Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
participations were of varying nature and degree in a matter of hours and issue
the warrant of arrest in the same day undue haste and an omission to ask
searching questions by the Judge who relied "mainly on the supporting
affidavits
- Judge conducted the preliminary investigation of the charges in total disregard
of the Provincial Fiscal who had already taken cognizance of the matter 12
days earlier and was poised to conduct his own investigation of the same;
- Issuance of a warrant of arrest against 50 "John Does" transgressed the
Constitutional provision requiring that such warrants should particularly
describe the persons or things to be seized
Petitioners ask this Court:
- To annul the warrant for their arrest issued by respondent Judge
- To prohibit the Judge from taking further cognizance of said criminal case
- To compel the Judge to forward the entire record of the case to the Provincial
Fiscal for proper disposition.
Solicitor General agrees and recommends that their petition be granted and the
warrant of arrest voided
SUMMARY: Shooting incident. Atty. Batuampar filed complaint with Fiscal, who
addressed indorsement to Respondent Judge. On the same day that the criminal
complaint for multiple murder was filed before Judge, Judge approved complaint and
issued warrants of arrest against 14 petitioners and 50 John Does. Petitioners claim that
the warrant for their arrest was issued by the respondent Judge without a proper
preliminary investigation. HELD: Warrants valid as to 14 petitioners, invalid as to 50
John Does.
DOCTRINE: Completion of the procedure in Section 3 of Rule 112 is not a condition
sine qua non for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. There is no requirement that the
entire procedure for preliminary investigation must be completed before a warrant of
arrest may be issued. What the Rule provides is that no complaint or information for an
offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court may be filed without completing that
procedure. But nowhere is it provided that the procedure must be completed before a
warrant of arrest may issue.
Whether the Judge had the power to issue the warrant of arrest without
completing the entire prescribed procedure for preliminary investigation - YES
Completion of the procedure in Section 3 of Rule 112 is not a condition sine qua
non for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
There is no requirement that the entire procedure for preliminary
investigation must be completed before a warrant of arrest may be issued.
What the Rule provides is that no complaint or information for an offense cognizable by
the Regional Trial Court may be filed without completing that procedure. But
nowhere is it provided that the procedure must be completed before a warrant of
arrest may issue.
The present Section 6 of the same Rule 112 (notes) clearly authorizes the
municipal trial court to order the respondent's arrest even before opening the
second phase of the investigation if said court is satisfied that a probable cause
exists and there is a necessity to place the respondent under immediate custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
Mayuga vs. Maravilla affirm the power of a justice of the peace or municipal
judge conducting a preliminary investigation to order the arrest of the accused after
the first stage (preliminary examination). Preliminary investigation is not for the
full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for the presentation of such
evidence only as may engender well-grounded belief (probable cause) that an
offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
RA 3838 modified the rule on arrest after preliminary examination since Mayuga,
but not to abrogate the authority of the investigating judge to order such arrest, and
only to prescribe the requirement that before he may do so, he must examine the
witnesses to the complaint, the examination to be under oath and reduced to
writing in the form of searching questions and answers.
HENCE, Judge did not act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant of
arrest against petitioners without first completing the preliminary investigation in
accordance with the prescribed procedure. Issuance need only await a finding of
probable cause, not the completion of the entire procedure of preliminary
investigation.
Whether argument that Judge had no time to determine probable cause against
64 people on a Saturday is tenable - NO
Judge positively affirmed that he had personally and closely examined under oath
the 3 witnesses to the complaint 24 and that he had issued the warrant of arrest
"believing that the offense thus filed had been committed."
Legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. .
For all that appears, Judge could have put off the 1:00 p.m. adjournment until he
had finished interrogating the witnesses to his satisfaction.
Anyway, there is really nothing unusual in completing within a three-hour period
the questioning of three witnesses in a preliminary examination to determine the
existence of probable cause.
Sec. 6, Rule 112 When warrant of arrest may issue.- xxx xxx xxx (b) By the
Municipal Trial Court. If the municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary
investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath of the
complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching question and answers, that
a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, he shall issue a
warrant of arrest
PESTILOS v GENEROSO
November 10, 2014 | Brion, J. | Arrest
Digester: Chua, Gian Angelo E.
SUMMARY: An altercation ensued between Pestilos, Macapanas, Gaces, Fernandez
and Munoz (petitioners) and Atty. Generoso. In an information, petitioners were
indicted for attempted murder. Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation on the ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. RTC
issued an Order denying petitioners motion. CA affirmed. SC held that there was a
valid warrantless arrest.
DOCTRINE: Personal knowledge of a crime just committed under Section 5(b), Rule
114, does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it
is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent (as in this case)
and the police officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime.
CRIME: Attempted Murder
ACTION: Rule 45 - Petition for Review on Certiorari.
FACTS:
An altercation ensued between Pestilos, Macapanas, Gaces, Fernandez and Munoz
(petitioners) and Atty. Generoso.
Atty. Generoso called the Batasan Hills Police Station to report the incident. When
SPO2 Javier arrived at the scene, he saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.
Atty. Generoso pointed to petitioners and this prompted SPO2 Javier to invite
the petitioners to go to the Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation.
In an information, petitioners were indicted for attempted murder.
RTC:
Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation on the
ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. Petitioners argued:
o No valid warrantless arrest took place since police officers had no
personal knowledge that they were perpetrators of the crime. They
were only invited to the police station. Thus, the inquest
proceeding was improper and a regular procedure for preliminary
investigation should have been performed pursuant to Rule 112.
RTC issued an Order denying petitioners motion.
Petitioners filed a MFR.
RTC denied MFR.
CA:
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari (Rule 65) before the CA alleging grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the RTC for
denying their Motion for Preliminary Investigation.
Organic Laws
The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of 1902, and the
1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions all protect the right of the people to be secure
in their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures. Arrest falls under the
term seizure.
This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States which traces its origins to the writings of Sir
Edward Coke and The Great Charter of the Liberties of England (Magna Carta
Libertatum).
United States v. Snyder - the United States Supreme Court held that this constitutional
provision does not prohibit arrests, searches and seizures without judicial warrant,
but only those that are unreasonable.
In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity of
warrantless arrests.
o United States v. Wilson - Section 37 of Act No. 183, or the Charter of
Manila, defined the arresting officers power to arrest without a
warrant, at least insofar as the City of Manila was concerned.
o United States v. Vallejo, et al. - in the absence of any provisions under
statutes or local ordinances, a police officer who held similar
functions as those of the officers established under the common law
of England and America, also had the power to arrest without a
warrant in the Philippines.
o United States v. Santos the rules on warrantless arrest were based on
common sense and reason. Court further held that warrantless arrest
found support under the then Administrative Code which directed
municipal policemen to exercise vigilance in the prevention of public
offenses.
o United States v. Fortaleza - the Court applied Rules 27, 28, 29 and 30 of
the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code which
were provisions taken from the Spanish Law.
These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our Rules of Court.
Presently, the requirements of a warrantless arrest are now summarized in Rule 113,
Section 5 (see Codal).
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a)
above has been denominated as one in flagrante delicto, while that under Section
5(b) has been described as a hot pursuit arrest.
Note: For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b) since it is the
provision applicable in the present case.
EVOLUTION OF SECTION 5(B), RULE 113
Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court
Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court, it was not necessary for the arresting officer to
first have knowledge that a crime was actually committed. What was necessary was
the presence of reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act
having the characteristics of a crime; and that the same grounds exist to believe
that the person sought to be detained participated in it.
In addition, it was also established that the phrase reasonable suspicion was
tantamount to probable cause without which, the warrantless arrest would be
invalid and the arresting officer may be held liable for its breach.
The gauge for a valid warrantless arrest was the arresting officers reasonable
suspicion (probable cause) that a crime was committed and the person sought to
be arrested has participated in its commission.
This principle left so much discretion and leeway on the part of the arresting
officer. However, the 1940 Rules of Court has limited this discretion.
Second And Third Element: The Crime Has Just Been Committed/Personal
Knowledge Of The Facts Or Circumstances That The Person To Be Arrested
Has Committed It
Discussed together since these are usually taken together in the Courts
determination in the validity of the warrantless arrests under Section 5(b), Rule 113
Posadas v. Ombudsman - NBI attempted to arrest Taparan and Narag 3 days after the
commission of the crime. With this set of facts, it cannot be said that the officers
CONCLUSION
Requirements For A Valid Warrantless Arrest
We hold that the following must be present for a valid warrantless arrest under
Section 5(b), Rule 113:
1. The crime should have been just committed; and
2. The arresting officers exercise of discretion is limited by the
standard of probable cause to be determined from the facts and
circumstances within his personal knowledge.
The requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies the reasonableness
of the warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the Constitutional
mandate against unreasonable arrests.
For purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the
present petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the requirements for a
valid warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 were complied with,
namely:
1. Has the crime just been committed when they were arrested?
2. Did the arresting officer have personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime?
3. Based on these facts and circumstances that the arresting
officer possessed at the time of the petitioners arrest, would a
reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the crime
was committed by the accused?
PEOPLE v. RACHO
August 3, 2010 | Nachura, J. | Arrest
Digester: Chan, Ysabelle
SUMMARY: Lorem Ipsum is simply dummy text of the printing and typesetting
industry. Lorem Ipsum has been the industry's standard dummy text ever since the
1500s, when an unknown printer took a galley of type and scrambled it to make a type
specimen book.
DOCTRINE: It has survived not only five centuries, but also the leap into electronic
typesetting, remaining essentially unchanged.
Breeze Lodge; stripped his clothes and underwear; then brought him to the police
station for investigation
RTC ruling: convicted appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00; but acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II,
R.A. 9165
CA:
CA ruling: RTC ruling affirmed
RULING: CA Decision Set Aside. Appellant is acquitted
The Assistant City Prosecutor filed with the trial court a Motion to Withdraw
Information, which the RTC granted
MeTC
RTC
Prosecutions pieces of evidence: Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated February 18, 2000
signed by SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, PO3 Corbe, PO3 Arcancia, PO3 Dela
Cruz and PO3 Javier; the Sketch prepared in open court by SPO1 Lectura; the 10
heat-sealed plastic sachets recovered from the possession of accused-appellants; the
PNP-RMG Request for Laboratory Examination of the contents of the 10 heatsealed plastic sachets; the PNP Crime Laboratory Physical Sciences Report No. D097-2000 dated February 18, 2000 which revealed that the contents of the 10 heatsealed plastic sachets positively tested for methamphetamine hydrochloride; and the
Letter (Referral of the case (probably for inquest) to the Office of the City
Prosecutor) dated February 18, 2000.
Defendants presented the testimonies of delos Reyes, E. de Claro, R. de Claro and
David (nephew of delos Reyes).
Decision: WHEREFORE, the prosecution having successfully proved the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt for unlawfully possessing/selling, delivering,
transporting and distributing methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known as
CA:
Sustained the conviction of accused-appellants, and merely modified the penalty
imposed upon them, from life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua. According to the
appellate court, the police officers testimonies deserve credence than accusedappellants defenses of denial and alibi, there being no evidence to rebut the
presumption that the police officers regularly performed their official duties.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 12, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01733 is hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. Accusedappellants Rolando delos Reyes and Raymundo Reyes are ACQUITTED on the
ground of reasonable doubt and they are ORDERED forthwith released from custody,
unless they are being lawfully held for another crime.
SO ORDERED.
Whether the warrantless arrest was illegal People: accused-appellants were caught while in the commission of a crime or in
flagrante delicto, which justifies their warrantless arrests under Section 5(a), Rule
113 of the Rules of Court.
The prosecutors and the RTC both displayed uncertainty as to the facts
surrounding accused-appellants arrest on the night of February 17, 2000.
o The Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, after
preliminary investigation and reinvestigation, recommended that the
RTC drop accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes and Lantion-Tom
from the criminal charge. The RTC only partially adopted the
recommendations of the Office of the City Prosecutor: dropping the
criminal charge against Lantion-Tom, but still finding probable cause
against accused-appellant delos Reyes.
o The RTC wavered in its findings and conclusion: subsequent acquittal
of E. de Claro.
o The Court of Appeals, on appeal, refused to consider the subsequent
acquittal of Emmanuel de Claro by the RTC. Instead, the CA upheld
the earlier ruling of the RTC giving absolute credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and convicted accusedappellants of the crime charged. Despite the varying judgments of the
RTC, the CA speciously ratiocinated in its assailed decision that when
the issue involves the credibility of a witness, the trial courts
assessment is entitled to great weight.
Settled rule: Where the inculpatory facts admit of several interpretations, one
consistent with accused's innocence and another with his guilt, the evidence thus
adduced failed to meet the test of moral certainty. Thus, the Court finds that the
RTCs subsequent decision is more in keeping with evidence on record in this case.
If the evidence is insufficient to convict the former, then it is also insufficient to
convict the latter.
The testimonies of prosecution witnesses SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3
Yumul are unreliable and suspiciously fabricated. In contrast, accused-appellants
presented clear and convincing evidence in support of their defenses, which the
prosecution failed to rebut. Even assuming that the prosecutions version of events
did happen, it still failed to establish probable cause to justify the in flagrante
delicto arrests of accused-appellants and search of accused-appellants
persons, incidental to their arrests, resulting in the seizure of the shabu in
accused-appellants possession.
Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained
therefrom may be admissible during a search incident to a lawful arrest. The Rules
of Court recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. A peace officer or a private
person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (arrest in flagrante delicto);
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another (arrest of escaped prisoners).
Peeping through the window: not sufficient reason for the police
authorities to enter his house without a valid warrant of arrest/search
warrant
Petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment
In consideration of his active participation in trial, he is deemed to have submitted
to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest
o Accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity in his arrest if he fails
to raise this issue or to move for a quashal of information against him on
this ground before arraignment
o
ANTIQUERA v. PEOPLE
December 11, 2013 | Abad, J. | Arrest without warrant, when lawful
Digester: Bathan, Lizzie
SUMMARY: Police officers were conducting a visibility patrol when they were alerted
by two men leaving a particular house. They peeked through the open door of the
house and claimed to have seen Antiquera and Cruz having a pot session. They searched
the premises and seized drug paraphernalia and later charged them with possession of
such paraphernalia. The RTC and CA found the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt ruling that it was a valid warrantless arrest. The SC acquitted the accused and held
that they were not caught in flagrante delicto since the officers had to push open the
door to see what was going on inside the house.
DOCTRINE: 1) Sec 5(a), Rule 113 Rules of Criminal Procedure: arrest in flagrante
delicto.
2) A waiver of an illegal warrantless does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility
of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.
CRIME: Illegal Possession of Paraphernalia for dangerous drugs
ACTION: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
FACTS:
Jan 13, 2004 The 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor of Pasay City charged the accused
George Antiquera and Corazon Cruz with illegal possession of paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs before the RTC of Pasay City. The court tried Cruz in absentia
since she jumped bail.
Feb 11, 2004, (4:45am) PO1 Recio and Cabutihan, along with other officers, were
on board a patrol car and a tricycle conducting a police visibility patrol on David
Street, Pasay City, when they saw two unidentified men rush out of house #107C
and immediately boarded a jeep. Suspecting that a crime had been committed, the
officers approached the house and peeked through the partially opened door. Recio
and Cabutihan saw Antiquera holding an improvised tooter and a pink lighter. Cruz
was beside him holding an aluminum foil and improvised burner. The officers
entered the house, introduced themselves, and arrested both.
While inspecting the immediate surroundings, Cabutihan saw a wooden jewelry box
atop a table, which contained other paraphernalia. The officers confiscated all these
and brought the two to the Drug Enforcement Unit of the PNP in Pasay City for
further investigation and testing. A forensic chemical officer found the
paraphernalia positive for traces of shabu.
Antiqueras version: He and Cruz were asleep in the house when someone knocked
on the door. When he opened it, three armed officers forced themselves into the
house and told him that he was a (drug) pusher. He was handcuffed and two
officers went to his room. They were brought to the police station and there, they
were informed of the charges against them. They were also shown a box claimed to
be recovered from his house.
RTC
Antiquera: Arrest was illegal.
RTC Found Antiquera and Cruz guilty of the crime charged and sentenced them to
a prison term ranging from 6 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months + P10k
fine each. The prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the police caught
the accused in the act of using shabu and having drug paraphernalia in their
possession. No ill motive could be attributed to Recio and Cabutihan, therefore the
court accorded full faith and credit to their testimony that prior to the arrest, they
saw Antiquera and Cruz in a pot session and in possession of drug paraphernalia.
CA: Affirmed decision in full. MR was likewise denied.
RULING: Petition granted. RTC and CA decision reversed and set aside. Antiquera
acquitted of the crime of which he is charged for lack of evidence sufficient to establish
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Whether accuseds arrest was valid NO.
Prosecutions theory, upheld by RTC and CA: valid warrantless arrest because the
police officers saw accused through the door of their house in the act of having a
pot session. The valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right as well to search
the living room for objects relation to the crime and thus seize the paraphernalia
they found. Since the paraphernalia tested positive for shabu, they were no doubts
used for using dangerous drugs in violation of RA 9165, Sec 12. That the accused
tested negative for shabu had no bearing since they were charged for illegal
possession of drug paraphernalia, not for illegal use of drugs. Furthermore,
assuming that the arrest was irregular, accused already waived his right to question
the validity of the arrest when he voluntarily submitted himself to the courts
jurisdiction by entering a plea of not guilty. Sec 5(a) Rule 113 provides that a police
officer may arrest a person without a warrant when he has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (in flagrante delicto).
The Court held that the circumstances do not make out a case of arrest made in
flagrante delicto. When two unidentified men suddenly rushed out of the house, the
police officers were alerted and they suspected that a crime had been committed.
However, the natural thing to do would be chase the jeep that the two fleeing men
boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle. Running after
suspects = more urgent. They gave priority instead to the house even when they
heard no cry for help from it. Furthermore, the police officers did not notice
anything amiss going on in the house from where they stood. Even as they peeked
through the door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it. According to
the testimony of PO1 Cabutihan, they had to push the door to be able to know
what was happening inside the house.
Warrantless arrest not valid invalid search and seizure inadmissible evidence.
Lastly, the failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is
not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless does not
carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal
warrantless arrest.
LUZ v. PEOPLE
February 29, 2012 | Sereno, J. | Method of Arrest
Digester: Batac, Jeffrey
SUMMARY: Rodel Luz was flagged down for violation of a city ordinance requiring
drivers to wear protective helmets. While being issued a traffic violation ticket, he was
asked to take out the contents of his pocket. Luz obliged even though the police
officers did not have a search warrant. It was later discovered that part of the contents
he pulled out of his pocket were sachets of shabu. Subsequently, he was charged with
and convicted of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Upon review by the SC, Luz was
acquitted on the ground that the evidence presented against him were inadmissible,
there being no lawful arrest that could have justified the warrantless search that yielded
said evidence.
DOCTRINE: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any
evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
CRIME: Violation of a city ordinance requiring all motorcycle drivers to wear a
protective helmet while driving; illegal possession of dangerous drugs
ACTION: Petition for review under Rule 45.
FACTS:
On March 10, 2003, at around 3 a.m., PO2/traffic enforcer Emmanuel L. Alteza of
Naga City Police Station flagged down Rodel Luz. The latter was seen riding a
motorcyle without a helmet in violation of an existing municipal ordinance
requiring all motorcycle drivers to wear a helmet while driving. Alteza invited Luz
to come inside their sub-station since the place where the latter was flagged down
was almost in front of the said sub-station.
Together with SPO1 Rayford Brillante, Alteza was issuing a citation ticket for
violation of municipal ordinance when he noticed that Luz was uneasy and kept on
getting something from his jacket. Alerted, Alteza told Luz to take out the contents
of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it. According to
the police officers, Luz obliged and slowly put out from his pocket a nickel-like tin
or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2)
cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife.
Upon seeing the said container, Alteza asked Luz to open it. Alteza noticed a
cartoon cover and something beneath it. Upon Alteza's instruction, Luz spilled out
the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic
sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained
suspected shabu.
Luz entered a plea of not guilty. Subsequentely, he was convicted of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. The RTC found the prosecution's evidence
sufficient to show that Luz had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and
then subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery on his person of two
plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. The RTC also found his defense of
frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-serving and unsubstantiated.
The CA affirmed the RTC's ruling.
Luz filed before the SC a petition for review under Rule 45. Luz was claiming that
there was no lawful search and seizure because there was no lawful arrest. One of
his arguments was that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous,
since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city
ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he was claiming that he had
never consented to the search conducted upon him..
a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the
information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be
stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an
offense.
But even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed
arrested upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the
issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied
with.
In numerous cases, the Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall
be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest
and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed
of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement
they might make could be used against them. It may also be noted that in this case,
these constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers only
after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs..
Whether or not the warrantless search conducted on Luz was valid. NO.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in plain view;
(iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs
search; (vi) a stop and frisk search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.
None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful
arrest, is applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently
discovered, was not in plain view. It was actually concealed inside a metal container
inside Luzs pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately apparent.
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be
lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence. It must be voluntary
in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be
unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion. While the prosecution claims that Luz acceded to the instruction of PO3
Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent.
In fact, the RTC found that Luz was merely told to take out the contents of his
pocket.
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this
determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the
environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether
the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether the defendant
objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of
the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendants
belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the
possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that has
the burden of proving by clear and positive testimony that the necessary consent
was obtained, and was freely and voluntarily given. In this case, all that was alleged
was that Luz was alone at the police station at three in the morning, accompanied
by several police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of
valid consent to a warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the stop and frisk rule. While the rule
normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct,
which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is
merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons..
worthless by the testimony of SPO Pedro Contreras. This policeman stated that a
civilian, obviously referring to Franco, brought appellant to the police station and
did not merely accompany the latter.
The police blotter clearly shows that Nuestro was placed under citizen's arrest by
Elias Franco and Ernesto Pe Benito and was turned over to the officers of the Jaro
Police Station. Obviously, the Court cannot grant Nuestro the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender which he claims.
NOTES:
The focus of the case is Nuestros invocation of the justifying circumstance of selfdefense when he stabbed Dabi. However, the Court ruled that his claim must
necessarily fail because evidence proves otherwise.
This is supported by their own eyewitness, one Josefina Bernas who testified
that on the night of the crime, while she and her husband were making copra, they
heard a woman crying. When Josefina went to see what it was, she saw a girl being
raped by a man. Josefina recognized the assailant to be Randy Gomba.
The RTC was swayed by the prosecutions case, giving particular weight to Ronnie
and Aurea Cabagtongs testimonies, and convicted appellants of the crime and
sentenced them accordingly.
The ISSUES are:
WoN RTC erred in finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
WoN their warrantless arrests were valid
RULING: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22,
Laoang, Northern Samar, dated December 22, 2000, is REVERSED and accusedappellants Renante Mendez and Rene Baby Cabagtong are ACQUITTED of the crime
of rape with homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt.
The Director of Prisons is hereby directed to forthwith cause the release of accusedappellants unless the latter are being lawfully held for another cause and to inform the
Court accordingly within ten (10) days from notice of the action taken herein.
SO ORDERED.
[ON ISSUE 1]
The RTC favored the prosecution by giving credence to Ronnie and Aurea
Cabagtongs testimonies. It should not have, because certain circumstances make these
testimonies suspect! For one, it is highly doubtful how Ronnie could have witnessed the
rape considering that it was raining and there was no moonlight. His contention that
there was a lamp illuminating the area is belied by the testimony of another prosecution
witness who described the crime scene as uninhabited and surrounded by thick foliage.
Thus, there could not have been any lamps in the area. Also, Ronnies behavior after he
allegedly witnessed the crime, if he is to be believed, is contrary to normal human
reaction (he casually proceeded home and went to sleep as if nothing happened). The
police also took at face value Ronnies and Aureas testimony against appellants without
considering (or overlooking) the ulterior motive that the former has in pointing to
appellants as the culprits.
RTC also did not probe the police why there was no investigation to follow up the
lead coming from the defenses witness Josefina Bernas coursed through the Barangay
Captain. This, together with the other circumstances mentioned above, constitute
reasonable doubt meriting the appellants acquittal.
[ON ISSUE 2]
Contrary to his claim, SPO2 Cernio did not have personal knowledge of the
commission of the crime so as to justify the warrantless arrest he made of appellant
Renante Mendez.
Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant under Sec. 5(b) of Rule
113 must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when it is based on
POSADAS v OMBUDSMAN
September 29, 2000 | Mendoza, J. | Arrest
Digester: Angat, Christine Joy F.
SUMMARY: Following the death of Dennis Venturina in a fraternity rumble, Posadas
requested the assistance of NBI to determine the perpetrators. Based on the accounts of
alleged eyewitnesses, NBI attempted to arrest without warrant two members of Scintilla
Juris Fraternity. Posadas and other UP officials opposed the arrest, and the arrest was
not effected. NBI then filed a complaint for obstruction of justice against Posadas et.
Al. The Court held that the attempted arrest was invalid, it being carried out without a
warrant and not falling within the provisions of a valid warrantless arrest. Hence, Posads
et.al. was within the bounds of the law when it opposed the attempted warrantless
arrest.
DOCTRINE: The general rule is that no arrest may be made except by virtue of a
warrant issued by a judge after examining the complaint and the witnesses he may
produce and after finding of probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed the crime. The exception to the general rule, that is, a valid warrantless
arrest, is provided in Rule 113, Sec. 5 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
CRIME: Violation of PD 1829 (Obstruction of Justice), Section 1(c) (see notes)
ACTION: Petition for certiorari and prohibition (to set aside the resolution of the
Ombudsman)
FACTS:
Following the death of Dennis Venturina (see notes), UP Diliman Chancellor
Roger Posadas sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation in
determining the persons responsible for the crime.
In the meantime, to put an end to the violence on the campus, UP Police called for
a peace talk at the UP Police Station between Sigma Rho Fraternity and Scintilla
Juris Fraternity.
Acting on Posadas request, Orlando Dizon, Chief of the Special Operations
Group of NBI, went to UP, and on the basis of the supposed positive
identification of two alleged eyewitnesses (Leandro Lachica and Cesar
Mangrobang), attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag,
officers of Scintilla Juris, who was then attending the peace talk at the UP Police
Station.
Posadas, together with Assistant Legal Counsel of UP, Marichu Lambino, and Vice
Chancellor Rosario Torres-Yu, also from UP, and Atty. Villamor, counsel for the
suspects, objected on the ground that NBI did not have warrants of arrest.
As a result of the intervention, Taparan and Narag were not arrested that day.
Posadas and Atty. Villamor, however, promised to take the suspects to NBI Office
the next day.
Taparan and Narag were not brought in the next day. Instead, they were able to
escape along with another principal suspect, Joel Carlo Denosta. Dizon filed a
they are doing anything illegal. The positive identification of the two alleged
eyewitnesses are insufficient to justify the warrantless arrest.
Personal knowledge must be based upon probable cause which means
an actual or reasonable grounds of suspicion; in the absence of actual
belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested
is probable guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e.
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.
The determination of the existence of probable cause that the persons to be
arrested committed the crime was for the judge to make. To allow the arrest which
the NBI intended to make without warrant would in effect allow them to supplant
the courts.
Whether there was probable cause for prosecuting petitioners for violation of PD
1829 -- NO
Petittioners objection to the arrest of the students cannot be construed as a
violation of PD 1829, 1(c). They had a right to prevent the arrest at the time
because it was illegal. It was not to obstruct or impede the prosecution, but it was
done to safeguard the rights of students.
The fact that the suspects were able to escape is not due to the fault of petitioners.
NBI is to blame for their inability to arrest Narag and Taparan. If the NBI believed
the information given to them by supposed eyewitness is sufficient to establish
probable cause, they should have applied for a warrant instead of arresting the
suspects without one. That they chose not to and were prevented from making an
arrest for lack of a warrant is their responsibility alone. Further, it is immaterial
whether or not Posadas surrendered the student suspects to the NBI agents the
following day. They were not sureties or bondsmen who could be held to their
undertaking.
NOTES:
PD 1829, Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or
a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any
person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the
apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by
committing any of the following acts:
(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or
has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under
existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution, and conviction.
Dennis Venturina was a UP graduating student and a member of the Sigma Rho
Fraternity who was killed in a rumble between his fraternity and Scintilla Juris
Fraternity on December 8, 1994.
LEVISTE v. ALAMEDA
August 3, 2010 | Carpio-Morales, J. | Determination of Probable Cause for issuance of
warrant of arrest
Digester: Agustin, Chrissete
SUMMARY: Petitioner was charged with homicide. Information against him was then
amended to murder. Complainants filed a motion for deferment of the proceedings for
reinvestigation. RTC granted the deferment and allowed reinvestigation. RTC also
admitted admitted the amended information and issued a warrant of arrest. Petitioner,
in his appeal to the SC, raised that there should have been a hearing conducted for the
judicial determination of probable cause. Court ruled in the negative.
DOCTRINE: The rules do not require cases to be set for hearing to determine
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of the accused before any warrant
may be issued.
CRIME: Homicide
ACTION: Petition for review via Rule 45
FACTS:
Petitioner was, by Information of January 16, 2007, charged with homicide for the
death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the RTC of Makati, presided
by Judge Elmo Alameda, forthwith issued a commitment order against petitioner
who was placed under police custody while confined at the Makati Medical Center
RTC
After petitioner posted a P40,000 cash bond which the trial court approved, he was
released from detention, and his arraignment was set on January 24, 2007.
The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the conformity of the
public prosecutor, an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying, inter alia, for the deferment
of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on
record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense.
The RTC thereafter issued the
(1) Order of January 24, 2007 deferring petitioners arraignment and allowing
the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense
and submit a recommendation within 30 days from its inception, inter alia; and
(2) Order of January 31, 2007 denying reconsideration of the first orders.
Petitioner assailed these orders via certiorari and prohibition before the CA.
Meantime, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion before the
trial court to defer acting on the public prosecutors recommendation on the proper
offense until after the appellate court resolves his application for injunctive reliefs,
or alternatively, to grant him time to comment on the prosecutors recommendation
and thereafter set a hearing for the judicial determination of probable cause.
Petitioner also separately moved for the inhibition of Judge Alameda with prayer to
defer action on the admission of the Amended Information.
Whether prosecution has right under the Rules to seek from the trial court an
investigation or reevaluation of the case YES
Section 6, Rule 112
A PI is required before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense
where the penalty prescribed by law is at least 4 years, 2 months and 1 day without
regard to fine. As an exception, the rules provide that there is no need for a PI in
cases of a lawful arrest without a warrant involving such type of offense, so long as
an inquest, where available, has been conducted
BEFORE THE FILING OF COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IN COURT
The private complainant may proceed in coordinating with the arresting officer and
the inquest officer during the latters conduct of inquest. Meanwhile, the arrested
person has the option to avail of a 15-day PI, provided he duly signs a waiver of
any objection against delay in his delivery to the proper judicial authorities under
Article 125 RPC. This remedy is not available to the private complainant since he
cannot waive what he does not have. The benefit of the provisions of Article 125,
which requires the filing of a complaint or information with the proper judicial
authorities within the applicable period, belongs to the arrested person.
The accelerated process of inquest ends with either the prompt filing of an
information in court or the immediate release of the arrested person. Notably, the
rules on inquest do not provide for a motion for reconsideration.
Contrary to petitioners position that private complainant should have appealed to
the DOJ Secretary, such remedy is not immediately available in cases subject of
inquest.
Noteworthy is the proviso that the appeal to the DOJ Secretary is by petition by a
proper party under such rules as the DOJ may prescribe. The rule referred to is the
2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal, Section 1 of which provides
that the Rule shall apply to appeals from resolutions x x x in cases subject of
preliminary investigation/ reinvestigation. In cases subject of inquest, therefore, the
private party should first avail of a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation, if
any, before elevating the matter to the DOJ Secretary.
In case the inquest proceedings yield no probable cause, the private complainant
may pursue the case through the regular course of a preliminary investigation.
ONCE A COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IS FILED IN COURT
The rules yet provide the accused with another opportunity to ask for a PI within 5
days from the time he learns of its filing. The ROC and the New Rules on Inquest
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial. What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from
the charge of murder after the claimed circumstances were made known to him as
early as the first motion.
Petitioner did not make much of the opportunity to present countervailing
evidence on the proposed amended charge. Despite notice of hearing, petitioner
opted to merely observe the proceedings and declined to actively participate, even
with extreme caution, in the reinvestigation. Mercado v. CA that the rules do not
even require, as a condition sine qua non to the validity of a PI the presence of the
respondent as long as efforts to reach him were made and an opportunity to
controvert the complainants evidence was accorded him.
Whether the RTC can issue orders despite pendency of appeals to CA YES
The Rules categorically state that the petition shall not interrupt the course of the
principal case unless a temporary retraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued.
The CA, by Resolution, denied petitioners application for a TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction. Supplementary efforts to seek injunctive reliefs proved
futile. The CA thus did not err in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the RTC when it proceeded with the case and eventually arraigned the accused
on March 21, 2007, there being no injunction order from the appellate court.
Moreover, petitioner opted to forego appealing to the DOJ Secretary, a postinquest remedy that was available after the reinvestigation and which could have
suspended the arraignment.
There is no ground for petitioners protestations against the DOJ Secretarys
sudden designation of Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco as Acting City
Prosecutor of Makati City for the present case and the latters conformity to the
motion for reinvestigation.
In granting the reinvestigation, Judge Alameda cannot choose the public prosecutor
who will conduct the reinvestigation or preliminary investigation. There is a
hierarchy of officials in the prosecutory arm of the executive branch headed by the
Secretary of Justice
The statements of the DOJ Secretary (media statements) do not evince a
determination to file the Information even in the absence of probable cause. On the
contrary, the remarks merely underscored the importance of securing basic
investigative reports to support a finding of probable cause. The original
Resolution even recognized that probable cause for the crime of murder cannot be
determined based on the evidence obtained [u]nless and until a more thorough
investigation is conducted and eyewitness/es [is/]are presented in evidence[.]
The trial court concluded that the wound sustained by the victim at the back of his
head, the absence of paraffin test and ballistic examination, and the handling of
physical evidence, as rationalized by the prosecution in its motion, are sufficient
circumstances that require further inquiry.
That the evidence of guilt was not strong as subsequently assessed in the bail
hearings does not affect the prior determination of probable cause because, as the
appellate court correctly stated, the standard of strong evidence of guilt which is
sufficient to deny bail to an accused is markedly higher than the standard of judicial
probable cause which is sufficient to initiate a criminal case
Whether the RTC is required to conduct at the very least, a hearing for judicial
determination of probable cause, considering the lack of substantial or material
new evidence adduced during the reinvestigation NO
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial.
The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary
investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is
given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge
those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus
should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial
authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court.
Whether that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e.,
whether he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in
a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to
pass upon
The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the judge to ascertain
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must
satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing
the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge
finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.
Paragraph (a), Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure
to be followed by the RTC.
To move the court to conduct a judicial determination of probable cause is a mere
superfluity, for with or without such motion, the judge is duty-bound to personally
evaluate the resolution of the public prosecutor and the supporting evidence. In
fact, the task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is
first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for
the arrest of the accused.
The rules do not require cases to be set for hearing to determine probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest of the accused before any warrant may be issued.
Petitioner thus cannot, as a matter of right, insist on a hearing for judicial
determination of probable cause. Certainly, petitioner cannot determine beforehand
how cursory or exhaustive the [judge's] examination of the records should be [since
t]he extent of the judges examination depends on the exercise of his sound
discretion as the circumstances of the case require.
The allegation of lack of substantial or material new evidence deserves no credence,
because new pieces of evidence are not prerequisites for a valid conduct of
reinvestigation. It is not material that no new matter or evidence was presented
during the reinvestigation of the case. It should be stressed that reinvestigation, as
the word itself implies, is merely a repeat investigation of the case. New matters or
evidence are not prerequisites for a reinvestigation, which is simply a chance for the
prosecutor to review and re-evaluate its findings and the evidence already
submitted.
BERNARDO v TAN
July 11, 2012| Sereno, J. | Distinguish probable cause of prosecutor and judge
Digester: Yee, Jenine
SUMMARY: Bernardo filed a complaint for violation of the Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers, the city prosecutor dismissed the complaint. Bernardo then filed
a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice. The Secretary of Justice ordered the
filing of informations. But when private respondents moved for reconsideration, the
Secretary of Justice ordered the City Prosecutor for the withdrawal of Informations.
The City Prosecutor moved for the withdrawal, and the RTC withdrew the Information.
Bernardo then filed an MR but the CA upheld the decision of the RTC. The SC
reversed the ruling of the RTC and CA saying that there is probable cause
DOCTRINE: The court may grant or deny at its option a motion to dismiss or to
withdraw the information based on its own assessment of the records of the preliminary
investigation submitted to it, in the faithful exercise of judicial discretion and
prerogative, and not out of subservience to the prosecutor. his exercise of discretion is
not unbridled, however, especially when attended with grave abuse.
CRIME: The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree of 1976 and
the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957 and Estafa through False
Pretenses and Fraudulent Acts
ACTION: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
FACTS:
The present controversy stems from the 29 June 2006 and 8 September 2006
Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) granting the withdrawal of the
Informations filed against respondents for violation of Sections 5 (first
Information), 17 (second Information), and 20 (third Information) in relation to
Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. 957, otherwise known as The Subdivision
and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree of 1976 (P.D. 957).
On October 26, 2000, the petitioner Julieta Bernardo (Ms. Bernardo), offered to
purchase a condominium unit of the Paseo Park view Suites Tower II project of
the developer Megaworld Corporation (Megaworld) located at Sedeo corner
Valero Streets, Salcedo Village, Makati City.
The said project was to be constructed on the lots covered by Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. 160210, 160211 and 160212, which are located at Makati City. Ms.
Bernardo paid a reservation deposit, thus, a Request for Reservation and
Offer to Purchase] was completed by Ms. Bernardo and the same was
assented to by Megaworld.
Subsequently, a Contract to Buy and Sell dated November 22, 2000 was furnished
to Ms. Bernardo. The said contract stipulated therein that the condominium unit
would be delivered not later than July 31, 2003 with an additional grace period of
six (6) months. As of October 22, 2003, Ms. Bernardo was able to make another
payment for the condo (although not in full). On April 15, 2004, Megaworld sent a
letter to Ms. Bernardo regarding the transmittal of the Deed of Absolute Sale for
her to affix her signatures thereto and for her to pay taxes and other fees so that
Megaworld could start with the processing of her bank loan. Attached with the
letter is a schedule of expenses needed in the transfer of the certificate of title in
favor of Ms. Bernardo. The taxes and other fees to be paid by Ms. Bernardo
amounted to P 93,318.13. The conflict arose when Megaworld sent a letter
dated August 9, 2004 to Ms. Bernardo as a final notice of cancellation or
rescission of the Request for Reservation because of the latters alleged
failure to make the necessary payments.
Consequently, Ms. Bernardo inquired with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) on the records of the project and she learned that the
Certificate of Registration and the License to Sell for the project Paseo
Parkview Tower 2 were only issued by HLURB on June 7, 2001. Hence, Ms.
Bernardo, represented by Romeo Ruiz, filed a complaint on August 12, 2004
before the City Prosecutor of Makati City against the respondents for
violations of Sections 5, 17 and 20 of Presidential Decree No. 957, otherwise
known as "Regulating the Sale of Subdivision Lots and Condominiums, Providing
Penalties for Violations Thereof" and the Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations of P.D. 957 and Estafa through False Pretenses and Fraudulent Acts
before the Office of the City Prosecutor. Ms. Bernardo alleged that, since the
Reservation Agreement (or Request for Reservation) was executed between her and
Megaworld on October 26, 2000, the respondents should have caused the
annotation of the same within 180 [days] therefrom or until April 24, 2001, that no
annotation on the certificates of title was done when she verified the same, that
Megaworld was never able to deliver the condominium unit on the stipulated
deadline, which was on December 2003 and that, by such acts and omissions,
Megaworld and the project owner, Sedeo Manor, violated the provisions of P.D.
957 to her prejudice.
In a Joint Counter-Affidavit filed by some of the respondents, they averred that
Megaworld applied for a Certificate of Registration and License to Sell for the
project as early as July 1, 1998, that subsequently, a License to Sell was issued by
the HLURB but only for the Paseo Parkview Suites Phase 1 due to the
modifications in the Paseo Parkview Suites Tower 2, that there was no intent on
the part of Megaworld to defraud Ms. Bernardo.
In a Resolution dated December 29, 2004, the CITY PROSECUTOR
DISMISSED the complaint of Ms. Bernardo. Consequently, she filed a petition
for review with the Secretary of Justice. Her petition was granted by the
Secretary of Justice, hence, it ordered the filing of the corresponding
Informations for violations of Sections 5, 17 and 20 of P.D. No. 957. The said
Informations were filed in RTC, Branch 62 in Makati City. Due to the
voluntary inhibition of the presiding judge of the said court, the case was reassigned to RTC, Branch 150.
Aggrieved, the private respondents moved for the reconsideration of the filing
of the Informations against them. This time, the Secretary of Justice ruled in
their favor and granted their motion in a Resolution dated November 17, 2005.
Hence, pursuant to the Resolution, the Secretary of Justice ordered the City
Prosecutor to move for the withdrawal of the Informations filed before the trial
court.
RTC
Acting on the motion of the City Prosecutor, the public respondent court ruled in
favor of the Megaworld.
Consequently, Ms. Bernardo filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied by the trial court in dated September 8, 2006.
CA:
On 24 November 2008, the CA issued its questioned Decision upholding the
29 June 2006 and 8 September 2006 Orders of the RTC. The appellate court
ruled that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it allowed
the withdrawal of the Informations filed against respondents for their alleged
violation of P.D. 957. According to the CA, the trial court made an assessment
and evaluation of the merits of the Motion to Withdraw the Informations
independent from those of the respective findings of the Secretary of Justice and
the City Prosecutor.
of the case on the merits, according to its sound discretion. The court "is the
best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it."
(Yambot v. Armovit) The court may therefore grant or deny at its option a motion to
dismiss or to withdraw the information based on its own assessment of the records
of the preliminary investigation submitted to it, in the faithful exercise of judicial
discretion and prerogative, and not out of subservience to the prosecutor. While it
is imperative on the part of a trial judge to state his/her assessment and reasons in
resolving the motion before him/her, he/she need not state with specificity or
make a lengthy exposition of the factual and legal foundation relied upon to arrive
at the decision.
This exercise of discretion is not unbridled, however, especially when
attended with grave abuse. Grave abuse of discretion denotes "abuse of
discretion too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and personal hostility." It is present when there is capricious, whimsical,
and arbitrary exercise of judgment, which in the eyes of the law amounts to lack of
jurisdiction.
The Court found reversible error in the CA Decision upholding the 29 June
2006 and 8 September 2006 Orders of the RTC insofar as the first (violation
of Section 5) and the third (violation of Section 20) Informations are
concerned. The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted
the motion to withdraw the first and the third Informations against respondents on
the basis of a grossly erroneous interpretation and application of law.
The Court reiterates that its findings here are limited to the existence of probable
cause to indict respondents based on the Informations filed with the RTC. As to
the merits of the criminal complaints, the prosecution and the accused must be
given the opportunity to present their arguments in the appropriate adversarial
proceedings.
COMERCIANTE v. PEOPLE
July 22, 2015 |Perlas-Bernabe, J. | Distinguish probable cause of fiscal from that of the
judge
Digester: Villafuerte, Beatriz C.
SUMMARY: Agent Randan and PO3 Calag were cruising at a speed of 30kph when
they spotted at a distance of 10meters, two menlater identified as Comerciante and
Erick Dasillastanding and showing improper and unpleasant movements with one
of them handing plastic sachets to the other. They arrested Comerciante and Dasilla and
confiscated 2 plastic sachets containing shabu. The RTC and CA held that it was a valid
warrantless arrest. However, the SC ruled that it was not a valid warrantless arrest.
Therefore, Comerciante was acquitted.
DOCTRINE: Officers personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an
offense is absolutely required for a valid warrantless arrest.
CRIME:
ACTION: Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS:
According to prosecution, at around 10pm of July 30, 2003, Agent Randan of
Narcotics groupd and PO3 Bievy Calag were aboard a motorcycle, along private
Road, Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong, patrolling the are while on their way to visit a
friend. They were cruising at a speed of 30kph when they spotted at a distance of
10meters, two menlater identified as Comerciante and Erick Dasillastanding
and showing improper and unpleasant movements with one of them handing
plastic sachets to the other. Thinking that these sachets contain shabu, they
immediately stopped and approached Comerciante and Dasilla. At a distance of
around 5 meters, PO3 Calag introduced himself as a police officer, arrested
Comerciante and Dasilla and confiscated 2 plastic sachets containing white
substance. A laboratory examination later confirmed that said saits contained
metemphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
July 31, 2003. Information was filed before the RTC charging Comerciante of
Violation of Sec. 11, Article II of RA 9165.
RTC
Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the RTC, thus his
acquittal. However, due to Comerciantes failure to file his own demurrer to
evidence, the RTC considered his right to do so waived and ordered him to present
his evidence.
RTC found Comerciante guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 11,
Article II, RA 9165. Sentenced him to suffer the penalty og imprisonment for 12y
and 1d to 20y and ordered him to pay fine in the amount of P300,000.
RTC found that Po3 Calag conducted a valid warrantless arrest which yieleded 2
plastic sachets of shabu
There was probable cause to justify the warrantless arrest, considering that Po3
Calag saw, in plain view, that Comerciante was carrying the said sachets when he
decided to approach and apprehend the latter.
Furthermore, absent any proof of intent that PO3 Calag was impelled by any
malicious motive, he must be presumed to have properly performed his duty when
he arrested Comerciante
CA:
CA affirmed Comerciantes conviction
PO3 Calag had probable cause to effect the warrantless arrest given that the latter
was committing a crime in flagrante delicto and that he personally saw the latter
exchanging plastic sachets with Dasilla. According to CA this was enough to draw a
reasonable suspicion that those sachets might be shabu. Therefore, PO3 Calag had
every reason to inquire on the matter right there and then.
Comerciante filed an MR which was denied by CA
Comerciante filed this petition
RULING: Petition is granted. Comerciante is acquitted.
Whether or not the warrantless arrest by PO3 Calag was validNO. There was
neither a valid warrantless arrest nor a valid stop-and-frisk search made on
Comerciante.
Arguments of Comerciante: not a valid warrantless arrest. Therefore, evidence is
inadmissible, necessarily resulting in his acquittal.
Arguments OSG: Comerciantes warrantless arrest was validly made pursuant to
stop-and-frisk rule, especially considering that he was caught in flagrante delicto in
possession of illegal drugs.
Sec.2, Article III of the Constitution madates that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the
existence of probable cause; in the absence of such warrant, such search and
seizure becomes, as a general rule, unreasonable within the meaning of said
constitutional provision. The Constitution provides an exclusionary rule which
instructs that evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for
being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.
Exceptions to the exclusionary rule Sec.5, Rule 113, Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with
section 7 of Rule 112. (5a)
Under this provision there are 3 instances when a warrantless arrest may be
lawfully effected:
Elements
Sec. 5 (a)
(a) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt
act indicating that he has
just committed, is
actually committing, or
is attempting to commit
a crime;
(b) such overt act is done in
the presence or within
the view of the arresting
officer
Sec. 5 (b)
(a) an offense had in fact just
been committed
(b) the arresting officer had
personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the
accused had committed it.
A judicious review of the factual milieu of the instant case reveals that there
could have been no lawful warrantless arrest made on Comerciante.
Highly implausible that Po3, Calag, even assuming that he has perfect
vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracyespecially
from a distance of 10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle cruising
at a speed of 30kphminiscule amounts of white crystalline
substance inside 2 very small plastic sachets held by Comerciante.
o No other overt act could be properly attributed to Comerciante as to
rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Calag. The acts of standing
around with a companion and handling over something to the latter
cannot in any way be considered criminal acts.
o Even if comerciante and his companion were showing improper and
unpleasant movements as put by PO3 Calag, the same would not
have been sufficient in order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest.
o That his reasonable suspicion bolstered by the fact that he has seen
his fellow officers arrest persons in possession of shabu; and his
trainings and seminars on illegal drugs when he was still assigned in
the province are insufficient to create a conclusion that what he saw
was indeed shabu.
Neither the prosecution established that the rigorous conditions set forth in
Sec. 5 (b) have been complied with. (same grounds as above). Verily it is not
enough that the arresting officer had reasonable ground to believe that the
accused had just committed a crime; a crime must, in fact, have been
committed first, which does not obtain in this case.
Requirement for a valid Stop-and Frisk as discussed in People v. Cogaed:
o it does not have to be probable cause, but it cannot be mere
suspicion. It has to be a genuine reason to serve the purposes of the
stop and frisk exception.
o Police officers must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance.
There should be presence of more than one seemingly innocent
activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of
criminal activity.
In the instant case, there was neither a valid warrantless arrest nor a valid stop
and frisk search made on Comerciante. As such, the shabu purportedly seized
from him is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of
the poisonous tree. Since the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the
crime charged, Comerciante must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated
from criminal liability.
o
SYDECO v. PEOPLE
November 12, 2014 | Velasco, J. | Arrest
Digester: Venturanza, Maria
SUMMARY: Upon swerving, police officers flagged down petitioners vehicle and
asked him to alight from it. Petitioner refused and insisted on the plain view doctrine,
which irked the officers. Using the empty beer bottles on the vehicles trunk as basis,
they insisted that the petitioner was drunk and forced him out of his vehicle. They then
brought him to the hospital, where they obtained a medical certificate that attested to
his drunken state. Petitioner was then detained overnight and was charged with drunk
driving and resisting arrest. The Court found that the police officers deviated from the
given standards in apprehending traffic violators, and thus the arrest of the petitioner
was unlawful.
DOCTRINE: Given the deviation of the police officers from the standard and usual
procedure in dealing with traffic violation by perceived drivers under the influence of
alcohol and executing an arrest, the blind reliance and simplistic invocation by the trial
court and the CA on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is
clearly misplaced.
FACTS:
In this petition for review under Rule 45, petitioner Edmund Sydeco assails the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the decision of the
lower courts in adjudging petitioner guilty of drunk driving and resisting arrest.
Version of the prosecution: P/Insp. Manuel Aguilar, SPO4 Bodino, PO3
Benedict Cruz III and another officer were manning a checkpoint along Roxas
Boulevard when they spotted a swerving red Ford ranger pick up driven by
petitioner. The officers flagged down the vehicle and asked petitioner to alight
from the vehicle so that he could take a rest the police station nearby before he
resumes driving. However, petitioner denied being drunk and began cursing the
officers. Thus, Aguilar proceeded to arrest petitioner who put up resistance. He was
then brought to the Ospital ng Maynila, where he was examined and found to be
positive of alcoholic breath per the Medical Certificate.
Version of petitioner: Petitioner, along with the cook and waitress of his
restaurant, was on the way home from work at around 3am when the officers
flagged him down. The officers then asked the petitioner to open the vehicles door
and alight for a body and vehicle search, a directive he refused to heed owing to a
previous extortion experience. Instead, he opened the vehicle window and said,
Plain view lang boss, plain view lang. Irked by this remark, Aguilar then told him
that petitioner was drunk, pointing to three empty bottles in the trunk of the
vehicle. When petitioner tried to explain that these were from his restaurant,
Aguilar boxed him on the mouth and cursed at him. He was then forced out of his
car and brought to the hospital, where they succeeded in securing a medical
certificate under the signature of Dr. Balicating, saying that he was positive of
alcoholic breath, even though was never examined. He was thereafter detained and
released the next day. However, before his release, he was allowed to undergo
actual medical examination where the resulting medical certificate indicated that he
has sustained physical injuries but negative for alcohol breath. Ten days later,
petitioner filed his Complaint-Affidavit against Dr. Balucating, P/Insp. Aguilar and
the other police officers.
The MeTc rendered judgment, finding petitioner guilty as charged. The RTC
affirmed the conviction of the petitioner. The CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC, saying that there was a presumption of regularity in the performance of duties
by the police officers.
RULING: Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby acquitted of the crimes charged.
Whether the apprehension of the petitioner by the police officers was lawful
NO.
Section 29 of RA 4136 provides:
Confiscation of Drivers License. Law enforcement and peace officers of other agencies duly
deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any
regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations x x x confiscate the
license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor
which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two
hours from the time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not
be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter. x x x (Emphasis added.)
(1) That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the performance of official duty or gives a lawful
order to the offender; and (2) That the offender resists or seriously disobeys such person or his agent.