, 38.67 mm above the 1961-90 average of 82.5 mm. 66.6% of the state had
326
above average to highest on record rainfall (BOM, 2011). Extremely heavy rains continued
for few weeks causing deadly flash floods in Toowoomba, the mountainous city 120km
west to Brisbane. The flood then advanced into already saturated soil in Lockyer Valley,
between Toowoomba and Brisbane. Accurate flood warnings minimized the human
casualties, but the economic damage of the region billed in billions of dollars. According to
early damage estimations, $2 billion and $1.2 billion economic losses have recorded in
mining and agriculture sector respectively (IBISworld, 2011). This flood disaster has taken
as the first case study to produce a MODIS image based GIS-media content.
The objectives of both case studies present in this study were set as optimization of
esthetic quality of the content (or the image map) while maximizing the production speed.
The content of the case study 1 presents with four images using natural color and band 72-1 combinations to show no flood (figure 6, 10th Jan 2010) and flood peak (figure 7 and 8,
15th Jan 2011) conditions. Figure 5, shows the KML formatted final product on Google
Earth. The widespread brownish colour turbid water (over 25km wide in some places) in
Moreton Bay is a clear indication of the massive scale of the flood (figure 7 and 8).
Compare the Moreton Bay or sea next to Brisbane city with no flood image. The
Queensland case study mainly focused on TV media with the secondary use targeted
WEB, mobile and print media portals. If these graphic contents are to be used in WEB
media, any of 640 x 480 they can be saved as JPG file, which only has file size around
50K( at 50% quality), which is a lighter file that can easily handles in present day
computers and most of the individual internet connections.
When the public is having a high attention on the disaster news, these semi-real-time
satellite image products will clearly increase the viewers enthusiasm and commercial
value of the news program. This is the important factor focused in this study. When the
viewer is well informed with firsthand real-time data, public cooperation for disaster
mitigation efforts improves positively.
Figure 5. The final product (KML format) on Google Earth.
327
Figure 6. When the news on flood telecast, this no-flood image can be used with all other
flood stage contents, to show the status of the flood.
Figure 7. The flood peak. Clouds have partly covered the flooded areas; however, bluish
color in sea (Moreton Bay) up to 35 km from the shore indicates the degree of flood. Band
7-2-1 combination used to compare with no-flood image.
328
\
Figure 8. The flood peak. This MODIS natural color image shows muddy water clearly, in
land and in the (Moreton Bay).
5.3 Case Study 2 - Bangkok floods, 2011
The worst flood in last 50 years hit Bangkok city and vicinity in Thailand during the 2011
monsoon season. Bangkok and surrounding provinces were severely inundated by the
long lasted flood. The disaster began around Jul 2011, and continued into Dec 2011 killing
over 800 people. More than 13 million people were affected and the World Bank estimated
the total damages as 45 billion USD as of Dec, 2011 (World Bank, 2011). The Media-GIS
contents were produced for the case study 2 with the no-flood content and three stages of
flood detected by MODIS band 7-2-1. Full image scenes were downloaded but only a
close-up image portion of Bangkok and some GIS data layers (roads, administration
boundaries) are presented here. Similar to the case study 1, all of these image maps can
be opened in Google Earth to pinpoint the content in TV news programs or can be
individually used in WEB and print media. Figure 9 shows the final KML file on Google
Earth, and consecutive figures are presenting no-flood image and three stages of the
flood.
329
Figure. 9 The final product of case study 2 ( in KML format) on Google Earth.
Only a selected image set is presented for the case study 2. With the semi-real-time
appearance of these image maps in media, the public can gain a great deal of information
on spatial conditions. The increase and decrease of flood extent is clearly standout in
MODIS 7-2-1 images. When these contents are on Google Earth, numerous other usages
can be generated.
Figure 10. The no-flood condition of the flooded region + some GIS data.
330
Figure. 11 The early stage of the flood. Black or dark blue flood water appears north and
east to Bangkok city.
Figure 12. The flood peak, when most of the areas north to Bangkok city center is
inundated.
331
Figure 13. By Dec 2011, flood started to decrease, however the satellite image shows a
large area of northwest Bangkok is under water.
5. 3 Mobile contents
The exact same media content can be re-produced for mobile media with spending very
little extra time on production. Other than the concerns discussed in production process,
mobile media demands graphic contents with small files size, which should be less than
100k to accommodate various capabilities in mobile phones and broader audience. As
Mobile Advertizing Guidelines explains, media contents may use the maximum image size
of 320 pixels by 240 pixels which is the recommended size for large MMS (multimedia
messaging service) video (Mobile marketing association, 2009). The figure 13 shows the
mobile media content reproduced from the figure 11 content into 320 x 240 dimension, and
jpg image did not exceed 30k in file size at 50% quality.
Figure 14. Re-production of the content for mobile media use.
332
In commercial application, all these environmental disaster media contents can be used to
enrich any news presentation and other weather and environment related programs and
documents. The case study presented here only focused on production aspects of the media
contents; hence, descriptive exploration of facts related to the spill was not discussed in length.
6. Recent trends
Due to the rapidly growing commercial competition, navigation in the Web using
innovative, visually stunning, and useful data visualization tools are upgrading daily
(Ostrow, A., 2007). Also, some of the latest developments in web based content
production pay attention to the visual character of the content, such as visualizing words
and visual web searching (Friedman V., 2007). With the ever-growing speed of these
developments in media world, content production is also facing an endless challenge to
meet new demands. These developments have influenced to introduce new modules in
leading GIS software packages too. In latest versions of ArcView, ArcEditor and ArcInfo,
the user (or content producer) can understand the geographic context of data, allowing
identifying relationships and patterns in new ways (ArcView - overview 2010). From the
other hand, powerful yet user friendly functions in Photoshop CS package provides rich
tools to produce and manage graphic contents through the links with GIS software. Google
earth plays integral role in data exploring and presenting, by combining Media-GIS
products with location using KML file format. GIS technology provides the base technology
to integrate data files in a spatially accurate and academically sound manner (esri, 2010)
to commercially produce media contents for natural disasters and. Another valuable
development is the improvements in MODIS web site, which regularly improve its subscenes, achieve system and data mining environments (NASA Rapid Response, 2012).
7. Conclusions
Freely available MODIS sensor images can be successfully used to produce semi real
time media-GIS contents to display many natural disasters, specially, when the disaster
has an impact on wider region. Media-GIS contents have to satisfy number of
requirements in production process, such as optimization of esthetic quality of the content
and production speed, which is not the priority in conventional GIS and remote sensing
studies. Yet, scientists have to guide content producers in this new application, since
basics in spatial data visualization and accurately registered GIS data sets are important to
set a sound and reliable working culture in media-GIS content production. The case
studies presented in this study are presenting disaster information using firmly registered
multi-temporal MODIS image layers. Also, the potentials of use of the content in different
media portals were discussed. When the content with fresh information is graphically
attractive and geographically correct, viewers will obtain a better understanding about
nature of natural disasters which increases the public awareness on natural disasters. This
approch will help to obtain a greater participation of public in disaster mitigation efforts.
References
Altan, O., Backhaus, R., Boccardo, P., Zlatanova, S., 2010. Geoinformation for Disaster
and Risk Management, Examples and Best Practices Joint Board of Geospatial
Information Societies 2010
ArcView overview, 2010. http://www.esri.com/software/arcgis/arcview/index.html
BOM, 2011. Queensland in December 2011, Australian Bureau of Meteorology,
http://www.bom.gov.au/climate/current/month/qld/summary.shtml
333
El-Masri, S., & Tipple, G., 2010. Natural Disaster, Mitigation and Sustainability: The Case
of Developing Countries, The Case of Developing Countries, International Planning
Studies, 7:2, 157-175
esri, 2010. GIS for Media and press, http://www.esri.com/industries/media/index.html
Friedl, M.A., McIver, D.K., Hodges, J.C.F., Zhang, X.Y., et al., 2002. Global land cover
mapping from MODIS: algorithms and early results. Remote Sens Environ 83, pp 287
302
Friedman, V., 2007. Data Visualization: Modern Approaches,
http://www.smashingmagazine.com/2007/08/02/data-visualization-modern-approaches/
Godschalk, D. R., brody, S., burby, R., 2003. Public Participation in Natural Hazard
Mitigation Policy Formation: Challenges for Comprehensive Planning, Journal of
Environmental Planning and Management, 46:5, 733-754
Gumley, L., Descloitre, J., Shmaltz, J.. Creating, 2003. Reprojected True Color MODIS
Images: A Tutorial. University of WisconsinMadison, 19 pages.
Hall, D.K., Riggs, G.A., Salomonson, V.V., DiGirolamo, N.E., Bayr, K.J., 2002.
MODISsnow cover products. Remote Sens. Environ. 83, pp.181194
IBISworld, 2011. Queensland floods: The economic impact, www.ibisworld.com.au
Jayawardane, A.K.W., (2005). Disaster Mitigation Initiatives in Sri Lanka,
http://management.kochi-tech.ac.jp/PDF/IWPM/IWPM_Jayawardane.pdf
Kraak, M., 1999. 'Visualising spatial distributions', in Geographical information systems,
vol. 1, 2nd edn, John Wiley & Sons, Canada, pp. 157-173.
Mobile marketing association, 2009. Mobile Advertizing Guidelines, Version 04.
http://www.mmaglobal.com/mobileadvertising.pdf
MODIS web, 2012. http://modis.gsfc.nasa.gov/
Nakya, S., Rangsipanich, A., Kaewsing, W., 2007. Applications of terra MODIS data for
disaster monitoring in Thailand, Geo-Informatics and Space Technology Development
Agency, Thailand.
NASA Rapid Response, 2012. http://lance.nasa.gov/imagery/rapid-response/
Nationmaster.com 2010. Encyclopedia - Geographic information system
http://www.statemaster.com/encyclopedia/Geographic-information-system
newworldencyclopedia 2008. mass media,
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Mass_media
Ostrow,
A.,
2007.
16
Awesome
Data
Visualization
Tools,
http://mashable.com/2007/05/15/16-awesome-data-visualization-tools/
Pearce, L. (2003). Disaster Management and Community Planning, and Public
Participation: How to Achieve Sustainable Hazard Mitigation, Natural Hazards 28: 211
228, 2003.
Perera, K. & Pathirana, A., 2006. The role of MODIS data in visualizing flood disaster
information for mass media. Asian Journal of Geoinformatics, 6 (3). ISSN 1513-6728
Perera K., & Tateishi R., 2008. Semi-real time media contents on haze hazard in Ganges
River Basin, 14th CEReS International Symposium of Remote Sensing, Nov 2008
Perera, K., & Tsuchiya, K., 2009. Experiment for mapping land cover and its change in
south eastern Sri Lanka utilizing 250 m resolution MODIS, Advances in Space
Research 43, pp. 13491355
Short N. M., 2010. Remote Sensing Tutorials, Ecological Damage from Natural and
Manmade Events Oil Spills, http://rst.gsfc.nasa.gov/Sect3/Sect3_6a.html
Stroehlein A., 2010. Why the media prefer natural disasters?
http://www.alertnet.org/db/blogs/3159/2010/00/21-100650-1.htm
Sultan A, H. S. Lim, M. Z. MatJafri, K. Abdullah and N., Saleh, 2008. Innovative satellite
image map of R.Alkhabrta area, Saudi Arabia using high resolution image, The
334
International Archives of the Photogrammetry, Remote Sensing and Spatial Information

Sciences. Vol. XXXVII. Part B7. Beijing
USGS Geography Publications, 2008. Geographic Information Systems,
http://edc2.usgs.gov/pubslists/gis_poster/index.php
USGS, 2007. MODIS NDVI products, https://lpdaac.usgs.gov/lpdaac/products
USGS, 2011. Near Real-time Satellite Data Delivery for Natural Disasters,
https://lpdaac.usgs.gov/user_community/data_in_action
Weichselgartner, J. (2001). Disaster Prevention and Management, Emerald Article:
Disaster mitigation: the concept of vulnerability revisited. Disaster Prevention and
Management, Vol. 10 Iss: 2 pp. 85 - 95
World Bank, 2011. The World Bank Supports Thailand's Post-Floods Recovery Effort
http://go.worldbank.org/TCFEHXJML0
Zhan, X., Sohlberg, R.A., Townshend, J.R, G., DiMiceli, C., Caroll, M.L., Eastman, J.C.,
Hansen, M.C., DeFries, R.S., 2002. Detection of land cover changes using MODIS 250
m data. Remote Sens. Environ. 83, pp. 336350
335
Shipping Disaster of The Rena in the New Zealand Waters: Looking

into the Possible Causes and Ongoing Recovery Operations?
Dr. Ram Roy

Senior Lecturer in Management
Eastern Institute of Technology, Napier, New Zealand.
rroy@eit.ac.nz
Paper presented at
Brisbane, 16 18, April 2012
336
Shipping Disaster of The Rena in the New Zealand Waters: Looking into the
Possible Causes and Ongoing Recovery Operations?
Abstract
This paper deals briefly into the past shipping disasters in the New Zealand waters and
investigates the reasons behind the recent shipping disaster in Tauranga, where the
recovery operations are still going on. Based on the external sources of information,
personal visits and interviews with various people, the paper collates and analyses the
causes behind the disaster using statistical tools and techniques such as Ishikawa
diagram, and decision tree analysis. The main objectives behind the paper are to
identify the potential causes of the Rena disaster using various sources of information,
list the important events during the recovery operations, analyze the various alternatives
and the associated risks and gains using a decision tree, to identify the effects of this
disaster on supply chain management and customers businesses, to carry out a postincident-review, and to recommend ways in which such disasters in future should be
responded to.
Keywords: disaster, management, recovery, oil-spillage, risk-analysis
Introduction
This paper briefly collates the important shipping disasters that occurred in the New
Zealand waters (Table 1) for a period of over a hundred years (1863-1968). It is
observed from Table 1 that the reasons behind most of the ship disasters are still
unknown. Although fire incidents have occurred only twice, it has caused the maximum
deaths (549) followed by the storms (99). Also noted is the interval of disasters. Earlier
(1863-68) the incidents were occurring almost every two years, but after 1868 it was
about every 6 to 8 years which may be due to improved technology and better safety
policies followed by the shipping companies. The happiest interval without any shipping
disasters was 41 years (1909-50) which later changed to 7-8 years. So, what could be
the reasons behind this interval? Is it because the crew members and the shipping
companies become slack and complacent with their health and safety procedures after
every few years? After this brief introductory account of past disasters, the paper shifts
its focus to the very recent disaster that took place near the port of Tauranga in New
Zealand. The paper identifies the potential reasons (some confirmed while others
unconfirmed) behind one of the worst disasters in countrys maritime history. A brief
background of this incident is given below. While this paper is in progress, we also
came across two ship disasters one in Italy (The Costa Concordia) on 15th Jan 2012
and other in Christmas Island of Australia.
Background of the incident
Various newspapers and electronic
media in New Zealand and all over the
world reported the ship disaster that
took place on Oct 5, 2011. A ship
named The Rena, with a s peed of
about 17 knots (20 mph), ran aground
on the Astrolabe reef, about 17 kms

away from the coast of Tauranga in New
Zealand. The ship was carrying 1,368
containers (8 of them with hazardous
materials), 1,700 tons of heavy fuel oil
and 200 tons of marine diesel. Initially
337
cargo, and they began washing ashore

on Motiti island (see map). A vertical
crack in the hull became visible on the
port side. The captain of the ship
appeared in a c ourt charged with
causing unnecessary risk to person and
property. If convicted he faces a f ine of
up to $10,000 or up t o 12 months
imprisonment. The ship's second officer,
responsible for navigation at the time of
the accident, was also charged.
the ship listed 11 degrees to the port,

with the front stuck on t he reef. The
reasons for this incident were not fully
known. As feared and expected, on the
9th & 10th October, a 5 k m oil slick
threatened the wildlife and the rich
fishing waters of the region. Oil from the
Rena began washing ashore at Mt
Maunganui beach which attracts a huge
number of surfers and beach lovers.
Bad weather caused the ship to shift on
the reef, and t he crew was evacuated.
Shifting of the ship caused further
damage and leakage of about 130 - 350
tons of oil. On Oct 11, the spill was
declared New Zealand's worst ever
environmental
disaster
by
the
environment minister Nick Smith (East
coast oil spill New Zealand's worst for
wildlife and beaches, 2011). Strong
winds and bad weather caused the ship
to list 19 degrees to starboard, and 30 to
70 containers were washed overboard.
None of them contained hazardous
Source: Tauranga Tourist Map
Risks from the contents

Aerial footage showed a large crack in the hull of the ship increasing fears that it could
break into two and sink. It also showed a container floating in the water surrounded by
smoke, suggesting some chemical reaction taking place. Some of the containers
contained chemicals such as: ferrosilicon that can slowly produce hydrogen on contact
with water; potassium nitrate that can produce a flammable gas as it degrades, but that
was highly unlikely; alkylsulfonic acid which was not believed to pose a significant risk to
health and not seen as hazardous in this case. However, sulfonic acid derivatives tend
to biodegrade slowly; trichloroisocyanuric acid used as industrial disinfectant had a
white chlorine-smelling powder. Overall, the primary risk assessment was low.
Recovery crew started to empty the ship of oil before the weather could make salvage
efforts much more difficult. Many people started suffering health effects probably from
the dispersant sprayed on the oil at sea, and mixing with the heavy oil that volunteers
were recovering from beaches. In other areas of the east coast, residents were advised
to disconnect rainwater pipes as they could be contaminated (Phillips, 2011).
Responses by the recovery team
The responses by recovery team and various related agencies after the incident are
shown in Table 2.
338
Table 1: Ship disasters in New Zealand
Year
Shipping Disasters
1863
On 7 Feb. the Royal Navy HMS Orpheus, carrying British troops, foundered
at the entrance to Aucklands Manukau Harbour. Of the 259 men on board,
189 died in the worst maritime disaster in New Zealand waters.
On 11 May the sailing ship Fiery Star caught fire and sank south of Cuvier
Island, off the Coromandel Peninsula, with the loss of 79 lives.
Leaving Wellington on 20 May, the City of Dunedin, its 39 passengers and
crew disappeared, and was presumed to have foundered in Cook Strait.
On 14 May, ship General Grant was wrecked in the Auckland Islands, with
the loss of 73 lives. Ten survivors finally rescued 18 months later.
On 3/4 Feb, a violent storm swept across the country, wrecking 12 ships
including the Star of Tasmania and Water Nymph at Oamaru and causing
flash floods. At least 25 lives were lost.
On the night of 17/18 Nov. the emigrant ship Cospatrick sailing from
England to Auckland, was destroyed by fire off the Cape of Good Hope. Of
the 473 people on board, only 3 survived. Although this tragedy occurred
far from New Zealand, this could be considered NZs worst civilian disaster.
On 29 April the steamer Tararua was wrecked off Waipapa Point,
Southland. Of the 151 passengers and crew, 131 lost their lives.
On 14 May a sudden storm wrecked two large sailing ships in Timarus
exposed roadstead. Nine lives were lost including the ports harbourmaster
and five local watermen, who had tried to rescue the ships crews.
Taiaroa shipwreck: On 11 April the steamer struck rocks near the mouth of
the Clarence River, north of Kaikura, and sank with the loss of 34 lives.
On 29 October, in a heavy fog, the liner Wairarapa steamed into cliffs on
Great Barrier Island, with the loss of 121 of its 235 passengers and crew.
In May the Loch Long was wrecked off the Chatham I., 24 lives were lost.
On 9 November the steamer Elingamite was wrecked on the Three Kings
Islands, north of Cape Ringa, with the loss of 45 lives.
On 12 February the Cook Strait ferry Penguin struck rocks off Cape
Terawhiti and sank with the loss of 72 lives.
On 28 December the passenger launch Ranui returning from a holiday trip
to Mayor Island, was wrecked on North Rock, Mt Maunganui. Of the 23
people on board, only one survived.
On 23 January, 20 yachts left Wellington for Lyttelton in an ocean yacht
race to celebrate Canterburys centenary. Following a severe southerly
storm only one yacht finished the race. Others were lost with 10 members.
On 24 November the coaster Holmglen foundered north of Oamaru. All 15
crew were lost.
On 23 May near Cape Ringa the collier Kaitawa was lost with all 29 hands.
On 10 April the LytteltonWellington ferry struck Barrett Reef at the
entrance to Wellington Harbour in atrocious conditions caused by cyclone.
Of the 734 passengers and crew on board, 51 died (2 more died later).
1865
1865
1866
1868
1874
1881
1882
1886
1894
1902
1902
1909
1950
1951
1959
1966
1968
Reason
Unknown
Lives
lost
189
Fire
79
Unknown
39
Unknown
73
Storm
25
Fire
470
Unknown
131
Storm
Struck
rock
Heavy
fog
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
9
34
121
24
45
72
22
Storm
12
Unknown
15
Unknown
Storm
29
53
New Zealand disasters timeline. Retrieved on Dec 5, 2012 from http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/culture/new-zealand-disasters/timeline
Table 2 Chronology of important events during the Renas recovery operations
Nov 16: As per Maritime New Zealand (MNZ), the first container has been lifted from the rear of the
cargo ship and w as placed on a crane barge. It was one of the three containers decoupled today.
Approximately 1280 containers still remain aboard the 47,000 ton ship. Weather conditions are pretty
good and salvors will take advantage of that. The removal process will take time, as each container
needs to be lifted separately, and each will present its own challenges, depending on its position on the
339
vessel and how badly damaged it is (One container down, 1279 to go, 16 Nov 2011).
Nov 17: Calm seas allowed 15 more containers to be lifted from the rear of the cargo ship to a crane
barge. With every container removed, the consequences are lessened, but every day is a new day and
each container presents its own puzzle. Cranes cannot operate in winds greater than around 24 knots,
so we are very much at the mercy of the weather. Even if it looks calm, strong winds can halt
operations," MNZ salvage unit manager Kenny Crawford said. Salvors have fitted 220 transponders to
containers aboard the ship and tugs are there to provide additional support for vessel operations.
Approximately 1260 c ontainers remain aboard the ship. At a r ate of 18 containers/day, it would take
more than 2 months to complete the job. No reports of oiling on b eaches; although teams of spill
responders were ready to deal with such situations (Rena may have to be broken up, 17 Nov 2011).
Nov 18: With most of the oil off the Rena and an environmental disaster seemingly averted, its owners
and managers have thanked and apologized to New Zealanders, without specifying how much it will
pay to cover the damage caused. While the insurance company of Rena's owners (The Swedish Club)
have said they will meet their obligations in full, they have not outlined whether that would be capped
according to its legal liability. New Zealand law restricts liability to $12 million, and taxpayers could be
called upon to cover the remaining costs (Rena apology, but no word on compo, 18 Nov 2011).
Nov 21: Total number of containers removed went to 64. The containers landed at the Port of Tauranga
included two that were refrigerated, and held the remains of rotting food. Container recovery company
processed those containers within two hours. Other work included the continued skimming of oil from
the starboard fuel oil tank. A warm water washing trial at Mt Maunganui to remove residual oil from
rocks had gone well. Health checks and micro-chipping of around 60 penguins were under way at the
oiled wildlife facility before their planned release (Winds batter Rena salvors 21 Nov 2011).
Nov 24: Containers could spill from the Rena as bad weather continues to shake the fragile cargo ship.
The container recovery company Braemar Howells has vessels and personnel on s tandby, ready to
respond if any containers fall overboard. Electronic sensors on board continue to monitor the ship's
condition and indicated no significant change overnight. (Cooke and Johnston, 24 Nov 2011).
Dec 4: Rough weather and s trong swells around the reef have caused oil previously trapped under
Rena to leak. The ship suffered significant damage to its hull and salvors saw blobs of oil floating from
the wreck. The strong swells at the reef were continuing to prevent container removal operations and
were putting stress on t he damaged wreck. Electronic sensors used to monitor the wreck are not
indicating any significant change in its movement (Gillies, 4 Dec 2011).
Dec 19: Sharks attacked sonar equipment being used to look for containers that fell off the cargo ship.
As a result, the recovery team had not been able to do s onar work yesterday. Total number of
containers removed so far is 227. A container with meat products fell off the Rena and had been
recovered, taking the total number of containers washed overboard from the ship to 89. Braemar
Howells was processing 219 containers brought ashore. Dive inspections showed buckling damage
continued to develop near the no.6 hold on the ship's starboard side which would be monitored. Also, a
narrow trail of rainbow sheen was visible off the bow of the Rena to the northwest for 1km. (Sharks
attack Rena salvage sonar gear, 19 Dec 2011).
Literature Review
Researchers have worked on di fferent aspects of disaster recovery and management
ranging from planning, forecasting, risk analysis, implementing, and evaluation. So,
what is disaster recovery to start with? Disaster recovery is the process, policies and
procedures related to preparing for recovery of infrastructure critical to an organization
after a nat ural or human-induced disaster. Disaster recovery is a s ubset of business
continuity. While business continuity involves planning for keeping all aspects of a
business functioning in the midst of disruptive events, disaster recovery focuses on the
systems that support business functions (Wikipedia, Jan 2012).
Researchers have also focused on scenario planning and what-if analysis approach to
identify various kinds of solutions for different ranges of potential situations caused by
340
storm, fire, flood, oil spillage, earthquake, and tsunami. Schroeder (2011), for example,
suggested what if that doesnt work approach for businesses where he advises very
strongly that every small business needs to ask one c ritical question with respect to
his/her current planning environment, What if that doesnt work? This according to
Schroeder will help in making the operations really resilient, however, honest answers in
this approach are very critical.
Business continuity has become a vital requirement within the overall corporate
strategy, and disaster planning can play a very important role in the business continuity.
In this context, Barry (2011) has highlighted the linkage between business continuity
and technology, and has recommended that corporate should identify critically their
strengths and weaknesses in the recovery plan and technology. Barry stresses that
business continuity planners have relied on technology to assist in responding to a
disruptive event. Staying prepared requires more than just a documented business
continuity plan but teamwork from all stakeholders. A good plan should start with a risk
impact analysis. Most companies will purchase an in-depth risk assessment and then
do nothing about it which is like making a list of essentials to pack in a kit in case of a
house fire but never assembling the kit. Companies that invest the time, resources, and
technology into business continuity plans are better prepared to handle business
disruptions.
Shipping has become one of the most preferred modes of cargo transport and with this
the risk on s ea has increased. Oil spills are becoming very common and disaster
management needs to deal with it and its collateral damages on aquatic life and
environment. It is very important to know how to deal with oil in the sea waters. In the
related context, Mohammed et al. (2002) reported eco-toxicological examination of
petroleum products and discussed factors affecting the removal of oil spill in marine and
soil environments. According to them, the effect of oil spill on the environment is
described by four factors: organisms, soil, water and type of oil. There are various
methods to handle oil spills and oil contaminated sites. However, removal of the oil from
the water surface or contaminated sites depends mainly on the oil type, weather
conditions, penetration depth of the hydrocarbons and soil type. They also stress the
importance of responding immediately to any oil accident whether onshore or offshore
to minimize the potential environmental consequences. Oil contamination occurring on
land can be handled using two procedures, viz. in-situ or ex-situ remediation.
Curtis et al (2011) in their research analyzed structural and personal exposure to
Hurricane Katrina. While structural exposure is measured by flood height and building
damage; the personal exposure is measured by the locations of 911 calls made during
the response. Using these variables, this paper characterizes the geography of
exposure and also demonstrates the utility of a r obust analytical approach in
understanding health-related challenges to disadvantaged populations during recovery.
Analysis is conducted using a multiple additive regression tree (MART), which displays
considerable improvement over traditional regression analysis. The most revealing
finding is that African Americans experienced disproportionate exposure in both
structural and personal contexts.
341
Decisions about disaster preparedness are rarely informed by cost-benefit analyses.

Ruben et al (2011) presented an economic model to address the thorny question, how
prepared is prepared enough? Difficulties related to the use of cost-benefit analysis in
the field of disaster management concern the tension between the large number of
high-probability events that can be h andled by a s ingle emergency response unit and
the small number of low-probability events that must be handled by a l arge number of
them. A further special feature of disaster management concerns the opportunity for
cooperation between different emergency response units. To account for these issues,
they introduced a portfolio approach which shows that it would be us eful to define
disaster preparedness not in terms of capacities, but in terms of the frequency with
which response capacity is expected to fall short.
Another issue that concerns decision makers is whether they should go for in-house
option or outside disaster recovery experts. Fordham (2011) has discussed this issue in
the context of database disaster management and stresses that organizations seeking
to maintain control over their valuable data, maximize utilization of existing staff and
infrastructure and reduce costs, might attempt to realize these benefits through an inhouse disaster recovery solution. Depending on the industry, disruptions can cost a
company millions of dollars per hour. A company not wanting to add the ongoing cost of
a service provider on top of those potential losses may be attracted to the in-house
option. But with the shorter recovery time objectives, the specialized expertise required
to achieve rapid recovery following a declared disaster and the high cost of creating and
maintaining a truly resilient computing environment, many organizations may find that
outsourcing to a service provider offers a more effective and economical disaster
recovery or business continuity solution. This must have been the case in the decision
making process of the Rena disaster management too where the services of outside
providers have been used. Fordham concludes that organization could reap benefit by
hiring the expertise of a highly trained staff focused exclusively on disaster recovery and
business continuity. He advises that organizations should seriously consider to avail
themselves of state-of-the-art facilities purpose-built to meet the recovery requirements
of a modern business, and to achieve a r ecovery delivered with the speed and
effectiveness to reduce the duration and impact of a business disruption.
Satapathy and Walia (2007) reports that fires cause a large number of deaths and
injuries in India, and present many complex emergency management challenges. They
reinforced the importance of adherence to safety regulations; the role of effective relief
and rehabilitation; public-private partnership in disaster management; and t he
importance of media management, humanitarian assistance during crisis management
and response, gender sensitivity in relief and rehabilitation, and services provided to
reduce mental health risks for the injured children and families.
Masuriera et al (2005) examined how reconstruction differs from routine construction,
and focused on the challenges of allocation of responsibility for coordination, scarcity of
resources and the application of legislation and regulations that were written for routine
construction rather than post-disaster reconstruction.
342
Disaster recovery team and other agencies can learn lessons from the experiences of
recent earthquakes and responses in New Zealand and Japan. On March 11, 2011 a
magnitude 9.0 earthquake rocked the main island of Japan followed by tsunami which
caused human, social and economic damages. The whole world watched the videos of
exploding nuclear power plant buildings, demolished cities and personal accounts of the
tragedy. After this event in Japan, many US firms were caught unprepared and ha d to
face severe disruptions in their supply chains. Electronics and aerospace manufacturers
with a significant supply chain presence in Japan had to face a high risk of parts
outages. When they contacted their suppliers in the earthquake region, the initial reports
were grim, and they informed their executives of the possible loss of critical parts, and
estimated huge revenue loss. In the end, cross-functional global teams worked for a
month very intensely to determine which suppliers had factories in the earthquake zone.
Most manufacturers had not mapped that information before the earthquake and
obtaining the information took weeks. The shortages of components from our tier one
suppliers were bad news as each component is generally used in multiple products.
Still, the real nail biter was the possibility that a raw material deep in the supply chain
could be unavailable, related a supply chain manager (Brennan, 2011).
Brennan (2011) stresses four key points that could help suppliers with their supply chain
network spread overseas: (i) dont apply the 80/20 rule to supply chain disaster
preparedness, (ii) identify supplier factory locations before a crisis hits, (iii) visibility into
supply chain sub-tiers remains a key challenge, and (iv) large crisis events shift market
share among competitors. Natural disasters and supply chain disruptions are
inevitable. To protect the revenue and marketing share, manufacturers must work
proactively with their critical suppliers to know their factory locations and ensure they
have adequate disaster preparedness in place. That visibility needs to extend into their
supply chain sub-tiers as well. During the recovery period, a weakened supply chain is
vulnerable to other risks that might not otherwise lead to supply chain failure, therefore
the need for better supply chain risk management is even greater (Brennan, Lessons
Learned from the Japan Earthquake, 2011).
Dean et al. (2008) in their report points out that existing New Zealand legislation does not
provide adequately for the facilitation of reconstruction projects following a major disaster. While
the construction industry would most likely cope with a medium sized disaster if the base work
load was at an average Resilient Organisations 3 M arch 2008 level, a l arge scale disaster
coinciding with a h igh base load could require up t o 180,000 additional construction workers.
This information could be very relevant to the ongoing reconstruction project in Christchurch
after the recent earthquakes. Report also highlights the urgent need for a well-developed and
understood protocol or procedure for procurement in the event of disasters. International
experience demonstrates the effectiveness of reflecting the cost of downtime by linking
performance payments with the speed of reconstruction.
Feedback on responses to the disaster

In order to feel the pulses of businesses and assess the after effects of The Rena
disaster, the author went to Tauranga and covered some of the key beaches along the
east coast of Bay of Plenty (viz. Waihi beach, Mt Maunganui beach, Papamoa beach,
Te Puke, and Maketu beach). On 10-11 Jan 2012, the containers from the ship and
343
their contents washed ashore on Waihi beach, and they were being cleared off by local
authorities using tractors and loaders under the supervision of Maritime New Zealand
(MNZ). Down south on the Papamoa beach, the author met with two wildlife experts and
20 volunteers who were getting ready to deal with new debris and oil coming from the
Rena after its stern started sinking on 10th Jan 2012. Wildlife experts and team leader
were seen briefing the volunteers how to deal with the oil affected birds and debris.
There was an open stockyard set up to receive all the debris coming from the Rena. At
Maketu beach, some personnel from the city care were taking precautionary measures
in anticipation of the arrival of debris to their beach. People were spreading booms
across the estuary to prevent oil leakage into the back waters. Day tourists were also
taking interest in these activities and were seen going along the beach to see any tell
tale sign of oil spillage. Some people also felt uncomfortable and little embarrassed in
discussing the ship disaster and recovery operations.
On the whole, the author felt that lots of resources (viz. booms, helicopters, barge,
cranes, boats, personnel, fire-fighters, security personnel, volunteers, temporary yards,
tractors, etc) were being used and all efforts were being made to the success of the
recovery operations. The biggest challenge was the unpredictable weather conditions
which impacted the behaviour of oil sheen movement. Computer modelling was used by
the MTNZ to forecast the likelihood of oil reaching the coastline so that the recovery
authorities could coordinate and prepare for dealing with the situations. It was possible
to see from a vantage point the bow of the Rena about 17 kms away from the Maketu
coast.
And what do the people say?
During the visit, the author talked to a range of people running different kinds of
businesses: motels, hotels, restaurants, and tour operators. Some of them are given:
a) Do you think the number of tourists coming to Tauranga has decreased after the
Rena disaster?
Yes, the number has gone down because people who look forward to recreational activities are
discouraged to some extent. They think they may not get full value for their money. But most of
them are still coming as the beaches have been cleaned up.
b) And do you think this has affected your business negatively?
No, in fact it has increased my business because the number of decreased tourists has been
well compensated by logistics personnel and officials of Maritime New Zealand, Svitzer, and
other agencies dealing with the after effects of the disaster. This has added to the overall
economic activities of hotels, motels, restaurants, transport, etc.
c) And how do you think this recovery or rescue operations are going on?
I think the operation is slow and could have been made faster. The ship stern and bow should
have been brought to the shore earlier. I know there could have been some leakage of oil in this
process but that is happening even otherwise. At least the problem of recovering the containers
could have been much easier and less expensive then than now when the stern section has
gone down with containers on it, and bow will go down too...which is just a matter of time. He
further added that the operation is very expensive. For example, about $500,000 has been
spent just on visibility jackets and uniforms for volunteers.
344
d) Opinion of the wildlife experts at Papamoa beach on the recovery operations: So,
what is being done here along the beach?
Well, we have kept our volunteers ready. They have been asked to dispose off the dead
animals or birds and hand over the live and affected ones to wild life experts who will treat them
at the wildlife care facility centre.
e) And whats your opinion about the ongoing operations?
I think its going well and it will be even better with our experiences gained in dealing with the
event and the wildlife. We are doing everything possible to make things better.
In response to my email to Kenneth W. Crawford, Manager, Salvage Unit, Maritime New

Zealand, Wellington, www.maritimenz.govt.nz/contact-us on 18th Jan 2012.
f) Is there a plan to bring the wreckage of the ship to the shore?
The plans for dealing with the forward and after sections of the ship are still being redeveloped. Bear in mind that, from the start, the priorities have been to: remove the oil, remove
the containers, and r emove the wreck. We are currently still in the container removal phase.
Plans are, however, being worked out as we speak to see what the next steps are with respect
to wreck removal. These are developed by the salvors and given to MNZ to review and
comment on as appropriate.
g) There was a crack visible soon after the disaster and some people feel that some
early steps (viz. joining the two sides of the crack with metal straps) should have been
taken up to reduce the crack initiation and further propagation. Why such steps were not
taken?
While to a lay-person, this may appear to offer a suitable solution to hold the sections together;
this would have been a totally pointless exercise. There would have been no strength
whatsoever in the structure, and the damage the sea can do is clearly evident from subsequent
events.
h) Was there any other way to accelerate the rate of unloading of containers from the
Rena? Have we lost the valuable time?
Safety is the priority. While there have been no fatalities with this incident, this is the way
everyone wants to keep it. Every step in the container removal operation (as with all other
aspects) is carefully considered. While it may appear to be a r isky process, it is actually well
controlled.
i) I sometimes feel that containers should have been unloaded from both the far ends of
the ship (the bow and the stern) to reduce the bending stress and shear forces along
the crack line. I am sure some structural engineers would have suggested the same
thing. Any comments please?
Bending moments and shear forces are continually monitored by a team of naval architects. The
effect of all ballast operations and cargo removal on the stresses in the vessel were assessed
and accounted for at every stage of the operation.
Research Objectives
The main objectives behind this paper are to: (a) identify the potential causes behind
the Rena disaster using external sources of information (viz. electronic and print media),
personal interviews and individuals comments, (b) list the important events during the
recovery operations, (c) compare the different alternative actions and approaches using
345
decision tree analysis, d) study the effects of this disaster on supply chain management
and customers businesses, and (e) make recommendations that might be useful in
dealing with such a challenging disaster recovery operations in future.
Methods and Approaches
The paper has made extensive use of various sources (viz. radio, newspapers,
websites, television, and i nterviews) of information on t he Rena disaster and t he
responses to recover oil and containers from the ship. The information gathered has
been used to complete an Ishikawa diagram (Figure 1) which helps put all the reasons
in their right perspectives. Next, the paper compares the various possible alternatives
that could have been initiated by the salvors of the Rena and the risks and payoff
associated with them (Table 3). It also takes into account the possible weather
conditions and the constraints under which the various alternatives might need to be
carried out. This analysis is also supplemented by a decision tree diagram (Figure 2).
So what could have possibly gone wrong?
It is not yet clear how the ship really got grounded in the first place. The disaster could
have occurred due to a r ange of reasons such as: poor visibility due to bad weather
conditions, failure of equipment or navigation instrument, erroneous information from
the control room or wrong weather forecasting, and of course the negligence of crew
members possibly due to lack of rest or the hangovers from long journey or drinks.
According to the environment minister the container ship may have been taking a
shortcut when the accident occurred. "It appears from the charts that they were in a
rush to get to the port, went full bore, cut the corner, and hit the reef," Nick Smith
(Stricken cargo ship was rushing to port, Dec 5, 2012). In order to collate all the
possible reasons, an I shikawa (or fishbone) diagram has been used based on t he
media reports (Figure 1).
346
*Based on the report by Nick Perry in New

Zealand Herald, December 22, 2011.
Method or Process
Lack of check and balances
Australian Maritime Safety Authority cited problems with the securing
of hatch and shipping containers and overall lack of maintenance*
Poor up keeping of records of shipping history
Poor maintenance of ship, instrument & equipment
Outdated manuals for the ship*
Ship registered in Liberia (flag of convenience)*
Ship was impounded in July by Aust. Authority but released later*
Lowered safety standards on ships*
2 weeks before the Rena arrived at Australian port on July 21, authorities
in Shenzhen, China, found 18 problems with the ship but allowed it to sail on*
Australia gave the company 3 months to demonstrate that its safety system
was in compliance. The Rena would run aground before the deadline was up*
Machinery or Equipment
Lack of instrument or state of the art technology
Tampered alarm*
Rena, built in 1989, is owned by a Greek company with Asian crew
and subject to
Liberian shipping rules, began plying this year in New Zealand,
Australia and Singapore*
Australian inspectors were concerned with rusted and improperly
tensioned hatch cleats
and ill-fitting pins for the cargo*
Ship agrounded
Management or Regulations
Oversight of relevant regulations in the maritime contract
An aging ship in poor repair under a dangerous cost-cutting culture*
Management don't pay the crews to do repairs, and they don't have
enough spare parts on board*
Restrictions on serving alcohol, registering ships in another country is a way for
shipping companies in wealthier countries to avoid taxes and employ cheap labor*
Liberia 6th worst performer of 58 visiting flag nations last year in Australia*
Liberia is 3rd poorest country in the world and has the world's 2nd largest shipping fleet,
behind only Panama, another flag-of-convenience nation*
On Sept. 28, inspectors in the NZ port of Bluff found 19 problems on the ship, though none
were considered serious enough to prevent the Rena from sailing. NZ maritime agency hasn't
released those records, although it characterized them on its website as a follow-up to see if
the Rena had resolved the problems found in China*
One week later, at 2 a.m. on Oct. 5, the Rena was traveling at high speed when it ran aground on
Astrolabe reef near Tauranga which has been identified on charts for almost 200 years.
Men
Negligence of crew members
Ignoring the rules of maritime operations
There was gross navigational error on the part of
the onboard crew*
It could be due to external influences, or may
be the crew was not properly rested*
Captain was trying to rush to the port*
Figure 1: Ishikawa diagram for the reasons behind disaster

What are the possible alternatives responses, risks and payoffs?
Alternative 1: Empty oil first from the Rena using efficient pumping system and then remove all the
containers one by one using ship crane (s).
Risks: The ship could split into two due to the weights of containers, load fatigue, wind pressure, and
onslaught of tidal waves. It is a very slow and time taking process and can take almost 40 days given
the constraints with pumping system and accessibility to the oil tanks. Containers being precariously
balanced can fall over as they are constantly bombarded by tidal waves. Ship and cargo can catch fire
in case of oil spill during the emptying process and can lead to huge losses (millions of $ depending on
the contents of the containers).
Payoff: This action can save the aquatic lives which can be destroyed if the oil remains in the ship and
the ship splits apart leading to huge amount of spillage.
Alternative 2: Remove containers first using ship crane(s), and then empty oil from the ship using
pumping systems. It is advised that removing containers should be from the bow and the stern sides as
these loads can create more bending stresses and shear forces on the line of split. Removing these
loads can reduce the splitting process very significantly (follow the theory of cracks initiation and cracks
propagation in fracture mechanics).
Possible Risk: Removal of containers can be hampered by the unpredictable wind and weather
conditions
Payoff : Reduced possibility of the ship splitting into two parts or more due to reduced lateral and
347
longitudinal pressures on the ship hull which may give more time and perhaps easy access to the ship
for emptying the oil using more pumps.
Alternative 3: Remove the containers using the ship crane, and empty the oil from the ship using
pumping systems simultaneously.
Risks: Increased possibility of fire hazards due to oil spills while containers being unloaded
simultaneously plus risks of two processes interfering into each other due to space constraints.
Payoff: Very quick process, and can reduce the opportunity costs.
Alternative 4: Do nothing and let them be at the mercy of natural forces (e.g. wind pressure, load
fatigue or tidal waves).
Risks: This inaction will lead to huge losses, immense damage to natural environment, aquatic
animals, clean and green image of New Zealand, tourism and business, fishing industry, etc.
Payoff: There are no costs involved and no resources required, but there will be long-term
consequences of this inaction.
Probability of good weather = 0.5 (due to the summer season); bad weather = 0.3 (due to low pressure
developed from time to time); ugly weather = 0.2 (due to storm, cyclone, hurricane, typhoon, etc).
Table 3: Various potential alternatives, risks and payoffs

Decision Tree diagram
The model takes into account three possible weather conditions (good, bad and ugly)
with their assumed probabilities (0.5, 0.3, and 0.2). There can be other rare possibilities
during the recovery operations such as volcanic eruption, earthquake and tsunami or a
combination of these, however, the probability could be something like 0.0000125 which
has been kept out of consideration for the sake of simplicity. Let
Ai = set of possible alternatives that could be initiated by the recovery team to recover the ship
and its cargo (Ai = A1, A2, A3, A4)
A1 = (OE1 + CR2 ) means oil emptying to be done 1st and the containers removal 2nd
A2 = (CR1 + OE2 ) means containers removal to be done 1st and the oil emptying 2nd
A3 = (OE + CR) means oil emptying and containers removal to be done simultaneously
A4 = just do nothing and let everything be left to nature.
Now each action or inaction will have its associated cost and benefit (payoff or expected
monetary value) as stated below. Let
EMVi = Expected monetary value or the possible payoff at node i (where i = 1, 2, 3, 4)
Xij = net benefit at ith node (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) with jth conditions (j = g, b, u or good, bad, ugly)
Estimated values of various payoffs

Node
1
2
3
Payoff in good weather

X1g = -$40 million*
X2g = - $50 million
X3g = - $70 million
Payoff in bad weather

X1b = -$50 million
X2b = - $60 million
X3b = - $80 million
Payoff in ugly weather

X1u = -$80 million
X2u = - $90 million
X3u = - $100 million
*Net Payoff = {various benefits different costs} = {(benefits to environment, aquatic animals, brand image
of New Zealand, tourism, health, and s afety, etc) (cost of pumping s ystem, cranes for handling
containers, barge, helicopters for air surveillance, motorboats for inspection around the ship + labour cost
+ opportunity cost + cost of lost sales)}
EMV1 = 0.5X1g + 0.3X1b + 0.2X1u

EMV2 = 0.5X2g + 0.3X2b + 0.2X2u
EMV3 = 0.5X3g + 0.3X3b + 0.2X3u
348
The costs of A2 will be higher than the costs involved in A1, however it will be less than A3 (i.e.,
CA1<CA2<CA3). Therefore, the net payoff will be in the reverse orders as shown in the above
Table.
X1g
G(.5)
1
X1b
B(.3)
X 1u
U(.2)
A1 = OE1 + CR2
Containers
Ship Recovery
Operations
A2 = CR1 + OE2
G(.5)
X 2g
B(.3) X2b
U(.2) X2u
G(.5) X3g
A3 = CR+OE together
3
B(.3) X3b
A4 = Do nothing
U(.2) X 3u
G(.5) X 4g
4
B(.3) X 4b
U(.2) X 4u
Figure 2 Decision Tree Diagram
Disaster and Insurance Issues

The Rena disaster has brought the issues of marine insurance in focus as reported in a
paper (Rena grounding - Marine insurance complications, Nov. 2011). International
convention limits the ship's liability to approximately NZ$ 14M which is based on the
ship's gross registered tonnage. Comments have also been made on whether the
Resource Management Act liabilities can be imposed either in lieu of, or in addition to,
the international convention but this is a legal matter, and not insurance related. Already
many businesses have indicated their income has been or will be affected. Business
interruption policies (BIP) would not include the losses arising from this incident
because it is likely that the businesses have no property on the Rena, and most of the
BIPs do not include maritime perils in the coverage.
According to a Vero Marines circular to customers "if you have goods on board, and are
obliged to maintain supply to overseas customers, and you are insured with Vero
Marine there may be some assistance in the form of reimbursement of some additional
freight costs you incur should your cargo be lost or damaged in this casualty". Other
insurers have taken up similar steps. Virtually all marine cargo policies exclude delay
and abandonment.
349
Conclusions and Recommendations

a) Enhanced visibility: Initial investigation suggests that human errors have caused the
Rena disaster. Although Astrolabe reef is well marked on the maritime map, there is
scope for making it more visible especially during the night or poor visibility conditions to
prevent any disasters in the future. Modern technology like satellite, GPS, RFID may be
used to track such sea based barriers or obstructions to prevent such incidents.
b) Disruption in supply chain: The approach (what if that doesnt work?) suggested by
Schroeder (2011) could be used by suppliers while sending items to overseas
customers by shipping to avoid disruption in supply chain. Suppliers sending their items
to New Zealand customers by The Rena could have done better by asking this question
to themselves. What if the shipping option doesnt work? Well, they can split their orders
and supply the items on two ships rather than one. But, what if that doesnt work? due
to a strong storm which can disrupt all the shipping modes of transport. Well in that case
they could have used other sources of supply such as using their strategic partners
overseas who are not affected by this storm. That sounds a very plausible alternative.
But what if that too doesnt work? Then the supply can be made by air cargo perhaps in
small volumes to maintain supply in critical areas for the time during which the recovery
operations on ship is in progress.
c) Although it is very difficult to benchmark the speed of recovery process carried out by
the team, it appeared slow at times to the public. The forces of nature have provided the
team with enough time and opportunity to apply more equipment and resources to
remove oil and containers from the ship. Removal process could have been carried out
even during the night using lighting arrangement, and the night vision technology
because it was summer season. Things could have been much worse and slower in the
winter season.
d) Post-Incident Review: It is essential to carry out a post-incident review (PIR) to
evaluate responses of the recovery team to identify gaps or weaknesses, and determine
ways and means to strengthen them. Morgan (2011) suggests that PIR should be
carried out by a team of individuals that are not part of the organization or were not
involved with the response to the incident. However, the responders and managers
should be given opportunity to provide their input in the process. PIR should evaluate
the recovery operations in terms of performance measures such as speed, cost,
effectiveness, and flexibility. It should also address the issues of planning, prevention,
mitigation, and implementation of disaster response. The PIR process clearly provides
an opportunity to learn from disasters and crises.
e) There seems to be huge ambiguity in terms of who should pay for the cost of
recovery operations. Insurance clause in the international maritime regulations should
be modified to express clearly the role of ship-owners in terms of the expenses of
disaster recovery operations.
Acknowledgements
The author acknowledges the support of Maritime, New Zealand, Wildlife volunteers, Tauranga
Community, and Eastern Institute of Technology, Hawkes Bay, New Zealand for their help
during the research paper. The author also thanks Vineeta Roy for her help in proofreading.
350
References
Barry, S. R. Business continuity and technology the strengths and the weaknesses, Disaster
Recovery Journal, 24(3), 2011. Retrieved on 22 Dec 2011 from http://www.drj.com/2011articles/summer-2011-volume-24-issue-3/business-continuity-and-technology-the-strengths-and-theweaknesses.html
Brennan, P. Lessons learned from the Japan earthquake, Disaster Recovery Journal, 24(3),
Summer 2011. Retrieved on 21 Dec 2011 from http://www.drj.com/2011-articles/summer-2011volume-24-issue-3/lessons-learned-from-the-japan-earthquake.html
Curtis, A., Li, B., Brian D. M., Jacqueline W. M. and John, P. A multiple additive regression tree
analysis of three exposure measures during Hurricane Katrina, Disasters, 35(1), p: 1935,
2011.
Fordham, D. Choosing between the in-house option or a service provider for disaster
recovery/business continuity. Retrieved on 24 Dec 2011 from http://www.drj.com/2011-
articles/online-exclusive/choosing-between-the-in-house-option-or-a-service-provider-for-disasterrecoverybusiness-continuity.html
Masuriera, J., Rotimia, J.O. and Wilkinson, S. A comparison between routine construction and
post-disaster reconstruction with case studies from New Zealand. 22nd ARCOM Conference on
Current Advances in Construction Management Research, Birmingham, U.K. 4-6th Sep., 2005.
Mohammed M. and Musaed N. Removal techniques of oil from marine and soil environments,
Proceedings of the symposium on Maritime Disaster Management, Jan 19-23, 2002.
Morgan, M. The post-incident review process: can you correct the weakness (2011)?
http://www.drj.com/article-archives/risk-analysis/the-post-incident-review-process-can-you-correct-theweakness.html
Myburgh, D., Wilkinson, S. and Seville, E. Post-disaster reconstruction research in New

Zealand: An industry update, Resilient Organisations Research Report, March 2008.
Rena grounding marine insurance complications. Risk Management Newsletter no. 194,
Independent risk management and insurance consultants, Sloan risk management services,
Wellington, Nov. 2011.
Ruben J., Helsloot, I., Beerens, R. and Vrijling, J. How prepared is prepared enough?
Disasters, 35(1), p.130142, 2011.
Satapathy, S., and Walia, A. Affected parents' and other stakeholders' perception of a fire
disaster management in India: A situational analysis. Disaster Management & Response, 5(4),
p. 111-118, Oct-Dec 2007.
Schroeder, K. What if that doesnt work? Some timely thoughts for small business. Disaster
Recovery Journal, 24(3), 2011. http://www.drj.com/2011-articles/summer-2011-volume-24-issue-
3/what-if-that-dont-work-some-timely-thoughts-for-small-business.html
Other links:
Disaster recovery. Retrieved on 1 Jan 2012 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disaster_recovery
Cooke, M. and Johnston, K. Weather may spill containers from fragile Rena, Retrieved on 24th
Nov. 2011 from http://www.stuff.co.nz/environment/rena-crisis/6024854/Weather-may-spill-containersfrom-fragile-Rena
351
East coast oil spill New Zealand's worst for wildlife and beaches. Retrieved on 28th Dec 2011
from http://www.suite101.com/news/east-coast-oil-spill-new-zealands-worst-for-wildlife-and-beachesa392433#ixzz1iSAJofl7
Gillies, A. More Rena oil to hit beaches, 4 December, 2011.

One container down, 1279 to go. Retrieved on 16th Nov 2011 from
http://www.stuff.co.nz/environment/rena-crisis/5979816/One-container-down-1279-to-go
Perry, N. Rena had at least 17 safety problems before crash, New Zealand Herald, 22nd Dec,
2011. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10774919
Phillips, S. Possible toxic effects from New Zealand oil spill disaster, 15 Oct, 2011.
http://www.suite101.com/news/possible-toxic-effects-from-new-zealand-oil-spill-disastera393383#ixzz1h6q96Lyg
Rena apology, but no word on compo, Fairfax New Zealand, 18 November 2011.
Stricken cargo ship was rushing to port. Retrieved on 5th Dec, 2011 from
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2011/10/2011101561925823312.html
352
New perspectives on disaster response: the role of systems theory

and methods
Dr Paul M. Salmon, Dr Natassia Goode, Professor Frank Archer, Dr Caroline

Spencer, Dudley McArdle & Professor Rod McClure
Monash Disaster Resilience Initiative, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
Paper presented at
353
New perspectives on disaster response: the role of systems theory and

methods
Abstract This paper argues that systems theory-based human factors methods
have a key role to play in understanding and enhancing systems of disaster
response. This argument is tested by an application of a popular risk management
framework to the analysis of bushfire response activities. Specifically, an Accimap
analysis of the collective response to a recent major Australian bushfire was
conducted. The analysis is used to test the applicability of this approach in a disaster
response context. In conclusion, the analysis demonstrates that such approaches are
highly suited to the analysis of disaster response efforts. Moreover, it is argued that,
compared to the existing individual component failures approach, this holistic
systems approach provides a more comprehensive understanding of response
system performance and better promotes improvements in disaster response
systems.
Keywords: disaster response, bushfires, systems approach
Introduction
Disasters, both natural and man-made, represent a substantial social, economic,
environmental and global public health problem of major importance. For example,
the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) estimates
that, over the past 12 years, 1.1 million people have been killed and 2.7 billion
affected as a result of disasters, with associated costs in economic damage of over a
trillion US Dollars (UNISDR, 2012). Evidence suggests that the frequency, scale and
impacts of disasters are likely to increase significantly in the future (e.g. Aini &
Fakhrul-Razi, 2010), which in turn suggests that the health, social and financial
burden of disasters is also likely to increase significantly.
The collective governmental, emergency service, environmental and military agency
response to disasters represents one of the primary mechanisms for minimising the
effects of disasters. Despite often heroic efforts the performance of multi-agency
disaster response systems is often sub-optimal, with factors such as lack of an overt
coordinating structure, unclear or conflicting agency roles and responsibilities,
incompatible processes and technologies, and inadequate equipment being
commonly cited (Goode et al, 2011). In the past high profile post disaster inquiries
have been used to identify the factors causing sup-optimal performance (e.g. VBRC,
2010). Although useful in that sub-optimal conditions are identified, it is argued here
that this approach is trapped within a reductionist paradigm that perpetuates
repetition of these conditions during future response efforts. There is a focus on
354
failed components in isolation (e.g. equipment, single agencies, procedures,

teamwork) and although multiple failures are often identified, the causal relationships
between them are often not made clear. Holistic accounts of how different conditions
interact with one another to shape the performance of the overall disaster response
system are not produced. This hunt for the broken component mentality has been
identified as a major factor limiting understanding of performance and safety and also
the countermeasures developed from post event analyses (e.g. Dekker, 2011).
A new approach to understanding and enhancing disaster response system
performance is required. It is argued here that a systems approach (e.g. Dekker,
2011; Leveson, 2011; Rasmussen, 1997) is appropriate and that analysis methods
underpinned by systems theory provide a more holistic approach for identifying, indepth, why disaster response systems did not perform optimally. This paper tests this
argument through an application of such an approach to the analysis of bushfire
response activities. Specifically, an Accimap analysis of the response to a recent
major Australian bushfire is presented. The aim of the analysis was to determine
whether systems theory-based frameworks are compatible with the analysis of
disaster response activities.
A systems approach to the analysis of disaster response
The systems approach to complex sociotechnical system performance centres on the
notion that safety is an emergent property arising from non-linear interactions
between multiple components across complex sociotechnical systems (e.g. Leveson,
2011). In order to understand performance in a way that supports appropriate
interventions, it is the relationships between components of the system that are of
interest, not the individual components themselves (e.g. Ottino, 2003).
Various systems-based safety and risk management models have emerged over the
past two decades (e.g. Leveson, 2011; Rasmussen, 1997; Reason, 1990).
Rasmussens risk management framework (Rasmussen, 1997, see Figure 1), for
example, describes the various levels (e.g. government, regulators, company,
company management, staff, and work) comprising complex sociotechnical systems.
According to the model each level is involved in safety and performance
management via the control of hazardous processes through laws, rules, and
instructions. For systems to function efficiently and safely, decisions made at higher
governmental, regulatory, and managerial levels of the system should propagate
down and be reflected in the decisions and actions occurring at the lower levels.
Conversely, information at the lower levels regarding the systems status needs to
transfer up the hierarchy to inform the decisions and actions occurring at the higher
levels (Cassano-Piche et al, 2009). Without this so called vertical integration,
systems can lose control of the processes that they are designed to control
(Cassano-Piche et al, 2009).
355
Government
Public opinion
Changing political climate

and public awareness
Regulators,
Associations
Laws
Regulations
Company
Policy
Company
Changing market
conditions and financial
pressure
Management
Changing competency
levels and education
Plans
Staff
Action
Work
Fast pace of
technological change
Hazardous process
Figure 1. Rasmussens risk management framework (adapted from Rasmussen, 1997).
Accimap
Rasmussen also outlined the Accimap methodology as a method for understanding
performance in complex sociotechnical systems (Rasmussen, 1997). Accimap is an
accident analysis approach that graphically represents the decisions, actions and
failures involved in creating a system in which the accident under analysis was
allowed to happen. Due to its holistic, systemic nature, it is these authors opinion
that Accimap could potentially provide new insight into the mechanisms shaping
disaster response system performance, particularly where improvements are sought.
The utility of Accimap lies first in its consideration of factors across the overall system
of activity, including higher governmental and regulatory levels, and second in its
ability to link factors both within and across these levels. This allows the causal flow
of events across the entire sociotechnical system to be identified, which enables
identification of the planning, management and regulatory bodies that may have
made a contribution to how a particular system performed in a given event
(Rasmussen, 1997). In the context of disaster response activities, performance
shaping factors across the entire system of disaster response are identified along
with the causal relationships between them.
Accimap uses the following six organisational levels: government policy and
budgeting; regulatory bodies and associations; local area government planning &
budgeting; technical and operational management; physical processes and actor
activities; and equipment and surroundings. Factors at each of the levels are
identified and linked between and across levels based on cause-effect relations. A
representation of an Accimap analysis is presented in Figure 2. Starting from the
356
bottom of the graph, the equipment and surroundings level provides a description of
the environment in terms of the configuration and physical characteristics of the
landscape, buildings, equipment, tools, and vehicles involved. The physical
processes and actor activities level provides a description of the factors involved at
the sharp end of system operation (i.e. front line work activities by human
operators). The remaining levels above the physical processes level represent all of
the decisions and actions that influenced activities at the other levels.
Figure 2. Accimap (adapted from Rasmussen, 1997).
Testing Accimap in the disaster response context: Murrindindi analysis

Accimap was used to identify the factors shaping the response to the Murrindindi fire
which occurred in Victoria on Black Saturday. The following description of the
incident and incident timeline (see Figure 3) are adapted from the Victorian Bushfires
Royal Commission (VBRC) report (VBRC, 2010).
Murrindindi is a small settlement located approximately 100 kilometres north-east of
Melbourne, Victoria. During Black Saturday (7th February 2009) a major bushfire,
referred to hereafter as the Murrindindi fire, burned through Marysville, Buxton, and
Taggerty. The fire began at approximately 14:55pm. After travelling rapidly to
Narbethong, early evening wind changes caused the fire to sweep through the
neighbouring communities of Marysville, Buxton and Taggerty. The fire burned
through 168,542 hectares of land, caused 40 fatalities and 73 injuries, and destroyed
over 500 houses along with the commercial centre of Marysville and much of its
357
public infrastructure. The fire continued to burn for weeks and was only fully
contained on 5th March 2009.
2.55pm,
Fire
starts
3pm, first
DSE crew
responds
4.10pm,
Alexandra ICC
takes control
of inident
4.15pm 4.30pm,
fire has advanced
12kms and multiple
spot fires ignite
5pm, first
evacuation of
Marysville
(VICSES)
5.05pm,
MECC
set up
6.30pm
Police warn
Marysville
residents
7.15pm, fire
moves through
Marysville
7.30pm,
fire
reaches
Buxton
8.20pm8.35pm,
Crews
fall back
7th February 2009
Fire contained
5th March 2009
Responding agencies/entities
CFA (Country Fire Authority)
DSE (Department of Sustainability and Environment
VIC SES (Victoria State Emergency Service
Vic Police (Victoria Police)
IMT (Incident Management Team)
6.15pm, Wind
change moves
through
Narbethong
7.15pm, Wind
change moves
through
Taggerty
Key
ICC = Incident Control Centre
MECC = Municipal Emergency Coordination Centre
6.35pm, Wind
change moves
through
Marysville
Figure 3. Incident timeline (adapted from VRBC, 2010).
In the aftermath, the VBRC inquiry identified various failures that impacted the
efficiency of the response to the Murrindindi fire. These included an inadequately
staffed Incident Management Team (IMT), various IMT failures (e.g. planning, use of
information, warnings, command and control), lack of coordination between
agencies, poor communication and inadequate warnings (VBRC, 2010). The aim of
the present analysis is not to identify further failures; rather it is to use Accimap to
place these failures at appropriate levels of the bushfire response system and to
identify the relationships between failures.
Methodology
Two human factors researchers used the Accimap method to analyse the Murrindindi
bushfire response. The data used to support the analysis was derived from the
VBRC report (VBRC, 2010). To ensure accuracy and validity, the analysis was
reviewed by 3 Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) with considerable experience in the
areas of disaster preparedness, response and recovery. Any discrepancies or
disagreements were resolved through discussion between the researchers and the
SMEs until consensus was reached.
Results
The Accimap analysis is presented in Figure 4. Discussion of the analysis is
presented in the following section.
358
Figure 4. Murrindindi bushfire response Accimap.
359
Equipment & surroundings

The environmental conditions were ideal for the creation and maintenance of a large,
rapidly spreading, ferocious bushfire. Victoria had endured one of its most severe
and prolonged heatwaves in the weeks leading up to the fire and temperatures on
the day were in excess of 40 degrees. The prolonged heatwave meant that the
surrounding forests and grasslands were extremely dry. There were also strong and
variable wind conditions which eventually grew into storm conditions. Not only did
these fan the fire but they also facilitated rapid directional changes and escorted
burning debris and embers up to distances of 15km (VBRC, 2011), which in turn
created spot fires and placed properties etc under the threat of fire. Dense vegetation
in the area provided a high fuel load at around 50 tonnes a hectare (VBRC, 2011)
and the local forests comprised tall, mature, mountain and alpine ash trees which are
easily ignited and have loose hanging bark ribbons which burn and can be
transported significant distances by convection columns (VBRC, 2011). Lightning
strikes caused by a huge pyrocumulonimbus cloud that had developed above the fire
served to trigger other fires from early evening onwards. On the morning of the 8th
February, a major fire from Kilmore east merged with the Murrindindi fire,
dramatically increasing its scale and ferocity.
Problems with public infrastructure and housing were evident. Many houses were illprepared for the bushfire season and some were non-defendable. The options for
evacuation were limited. No bushfire shelters or refuges had been built in the
townships and some vulnerable residents (i.e. elderly, disabled) lacked
transportation. Roads in and around the Murrindindi shire were affected by fires,
rendering them impassable; for example, the initial CFA and DSE response was
delayed as they could not take direct fire affected routes to the fire. Power failures,
due to the bushfires and ageing infrastructure, were also problematic; one severely
impacted the Buxton and Marysville water supply system, which meant that Buxton
residents were without water. An inability of the water within the Marysville
reticulation network to flow quickly meant that demand could not be met. As water
pressure dropped, water flow in elevated parts of the shire stopped. As a result, over
half of Marysville was without water by the evening of the 7th February. A power
failure also took the local radio station off air for almost forty minutes after 5pm,
preventing transmission of messages and warnings.
The equipment used during the response is also important. The CFA and DSE
operated from separate command centres, had different information systems, and
the radios used by the Metropolitan and Regional Police were incompatible, one
being digital and one being analogue. This led to communications problems between
the two groups and the fire agencies. Severe phone and radio congestion further
exacerbated this. There was also a general lack of residential fire fighting equipment,
meaning that residents could not properly defend properties. Finally, the wind
conditions meant that aerial fire attacks were ineffective.
360
Physical processes and actor activities level

This level focuses primarily on activities on the ground by residents and the
emergency services. From the onset fire fighting resources were depleted due to an
existing fire in neighbouring Kilmore. The initial fire attack was sub-optimal as first
responding crews were delayed in responding due to fire affected roads, (VBRC,
2010).
Residents fire plans were placed under scrutiny by the VBRC. Some residents did
not have one, some of the plans were inadequate (i.e. failing to take into account the
lack of power and water) and many were inappropriate given the severity of the fire.
Further, many fire plans were not enacted in a timely manner; many residents only
left in response to trigger events such as the fire being in close proximity or being
personally told to leave (VBRC, 2010). Finally, many residents had a general lack of
fire awareness, which in turn shaped their fire plan and enactment of it.
The fire plan failures are linked to a general failure of residents to evacuate or be
evacuated. This is also linked to a failure by fire crews to evacuate residents;
however, this has to be considered in the context of the overall system. The State
Emergency Response Plan left the decision to evacuate residents with the Incident
Controller (IC) and the Incident Management Team (IMT) did not consider evacuation
of any towns during the incident. On the ground, the CFAs policy prevented crews
from providing stay or go advice. As a result fire crews could not evacuate Marysville
without permission from the IC. At around 4.30 in the afternoon, the Victoria State
Emergency Service (VICSES) enacted their evacuation plan for vulnerable residents.
However, the Murrindindi Shire Council list of vulnerable residents was not utilised. A
more general evacuation of Marysville was not advised until around 6.30pm in the
evening when Police issued siren warnings.
Various communications failures that impacted the response are placed at this level.
These included the inability of a fire tower observer, due to phone and radio line
congestion, to communicate his concerns regarding the fire and its risk to Marysville
to the IMT until around 4pm. Some DSE crew members were also unable to
communicate their observations on the fire and other spot fires to the IMT.
Information from a reconnaissance flight over Marysville also failed to reach the IMT.
These communications failures limited the IMTs situation awareness of operations
on the ground and of the fire itself. A failure by fire crews to complete incident reports
compounded this, rendering the tracking of fire-fighters and their vehicles difficult.
Information flow from the IMT to fire crews was also limited. The IMT failed to
communicate that there was insufficient time to complete a back burn due to an
impending change in wind conditions. Fire crews barely escaped, one tanker
sustained serious damage and another was destroyed.
Technical and operational management
361
The technical and operational management level primarily deals with the composition
of the IMT and their management of the incident, but also covers the higher
command levels of the DSE and CFA and the interactions between agencies and the
IMT. Many issues surrounding the composition and performance of the IMT are
present at this level. Preparation and staffing of the IMT was identified as a key factor
shaping the response (VBRC, 2010). Before the fire the IMT was already depleted
due to staff members being allocated to other major fires. For the first two hours of
the fire there was no information officer to deal with preparation and distribution of
warnings. Handovers were also not conducted between the IMTs at different
locations, leading to confusion over who was managing the response. The
inexperience of IMT staff meant that they were inadequately prepared for the fire.
The first Incident Controller (IC) held only level 1 Qualifications. Notably a much more
experienced level 3 qualified IC was available. A level 2 controller was appointed
following the initial unsuccessful fire attack; however, he did not arrive at the incident
control centre until around 17:30. Again, the experienced level 3 controller was
available. The level 3 controller was eventually appointed on the morning of the 8th
February.
The IMTs planning for, and management of, the incident is represented in the
Accimap under the general item of IMT failures. They did not prepare an incident
action plan until the 8th February. The VBRC concluded that the IMT did not provide
appropriate strategic and operational direction to those on the ground. Information
use and management by the IMT was also flawed; the VBRC concluded that the IMT
failed to make good use of various sources of information available to them, including
a fire tower observer, air reconnaissance, and DSE crew leaders reports on fire
behaviour and location, and local weather forecasts from the integrated Emergency
Coordination Centre. This meant that they did not have sufficiently accurate
information regarding the situation, which in turn meant that warnings were
inadequate or erroneous. This must be considered, however, alongside the fact that
information flow to the incident control centre was limited. The failure by the IMT to
seek a local weather forecast is also important; this meant that they did not have
sufficiently accurate information regarding the weather conditions, which in turn
meant that warnings were inadequate or erroneous.
Coordination between the CFA and DSE during the response was poor (VBRC,
2010). The initial response was managed by the CFA, and there was no coordination
of CFA and DSE resources. After the initial attack, the DSE was appointed the
control agency. There was no official handover from the CFA to DSE which led to
confusions over responsibilities. CFA crews continued to report to CFAs Yea Group
headquarters, rather than the IMT overseeing the incident. Some CFA fire crews
received information about the predicted wind change from CFA Group Officers,
rather than the IMT. CFA level 3 staff were available during the response, but they
remained at the CFA Group Office, a short distance from the location of the IMT.
362
Communications failures are also present at this level; these reflect communications
failures associated with the IMT (i.e. between the IMT and other agencies) and
between other agencies such as the VICSES and local council and CFA and DSE.
IMT communications protocols were also unclear.
Local area government planning
The local area government planning level captures decisions and actions at the
strategic level of response. Various issues were identified in Murrindindi Shire
councils preparation for bushfires. The planning scheme contained no clear plans for
mitigating bushfire risk. The risks related to the lack of a reticulated water system
were discussed, but no course of action was identified to deal with these risks.
Permits were required to remove vegetation and the exemptions were restrictive
compared to the state planning guidelines. As part of Victorias Planning Provisions
local council planning schemes can incorporate the Wildfire Management Overlay
(WMO), which identifies areas where the intensity of wildfire is significant and likely
to pose a threat to life and property (p.219, Vol.2). The WMO did not apply to the
townships of Marysville, Kinglake and Kinglake West, although the VBRC notes that
It is obvious from aerial photographs taken before the fire that these were areas
where the intensity of wildfire is significant and likely to pose a threat to life and
property (p.219, Vol. 2). The Murrindindi Municipal Emergency Management Plan
(MMEMP) lacked detail concerning the most appropriate roads for evacuation, the
size of the population, vulnerable community members who might need assistance
during evacuation, locations of schools and hospitals, places of refuge, possible
locations for emergency relief centres or responsibilities for evacuation.
At the local level, the Alexandra ICC (which was to become the ICC for the
Murrindindi fire) was not finalised prior to the fire, having only level 2 ICC resources
and facilities in place before the fire. The plan was to send level 3 staff when needed,
despite weather conditions forecast to be worse than those on Ash Wednesday.
These arrangements differed from other regions where level 3 staff were allocated to
ICCs in preparation. The DSE policy to appoint the present duty officer as the IC is
also represented at this level. Other pertinent factors at this level include the lack of
joint training exercises between the DSE and CFA, the DSE and CFA policy on
evacuation, which did not encourage evacuation or enable fire fighters to provide
specific stay or go advice, and a lack of supervision of the IMT, which included the
absence of a system for monitoring the quality of warnings being issued by them
(VBRC, 2010).
The evacuation of Marysville was hindered by CFA/DSE policies on evacuation.
Although the State Emergency Response Plan allocates the responsibility for
evacuation to the IC, DSE practice does not encourage evacuation. Similarly, CFA
personnel are precluded from advising residents whether to evacuate. As a result,
VICSES decided to evacuate Marysville as the fire grew close to the township.
Regulatory bodies and associations
363
In 2007 the Director of Victoria State Emergency Service conducted an audit of the
MMEMP plan in 2007 and subsequently deemed it to meet the standards set out in
the Emergency Management Act. The VBRC report that the audit failed to detect that
the plan lacked details regarding most aspects of preparedness, response and
recovery.
At the time of the incident, the Building Code of Australias bushfire safety
construction standards only applied to new buildings in areas that had been
designated as bushfire prone (BPAs) by local councils. The criteria for designating
BPAs in the Building Code of Australia were unclear, and as a result many local
councils failed to apply it, which meant that Marysville was not designated a BPA.
Government policy and budgeting
Victorias bushfire safety policy, stay or go impacted the decisions made by
residents and fire agency personnel on the day. The policy stated that households
should make plans before the bushfire season to leave the area early before the
fires, or stay and defend a well-prepared defendable home. The policy did not take
into account that high fuel loads and heatwave conditions result in ferocious fires that
cannot be contained. Even well prepared homes were destroyed by the fire, and
many residents died defending their homes. The policy also shaped the focus of the
warnings that were issued, which primarily instructed residents to enact their fire
plans. Many residents had no fire plan or only a vague plan to leave when they
received a clear signal that they were in danger. As a result, a number of residents
died in their attempt to leave at the last minute. The policy also failed to mention
alternative options, such as evacuation and refuges. This may have influenced the
Murrindindi Municipal Fire Plan which lacked details concerning the best roads for
evacuation and places of refuges. Community education programs accompanying
the policy were also found to be lacking (VBRC, 2010). CFA educational materials
failed to provide adequate information about fire behaviour and inform residents of
the risks involved in defending a house. Victorias ageing power infrastructure also
played a significant role in the inadequate response. While not a direct cause of the
fire (as it was of other Black Saturday fires), the power infrastructure lacked
resilience, resulting in a loss of power at 17:15 on 7th February. As a result, the town
water supply was cut off, the local radio station was unable to broadcast warnings
during a critical period and emergency relief centres were unable to operate
effectively.
The VBRC inquiry report suggests that the Police and Emergency Services Minister
should have declared a state of disaster (VBRC, 2010). This would have increased
the focus on warnings and resolved some of the leadership issues during the
response to the fires (VBRC, 2010). The decision not to declare a state of emergency
was informed by the Victorian Emergency Management Council Coordination
Groups advice that the CFA and DSE were ready in all the key high danger areas
(p.72, Vol.2 VBRC), although this was not the case in the Murrindindi Shire, as nine
364
Alexandra IMT staff had been sent to deal with other fires. During the response, at
the state level Victoria Police functions and resources were divided between three
centres, one of which was located at the opposite end of the city to the others. This
created confusion about responsibilities and leadership during the response, and
impacted communications between the police and fire agencies. Overall, at the state
level the leadership structure during the response was unclear; there was no single
agency responsible for the response, which led to confusion over responsibilities at
the state level. In turn, this added to confusion over CFA and DSE responsibilities at
the local level during the Murrindindi fire.
A number of failures were identified in the strategic preparation for, and response to,
the emergency. Insufficient investment in new technologies has been a long standing
issue for the CFA, DSE and Victorian Police. The main fire mapping technology used
by the CFA and DSE was overwhelmed by the demand on the 7th of February and
had to be restarted a number of times, leaving IMTs without access to critical
information.
At the State level, there was no single point of leadership, with command shared by
the Chief Officer of the CFA, the Chief Fire Officer of DSE and the Chief
Commissioner of Police. The responsibilities of each post were unclear, which in
some cases led to confusion over who was executing the command function. The
VBRC noted that there was a disturbing trend (p.79) to delegate responsibility
further down the chain of command, most notably to the incident control centres
(p.79, Vol.2), which resulted in a lack of IMT supervision. State wide plans were not
finalised to assign resources to the most threatening fires, and the VBRC found that
decisions were made regarding the allocation of resources and personnel without
reference to predictive fire maps. These factors contributed to the severe shortage of
staff and resources allocated to the Murrindindi fires.
Discussion
The aim of this article was to put forward the Accimap methodology (Rasmussen,
1997) as a suitable approach for examining disaster response activities. Accimap
was used to describe the factors influencing the response to the Murrindindi bushfire
that occurred during Black Saturday in Victoria, Australia. The results provide support
for the Accimap approach as a valid and appropriate analysis methodology for use in
the disaster response context. Holistic in nature, the output was able to represent the
factors present across the overall system of disaster response that shaped how the
response unfolded and ultimately its efficiency.
Importantly, the analysis was able to specify the relationships between the factors
both within and across the different system levels. This is extremely powerful, since it
allows a rapid understanding of why different factors occurred and also engenders
development of more appropriate interventions, since it supports treatment of failures
across the system that influence the way in which the disaster response system
performs. Treatment of wider systems failures, identified through systems-based
365
analyses, is more appropriate than the treatment of local factors at the sharp end of
system operation, since the factors creating the sharp end behaviours are removed
following analysis efforts (e.g. Reason, 1990; Dekker, 2002; Leveson, 2004). For
example, identifying that equipment, such as radios, was inefficient is useful;
however, without a systems analysis, the higher level factors that shaped what
equipment was purchased are not understood. Recommendations on the purchase
of new equipment are thus likely to be ineffective since the same higher level
conditions that led to the purchasing of ineffective equipment still remain, untreated,
within the disaster response system. The use of Accimap analyses for generating
pro-active improvements to disaster response systems is therefore recommended. In
particular, planners could use Accimap analyses to develop policy and practice
designed to remove higher systems level factors.
The Accimap approach is generic and can be applied to any form of disaster
response, be it bushfires, flood events, hurricanes or even man-made disasters such
as terrorist attacks. This is attractive since it supports understanding and
enhancement of disaster response systems for all hazards, as opposed to one type
in isolation. Further, analysis from different disaster types can be compared easily.
Finally, Accimap is simple learn and apply, and the output is easily interpretable.
Practitioners working in the emergency management area will be able to grasp and
apply the method with only minimal training, and the simplicity of the output is such
that emergency management personnel will easily be able to interpret analysis
outputs.
References
Aini, M. S., & Fakhrul-Razi, A. (2010). Development of socio-technical disaster
model. Safety Science, 48:10, pp. 1286-1295
Cassano-Piche, A. L., Vicente, K. J., & Jamieson, G. A. (2009). A test of
Rasmussens risk management framework in the food safety domain: BSE in the UK.
Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science, 10:4, pp. 283-304.
Dekker, S. (2011). Drift into failure: from hunting broken components to
understanding complex systems. Ashgate, Aldershot, UK.
Goode, N., Spencer, C., Archer, F., McArdle, D., Salmon, P. M., McClure, R. J.
(2011). Review of recent Australian disaster inquiries. Attorney Generals Department
Report, October 2011.
Leveson, N. G. (2011). Applying systems thinking to analyze and learn from events.
Safety Science, 49:1, pp. 55-64
Ottino, J., (2003). Complex systems. AIChE Journal, 49, pp. 292 - 299.
Rasmussen, J. (1997). Risk management in a dynamic society: A modelling problem.
Safety Science, 27:2/3, 183-213.
366
Reason, J. (1990). Human Error. New York, Cambridge University Press.

United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (2012). The economic
and human impact of disasters in the last 12 years. http://www.unisdr.org/, accessed
4th April 2012.
Victorian Royal Bushfires Commission (2010). Final report, Volume II Fire
preparation, response and recovery.
367
Recovery from disaster: A case study of individual and community resilience

in the face of cyclones
Professor Bob Stevenson, PhD, M.S., BA, Dip Nat Res, Dip Ed, James Cook
University, Australia
Dr Helen Boon, PhD, BSc (Hons), PGCE, Senior Lecturer, James Cook University,
Australia
Brenton Clark, BA (Hons), James Cook University, Australia
Dr Joanne Millar, PhD, BAgrSci, Senior Lecturer, Charles Sturt University, Australia
Dr Alison Cottrell, PhD, MSPD, BA, GCTT, Senior Lecturer, James Cook University,
Australia
Associate Professor David King, PhD, BA (Hons), PGCE, James Cook University,
Australia

Brisbane, April 16 18, 2012

risk of climate change impacts.
The views and opinions expressed in this publication not necessarily the views of the
Commonwealth, and the Commonwealth does not accept responsibility for any
information or advice contained herein.
368
Recovery from disaster: A case study of individual and community resilience

in the face of cyclones
Abstract
This paper reports one of four case studies that are part of a larger study aimed at
identifying indicators of individual and community resilience to a disaster event. The
case studies were conducted in eastern Australia communities which have
experienced different kinds of natural disasters or extreme weather events, namely:
cyclone, flood, fire and drought. This research was intended to identify the
characteristics and indicators of resilience in and across different communities
experiencing different natural disasters. The case study reported here draws on data
collected from individual and focus group interviews to examine factors perceived to
be critical to individual and community recovery from a major cyclone.
Two different groups of participants were interviewed: (1) a cross-section of
community residents or stakeholders (e.g. small business owners, farmers,
construction workers, womens groups); and (2) disaster emergency (e.g., state
emergency management services, emergency medical services, fire and rescue,
ambulance) and recovery respondents (e.g., community welfare agencies, mental
health professionals) who were involved in assisting the community during and after
the event. A semi-structured interview posed questions to both groups on what
helped during and after the event, how different groups coped and which ones were
most affected, with particular attention paid to beliefs, behaviours and policies cited
as promoting post-disaster resilience.
Key findings that emerged include the critical role in individual and household
resilience of strong social networks or experience in being self-sufficient, and the
importance of coordinated material and psychological assistance through the
recovery phase, particularly to people whose housing or businesses suffered severe
damage. The implications of the study raise a challenge for disaster respondents
and policymakers of finding an appropriate balance in the extent of support provided
and enabling individuals and communities to develop adaptive capacity without
becoming dependent on external assistance.
Keywords: disaster, community, cyclone, adaptation, climate change
Introduction
The worlds climate is experiencing marked changes. With predictions of hightened
climatic uncertainty brought about by global climate change, there is an urgent need
to examine disaster impacted communities to find out what has supported their
sustainability and adaptation to living in natural hazard prone areas.
When a natural hazard overwhelms a community, the consequent disaster shuts
down many services and impacts upon the capacity of local institutions to function.
An unprepared community might be pushed into crisis. It is during the immediate
period before a natural hazard impact, during the passage of the hazard, and in the
days immediately following, that communities must rely on their own knowledge and
adaptive capacity to prepare, survive, cope and recover. Community surveys in
Australia underscore a lack of preparation for a range of gradual onset hazards such
369
as floods (ABS 2008; GNS 2007), bushfire (Bushnell, Balcombe and Cottrell 2007),
and cyclones (Anderson-Berry and King 2005).
Emergency management responses and strategies within this context face many
challenges. Data on disasters and disaster risk reduction are often lacking at the
local Australian level, which can constrain improvements in local vulnerability
reduction (IPCC 2012). In an effort to design effective adaptation and risk
management strategies it is critical that government, especially local government
and emergency management examine best practice: what strategies increase
effective responses to natural hazards, reduce vulnerability to hazard impact and
enhance community recovery in specific contexts? Post-disaster recovery and
reconstruction processes do not only provide an opportunity for reducing weatherand climate-related disaster risk and for improving adaptive capacity locally, they
also provide valuable knowledge and lessons for application more broadly,
increasing the capacity for longer-term planning and policy changes for sustainable
development nationally and internationally.
Post-disaster case studies can illuminate the diverse factors that influence individual
and community resilience. This understanding can be used to design interventions to
improve community resilience for responding to and recovering from emergency
climate change contingencies.
This paper reports one of four case studies that are part of a larger project aimed at
identifying private and public sector groups beliefs, behaviours and policies that
support community resilience to a disaster event. The case studies were conducted
of communities in eastern Australia which have experienced different kinds of natural
disasters or extreme weather events, namely: cyclone, flood, fire and drought. This
research was intended to identify the characteristics and indicators of resilience to
climate change in and across different communities and different natural disasters.
The case study reported here examined how people responded to and recovered
from a major cyclone. A range of perceptions of individual and community resilience
were documented through individual and focus group interviews. Particular attention
was paid to beliefs, behaviours and policies cited by particular community sectors as
assisting recovery and promoting post-disaster resilience.
A Framework for Studying Recovery from Disaster
Bronfenbrenners bioecological model or systems theory (1979; 1989) is often used
to help understand the dynamic relationship between risk and protection. The model
is helpful because it supports exploration of relationships and processes, rather than
being limited to a simplistic list of risk factors (Sutherland, 2005, p. 600). This model
therefore lends itself well to the examination of risk or vulnerability and protection or
resilience in the face of extreme climate events in that it views the individuals
adaptive capacity within a system of multilevel environmental relationships.
This suggested its usefulness as a conceptual framework to examine the influences
that shape individuals resilience in a disaster impacted community given that
resilience can be viewed as the ability to positively adjust or adapt to adversity. We
used this model (Figure 1) to organise factors that individuals cite as helpful
according to the placement of the factor in relation to the individuals ecosystem
370
(Boon et al 2012). Using this framework we can examine individual characteristics,

such as adaptive coping and optimism, as well as factors that are external to the
person, such as family support, neighbourhood networks, health provision, and state
and federal government financial support. This type of factor categorization
facilitates the evaluation of existing policies and provides a rationale for formulating
future interventions to support individuals and communities (Boon et al 2012).
Macrosystem
Chronosystem
Exosystem
Welfare,
Community
hospitals
Economy
family
Media
based
services
Individual
Mesosystem
Microsystem
neighbourhood
workplace
church
Figure 1 Conceptual scheme of Bronfenbrenners systems and their interactions

(Diagram constructed by authors to illustrate Bronfenbrenners theories) (Boon et al
2012)
Bronfenbrenner structures
(Bronfenbrenner, 1989):
an
individuals
social
context
into
five
areas
a. Microsystem the environments and spaces where the individual interacts directly
every day.
b. Mesosystem the everyday environments in which microsystem members interact
independent of the central individuals interactions
c. Exosystem larger and more loosely defined entities and organisations (e.g.
social welfare services, neighbours) that might be accessed by the individual or
their family less frequently.
d. Macrosystem the customs, cultural beliefs/attitudes/values, and political
ideologies that represent the cultural fabric of the individuals society.
e. Chronosystem the elements of time and socio-historical conditions as they relate
to events in the individuals environment over the lifespan.
The processes and experiences that the individual is exposed to either directly or
through proximal interactions with the various systems above are thought to interact
with their predispositions to structure their perceptions and responses, their
371
behaviours, their adaptation and their acquisition of knowledge and skills

(Bronfenbrenner and Ceci 1994).
The Context
Innisfail is located 88km south of Cairns and 260km north of Townsville at the
confluence of the North and South Johnstone rivers. It is a major centre within the
Cassowary Coast Regional Shire that also includes the towns of Babinda, Tully,
Mission Beach and Cardwell. Innisfail and the surrounding regions main industries
include tourism, aquaculture, agriculture and tropical fruit horticulture, with a
prominent reliance on the sugar cane and banana industries (innisfail.oz-e.com.au,
2010).
The town and the surrounding region is widely known for its multicultural and ethnic
diversity with many people within the community originating from overseas or
descendants of migrants from countries such as Italy, Greece, the former
Yugoslavia, India and northern Laos (innisfail.oz-e.com.au, 2010). According to the
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2006 census data, the former Johnstone
Statistical Local Area (SLA) consisted of 12.6% of the population born outside of
Australia and 9.2% identifying as Indigenous Australians (ABS 2010). Innisfails
notable ethnic and cultural diversity is also coupled with a large proportion of families
(73%) and a corresponding youthful population. Almost 20% of the former
Johnstone SLAs population were aged between 0 and 14 years of age (ABS 2010).
The former Johnstone SLA represents a broad spectrum of vocations with a
predominance of managers, technicians, trade workers and labourers with 10.7% of
workers involved in the construction industry and 12.3% in property and business
services (ABS 2010). Primary industries, however, were the largest contributor to
the region comprising 39.7% of the businesses categorised by industry according to
the 2006 census data (ABS 2010a).
Immediately following Cyclone Larry there was a decrease in population within the
now defunct Johnstone Shire area (ABS 2010). By 2007 the population of the
former Johnstone SLA began to gradually recover with the population surpassing
pre-cyclone levels by 2008 (ABS 2010). According to Queensland Government
statistics, the projected population for the Cassowary Coast Local Government Area
(LGA) will reach 29,623 by 2011 (Office of Economic and Statistical Research
(OESR), 2010).
The Cyclone Event
During the early hours of the 18th March 2006 Cyclone Larry formed from a lowpressure system over the Coral Sea and was classified by the Bureau of
Meteorology (BOM) as a severe Category 3 cyclone and continued to intensify into a
Category 5 as it tracked towards the northern Queensland coast (BOM 2007).
The eye of the cyclone crossed the coast near Innisfail around daybreak on the 20 th
March 2006. Upon landfall wind gusts were estimated to have reached up to
240km/h, which led to Larry being categorised as a Category 4 cyclone.
372
Cyclone Larrys winds had a devastating impact, destroying thousands of buildings

throughout the cyclone affected area. Fortunately no lives were lost with only 30
recorded injuries. The large-scale devastation created by Cyclone Larry led to over
300 people being evacuated from their homes throughout the cyclone affected area
(Australian Red Cross 2006; BOM 2007).
Electricity transmission lines were cut both to the north and southwest of Innisfail,
with extensive damage to the electrical distribution network. This led to the
disruption of power to vital utilities such as the local hospital, and water supply and
treatment facilities (Adrian Hitchman et al 2006). Other vital infrastructure was either
badly damaged or disrupted with all road and rail access to the region being cut for
several days following Cyclone Larry due to heavy flooding (Hitchman et al 2006).
Many houses lost their roofs during the event and the Insurance Council of Australia
recorded a total of $540 million in insurance claims resulting from Cyclone Larry (The
Honourable Peter Beattie, 2006; BOM 2007).
Aims of the Study
The aim of this research was to understand community perceptions about what
assisted in the response to and recovery from the 2006 Cyclone Larry in the Innisfail
region. This understanding was intended to help identify indicators of resilience to
climate contingencies in a diverse community experiencing cyclones and to link
community level factors with individual level factors of resilience. We were also
interested in identifying private and public sector groups beliefs, behaviours and
policies that have supported community resilience to a cyclone.
Methods
Interviews were conducted with two different groups:
(1) key informants (KI) comprising various categories of disaster emergency (e.g.,
state emergency management services, emergency medical services, fire and
rescue, ambulance) and recovery respondents (e.g., community welfare
agencies, mental health professionals) who were involved in assisting the
community during and after the event.
(2) a cross-section of community residents (R) (e.g. small business owners,
farmers, construction workers, womens groups) determined from a
demographic profile of each community and conversations with key
informants and community representatives of various organisations.
Members of these two groups were not mutually exclusive as many engaged in
disaster response were also members of the affected community. Particular
attention was paid to including (although not always successfully) participants for the
community focus groups and key informants, those most affected by the event and
to members of vulnerable groups, even if they were not widely represented in the
community.
A semi-structured interview of open questions was developed for use with each
group. Questions to informants and the community addressed the kinds of
assistance that helped (and/or were provided) both during the event and after the
event, how different groups coped and which ones were most affected, and the
impact on the community. The difficulty of scheduling people at the same time led to
only two focus groups being conducted and many individual or paired interviews.
373
The length of interviews varied from around 30 minutes to two hours. Interviews
were conducted between August, 2010 and January, 2011 with a series of final
interviews scheduled in early February on responses to Cyclone Larry unable to be
completed because of Cyclone Yasi. A total of eighteen key informants and twenty
community residents were interviewed at this site. All the community residents who
were interviewed lived in the Innisfail region at the time of Cyclone Larry.
Interviews were taped in most cases and transcribed (except in a few cases where
recordings were inaudible) and notes were taken and later expanded. Transcribed
tapes (or notes when transcriptions not available) from interviews were analysed
separately using the qualitative data technique of open coding in which the main
issues that emerged are first identified and coded. These codes were then
categorised into themes or recurrent patterns. Common themes were identified
within and across the Bronfenbrenner categories of scale: the microsystem,
mesosystem, exosystem, macrosystem and chronosystem.
Findings
A number of major themes emerged from the interview participants responses to
five major interview questions:
(1) What or who helped during and after the cyclone?
(2) Who were most affected?
(3) How did different groups cope during and after the cyclone? Who didnt cope
well?
(4) What was the perceived (short and long term) impact on the community?
(5) How prepared is the community to face future cyclones?
Key influences or factors were first identified among the responses to each of these
questions. For example, three factors emerged from the responses to the first
question (what and who helped?) as important to helping individuals and the
community during and immediately after the cyclone. These were: readiness or
preparedness for the event; immediate responses from government and other
agency services to meet basic needs (e.g., food, water, energy supplies, medical);
and community spirit. Three broad groups were identified as providing assistance
various government agencies at all levels (including the Army); non-profit national
and local community organisations; and members of the community itself.
The factors identified within responses to each question were then constructed into
major themes across the question responses in relation to both the immediate
response to and recovery from the cyclone. Findings are presented in categories of
system level themes. The major themes at the micro-system level were: contributing
factors to readiness or preparedness; and the impact (i.e., the most affected) on
individuals and families whose homes or crops were severely damaged. The
mesosystem themes were social networks; and the impact (i.e., the least resilient
groups) on the poor, young and new or transient residents. Four themes emerged at
the exosystem or local community, regional, state and federal levels: community
spirit; kinds of assistance provided by local business, non-government and
community organisations; response by private regional infrastructure providers; and
kinds of assistance provided by state and federal government. A number of claims
are made within and across these themes.
374
The Microsystem of Individuals and Families

Readiness/Preparedness
Stakeholders reported being placed on a high state of readiness before the cyclone
occurred, which assisted in their preparation for and response to the event. An
awareness that the cyclone had a high possibility of impacting the Innisfail area - the
cyclone was in the news, it was everywhere (R) leading up to its landfall - alerted
most stakeholders. Prior experiences and learning gleaned from fellow members
within the community reportedly contributed to creating this state of readiness by
helping jolt a number of stakeholders into action. As one local stakeholder
commented, seeing her elderly father who had been through numerous cyclones
feverishly prepare his property made her think ok this is seriousI was thinking hell
if he is cleaning up we better start doing something. Being ready and prepared for
the impact of the cyclone and feeling self-sufficient also included having canned
food, water, gas bottles and other supplies on hand (KI,R). One respondent argued
that residents of Far North Queensland are also better mentally prepared because of
experiences of living with extreme weather events.
Emergency respondents, however, had a somewhat different view of the
communitys awareness of and preparation for the impending cyclone. While
respondents reported that information technologies, particularly the internet, allowed
them to accurately track the cyclones path (KI), they believed this warning was not
widely disseminated or known until at least two days prior to the event, when the
local Mayor informed the community at a local festival to go home and get their
families and properties prepared. This perceived late notice was viewed as
contributing to ill-preparedness and a lack of readiness. A number of respondents
noted that many people did not seem to know what was going on, or acted
complacently (KI,R).
Some stakeholders agreed that there was at least a disbelief, which could be seen
as bordering on complacency, among some people in the community that resulted in
a lack of preparation. This applied not only to some newcomers to Innisfail who had
never experienced a cyclone before and were unaware of its potentially serious
impact, but also to those who had experienced previous cyclone warnings but were
in a state of disbelief that the cyclone would actually hit Innisfail (but swing away and
miss the town) a feeling reinforced by the weather the day before the cyclone
struck being calm and sunny with many folk participating in a local festival.
I had a conversation with one of our carers and I rang them because once I
had been called into work and then went and rang family day care providers
who come in and they service and said to this particular carer, 'have you
notified your parents what are you going to do tomorrow have you cancelled
care? and they said what for? I said the cyclone is coming, and he said do
you really think it is going to hit? Well everybody else thinks it is... (KI)
The increased accuracy that has been developed in predicting the path of cyclones
was viewed as not consistently reflected in the media. Internet websites such as the
Bureau of Meteorology were seen as reliable, however traditional media resources
such as Television and Radio news media were seen as not clear about anything
375
and contributing to confusion (KI). Yet one service provider believed that prior
warnings were taken seriously: I think everyone here, listened to the warnings, and
that is one good thing about our community is that they do heed to the warnings that
were sent. (R). The data just presented suggested the first claim that can be made
about peoples preparation in Innisfail for a cyclone:
Claim 1: Past experiences with and current knowledge of cyclones can assist
preparedness, but past experiences with inaccurate predictions of landfall of
cyclones can hinder preparation.
Both residents and service providers acknowledged that some people were not
prepared with extra fuel, food and other daily living necessities (KI,R): I guess I was
surprised at .. what seemed to be a relatively large number of people that were
unprepared in terms of they needed things like .. baby nappies and they needed
things like food. (KI)
However, it was pointed out:
[Lack of preparedness] broadly speaking, I think its a function of income. I
think probably your best measure is low income individual families and
individuals. Because of the income, obviously you need money to stock up. If
youre living cheque to cheque - payday to payday, low income families predominantly low income families rely on welfare. (KI)
In addition to a lack of financial resources, some respondents argued that many
people dont take responsibility for their own preparations and have become
dependent on others for support (KI,R)
some of those issues around long term welfare dependency about you
know, whether that starts to [limit] peoples capacity to look after them[selves],
you know, to make decisions and to take responsibility goes in some of the
stuff Noel Pearson talks about, you know. Things like peoples rights - their
right to take responsibility. You see Im struggling to sort of say that sort of
thing in the confines of a social welfare department, but yeah, its a real factor.
So welfare dependency I think was two things going on there - the low income
plus the expectation that comes up over time that somebody will look after
you. (KI)
Another dimension of vulnerability occurs across a broader socio-economic
spectrum and involves people who struggle with the realisation that they would not
get help straight away after the cyclone struck their community:
[It is hard to get people to realise] community members as well as agencies
to come to terms with that stuff cant beyeah, you cant snap your fingers
and have it appear, particularly your transport connections are strained. It
took 48hrs or whatever to get the road open. Theres a tiny little runway there
that came down - has limited capacity in terms of the planes and set-down
there I guess there was a large number of people who were very dependent
on relief very early in the piece. (KI)
376
In contrast, families in outlying areas were singled out for being well prepared and
having coped well because they are used to stocking up on supplies and being selfsufficient:
I found that people who lived out, like Mena Creek the ones that dont
regularly come into town coped a lot better and I think that comes back
topeople had food out there and Im not saying that everyone did but the
families that I ended up seeing they seemed to have coped a bit better
because they were prepared and they are not used to coming into town every
dayand some people dont have power so they have their own generators
and there might have been some issues with getting diesel and petrol and that
but they coped (KI)
These findings suggest that peoples readiness or preparation for a cyclone is limited
by an individuals or households: (i) economic resources given that they cant afford
to stock up on food and other daily necessities, gas bottles or buy generators; and
(ii) beliefs or dispositions about self-responsibility for their own preparations or selfsufficiency regarding support. Our analysis of the data on preparedness in response
to interview questions about what and who helped during and after the cyclone, who
were most affected and how different groups coped during and after the cyclone
leads to our second thematic claim:
Claim 2: Individual and household preparedness for a cyclone is affected by
resource capacity (e.g., financial resources, equipment) and beliefs (e.g.,
acceptance of self-responsibility, self-efficacy).
Individuals and Families Most Affected: Homes or crops severely damaged
Irrespective of the extent of their preparation there were individuals and groups who
were adversely affected by cyclone Larry and therefore whose resilience was
particularly tested. In response to our questions about who was most affected, two
groups were identified: people whose housing and material possessions or
businesses were lost or severely damaged; and people in the agricultural sector,
particularly banana, sugar cane and exotic fruit farmers who lost their crops.
Many of the interview participants felt that those who had damaged or destroyed
homes and properties were the most affected by Cyclone Larry. This was due to a
number of factors including the stress of losing valuables, the uncertainty over
insurance claims, and the inability to find interim accommodation whilst their houses
were in such a damaged state. Many people who lost their housing or had extensive
damage to their properties had to leave Innisfail and move to Cairns for
accommodation, either voluntarily or under pressure of having their houses
condemned, owing to a severe housing shortage or unaffordable rents resulting from
sudden large rent increases (KI, R)
Of the people who had significant damage to their properties some were uninsured,
some of those who were insured had the added stress of fighting their claims with
insurance companies, and then others (reported to be at least 10%) whose
renovations and repairs were shoddy or not done correctly (R) had to battle with,
contractors, usually from out of town, and often their insurance company as well (R).
377
People are still going through the nightmare again... The nightmare
continues They had a leaking house and got the insurance to pay the
people who did the job and they had to refund the money and [move] out their
house [again] and the nightmare still continues. The job wasnt done
properlySome people got a palace built, where they just had a dump [
before the cyclone]. Its like Ying and Yang. Some people did good and some
people are still suffering. (R)
Many of the people who lost their houses and material possessions or could not
leave their properties owing to debris were reported to be unhappy and still trying to
cope. Some had their houses condemned and a year later, people were still living in
temporary accommodation and there were still a thousand houses with tarps on their
rooves (R). Four years later many still had tarps on their roofs.
Elderly, whose own house or whose childrens house in which they were living was
affected, had to move into aged care facilities and many were not able to move back
into their own or childrens homes. They were reported to be disrupted by the
breakup of the family structure and forced into aged care before they were ready
(KI).
Banana, cane and exotic fruit farmers in the region suffered a massive loss of profits
(KI,R) as their crops were destroyed with no banana crop production or income for at
least 9 months. Sugar was reduced to only a half crop with low sugar content owing
to excessive rains following the cyclone resulted in cane being rejected from
processing. Exotic fruit growers were faced with an even longer time before their
trees would produce again. Their problems were compounded by a lack of workers
to help pick up fallen fruit and clean up their farms as well as the dilemmas many
faced of helping their farm business by focusing on picking the banana crop
immediately or helping their family by attending to fixing their own house or, more
simply, using the generator for business or home (R).
There were growers that couldnt go in and clean up their farms [pick up
fallen bananas and other fruit] because they had no workers, all the workers
had their thousand dollars [government assistance] tucked under their arm
and had gone to the Brothers Clubthat was the last opportunity you had
to make any money for nine monthsI had to go fix my house and look
after my family and the only money I am going to get for nine months will
be lost in the next week...it was very hard. (R)
Some farmers lost everything their farm destroyed, crops flattened, and house and
shed damaged. Not surprisingly, depression among these farmers was not
uncommon:
Farmers are generally resilient, they are just renowned for it, some took hits, I
had farmers crying in front of me you know? They virtually couldnt see any
future, their farm had been destroyed, flattened, and the shed is buggered,
the house is buggered, they couldnt see the future. It was too hard, there
was a quite a bit of depression within the growing sector, like I said they have
got a house that has fallen down, at home they have got a tractor shed that
378
isnt working for them, some just decided they didnt want to do anything, it
was like they were stunned. I had one bloke come here, he couldnt get me on
my phone, my phone would go off the hook every day, he came around to the
shed and he just sat there and started crying I said mate go and see a
doctorI said you gotta go and see a doctor... (R)
As indicated, farmers are generally resilient once they got over the initial shock ..
they just got stuck into and did what they needed to do. However, for some farmers
who were at their financial limit or close to retirement, the financial or psychological
impact of the cyclone pushed them beyond the boundaries of their resilience and
they left the industry.
Claim 3: As well as capacity and beliefs, the severity and nature of the impact of a
cyclone on households have a large influence on individual and family resilience
(and therefore on their need for external assistance or support from government and
other agencies).
The Least Resilient: Economically strained and new or transient residents
As already discussed low socio-economic groups were unable to afford to prepare
adequately for the cyclone, but views differed on how well they coped with recovery
from the cyclone. One respondent argued that people from low socio-economic
groups were:
well looked after .... provided financial assistance lot of them [people from
low socio-economic groups] relied on a lot of the funding that came through
so they were getting money in one hand and they were also getting handouts
for food and fuel in town were given out and things like that were given to
them. Life was good for those probably at the bottom of the scale who
normally dont have those things ... (KI)
On the other hand, those from limited economic resource groups whose rental
housing or own, especially uninsured, home was damaged to the extent of being
uninhabitable had to leave town because of unaffordable rents and, in the latter
case, hope and wait for government assistance to carry out repairs. Similarly, people
whose business was already somewhat precarious and who received insufficient
government assistance to overcome their recovery costs had to close their
businesses.
Claim 4: Those who lack economic resources and receive insufficient government or
insurance assistance to overcome major housing or business damage sustained in
the event, and new or transient and other community residents who lack community
connections are likely to be the most vulnerable in their resilience to a cyclone.
The Mesosystem and Social Networks
As Bronfenbrenners model identifies, individuals interact directly with people in their
microsystem which includes family, friends, neighbours and workplace colleagues.
These relationships constitute one level of a social network. As one respondent
379
stated, if people didnt have any relations in the area, they didnt know where to go,
they didnt know how to go there and a lot of places (KI).
According to Bronfenbrenners framework, an individual can also access the
connections of family members, neighbours and work colleagues to other systems
(e.g., a parents workplace, a childs school, a neighbours sporting club), known as
exosystems. In other words, people are members of multiple communities
(workplace, school, church, sports clubs) in addition to their place of residence. The
above comments about transients and newcomers lacking local connections
highlight the importance of these social networks or networks of communities which
contribute to social capital which is a contributor to resilience (Cottrell et al 2007).
Those individuals, including elderly, who remained connected to the community and
knew others around them, were deemed to have coped better:
I think [even if you are from a low income background] but youre still strongly
connected, and feel a part of your community, have good strong community
networks or engage with community groups. So hence, youll see that - so
you can be low income and oldhuge generalisations here, but you can be
an older person on a low income so the pension only, but if you engage with
the CWA and the Senior Citizens Hall and you go and play bridge every
Wednesday with neighbours and Doris and all that and youve got family and
you know the butcher, the baker, the candle-stick maker, you know, youre
well placed, your buffeted, your connected, youre not going to be left alone if
youre liked so you reach out to help people [and] people [will] reach out to
help you. (KI)
Social networks, especially among ethnic groups such as Italians and indigenous
communities, were seen as a strong positive influence and helpful coping
mechanism (KI). The indigenous community was fairly resilient (KI,R) because it was
suggested they are not as dependent on businesses and farms which were affected
(R) and have cohesiveness and sense of their place within the community (KI)
The indigenous community is a perfect example [of resiliency] you can be low
income but because youre part of a community and you have a place in
community - as long as its a reasonably functioning community which I think
its fair to say, you know - the communities out the back of Tully.... In the
scale of things, uh, you know, are still quite a cohesive community there. You
had high needs - you had high needs all over the place but often that sort of
setting is an example of resiliency, having resilience through social
connectedness, and having a place in the world I guess and a place in your
community. (KI)
On the other hand, two groups that were mentioned as not coping well after the
event were itinerants or transients and newcomers. Transients were seen as not
as well prepared financially or in terms of awareness of cyclone threat (KI), while
newcomers were portrayed as lacking the knowledge and experience to know how to
prepare for the event as well as the deep roots in the community that would have
enabled them to connect to sources of advice, support and assistance.
380
Community Spirit
Social networks are facilitated when there is a sense of community or community
spirit. Many interview participants commented not only on the help that was
provided by family, friends, and neighbours, but also by complete strangers from
within and outside the community. They emphasised that the community banded
together and tried hard to look out for each others interests. There was a common
feeling amongst stakeholders that there was a realquite beautiful community
spirit (KI) with people checking on and helping each other:
Our street, Bay Roadone of the guys is a builder and he went and hired a
massive generator from Townsvillewehooked up to thatso we all had
power and had certain machineries and so [we] could clean the whole street
up in about three days to get rid of rubbish. The whole community, the place
got actually better (sic). We tidied up all what was ugly and we all had BBQ
every night and it was a real good community bringing together (sic) as
welldisaster bringing them together (sic) it was fantastic. Someones got a
generator, Ive got a track and thrasher we tend[ed] to help everyone, we
cleaned up, kids helped clean up, we all tidied up ourselves. (R)
Individuals reportedly stepped up and took responsibility (R)
On my days off [I volunteered] and went to the TAFE and we had to take the
food out and sheets and everything and were told that we got to set up
everything for them [sheltering at the TAFE]. I asked my friends that I play
football with, and once we started, they started doing it themselves and one of
them took charge and it was amazing to watch. I just stood back... They just
needed to be directed, people need guidance, they will step up. You [have to]
give them a chance, I was amazed, how leaders come out everywhere. (R)
By checking on neighbours who might need assistance, working together to clean up
and make emergency repairs, and sharing experiences and creating a sense of a
shared experience by holding barbeques in the street, there was a strong feeling
among stakeholders with whom we talked of community support and self-sufficiency
that helped people to deal with the situation and fostered their resilience.
Claim 5: The interrelationships between individuals and the communities in which
they reside in the form of social networks that are established and fostered by a
strong community spirit or sense of cohesion can contribute to both individual and
community resilience.
Exosystem
Kinds of Assistance provided by Local Business, Non-Government and Community
Organisations
In addition to assistance provided by family and community networks of friends,
neighbours and co-workers, local and regional small food businesses and
restaurants and non-profit community organisations were all mentioned as
contributing food or water to meet immediate basic community needs. Nearly all
stakeholders who were interviewed mentioned the distribution of free food that was
381
cooked by local cafes and sent in by out-of-town restaurants as well as donated food
distributed by the Salvation Army and water distributed by a bottling manufacturer
and later on, the government (R, KI)
A number of NGOs and local non-profit organisations were also very active in the
post-cyclone period (R, KI) and helped the community during recovery with
economic and material assistance, as well as counselling services. These included
the Red Cross, Seventh Day Adventist Church, St. Vincent de Paul and several
small local organisations.
Smaller community-based organizations helped people with their bills, fuel vouchers,
and advocacy:
A lot of [the smaller community based organisations] manage whats called an
emergency relief scheme so theynot related to disaster, but also for people
who struggle to meet their bills or whatever can - theyre funded through the
State and Commonwealth government to occasionally provide financial
assistance to families in need or it can be assistance in terms of food
vouchers and things like that, so they have their emergency relief
programsyou know, information, referral, counselling, neighbourhood
centres, [they] can sometimes do advocacy you know, case management...
(KI)
Theres a whole support system around the Indigenous community as
wellso Indigenous health organisationswhich is down in Innisfail is the
Mamu Health Organisationso they have a big role. (KI)
In addition to offering material forms of support, some noted that even for those who
did not need or want such assistance their presence provided a useful opportunity to
just talk:
I do remember people coming around and offering to help, the church and the
Red Cross and everything were coming around and offering help but yeah I
suppose it was available but like people are they go 'nah we are right' but
some people just come and had a chat which was good at times. (R)
Response by Private Regional Infrastructure Providers
Repairing vital infrastructure is a major task following a cyclone that confronts utility
providers, such as in the case of Cyclone Larry, Ergon Energy and Telstra. The
larger towns in North Queensland, such as Innisfail, do have permanent diesel
generators which mean that power was not completely lost and therefore available to
the emergency response teams. Restoration of power, however, was a major
concern to restaurants, cafes and food stores and many families for preventing food
spoilage and contamination. The local power company was praised for its quick
response in bringing in large generators to provide power for whole suburbs (R) and
to repair damaged infrastructure. (R)
Ergon sent a whole troupe of people from all around Australia and sent them
up here. I didnt have power at my place for two weeks; two and a half
382
weeks they did a really good job considering there was a lot of damage to
the power [distribution network]. (R)
Others apparently did not find the loss of power a major issue: I dont know why, I
didnt really hear any people whinge about lack of [electricity] (R). One resident
claimed the reason was that people found other things to do (than watching TV and
sitting in air conditioning).
Kinds of Assistance provided by State and Federal Government
The immediate response by the local disaster management group, the army, State
Emergency Services, and the local council was widely viewed by local Innisfail
residents as efficient and well coordinated:
I think [the response] was really well coordinated between the disaster management
response group locally, the SES, and the army I think they worked really well to get
everything done That side of it I think was handled particularly well, even though
there was people complaining, but they would complain no matter what. (R)
Cyclone Larry, being considered one of the biggest cyclones since Tracy which hit
Darwin in 1974, became a political hot potatobasically the minute it happened
there was (sic) politicians one after the other come into townevery politician comes
in with a truckload of whatever you want, whatever you need (KI). Political concerns
to not repeat the poor response to New Orleans after Katrina (KI,R) resulted in the
community receiving more government assistance than similar events. As one
resident stated, we were really lucky that Larry came after Katrina.
The role of government at all levels in assisting recovery efforts was also generally
viewed positively, including assistance provided to businesses (reportedly $10,000)
and the injection of cash into the community
Collectively it was fantastic. Within two months, everything is down and flat, it
was tidy and clean. It was amazing the speed theyve got the town back to
normal. I think it was because the incentives they gave us were spot-on.
But they [the incentives] didnt come until a little bit later and at first people
would jump in anyway without incentives. That was a week later when the
government gave everyone $1000. There was no cash around. But ATM
didnt work so you couldnt get fuel out because there was no electricity and
generators ran out. (R)
Besides financial support, psychological services and support were also provided by
the state government through the Queensland Health program on mental health,
which was described as helping farmers deal with depression:
We had a lot of growers meetings after the cyclone...and we had people from
Centrelink from Queensland Health and they did talks on mental health issues
and that side of it, (inaudible) there was people everywhere here and in Tully,
Babinda, if you needed help you could go and talk to someone privately and it
was a very good response just a month after the cyclone, the first couple of
weeks there was probably a gap, after that once people got on the ground
383
here, if you needed somebody they were here. (R)

The state governments response phase, which lasted six months, assisted people
with accommodation and daily living requirements. Two community recovery mental
health teams were then set up providing extra assistance, in conjunction with various
agencies, for another 12 months. A large increase in mental health cases was
expected but did not occur, just a large call for assistance immediately after the
cyclone but then that tapered off (KI).
We expected a great deal [of mental health issues within the Innisfail
community following Cyclone Larry] but I think one of the good one of the
things that came out of Larry was we really didnt attribute any deaths to
Larry. And because of that, I think thatmy personal opinion was that made it
more easy for the people in the affected area to process their emotions about
how Larry had affected them a lot more positively and move on we were
looking for say, a 12% increase [in people seeking their services] and we
didnt get it. We didnt get anywhere near itdidnt get near it. I think we were
lucky to get about half of them, so that was interesting side-effect of Larry.
(KI)
A dilemma of government assistance was raised by a couple of the interview
participants who feel a major downside to the assistance that was provided to the
Innisfail community by all levels of government and a range of non-government
organisations is that the communitys resilience has been eroded. They argued that
people now expect financial assistance following a major disaster, and are unwilling
to help themselves and following the event many people have displayed a lack of
integrity and self-sufficiency.
I think the concern at the moment is mostly that there was considerable
assistance afterwards and theres a bit of an expectation now that, that
assistance will be there for any event and we found that in the floods because
we have annual flooding every year and with the following floods that
occurred people were starting to take white goods down into the water instead
of putting them up because they think they might get a new washing machine
or whatever and they were starting to ring up before that was even announced
' what's the number to get the money?' So its set a precedent now that we
have to reverse. (KI)
Claim 6: The kinds (e.g., economic, material, medical/health), extent and timing of
assistance provided by local and regional non-government and private bodies and
state and federal government agencies are critical to both individual and community
post-cyclone resilience but can also create a dependency that inhibits the
development of resiliency.
Conclusion
As a consequence of socio-historical conditions (the chronosystem) in modern
societies (the macrosystem) individuals have become more dependent on services
and institutions in both their local community (within their exosystem) and the larger
society (macrosystem). This economic or psychological dependency can become a
particular problem when interactions with these institutions are ruptured by a major
384
disaster such as an extreme weather event. Peoples expectations regarding

assistance were described as degrading their preparedness as many do not take
responsibility or have the economic resources to become self-sufficient, leave before
the event or mitigate the risks.
In contrast, those individuals, households and groups who have strong social
networks (in their microsystem) are able to draw on shared material and social
resources to sustain them during and through the aftermath of a cyclone. For
example, in the indigenous community in Innisfail the strengths of their (microsystem
and mesosystem) interactions made them less dependent on organizations in the
larger community (exosystem) during the period of chaos following a cyclone than
individuals who lack such close social or cultural ties or relationships. They are able
to rely on extended family and neighbours for support for managing or maintaining
basic functions and structures. Similarly, those who have had to be more selfsufficient owing to their circumstances (e.g., rural fringe dwellers) are likely to cope
better because of their capacity to draw on their own resources and knowledge of
more traditional methods of survival (by finding substitutes for lack of power for
cooking and entertainment).
Individuals with limited or weak family or neighbourhood (microsystem) interactions
(e.g., community newcomers, transients) are likely to have a limited mesosystem
which reduces their interactions with supportive community groups and organisations
(in the exosystem). A lack of these connections can hinder interactions with loosely
defined or informal community groups as well as the larger and more impersonal
government and non-government services and organizations.
This suggests that our societies have become potentially more vulnerable and less
resilient to disasters unless individuals and communities can draw on personal and
social resources and capacities. Yet in an urbanized and suburbanized environment
the opportunities to make these connections are not always readily present.
Despite living in environments that, by and large, do not provide support for the
development of autonomy, competence, and relatedness, some individuals survive
and thrive by relying more heavily on their own abilities. In the face of increased
extreme climate contingencies others need to be assisted to learn such adaptive
strategies and hence become more resilient. At the same time, recovery from such
extreme climate events as cyclones is beyond the sole capacity of most individuals
and communities. Finding a balance between adequate economic and psychological
support and creating a dependence on external assistance is a challenge for
policymakers and respondents charged with responsibility for helping individuals and
communities bounce back from and adapt to disaster events.
References
Anderson-Berry, L. and King, D. 2005, Mitigation of the Impact of Tropical Cyclones
in Northern Australia through Community Capacity Enhancement. Mitigation and
Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, vol. 10, pp. 367-392. Springer
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2010. 1379.0.55.001 National Regional Profile,
Cassowary Coast (R) - Johnstone, 2004-2008. Canberra.
Australian Bureau of Statistics .2008, Social Trends 2008. Available online
www.abs.gov.au Adams, A.M., Madhavan, S. and Simon, D. 2002, Womens social
385
networks and child survival in Mali, Social Science and Medicine, vol. 54, pp.165178.
Australian Red Cross. 2006, Red Cross Volunteers Assisting Cyclone Victimes
[Online]. Available: http://www.redcross.org.au/QLD/news_CycloneLarry.htm
[Accessed 7 September 2010].
Beattie, P. 2006, Premier urges residents to prepare for Cyclone Larry. Queensland
Government.
Boon, H., Cottrell, A., King, D., Stevenson, R. and Millar, J. 2012, Bronfenbrenners
bioecological theory for modelling community resilience to natural disasters. Natural
Hazards, vol:60, no.2, pp. 381-408.
Brofenbrenner, U. 1989, Ecological systems theory. Ann Child Dev vol:6, pp187
249.
Brofenbrenner, U. 1979, The ecology of human development. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Bronfenbrenner, U. and Ceci, S. 1994, Nature nurture reconceptualised in
developmental perspective: a bioecological model. Psychol Rev vol:101, no.4,
pp.568586.
Bureau of Meteorology (BOM) 2007, Severe Tropical Cyclone Larry. Australian
Government: Commonwealth of Australia.
Bushnell, S., Balcombe, L. and Cottrell, A. 2007, Community and fire service
perceptions of bushfire issues in Tamborine Mountain: whats the difference?
Australian Journal of Emergency Management, vol. 22, no.3, pp.3-9.
GNS. 2007, Flood risk perceptions, education and warning in four communities in
New South Wales, Australia results of a questionnaire survey, 2005. GNS
Scientific Report 2007/30.
Hitchman, A, Cechet, B, Edwards, M, Boughton, G, Milne, M, Mullaly, D, and
Thankappan, M. 2006, Preliminary assessment of Tropical Cyclone Larry, AusGeo
News, September 2006, No 83, Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.
IPCC, 2012, Summary for Policymakers. In: Managing the Risks of Extreme Events
and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation [Field, C.B., V. Barros, T.F.
Stocker, D. Qin, D.J. Dokken, K.L. Ebi, M.D. Mastrandrea, K.J. Mach, G.-K. Plattner,
S.K. Allen, M. Tignor, and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. A Special Report of Working Groups
I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University
Office of Economic and Statistical Research 2010, Queensland Regional Profiles:
Cassowary Coast Regional. Queensland Government.
Sutherland, D. 2005, Resiliency and collateral learning in science in some students
of Cree ancestry. Science Education, vol:89, no.4, pp. 595-613.
386
Dr Suzanne Vallance
Lecturer
Lincoln University, Canterbury, New Zealand
Paper presented at
387
Abstract: The recent Christchurch earthquakes provide a unique opportunity to better
understand the relationship between pre-disaster social fault-lines and post-disaster

community fracture. As a resident of Christchurch, this paper presents some of my
reflections on the social structures and systems, activities, attitudes and decisions that have
helped different Canterbury communities along their road to recovery, and highlights some
issues that have, unfortunately, held us back.
These reflections help answer the most crucial question asked of disaster scholarship: what
can recovery agencies (including local authorities) do - both before and after disaster - to
promote resilience and facilitate recovery. This paper based on three different definitions of
resilience - presents a thematic account of the social recovery landscape. I argue that
coping might best be associated with adaptive capacity, however thriving or bounce
forward versions of resilience are a function of a communitys participative capacity.
Keywords: resilience; community engagement; recovery; earthquakes;

disaster; Canterbury
Introduction
On September 4th 2010, at 4.36 am, the Canterbury (New Zealand) region was
rocked by a large 7.1 magnitude earthquake that moved Canterbury 2 metres closer
to Australia. Although there were no casualties, certain suburbs of the city of
Christchurch, and parts of Kaiapoi in the neighbouring Waimakariri District, suffered
extensive land damage in the form of liquefaction (known colloquially as sand
volcanoes) and lateral spread (surface rupture and slippage). These geological
phenomena left some residents homeless and many more living in sub-standard
housing. Then, 6 months later, almost directly under the city of Christchurch, another
6.8 magnitude earthquake occurred. Though technically smaller, the peak ground
acceleration of 2.2 (over twice that of gravity) was one of the highest ever recorded
and, according to Professor Yeats, Professor Emeritus of Geology at Oregon State
University in Corvallis, USA, this would have flattened most world cities. 1 This time,
181 people were killed (most of them in the collapse of two large inner city buildings)
and many more were injured. Those homes that had already been affected in the
first earthquake generally suffered further damage and some previously unscathed
hillside suburbs also became unstable. The CBD was devastated, and considerable
areas of the inner city the drop zones - will remain off-limits until two tall, unstable
buildings are deconstructed.
www.stuff.co.nz/national/christchurch-earthquake/4711189/Tuesday-quake-no-aftershock
388
The recovery process has been delayed and complicated by the on-going
aftershocks; as of January 2012, almost one year after the February quake, the
Canterbury region has suffered 4 major events of 6+ magnitude or more on the
Richter scale with each of these causing significant liquefaction and lateral spread;
over 3000 of 3+, many of which exacerbate existing damage and make the authors
filing cabinet rattle; and nearly 7000 of lesser magnitude. Given the extended nature
of earthquake sequence, finding companies to re-insure infrastructure has proved
difficult and has slowed the recovery.
The cost of repair is considerable, and climbing. Latest estimates (approximately 8

months on) put the bill at about US $20 billion or 8 per cent of the countrys GDP. To
put this in perspective, the bill from Hurricane Katrina was less than 1 per cent of the
United States GDP. The 1995 Kobe earthquake in Japan cost just over 2 per cent of
that countrys GDP, and the bill for the more recent event there in March 2011 is
estimated to be between 3 and 5 per cent. The silver lining, if there is one, was
summarised by Roger Sutton, CEO of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery
Authority (CERA): When asked if he was concerned about the earthquakes causing
more damage he replied There's not much left to break.
The costs to businesses and communities are difficult to quantify, but we know they
are considerable because much of the soft social infrastructure is as badly
damaged as the pipes and buildings. Though the final figures are not yet in, as of
January 2012, we believe between 10,000 and 12,000 homes in the Red Zones 2 will
be demolished. Other aspects of daily life, besides housing, have also been
significantly affected: schools, churches, community halls, recreation centres,
shopping malls, corner shops, restaurants, fast food outlets many of the everyday
sites and activities we take for granted have closed or relocated. This widespread
displacement, relocation and closure has had consequences for the so-called
unaffected parts of the city: some schools are accommodating two different
institutions and doing double shifts 8 months later; inner-city issues such as
weekend drunken revelry and prostitution has shifted to suburban centres; and traffic
delays are common. This has profoundly altered residents patterns of behaviour and
disrupted many of those basic routines that glue everyday life together.
The label of the Red Zone was originally applied to parts of the CBD that had been cordoned off.
The term is now applied to several suburban areas where the land damage is so extensive, and
land remediation so expensive, that rebuilding is not possible in the short-term. In July 2011,
residents in these Red Zones were offered a property buy-out package from the central
government.
389
The aim of this paper is to highlight how, where and why the social or soft
infrastructure of Christchurch has broken along several fault-lines which, like our
geotechnical fractures, have the potential to cause considerable damage. Indeed, it
is claimed that the term natural disaster is a misnomer, and that the catastrophe lies
in our expectations and social systems - before and after certain events - that make
disasters possible or even probable (see, for example, Hinchliffe and Woodward,
2004 on BSE; Clarke, 2008 on Hurricane Katrina). In attempting to highlight the
fissures exposed by the earthquakes, I begin with some discussion of three terms
crucial to this account - disaster, community and resilience. For convenience3 I
divide my observations of ways in which recovery authorities might help communities
build resilience - pre- and post-disaster - so as to facilitate recovery. This is not so
much a chronological account as an outline of a complex web of factors that will
inevitably play out differently in other contexts.
Communities and disasters

There is considerable debate as to the definition and characteristics of community
(Chamberlain, Vallance, Perkins, 2010). Increased mobility, interpreted in a broad
sense, challenges the traditional view of communities as geographically-bound
entities, connected in and through particular places. It is now common to hear about
communities of interest, professional and virtual communities, all of which have
contributed to claims that geography is dead. Consequently, there is now
considerable debate as to what essential features are required in order for a
collective to become a community, though many claim that important ideas include
shared values and common goals (Williams and Pocock, 2009); a common sense of
identity (Scott and Marshall, 2005); or a web of affect-laden ties and common culture
(Etzioni, 1996). Rather than settling on a particular set of features, Thorns (2002)
categorised three different uses of the term based on geography, other social
systems, and emotional ties. He pointed out that the uses and applications of
community are highly variable and the only common factor among them is that they
all involve people.
This debate over the meaning of community becomes particularly problematic in the
post-disaster context. By definition a disaster contains several elements: a
community of interest or social system is affected; it is affected adversely; and the
adverse effects must be of a magnitude that compromises functionality (to
distinguish meaningfully between disasters and inconveniences). Based on my
observations here in Christchurch, this means, in practice, that the glue that bound
I am aware that by reinforcing the event as the problem, rather than the social structures and
systems that actually create the problems, the labels pre- and post-disaster actually undermine my
claim that there are no natural catastrophes.
3
390
many pre-existing, well-defined communities together suddenly dissolved either

temporarily or permanently. Schools closed which cut children off from each other,
and made life difficult for working parents who then become isolated from their
colleagues; Residents Association representatives suddenly left the city making
neighbourhoods difficult to access, co-ordinate and communicate with; churches
were reduced to rubble leaving the congregation with no-where to meet, and so on. I
will return to a more detailed account of this compromise of functionality and its
consequences in due course, but for now, it is important to establish a connection
between these suddenly inaccessible communities and broader recovery processes
with particular emphasis on engagement.
Recovery best-practice consistently advocates for community engagement (Kweit

and Kweit, 2004; Etye, 2004; Coghlan, 2004; Coles and Buckle, 2004; Waugh and
Streib, 2006; Murphy, 2007; Hauser, Sherry and Swartz, 2008; Wilson, 2009;
Vallance, 2011; Norman, 2004) with the benefits said to include political stability,
identifying workable solutions to the range of problems recovery presents, sharing
and delegation of duties, securing community buy-in to the process, building trust
and promoting a positive and cathartic recovery. It is often assumed in all this that
recovery authorities are 1) willing and 2) able to engage communities that are
themselves 3) willing and 4) able to be engaged (Vallance, 2011a). Unfortunately, if
any one of these four assumptions folds, the recovery process can stall. 4 Further, as
Olshansky, Johnson and Topping (2006, p. 368-9) noted, community engagement is
key but to work most effectively after disasters, community organizations should
already be in place and have working relationships with the city [officials]. It is difficult
to invent participatory processes in the intensity of a post-disaster situation. Preexisting relationships are, therefore, critical to the recovery process. This raises
interesting questions about the connections between recovery, resilience and the
role of communities.
Communities, disasters and resilience

Resilience is another of those terms capturing a range of definitions and approaches,
and is arguably coming to replace sustainability as the latest policy buzzword.
Nonetheless, it has a long history and has been employed widely in engineering,
business administration and organisation behaviour models, civil defence and
4
I would argue that this may be occurring in Christchurch. On the 1st of Feb 2012, roughly a year on, over 4000 people marched on the
civic offices of the Christchurch City Council (CCC) demanding a change of leadership. Across the political spectrum, dissatisfaction with
both the Mayor and CEO is high, and the CCC has been routinely described as dysfunctional and bureaucratically buggered.
Reinvestment in the city has been sluggish, and at three times normal levels, out-migration is high. Various sources, at different times,
estimated the loss to be between 4 and 17 per cent).
391
emergency management (CDEM), social work, and socio-ecological systems (SES).

Across this varied literature, resilience has three related definitions that reflect these
numerous disciplinary ties. The first supposes an ideal steady-state or equilibrium to
which a system bounces back following a disturbance. The second relates to the
extent to which a system is able to self-organise or cope with a disturbance and
restore functionality. The third recognises that a system may have multiple ideal
states and that being able to bounce back to normal might be less important or
even less desirable - than the ability to adapt and thrive in new conditions (i.e., its
adaptive capacity). The adaptive capacity of a socio-ecological system refers to its
ability to cope with change by observing, learning and then modifying the way it
interacts with the world, over different geographic and temporal scales (Folke et al.,
2002). Manyena, O'Brien, OKeefe, and Rose (2011) have described this as a
systems ability to bounce forward. Because this last definition works with imagined
futures rather than a return to normal, bouncing forward situates resilience as an
expression of the way people expect or want the world to be. Thus, the ability to
bounce forward depends as much on our collective capacity for expectative abstract
thought, as it does on our technical ability and/or financial resources.
It also depends on what Lorenz (2011) has called participative capacity which
speaks to the flow and distribution of power and resources in a social system. It is
this participative capacity that allows peoples expectations and their ideas about
what recovery might mean, to flavour the overall process. Solnits (2009) work, for
example, suggests that normal life is the catastrophe and disaster is actually the
opportunity to make things better. She writes:
Disaster reveals what the world could be likeIt reveals mutual aid as a default
operating principle and civil society as something waiting in the wings when it is
absent from the stage. A world could be built on this basis, and to so would redress
the long divides that produce everyday pain, poverty, and loneliness (p. 313).
This is where those earlier questions around the nature of community, various
communities roles in recovery, and the quality of community engagement become
critical.
In summarising the above, several points deserve to be highlighted. First, the

recovery literature acknowledges the importance of community engagement but
takes for granted that the post-disaster community landscape will be recognisable.
On the contrary, the very nature of disaster as involving compromised functionality
means that this is probably not the case. The communitys glue whatever that was
has likely eroded. Second, resilience particularly the thriving interpretation
depends on both adaptive capacity (within the community) and participative capacity
392
(engagement and relationship with others).5 This brings us back to the original focus
of this paper which was to contribute to a better understanding of hidden social faultlines, exposed by the earthquake, that may promote community resilience and
facilitate recovery or hinder the process.
Methodology
It would be fair to say that the methodology used for this research is rather messy.
This seems an unlikely and unprofessional admission, yet the term messy is the
most appropriate given the rapidly changing circumstances associated with disaster
recovery, and John Laws (2004) work where he argues that our research methods
actually create rather than reveal reality. This is true not just of (participant) action
research, but also of more natural scientific research relying on bioassays and
penetrometers. The latter have been used extensively here to help gauge land
damage and land stability. Some of these assessments are clearly at odds with
those of residents who disagree with the land zoning decisions that penetrometers
helped shape. The idea is that our methods, even those so-called objective
measures are highly political as they shape our social world.
Research philosophy aside, in practical terms, it is acknowledged that qualitative

methods are best able to provide rich data that help us understand the ambiguity and
temporal liveliness of the social world (Flick, 2006; Babbie, 2010). The rapidly
changing landscape of recovery continually affected the types of questions and
demanded a fluid and flexible methodology. The actual methods employed for this
research included (often participant) observation of numerous public events and
meetings, and unstructured interviews with active community representatives
(loosely defined). These opportunities arose through my on-going involvement with
Gap Filler, Greening the Rubble, CanCERN, the Community Forum and the AvON
network, all of which emerged in the wake of the quakes. My relationship and
familiarity with these groups has allowed me to contextualise their concerns and
build a picture that, inevitably, can only be partial, situated and temporary. Thus,
rather than trying to establish what exactly happened and predict for others in other
places what will happen, my goal here was to contribute to a better understanding of
themes (fractures and fault-lines) that seemed to promote community resilience and
facilitate or hinder recovery.
Pre-disaster fault-lines
Parallel debates occur around the notion of social capital often described in terms of strong/weak,
vertical/horizontal, or binding, bonding and bracing capitals. See Putnam (1995) or Vallance (2011b)
for an overview.
5
393
Formal structures of governance
As Olshansky, Johnson and Topping (2006) argued, post-disaster recovery is

heavily influenced by pre-event patterns of governance, behaviour, social structures,
expectations, cultural competencies and so on. The Christchurch case is very
interesting as, historically, it had a reputation as the Peoples Republic. Ex-Mayor of
Christchurch Vicki Buck popularised this slogan in the 1980s and even had T-shirts
printed with these words, presumably to reflect the strong social focus held by the 24
elected Councillors and their leader. The Christchurch City Council (CCC) now has
only 12 elected councillors, two from each Ward, and the Mayor. Each ward also has
5 elected Community Board representatives making up the 2nd tier of elected local
government. Traditionally, these representatives held some mana or standing in
their communities, and Community Board members were seen to wield considerable
influence both at the coal face and within council. Their position today is more
ambiguous; some describe the role as token.
The number of open (to the public) standing council committee meetings exceeded
that which we have today, where closed meetings have become the norm.
Information flows up and down the council hierarchy have also changed in the last
30 years. The 12 Councillors and lower level staff no longer have ready access to
certain information and some have been discouraged (or forbidden) from talking to
media and academics. In November 2011, Cr Chrissie Williams resigned citing this
as one of the reasons for leaving, and in January this year, Cr Sue Wells even asked
the government to replace the Council with appointed commissioners because
Councillors could no longer do their jobs.6
Further, the old model of community-based teams working together on holistic

solutions before advocating to higher levels has been replaced with one where
employees report directly and individually to their managers at the civic offices in the
central city. Community Board delegations that were extensive have been reduced.
As a result of these changes, the Christchurch City Council was described in a report
for the Royal Commission as having promoted a corporate approach (Richardson,
2008), first under CEO Lesley McTurk, and now under the incumbent CEO, Tony
Marryatt.
The pre-existing issues outlined here the number and type of opportunities for
community engagement, information flows, the locus of decision-making, lack of
transparency, and the relationship between the different parts of local government
have all come to play an important role post-disaster. Most significantly, the CCCs
6
http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/news/6299843/Council-is-tearing-itself-apart-Sue-Wells
394
dysfunction has been a critical factor shaping the role played by the Canterbury
Earthquake Recovery Authority. Rather than supporting and enabling the CCC,
CERA has essentially taken over many of the Councils functions and residents are
very uncertain as to who is responsible for what. Their dissatisfaction recently came
to a head at a protest attended by over 4, 000 people demanding mid-term elections
and the CEO, Tony Marryatts, resignation. This adds weight to Kweit and Kweits
(2004) observation that inadequate community engagement can lead to political
instability.
Formal and non-formal relationships
Collaboration is another of those words that acts as a catch-all for a range of

activities, including co-production, co-management, deliberative democracy,
deep democracy, collaborative planning, diffuse decision-making and numerous
other participatory models. Many of these, including the IAP2,7 Arnsteins (1969)
Ladder of participation and Prettys Typology of Participation (1994; in Kumar,
2002) try to categorise types of citizen or community involvement in formal planning
processes from token or passive informing/consulting, through to more active
forms based on empowerment and self-mobilisation. This more active or engaged
end of the spectrum is particularly useful post-disaster but, as Olshansky, Johnson
and Topping (2006) pointed out, it is immensely difficult to build the skills and an
appropriate participatory framework for this after the catastrophe has struck. It is
therefore important to build collaborative and participatory capacity (Lorenz, 2011)
pre-disaster through, for example, shared management of community resources, the
development and implementation of small scale projects like community gardens,
and so on.
Community development
In Christchurch the CCCss community advocates have been replaced with

strengthening community advisors who have slightly different roles and
responsibilities. Whatever label one gives to these staff members, certain
characteristics of the role are worth enhancing pre-disaster so as to facilitate postdisaster recovery and resilience. These characteristics include being geographically
dispersed and located in the community (or suburban centres) rather than a central
office. They should be in a position to facilitate holistic responses to social, cultural,
economic and environmental issues or take a helicopter view. This means their
coverage may not be much more than 4000 households.8 They should have some
7
http://www.iap2.org/displaycommon.cfm?an=5
This figure of 4000 was used by representatives from nearby Waimakariri District Council (WDC)
whose earthquake recovery strategy has been seen as exemplary. A presentation from Sandra
James at WDC is available on http://www.lincoln.ac.nz/Services-facilities-and-support/Conference8
395
knowledge of community development techniques, and conflict resolution. These

staff members should have a mandate, and necessary support, to liaise with
communities as soon as possible after the event (so long as their safety is not
compromised). Part of their role should be to gather and transmit information, to
identify and support new and established community leaders, and help communities
(re)form.
Civil society and the non-governmental sector
Other factors, pre-disaster, that are now shaping the recovery process here in
Christchurch include the quality, quality and degree of overlap among different civil
society groups and non-governmental organisations. These form social reserves or
community spare capacity to borrow a term from systems theory. These various
formal and informal social networks should be geographically and thematically
diverse. As one example of how and why this important, an early supporter of a postquake civil society organisation - the Canterbury Communities Earthquake Recovery
Network (CanCERN)9 was an employee at the Delta Community Trust, a nongovernmental organisation. Delta helped CanCERN become a community by acting
as a repository for funding (aid agencies do not like giving money to individuals, even
if they are leaders of community recovery initiatives), providing meeting spaces, and
general administrative support. In light of this, keeping reasonably up-to-date lists of
the various NGOs and CSOs, and supporting their development, is a sensible predisaster investment. My view is that some of these existing and emergent groups
such as the student volunteer army10 - filled the gap left by recovery authorities
(including the CCC) who were themselves temporarily dysfunctional.11
Funding
The opportunities and regulations around discretionary funding are very important
post-disaster. It is recommended that pre-disaster a pool of funding be ready to go at
a moments notice with good flexibility around the application process, criteria,
closing dates and accountability. My observation was that community groups could
make small amounts of money go a long way. CanCERN (www.cancern.org.nz),
facilities-and-event-management/Professional-Development-Group/Resilient-Futures/Resilientfutures-conference-recordings/
9
The author is a CanCERN Board member.
10
Community Board member Sam Johnson quickly mobilised thousands of people the Volunteer
Student Army - to help shovel liquefaction using Facebook and Twitter. The Farmy Army co-ordinated
farmers with heavy farm machinery to do the same.
11
The Civic offices were damaged in the earthquake and then off-limits for weeks whilst nearby
buildings were demolished. The same thing happened to the Regional Councils bunker which had
consequences for their ability to respond effectively. It is a warning to those who would locate their
civil defence headquarters near other hazards; have a Plan B.
396
Gap Filler (www.gapfiller.co.nz), Greening the Rubble

(www.greeningtherubble.co.nz) and AvON (www.avonotakaronetwork.co.nz) all
started with nothing except goodwill and ideas that resounded with the public
imagination, but are now fairly well-recognised actors in the recovery process. Their
journey would have been easier and possibly more fruitful with adequate support
early on.
It is important to recognise that many of the emergent communities that spring up

after a disaster will not have any track record. I would suggest that iterative funding
schedules are therefore useful, though other disagree: Evan Smith, formerly from
CanCERN, read an early version of this paper and argued that Short contract
periods although being helpful for agility are actually detrimental because they lack
security and require a much higher level of reporting and administration. Overall, he
disagreed with the idea of short, iterative funding timeframes, but interviews with
recovery authorities revealed practical difficulties around bestowing large sums of
money to people with no track record. Funding criteria and reporting must therefore
strike a delicate balance between meeting needs for accountability and meeting the
needs of the community.
Post-disaster fractures and fault-lines

Leadership # 1 (Central Government)
As much as I would like to think that there are important techniques and strategies
associated with disaster recovery (and I will list some of these below), it is clear that
leadership and leadership style are fundamental to the recovery process. The very
top level of decision-makers (central government) must ensure that the various
recovery agencies and authorities are working together as soon as possible. Here,
we have witnessed CERA, the CCC, the Earthquake Commission, Fletchers (who
won the tender for the rebuild), and various insurance companies all playing
important roles but, often, the responsibilities of each are unclear. This leads to
unnecessary duplication of effort or, worse, gaps that none of them seem to want to
fill.
A related point, though one that is less clear-cut, is relationship between recovery
authorities like CERA and central government. CERA is loosely modelled on VBRRA
but an important difference is that CERA is not a stand alone agency but newly
created government department. This raises interesting questions over the extent to
which the Minister is willing and able to be openly critical of his own department, and
vice versa.
397
Leadership # 2 (Regional/City/District)
Our success will not be measured by the kilometres of pipe and road that we
replace, but by how the people come through this, Jim Palmer, CEO, WDC.
In contrast to the CCC, post-earthquake, the nearby Waimakariri District Council
(WDC) quickly established a local hub in the worst affected area where residents
could access a Support Co-ordinator who knew about the area and understood the
various support structures and services available (such as emergency funding for
house repairs, etc). WDC also undertook a pastoral care programme which included
door knocking, cups of tea and, as some residents were being told their homes were
to be demolished, cakes baked by neighbours and nearby residents. Open
conversation, where the bad news is conveyed with support, has characterised
WDCs communication strategy. The framework they used was based on an Asset
Based Community Development Programme where the guiding questions included:
What is it you want to RETAIN?
What would you like to REGAIN?
What would you CHANGE/MODIFY?
What doesnt WORK?
What would you CREATE if we could?12
I have heard many Kaiapoi residents express a degree of gratitude for this, and
although there have been problems, by and large, residents in WDC appear satisfied
with the overall tone of the recovery there and the efforts of their council.
The CCC, by comparison, is less clearly demonstrating a recovery strategy or,

perhaps more accurately, the approach is not one where the residents of the city feel
they have priority. In fact, at a Community Forum13 meeting, the CEO of Christchurch
City Council Tony Marryatt stated that the focus had been on doing what the
government had told them to do which was to repair major infrastructure and develop
the Draft Central City Plan. This has resulted in many residents those with few ties
12
This information is contained in a presentation by Sandra James available on

http://www.lincoln.ac.nz/PageFiles/12552/Lincoln-18th-April-2011-Sandra-James.pdf
13
Members of the 40 strong forum were selected from candidates nominated by various Canterburybased interest groups, and now includes representatives from businesses, Residents Associations,
CSOs and NGOs. The author is a member. None of us are sure what the selection criteria were, or
what our mandate is.
398
to the CBD and relatively intact infrastructure feeling left out of the recovery
process and has resulted in the protest mentioned earlier.
Leadership #3 Community
I have argued elsewhere (Vallance, 2011b) that, post-earthquake, communities14 in

Canterbury had to first become before they could become engaged and indicated an
important role for basic community development. Disasters, by definition,
compromise functionality of, in this case, communities. Restoring functionality thus
involves recognising the altered nature of the community leadership landscape.
Helping emerging leaders in their new role becomes critical as they may have little
previous experience in leadership roles and may be completely unaware of existing
processes, procedures, plans, or policies. They need to be identified and enabled.
Identifying new leaders may be difficult because, as my observations here suggest,

they really do build credibility from the ground up rather than shouting from the
treetops. They may not actually see themselves to be leaders. Nonetheless, they
will be the ones who, with no funding to speak of, show initiative and set up meals on
wheels for the elderly, organise community meetings to obtain and share
information, co-ordinate teams of students to shovel liquefaction, lobby for residents
rights and needs, develop a local neighbourhood recovery plan, or set up local
suicide watches on people in the neighbourhood who are not coping...But, if the
recovery authority is actively out there liaising with the affected communities in a
meaningful way, these new leaders are pretty obvious. Aligning quickly with these
new leaders (whilst not ignoring existing structures if they remain intact) is critical.
Once they have been identified, they should be enabled. This can be achieved
through various means including adequately funding their position, resourcing
(provide rooms, photocopiers, computers, access to legal aid, etc), up-skilling or,
importantly, providing information.
Information flows
Johnson (2011) has called information the currency of recovery and its value should
not be underestimated. In the early response phase residents in badly affected
communities were so desperate for information that they would ask the loo man15
what was going on. Those who have access to reliable information gain real
14
Frankly, the same applies to the recovery authorities themselves. CERA did not even exist this time
last year and the EQC went from a small staff of 22 to over 700. It has taken time for these
organisations to become functional.
15
Loo men dropped off and collected the port-o-loos from areas without sewerage.
399
credibility in the community and this can be a way of endorsing new leaders and
promoting participative capacity before formal funding starts flowing.
Information flows should work both ways; it is not always about conveying messages
but also about acquiring information. Engaging communities can be seen as a way of
gathering relevant and useful data upon which to base important decisions and
identify workable solutions to wicked problems.16
Engaging communities and working with new and established community leaders
gives recovery authorities another option when it comes to delivering bad news.
Complex and/or unwelcome news might best be delivered face-to-face or in a small
supportive group. Community leaders are best-placed to identify what will work best.
As but one example, the Community Forum asked that difficult or controversial or
complex messages not be issued on a Friday because it means residents have to
wait the whole weekend for clarification on the finer points.17 If the message should
suit the medium, community leaders can help recovery authorities understand what
is most appropriate in terms of timing and delivery.
When answers are not known and this is very common after a disaster - it is
tempting to retreat to the safety of the civic offices, however, this can be extremely
counter-productive. It is important to remember that residents do not actually expect
recovery authorities to know everything immediately. Many would prefer to see time
spent making the right decision rather than time wasted fixing the wrong one
(CanCERN meeting Oct, 2011). However, when answers are not known, an
information timeline should be indicated because the only thing worse than not
knowing is not knowing when youll know. This has been particularly true for
residents here who have waited and waited to find out if there house has been redzoned and are wondering whether or not to buy a new pair of gumboots to cope with
the liquefaction, plant out their tomatoes, order firewood for the winter, or enrol their
kids at a particular school...The message it not to wait for certainty and glossy
pamphlets; indicative timelines at least allow people to get on with a life of sorts;
complete information vacuums can drive people to despair.
In early recovery, it can seem as if the only constant is rapid change. Communities
and, it must be said, recovery authorities are forming and re-forming after lost
16
See Vallance (2011b) for an example involving the lack of engagement over sewerage and
temporary/permanent solutions.
17
CanCERN workers had noted a demonstrable rise in violence and alcohol abuse over weekends if
bad news was issued on a Friday.
400
functionality. Roles are still being negotiated and this can make information flows
difficult. A helpful technique here in Christchurch was to get a representative from
EQC, AMI (the insurer of the largest number of damaged homes, Fletchers (the
rebuilding company) and Tonkin and Taylor (the geotech company) in one place 18
for a community meeting with residents who were asked to sit in clusters according
to the street in which they lived. A very strong facilitator then went around the room,
from street to street as it were, asking residents to voice their concerns. This strategy
allowed everyone the opportunity to speak and also provided small community
issues to be identified. This can be very productive in areas where a sense of
community is fairly weak and geographically close residents do not even know each
other. As one example, once several street residents got to know each other in this
forum they realised the geotech assessments were incorrect and were able to ask
for a re-evaluation. As another example, it became clear that fixing the sewerage for
one household often meant a nasty problem for someone else along the sewerage
lateral and they were able to suggest a more co-ordinated approach. Finally, hearing
other peoples stories took some residents away from seeing their problem in
isolation, and allowed them to place the earthquake geographically. On a number of
levels, this way of organising community meetings can foster the development of
holistic solutions to communal problems.
Transitions
Recovery often seems to be construed as a race towards normal or better, as if

there were some kind of definitive end point. Conversely, much of the recent normal
planning literature now speaks of a post-normal condition where we should
acknowledge the limits of our predictive science and move towards post-positivist
(see, for example, Allmendinger, 2009) or contingent planning models (see, for
example, Francois, 2008; de Roo and Silva, 2010; Loorbach, 2010). Though
disaster presents some challenges for non-disaster planning approaches, some of
the lessons from the post-positivist planning literature are both interesting and salient
as key features include concepts of complexity and uncertainty. This literature has
some very practical implications around process (e.g. Whatmore and Landstroms
(2011) work on flood apprentices) and content (e.g. Gunder, 2008 and Gunder and
Hilliers (2007) work on hauntology and what should be recognised in planning).
This literature highlights and challenges some fundamental planning principles,
whether recovery-based or not, that assume planning will actually achieve a desired
outcome. The idea of a plan becomes distinctly fuzzy and, as a result,
experimenting with new ways of getting things done becomes more important.
18
I believe this was useful for both the residents and recovery agents and authorities, as they each
got to hear what the others agencies were actually saying and this helped shape the relationship
between them. Unfortunately, CCC representatives were noticeably absent from these meetings.
401
A new way of getting things done in Christchurch emphasises temporary solutions

and transitional arrangements. These include temporary emergency repairs to
homes and businesses; temporary installations, such as those developed by Gap
Filler and Greening the Rubble; the transitional city outlined in the draft Central City
Plan which acknowledges the lengthy timeframes of this recovery; and CERA which
has a 5 year life span. Debates about the actual value of temporary solutions have
framed these activities; is it worth investing in something we know will not endure?
My own view, based on the Christchurch case, is that temporary solutions are
immensely valuable because they promote experimentation and innovation; provide
opportunities for trial runs; give residents and recovery authorities the opportunity to
do something useful; and, importantly, temporary activities help balance the hasty
demand for progress with the time needed for careful planning.
To alleviate concerns that the transitional arrangements might become permanent,

temporary activities and organisations should have an exit strategy. As one example,
Greening the Rubble and Gap Filler both have a strategy (and now a demonstrable
history) of leaving a site in as good, or better, condition than they found it, not least
because they have a commitment to re-using as much material as they can. This
clear exit strategy associated with temporary installations gives site owners
confidence in the project management and sites are readily available as a result.
Conversely, CERA which has a legislative 5 year life span is gearing up rather than
planning their exit, and the roles of CCC and CERA are becoming increasingly
blurred. There is a sense, rightly or wrongly, that the CCC is focussing on the CBD
(as outlined in the Draft Central City Plan) whilst CERA is responsible for everything
else, including the Draft Recovery Strategy for Greater Christchurch. At a practical
level there has been some duplication of roles, with one example being CERAs
provision of its own summertime activities programme, which is usually the domain
of the CCC. There has also been confusion about the role of the Community Forum,
and whether this has replaced the elected Council and Community Board members.
Though it is understood that CERA will not endure beyond 2015, they seem to lack
an exit strategy that will leave democracy, capacity and capability in Christchurch as
it was before the quakes. The lesson here seems to be to make sure temporary
recovery agencies add capacity without eroding capability.
Concluding thoughts
402
In this paper I have identified potential fault-lines which, like those geotechnical
fractures, have the potential to fracture and erode a communitys resilience. I have
argued that these fault-lines or species of trouble (Erikson, 1995) that might hinder
recovery include pre-disaster formal structures governance; the relationship
between formal and informal structures; community development; the role and status
of CSEs and NGOs; and the management of emergency funding pools. Postdisaster, potentially difficult areas include leadership at the state, regional/city/district
and community levels; information flows or the currency of recovery; and the value
and management of temporary solutions.
The Canterbury earthquakes have unfortunately - provided an opportunity to

examine pre-disaster and post-disaster efforts, by communities and recovery
authorities, to promote resilience and recover from disaster. Identifying and
addressing, pre-disaster, those areas of weakness may help facilitate recovery.19 On
the other hand, if I had to pinpoint one factor that has caused a great deal of trauma
post-disaster, it would have to be leadership. Referring back to the introductory
sections, I argued that community resilience in a thriving sense was a function of
both adaptive capacity and participative capacity. Elsewhere I have argued that
communities must take some responsibility for becoming a community so as to build
participative capacity, and be engaged in recovery processes. Yet, much of the
responsibility for participative capacity rests with formally appointed leaders, such as
our Minister for Earthquake Recovery Gerry Brownlee, and the Mayors and CEOs of
our local authorities. Have they ensured that their models of governance enable and
encourage community participation or are they focussing on the pipes and
pavements? Ultimately, recovery is not something that authorities and agencies
simply decide is happening or has happened; recovery is in the eye of the beholder
thus it is important to take the community with you.
References
Allmendinger, P. (2009). Planning Theory. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Babbie, E. (2010). The Practice of Social Research. Belmont; Wadsworth.
Chamberlain, P., Vallance, S., Perkins, H. and Dupuis, A. (2010). Community
commodified: Planning for a sense of community in residential subdivisions.
A paper presented at the Australasian Housing Researchers Conference,
Auckland, 17-19th November, 2010
19
Ironically we may never know because if we are successful, disasters are averted or the costs
reduced!
403
Clarke, L. (2008). Worst-case thinking and official failure in Katrina. In H.

Richardson, P. Gordon, and J. Moore (Eds.). Natural Disaster Analysis after
Hurricane Katrina: Risk Assessment, Economic Impacts and Social
Implications (pp. 84-92). Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar.
Coghlan, A. (2004). Recovery management in Australia: A community based
approach. In S. Norman (Ed.). Proceedings of the New Zealand Recovery
Symposium, 12-13th July, 2004 (pp. 81-91). Napier, New Zealand. Ministry of
Civil Defence and Emergency Management.
Coles, E. and Buckle, P. (2004). Developing community resilience as a foundation
for effective disaster recovery. Australian Journal of Emergency
Management, 19, 6-15.
De Roo, G. and Silva, E. (2010). A Planners Encounter with Complexity. Surrey,
Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company.
Etye, A. (2004). Psychosocial aspects of recovery: Practical implications for disaster
managers. In S. Norman (Ed.), Proceedings of the New Zealand Recovery
Symposium, 12-13th July, 2004 (pp. 135-142). Napier, New Zealand: Ministry
of Civil Defence and Emergency Management.
Etzioni, A. (1996). The Responsive Community: A Communitarian Perspective.
American Sociological Review, 61(1), 1-11.
Flick, U. (2006). An Introduction to Qualitative Research. London; Sage.
Folke, C., Carpenter, C., Elmqvist, T., Gunderson, L., Holling, C. and Walker, B.
(2002). Resilience and sustainable development: Building adaptive capacity
in a world of transformations. AMBIO: A Journal of the Human Environment,
31, 437-440.
Francois, C. (2008). Complexity: a challenge to governance. Systems Research and
Behavioural Science, 25, pp. 355-357.
Gunder, M. and Hillier, J. (2007). Problematising responsibility in planning theory and
practice: On seeing the middle of the string. Progress in Planning, 68, 57-96
Gunder, M. (2011). Ideologies of certainty in a risky world. Planning Theory. 7, 186206.
Hauser, E., Sherry, E. and Swartz, N. (2008). Risk, preparation and rescue. In H.
Richardson, P. Gordon, and J. Moore (Eds.), Natural disaster analysis after
Hurricane Katrina: Risk assessment, economic impacts and social
implications (pp. 93-120), Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar.
Hinchliffe, S. and Woodward, K. (2004). The Natural and the Social: Uncertainty,
Risk, Change. London: Routledge
404
Kweit, M. and Kweit, R. (2004). Citizen participation and citizen evaluation in disaster
recovery. The American Review of Public Administration, 34, 354-373.
Law, J. (2004). After Method : Mess in Social Science Research. London: Routledge.
Loorbach, D. (2010). Transition management for sustainable development: A
prescriptive, complexity-based governance framework. Governance, 23, pp.
161183.
Lorenz, D. (2011). The diversity of resilience: Contributions from a social science
perspective. Natural Hazards, online first,
www.springerlink.com/content/jp68pv2185320301/
Manyena, S., O'Brien, G., O'Keefe, P. and Rose, J. (2011). Disaster resilience: A
bounce back or bounce forward ability? Local Environment, 16, 417-424.
Murphy, B. (2007). Locating social capital in resilient community-level emergency
management. Natural Hazards, 41, 297315.
Norman, S. (2004). Focus on recovery: A holistic framework. In S. Norman (Ed.),
Proceedings of the New Zealand Recovery Symposium, 12-13th July, 2004.
Napier, New Zealand. Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency
Management, pp. 31 46.
Olshansky, R., Johnson, L., and Topping, K. (2006). Rebuilding communities
following disaster: Lessons from Kobe and Los Angeles. Built Environment,
32, 354-375.
Richardson, M. (2008). Setting Community Boards in Context: A Report for the Royal
Commission on Auckland Governance. Salt and Light HIS Limited.
Scott, J. and Marshall, G. (Eds.). (2005). Oxford Dictionary of Sociology (3rd ed.).
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Solnit, R. (2009). A Paradise Built in Hell: The Extraordinary Communities that Arise
in Disaster. London: Penguin Books.
Thorns, D. C. (2002). The Transformation of Cities: Urban Theory and Urban Life.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Vallance, S. (2011a). Early disaster recovery: A Citizens Guide. Australasian Journal
of Disaster and Trauma Studies, 2011-2.
Vallance, S. (2011b). Community, resilience and recovery: Building or burning
bridges? Lincoln Planning Review, 3,1, 4-7.
Waugh, W. and Streib, G. (2006). Collaboration and leadership for effective
emergency management. Public Administration Review, 66, 131140.
405
Whatmore, S. and Landstrom, C. (2011). Flood apprentices; An exercise in making

things public. Economy and Society, 40, 582-610.
Wilson, P. (2009). Deliberative Planning for Disaster Recovery: Re-membering New
Orleans. Journal of Public Deliberation, 5, 1-25.
Williams, P. and Pocock, B. (2009). Building community for different stages of life:
physical and social infrastructure in master planned communities.
Community, Work & Family, 13(1), 71-87.
406

Yoko Akama, Susan Chaplin, Richard Philips, Keith Toh
Bushfire CRC research team: Effective Communication: Communities and Bushfire.
RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia
Paper presented at
407

Abstract
To date, both government and fire authorities in Victoria have deployed a variety of
communication messages on bushfire awareness. Yet, distributing information to a
wide audience is not enough to increase peoples preparedness for bushfire. These
forms of communication sustain a transmission process that reinforces the powerdynamics of control, making audiences passive. It perpetuates the disempowerment
felt by communities who are not engaged in a dialogic process, further broadening
the gap between expert fire authorities and non-expert community. This paper
presents co-design methods that were used to facilitate a dialogic form of
communication on bushfire preparedness with community members in the Southern
Otways, Victoria. The research engaged a group of 20 residents to facilitate cocreation and communication of local knowledge of the geographical environment
through visualisation. These methods show potential of bridging relationships
between neighbours and the importance of social interactions that can lead to better
fire preparation.
Keywords: communication, community, design-based methodology, participation,
visualisation
Introduction
Evidence now shows that, despite the effectiveness of distributing information to the
broader public, this method alone is not enough to increase peoples preparedness
for bushfire (Robinson 2003). The paper further builds on this evidence to argue that
this form of communication-as-transmission process reinforces the power-dynamics
that currently exists between the fire authorities and the community. The
transmission view of communication considers audiences as passive agents. It is
seen as a way to achieve immediate, unimpeded transmission of messages as a
form of control of distance and people (Carey 1998). The paper will begin by
elaborating on the different frameworks of communication that perpetuates the
obstacles in communicating bushfire risk. It then moves to describe the complacency
and disempowerment felt by communities, further broadening the gap between
expert fire authorities, who has knowledge and experience of bushfires, and the
community as non-experts seen to have little or poor knowledge.
In an attempt to explore and facilitate a dialogic form of communication, a team of
researchers undertook investigations in community-level awareness of bushfire risk.
This paper draws on one particular case study in the Southern Otways, Victoria,
Australia, a regional coastal area that has been identified as high risk and has not
seen catastrophic fire since 1939. The research project is a collaborative partnership
between design researchers from [Name withheld] University, local community
408
organisations and the Community Fireguard facilitator in the Barwon-Corangamite

area. The data was collated during August 2009-February 2010 that included
fieldwork, household visits, focus groups and interviews with residents and Fire
Chiefs. This was followed by a workshop that engaged 20 residents on strengthening
awareness, resilience and preparedness for bushfires. The latter part of the paper
describes details of the design-led methods that were trailed during the workshop.
The term design in the context of this paper refers to both the tangible materiality
(artefacts) and intangible methods and processes. Design thinking is commonly
described as an iterative process that involves re-framing of what we understand the
problem to be (Buchanan 1992; Kimbell 2009). Our knowledge changes as we talk to
different people and undergo various stages of the research inquiry. Instead of
isolating design to one part of a project (ie to produce the final artefact or technical
innovation), designers often see their involvement with various aspects of the project
as an entire design process (Kimbell 2011). Terms such as co-design are often
used to describe processes that help project stakeholders to find solutions for
themselves (Morelli 2007, pp. 5-6). The role of the designer, then, is to amplify the
creativity of other people (Sanders 2007), facilitating through co-creation and to see
people as experts of their own experiences and contexts. This role and view was
critical to this research where the practitioners brought multiple sets of expertise as
communication designers, researchers and educators.
As such, the variety of design-led methods described in this paper includes artefacts
and methods. In particular, it will focus on two design methods called Playful
Triggers (Akama et al, 2007; Loi 2005) and What if scenario cards, which were
used during the workshop in the Southern Otways. These were used to facilitate cocreation and communication of local knowledge of the geographical environment.
Through this process, each resident shared their limited knowledge of their
neighbours and geographical areas. This in turn opened up assumptions or
generalisations, inviting other participants to question what they knew. The process
of visualising tacit or informal knowledge made it tangible and concrete. Casual,
collective knowledge of others in a bushfire context became substantial, valuable
and significant for mitigation and planning. These design methods show the
importance of social interactions and demonstrate potential of bridging relationships
between neighbours that can lead to better fire preparation.
Defining communication
The term communication is a rich tangle of intellectual and cultural strands that
confronts us with a longing for utopia where nothing can be misunderstood (Peters
2000). Communication is both the most intuitively human and every-day mundane
processes, as well as being the force that drive political, religious, commercial and
personal interactions.
409
The most common definition of communication refers to the activity of imparting or

transmitting messages, information, ideas or knowledge. The transmission view of
communication dominates in most industrial cultures due to its historical association
with the movement of goods, people and the rapid development of transportation.
The rise of the mass media between the 19 th and 20th centuries, particularly with the
invention of the telegraph with its capacity to send electronic messages over long
distances, made communications more symbolic rather than physical (Morley 2005).
Early models of mass communication emphasised mechanistic processes where
explicit units of information were delivered immediately. This was a form of control of
distance and people (Carey 1988).
Yet, there is another, ancient concept of communication that is also critical to our
understanding. Carey describes the ritual view of communication that is linked to
terms such as sharing, participation, association and fellowship. It is connected
to an ancient identity and common roots to terms such as commonness,
communion, community and communication. The connection between
communication and community is significant where communication can be viewed
as the very constitution of a community. The key is to recognise that a community is
not an entity that exists, which happens to communicate. Instead, communities are
best described as constituted in and through their changing patterns of
communication (Morely 2005, p. 50). Seen this way, a ritual view of communication
is not the direction and extension of messages in space but it is maintenance of
society in time and the representation of shared beliefs.
Communication brings the community into being, rather than provide predefined
identities, which is then expressed or represented. It is a symbolic order that
manifests an ongoing, fragile social process (Carey 1988). Carey also draws on
Deweys description of communication as human fellowship that produces social
bonds. Dewey describes that the things people have in common aims, beliefs,
aspirations, knowledge, like-mindedness cannot be passed physically from one to
another like bricks; they cannot be shared as persons would share a pie by dividing it
into physical pieces consensus demands communication (Dewey in Carey 1988,
p. 22). Through this sharing, entities such as communities of interest or
communities of practices are formed.
The social process of communication is emphasised further by Bush who explains
that communication occurs when people complete the messages by bringing their
own expectations and interpretive practices to the exchange (2003, p. 26). This
critiques the transmission view of communication as sending and receiving
messages in a neutral form. Communication, on a social, personal level is a dialogic
process of meaning-making through exchange. The process of meaning-making is a
personal act and it can have many variables (Bush 2003; Krippendorff 2006).
There is rich discourse in the fields of design, education, psychology, management,
and community development, for example, that describe the limitation to change,
410
growth, learning and sustainable transformation when the context for such
development is dominated and enforced by a authorial figure ie, parent-child,
teacher-student, manager-employee etc. Further compounding the process of
change and transformation is the complexity of social problems, which has been
categorised as wicked problems (Rittel & Webber, 1973) that defy a standard
problem-solving approach in eluding clear problem definition. A wicked problem is a
dynamic moving target characterised by interlocking issues, interests and constraints
and require constant negotiation and cascading, interconnected interventions that
may not solve the problem, although it should reveal more of its nature and scope for
more informed intervention. Many scholars (eg. Buchanan 1992) propose the
suitability of design to such problems on the basis that design is an iterative process,
especially forms of design founded on co-creation where stakeholders have an
integral role in managing issues by influencing responses in an ongoing change
process (Darwin 2010). A key element of many social initiatives is their bottom-up
orientation and collaborative nature in drawing on the local, situated knowledge of
people (Parker & Parker 2007).
In the context of community engagement and bushfire preparedness, a ritual view of
communication that is dialogic, communal and personal is a critical framework to
enable, guide and support capacity-building. Such forms of communication that
emphasises human-to-human engagement, interaction and conversation, can allow
individuals to make-sense of the complex issues and challenges related to
bushfires preparedness in their own words, view and contexts. Scaffolding a ritual
view of communication can create and build social bonds where learning and
transformation of behaviour can take place among a supportive group, leading to
more resilient and sustainable change. These ideas will be further discussed in the
paper through the design-led workshops that were conducted. But first, we look at
current problems in communicating bushfire risks that have used a transmission view
of communication that is hindering some communitys preparedness for bushfire.
Current obstacles in communicating bushfire risk

In Victoria alone, there are approximately 14 authorities and agencies competing for
air-time, potentially providing contradictory messages and overloading the public with
too much information related to bushfire risks (Fairbrother et al. 2011). For example,
many elderly residents from the Yarra Ranges, Victoria, had found the paper-based
information of preparedness excessive (Yarra Ranges Council 2010), often having
difficulty in interpreting the information and how it might apply to their own situation.
Similarly, residents interviewed in the Southern Otways, including staff from the
Country Fire Authority (CFA) who provide services to those areas, have also
disclosed that the Fire Ready information packs delivered to residents remain sealed
in their plastic packs, unopened and unused.
411
It is not just printed materials that are at risk of being ignored or perceived as being
ineffective. Interviews with residents in Kilmore-East after 2009 Black Saturday
tragedy indicates that there was confusion and lack of trust for websites in triggering
or enacting residents fire plan (Elliott & McLennan 2011). Only 1% of those
interviewed described fire agency websites as the information source in triggering
their bushfire plans. In fact, almost half of the residents interviewed (51%) relied on
environmental indications and phone calls from family and friends as cues for
enacting their plans. Elliott and McLennans study reveals that the slowness of
information updates on websites, the ambiguity of information provided and a
perceived absence of threat warnings through the official channels of communication
were some of the reasons for not relying on the internet for information.
More critical is the unreliability of infrastructure to communicating bushfire
preparedness. Even if these messages are updated on the website in a timely way
and worded in a manner that is direct and unambiguous, all electronic forms of
communication are as reliable as the weakest link. Topography of landscapes makes
mobile phone or internet reception inconsistent. If power-lines are exposed, they can
become easily damaged and disconnected in extreme heat, wind and fire, as seen
during the events of 2009 Black Saturday. A place like the Southern Otways has
poor coverage in radio, TV, internet and mobile phone. Many residents voiced their
frustration in being unable to depend on the ABC radio for locally specific, timely and
relevant news broadcast. Inadequate mobile coverage and poor reception of local
radio stations are voiced as being one of the most concerning communication
problems occurring in many regional parts of Australia.
These communication and infrastructure obstacles put into question the national
telephone-based emergency warning system that is undergoing implementation.
Under the Emergency Alert system, emergency services will send warning
messages to phones and mobile phones (CFA website 2011). This method is further
disadvantaged because the alerts are sent to billing addresses of mobile phones,
rather than where the phone is at the time of emergency. Many holiday homeowners
might own a property in high bushfire risk areas, whilst having their main resident
and postal address elsewhere. Given that the peak bushfire season coincides with
the summer holidays, there is grave concern that many holiday homeowners and the
tourists who rent from them, will not receive the SMS alerts. Coupling this fact with
the accounts from the field reveals that a complete dependency on masscommunication is not fail-safe. The dominant and prevailing mindset towards
communication, seen only as a transmission of information, is one of many critical
obstacles in re-thinking different ways to communicating risk and preparedness for
bushfires.
In conjunction with the distanced, print or technology based forms of masscommunication, the CFA for example, have been conducting Fire Ready
presentations during the bushfire season for a number of years. However, even
these locally situated, face-to-face communications have its obstacles. We have
412
observed in a number of locations in Victoria and Tasmania that there were mixed
views on how the community perceives the role and effectiveness of fire authorities.
There are strong emotions held by some members of the community caused by
meeting fatigue and mistrust that presenters were simply towing the company line.
The fire authorities speakers who undertake community talks are required to adhere
to a management-approved script to avoid any potential litigation (Goodman,
Stevens & Rowe 2009), disabling them from offering personal opinions to questions
that are locally specific and situated. This impression of impenetrable bureaucracy,
so unappealing to the locals, is another reason for their lack of attendance and trust.
Residents in the Southern Otways voiced that the presentations were always the
same, and they found little value in attending the community meetings. Non-local
representatives with little in-depth knowledge of the local area are unable to build the
necessary trust with the community or provide information that is relevant to their
specific contexts.
Irrespective of clear, accessible information displayed on websites or receiving
brochures on household preparation, many residents in the Southern Otways have
voiced that these have not led them to be more proactive towards bushfire
preparation. This is also evidenced in the hazards field that provision of information
is not directly related to the adoption of hazards adjustment (Brenkert-Smith 2010).
Similarly, these communication devices, due to the variety in medium, messages,
authority, tangibility and durability, are providing a false perception among the
community and the fire authorities, that an abundance of communication is taking
place between these constituents. This can be critiqued, however, that transmission
and distribution of information is taking place, together with perpetual reinforcements
of control through such transmissions, reflecting the culture of command and control
that has traditionally characterised the emergency services.
It can be argued that the transmission and control of communication diminishes
empowerment, participation and capacity-building for change by the community. A
stronger belief in the fire agencies ability to manage the threat of bushfire reduces
levels of personal bushfire mitigation (Paton 2006). To further evidence this view, we
observed complacency for preparedness and dependency on the fire services to tell
them what to do in many communities in Victoria (Southern Otways and St Arnaud)
and Tasmaina (Derby, Kingborough and Huon Valley). The changing demographic of
these areas also compounds issues of dependency and false-expectations. Urban
dwellers who are used to service delivery are moving into rural settings where selfreliance and locally-based initiatives become more important. As a result, the influx
of newcomers is fragmenting the networks and groups within communities like the
Southern Otways.1
1
For example, see Akama and Ivanka (2010) research on the social network analysis conducted in the Southern
Otways where they had tried to understand the fragmentation and build connections between neighbours for
greater preparedness.
413
There is a danger when this false perception, reinforced by the authority of

communication artefacts, replaces the critical human-to-human engagement needed
for behaviour change to occur. Informal social processes are also important
mechanisms for spreading information, yet its critical role lacks recognition in
bushfire communication. Brenkert-Smiths (2010) research on communities in
Colorado on bushfire mitigation indicate the benefits of bridging relationships
between neighbours and the importance of social interactions that can lead to better
fire preparation. Knowledgeable neighbours, who share the same risk, can often be
more trusted, relied upon and become sources of vital information, than the official
experts. Her study reveals that many of these permanent residents become
interpreters and consolidators of information, tailoring and detailing the information to
enable it to become immediately applicable to the neighbouring property and local
environment.
Next, we look more closely at the ritual view of communication that was explored in a
workshop with residents in the Southern Oways. The dialogic, communal and
personal one-to-one interactions between residents were facilitated through a variety
of design methods.
Exploring various design scaffolds

Playful Triggers to visualise community of place
The term, scaffolding, is central to the way we undertook participant engagement. It
has origins in education (Wood, Bruner & Ross 1976) and cognitive psychology
(Vygotsky 1978). Constructing temporary structures to provide alternative routes to
problem solving and to enable cooperative learning with one another supports
learning. Reciprocity is also key tenet to scaffolding (Holton & Clarke 2006) and to
promote collective generativity among ordinary people (Sanders 2002). Participants
of the bushfire awareness workshop brought their individual knowledge and
expertise to the group activity, effectively facilitating the learning and understanding
of the groups local environmental conditions and community fabric. The researchers
undertook a co-design approach to initiate living change processes (Meroni &
Sangiorgi 2011) to facilitate social creativity (Fischer 2003) that can generate new
insights. The design methods described here are change-agents to catalyse action
and enable people to build their capabilities so they can co-design solutions that
address their circumstance, rather than being instructed what to do in a top-down
manner.
414
Fig. A: Playful Triggers used in a workshop in the Southern Otways
The first design scaffold we discuss are Playful Triggers (Akama et al, 2007; Loi
2005). Figure A shows a close up of the objects that make up the Playful Triggers.
They are ethnomethodological tools where commonly found objects are used to
access, interpret, visualise, articulate and communicate implicit knowledge through
facilitated conversations. This methodology utilises playful, tactile, everyday qualities
of objects. When placed in a specific context, the artefacts take on the meanings
placed on them by the participants.
In the workshops, groups of residents living in the same geographical area were
asked to use the Playful Triggers to visualise the collective knowledge of their local
area: a variety of objects, such as buttons, beads, coloured matchsticks and toy
animals. Each household and individuals situation is different and they hold expert
knowledge of the people, land and topography. Through facilitated discussion and
interaction, the participants visualised the location and number of permanent and
non-permanent households; holiday homes; those they thought were vulnerable;
potential geographical, natural or structural hazards; any media and communication
coverage; and likely direction of the fire (see Fig B).
415
Fig B: A group of residents undertaking the visualisation of their local area
Many participants took to the visualisation method easily and intuitively, remarking
that it was an informal, effective way of revealing and capturing and sharing
collective knowledge. There were several significant observations. Firstly, this
method gave recognition to participants local knowledge, which is critical to bushfire
mitigation. Locally-situated, current knowledge they shared included vegetation that
needed cutting, or sharp corners on a dirt-track that is hazardous. Secondly, it
revealed insights that they were not aware of before. Some quickly realised that they
knew little about their neighbours or their plans for bushfires. For example, one
participant thought he knew his neighbours well and recalled that they had discussed
their bushfire plans. Upon being questioned by his wife, he was unable to detail what
they were. This lack of knowledge and awareness of others was more acute for nonpermanent residents who only knew a small number of people living nearby. Thirdly,
the open-nature of the activity enabled them to be less confronted by what they
didnt know, and instead, promoted a willingness to share, or be proactive in what
they didnt know. For example, one participant who didnt know the names of those
living on his street went out later after the workshop, to find out all their names.
Overall, we observed that there was immediate knowledge transfer among
participants, facilitated through discussions during this exercise. The interaction and
conversation among neighbours led to greater awareness and knowledge of others
residing in their local area. Through knowledge shared among residents living in their
area, they were able to increase their awareness of other households and the
environment. The process of visualising tacit or informal knowledge made it
416
tangible and concrete. Conversation with others enabled assumptions to be

questioned. Casual, collective knowledge of others in a bushfire context became
substantial, valuable and significant for mitigation and planning.
Several residents remarked that this method provided them with an understanding of
their community of place much more than initially conceived. Previously, each
individual or household held a limited amount of knowledge about their neighbours or
their geographical area. Sometimes, as illustrated previously, this knowledge was
assumed or generalised without being critically interrogated. The residents
understood that this knowledge was critical to their individual bushfire plans
highlighting a need for collective neighbourhood-level planning.
We also observed that this exercise was catalytic to the creation of sub-groups
gathered around a common cause. Identification of those who are vulnerable
heightened a general awareness of ensuring that contact was made with them. For
example, several frail elderly residents (Fig. C) were concerned that they should not
even be at the workshop since bushfire preparation often involves a great deal of
physical labour, for example, clearing gutters of debris, mowing the lawn, cutting
down bushy trees, etc and they were unable to do any of these tasks by themselves
(at the time, there were no community services that can undertake these tasks on
their behalf). Yet, there was no need for them to ask others to help. Their
participation in the workshop activity alone naturally led to conversations about
where they lived and who they lived nearby. Another participant realised that her
elderly mother lived close to the two most timid old ladies. The three organised to
swap phone numbers and then subsequently formed a Community Fire Guard
group, so they could be better prepared together. Other participants requested if they
could adopt this method and develop it further, aggregating other forms of data such
as households names, contact numbers, equipment (such as water pump, radio
scanner, fire bunker etc.) for smaller groups of neighbours.
417
Fig C: Elderly ladies undertake the visualisation exercise, with the assistance from one of the researcher
What if scenario cards

Assisting people to use their imagination, to stimulate and heighten their emotivecognition skills was another method used in the workshop (Fig. D & E). These cards
dovetailed the exercise after the Playful Triggers visualisation, designed to extend
the participants knowledge gained, and to think specifically about unexpected
scenarios that could occur in sudden bushfire.
418
Fig D: An example of a trigger scenario and the responses by a participant
Scenarios are an effective method used in design to stimulate the imagination and
visualise the future (see. Mazini & Jgou 2004; Stickdorn & Schneider 2010). In the
context of bushfire preparedness, it reduces the temptation for insular thinking, it
cant happen to me, which is one of the key obstacles to bushfire preparation.
Instead, triggering peoples imagination is viewed as a critical mechanism for
anticipating the threat of fire (Goodman, Stevens & Rowe 2009). The scenarios were
generated from various interviews and case studies of past bushfire survivors in
Australia, highlighting common accidents, unexpected occurrences and lack of
planning that lead to increased risks. Incidents involving pets, farm animals or
tourists in panic were a common cause for people taking risks. Drawing upon these
real events, the cards were designed to initiate conversations based on the
residents particular locale. Trigger cards with unforeseen occurrences, such as a
fallen tree blocking access or poor visibility, were randomly selected from a stack of
cards. They prompted people to strategise alternative plans to circumnavigate such
occurrences. Their ideas were then written on another card and shared to lead a
group discussion (Fig. E). The emphasis of a group conversation enabled a relatively
safe environment to discuss a scenario which can set off complex, confronting and
difficult circumstances and to really think through each one carefully in guidance
from the CFG facilitator.
Fig E: One participant thinks through the trigger scenario You are injured and you cant move or drive
419
The scenario cards emphasised the importance of having alternative plans in case
there were unforeseen circumstances that hindered them from evacuating earlier. It
also highlighted that some plans were ill considered, for example, the most common
plan was to go to the beach. Using this scenario, the Community Fireguard facilitator
talked through the details of its possible risks and what to evaluate and prepare for,
for example, access to the beach and likelihood of wading in water for a long period
of time. This exercise guided the participants to think through their plans more
thoroughly.
Some participants were baffled by some of the unexpected scenarios from the stack
of cards. For example, one lady was confronted with the situation, you cant get in
touch with your friend. She is a temporary resident and doesnt drive and relies on
public transport. This scenario really troubled her. However, in discussion with
others, it prompted her to think through how to avoid or get around this situation if
she couldnt get hold of her husband.
The significance of this methodology in fostering ground-up dialogue is
demonstrated by the 18 evaluation sheets that were returned, all indicating that the
event and the activities were effective in raising awareness on bushfire preparation.
As a result of attending the Awareness Day, majority of the participants also signed
up to the Community Fire Guard2. The workshop method is very open-ended,
scaffolded in a way to enable the conversation to take its natural course. Visualising
each persons understanding catalysed numerous location-specific, bushfire related
conversations, driven by the participants themselves. What was most striking to
observe is how motivated and willing all participants were in taking part in the
activities, due to its playful, game-like design. For example, several participants
asked if they could take away the set of what if scenario cards to help them
reinforce their bushfire plans when they returned home. Such serendipitous
outcomes cannot be scripted or instructed in a communication message. However,
through carefully facilitated and scaffolded engagements, serendipitous discovery
and tangential conversations can be designed into an activity, as demonstrated by
this methodology.
Conclusion
The process of raising awareness to lead to effective bushfire preparedness
depends on various factors that can encounter significant obstacles, requiring a
dynamic and multi-layered approach to community awareness and engagement.
This paper has demonstrated the shortcomings in over-emphasising communication
2
When this research began in August 2009, the CFG had only recently been initiated in the Southern Otways.
The research team had partnered with the CFG facilitator for the workshop to provide more visibility to the CFG
activities, as well as recruit new participants.
420
based on solely transmitting information. Limited understandings of communication

are obstacles in achieving behaviour change that is engaging and sustainable. It
argued that catalysing behaviour change could only occur when the actors are
enacting their self-empowerment. Our exploration of fostering knowledge sharing in
a social context through a variety of design methods could be developed further, in
parallel with more formal methods initiated by the fire authorities. There is untapped
potential at the community level for households to learn from and assist one another.
Yet this informal, participatory form of communication lacks stronger recognition by
the fire authorities that are more concerned about the danger of promoting
misguided information. It is critical to understand that the methods we explored are
catalysts to building relationships for communities who, ultimately, have to rely on
their shared resources and networks in a catastrophic event like a bushfire. In these
dramatic events, communication can catalyse social cohesion and fellowship that
become one of the most vital lifelines that residents can depend upon. Our team are
continuing discussions with the fire authorities and, in particular with the DSE on
their program on fire learning network that have fruitful synergies with our
approach3. Other examples include the use of social media technology, like Bushfire
Connect (Funnell 2011), which crowd-sources information from the community who
become the first responders to a bushfire event. These initiatives show potential for a
hands-on, participatory engagement that is promoted and supported by partnerships
among bushfire researchers, community organisations and fire authorities.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the invaluable input by the residents and fire agency staff in
the Southern Otways, St Arnaud, Kinborough, Huon Valley, Scottsdale as well as the
co-operation of the Community Fire Guard facilitator in Barwon-Corangamite area,
the Southern Otways Landcare Netowrk and Otway Health Community Services.
This research has been funded by the School of Media and Communication, Design
Research Institute and the Bushfire CRC at RMIT University.
References
Akama, Y., Cooper, R., Vaughan, L., Viller, S., Simpson, M., & Yuille, J. (2007).
Show and tell: Accessing and communicating implicit knowledge through artefacts.
Artifact, 1(3), 172-181.
See the work conducted by Simone Blair, Clair Campbell and Matt Campbell on A case study of a strategic
conversation about fire in Victoria, Australia, 2010, published by the Department of Sustainability and
Environment. It gives an excellent account of their processes in facilitating and supporting a ground-up, dialogic
conversation on bushfire awareness.
421
Akama, Y., & Ivanka, T. (2010). What community? Facilitating awareness of

community through Playful Triggers. Paper presented at the The Eleventh
Conference on Participatory Design 2010, Sydney, Australia, Nov 29 Dec 3, 2010.
Blair, S., Campbell, C., & Campbell, M. (2010). A case study of a strategic
conversation about fire in Victoria, Australia: Department of Sustainability and
Environment. Report Number 79)
Brenkert-Smith, H. (2010). Building bridges to fight fire: the role of informal social
interactions in six Colorado wildland-urban interface communities. International
Journal of Wildland Fire, 19, 689-697.
Buchanan, R. (1992). Wicked problems in design thinking. Design Issues, 8(2), 5-21.
Bush, A. (2003). Beyond Pro Bono. In S. Heller & V. Vienne (Eds.), Citizen Designer
- Perspectives on Design Responsibility (pp. 25-31). New York: Allworth Press.
Carey, J. (1998). Communication as culture: essays on media and society. London:
Routledge.
CFA. (2011). Bushfire alerts and warnings: What to expect and where to find
information. CFA website, accessed on 18th Jan 2011 from
http://www.cfa.vic.gov.au/warnings-and-incidents/understand-bushfire-warnings.htm
Darwin, T. (2010). From the townhall into the studio: Design, Democracy and
Community Resilience. The Journal of Design Strategies, 4(1), 29-33.
Elliott, G., & McLennan, J. (2011). Civilian decision making under stress: use of fire
agency web-sites on Black Saturday, Bushfire CRC, accessed 10th January 2011
from http://www.bushfirecrc.com/resources/poster/civilian-decision-making-understress-use-fire-agency-web-sites-black-saturday
Fairbrother, P., Chaplin, S., Philips, R., & Toh, K. (2011). Bushfire Communication
Schema - Tracking Variety of Sources, Modes and Audiences. Bushfire CRC:
Bushfire CRC.
Fischer, G. (2003). Meta-Design: Beyond User-Centred and Participatory Design.
Paper presented at the HCI International, Crete, Greece, June 2003.
Funnell, A. (2011). Emergencies, disasters and the role of digital technology. On
Future Tense: ABC Radio National, broadcasted on 10th November 2011. Accessed
via pod cast on 27th January 2012 at
http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/futuretense/emergencies-disastersand-the-role-of-digital/3652170
Goodman, H., Stevens, K., and Rowe, C. (2009) Mt Bold Case Study: Bushfire CRC
/ RMIT University.
422
Holton, D., & Clarke, D. (2006). Scaffolding and metacognition. International Journal
of Mathematical Education in Science and Technology, 37, 137-143.
Kimbell, L. (2009). Beyond design thinking: Design-as-practice and designs-inpractice. Paper presented at the CRESC Conference.
Kimbell, L. (2011). Designing for services as one way of designing services.
International Journal of Design, 5(2), 1-12.
Krippendorff, K. (2006). The Semantic Turn: A New Foundation for Design. Boca
Raton: Taylor & Francis.
Morelli, N. (2007). "Social Innovation and New Industrial Contexts: Can Designers
"Industrialize" Socially Responsible Solutions?" Design Issues 23(4): 3-21.
Loi, D. (2005). The Book of Probes. Lavoretti Per Bimbi: Playful Triggers as key to
foster collaborative practices and workspaces where people learn, Wonder and play.
RMIT University, Melbourne.
Manzini, E., & Jegou, F. (2004). Sustainable Everyday: Scenarios of Urban Life.
Retrieved 27 October, 2007, from http://sustainableeveryday.net/scenarios/?page_id=28
Meroni, A., & Sangiorgi, D. (2011). Design for services. Farnham, England: Gower.
Morley, D (2005), Communication in Bennett T., Grossberg L., Morris M., eds.,
New Keywords: A Revised Vocabulary of Culture and Society, Oxford, Blackwell,
pp.47-50.
Parker, S., & Parker, S. (2007). Unlocking innovation. Why citizens hold the key to
public servcie reform. London: Demos.
Paton, D., Kelly, G., Burgelt, P., & Doherty, M. (2006). Preparing for bushfires:
understanding intentions. Disaster Prevention and Management, 15(4), 566-575.
Peters, J. D. (2000). Introduction: The problem of communication. In J. D. Peters
(Ed.), Speaking into the Air: A history of the idea of communication (pp. 1-10).
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Robinson, L. (2003). Education for resilience: Community safety communication for
natural hazards, accessed 8th August 2009, from
http://www.enablingchange.com.au/Resilience_and_risk.pdf
Rittel, H.W.J. and Webber M.M. (1973). Dilemmas in a general theory of planning.
Policy Sciences, 4(2):155-169.
Sanders, E. B. (2002). Scaffolds for Experiencing in the New Design Space.
Information Design, pp. 1-6.
423
Sanders, E. (2007). Design Research: From Market-Driven Era to User-centred

innovation. Retrieved 25th October, 2007, from
http://www.masternewmedia.org/interface_and_navigation_design/designresearch/state-of-design-research-from-market-driven-era-to-user-centeredinnovation-MakeTools-Liz-Sanders-20071019.htm
Strickdorn, M., & Schneider, J. (2010). This is service design thinking. Amsterdam:
BIS Publishers.
Wood, D., Bruner, J., & Ross, G. (1976). The Role of Tutoring in Problem Solving.
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 17, 89-100.
Vygotsky, L.S. (1978) In: Cole, M., John-Steiner, V., Scribner S. and Souberman,
E. (eds) Mind in Society: the Development of Higher Psychological Processes.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Yarra Ranges Council (2010) I Fought Two Wars, I Can Fight This: Bushfire
awareness and preparedness of frail older and vulnerable residents in Yarra
Ranges, Project Report, Yarra Ranges Council, Lilydale, accessed 22nd January
2011, from www.yarraranges.vic.gov.au
424
ISBN: 978-0-9808147-4-3
Publisher Details
Publisher AST Management Pty Ltd
Contact Cathryn Gertzos
Address PO Box 29, Nerang QLD 4211
Telephone +61 7 5502 2068
Fax +61 7 5527 3298
Email: conference@anzdmc.com.au

Emergency Management - Australia and NZ

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Emergency Management - Australia and NZ

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Australian & New Zealand Disaster and

Emergency Management Conference

EARTH: FIRE AND RAIN

Disaster and Emergency Management

Developing the next generation of Emergency Managers: a 202vision

structures: the square peg into the round hole?

Likelihood of Innovative Construction Techniques to strengthen Housing for Disaster Mitigation

The case for a changed flood warning paradigm

Kate Brady & Jolie Wills

Cross in Disaster Recovery.

weather events in Australia

Have we recovered yet?

Rebuilding After the 2010/2011 Victorian Floods A Roads Perspective

Karleen Gribble & Nina Berry

Examining the resilience of rural communities to flooding emergencies

and Ongoing Recovery Operations?

PEER REVIEWED PAPERS

Lifestyle at risk? The case of Ingham

Axel Bruns & Jean Burgess

Jennie Cramp & Jennifer Scott

Learning for disaster resilience

Ruth Fuller, David Cliff & Tim

Optimising the use of an incident management system in coal mining emergencies

Implications for Managers

Emergency Communications and Warning Systems: Determining Critical Capacities and

Capabilities in the Australian Context

The Core Volunteer

Joanne Millar et al.

on capacity, the building of trust, and the security in working together.

Bob Stevenson et al.

Urban resilience: Bouncing back, coping, thriving

Design-led strategies for bushfire preparedness

Developing the next generation of Emergency Managers:

Mr Chris Ainsworth MBS CEM Fulbright Alumnus

Principal: raemec australia

International Association of Emergency Managers

Chris Ainsworth, 2012

Developing the next generation of Emergency Managers:

Image 1 A visual perspective

Experiences within Disasters

Organisational Leadership Sustainability

As the field of emergency management assumes greater recognition and respect as

Will organisations accept academic programs as the benchmark in meeting the

Image 2 Ike viewed from the International Space Station

Hurricane Ike was the third most destructive hurricane to ever

September 13, 2008

September 14, 2008 (Iceland)

230 km/h (145 mph) Cat 4

103 direct, 92 indirect, 34 missing

$28.7 billion (2008 USD) Sept 2008

Turks and Caicos, Bahamas, Haiti,

What Dallas Mega Shelter Operations achieved in 48 hours?

Image 3 Lessons from the field

Communication and public information in a technology world is challenging at best.

Communities are beginning to demand information, and in many cases, information

Issues with the current system

Image 5 Modified PESTEL framework

Social: Demographic variables: population size, age structure, geographic

distribution, ethnic mix, income distribution. It also includes tastes, fashions,

Technological: Primary new products, processes, and materials. Includes the

Environmental: Reflects concern for the sustainability of the physical

environment. Issues include; greenhouse effect, CO2 emissions, genetic

Political: Issues: government stability, alignments at the international level,

Media: An increasing important influence on business, politics and society as