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Koruga is a minority stockholder of Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage
Bank. On August 20, 2003, she filed a complaint before the Makati RTC against its board
of directors for allegedly engaging in unsafe and fraudulent banking practices. The
complaint filed by Koruga charged the defendants with violation of Section 31 to 34 of
the Corporation Code which prohibit self-dealing and conflict of interest of directors and
officers; invoked her right to inspect the corporations records under Section 74 of the
Corporation Code and prayed for receivership and creation of a management committee
pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Securities Regulation Code, the Interim
Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies, the General Banking Law
of 2000, and the New Central Bank Act. She claimed that Banco Filipino's management
had engaged in unsafe, unsound, and even fraudulent banking practices; engaged in selfdealing; violated banking laws prohibiting or limiting DOSRI transactions; put the bank
and its depositors in jeopardy. The respondents, however, questioned the jurisdiction of
the trial court, and even went to as far as getting an injunction from the Court of Appeals.
In a decision dated July 20, 2005, the appellate court directed the trial court to proceed
with the hearings, having found no grave abuse of discretion when it accepted the case.
The case was eventually brought to the Supreme Court.

WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case?

RTC had no jurisdiction. The court pointed out that it is the Bangko
Sentralng Pilipinas and not the RTC which has jurisdiction over the case. In its decision,
the high court said: "It is clear that the acts complained of pertain to the conduct of Banco
Filipinos banking business. It is the governments responsibility to see to it that the
financial interests of those who deal with banks and banking institutions are protected.
That task is delegated to the BSP. "The General Banking Law of 2000, which provides
powers to the Monetary Board, restricts the bank exposures of directors and its officers. It
also allows the Monetary Board to determine whether a bank is conducting business in an
unsafe manner. The New Central Bank Act, on the other hand, provides the Monetary
Board with the power to impose administrative sanctions on the officers and board
members of erring banks. It is the Monetary Board that exercises exclusive jurisdiction
over proceedings for receivership of banks. Thus, the courts jurisdiction could only
have been invoked after the Monetary Board had taken action on the matter and only on
the ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of
discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Finally, given her own admission
and the same is likewise supported by evidence that she is merely a minority stockholder
of Banco Filipino, she would not have the standing to
question the Monetary Boards action.

Cheryl married Edward Lim sometime 1979 and they have three children.
Cheryl, Edward and their children lived at the house of Edwards parents, Prudencio and
Filomena, in Forbes Park, Makati City, together with Edwards ailing grandmother, Chua
Giak and her husband Mariano. Edward was employed with the family business, which
provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000 and shouldered the family expenses.
Cheryl had no steady source of income. Cheryl caught Edward in a very compromising
situation with the midwife of Chua Giak. After a violent confrontation with Edward,
Cheryl left the Forbes Park residence on October 14, 1990. She subsequently sued, for
herself and her children, Edward, Edwards parents, and Edwards grandparents for
support. The RTC ordered Edward and his parents to jointly provide P40,000 monthly
support to Cheryl and her children, with Edward shouldering P6,000 and Edwards
parents the balance of P34,000 subject to Chua Giaks subsidiary liability.
Edwards parents appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated 28 April 2003,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the regional trial court.The Court of Appeals ruled: The
law on support under Article 195 of the Family Code is clear on this matter. Parents and
their legitimate children are obliged to mutually support one another and this obligation
extends down to the legitimate grandchildren and great grandchildren.

WON the grandparents are liable for support?

According to the Supreme Court, Edwards parents are liable to provide
support but only to their grandchildren: By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the
liability of ascendants to provide legal support to their descendants is beyond cavil.
Petitioners themselves admit as much they limit their petition to the narrow question of
when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on provisions found in Title
IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that their
liability is activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by its
termination or suspension during the childrens minority. Because at the time respondents
sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their children,
petitioners submit that the obligation to support the latters offspring ends with them.
While parental authority under Title IX (and the correlative parental rights) pertains to
parents, passing to ascendants only upon its termination or suspension, the obligation to
provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents but
also for the latters inability to provide sufficient support. Here, there is no question that
Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal support to her
children, then all school-bound.

Respondent Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc. and petitioners executed two
Contracts of Lease. The lease of Rooms 36, 37 and 38 did not materialize leaving only
Rooms 22, 24, 32, 33, 34 and 35 as subjects of the lease contracts. While the contracts
were in effect, petitioners dealt with Francis Pacheco (Pacheco), then General Manager of
private respondent. Thereafter, Pacheco was replaced by Roswinda Bautista (Ms.
Bautista). Petitioners religiously paid the monthly rentals until May 1992. After that,
however, despite repeated demands, petitioners continuously refused to pay the stipulated
rent. Consequently, respondent was constrained to refer the matter to its lawyer who, in
turn, made a final demand on petitioners for the payment of the accrued rentals
amounting to P916,585.58. Because petitioners still refused to comply, a complaint for
ejectment was filed by private respondent through its representative, Ms. Bautista, before
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. The case was raffled to Branch XIX and
was docketed as Civil Case No. 143058-CV. Petitioners admitted their failure to pay the
stipulated rent for the leased premises starting July until November 1992, but claimed
that such refusal was justified because of the internal squabble in respondent company as
to the person authorized to receive payment.
MeTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for ejectment. It considered
petitioners non-payment of rentals as unjustified. The court held that mere willingness to
pay the rent did not amount to payment of the obligation; petitioners should have
deposited their payment in the name of respondent company. The RTC set aside the ruing
of MeTC. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

WON petitioners should be ejected?

YES. Petitioners communications to respondent prior to the filing of the
complaint never mentioned their alleged inability to use the rooms. What they pointed out
in their letters is that they did not know to whom payment should be made, whether to
Ms. Bautista or to Pacheco. In their July 26 and October 30, 1993 letters, petitioners only
questioned the method of computing their electric billings without, however, raising a
complaint about their failure to use the rooms. Although petitioners stated in their
December 30, 1993 letter that respondent failed to fulfill its part of the contract, nowhere
did they specifically refer to their inability to use the leased rooms. Besides, at that time,
they were already in default on their rentals for more than a year.What was, instead,
clearly established by the evidence was petitioners non-payment of rentals because
ostensibly they did not know to whom payment should be made. However, this did not
justify their failure to pay, because if such were the case, they were not without any
remedy. They should have availed of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines
on the consignation of payment and of the Rules of Court on interpleader.

Michael J. Lagrosas was employed by Bristol-Myers. On February 4,
2000, Ma. Dulcinea S. Lim, also a Territory Manager and Lagrosas former girlfriend,
attended a district meeting of territory managers at McDonalds Alabang Town Center.
After the meeting, she dined out with her friends. She left her car at McDonalds and rode
with Cesar R. Menquito, Jr. When they returned to McDonalds, Lim saw Lagrosas car
parked beside her car. Lim told Menquito not to stop his car but Lagrosas followed them
and slammed Menquitos car thrice. Menquito and Lim alighted from the car. Lagrosas
approached them and hit Menquito with a metal steering wheel lock. When Lim tried to
intervene, Lagrosas accidentally hit her head.
Upon learning of the incident, Bristol-Myers required Lagrosas to explain in writing why
he should not be dismissed for assaulting a co-employee outside of business hours. In his
memo, Lagrosas admitted that he accidentally hit Lim when she tried to intervene. On
March 23, 2000, Bristol-Myers dismissed Lagrosas effective immediately. Lagrosas then
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of vacation and sick leave benefits,
13th month pay, attorneys fees, damages and fair market value of his Team Share Stock
Option Grant. The labor arbiter ruled that while Lagrosas committed a misconduct, it was
not connected with his work. Thus there was illegal dismissal. NLRC did not alter the
Labor Arbiters ruling. Later, Labor Arbiter Hernandez issued a writ of execution which
Bristol moved to quash contending that it timely filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals. The appellate court gave due course to Bristol-Myers petition and
issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the enforcement of the writ of
execution and notices of garnishment. Upon the expiration of the TRO, the appellate
court issued a writ of preliminary injunction dated September 17, 2004.
Bristol-Myers then moved to discharge and release the TRO cash bond. It argued that
since it has posted an injunction cash bond, the TRO cash bond should be legally
discharged and released.)

WON preliminary injunction is proper?

In this case, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of preliminary injunction
to enjoin the implementation of the writ of execution and notices of garnishment
"pending final resolution of this case or unless the [w]rit is sooner lifted by the Court.
By its Decision dated January 28, 2005, the appellate court disposed of the case by
granting Bristol-Myers petition and reinstating the Decision dated September 24, 2002 of
the NLRC which dismissed the complaint for dismissal. It also ordered the discharge of
the TRO cash bond and injunction cash bond. Thus, both conditions of the writ of
preliminary injunction were satisfied.

Notably, the appellate court ruled that Lagrosas had no right to the monetary awards
granted by the labor arbiter and the NLRC, and that the implementation of the writ of
execution and notices of garnishment was properly enjoined. This in effect amounted to a
finding that Lagrosas did not sustain any damage by reason of the injunction. To reiterate,
the injunction bond is intended to protect Lagrosas against loss or damage by reason of
the injunction only. Contrary to Lagrosas claim, it is not a security for the judgment
award by the labor arbiter. Considering the foregoing, we hold that the appellate court
erred in disallowing the discharge and release of the injunction cash bond.


On June 7, 1999, LBP filed a complaint for estafa against the respondents
before the City Prosecutors Office in Makati City. In the affidavit-complaint the LBPs
Account Officer for the Account Management Development, Edna L. Juan, stated that
LBP extended a credit accommodation to ACDC through the execution of an Omnibus
Credit Line Agreement. In various instances, ACDC used the Letters of Credit/Trust
Receipts Facility of the Agreement to buy construction materials. The respondents, as
officers and representatives of ACDC, executed trust receipts in connection with the
construction materials, with a total principal amount of P52,344,096.32. The trust
receipts matured, but ACDC failed to return to LBP the proceeds of the construction
projects or the construction materials subject of the trust receipts. LBP sent ACDC a
demand letter dated May 4, 1999, for the payment of its debts, including those under the
Trust Receipts Facility in the amount of P66,425,924.39. When ACDC failed to comply
with the demand letter, LBP filed the affidavit-complaint. They stated that they signed the
trust receipt documents on or about the same time LBP and ACDC executed the loan
documents; their signatures were required by LBP for the release of the loans. The trust
receipts in this case do not contain (1) a description of the goods placed in trust, (2) their
invoice values, and (3) their maturity dates, in violation of Section 5(a) of P.D. 115.
Moreover, they alleged that ACDC acted as a subcontractor for government projects such
as the Metro Rail Transit, the Clark Centennial Exposition and the Quezon Power Plant in
Mauban, Quezon. Its clients for the construction projects, which were the general
contractors of these projects, have not yet paid them; thus, ACDC had yet to receive the
proceeds of the materials that were the subject of the trust receipts and were allegedly
used for these constructions. As there were no proceeds received from these clients, no
misappropriation thereof could have taken place.

WON the transactions are trust receipts?

NO. The disputed transactions are not trust receipts. There are two
obligations in a trust receipt transaction. The first is covered by the provision that refers
to money under the obligation to deliver it (entregarla) to the owner of the merchandise
sold. The second is covered by the provision referring to merchandise received under the
obligation to return it (devolvera) to the owner. Thus, under the Trust Receipts Law,
intent to defraud is presumed when (1) the entrustee fails to turn over the proceeds of the
sale of goods covered by the trust receipt to the entruster; or (2) when the entrustee fails
to return the goods under trust, if they are not disposed of in accordance with the terms of
the trust receipts.

In all trust receipt transactions, both obligations on the part of the trustee exist in
the alternative the return of the proceeds of the sale or the return or recovery of the
goods, whether raw or processed. When both parties enter into an agreement knowing
that the return of the goods subject of the trust receipt is not possible even without any
fault on the part of the trustee, it is not a trust receipt transaction penalized under Section
13 of P.D. 115; the only obligation actually agreed upon by the parties would be the
return of the proceeds of the sale transaction. This transaction becomes a mere loan,
where the borrower is obligated to pay the bank the amount spent for the purchase of
the goods. Since these transactions are not trust receipts, an action for estafa should not
be brought against the respondents, who are liable only for a loan. In passing, it is useful
to note that this is the threat held against borrowers that Retired Justice Claudio
Teehankee emphatically opposed in his dissent in People v. Cuevo, restated in Ong v. CA,
et al;

The very definition of trust receipt x x x sustains the lower courts

rationale in dismissing the information that the contract covered by a trust
receipt is merely a secured loan. The goods imported by the small
importer and retail dealer through the banks financing remain of their
own property and risk and the old capitalist orientation of putting them in
jail for estafa for non-payment of the secured loan (granted after they had
been fully investigated by the bank as good credit risks) through the
fiction of the trust receipt device should no longer be permitted in this day
and age.

As the law stands today, violations of Trust Receipts Law are criminally
punishable, but no criminal complaint for violation of Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation with P.D. 115, should prosper against a borrower who
was not part of a genuine trust receipt transaction.


Eugenio owns a parcel of land in Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan (4,527 square
meters, more or less, andcovered by a TCT --- property was adjudicated to Eugenio by
virtue of an extrajudicial settlement among the heirs following the death of his parents).
Librada F. Mauricio (Librada, DECEASED) and her daughter Leonida F. Mauricio
(Leonida) filed a complaint before the DARAB of Malolos, Bulacan alleging that theyre
the legal heirs of Godofredo Mauricio who was the lawful and registered tenant of
Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest to the subject land (that from 1936 until his
death in May 1994,Godofredo had been working on the subject land and introduced
improvements consisting of fruit-bearing trees, seasonal crops, a residential house and
other permanent improvements; that through fraud, deceit, strategy and other unlawful
means, Eugenio caused the preparation of a document denominated as Kasunduan dated
28 September 1994 to eject respondents from the subject property, and had the same
notarized by Notary Public Ma. Sarah G. Nicolas in Pasig, Metro Manila; that Librada
never appeared before the Notary Public; that Librada was illiterate and the contents of
the Kasunduan were not read nor explained to her; that Eugenio took undue advantage of
the weakness, age, illiteracy, ignorance, indigence and other handicaps of Librada in the
execution of the Kasunduan rendering it void for lack of consent; and that Eugenio had
been employing all illegal means to eject respondents from the subject property). Leonida
and Librada prayed for the declaration of nullity of the Kasunduan and for an order for
Eugenio to maintain and place them in peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject
property. According to Eugenio: Godofredos occupation of the subject premises was
based on the formers mere tolerance and accommodation. Eugenio denied signing a
tenancy agreement, nor authorizing any person to sign such an agreement. He maintained
that Librada, accompanied by are lative, voluntarily affixed her signature to the
Kasunduan and that she was fully aware of the contents of the document. Moreover,
Librada receivedP50,000.00 from Eugenio on the same day of the execution of the
Kasunduan. Eugenio also questioned the jurisdiction of the DARAB since the principal
relief sought by respondents is the annulment of the contract, over which jurisdiction is
vested on the regular courts.

WON Eugenio can question the filiation of Leonida?

NO. Eugenio cannot collaterally attack the status of Leonida in the instant
petition. The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a
collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent
action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican code
(article335) which provides: The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or
his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made
in any other way is void. This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and
171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to the action to impugn the
legitimacy. This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the
periods fixed in the present articles. In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental, the Court stated that legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only
in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack.
The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject to a
collateral attack. InReyes v. Sotero, this Court reiterated that adoption cannot be assailed
collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedents estate. Furthermore, in
Austria v. Reyes, the Court declared that the legality of the adoption by the testatrix can
be assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose and cannot be subject to
collateral attack.