Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
EN BANC.
21
VOL. 240,
JANUARY 4, 1995
Santos vs. Court of
Appeals
2
1
2
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Santos vs. Court of
Appeals
it has not been shown that petitioner does not deserve to live and
cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent
Same; Same; Same; Same; A spouses obligation to live and
cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in
marriage.A spouses obligation to live and cohabit with his/her
partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in marriage, unless
there are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance,
an incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty
of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be instances
when, for economic and practical reasons; husband and wife have
to live separately, but the marital bond between the spouses
always remains. Mutual love and respect for each other would, in
such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular
contacts with the other to inform the latter of his/ her condition
and whereabouts.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Private respondent Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her
husband.In the present case, it is apparent that private
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no intention of
cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact
with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want
her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she any
intention of living and cohabiting with him.
VOL, 240,
JANUARY 4, 1995
Santos vs. Court of
Appeals
2
3
the contracting parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are
constrained to find a way of putting an end to their union through
some legally-accepted means.The constitutional and statutory
provisions on the family will remain the lodestar which our society
will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article
36 is not to be taken as an abandonment -of the ideal which we all
cherish, If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some
marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting
parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to
find a way of putting an end to their union through some legallyaccepted means.
24
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Santos vs. Court of Appeals
_______________
Rollo, 3742.
Rollo, 1318.
26
26
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Santos vs. Court of Appeals
her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more
or less, is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage. Respondent Julia
Rosario Bedia-Santos is one such wife.
xxx
xxx.
Article 36x x x
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
28
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Santos vs. Court of Appeals
Article 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
29
not apply if the marriage was contracted at the time when there is
understanding of the consequence of marriage.
x x x
xxx
xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to
copulate among the grounds for void marriages, Justice Reyes
commented that in some instances the impotence is only
5
even
if
such
incapacity
becomes
manifest
after
its
solemnization.
_______________
5
30
30
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Santos vs. Court of Appeals
who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak
phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . .
31
_______________
7
C 1095
Sunt incapaces matrimonii contrahendi;
1. 1.qui sufficiente rationis usu carent;
2. 2.qui laborant gravi defectu discretionis iudicii circa iura a et official
matrimonialia essentialia mutuo tradenda et acceptanda;
3. 3.qui ob causas naturae psychicae obligationes matrimonii essentiales
assumere non valent
32
32
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt
that the legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict
and narrow norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage
because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975,
canon 297, a new canon, novus);
Ibid., 131132.
33
_______________
11
34
34
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Santos vs. Court of Appeals
36
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Santos vs. Court of Appeals
38
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Santos vs. Court of Appeals
13
SEPARATE OPINION
ROMERO, J., Concurring:
I agree that under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is
not entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the
ground
39
name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to
discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision
Committee and Family Law Committee started holding joint
meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code,
they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as
a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the
_______________
Teodoro during the March 23, 1985 joint meeting of the Family Law and Civil
Code Revision Committees at the UP Law Center for comments on P.B. 3149
(Pacificador Bill) on Divorce, P.B. No. 1086 (Monfort and Collantes Bill) on
Recognition of Church Annulments of Marriages, P.B. No. 2347 (Sitoy Bill) on
Additional Grounds for Annulment of Marriage and Legal Separation and P.B.
No. 1350 (Kalaw Bill) on Equal Rights of Filipino Women which were pending
before her Sub-Committee.
40
40
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Santos vs. Court of Appeals
xxx
xxx
41
generis. But the law requires that the same be existing at the
time of marriage although it be manifested later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just
like any other provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent
this, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Moreover, the
judge, in interpreting
2
_______________
o0o
2
42
_______________
42
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Santos vs. Court of Appeals
PHILIPPINES, 37 (1988).
4
16
325
VOL. 266,
3
JANUARY 16, 1997
25
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court
of Appeals
of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse
is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
Same; Same; Same; One of the essential marital obligations
under the Family Code is to procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage.Evidently, one of the
essential marital obligations under the Family Code is To
procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end
of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will
finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the
case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
326
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of
Appeals
327
328
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of
Appeals
and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still
be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them has
some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be
cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured
by the intervention of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22,
1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no
sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to
the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual
intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever
he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The
defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only
once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did
not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant, why the
plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is
afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his
mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will
consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid
because they are still very young and there is still a chance to
overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination.
His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose
of finding out whether he is impotent. As a result thereof, Dr.
Alteza submitted his Doctors Medical Report. (Exh. 2). It is
stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. 2-B),
and he is capable of erection. (Exh. 2-C)
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to
find out whether or not he has an erection and he found out that
from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the
penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one
centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft
erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is
capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the
defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no
collusion between the parties and that the evidence is not
fabricated.
2
_______________
2
329
330
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of
Appeals
Ibid.
331
Rollo, p. 34.
332
332
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of
Appeals
Psychological Incapacity, G.T. Veloso, p. 20, cited in The Family Code of the
22
334
334
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of
Appeals
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are
obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is
actually the spontaneous, mutual affection between
husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order
(Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless
unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island,
the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say I could not
have cared less. This is so because an ungiven self is an
unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the
natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses
wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function
which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between
petitioner and private respondent. That isa shared feeling
which between husband and wife must be experienced not
only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense
of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process.
An expressive interest in each others feelings at a time it is
needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the
23
____________________________
*
EN BANC.
199
VOL. 268,
1
FEBRUARY 13, 1997
99
Republic vs. Court of
Appeals
testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric
disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.
Same; Same; Guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Art. 36 of the Family Code.From their submissions and the
Courts own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are
hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar: (1)
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees
marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be protected by the state.
Same; Same; Root cause of psychological incapacity must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological
not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
24
2
00
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Court of
Appeals
VOL. 268,
2
FEBRUARY 13, 1997
01
Republic vs. Court of
Appeals
25
202
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
26
____________________________
1
203
204
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that the Court of
Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of
the phrase psychological incapacity (as provided under Art.
36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application
thereof to the facts of the case, adding that the appealed
Decision tended to establish in effect the most liberal
divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our
culture.
In denying the Solicitor Generals appeal, the respondent
Court relied heavily on the trial courts findings that the
5
____________________________
intelligent causing him to believe then that she would make an ideal wife and mother.
5
Likewise, petitioner fell in love with respondent because of his thoughtfulness and
gentleness. After a year, however, they decided to break their relationship because of
some differences in their personalities. Almost five (5) years later, while they were
working in Manila, petitioner and respondent rekindled their love affair. They became
very close and petitioner was glad to observe a more mature respondent. Believing
of respondent are based on petitioners testimony that the former failed to be gainfully
that they know each other much better after two years of going steady, they decided to
employed after he was relieved from the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
settle down and get married. It would seem, therefore, that petitioner and respondent
sometime in February, 1986, leaving petitioner as the sole breadwinner of the family.
knew each other well and were then prepared for married life.
Also when they were separated in fact, respondent practically abandoned both
During their marriage, however, the true personalities of the parties cropped-up
petitioner-mother and son except during the first few months of separation when
and dominated their life together. Unexpectedly on both their parts, petitioner and
respondent regularly visited his son and gave him a monthly allowance of P1,000.00
respondent failed to respond properly to the situation. This failure resulted in their
for about two to four months. Respondent is likewise dependent on his parents for
frequent arguments and fightings. In fact, even with the intervention and help of their
financial aid and support as he has no savings, preferring to spend his money with his
parents who arranged for their possible reconciliation, the parties could not come to
friends and peers. A year after their marriage, respondent informed petitioner that he
terms.
bought a house and lot at BF Homes, Paraaque for about a million pesos. They then
It seems clear at this stage that the marriage between the parties broke-up
transferred there only for the petitioner to discover a few months later that they were
because of their opposing and conflicting personalties (sic). Neither of them can accept
actually renting the house with the respondents parents responsible for the payment
and understand the weakness of the other. No one gives in and instead, blame each
of the
205
cannot be solely responsible for the failure of other (sic) marriage. Rather, this
205
resulted because both parties cannot relate to each other as husband and wife which is
unique and requisite in marriage.
28
____________________________
with the basic objective of establishing a conjugal and family life. (Article 1, Family
Code). The
206
206
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
207
29
A
Q
A
A
Q
____________________________
6
208
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
COURT
Q It is therefore the
recommendation of the
psychiatrist based on your
findings that it is better for
the Court to annul (sic) the
marriage?
Yes, Your Honor.
There is no hope for the
marriage?
There is no hope, the man
is also living with another
woman.
Is it also the stand of the
psychiatrist that the parties
are psychologically unfit
for each other but they are
psycho logically fit with
other parties?
Yes, Your Honor.
Neither are they
psychologically unfit for
their professions?
Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more
questions.
____________________________
8
209
10
who was a Council member, had the privilege of being overwhelmed by his
keen mind and prayerful discernments.
10
Minister of Justice, author, noted civil law professor and law practitioner.
11
Article XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino Family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
210
210
1. (1)The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in
the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it as
11
____________________________
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
1. the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally
inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to
be protected by the state.
31
man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment
of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix
the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this
Code.
211
12
13, 1997
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
211
212
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
212
14
xxx
xxx
3. Who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
The difference in wording between this and that in Arch. Cruzs Memorandum is
due to the fact that the original Canon is written in Latin and both versions are
differently-worded English translations.
213
214
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
216
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
35
Justice Caguioas explanation in the Minutes of July 26, 1986 of the Civil
218
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
36
220
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
____________________________
2
The Code of Canon Law, A Text and Commentary, The Canon Law
222
222
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
We declared:
____________________________
5
223
becomes
manifest
only
after
its
____________________________
1
224
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
VITUG, J.:
40
Supra.
225
41
At pages 34-35.
226
226
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be
significant not so much for the specific issue there resolved
but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that
227
227
OF
Actions; Pleadings
and
Practice; Cause
of
Action;Elements; Words and Phrases; A cause of action is an act or
omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right of the
plaintiff.Petitioner Dianas contention that the second petition
fails to state a cause of action is untenable. A cause of action is an
act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right of
the plaintiff. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains
three essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises; (2) an
obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) the act or
omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Ultimate facts refer to
the principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon the existence of
which the cause of action reststhe term does not refer to details of
probative matter or particulars of evidence which establish the
material elements.The second petition states the ultimate facts
on which respondent bases his claim in accordance with Section 1,
Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court. Ultimate facts refer to the
principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon the existence of
which the cause of action rests. The term does not refer to
_______________
*
FIRST DIVISION.
42
4
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Barcelona vs. Court of
Appeals
VOL. 412,
4
SEPTEMBER 24, 2003
3
Barcelona vs. Court of
Appeals
omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any
event that would not constitute res judicata and litis pendentia as
in the case at bar, is not fatal as to merit the dismissal and
nullification of the entire proceedings considering that the evils
sought to be prevented by the said certificate are not present. It is
in this light that we ruled in Maricalum Mining Corp.v. National
Labor Relations Commission that a liberal interpretation of
Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 on non-forum shopping would
be more in keeping with the objectives of procedural rules which is
to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding. The dismissal of the first petition
precluded the eventuality of litis pendentia. The first petitions
dismissal did not also amount tores judicata. Thus, there is no
need to state in the certificate of non-forum shopping in the second
petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-24471) about the prior filing and
dismissal of the first petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-23445).
Same; Same; Same; Same;Circular No. 04-94 should not be
interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own
ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of
procedure, which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously
_______________
1
44
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Barcelona vs. Court of
Appeals
44
_______________
2
45
45
46
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Barcelona vs. Court of
Appeals
_______________
Far East Bank and Trust Co. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135548, 29
Relucio v. Lopez, G.R. No. 138497, 16 January 2002, 373 SCRA 578.
47
46
xxx
1. 5.During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to
their varied upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich
family, was a disorganized housekeeper and was
frequently out of the house. She would go to her sisters
house or would play tennis the whole day.
2. 6.When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages
suffered by respondent and the sickness of a child,
respondent withdrew to herself and eventually refused to
speak to her husband.
3. 7.On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months
pregnant with Cristina Maria and on the pretext of reevaluating her feelings with petitioner, requested the
latter to temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. She
further insisted that she wanted to feel a little freedom
from petitioners marital authority and influences. The
petitioner argued that he could occupy another room in
their conjugal dwelling to accommodate respondents
desire, but no amount of plea and explanation could
dissuade her from demanding that the petitioner leave
their conjugal dwelling.
4. 8.In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard
the respondents pregnancy, the petitioner was compelled
to leave their conjugal dwelling and reside in a
condominium located in Greenhills.
5. 9.This separation resulted in complete estrangement
between the petitioner and the respondent. The petitioner
waived his right to the conjugal dwelling in respondents
favor through an extrajudicial dissolution of their conjugal
48
48
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Barcelona vs. Court of
Appeals
1. 12.Under Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage
between the petitioner and the respondent is void ab
initio and needs to be annulled. This petition is in
accordance with Article 39 thereof.
x x x.
The second petition states the ultimate facts on which
respondent bases his claim in accordance with Section 1,
Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court. Ultimate facts refer to the
principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon the
existence of which the cause of action rests. The term does
not refer to details of probative matter or particulars of
evidence which establish the material elements.
8
10
47
12
13
15
logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on
which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be,
omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts.
10
11
Petitioner Diana relied onSantos for her motion to dismiss in the trial
court and her certiorari petition in the appellate court. In her motion to
reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals, she citedMolina.
12
13
49
49
48
17
Forum Shopping
Similarly untenable is petitioner Dianas contention that the
second petitions certificate of non-forum shopping which
does not mention the filing of the first petition and its
dismissal without prejudice violates Circular No. 0494. Petitioner Diana refers to this portion of Circular No. 049419
20
52
52
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Barcelona vs. Court of
Appeals
21
22
21
53
53
50
23
24
25
_______________
23
24
25
54
54
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villaruel, Jr. vs. Fernando
51
THIRD DIVISION.
756
7
56
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Marcos vs. Marcos
that
can
adequately
establish
the
partyspsychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Same; There could be no conclusion
of psychological incapacity where there is absolutely no showing
that the defects were already present at the inception of the
marriage or that they are incurable.Although this Court is
sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material
support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion
of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no
showing that his defects were already present at the inception of
the marriage or that they are incurable.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Same; Divorce; Article 36 of the
Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with
a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage, it is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital
obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221
and 225 of the Family Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Same; Legal Separation; Neither is
Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds
need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical
violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and
the like.Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation,
in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological
incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral
52
757
VOL. 343,
7
OCTOBER 19, 2000
57
Marcos vs. Marcos
758
758
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Marcos vs. Marcos
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
It was established during the trial that the parties were married
twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge
Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and
(2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L.
Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security
Command Chapel in Malacanang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of
their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and
F).
Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the
Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the
53
759
the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a
trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and
Construction Development Corporation.
The straw that broke the camels back took place on October
16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already
living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house
anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was
so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting
physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her aid.
The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the
house and sought refuge in her sisters house.
On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical
examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her
injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters
and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look
for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After
knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after
them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.
At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children
were renting a house in Camella. Paraaque, while the appellant
was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan,
the children described their father as cruel and physically abusive
to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
760
760
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Marcos vs. Marcos
his failure to find work to support his family and his violent
attitude towards appellee and their children. x x x.
3
761
761
_______________
4
This case was deemed submitted for resolution on February 24, 2000,
762
762
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Marcos vs. Marcos
_______________
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
763
764
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Marcos vs. Marcos
1. licitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15)
days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.
10
57
_______________
12
following grounds:
_______________
10
11
765
Article 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the
765
58
766
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Marcos vs. Marcos
59
THIRD DIVISION.
736
7
36
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. QuinteroHamano
_______________
1
Second Division.
737
738
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Republic vs. QuinteroHamano
_______________
4
Rollo, p. 33.
Rollo, p. 52.
Rollo, p. 30.
739
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO PROVE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY OF TOSHIO HAMANO TO PERFORM HIS
MARITAL OBLIGATIONS, DESPITE RESPONDENTS FAILURE
TO COMPLY WITH THE GUIDELINES LAID DOWN IN
THE MOLINACASE.
10
12
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Article II, Section 12; and, Article XV, Sections 1 & 2 of the 1987
Philippine Constitution.
12
Republic
of
the
Philippines
vs.
Dagdag, 351
SCRA
425 (2001)
14
15
13
15
743
65
18
o0o
_______________
16
ANNOTATED
People vs. Cachapero
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
xxx
xxx
xxx
18
744
744
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
66
462
4
62
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Dedel vs. Court of
Appeals
FIRST DIVISION.
67
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE
CHURCH MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER IS NULL AND
VOID.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION
WITHOUT A CERTIFICATION HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY
THE
SOLICITOR
GENERAL
AS
REQUIRED
IN
THE MOLINACASE.
11
_______________
9
Rollo, pp. 33-44; per Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with
Rollo, p. 45.
465
16
_______________
13
14
Republic v. Dagdag, G.R. No. 109975, 9 February 2001, 351 SCRA 425.
15
Pesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, 17 April 2001, 356 SCRA 588, 594.
16
17
ART. 55.A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the
following grounds:
1. (1)Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed
against the petitioner, a common child or a child of the petitioner;
2. (2)Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to
change religious or political affiliation;
467
70
20
_______________
1. (3)Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution,
or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
2. (4)Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of
more than six years even if pardoned;
19
20
468
468
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Domingo vs. Scheer
71
424
424
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Carating-Siayngco vs.
Siayngco
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of
the Court of Appeals promulgated on 01 July 2003, reversing
the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 102,
Quezon City, dated 31 January 2001, which dismissed the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by
respondent herein Judge Manuel Siayngco (respondent
Manuel).
Petitioner
Juanita
Carating-Siayngco
(Petitioner
Juanita) and respondent Manuel were married at civil rites
on 27 June 1973 and before the Catholic Church on 11
August 1973. After discovering that they could not have a
child of their own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy in
1977, who they named Jeremy.
On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of
married life together, respondent Manuel filed for the
declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all
throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over
domineering and selfish attitude towards him which was
exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose nature;
that she incessantly complained about almost everything and
anyone connected with him like his elderly parents, the staff
in his office and anything not of her liking like the physical
_______________
425
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
_______________
3
Id., at p. 13.
17
18
_______________
426
426
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Carating-Siayngco vs.
Siayngco
Id., at p. 19.
10
Id., at p. 23.
11
12
Id., at p. 34.
13
Id., at p. 30.
14
15
Id., at p. 33.
74
16
Id., at p. 30.
17
Id., at p. 37.
18
427
_______________
19
20
21
22
Id., at p. 14.
23
24
19
20
21
22
23
24
428
428
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Carating-Siayngco vs.
Siayngco
27
28
_______________
25
26
27
Id., at p. 7.
28
Id., at p. 11.
34
35
429
_______________
30
29
Id., at p. 12.
30
Id., at p. 22.
31
32
Records, p. 169.
33
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid.
76
430
430
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Carating-Siayngco vs.
Siayngco
39
_______________
36
Id., at p. 6.
37
38
Id., at p. 209.
39
36
431
Rollo, p. 43.
432
432
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Carating-Siayngco vs.
Siayngco
milieu with the case at bar. In Chi Ming Tsoi, the couple
involved therein, despite sharing the same bed from the time
of their wedding night on 22 May 1988 until their separation
on 15 March 1989, never had coitus. The perplexed wife filed
the petition for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity of her husband. We
sustained the wife for the reason that an essential marital
obligation under the Family Code is procreation such that
the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to
fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
On the other hand, sexual intimacy for procreation is a
non-issue herein. Rather, we have here a case of a husband
who is constantly embarrassed by his wifes outbursts and
overbearing ways, who finds his wifes obsession with
cleanliness and the tight reign on his wallet irritants and
who is wounded by her lack of support and respect for his
person and his position as a Judge. In our book, however,
these inadequacies of petitioner Juanita which led
respondent Manuel to file a case against her do not amount
to psychological incapacity to comply with the essential
marital obligations.
_______________
41
433
78
44
_______________
42
43
Id.; Marcos v. Marcos, G.R. No. 136490, 19 October 2000, 343 SCRA 755.
44
434
434
1. (1)The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in
the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees
marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be protected by the state. The Family
Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.
2. (2)The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a)
medically or clinically identified, b) alleged in the
complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Carating-Siayngco vs.
Siayngco
1. the principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
2. (3)The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time
of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the illness
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
3. (4)Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may
be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician
may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
79
435
marriage under Article 36 is dispensed with. Instead, the court shall determine the
xxx
xxx
12. The certification of the Solicitor General required in the Molina case is
dispensed with to avoid delay.
1. (7)Interpretations
436
436
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Carating-Siayngco vs.
Siayngco
47
46
47
437
50
51
52
81
_______________
48
49
50
_______________
Appeals, G.R. No. 126010, 08 December 1999, 320 SCRA 76; Dedel v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 151867, 29 January 2004, 421 SCRA 461.
53
51
Ibid.
54
52
55
56
Id., at p. 111.
57
Id., at p. 110.
438
438
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Carating-Siayngco vs.
Siayngco
58
54
55
56
57
82
60
61
59
60
440
440
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Villariasa-Riesenbeck vs.
Abarrientos
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman),Austria-Martinez, Callejo,
Sr.and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.
Note.There could be no conclusion of psychological
incapacity where there is absolutely no showing that the
defects were already present at the inception of the
marriage or that they are incurable. (Marcos vs. Marcos, 343
SCRA 755[2000])
o0o
_______________
83
FIRST DIVISION.
573
VOL. 475,
5
NOVEMBER 18, 2005
73
Villalon vs. Villalon
to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which
rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. The
same appears as the result of a general dissatisfaction with his
marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in
petitioners personal history.
Same; Same; Same;Psychological incapacity, as a ground for
the declaration of nullity of a marriage, must be characterized by
juridical attendance, gravity and incurability.In Santos v. Court
of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995), the court held that psychological
incapacity, as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage,
5
74
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
84
575
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a
petition for the annulment of his marriage to respondent Ma.
Corazon N. Villalon before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City where it was docketed as JDRC No. 3917 and raffled to
Branch 69. As ground therefor, petitioner cited his
psychological incapacity which he claimed existed even prior
to his marriage.
According to petitioner, the manifestations of his
psychological incapacity were: (a) his chronic refusal to
maintain harmonious family relations and his lack of interest
in having a normal married life; (b) his immaturity and
irresponsibility in refusing to accept the essential obligations
of marriage as husband to his wife; (c) his desire for other
women and a life unchained from any spousal obligation; and
(d) his false assumption of the fundamental obligations of
companionship and consortium towards respondent.
Petitioner thus prayed that his marriage to respondent be
declared null and void ab initio.
On September 25, 1996, respondent filed an
answer denying petitioners allegations. She asserted that
her 18-year marriage to petitioner has been fruitful and
characterized by joy, contentment and hopes for more growth
in their relationship and that their marital squabbles were
normal based on community standards. Petitioners success
1
85
10
_______________
576
576
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Villalon vs. Villalon
Id., at p. 27.
Id., at p. 28.
Id., at p. 73.
Id., at p. 34.
10
577
577
12
13
14
15
16
86
20
21
22
23
_______________
11
12
13
Id., at p. 30.
14
Id., at p. 49.
15
Id.
16
17
Id., at p. 24.
24
_______________
578
578
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Villalon vs. Villalon
18
19
20
21
Id., at p. 36.
22
Id., at p. 26.
23
Id., at p. 31.
87
24
579
579
_______________
25
26
27
28
25
26
27
580
580
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Villalon vs. Villalon
88
Id., at p. 84.
581
581
32
o0o
34
39
35
36
90
Marriages; Annulment;Family
Code; Psychological
Incapacity; The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity
exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the
case.The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists
in a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case.
Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to
review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all
over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual
determination. It is a well-established principle that factual
findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
are binding on this Court, save for the most compelling and cogent
reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond
the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties
to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a
misappreciation of facts, which are unavailing in the instant case.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Words and Phrases; The term
psychological incapacity to be a ground for the nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
the marriage.The term psychological incapacity to be a ground
for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and
so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As
all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated
characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there
is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
FIRST DIVISION.
397
3
97
preferred to spend more time with his friends than his family on
whom he squandered his money, depended on his parents for aid
and assistance, and was dishonest to his wife regarding his
finances, the Court held that the psychological defects spoken of
were more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in
the performance of some marital obligations and that a mere
showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities
in no wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown
to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not physical,
illness.
Same; Same; Same; Same;An unsatisfactory marriage is not a
null and void marriage.We held in Hernandez v. Court of
Appeals, 320 SCRA 76, 87 (1999), that habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves
constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on
psychological incapacity. While petitioners marriage with the
respondent failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation,
the remedy however is not always to have it declared void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory
marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. No less than
the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity
of the family; it decrees marriage as legally inviolable and
protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be protected by the state.
398
3
98
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Perez-Ferraris vs.
Ferraris
92
_______________
Id., at p. 101.
Id., at p. 17.
Id., at p. 18.
Id., at p. 7.
400
400
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Perez-Ferraris vs. Ferraris
10
11
93
_______________
7
Id., at p. 228.
Corporation, G.R. No. 162270, April 6, 2005, 455 SCRA 97, 106.
11
Domingo v. Robles, G.R. No. 153743, March 18, 2005, 453 SCRA 812,
817.
12
15
Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 851; 343 SCRA 755, 765 (2000).
14
Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21, 40; 240 SCRA 20, 34 (1995).
15
94
402
402
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Perez-Ferraris vs. Ferraris
403
18
16
95
19
20
_______________
17
Supra note 9 at pp. 669 & 674; pp. 202 & 207.
18
19
illegitimate:
1. (1)Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from
Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 508,
522.
23
404
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for
404
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Perez-Ferraris vs. Ferraris
1. (1)Between
collateral
blood
relatives,
whether
legitimate
or
22
23
24
_______________
21
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
adopted child;
6. (6)Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the
adopter;
7. (7)Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
8. (8)Between the adopted children of the same adopter; and
96
9. (9)Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other,
over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of
twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both
lived together as husband and wife;
24
2. (2)That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebra-
405
wife;
25
or
undue
influence,
unless
the
same
having
26
to be incurable; or
_______________
tion of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article
391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death
of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.
25
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes,
26
406
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Perez-Ferraris vs. Ferraris
28
97
28
98
December 8, 2010.*
ENRIQUE
AGRAVIADOR yALUNAN,
petitioner, vs.ERLINDA
AMPARO-AGRAVIADOR
and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Marriages; Husband and Wife; Declaration of Nullity;
Psychological Incapacity; Words and Phrases; The initial common
consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code was that it did not involve a species of vice of
consent.The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that [a]
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization. It introduced the concept of psychological
incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage, although this
concept eludes exact definition. The initial common consensus on
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was
that it did not involve a species of vice of consent. Justices SempioDiy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision
committee that drafted the Code, conceded that the spouse may
have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was,
nonetheless, incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations. Dr.
Arturo Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his
commentaries on the Family Code that this psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does
not affect the consent to the marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Expert Testimony; It is no longer
necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36
of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that
psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.In Santos
v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995), the Court first declared
that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity;
(b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to no
5
20
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Agraviador vs. AmparoAgraviador
VOL. 637,
5
DECEMBER 8, 2010
21
Agraviador vs. AmparoAgraviador
5
22
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Agraviador vs. AmparoAgraviador
_______________
2 Rollo, pp. 39-55. Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, and
concurred in by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Associate
Justice Fernanda Lampas-Peralta.
3 Id., at pp. 56-57.
4 Id., at pp. 33-38.
5 Records, pp. 1-4.
Antecedent Facts
The petitioner first met the respondent in 1971 at a
beerhouse where the latter worked. The petitioner, at that
time, was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau of
Customs, while the respondent was a 17-year old waitress.
Their meeting led to a courtship, and they eventually became
sweethearts. They often spent nights together at the
respondents rented room, and soon entered into a commonlaw relationship.
On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent
contracted marriage in a ceremony officiated by Reverend
Juanito Reyes at a church in Tondo, Manila. The petitioners
family was apprehensive about this marriage because of the
nature of the respondents work and because she came from a
broken family. Out of their union, the petitioner and the
respondent begot four (4) children, namely: Erisque,
Emmanuel, Evelyn, and Eymarey.
On March 1, 2001, the petitioner filed with the RTC a
petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the
respondent, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as
amended.5 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-081.
He alleged that the respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of
marriage as she was carefree and irresponsible, and refused
to do house-
524
524
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Agraviador vs. AmparoAgraviador
hold chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their
house for long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian;
did not take care of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor
in order to bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family
name Agraviador in her activities.
The petitioner likewise claimed that the respondent
refused to have sex with him since 1993 because she became
very close to a male tenant in their house. In fact, he
discovered their love notes to each other, and caught them
inside his room several times.
The respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the
ground that the root cause of her psychological incapacity
was not medically identified and alleged in the petition.6The
RTC denied this motion in its order dated July 2, 2001.7
In her answer,8 the respondent denied that she engaged in
extramarital affairs and maintained that it was the
petitioner who refused to have sex with her. She claimed that
the petitioner wanted to have their marriage annulled
because he wanted to marry their former household helper,
Gilda Camarin. She added that she was the one who took
care of their son at the hospital before he died.
102
103
526
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Agraviador vs. AmparoAgraviador
The CA Decision
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The
CA, in its decision15 dated May 31, 2005, reversed and set
aside the RTC resolution, and dismissed the petition.
The CA held that Dr. Patacs psychiatric evaluation report
failed to establish that the respondents personality disorder
was serious, grave and permanent; it likewise did not
mention the root cause of her incapacity. The CA further
ruled that Dr. Patac had no basis in concluding that the
respondents disorder had no definite treatment because he
did not subject her to a mental assessment.
The CA added that the psychiatric remarks in the
Report were nothing but a showcase of respondents
character flaws and liabilities. There was no proof of a natal
or supervening factor that effectively incapacitated the
respondent from accepting and complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. If at all, these character flaws may
only give rise to a legal separation suit.
The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the
CA denied his motion in its resolution of December 6, 2005.16
_______________
14 Supra note 4, at pp. 37-38.
15 Supra note 2.
16 Supra note 3.
528
528
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Agraviador vs. AmparoAgraviador
The Petition and Issues
529
Tolentino, Civil
Code
of
the
Philippines:
Commentaries
and
530
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Agraviador vs. AmparoAgraviador
531
8, 2010
Agraviador vs. AmparoAgraviador
adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. x x x
(8)
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge
the
equivalent
function
of
thedefensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
Out of your marriage with the said respondent, were you blessed with
children, and how many?
_______________
21 G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755.
22 G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 193.
A:
Yes, sir, we were blessed with four (4), two (2) boys and two (2) girls.
Q:
A:
All grown up with the exception of one who died of pneumonia due to the
neglect and fault of my said wife who abandone[d] him at the time of his
532
532
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Agraviador vs. AmparoAgraviador
illness.
Q:
Is that the reason why you file[d] the instant petition, Mr. Witness?
A:
VOL. 637,
533
DECEMBER 8,
2010
Agraviador vs. AmparoAgraviador
Q:
A:
108
A:
xxxx
Q:
Can you not give a last chance for you to save your marriage?
A:
I think I cannot since she does not accept her fault and she does not want to
change for the sake of our family.25
534
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Agraviador vs. AmparoAgraviador
intent of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disordersexisting at the time of the marriage
clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage.27 The
psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the
inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to
assume.28
In the present case, the petitioners testimony failed to
establish that the respondents condition is a manifestation
of a disordered personality rooted on some incapacitating or
debilitating psychological condition that makes her
completely unable to discharge the essential marital
obligations. If at all, the petitioner merely showed that the
respondent had some personality defects that showed their
manifestationduring the marriage; his testimony sorely
lacked details necessary to establish that the respondents
defects existed at the inception of the marriage. In addition,
the petitioner failed to discuss thegravity of the respondents
condition; neither did he mention that the respondents
malady was incurable, or if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the respondents means to undertake. The
petitioners declarations that the respondent does not accept
her fault, does not want to change, and refused to reform
are insufficient to establish a psychological or mental defect
that is serious, grave, or incurable as contemplated by Article
36 of the Family Code.
In a similar case, Bier v. Bier,29 we ruled that it was not
enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital
109
536
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Agraviador vs. AmparoAgraviador
538
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Agraviador vs. AmparoAgraviador
Agraviador
sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like.36Unless the
evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the
parties or one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable
psychological illness existing at the time the marriage was
celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the obligations of
marital life (and thus could not then have validly entered
into a marriage), then we are compelled to uphold the
indissolubility of the marital tie.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we DENY the
petition and AFFIRM the Decision and the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated May 31, 2005 and December 6, 2005,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75207. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales (Chairperson), Bersamin, Villarama,
Jr. and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.A.M. No. 02-11-10-SCwhich was promulgated
on March 15, 2003 and duly publishedis geared towards
the relaxation of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
certification that Republic v. Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1997),
required. (Padilla-Rumbaua vs. Rumbaua, 596 SCRA 157
[2009])
He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk
of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the
criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the
pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. (Jarillo vs.
People, 601 SCRA 236 [2009])
o0o
113
5
74
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Domingo vs. Court of
Appeals
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent courts ruling
finding no grave abuse of discretion in the lower courts order denying
petitioners motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage and separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo
filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property
against petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was docketed
as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others that: they
were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center
Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76
with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite;
unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela
Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; she
came to know of the prior marriage
575
576
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
115
such as the separation of their properties. Lastly, it noted that since the
Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion
to dismiss is merely one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would
have been to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of an
adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are
the following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void
marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same should
be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP N6. 1989-J is the proper remedy of
private respondent to recover certain real and personal properties
allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon and People v.
Mendoza, contends that SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private respondent must
be dismissed for being unnecessary and superfluous. Furthermore,
under his own interpretation of Article 40 of the Family Code, he
submits that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is
required only for purposes of remarriage. Since the petition in SP No.
1989-J contains no
5
_______________
Annex C, Rollo, pp. 28-29.
L-28093, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 315.
3
Annex J, Rollo, pp. 62-67, Justice Jorge S. Imperial, ponenteand Justices Luis A.
Javellana and Serafin V.C. Guingona, concurring.
4
L-40003, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 229.
577
1
2
_______________
Annex M, Rollo, p. 80.
100 Phil. 1033 (1957).
7
95 Phil. 845 (1954).
578
5
6
578
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there
would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge whether
that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. x x
x
10
_______________
13
14
15
16
CIVIL CODE, art. 80, par. 4; FAMILY CODE, arts. 35, par. 4 and 41.
Rollo, pp. 102 and 106.
10
See: Note 6 at p. 1036; Note 7 at p. 848.
11
L-23214, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 615, 620-621.
579
8
9
_______________
L-43905, May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 525.
G.R. No. 53703, August 19, 1986, 143 SCRA 499.
14
FAMILY CODE, art. 39.
15
Id., art. 40. See also: arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147, 148.
16
The Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
prepared the draft of the revision of Book I of the
580
12
13
117
580
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only
void but also voidable marriages. He then suggested that the above provision
be modified as follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . . Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes),
however, proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only. . .
581
581
582
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
118
ANNOTATED
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
17, 1993
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will
not solve the objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if
one enters into a subsequent marriage without obtaining a final judgment
declaring the nullity of a previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is
void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the
original wording of the provision as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void, except as provided in Article 41.
17
19
_______________
August 23, 1986, pp. 4-7.
J. A.V. SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, 46 (1988).
19
Adm. Case No. 2349, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 6, 11.
583
17
18
583
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. (n)
584
satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open
and public
584
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
_______________
20
21
22
21
Dean Gupit commented that the word only may be misconstrued to refer
to for purposes of remarriage. Judge Diy stated that only refers to
final judgment. Justice Puno suggested that they say on the basis only of
a final judgment. Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal term
solely instead of only, which the Committee approved. (Italics
supplied)
24
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity
of marriage is unnecessary, petitioner suggests that private respondent
should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the
properties alleged to have been acquired during their union. In such an
eventuality, the lower court would not be acting as a mere special
120
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith,
said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage
and testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the other are revoked
by operation of law. (n)
_______________
Id., art. 11.
See: Note 17, at p. 7.
586
23
26
24
586
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
Art. 43. x x x
xxx
xxx
121
588
SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals
where certain effects of a valid marriage can still flow from the void
marriage. Examples of these cases are children of void marriages
under Article 36 (due to psychological incapacity) and Article 53, in
relation to Article 52 (due to failure of partition, delivery of
presumptive legitimes of children and recording thereof following the
annulment or declaration of nullity of a prior marriage), conceived or
born before the judicial declaration of nullity of such void marriages,
who the law deems as legitimate (Article 54, Family Code).
In most, if not in all, other cases, a void marriage is to be
considered extant per se.Neither the conjugal partnership of gain under
the old regime nor the absolute community of property under the new
Code (absent a marriage settlement), will apply; instead, their property
relations shall be governed by the co-ownership rules under either
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. I must hasten to add as
a personal view, however, that the exceptional effects on children of a
void marriage because of the psychological incapacity of a party
thereto should have been extended to cover even the personal and
property relations of the spouses. Unlike the other cases of void
marriages where the grounds therefor may be established by hard facts
and with little uncertainty, the term psychological incapacity is so
relative and unsettling that until a judicial declaration of nullity is
made its interim effects can long and literally hang on the balance not
only insofar as the spouses themselves are concerned but also as
regards third persons with whom the spouses deal.
Petition denied. Questioned decision affirmed.
Notes.Obligation to give or the right to ask for support
does