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DECISIONBARREDO, J.:
Appeal of the Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., defendant in the court below, from a
judgment of the said court (Court of First Instance of Batangas) in its Civil
Case No. 834, wherein appellee Herminio L. Nocum was plaintiff, senten cing
appellant to pay appellee the sum of P1,351.00 for actual damages and
P500.00 as attorney's fees, with legal interest from the filing of the complaint
plus costs. Appellee, who was a passenger in appellant's Bus No. 120 then
making a trip within the barrio of Dita, Municipality of Bay, Laguna, was injured
as a consequence of the explosion of firecrackers, contained in a box, loaded
in said bus and declared to its conductor as containing clothes and
miscellaneous items by a co-passenger. The findings of fact of the trial court
are not assailed. The appeal is purely on legal questions.
Appellee has not filed any brief. All that We have before Us is appellant's brief
with the following assignment of errors:
The main basis of the trial court's decision is that appellant did not observe the
extraordinary or utmost diligence of a very cautious person required by the
following articles of the Civil Code:
"ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers trans ported by
them, according to all the circumstances of each case."Such extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734,
1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the
safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756."ART.
1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances."ART. 1756. In
case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."
Analyzing the evidence presented by the parties, His Honor found:
"According to Severino Andaya, a witness for the plaintiff, a man with a box
went up the baggage compartment of the bus where he already was and said
box was placed under the seat. They left Azcarraga at about 11:30 in the
morning and when the explosion occured, he was thrown out. PC investigation
report states that thirty seven (37) passengers were injured (Exhibit 'O and
'2')."The bus conductor, Sancho Mendoza, testified that the box belonged to a
passenger whose name he does not know and who told him that it contained
miscellaneous items and clothes. He helped the owner in loading the bag gage
which weighed about twelve (12) kilos and because of company regulation, he
charged him for it twenty-five centavos (P0.25). From its appearance there
was no indication at all that the contents were explosives or firecrackers.
Neither did he open the box because he just relied on the word of the owner.
"Dispatcher Nicolas Cornista of defendant company corroborated the
testimony of Mendoza and he said, among other things, that he was present
when the box was loaded in the truck and the owner agreed to pay its fare. He
added that they were not authorized to open the baggages of passengers
because instruction from the management was to call the police if there were
packages containing articles which were against regulations.x x x x x"There is
no question that Bus No. 120 was road worthy when it left its Manila Terminal
for Lucena that morning of December 5, 1960. The injuries suffered by the
plaintiff were not due to mechanical defects but to the explosion of firecrackers
inside the bus which was loaded by a co-passenger.x x x Turning to the
It is undisputed that before the box containing the firecrackers were allowed to
be loaded in the bus by the conductor, inquiry was made with the passenger
carrying the same as to what was in it, since its "opening .. was folded and
tied with abaca." (Decision p. 16, Record on Appeal.) According to His Honor,
"if proper and rigid inspection were observed by the defendant, the contents of
the box could have been discovered and the accident avoided. Refusal by the
passenger to have the package opened was no excuse because, as stated by
Dispatcher Cornista, employees should call the police if there were packages
containing articles against company regulations." That may be true, but it is
Our considered opinion that the law does not require as much. Article 1733 is
not as unbending as His Honor has held, for it reasonably qualifies the
extraordinary diligence required of common carriers for the safety of the
passengers transported by them to be "according to all the circumstances of
each case." In fact, Article 1755 repeats this same qualification: "A common
carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with
due regard for all the circumstances."
In this particular case before Us, it must be considered that while it is true the
passengers of appellant's bus should not be made to suffer for something over
which they had no control, as enunciated in the decision of this Court cited by
His Honor, fairness demands that in measuring a common carrier's duty
towards its passengers, allowance must be given to the reliance that should be
reposed on the sense of responsibility of all the passengers in re gard to their
common safety. It is to be presumed that a passenger will not take with him
anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his co-passengers, not to speak
of his own. Not to be lightly considered must be the right to privacy to which
each passenger is entitled. He cannot be subjected to any unusual search,
when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and nothing appears to
indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar. In other words, in quiry may be
verbally made as to the nature of a passenger's baggage when such is not
outwardly perceptible, but beyond this, constitutional boundaries are already in
danger of being transgressed. Calling a policeman to his aid, as suggested by
the service manual invoked by the trial judge, in compelling the passenger to
submit to more rigid inspection, after the passenger had already declared that
the box contained mere clothes and other miscellanies, could not have justified
invasion of a constitutionally protected domain. Police officers acting without
judicial authority secured in the manner provided by law are not beyond the
pale of constitutional inhibitions designed to protect individual human rights
and liberties. Withal, what must be importantly considered here is not so much
the infringement of the fundamental sacred rights of the particular passenger
herein involved, but the constant threat any contrary ruling would pose on the
right of privacy of all passengers of all common carriers, considering how
easily the duty to inspect can be made an excuse for mischief and abuse. Of
course, when there are sufficient indications that the representations of the
passenger regarding the nature of his baggage may not be true, in the interest
of the common safety of all, the assistance of the police authorities may be
solicited, not necessarily to force the passenger to open his baggage, but to
conduct the needed investigation consistent with the rules of propriety and,
above all, the constitutional rights of the passenger. It is in this sense that the
mentioned service manual issued by appellant to its conductors must be
understood.
1
"The principle that must control the servants of the carrier in a case like the
one before us is correctly stated in the opinion in the case of Clarke v.
Louisville & N.R. Co. 20 Ky. L. Rep. 839, 49 S. W. 1120. In that case Clarke
was a passenger on the defendant's train. Another passenger took a quantity
of gasoline into the same coach in which Clarke was riding. It ignited and
exploded, by reason of which he was severely injured. The trial court
peremptorily instructed the jury to find for the defendant. In the opinion,
affirming the judgment, it is said: 'It may be stated briefly, in assuming the
liability of a railroad to its passengers for injury done by another passenger,
only where the conduct of this passenger had been such before the injury as
to induce a reasonably prudent and vigilant conductor to believe that there was
reasonable ground to apprehend violence and danger to the other passengers,
and in that case asserting it to be the duty of the conductor of the railroad train
to use all reasonable means to prevent such injury, and if he neglects this
reasonable duty, and injury is done, that then the company is responsible; that
otherwise the railroad is not responsible.'"The opinion quotes with approval
from the case of Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. vs. Shields, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 652, 29 S.
W. 652, in which case the plaintiff was injured by alcohol which had been
carried upon the train by another passenger. In the opinion in that case it is
said: 'It was but a short period of time after the alcohol was spilt when it was
set on fire and the accident occurred, and it was not shown that appel lant's
employees knew that the jug contained alcohol. In fact, it is not shown that the
conductor or any other employee knew that Harris had a jug with him until it
fell out of the sack, though the conductor had collected (his) fare, and
doubtless knew that he had the sack on the seat with him ... It cannot be
successfully denied that Harris had the right as a passenger to carry baggage
on the train, and that he had a right to carry it in a sack if he chose to do so.
We think it is equally clear that, in the absence of some intimation or
circumstance indicating that the sack contained something dangerous to other
passengers, it was not the duty of appellant's conductor or any other employee
to open the sack and examine its contents.' Quinn v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 98
Ky. 231, 32 S. W. 742; Wood v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 101 Ky. 703, 42 S. W.
349; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Vincent, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 1049, 96 S. W. 898;
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Renfro, 142 Ky. 590, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 133, 135 S. W.
266." (Underscoring supplied.)"Explosive or Dangerous Contents. - A carrier is
ordinarily not liable for injuries to passengers from fires or explosions caused
by articles brought into its conveyances by other passengers, in the absence
of any evidence that the carrier, through its employees, was aware of the
nature of the article or had any reason to anticipate danger therefrom. (Bogard
v. Illinois C. R. Co. 144 Ky. 649, 139 S. W. 855, 36 L. R. A. [N. S.] 337; Clarke
v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 101 Ky. 34, 39 S. W. 840, 36 L. R. A. 123 [explosion of
can of gasoline]; East Indian R. Co. v. Mukerjee [1901] A. C. [Eng.] 396, 3 B.
R. C. 420 - P. C. [explosion of fireworks]; Annotation: 37 L. R. A. [N. S.] 725.)"
Appellant further invokes Article 1174 of the Civil Code which relieves all
obligors, including, of course, common carriers like appellant, from the
consequence of fortuitous events. The court a quo held that "the breach of
contract (in this case) was not due to fortuitous event and that, therefore, the
defendant is liable in damages." Since We hold that appellant has succeeded
in rebutting the presumption of negligence by showing that it has exercised
extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passengers, "according to the
circumstances of the (each) case", We deem it unnecessary to rule whether or
not there was any fortuitous event in this case.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the trial court is reversed and the
case is dismissed, without costs.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 110398, November 07, 1997 ]
NEGROS NAVIGATION CO., INC., PETITIONER,
VS.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON MIRANDA, SPS. RICARDO
AND VIRGINIA DE LA VICTORIA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISIONMENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming with modification the Regional Trial Courts award of damages to
private respondents for the death of relatives as a result of the sinking of
petitioners vessel.
At about 10:30 in the evening of April 22, 1980, the Don Juan collided off the
Tablas Strait in Mindoro, with the M/T Tacloban City, an oil tanker owned by the
Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and the PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). As a result, the M/V Don Juan sank.
Several of her passengers perished in the sea tragedy. The bodies of some of
the victims were found and brought to shore, but the four members of private
respondents families were never found.
Private respondents filed a complaint on July 16, 1980 in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 34, against the Negros Navigation, the Philippine
National Oil Company (PNOC), and the PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation (PNOC/STC), seeking damages for the death of Ardita de la
Victoria Miranda, 48, Rosario V. Miranda, 19, Ramon V. Miranda, Jr., 16, and
Elfreda de la Victoria, 26.
On January 20, 1986, the PNOC and petitioner Negros Navigation Co., Inc.
entered into a compromise agreement whereby petitioner assumed full
responsibility for the payment and satisfaction of all claims arising out of or in
connection with the collision and releasing the PNOC and the PNOC/STC from
any liability to it. The agreement was subsequently held by the trial court to be
binding upon petitioner, PNOC and PNOC/STC. Private respondents did not
join in the agreement.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on February 21, 1991, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering all the
defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs damages as follows:
To Ramon Miranda:
(2) whether the ruling in Mecenas v. Court of Appeals, finding the crew
members of petitioner to be grossly negligent in the performance of their
duties, is binding in this case;
(3) whether the total loss of the M/V Don Juan extinguished petitioners
liability; and
(4) whether the damages awarded by the appellate court are excessive,
unreasonable and unwarranted.
First. The trial court held that the fact that the victims were passengers of the
M/V Don Juan was sufficiently proven by private respondent Ramon Miranda,
who testified that he purchased tickets numbered 74411, 74412, 74413, and
74414 at P131.30 each from the Makati office of petitioner for Voyage No. 47A of the M/V Don Juan, which was leaving Manila on April 22, 1980. This was
corroborated by the passenger manifest (Exh. E) on which the numbers of the
tickets and the names of Ardita Miranda and her children and Elfreda de la
Victoria appear.
Petitioner contends that the purchase of the tickets does not necessarily mean
that the alleged victims actually took the trip. Petitioner asserts that it is
common knowledge that passengers purchase tickets in advance but do not
actually use them. Hence, private respondent should also prove the presence
of the victims on the ship. The witnesses who affirmed that the victims were on
the ship were biased and unreliable.
Petitioner casts doubt on Ramirez testimony, claiming that Ramirez could not
have talked with the victims for about three hours and not run out of stories to
tell, unless Ramirez had a storehouse of stories. But what is incredible about
acquaintances thrown together on a long journey staying together for hours on
end, in idle conversation precisely to while the hours away?
Petitioner also points out that it took Ramirez three (3) days before he finally
contacted private respondent Ramon Miranda to tell him about the fate of his
family. But it is not improbable that it took Ramirez three days before calling on
private respondent Miranda to tell him about the last hours of Mrs. Miranda
and her children and niece, in view of the confusion in the days following the
collision as rescue teams and relatives searched for survivors.
Indeed, given the facts of this case, it is improper for petitioner to even suggest
that private respondents relatives did not board the ill-fated vessel and perish
in the accident simply because their bodies were not recovered.
In addition, the Court found that the Don Juan was overloaded. The Certificate
of Inspection, dated August 27, 1979, issued by the Philippine Coast Guard
Commander at Iloilo City stated that the total number of persons allowed on
the ship was 864, of whom 810 are passengers, but there were actually 1,004
on board the vessel when it sank, 140 persons more than the maximum
number that could be safely carried by it.
Taking these circumstances together, and the fact that the M/V Don Juan, as
the faster and better-equipped vessel, could have avoided a collision with the
PNOC tanker, this Court held that even if the Tacloban City had been at fault
for failing to observe an internationally-recognized rule of navigation, the Don
Juan was guilty of contributory negligence. Through Justice Feliciano, this
Court held:
The grossness of the negligence of the Don Juan is underscored when one
considers the foregoing circumstances in the context of the following facts:
Firstly, the Don Juan was more than twice as fast as the Tacloban City. The
Don Juans top speed was 17 knots; while that of the Tacloban City was
6.3. knots. Secondly, the Don Juan carried the full complement of officers
and crew members specified for a passenger vessel of her class. Thirdly, the
Don Juan was equipped with radar which was functioning that night. Fourthly,
the Don Juans officer on-watch had sighted the Tacloban City on his radar
screen while the latter was still four (4) nautical miles away. Visual
confirmation of radar contact was established by the Don Juan while the
Tacloban City was still 2.7 miles away. In the total set of circumstances which
existed in the instant case, the Don Juan, had it taken seriously its duty of
extraordinary diligence, could have easily avoided the collision with the
Tacloban City. Indeed, the Don Juan might well have avoided the collision
even if it had exercised ordinary diligence merely.
It is true that the Tacloban City failed to follow Rule 18 of the International
Rules of the Road which requires two (2) power-driven vessels meeting end
on or nearly end on each to alter her course to starboard (right) so that each
vessel may pass on the port side (left) of the other. The Tacloban City, when
the two (2) vessels were only three-tenths (0.3) of a mile apart, turned (for the
second time) 15o to port side while the Don Juan veered hard to
starboard. . . . [But] route observance of the International Rules of the Road
will not relieve a vessel from responsibility if the collision could have been
avoided by proper care and skill on her part or even by a departure from the
rules.
In the petition at bar, the Don Juan having sighted the Tacloban City when it
was still a long way off was negligent in failing to take early preventive action
and in allowing the two (2) vessels to come to such close quarters as to render
the collision inevitable when there was no necessity for passing so near to the
Tacloban City as to create that hazard or inevitability, for the Don Juan
could choose its own distance. It is noteworthy that the Tacloban City, upon
turning hard to port shortly before the moment of collision, signalled its
intention to do so by giving two (2) short blasts with its horn. The Don Juan
gave no answering horn blast to signal its own intention and proceeded to turn
hard to starboard.
We conclude that Capt. Santisteban and Negros Navigation are properly held
liable for gross negligence in connection with the collision of the Don Juan
and Tacloban City and the sinking of the Don Juan leading to the death of
hundreds of passengers. . . .Petitioner criticizes the lower courts reliance on
the Mecenas case, arguing that, although this case arose out of the same
incident as that involved in Mecenas, the parties are different and trial was
conducted separately. Petitioner contends that the decision in this case should
be based on the allegations and defenses pleaded and evidence adduced in it
or, in short, on the record of this case.
The contention is without merit. What petitioner contends may be true with
3
respect to the merits of the individual claims against petitioner but not as to the
cause of the sinking of its ship on April 22, 1980 and its liability for such
accident, of which there can only be one truth. Otherwise, one would be
subscribing to the sophistry: truth on one side of the Pyrenees, falsehood on
the other!
Indeed, the evidence presented in this case was the same as those presented
in the Mecenas case, to wit:
Exh. 13
Nor is it true that the trial court merely based its decision on the Mecenas
case. The trial court made its own independent findings on the basis of the
testimonies of witnesses, such as Senior Third Mate Rogelio de Vera, who
incidentally gave substantially the same testimony on petitioners behalf before
the Board of Marine Inquiry. The trial court agreed with the conclusions of the
then Minister of National Defense finding both vessels to be negligent.
Fourth. Petitioner contends that, assuming that the Mecenas case applies,
private respondents should be allowed to claim only P43,857.14 each as moral
damages because in the Mecenas case, the amount of P307,500.00 was
awarded to the seven children of the Mecenas couple. Under petitioners
formula, Ramon Miranda should receive P43,857.14, while the De la Victoria
spouses should receive P97,714.28.
Here is where the principle of stare decisis does not apply in view of
differences in the personal circumstances of the victims. For that matter,
differentiation would be justified even if private respondents had joined the
private respondents in the Mecenas case. The doctrine of stare decisis works
as a bar only against issues litigated in a previous case. Where the issue
involved was not raised nor presented to the court and not passed upon by the
court in the previous case, the decision in the previous case is not stare
decisis of the question presently presented. The decision in the Mecenas case
relates to damages for which petitioner was liable to the claimants in that case.
In the case at bar, the award of P300,000.00 for moral damages is reasonable
considering the grief petitioner Ramon Miranda suffered as a result of the loss
of his entire family. As a matter of fact, three months after the collision, he
developed a heart condition undoubtedly caused by the strain of the loss of his
family. The P100,000.00 given to Mr. and Mrs. de la Victoria is likewise
reasonable and should be affirmed.
We now turn to the determination of the earning capacity of the victims. With
respect to Ardita Miranda, the trial court awarded damages computed as
follows:
In the case of victim Ardita V. Miranda whose age at the time of the accident
was 48 years, her life expectancy was computed to be 21.33 years, and
therefore, she could have lived up to almost 70 years old. Her gross earnings
for 21.33 years based on P10,224.00 per annum, would be P218,077.92.
Deducting therefrom 30% as her living expenses, her net earnings would be
P152,654.55, to which plaintiff Ramon Miranda is entitled to compensatory
damages for the loss of earning capacity of his wife. In considering 30% as the
living expenses of Ardita Miranda, the Court takes into account the fact that
plaintiff and his wife were supporting their daughter and son who were both
college students taking Medicine and Law respectively.In accordance with the
ruling in Villa-Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we think the life expectancy
of Ardita Miranda was correctly determined to be 21.33 years, or up to age 69.
Petitioner contends, however, that Mrs. Miranda would have retired from her
job as a public school teacher at 65, hence her loss of earning capacity should
be reckoned up to 17.33 years only.
The accepted formula for determining life expectancy is 2/3 multiplied by (80
minus the age of the deceased). It may be that in the Philippines the age of
retirement generally is 65 but, in calculating the life expectancy of individuals
for the purpose of determining loss of earning capacity under Art. 2206(1) of
the Civil Code, it is assumed that the deceased would have earned income
even after retirement from a particular job. In this case, the trial court took into
account the fact that Mrs. Miranda had a masters degree and a good prospect
of becoming principal of the school in which she was teaching. There was
reason to believe that her income would have increased through the years and
she could still earn more after her retirement, e.g., by becoming a consultant,
had she not died. The gross earnings which Mrs. Miranda could reasonably be
expected to earn were it not for her untimely death was, therefore, correctly
computed by the trial court to be P218,077.92 (given a gross annual income of
P10,224.00 and life expectancy of 21.33 years).
Petitioner contends that from the amount of gross earnings, 60% should be
deducted as necessary living expenses, not merely 30% as the trial court
allowed. Petitioner contends that 30% is unrealistic, considering that Mrs.
Mirandas earnings would have been subject to taxes, social security
deductions and inflation.
We agree with this contention. In Villa-Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the
Court allowed a deduction of P1,184.00 for living expenses from the P2,184.00
annual salary of the victim, which is roughly 54.2% thereof. The deceased was
29 years old and a training assistant in the Bacnotan Cement Industries. In
People v. Quilaton, the deceased was a 26-year old laborer earning a daily
wage. The court allowed a deduction of P120,000.00 which was 51.3% of his
annual gross earnings of P234,000.00. In People v. Teehankee, the court
allowed a deduction of P19,800.00, roughly 42.4% thereof from the
deceaseds annual salary of P46,659.21. The deceased, Maureen Hultman,
was 17 years old and had just received her first paycheck as a secretary. In
the case at bar, we hold that a deduction of 50% from Mrs. Mirandas gross
earnings (P218,077.92) would be reasonable, so that her net earning capacity
should be P109,038.96. There is no basis for supposing that her living
expenses constituted a smaller percentage of her gross income than the living
expenses in the decided cases. To hold that she would have used only a small
part of her income for herself, a larger part going to the support of her children
would be conjectural and unreasonable.
As for Elfreda de la Victoria, the trial court found that, at the time of her death,
she was 26 years old, a teacher in a private school in Malolos, Bulacan,
4
net earning capacity (x) = life expectancy x[ gross annual income less
reasonable & necessary living expenses (50%) ]x = [ 2 (80-26) ] x[P6,192.00 P3,096.00]3= 36 x 3,096.00= P111,456.00
On the other hand, the award of actual damages in the amount of P23,075.00
was determined by the Court of Appeals on the basis of receipts submitted by
private respondents. This amount is reasonable considering the expenses
incurred by private respondent Miranda in organizing three search teams to
look for his family, spending for transportation in going to places such as
Batangas City and Iloilo, where survivors and the bodies of other victims were
found, making long distance calls, erecting a monument in honor of the four
victims, spending for obituaries in the Bulletin Today and for food, masses and
novenas.
Petitioners contention that the expenses for the erection of a monument and
other expenses for memorial services for the victims should be considered
included in the indemnity for death awarded to private respondents is without
merit. Indemnity for death is given to compensate for violation of the rights of
the deceased, i.e., his right to life and physical integrity. On the other hand,
damages incidental to or arising out of such death are for pecuniary losses of
the beneficiaries of the deceased.
As for the award of attorneys fees, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the
amount of P40,000.00 for private respondent Ramon Miranda and P15,000.00
for the de la Victoria spouses is justified. The appellate court correctly held:
The Mecenas case cannot be made the basis for determining the award for
attorneys fees. The award would naturally vary or differ in each case. While it
is admitted that plaintiff-appellee Ramon Miranda who is himself a lawyer,
represented also plaintiffs-appellees Dela Victoria spouses, we note that
separate testimonial evidence were adduced by plaintiff-appellee Ramon
Miranda (TSN, February 26, 1982, p. 6) and plaintiffs-appellees spouses Dela
Victoria (TSN, August 13, 1981, p. 43). Considering the amount of work and
effort put into the case as indicated by the voluminous transcripts of
stenographic notes, we find no reason to disturb the award of P40,000.00 for
plaintiff-appellee Ramon Miranda and P15,000.00 for plaintiffs-appellees Dela
Victoria spouses.The award of exemplary damages should be increased to
P300,000.00 for Ramon Miranda and P100,000.00 for the de la Victoria
spouses in accordance with our ruling in the Mecenas case:Exemplary
damages are designed by our civil law to permit the courts to reshape
behaviour that is socially deleterious in its consequence by creating negative
incentives or deterrents against such behaviour. In requiring compliance with
the standard of extraordinary diligence, a standard which is in fact that of the
highest possible degree of diligence, from common carriers and in creating a
presumption of negligence against them, the law seeks to compel them to
control their employees, to tame their reckless instincts and to force them to
take adequate care of human beings and their property. The Court will take
judicial notice of the dreadful regularity with which grievous maritime disasters
occur in our waters with massive loss of life. The bulk of our population is too
poor to afford domestic air transportation. So it is that notwithstanding the
frequent sinking of passenger vessels in our waters, crowds of people
continue to travel by sea. This Court is prepared to use the instruments given
to it by the law for securing the ends of law and public policy. One of those
instruments is the institution of exemplary damages; one of those ends, of
special importance in an archipelagic state like the Philippines, is the safe and
reliable carriage of people and goods by sea.WHEREFORE, the decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with modification and petitioner is
ORDERED to pay private respondents damages as follows:
In the event the Philippine National Oil Company and/or the PNOC Shipping
and Transport Corporation pay or are required to pay all or a portion of the
amounts adjudged, petitioner Negros Navigation Co., Inc. shall reimburse
either of them such amount or amounts as either may have paid, and in the
event of failure of Negros Navigation Co., Inc., to make the necessary
reimbursement, PNOC and/or PNOC/STC shall be entitled to a writ of
execution without need of filing another action.SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 114061, August 03, 1994 ]
AND
JUANITO
C.
LAPUZ,
VS.
COURT OF APPEALS
RESPONDENTS.
AND
KOREAN
AIRLINES
CO.,
LTD.,
DECISIONCRUZ, J.:
According to Lapuz, he was allowed to check in with one suitcase and one
shoulder bag at the check-in counter of KAL. He passed through the customs
and immigration sections for routine check-up and was cleared for departure
as Passenger No. 157 of KAL Flight No. KE 903. Together with the other
passengers, he rode in the shuttle bus and proceeded to the ramp of the KAL
aircraft for boarding. However, when he was at the third or fourth rung of the
stairs, a KAL officer pointed to him and shouted "Down! Down!" He was thus
barred from taking the flight. When he later asked for another booking, his
ticket was canceled by KAL. Consequently, he was unable to report for his
work in Saudi Arabia within the stipulated 2-week period and so lost his
employment.
KAL, on the other hand, alleged that on November 8, 1980, Pan Pacific
Recruiting Services Inc. coordinated with KAL for the departure of 30 contract
workers, of whom only 21 were confirmed and 9 were wait-listed passengers.
The agent of Pan Pacific, Jimmie Joseph, after being informed that there was
a possibility of having one or two seats becoming available, gave priority to
Perico, who was one of the supervisors of the hiring company in Saudi Arabia.
The other seat was won through lottery by Lapuz. However, only one seat
became available and so, pursuant to the earlier agreement that Perico was to
be given priority, he alone was allowed to board.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 30, adjudged KAL liable
for damages, disposing as follows:
In G.R. No. 114061, KAL assails the decision of the appellate court on the
following grounds:
It is evident that the issues raised in these petitions relate mainly to the
correctness of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the award of
damages. The Court has consistently affirmed that the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals and the other lower courts are as a rule binding upon it,
subject to certain exceptions. As nothing in the record indicates any of such
exceptions, the factual conclusions of the appellate court must be affirmed.
This Court has held that a contract to transport passengers is different in kind
and degree from any other contractual relation. The business of the carrier is
mainly with the traveling public. It invites people to avail themselves of the
comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage generates a
relation attended with a public duty. Passengers have the right to be treated by
the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is that
any discourteous conduct on the part of these employees toward a passenger
gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.
The evidence presented by Lapuz shows that he had indeed checked in at the
departure counter, passed through customs and immigration, boarded the
shuttle bus and proceeded to the ramp of KAL's aircraft. In fact, his baggage
had already been loaded in KAL' s aircraft, to be flown with him to Jeddah. The
contract of carriage between him and KAL had already been perfected when
he was summarily and insolently prevented from boarding the aircraft.
KAL's allegation that the respondent court abused its discretion in awarding
moral and exemplary damages is also not tenable.
The findings of the court a quo that the defendant-appellant has committed
breach of contract of carriage in bad faith and in wanton, disregard of plaintiffappellant's rights as passenger laid the basis and justification of an award for
moral damages.x x xIn the instant case, we find that defendant-appellant
Korean Air Lines acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner when it "bumped off" plaintiff-appellant on November 8,
1980, and in addition treated him rudely and arrogantly as a "patay gutom na
contract worker fighting Korean Air Lines," which clearly shows malice and bad
faith, thus entitling plaintiff-appellant to moral damages.x x xConsidering that
the plaintiff-appellant's entitlement to moral damages has been fully
established by oral and documentary evidence, exemplary damages may be
awarded. In fact, exemplary damages may be awarded, even though not so
expressly pleaded in the complaint (Kapoe vs. Masa, 134 SCRA 231). By the
same token, to provide an example for the public good, an award of exemplary
damages is also proper (Armovit vs. Court of Appeals, supra).On the other
hand, Lapuz's claim that the award of P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages is inadequate is not acceptable either. His prayer for moral damages
of not less than P1 million and exemplary damages of not less than
P500,000.00 is overblown.
A review of the record of this case shows that the injury suffered by Lapuz is
not so serious or extensive as to warrant an award of P1.5 million. The
assessment of P100,000 as moral and exemplary damages in his favor is, in
our view, reasonable and realistic.
Lapuz likewise claims that the respondent court could not rule upon the
propriety of the award of actual damages because it had not been assigned as
an error by KAL. Not so. The rule is that only errors specifically assigned and
properly argued in the brief will be considered except errors affecting
jurisdiction over the subject matter and plain as well as clerical errors. But this
is not without qualification for, as the Court held in Vda. de Javellana vs. Court
of Appeals:
x x x [T]he Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they
are not assigned as errors in their appeal, if it finds that their consideration is
necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case.A similar pronouncement
was made in Baquiran vs. Court of Appeals in this wise:
Issues, though not specifically raised in the pleading in the appellate court,
may, in the interest of justice, be properly considered by said court in deciding
a case, if they are questions raised in the trial court and are matters of record
having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or
the lower court ignored.The Court of Appeals was therefore justified in
decreasing the award of actual damages even if the issue was not assigned as
an error by KAL. Consideration of this question was necessary for the just and
complete resolution of the present case. Furthermore, there was enough
evidence to warrant the reduction of the original award, as the challenged
decision correctly observed:
If suit were for payment of a definite sum of money, the contention might be
tenable. However, if it is for damages, unliquidated and not known until
definitely ascertained, assessed and determined by the courts after proof,
interest should be from the date of the decision.x x xThe obligation to pay
interest on a sum filed in a judgment exists from the date of the sentence,
when so declared; for until the net amount of the debtor's liability has been
determined, he cannot he considered delinquent in the fulfillment of his
obligation to pay the debt with interest thereon.Finally, we find that the
respondent court did not err in sustaining the trial court's dismissal of KAL's
counterclaim against Pan Pacific Overseas Recruiting Recruiting Services Inc.,
whose responsibility ended with the confirmation by KAL of Lapuz as its
passenger in its Flight No. 903.
This is still another case of the maltreatment of our overseas contract workers,
this time by the airline supposed to bring the passenger to his foreign
assignment. Our OCWs sacrifice much in seeking employment abroad, where
they are deprived of the company of their loved ones, the direct protection of
our laws, and the comfort of our own native culture and way of life. This Court
shall exert every effort to vindicate their rights when they are abused and shall
accord them the commensurate reparation of their injuries consistent with their
dignity and worth as members of the working class.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 119756, March 18, 1999 ]
At about 6:45 P.M. on November 22, 1989, three armed Maranaos who
pretended to be passengers, seized a bus of petitioner at Linamon, Lanao del
Norte while on its way to Iligan City. Among the passengers of the bus was
Atty. Caorong. The leader of the Maranaos, identified as one Bashier
Mananggolo, ordered the driver, Godofredo Cabatuan, to stop the bus on the
side of the highway. Mananggolo then shot Cabatuan on the arm, which
caused him to slump on the steering wheel. Then one of the companions of
Mananggolo started pouring gasoline inside the bus, as the other held the
passengers at bay with a handgun. Mananggolo then ordered the passengers
to get off the bus. The passengers, including Atty. Caorong, stepped out of the
bus and went behind the bushes in a field some distance from the highway.
However, Atty. Caorong returned to the bus to retrieve something from the
overhead rack. At that time, one of the armed men was pouring gasoline on
the head of the driver. Cabatuan, who had meantime regained consciousness,
heard Atty. Caorong pleading with the armed men to spare the driver as he
was innocent of any wrong doing and was only trying to make a living. The
armed men were, however, adamant as they repeated their warning that they
were going to burn the bus along with its driver. During this exchange between
Atty. Caorong and the assailants, Cabatuan climbed out of the left window of
the bus and crawled to the canal on the opposite side of the highway. He
heard shots from inside the bus. Larry de la Cruz, one of the passengers, saw
that Atty. Caorong was hit. Then the bus was set on fire. Some of the
passengers were able to pull Atty. Caorong out of the burning bus and rush
him to the Mercy Community Hospital in Iligan City, but he died while
undergoing operation.
The private respondents brought this suit for breach of contract of carriage in
the Regional Trial Court, Branch VI, Iligan City. In his decision, dated
December 28, 1990, the trial court dismissed the complaint, holding as follows:
The fact that defendant, through Operations Manager Diosdado Bravo, was
informed of the "rumors" that the Moslems intended to take revenge by
burning five buses of defendant is established since the latter also utilized
Crisanto Generalaos as a witness. Yet despite this information, the plaintiffs
charge, defendant did not take proper precautions. . . . Consequently, plaintiffs
now fault the defendant for ignoring the report. Their position is that the
defendant should have provided its buses with security guards. Does the law
require common carriers to install security guards in its buses for the
protection and safety of its passengers? Is the failure to post guards an
omission of the duty to "exercise the diligence of a good father of the family"
which could have prevented the killing of Atty. Caorong? To our mind, the
diligence demanded by law does not include the posting of security guards in
buses. It is an obligation that properly belongs to the State. Besides, will the
presence of one or two security guards suffice to deter a determined assault of
the lawless and thus prevent the injury complained of? Maybe so, but again,
perhaps not. In other words, the presence of a security guard is not a
guarantee that the killing of Atty. Caorong would have been definitely avoided.
....
DECISIONMENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal by petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated July
29, 1994, of the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch VI, Iligan City. The aforesaid decision of the trial court
dismissed the complaint of private respondents against petitioner for damages
for breach of contract of carriage filed on the ground that petitioner had not
exercised the required degree of diligence in the operation of one of its buses.
Atty. Talib Caorong, whose heirs are private respondents herein, was a
passenger of the bus and was killed in the ambush involving said bus.
Accordingly, the failure of defendant to accord faith and credit to the report of
Mr. Generalao and the fact that it did not provide security to its buses cannot,
in the light of the circumstances, be characterized as negligence.
Finally, the evidence clearly shows that the assailants did not have the least
intention of harming any of the passengers. They ordered all the passengers
to alight and set fire on the bus only after all the passengers were out of
danger. The death of Atty. Caorong was an unexpected and unforseen
occurrence over which defendant had no control. Atty. Caorong performed an
act of charity and heroism in coming to the succor of the driver even in the
face of danger. He deserves the undying gratitude of the driver whose life he
saved. No one should blame him for an act of extraordinary charity and
altruism which cost his life. But neither should any blame be laid on the
doorstep of defendant. His death was solely due to the willful acts of the
lawless which defendant could neither prevent nor stop.
7
....
Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for
injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the wilful acts of other
passengers, if the employees of the common carrier could have prevented the
act the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. In the present
case, it is clear that because of the negligence of petitioner's employees, the
seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men was made possible.
....
Had petitioner and its employees been vigilant they would not have failed to
see that the malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. Under the
circumstances, simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of
passengers, such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages,
preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before allowing
them on board could have been employed without violating the passenger's
constitutional rights. As this Court intimated in Gacal v. Philippine Air Lines,
Inc., a common carrier can be held liable for failing to prevent a hijacking by
frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages.
The petitioner contends that the seizure of its bus by the armed assailants was
a fortuitous event for which it could not be held liable.
Art. 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous even as an occurrence which
could not be foreseen or which though foreseen, is inevitable. In Yobido v.
Court of Appeals, we held that to be considered as force majeure, it is
necessary that: (1) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be
independent of the human will; (2) the event must be either unforeseeable or
unavoidable; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be
free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor. The
absence of any of the requisites mentioned above would prevent the obligor
from being excused from liability.
Thus, in Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the common carrier was
liable for its failure to take the necessary precautions against an approaching
typhoon, of which it was warned, resulting in the loss of the lives of several
passengers. The event was foreseeable, and, thus, the second requisite
mentioned above was not fulfilled. This ruling applies by analogy to the
present case. Despite the report of PC agent Generalao that the Maranaos
were going to attack its buses, petitioner took no steps to safeguard the lives
and properties of its passengers. The seizure of the bus of the petitioner was
foreseeable and, therefore, was not a fortuitous event which would exempt
petitioner from liability.
It is clear that the cases of Pilapil and De Guzman do not apply to the present
case. Art. 1755 of the Civil Code provides that "a common carrier is bound to
carry the passengers as far as human care and foresight can provide, using
the utmost diligence of very cautious person, with due regard for all the
circumstances." Thus, we held in Pilapil and De Guzman that the respondents
therein were not negligent in failing to take special precautions against threats
to the safety of passengers which could not be foreseen, such as tortious or
criminal acts of third persons. In the present case, this factor of
unforeseeablility (the second requisite for an event to be considered force
majeure) is lacking. As already stated, despite the report of PC agent
Generalao that the Maranaos were planning to burn some of petitioner's buses
and the assurance of petitioner's operations manager (Diosdado Bravo) that
the necessary precautions would be taken, nothing was really done by
petitioner to protect the safety of passengers.
8
We now consider the question of damages that the heirs of Atty. Caorong,
private respondents herein, are entitled to recover from the petitioner.
Indemnity for Death. Art. 1764 of the Civil Code, in relation to Art. 2206 thereof,
provides for the payment of indemnity for the death of passengers caused by
the breached of contract of carriage by a common carrier. Initially fixed in Art.
2206 at P3,000.00, the amount of the said indemnity for death has through the
years been gradually increased in view of the declining value of the peso. It is
presently fixed at P50,000.00. Private respondents are entitled to this amount.
WHEREFORE, the decision, dated July 29, 1994, of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Fortune Express,
Inc. is ordered to pay the following amounts to private respondents Paulie,
Yasser King, Rose Heinni, and Prince Alexander Caorong:death indemnity in
the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00);
compensation for loss of earning capacity in the amount of two million one
hundred twenty-one thousand four hundred four pesos and ninety centavos
(P2,121,404.90); and
Exemplary Damages. Art. 2232 provides that "in contracts and quasicontracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." In the
present case, the petitioner acted in a wanton and reckless manner. Despite
warning that the Maranaos were planning to take revenge against the
petitioner by burning some of its buses, and contrary to the assurance made
by its operations manager that the necessary precautions would be taken, the
petitioner and its employees did nothing to protect the safety of passengers.
Under the circumstances, we deem it reasonable to award private respondents
exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00.
Compensation for Loss of Earning Capacity. Art. 1764 of the Civil Code, in
relation to Art. 2206 thereof, provides that in addition to the indemnity for death
arising from the breach of contract of carriage by a common carrier, the
"defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased,
and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter." The formula
established in decided cases for computing net earning capacity is as follows:
Gross NecessaryNet earning =Life x Annual -LivingCapacity Expectancy
Income ExpensesLife expectancy is equivalent to two thirds (2/3) multiplied by
the difference of eighty (80) and the age of the deceased. Since Atty. Caorong
was 37 years old at the time of his death, he had a life expectancy of 28 2/3
more years. His projected gross annual income, computed based on his
monthly salary of P11,385.00 as a lawyer in the Department of Agrarian
Reform at the time of his death, was P148,005.00. allowing for necessary
living expenses of fifty percent (50%)of his projected gross annual income, his
total earning capacity amounts to P2,121,404.90. Hence, the petitioner is liable
to the private respondents in the said amount as compensation for loss of
earning capacity.
DECISIONMEDIALDEA, J.:
About 11:00 o'clock in the morning on December 24, 1966, Catalina Pascua,
Caridad Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, Erlinda Meriales, Mercedes Lorenzo,
Alejandro Morales and Zenaida Parejas boarded the jeepney owned by
spouses Isidro Mangune and Guillerma Carreon and driven by Tranquilino
Manalo at Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga bound for Carmen, Rosales,
Pangasinan to spend Christmas at their respective homes. Although they
usually ride in buses, they had to ride in a jeepney that day because the buses
were full. Their contract with Manalo was for them to pay P24.00 for the trip.
The private respondents' testimonial evidence on this contractual relationship
was not controverted by Mangune, Carreon and Manalo, nor by Filriters
Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc., the insurer of the jeepney, with contrary
evidence. Purportedly riding on the front seat with Manalo was Mercedes
9
Lorenzo. On the left rear passenger seat were Caridad Pascua, Alejandro
Morales and Zenaida Parejas. On the right rear passenger seat were Catalina
Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, and Erlinda Meriales. After a brief stopover at
Moncada, Tarlac for refreshment, the jeepney proceeded towards Carmen,
Rosales, Pangasinan.
Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan, San Manuel, Tarlac, the right rear wheel of the
jeepney was detached, so it was running in an unbalanced position. Manalo
stepped on the brake, as a result of which, the jeepney which was then
running on the eastern lane (its right of way) made a U-turn, invading and
eventually stopping on the western lane of the road in such a manner that the
jeepney's front faced the south (from where it came) and its rear faced the
north (towards where it was going). The jeepney practically occupied and
blocked the greater portion of the western lane, which is the right of way of
vehicles coming from the north, among which was Bus No. 753 of petitioner
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (Rabbit) driven by Tomas delos Reyes.
Almost at the time when the jeepney made a sudden U-turn and encroached
on the western lane of the highway as claimed by Rabbit and delos Reyes, or
after stopping for a couple of minutes as claimed by Mangune, Carreon and
Manalo, the bus bumped from behind the right rear portion of the jeepney. As a
result of the collision, three passengers of the jeepney (Catalina Pascua,
Erlinda Meriales and Adelaida Estomo) died while the other jeepney
passengers sustained physical injuries. What could have been a festive
Christmas turned out to be tragic.
The causes of the death of the three jeepney passengers were as follows (p.
101, Record on Appeal):
"The deceased Catalina Pascua suffered the following injuries, to wit: fracture
of the left parietal and temporal regions of the skull; fracture of the left
mandible; fracture of the right humenous; compound fracture of the left radious
and ullma, middle third and lower third; fracture of the upper third of the right
tibia and fillnea; avulsion of the head, left internal; and multiple abrasions. The
cause of her death was shock, secondary to fracture and multiple hemorrhage.
The fractures were produced as a result of the hitting of the victim by a strong
force. The abrasions could be produced when a person falls from a moving
vehicles (sic) and rubs parts of her body against a cement road pavement. x x
x."Erlinda Mariles (sic) sustained external lesions such as contusion on the left
parietal region of the skull; hematoma on the right upper lid; and barasions
(sic) on the left knee. Her internal lesions were: hematoma on the left thorax;
multiple lacerations of the left lower lobe of the lungs; contusions on the left
lower lobe of the lungs; and simple fractures of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th,
and 8th ribs, left. The forcible impact of the jeep caused the above injuries
which resulted in her death. x x x."The cause of death of Erlinda or Florida
Estomo (also called Adelaida) as per autopsy of Dr. Panlasiqui was due to
shock due to internal hemorrhage, ruptured spleen and trauma. x x x."Caridad
Pascua suffered physical injuries as follows (p. 101, Record on Appeal):
"x x x lacerated wound on the forehead and occipital region, hematoma on the
forehead, multiple abrasions on the forearm, right upper arm, back and right
leg. x x x."The police investigators of Tacpal and policemen of San Manuel,
Tarlac, Tarlac, upon arrival at the scene of the mishap, prepared a sketch
(common exhibit "K" for private respondents and "19 for Rabbit) showing the
relative positions of the two vehicles as well as the alleged point of impact (p.
100, Record on Appeal):
"x x x. The point of collision was a cement pave-portion of the Highway, about
six (6) meters wide, with narrow shoulders with grasses beyond which are
canals on both sides. The road was straight and points 200 meters north and
south of the point of collision are visible and unobstructed. Purportedly, the
point of impact or collision (Exh. 'K-4'-Pascua, on the sketch Exh. 'K'-Pascua)
was on the western lane of the highway about 3 feet (or one yard) from the
center line as shown by the bedris (sic), dirt and soil (obviously from the
undercarriage of both vehicles) as well as paint, marron (sic) from the Rabbit
bus and greenish from the jeepney. The point of impact encircled and marked
with the letter 'X' in Exh. 'K'-4, Pascua, had a diameter of two meters, the
center of which was about two meters from the western edge of cement
pavement of the roadway. Pictures taken by witness Bisquera in the course of
the investigation showed the relative positions of the point of impact and
center line (Exh. 'P'-Pascua) the back of the Rabbit bus (Exh. 'P-1-Pascua),
the lifeless body of Catalina Pascua (Exh 'P-2-Pascua'), and the damaged
front part of the Rabbit bus (Exh. 'P-3-Pascua'). No skid marks of the Rabbit
bus was found in the vicinity of the collision, before or after the point of impact.
On the other hand, there was a skid mark about 45 meters long purportedly of
the jeepney from the eastern shoulder of the road south of, and extending up
to the point of impact."At the time and in the vicinity of the accident, there were
no vehicles following the jeepney, neither were there oncoming vehicles
except the bus. The weather condition of that day was fair.
After conducting the investigation, the police filed with the Municipal Court of
San Manuel, Tarlac, a criminal complaint against the two drivers for Multiple
Homicide. At the preliminary investigation, a probable cause was found with
respect to the case of Manalo, thus, his case was elevated to the Court of First
Instance. However, finding no sufficiency of evidence as regards the case of
delos Reyes, the Court dismissed it. Manalo was convicted and sentenced to
Complaints for recovery of damages were then filed before the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan. In Civil Case No. 1136, spouses Casiano Pascua and
Juana Valdez sued as heirs of Catalina Pascua while Caridad Pascua sued in
her behalf. In Civil Case No. 1139, spouses Manuel Millares and Fidencia
Arcica sued as heirs of Erlinda Meriales. In Civil Case No. 1140, spouses
Mariano Estomo and Dionisia Sarmiento also sued as heirs of Adelaida
Estomo.
In all three cases, spouses Mangune and Carreon, Manalo, Rabbit and delos
Reyes were all impleaded as defendants. Plaintiffs anchored their suits against
spouses Mangune and Carreon and Manalo on their contractual liability. As
against Rabbit and delos Reyes, plaintiffs based their suits on their culpability
for a quasi-delict. Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. was also
impleaded as additional defendant in Civil Case No. 1136 only.
For the death of Catalina Pascua, plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1136 sought to
collect the aggregate amount of P70,060.00 in damages, itemized as follows:
P500.00 for burial expenses; P12,000.00 for loss of wages for 24 years;
P10,000.00 for exemplary damages; P10,000.00 for moral damages; and
P3,000.00 for attorney's fees. In the same case, plaintiff Caridad Pascua
claimed P550.00 for medical expenses; P240.00 for loss of wages for two
months; P2,000.00 for disfigurement of her face; P3,000.00 for physical pain
and suffering; P2,500.00 as exemplary damages and P2,000.00 for attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation.
In Civil Case No. 1139, plaintiffs demanded P500.00 for burial expenses;
P6,000.00 for the death of Erlinda, P63,000.00 for loss of income P10,000.00
for moral damages and P3,000.00 for attorney's fees or total of P80,000.00.
In Civil Case No. 1140, plaintiffs claimed P500.00 for burial expenses;
P6,000.00 for the death of Adelaida, P56,160.00 for loss of her income or
earning capacity; P10,000.00 for moral damages; and P3,000.00 for attorney's
fees.
Rabbit filed a cross-claim in the amount of P15,000.00 for attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation. On the other hand, spouses Mangune and Carreon filed
a cross-claim in the amount of P6,168.00 for the repair of the jeepney and
P3,000.00 for its non-use during the period of repairs.
On December 27, 1978, the trial court rendered its decision finding Manalo
negligent, the dispositive portion of which reads (pp. 113-114, Record on
Appeal):
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court is of the opinion and so holds: "1) That
defendants Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and Tranquilino Manalo thru
their negligence, breached contract of carriage with their passengers the
plaintiffs' and/or their heirs, and this Court renders judgment ordering said
defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs -'a) In Civil Case No.
1136, for the death of Catalina Pascua, to pay her heirs the amounts of
P12,000.00 for indemnity for loss of her life; P41,760.00 for loss of earnings;
P324.40 for actual expenses and P2,000.00 for moral damages;
'b) In the same Civil Case No. 1136 for the injuries of Caridad Pascua, to pay
her the amounts of P240.00 for loss of wages, P328.20 for actual expenses
and P500.00 for moral damages;
'c) In Civil Case No. 1139 for the death of Erlinda Meriales, to pay her heirs
(the plaintiffs) the amount of P12,000.00 - for indemnity for loss of her life;
P622.00 for actual expenses, P60,480.00 for loss of wages or income and
P2,000.00 for moral damages;
'd) In Civil Case No. 1140, for the death of Erlinda (also called Florida or
Adelaida Estomo), to pay her heirs (the plaintiffs) the amount of P12,000.00 for
indemnity for the loss of her life; P580.00 for actual expenses; P53,160.00 for
loss of wages or income and P2,000.00 for moral damages.'
as actual damages to its Bus No. 753 and P2,173.60 for loss of its earning. "All
of the above amounts shall bear legal interest from the filing of the complaints.
"Costs are adjudged against defendants Mangune, Carreon and Manalo and
Filriters Guaranty."SO ORDERED."On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate
Court reversed the above-quoted decision by finding delos Reyes negligent,
the dispositive portion of which reads (pp. 55-57, Rollo):
The issue is who is liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the
passengers of the jeepney?
The trial court, in declaring that Manalo was negligent, considered the
following (p. 106, Record on Appeal):
"(1) That the unrebutted testimony of his passenger plaintiff Caridad Pascua
that a long ways (sic) before reaching the point of collision, the Mangune
jeepney was 'running fast' that his passengers cautioned driver Manalo to slow
down but did not heed the warning: that the right rear wheel was detached
causing the jeepney to run to the eastern shoulder of the road then back to the
concrete pavement; that driver Manalo applied the brakes after which the
jeepney made a U-turn (half-turn) in such a manner that it inverted its direction
making it face South instead of north; that the jeepney stopped on the western
lane of the road on the right of way of the oncoming Phil. Rabbit Bus where it
was bumped by the latter;"(2) The likewise unrebutted testimony of Police
Investigator Tacpal of the San Manuel (Tarlac) Police who, upon responding to
the reported collision, found the real evidence thereat indicating in his sketch
(Exh. K, Pascua), the tracks of the jeepney of defendant Mangune and
Carreon running on the Eastern shoulder (outside the concrete paved road)
until it returned to the concrete road at a sharp angle, crossing the Eastern
lane and the (imaginary) center line and encroaching fully into the western
lane where the collision took place as evidenced by the point of impact;"(3)
The observation of witness Police Corporal Cacalda also of the San Manuel
Police that the path of the jeepney they found on the road (and indicated in the
sketch (Exh. K-Pascua) was shown by skid marks which he described as
'scratches on the road caused by the iron of the jeep, after its wheel was
removed;'"(4) His conviction for the crime of Multiple Homicide and Multiple
Serious Physical Injuries with Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence
by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac (Exh. 24-Rabbit) upon the criminal
Information by the Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac (Exh. 23-Rabbit), as a result of
the collision, and his commitment to prison and service of his sentence (Exh.
25-Rabbit) upon the finality of the decision and his failure to appeal therefrom;
and"(5) The application of the doctrine of res-ipsa loquitar (sic) attesting to the
circumstance that the collision occurred (sic) on the right of way of the Phil.
Rabbit Bus."The respondent court had a contrary opinion. Applying primarily
(1) the doctrine of last clear chance, (2) the presumption that drivers who
bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident unless
contradicted by other evidence, and (3) the substantial factor test, concluded
that delos Reyes was negligent.
The misappreciation of the facts and evidence and the misapplication of the
laws by the respondent court warrant a reversal of its questioned decision and
resolution.
We reiterate that "[t]he principle about the 'last clear chance' would call for
application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding
vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the
carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to
exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that
the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence." This was Our ruling in
Anuran, et al. v. Buo, et al., G.R. Nos. L-21353 and L-21354, May 20, 1966,
17 SCRA 224. Thus, the respondent court erred in applying said doctrine.
On the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty
and the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence, the
respondent court said (p. 49, Rollo):
"x x x, the jeepney had already executed a complete turnabout and at the time
of impact was already facing the western side of the road. Thus the jeepney
assumed a new frontal position vis a vis, the bus, and the bus assumed a new
role of defensive driving. The spirit behind the presumption of guilt on one who
bumps the rear end of another vehicle is for the driver following a vehicle to be
at all times prepared of a pending accident should the driver in front suddenly
come to a full stop, or change its course either through change of mind of the
front driver, mechanical trouble, or to avoid an accident. The rear vehicle is
given the responsibility of avoiding a collision with the front vehicle for it is the
rear vehicle who has full control of the situation as it is in a position to observe
the vehicle in front of it."The above discussion would have been correct were it
not for the undisputed fact that the U-turn made by the jeepney was abrupt
(Exhibit "K," Pascua). The jeepney, which was then traveling on the eastern
shoulder, making a straight skid mark of approximately 35 meters, crossed the
eastern lane at a sharp angle, making a skid mark of approximately 15 meters
from the eastern shoulder to the point of impact (Exhibit "K," Pascua). Hence,
delos Reyes could not have anticipated the sudden U-turn executed by
Manalo. The respondent court did not realize that the presumption was
rebutted by this piece of evidence.
With regard to the substantial factor test, it was the opinion of the respondent
court that (p. 52, Rollo):
"x x x. It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is
a substantial factor it bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor
neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the
manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable
(Restatement, Torts, 2d). Here, We find defendant bus running at a fast speed
when the accident occurred and did not even make the slightest effort to avoid
the accident, x x x. The bus driver's conduct is thus a substantial factor in
bringing about harm to the passengers of the jeepney, not only because he
was driving fast and did not even attempt to avoid the mishap, but also
because it was the bus which was the physical force which brought about the
injury and death to the passengers of the jeepney."The speed of the bus was
calculated by respondent court as follows (pp. 54-55, Rollo):
"According to the record of the case, the bus departed from Laoag, Ilocos
Norte, at 4:00 o'clock A.M. and the accident took place at approximately
11
around 12:30 P.M., after travelling roughly for 8 hours and 30 minutes. Deduct
from this the actual stopover time of two Hours (computed from the testimony
of the driver that he made three 40-minute stopovers), We will have an actual
travelling time of 6 hours and 30 minutes."Under the circumstances, We
calculate that the Laoag-Tarlac route (365 kms.) driving at an average of 56
km. per hour would take 6 hours and 30 minutes. Therefore, the average
speed of the bus, give and take 10 minutes, from the point of impact on the
highway with excellent visibility factor would be 80 to 90 kms. per hour, as this
is the place where buses would make up for lost time in traversing busy city
streets."Still, We are not convinced. It cannot be said that the bus was
travelling at a fast speed when the accident occurred because the speed of 80
to 90 kilometers per hour, assuming such calculation to be correct, is yet within
the speed limit allowed in highways. We cannot even fault delos Reyes for not
having avoided the collision. As aforestated, the jeepney left a skid mark of
about 45 meters, measured from the time its right rear wheel was detached up
to the point of collision. Delos Reyes must have noticed the perilous condition
of the jeepney from the time its right rear wheel was detached or some 90
meters away, considering that the road was straight and points 200 meters
north and south of the point of collision, visible and unobstructed. Delos Reyes
admitted that he was running more or less 50 kilometers per hour at the time
of the accident. Using this speed, delos Reyes covered the distance of 45
meters in 3.24 seconds. If We adopt the speed of 80 kilometers per hour,
delos Reyes would have covered that distance in only 2.025 seconds. Verily,
he had little time to react to the situation. To require delos Reyes to avoid the
collision is to ask too much from him. Aside from the time element involved,
there were no options available to him. As the trial court remarked (pp. 107108, Record on Appeal):
"x x x. They (plaintiffs) tried to impress this Court that defendant de los Reyes,
could have taken either of two options: (1) to swerve to its right (western
shoulder) or (2) to swerve to its left (eastern lane), and thus steer clear of the
Mangune jeepney. This Court does not so believe, considering the existing
exigencies of space and time."As to the first option, Phil. Rabbit's evidence is
convincing and unrebutted that the Western shoulder of the road was narrow
and had tall grasses which would indicate that it was not passable. Even
plaintiff's own evidence, the pictures (Exhs. P and P-2, Pascua) are mute
confirmation of such fact. Indeed, it can be noticed in the picture (Exh. P-2,
Pascua) after the Rabbit bus came to a full stop, it was tilted to right front side,
its front wheels resting most probably on a canal on a much lower elevation
that of the shoulder or paved road. It too shows that all of the wheels of the
Rabbit bus were clear of the roadway except the outer left rear wheel. These
observation appearing in said picture (Exh. P-2, Pascua) clearly shows
coupled with the finding the Rabbit bus came to a full stop only five meters
from the point of impact (see sketch, Exh. K-Pascua) clearly show that driver
de los Reyes veered his Rabbit bus to the right attempting to avoid hitting the
Mangune's jeepney. That it was not successful in fully clearing the Mangune
jeepney as its (Rabbit's) left front hit said jeepney (see picture Exh. 10-ARabbit) must have been due to limitations of space and time."Plaintiffs
alternatively claim that defendant delos Reyes of the Rabbit bus could also
have swerved to its left (eastern lane) to avoid bumping the Mangune jeepney
which was then on the western lane. Such a claim is premised on the
hypthesis (sic) that the eastern lane was then empty. This claim would appear
to be good copy of it were based alone on the sketch made after the collision.
Nonetheless, it loses force it one were to consider the time element involved,
for moments before that, the Mangune jeepney was crossing that very eastern
lane at a sharp angle. Under such a situation then, for driver delos Reyes to
swerve to the eastern lane, he would run the greater risk of running smack in
the Mangune jeepney either head on or broadside."After a minute scrutiny of
the factual matters and duly proven evidence, We find that the proximate
cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune
and Carreon. They all failed to exercise the precautions that are needed
precisely pro hac vice.
The negligence of Manalo was proven during the trial by the unrebutted
testimonies of Caridad Pascua, Police Investigator Tacpal, Police Corporal
Cacalda, his (Manalo's) conviction for the crime of Multiple Homicide and
Multiple Serious Injuries with Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence,
and the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, supra. The negligence
of spouses Mangune and Carreon was likewise proven during the trial (p. 110,
Record on Appeal):
"To escape liability, defendants, Mangune and Carreon offered to show thru
their witness Natalio Navarro, an alleged mechanic, that he periodically checks
and maintains the jeepney of said defendants, the last on Dec. 23, the day
before the collision, which included the tightening of the bolts. This
notwithstanding the right rear wheel of the vehicle was detached while in
transit. As to the cause thereof no evidence was offered. Said defendant did
not even attempt to explain, much less establish, it to be one caused by a caso
fortuito. x x x."In any event, "[i]n an action for damages against the carrier for
his failure to safely carry his passenger to his destination, an accident caused
either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver, is
not a caso fortuito which would avoid the carrier's liability for damages (Son v.
Cebu Autobus Company, 94 Phil. 892 citing Lasam, et al. v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil.
657; Necesito, etc. v. Paras, et al., 104 Phil. 75).
The trial court was therefore right in finding that Manalo and spouses Mangune
and Carreon were negligent. However, its ruling that spouses Mangune and
Carreon are jointly and severally liable with Manalo is erroneous. The driver
cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case of breach of
the contract of carriage. The rationale behind this is readily discernible. Firstly,
the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger, and in the
event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible therefor to
the passenger, even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver (see
Viluan v. The Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. L-21477-81, April 29, 1966, 16
SCRA 742). In other words, the carrier can neither shift his liability on the
contract to his driver nor share it with him, for his driver's negligence is his.
Secondly, if We make the driver jointly and severally liable with the carrier, that
would make the carrier's liability personal instead of merely vicarious and
consequently, entitled to recover only the share which corresponds to the
driver, contradictory to the explicit provision of Article 2181 of the New Civil
Code.
We affirm the amount of damages adjudged by the trial court, except with
respect to the indemnity for loss of life. Under Article 1764 in relation to Article
2206 of the New Civil Code, the amount of damages for the death of a
passenger is at least three thousand pesos (P3,000.00). The prevailing
jurisprudence has increased the amount of P3,000.00 to P30,000.00 (see
Heirs of Amparo delos Santos, et al. v. Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
No. 51165, June, 21, 1990 citing De Lima v. Laguna Tayabas Co., G.R. Nos.L35697-99, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 70).
SO ORDERED.
attorneys' fees, said defendant contending that the court should have declared
that the death of Lara was due to unavoidable accident.
The deceased was an inspector of the Bureau of Forestry stationed in Davao
with an annual salary of P1,800. The defendant is engaged in the business of
exporting logs from his lumber concession in Cotabato. Lara went to said
concession upon instructions of his chief to classify the logs of defendant
which were about to be loaded on a ship anchored in the port of Parang. The
work Lara of lasted for six days during which he contracted malaria fever. In
the morning of January 9, 1954, Lara who then in a hurry to return to Davao
asked defendant if he could take him in his pick-up as there was then no other
means of transportation, to which defendant agreed, and in that same morning
the pick-up left Parang bound for Davao taking along six passengers, including
Lara.
The pick-up has a front seat where the driver and two passengers can be
accommodated and the back has a steel flooring enclosed with a steel walling
of 16 to 17 inches tall on the sides and with a 19 inches tall walling at the back.
Before leaving Parang, the sitting arrangement was as follows: defendant was
at the wheel and seated with him in the front seat were Mrs. Valencia and
Nicanor Quinain; on the back of the pick-up were two improvised benches
placed on each side, and seated on the right bench were Ricardo Alojipan and
Antonio Lagahit, and on the left one Bernardo and Pastor Geronimo. A person
by the name of Leoning was seated on a box located on the left side while in
the middle Lara sat on a bag. Before leaving Parang, defendant invited Lara to
sit with him on the front seat but Lara declined. It was their understanding that
upon reaching barrio Samoay, Cotabato, the passengers were to alight and
take a bus bound for Davao, but when they arrived at that place, only
Bernardo alighted and the other passengers requested defendant to allow
them to ride with him up to Davao because there was then no available bus
that they could take in going to that place. Defendant again accommodated the
passengers.
When they continued their trip, the sitting arrangement of the passengers
remained the same, Lara being seated on a bag in the middle with his arms on
a suitcase and his head cove red by a jacket. Upon reaching Km. 96, barrio
Catidtuan, Lara accidentally fell from the pick-up and as a result he suffered
serious injuries. Valencia stopped the pick-up to see what happened to Lara.
He sought the help of the residents of that place and applied water to Lara but
to no avail. They brought Lara to the nearest place where they could find a
doctor and not having found any they took him to St. Joseph's Clinic of
Kidapawan. But when Lara arrived he was already dead. From there they
proceeded to Davao City and immediately notified the local authorities. An
investigation was made regarding the circumstances surrounding the death of
Lara but no criminal action was taken against defendant.
It should be noted that the deceased went to the lumber concession of
defendant in Parang, Cotabato upon instructions of his chief in order to classify
the logs of defendant which were then ready to be exported and to be loaded
on a ship anchored in the port of Parang. It took Lara six days to do his work
during which he contracted malaria fever and for that reason he evinced a
desire to return immediately to Davao. At that time, there was no available bus
that could take him back to Davao and so he requested the defendant if he
could take him in his own pick-up. Defendant agreed and, together with Lara,
other passengers tagged along, most of them were employees of the
Government. Defendant merely accommodated them and did not charge them
any fee for the service. It was also their understanding that upon reaching
barrio Samoay, the passengers would alight and transfer to a bus that
regularly makes the trip to Davao but unfortunately there was none available at
the time and so the same passengers, including Lara, again requested the
defendant to drive them to Davao. Defendant again accommodated them and
upon reaching Km. 96, Lara accidentally fell suffering fatal injuries.
It therefore appears that the deceased, as well his companions who rode in
the pick-up of defendant, were merely accommodation passengers who paid
nothing for the service and so they can be considered as invited guests within
the meaning of the law. As accommodation passengers or invited guests,
defendant as owner and driver of the pick-up owes to them merely the duty to
exercise reasonable care so that they may be transported safely to their
destination. Thus, "The rule is established by the weight of authority that the
owner or operator of an automobile owes the duty to an invited guest to
exercise reasonable care in its operation, and not unreasonably to expose him
to danger and injury by increasing the hazard of travel. This rule, as frequently
stated by the courts, is that an owner of an automobile owes a guest the duty
to exercise ordinary or reasonable care to avoid injuring him. Since one riding
in an automobile is no less a guest because he asked for the privilege of doing
so, the same obligation of care is imposed upon the driver as in the case of
one expressly invited to ride" (5 Am. Jur., 626-627). Defendant, therefore, is
only required to observe ordinary care, and is not in duty bound to exercise
extraordinary diligence as required of a common carrier by our law (Articles
1755 and 1756, new Civil Code).
xxx
xxx
The question that now arises is: Is there enough evidence to show that
defendant failed to observe ordinary care or diligence in transporting the
deceased from Parang to Davao on the date in question?
The trial court answered the question in the affirmative but in so doing it took
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia and
13
the carrier bears the burden of satisfying the court that he has duly discharged
the duty of prudence required. In the American law, where the carrier is held to
the same degree of diligence as under the new Civil Code, the rule on the
liability of carriers for defects of equipment is thus expressed: "The
preponderance of authority is in favor of the doctrine that a passenger is
entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from a defect
in an appliance purchased from a manufacturer, whenever it appears that the
defect would have been discovered by the carrier if it had exercised the
degree of care which under the circumstances was incumbent upon it, with
regard to inspection and application of the necessary tests. For the purposes
of this doctrine, the manufacturer is considered as being in law the agent or
servant of the carrier, as far as regards the work of constructing the appliance.
According to this theory, the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve
the carrier from liability" (10 Am. Jur. 205, s, 1324; see also Pennsylvania R.
Co. vs. Roy, 102 U. S. 451; 20 L. Ed. 141; Southern R. Co. vs. Hussey, 74
ALR 1172; 42 Fed. 2d 70; and Ed Note, 29 ALR 788; Ann. Cas. 1916E 929).
The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that the passenger has neither
choice nor control over the carrier in the selection and use of the equipment
and appliances in use by the carrier. Having no privity whatever with the
manufacturer or vendor of the defective equipment, the passenger has no
remedy against him, while the carrier usually has. It is but logical, therefore,
that the carrier, while not in insurer of the safety of his passengers, should
nevertheless be held to answer for the flaws of his equipment if such flaws
were at all discoverable. Thus Hannen, J., in Francis vs. Cockrell, LR 5 Q. B.
184, said:
In the ordinary course of things, the passenger does not know whether the
carrier has himself manufactured the means of carriage, or contracted with
someone else for its manufacture. If the carrier has contracted with someone
else the passenger does not usually know who that person is, and in no case
has he any share in the selection. The liability of the manufacturer must
depend on the terms of the contract between him and the carrier, of which the
passenger has no knowledge, and over which he can have no control, while
the carrier can introduce what stipulations and take what securities he may
think proper. For injury resulting to the carrier himself by the manufacturer's
want of care, the carrier has a remedy against the manufacturer; but the
passenger has no remedy against the manufacturer for damage arising from a
mere breach of contract with the carrier . . . . Unless, therefore, the presumed
intention of the parties be that the passenger should, in the event of his being
injured by the breach of the manufacturer's contract, of which he has no
knowledge, be without remedy, the only way in which effect can be given to a
different intention is by supposing that the carrier is to be responsible to the
passenger, and to look for his indemnity to the person whom he selected and
whose breach of contract has caused the mischief. (29 ALR 789)
And in the leading case of Morgan vs. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. 15 LRA (NS)
790, 16 Ann. Cas. 608, the Court, in holding the carrier responsible for
damages caused by the fracture of a car axle, due to a "sand hole" in the
course of moulding the axle, made the following observations.
The carrier, in consideration of certain well-known and highly valuable rights
granted to it by the public, undertakes certain duties toward the public, among
them being to provide itself with suitable and safe cars and vehicles in which
carry the traveling public. There is no such duty on the manufacturer of the
cars. There is no reciprocal legal relation between him and the public in this
respect. When the carrier elects to have another build its cars, it ought not to
be absolved by that facts from its duty to the public to furnish safe cars. The
carrier cannot lessen its responsibility by shifting its undertaking to another's
shoulders. Its duty to furnish safe cars is side by side with its duty to furnish
safe track, and to operate them in a safe manner. None of its duties in these
respects can be sublet so as to relieve it from the full measure primarily
exacted of it by law. The carrier selects the manufacturer of its cars, if it does
not itself construct them, precisely as it does those who grade its road, and lay
its tracks, and operate its trains. That it does not exercise control over the
former is because it elects to place that matter in the hands of the
manufacturer, instead of retaining the supervising control itself. The
manufacturer should be deemed the agent of the carrier as respects its duty to
select the material out of which its cars and locomotive are built, as well as in
inspecting each step of their construction. If there be tests known to the crafts
of car builders, or iron moulders, by which such defects might be discovered
before the part was incorporated into the car, then the failure of the
manufacturer to make the test will be deemed a failure by the carrier to make
it. This is not a vicarious responsibility. It extends, as the necessity of this
business demands, the rule of respondeat superior to a situation which falls
clearly within its scope and spirit. Where an injury is inflicted upon a passenger
by the breaking or wrecking of a part of the train on which he is riding, it is
presumably the result of negligence at some point by the carrier. As stated by
Judge Story, in Story on Bailments, sec. 601a: "When the injury or damage
happens to the passenger by the breaking down or overturning of the coach,
or by any other accident occurring on the ground, the presumption prima facie
is that it occurred by the negligence of the coachmen, and onus probandi is on
the proprietors of the coach to establish that there has been no negligence
whatever, and that the damage or injury has been occasioned by inevitable
casualty, or by some cause which human care and foresight could not prevent;
for the law will, in tenderness to human life and limb, hold the proprietors liable
for the slightest negligence, and will compel them to repel by satisfactory
proofs every imputation thereof." When the passenger has proved his injury as
the result of a breakage in the car or the wrecking of the train on which he was
being carried, whether the defect was in the particular car in which he was
14
riding or not, the burden is then cast upon the carrier to show that it was due to
a cause or causes which the exercise of the utmost human skill and foresight
could not prevent. And the carrier in this connection must show, if the accident
was due to a latent defect in the material or construction of the car, that not
only could it not have discovered the defect by the exercise of such care, but
that the builders could not by the exercise of the same care have discovered
the defect or foreseen the result. This rule applies the same whether the
defective car belonged to the carrier or not.
were injured; (2) the damages awarded, that appellees argue to be excessive;
and (3) the award of attorneys' fees.
In the case now before us, the record is to the effect that the only test applied
to the steering knuckle in question was a purely visual inspection every thirty
days, to see if any cracks developed. It nowhere appears that either the
manufacturer or the carrier at any time tested the steering knuckle to ascertain
whether its strength was up to standard, or that it had no hidden flaws would
impair that strength. And yet the carrier must have been aware of the critical
importance of the knuckle's resistance; that its failure or breakage would result
in loss of balance and steering control of the bus, with disastrous effects upon
the passengers. No argument is required to establish that a visual inspection
could not directly determine whether the resistance of this critically important
part was not impaired. Nor has it been shown that the weakening of the
knuckle was impossible to detect by any known test; on the contrary, there is
testimony that it could be detected. We are satisfied that the periodical visual
inspection of the steering knuckle as practiced by the carrier's agents did not
measure up to the required legal standard of "utmost diligence of very cautious
persons" "as far as human care and foresight can provide", and therefore
that the knuckle's failure can not be considered a fortuitous event that exempts
the carrier from responsibility (Lasam vs. Smith, 45 Phil. 657; Son vs. Cebu
Autobus Co., 94 Phil., 892.)
As far as the record shows, the accident was caused either by defects in the
automobile or else through the negligence of its driver. That is not caso
fortuito.
RESOLUTION
And in Son vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 94 Phil., 892, this Court held a
common carrier liable in damages to passenger for injuries cause by an
accident due to the breakage of a faulty drag-link spring.
It can be seen that while the courts of the United States are at variance on the
question of a carrier's liability for latent mechanical defects, the rule in this
jurisdiction has been consistent in holding the carrier responsible. This Court
has quoted from American and English decisions, not because it felt bound to
follow the same, but merely in approval of the rationale of the rule as
expressed therein, since the previous Philippine cases did not enlarge on the
ideas underlying the doctrine established thereby.
The new evidence sought to be introduced do not warrant the grant of a new
trial, since the proposed proof available when the original trial was held. Said
evidence is not newly discovered.
(2) With regard to the indemnity awarded to the child Precilliano Necesito, the
injuries suffered by him are incapable of accurate pecuniary estimation,
particularly because the full effect of the injury is not ascertainable
immediately. This uncertainty, however, does not preclude the right to an
indemnity, since the injury is patent and not denied (Civil Code, Art. 2224). The
reasons behind this award are expounded by the Code Commission in its
report:
There are cases where from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary
loss cannot be offered, although the court is convinced that there has been
such loss. For instance, injury to one's commercial credit or to the goodwill of a
business firm is often hard to show with certainty in terms of money. Should
damages be denied for that reason? The judge should be empowered to
calculate moderate damages in such cases, rather than that the plaintiff should
suffer, without redress, from the defendant's wrongful act." (Report of the Code
Commission, p. 75)
In awarding to the heirs of the deceased Severina Garces an indemnity for the
loss of her "guidance, protection and company," although it is but moral
damage, the Court took into account that the case of a passenger who dies in
the course of an accident, due to the carrier's negligence constitutes an
exception to the general rule. While, as pointed out in the main decision, under
Article 2220 of the new Civil Code there can be no recovery of moral damages
for a breach of contract in the absence of fraud malice or bad faith, the case of
a violation of the contract of carriage leading to a passenger's death escapes
this general rule, in view of Article 1764 in connection with Article 2206, No. 3
of the new Civil Code.
ART. 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in
accordance with Title XVIII of this Book, concerning Damages. Article 2206
shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract
by a comman carrier. ART. 2206. . . .
(3) The spouse, legitimate and eligimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the
death of the deceased.
Being a special rule limited to cases of fatal injuries, these articles prevail over
the general rule of Art. 2220. Special provisions control general ones
(Lichauco & Co. vs. Apostol, 44 Phil. 138; Sancio vs. Lizarraga, 55 Phil. 601).
It thus appears that under the new Civil Code, in case of accident due to a
carrier's negligence, the heirs of a deceased passenger may recover moral
damages, even though a passenger who is injured, but manages to survive, is
not entitled to them. There is, therefore, no conflict between our main decision
in the instant case and that of Cachero vs. Manila Yellow Taxi Cab Co., 101
Phil., 523, where the passenger suffered injuries, but did not lose his life.
(3) In the Cachero case this Court disallowed attorneys' fees to the injured
plaintiff because the litigation arose out of his exaggerated and unreasonable
deeds for an indemnity that was out of proportion with the compensatory
damages to which he was solely entitled. But in the present case, plaintiffs'
original claims can not be deemed a priori wholly unreasonable, since they
had a right to indemnity for moral damages besides compensatory ones, and
moral damages are not determined by set and invariable bounds.
15
Neither does the fact that the contract between the passengers and their
counsel was on a contingent basis affect the former's right to counsel fees. As
pointed out for appellants, the Court's award is an party and not to counsel. A
litigant who improvidently stipulate higher counsel fees than those to which he
is lawfully entitled, does not for that reason earn the right to a larger indemnity;
but, by parity of reasoning, he should not be deprived of counsel fees if by law
he is entitled to recover them.
We find no reason to alter the main decision heretofore rendered. Ultimately,
the position taken by this Court is that a common carrier's contract is not to be
regarded as a game of chance wherein the passenger stakes his limb and life
against the carrier's property and profits.
Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo,
Concepcion, Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.
August 7, 1998
Obviously, still reeling from the experience, private respondents, on July 25,
1991, commenced an action for damages against JAL before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104. 2 To support their claim, private
respondents asserted that JAL failed to live up to its duty to provide care and
comfort to its stranded passengers when it refused to pay for their hotel and
accommodation expenses from June 16 to 21, 1991 at Narita, Japan. In other
words, they insisted that JAL was obligated to shoulder their expenses as long
as they were still stranded in Narita. On the other hand, JAL denied this
allegation and averred that airline passengers have no vested right to these
amenities in case a flight is cancelled due to "force majeure."
On June 18, 1992, the trial court rendered its judgment in favor of private
Furthermore, it has been held that airline passengers must take such risks
incident to the mode of travel. 7 In this regard, adverse weather conditions or
extreme climatic changes are some of the perils involved in air travel, the
16
SO ORDERED.
LA MALLORCA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MARIANO BELTRAN, ET
AL., respondents.
G. E. Yabut, R. Monterey and M.C. Lagman for petitioner.
Ahmed Garcia for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
La Mallorca seeks the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. No. 23267-R, holding it liable for quasi-delict and ordering it to pay to
respondents Mariano Beltran, et al., P6,000.00 for the death of his minor
daughter Raquel Beltran, plus P400.00 as actual damages.
The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals, briefly are:
On December 20, 1953, at about noontime, plaintiffs, husband and wife,
together with their minor daughters, namely, Milagros, 13 years old, Raquel,
about 4 years old, and Fe, over 2 years old, boarded the Pambusco Bus No.
352, bearing plate TPU No. 757 (1953 Pampanga), owned and operated by
the defendant, at San Fernando, Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico,
Pampanga. At the time, they were carrying with them four pieces of baggages
containing their personal belonging. The conductor of the bus, who happened
to be a half-brother of plaintiff Mariano Beltran, issued three tickets (Exhs. A,
B, & C) covering the full fares of the plaintiff and their eldest child, Milagros. No
fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both were below the height at
which fare is charged in accordance with the appellant's rules and regulations.
After about an hour's trip, the bus reached Anao whereat it stopped to allow
the passengers bound therefor, among whom were the plaintiffs and their
children to get off. With respect to the group of the plaintiffs, Mariano Beltran,
then carrying some of their baggages, was the first to get down the bus,
followed by his wife and his children. Mariano led his companions to a shaded
spot on the left pedestrians side of the road about four or five meters away
from the vehicle. Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to get his
other bayong, which he had left behind, but in so doing, his daughter Raquel
followed him, unnoticed by her father. While said Mariano Beltran was on the
running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him his bayong
which he left under one of its seats near the door, the bus, whose motor was
not shut off while unloading, suddenly started moving forward, evidently to
resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor has not given the
driver the customary signal to start, since said conductor was still attending to
the baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when the bus was
again placed into a complete stop, it had travelled about ten meters from the
point where the plaintiffs had gotten off.
Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano Beltran immediately
jumped from the running board without getting his bayong from the conductor.
He landed on the side of the road almost in front of the shaded place where he
left his wife and children. At that precise time, he saw people beginning to
gather around the body of a child lying prostrate on the ground, her skull
crushed, and without life. The child was none other than his daughter Raquel,
who was run over by the bus in which she rode earlier together with her
parents.
For the death of their said child, the plaintiffs commenced the present suit
against the defendant seeking to recover from the latter an aggregate amount
of P16,000 to cover moral damages and actual damages sustained as a result
thereof and attorney's fees. After trial on the merits, the court below rendered
the judgment in question.
On the basis of these facts, the trial court found defendant liable for breach of
contract of carriage and sentenced it to pay P3,000.00 for the death of the
child and P400.00 as compensatory damages representing burial expenses
and costs.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, La Mallorca claimed that there could not be
a breach of contract in the case, for the reason that when the child met her
death, she was no longer a passenger of the bus involved in the incident and,
therefore, the contract of carriage had already terminated. Although the Court
of Appeals sustained this theory, it nevertheless found the defendant-appellant
guilty of quasi-delict and held the latter liable for damages, for the negligence
of its driver, in accordance with Article 2180 of the Civil Code. And, the Court of
Appeals did not only find the petitioner liable, but increased the damages
awarded the plaintiffs-appellees to P6,000.00, instead of P3,000.00 granted by
the trial court.
In its brief before us, La Mallorca contends that the Court of Appeals erred (1)
in holding it liable for quasi-delict, considering that respondents complaint was
one for breach of contract, and (2) in raising the award of damages from
P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 although respondents did not appeal from the decision
of the lower court.
Under the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, we have to sustain the
judgement holding petitioner liable for damages for the death of the child,
Raquel Beltran. It may be pointed out that although it is true that respondent
Mariano Beltran, his wife, and their children (including the deceased child) had
17
sentencing, the petitioner to pay to the respondents Mariano Beltran, et al., the
sum of P3,000.00 for the death of the child, Raquel Beltran, and the amount of
P400.00 as actual damages. No costs in this instance. So ordered.
It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger
does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle
at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until
the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave
the carrier's premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay
within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. Thus, a person
who, after alighting from a train, walks along the station platform is considered
still a passenger.2 So also, where a passenger has alighted at his destination
and is proceeding by the usual way to leave the company's premises, but
before actually doing so is halted by the report that his brother, a fellow
passenger, has been shot, and he in good faith and without intent of engaging
in the difficulty, returns to relieve his brother, he is deemed reasonably and
necessarily delayed and thus continues to be a passenger entitled as such to
the protection of the railroad and company and its agents.3
In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages
which was not unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Raquel, the child
that she was, must have followed the father. However, although the father was
still on the running board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to hand him the
bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that even he (the father) had to jump
down from the moving vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, who must
be near the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be
claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised the "utmost diligence" of a "very
cautions person" required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by
a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its
passengers. In the first place, the driver, although stopping the bus,
nevertheless did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus
even before the bus conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter
was still unloading part of the baggages of the passengers Mariano Beltran
and family. The presence of said passengers near the bus was not
unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of
the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage.
But even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already
terminated, herein petitioner can be held liable for the negligence of its driver,
as ruled by the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Paragraph 7 of the complaint, which reads
That aside from the aforesaid breach of contract, the death of Raquel Beltran,
plaintiffs' daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of exercise of the
utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of the defendants and
their agent, necessary to transport plaintiffs and their daughter safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide in the operation of their vehicle.
is clearly an allegation for quasi-delict. The inclusion of this averment for
quasi-delict, while incompatible with the other claim under the contract of
carriage, is permissible under Section 2 of Rule 8 of the New Rules of Court,
which allows a plaintiff to allege causes of action in the alternative, be they
compatible with each other or not, to the end that the real matter in
controversy may be resolved and determined.4
The plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the culpa or negligence upon which the claim
was predicated when it was alleged in the complaint that "the death of Raquel
Beltran, plaintiffs' daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of
exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of the
defendants and their agent." This allegation was also proved when it was
established during the trial that the driver, even before receiving the proper
signal from the conductor, and while there were still persons on the running
board of the bus and near it, started to run off the vehicle. The presentation of
proof of the negligence of its employee gave rise to the presumption that the
defendant employer did not exercise the diligence of a good father of the
family in the selection and supervision of its employees. And this presumption,
as the Court of Appeals found, petitioner had failed to overcome.
Consequently, petitioner must be adjudged peculiarily liable for the death of
the child Raquel Beltran.
The increase of the award of damages from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 by the
Court of Appeals, however, cannot be sustained. Generally, the appellate court
can only pass upon and consider questions or issues raised and argued in
appellant's brief. Plaintiffs did not appeal from that portion of the judgment of
the trial court awarding them on P3,000.00 damages for the death of their
daughter. Neither does it appear that, as appellees in the Court of Appeals,
plaintiffs have pointed out in their brief the inadequacy of the award, or that the
inclusion of the figure P3,000.00 was merely a clerical error, in order that the
matter may be treated as an exception to the general rule.5 Herein petitioner's
contention, therefore, that the Court of Appeals committed error in raising the
amount of the award for damages is, evidently, meritorious.1wph1.t
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified by
November 6, 1989
REGALADO, J.:
that Pioneer had taken the necessary safeguards insofar as its unloading
operations were concerned, a fact which appears to have been accepted by
the plaintiff therein by not impleading Pioneer as a defendant, and likewise
inceptively by Aboitiz by filing its third-party complaint only after ten (10)
months from the institution of the suit against it. Parenthetically, Pioneer is not
within the ambit of the rule on extraordinary diligence required of, and the
corresponding presumption of negligence foisted on, common carriers like
Aboitiz. This, of course, does not detract from what we have said that no
negligence can be imputed to Pioneer but, that on the contrary, the failure of
Aboitiz to exercise extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passenger is the
rationale for our finding on its liability.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the judgment appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
II.
Under the law, common carriers are, from the nature of their
business and for reasons of public policy, bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. 15 More
particularly, a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far
as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. 16 Thus, where
a passenger dies or is injured, the common carrier is presumed to have been
at fault or to have acted negligently. 17 This gives rise to an action for breach
of contract of carriage where all that is required of plaintiff is to prove the
existence of the contract of carriage and its non-performance by the carrier,
that is, the failure of the carrier to carry the passenger safely to his destination,
18 which, in the instant case, necessarily includes its failure to safeguard its
passenger with extraordinary diligence while such relation subsists.
As found by the Court of Appeals, the evidence does not show that there was
a cordon of drums around the perimeter of the crane, as claimed by petitioner.
It also adverted to the fact that the alleged presence of visible warning signs in
the vicinity was disputable and not indubitably established. Thus, we are not
inclined to accept petitioner's explanation that the victim and other passengers
were sufficiently warned that merely venturing into the area in question was
fraught with serious peril. Definitely, even assuming the existence of the
supposed cordon of drums loosely placed around the unloading area and the
guard's admonitions against entry therein, these were at most insufficient
precautions which pale into insignificance if considered vis-a-vis the gravity of
the danger to which the deceased was exposed. There is no showing that
petitioner was extraordinarily diligent in requiring or seeing to it that said
precautionary measures were strictly and actually enforced to subserve their
purpose of preventing entry into the forbidden area. By no stretch of liberal
evaluation can such perfunctory acts approximate the "utmost diligence of very
cautious persons" to be exercised "as far as human care and foresight can
provide" which is required by law of common carriers with respect to their
passengers.
While the victim was admittedly contributorily negligent, still petitioner's
aforesaid failure to exercise extraordinary diligence was the proximate and
direct cause of, because it could definitely have prevented, the former's death.
Moreover, in paragraph 5.6 of its petition, at bar, 19 petitioner has expressly
conceded the factual finding of respondent Court of Appeals that petitioner did
not present sufficient evidence in support of its submission that the deceased
Anacleto Viana was guilty of gross negligence. Petitioner cannot now be heard
to claim otherwise.
No excepting circumstance being present, we are likewise bound by
respondent court's declaration that there was no negligence on the part of
Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation, a confirmation of the trial court's finding to
that effect, hence our conformity to Pioneer's being absolved of any liability.
As correctly observed by both courts, Aboitiz joined Pioneer in proving the
alleged gross negligence of the victim, hence its present contention that the
death of the passenger was due to the negligence of the crane operator
cannot be sustained both on grounds, of estoppel and for lack of evidence on
its present theory. Even in its answer filed in the court below it readily alleged
SUNGA
and
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of
Appeals, dated March 31, 1991, reversing the contrary decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Dumaguete City, and awarding damages
instead to private respondent Eliza Jujeurche Sunga as plaintiff in an action for
breach of contract of carriage.
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490
that the negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident
negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the common
carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers. He contends that the
bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was a caso fortuito.
Petitioner further assails the award of moral damages to Sunga on the ground
that it is not supported by evidence.
The petition has no merit.
The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding
the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that
she was never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle of res judicata
does not apply.
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same.
The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena
were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On
the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his
contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or
culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The
second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the
negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly
established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract,
the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract
and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport
his passenger safely to his destination.2 In case of death or injuries to
passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove
that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of
the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of
proof.
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No.
3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioner's
jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause
of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the
truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for
quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a
device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him
and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But,
where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the
parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is
merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage
are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting
the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safety of
passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or
injury to passengers. It provides:
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by
them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further
expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the
extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in
articles 1755 and 1756.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove
that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and
1755.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of
negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he
had to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers.
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care and
foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with due regard for all the circumstances" as required by Art. 1755? We do not
think so. Several factors militate against petitioner's contention.
G.R. No. L-8034
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked,
its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of
the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is
a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code, which provides:
Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. No person shall drive his motor vehicle in
such a manner as to obstruct or impede the passage of any vehicle, nor, while
discharging or taking on passengers or loading or unloading freight, obstruct
The Manila Railroad Company has appealed from a judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna sentencing it to pay P4,000 damages to the appellees
herein, the widow and children of the late Tomas Gillaco, shot by an employee
of the Company in April, 1946.
The lower Court and the appellees both relied on the American authorities that
particularly hold carriers to be insurers of the safety of their passengers
against willful assault and intentional ill treatment on the part of their servants,
it being immaterial that the act should be one of private retribution on the part
of the servant, impelled by personal malice toward the passenger (10 Am. Jur.
108; Ed. Note to Gassenheimer vs. Wester R. Co. 40 LRA (NS), p. 999, et
seq.) But as can be inferred from the previous jurisprudence of this Court , the
Civil Code of 1889 did not impose such absolute liability (Lasam vs. Smith,
supra). The liability of a carrier as an insurer was not recognized in this
jurisdiction (Government vs. Inchausti & Co., 40 Phil., 219; Oriental Comm.
Co. vs. Naviera Filipina, 38 Off. Gaz., 1020).
Another very important consideration that must be borne in mind is that, when
the crime took place, the guard Devesa had no duties to discharge in
connection with the transportation of the deceased from Calamba to Manila.
The stipulation of facts is clear that when Devesa shot and killed Gillaco,
Devesa was assigned to guard the Manila-San Fernando (La Union) trains,
and he was at Paco Station awaiting transportation to Tutuban, the starting
point of the train that he was engaged to guard. In fact, his tour of duty was to
start at 9:00 a.m., two hours after the commission of the crime. Devesa was
therefore under no obligation to safeguard the passenger of the CalambaManila train, where the deceased was riding; and the killing of Gillaco was not
done in line of duty. The position of Devesa at the time was that of another
would be passenger, a stranger also awaiting transportation, and not that of an
employee assigned to discharge any of the duties that the Railroad had
assumed by its contract with the deceased. As a result, Devesa's assault
cannot be deemed in law a breach of Gillaco's contract of transportation by a
servant or employee of the carrier. We agree with the position taken by the
Supreme Court of Texas in a similar case, where it held:
The only good reason for making the carrier responsible for the misconduct of
the servant perpetrated in his own interest, and not in that of his employer, or
otherwise within the scope of his employment, is that the servant is clothed
with the delegated authority, and charge with the duty by the carrier, to execute
his undertaking with the passenger. And it cannot be said, we think, that there
is any such delegation to the employees at a station with reference to
passenger embarking at another or traveling on the train. Of course, we are
speaking only of the principle which holds a carrier responsible for wrong done
to passenger by servants acting in their own interest, and not in that of the
employer. That principle is not the ordinary rule, respondent superior, by which
the employer is held responsible only for act or omissions of the employee in
the scope of his employment; but the only reason in our opinion for a broader
liability arises from the fact that the servant, in mistreating the passenger
wholly for some private purpose of his own, in the very act, violates the
contractual obligation of the employer for the performance of which he has put
the employee in his place. The reason does not exist where the employee who
committed the assault was never in a position in which it became his duty to
his employer to represent him in discharging any duty of the latter toward the
passenger. The proposition that the carrier clothes every employee engaged in
the transportation business with the comprehensive duty of protecting every
passenger with whom he may in any way come in contact, and hereby makes
himself liable for every assault commited by such servant, without regard to
the inquiry whether or not the passenger has come within the sphere of duty of
that servant as indicated by the employment, is regarded as not only not
sustained by the authorities, but as being unsound and oppressive both to the
employer and the employee. (Houston & T. C. R. Co. vs. Bush, 32 LRA (NS),
p. 1205.)
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the complaint ordered
dismissed, without cost. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-22272
The court a quo, after trial, found for the plaintiff and awarded her P3,000 as
damages against defendant Perez. The claim against defendant Valenzuela
was dismissed. From this ruling, both plaintiff and defendant Perez appealed
to this Court, the former asking for more damages and the latter insisting on
non-liability. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of
conviction earlier mentioned, during the pendency of the herein appeal, and on
May 19, 1964, final judgment was entered therein. (Rollo, p. 33).
Defendant-appellant relies solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco v. Manila
Railroad Co., 97 Phil. 884, that the carrier is under no absolute liability for
assaults of its employees upon the passengers. The attendant facts and
controlling law of that case and the one at bar are very different however. In
the Gillaco case, the passenger was killed outside the scope and the course of
duty of the guilty employee. As this Court there found:
x x x when the crime took place, the guard Devesa had no duties to discharge
in connection with the transportation of the deceased from Calamba to Manila.
The stipulation of facts is clear that when Devesa shot and killed Gillaco,
Devesa was assigned to guard the Manila-San Fernando (La Union) trains,
and he was at Paco Station awaiting transportation to Tutuban, the starting
point of the train that he was engaged to guard. In fact, his tour of duty was to
start at 9:00 two hours after the commission of the crime. Devesa was
therefore under no obligation to safeguard the passengers of the CalambaManila train, where the deceased was riding; and the killing of Gillaco was not
done in line of duty. The position of Devesa at the time was that of another
would be passenger, a stranger also awaiting transportation, and not that of an
employee assigned to discharge any of the duties that the Railroad had
assumed by its contract with the deceased. As a result, Devesa's assault can
not be deemed in law a breach of Gillaco's contract of transportation by a
servant or employee of the carrier. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Now here, the killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting
the passenger, in whose hands the carrier had entrusted the duty of executing
the contract of carriage. In other words, unlike the Gillaco case, the killing of
the passenger here took place in the course of duty of the guilty employee and
when the employee was acting within the scope of his duties.
Moreover, the Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil Code
of 1889 which, unlike the present Civil Code, did not impose upon common
carriers absolute liability for the safety of passengers against wilful assaults or
negligent acts committed by their employees. The death of the passenger in
the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event which exempted the carrier from
liability. It is true that Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code on fortuitous events has
been substantially reproduced in Art. 1174 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
but both articles clearly remove from their exempting effect the case where the
law expressly provides for liability in spite of the occurrence of force majeure.
And herein significantly lies the statutory difference between the old and
present Civil Codes, in the backdrop of the factual situation before Us, which
further accounts for a different result in the Gillaco case. Unlike the old Civil
Code, the new Civil Code of the Philippines expressly makes the common
carrier liable for intentional assaults committed by its employees upon its
passengers, by the wording of Art. 1759 which categorically states that
Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through
the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such
employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation
of the orders of the common carriers.
The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers1 are new and
were taken from Anglo-American Law.2 There, the basis of the carrier's liability
for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rests either on (1) the
doctrine of respondeat superior or (2) the principle that it is the carrier's implied
duty to transport the passenger safely.3
Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act
of the employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient
that the act be within the course of employment only.4
Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is
enough that the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is
no defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in
disobedience of the carrier's orders.5 The carrier's liability here is absolute in
the sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed
by its own employees.6
As can be gleaned from Art. 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently
follows the rule based on the second view. At least three very cogent reasons
underlie this rule. As explained in Texas Midland R.R. v. Monroe, 110 Tex. 97,
216 S.W. 388, 389-390, and Haver v. Central Railroad Co., 43 LRA 84, 85: (1)
the special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that
full measure of protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care
prescribed by the law, inter alia from violence and insults at the hands of
strangers and other passengers, but above all, from the acts of the carrier's
own servants charged with the passenger's safety; (2) said liability of the
carrier for the servant's violation of duty to passengers, is the result of the
formers confiding in the servant's hands the performance of his contract to
safely transport the passenger, delegating therewith the duty of protecting the
passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law; and (3) as between the
carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful acts or
negligence of the carrier's employees against passengers, since it, and not the
passengers, has power to select and remove them.
Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar
employees with due regard not only to their technical competence and
physical ability, but also, no less important, to their total personality, including
their patterns of behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude.
Applying this stringent norm to the facts in this case, therefore, the lower court
rightly adjudged the defendant carrier liable pursuant to Art. 1759 of the Civil
Code. The dismissal of the claim against the defendant driver was also
correct. Plaintiff's action was predicated on breach of contract of carriage7 and
the cab driver was not a party thereto. His civil liability is covered in the
criminal case wherein he was convicted by final judgment.
In connection with the award of damages, the court a quo granted only P3,000
to plaintiff-appellant. This is the minimum compensatory damages amount
recoverable under Art. 1764 in connection with Art. 2206 of the Civil Code
when a breach of contract results in the passenger's death. As has been the
policy followed by this Court, this minimal award should be increased to
P6,000. As to other alleged actual damages, the lower court's finding that
plaintiff's evidence thereon was not convincing,8 should not be disturbed. Still,
Arts. 2206 and 1764 award moral damages in addition to compensatory
damages, to the parents of the passenger killed to compensate for the mental
anguish they suffered. A claim therefor, having been properly made, it
becomes the court's duty to award moral damages.9 Plaintiff demands P5,000
as moral damages; however, in the circumstances, We consider P3,000 moral
damages, in addition to the P6,000 damages afore-stated, as sufficient.
Interest upon such damages are also due to plaintiff-appellant. 10
Wherefore, with the modification increasing the award of actual damages in
plaintiff's favor to P6,000, plus P3,000.00 moral damages, with legal interest
on both from the filing of the complaint on December 6, 1961 until the whole
amount is paid, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects.
No costs. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and
Castro, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-55347
October 4, 1985
and ROSARIO
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the principle of state immunity from suit, the Philippine National
Railways, PNR for short, instituted this petition for review on certiorari to set
aside the decision of the respondent Appellate Court which held petitioner
PNR liable for damages for the death of Winifredo Tupang, a paying
passenger who fell off a train operated by the petitioner.
The pertinent facts are summarized by the respondent court as follows:
The facts show that on September 10, 1972, at about 9:00 o'clock in the
evening, Winifredo Tupang, husband of plaintiff Rosario Tupang, boarded
'Train No. 516 of appellant at Libmanan, Camarines Sur, as a paying
passenger bound for Manila. Due to some mechanical defect, the train
stopped at Sipocot, Camarines Sur, for repairs, taking some two hours before
the train could resume its trip to Manila. Unfortunately, upon passing Iyam
Bridge at Lucena, Quezon, Winifredo Tupang fell off the train resulting in his
death.The train did not stop despite the alarm raised by the other passengers
that somebody fell from the train. Instead, the train conductor Perfecto
Abrazado, called the station agent at Candelaria, Quezon, and requested for
verification of the information. Police authorities of Lucena City were
dispatched to the Iyam Bridge where they found the lifeless body of Winifredo
Tupang.
As shown by the autopsy report, Winifredo Tupang died of cardio-respiratory
failure due to massive cerebral hemorrhage due to traumatic injury [Exhibits B
and C, Folder of Exhibits],Tupang was later buried in the public cemetery of
Lucena City by the local police authorities. [Rollo, pp. 91-92]
Upon complaint filed by the deceased's widow, Rosario Tupang, the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal, after trial, held the petitioner PNR liable for
damages for breach of contract of carriage and ordered "to pay the plaintiff the
sum of P12,000,00 for the death of Winifredo Tupang, plus P20,000.00 for loss
of his earning capacity and the further sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages,
and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, and costs. 1
On appeal, the Appellate Court sustained the holding of the trial court that the
PNR did not exercise the utmost diligence required by law of a common
carrier. It further increased the amount adjudicated by the trial court by
ordering PNR to pay the plaintiff an additional sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
Moving for reconsideration of the above decision, the PNR raised for the first
23
time, as a defense, the doctrine of state immunity from suit. It alleged that it is
a mere agency of the Philippine government without distinct or separate
personality of its own, and that its funds are governmental in character and,
therefore, not subject to garnishment or execution. The motion was denied; the
respondent court ruled that the ground advanced could not be raised for the
first time on appeal.
Hence, this petition for review.
The petition is devoid of merit. The PNR was created under Rep. Act 4156, as
amended. Section 4 of the said Act provides:
aside. Exemplary damages may be allowed only in cases where the defendant
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. 9
There being no evidence of fraud, malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner,
the grant of exemplary damages should be discarded.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is hereby
modified by eliminating therefrom the amounts of P10,000.00 and P5,000.00
adjudicated as moral and exemplary damages, respectively. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Cuevas, and Alampay, JJ., concur.
March 7, 1929
the ground, and his right foot was caught and crushed by the moving car. The
next day the member had to be amputated in the hospital. The witness, Ciriaco
Guevara, also stated that, as the plaintiff started to board the car, he grasped
the handpost on either side with both right and left hand. The latter statement
may possibly be incorrect as regards the use of his right hand by the plaintiff,
but we are of the opinion that the finding of the trial court to the effect that the
motorman slowed up slightly as the plaintiff was boarding the car that the
plaintiff's fall was due in part at lease to a sudden forward movement at the
moment when the plaintiff put his foot on the platform is supported by the
evidence and ought not to be disturbed by us.
The motorman stated at the trial that he did not see the plaintiff attempting to
board the car; that he did not accelerate the speed of the car as claimed by the
plaintiff's witnesses; and that he in fact knew nothing of the incident until after
the plaintiff had been hurt and some one called to him to stop. We are not
convinced of the complete candor of this statement, for we are unable to see
how a motorman operating this car could have failed to see a person boarding
the car under the circumstances revealed in this case. It must be remembered
that the front handpost which, as all witness agree, was grasped by the plaintiff
in attempting to board the car, was immediately on the left side of the
motorman.
With respect to the legal aspects of the case we may observe at the outset
that there is no obligation on the part of a street railway company to stop its
cars to let on intending passengers at other points than those appointed for
stoppage. In fact it would be impossible to operate a system of street cars if a
company engage in this business were required to stop any and everywhere to
take on people who were too indolent, or who imagine themselves to be in too
great a hurry, to go to the proper places for boarding the cars. Nevertheless,
although the motorman of this car was not bound to stop to let the plaintiff on,
it was his duty to do act that would have the effect of increasing the plaintiff's
peril while he was attempting to board the car. The premature acceleration of
the car was, in our opinion, a breach of this duty.
The relation between a carrier of passengers for hire and its patrons is of a
contractual nature; and in failure on the part of the carrier to use due care in
carrying its passengers safely is a breach of duty (culpa contructual) under
articles 1101, 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, the duty that the
carrier of passengers owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding the cars
as well as to those alighting therefrom. The case of Cangco vs. Manila
Railroad Co. (38 Phil., 768), supplies an instance of the violation of this duty
with respect to a passenger who was getting off of a train. In that case the
plaintiff stepped off of a moving train, while it was slowing down in a station,
and at the time when it was too dark for him to see clearly where he was
putting his feet. The employees of the company had carelessly left
watermelons on the platform at the place where the plaintiff alighted, with the
result that his feet slipped and he fell under the car, where his right arm badly
injured. This court held that the railroad company was liable for breach positive
duty (culpa contractual), and the plaintiff was awarded damages in the amount
of P2,500 for the loss of his arm. In the opinion in that case the distinction is
clearly drawn between a liability for negligence arising from breach of
contructual duty and that arising articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code
(culpa aquiliana).
The distiction between these two sorts of negligence is important in this
jurisdiction, for the reason that where liability arises from a mere tort (culpa
aquiliana), not involving a breach of positive obligation, an employer, or
master, may exculpate himself, under the last paragraph of article 1903 of the
Civil Code, by providing that he had exercised due degligence to prevent the
damage; whereas this defense is not available if the liability of the master
arises from a breach of contrauctual duty (culpa contractual). In the case bfore
us the company pleaded as a special defense that it had used all the
deligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage suffered by the
plaintiff; and to establish this contention the company introduced testimony
showing that due care had been used in training and instructing the motorman
in charge of this car in his art. But this proof is irrelevant in view of the fact that
the liability involved was derived from a breach of obligation under article 1101
of the Civil Code and related provisions. (Manila Railroad Co. vs. Compana
Transatlantica and Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., 38 Phil., 875, 887; De Guia vs.
Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., 40 Phil., 706, 710.)
Another practical difference between liability for negligence arising under 1902
of the Civil Code and liability arising from negligence in the performance of a
positive duty, under article 1101 and related provisions of the Civil Code, is
that, in dealing with the latter form of negligence, the court is given a discretion
to mitigate liability according to the circumstances of the case (art 1103). No
such general discretion is given by the Code in dealing with liability arising
under article 1902; although possibly the same end is reached by courts in
dealing with the latter form of liability because of the latitude of the
considerations pertinent to cases arising under this article.
As to the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, we are of the opinion that it
should be treated, as in Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359),
as a mitigating circumstance under article 1103 of the Civil Code. It is obvious
that the plaintiff's negligence in attempting to board the moving car was not the
proximate cause of the injury. The direct and proximate cause of the injury was
the act of appellant's motorman in putting on the power prematurely. A person
boarding a moving car must be taken to assume the risk of injury from
boarding the car under the conditions open to his view, but he cannot fairly be
held to assume the risk that the motorman, having the situation in view, will
increase his peril by accelerating the speed of the car before he is planted
safely on the platform. Again, the situation before us is one where the
negligent act of the company's servant succeeded the negligent act of the
plaintiff, and the negligence of the company must be considered the proximate
cause of the injury. The rule here applicable seems to be analogous to, if not
identical with that which is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of "the last
clear chance." In accordance with this doctrine, the contributory negligence of
the party injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant
might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the
consequences of the negligence of the injured party (20 R. C. L., p. 139; Carr
vs. Interurban Ry. Co., 185 Iowa, 872; 171 N. W., 167). The negligence of the
plaintiff was, however, contributory to the accident and must be considered as
a mitigating circumstance.
With respect to the effect of this injury upon the plaintiff's earning power, we
note that, although he lost his foot, he is able to use an artificial member
without great inconvenience and his earning capacity has probably not been
reduced by more than 30 per centum. In view of the precedents found in our
decisions with respect to the damages that ought to be awarded for the loss of
limb, and more particularly Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil.,
359); Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. (38 Phil., 768); and Borromeo vs. Manila
Electric Railroad and Light Co. (44 Phil., 165), and in view of all the
circumstances connected with the case, we are of the opinion that the plaintiff
will be adequately compensated by an award of P2,500.
It being understood, therefore, that the appealed judgment is modified by
reducing the recovery to the sum of P2,500, the judgment, as thus modified, is
affirmed. So ordered, with costs against the appellant.
Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
lane. The driver of the bus, upon seeing the manner in which the pick-up was
then running, swerved the bus to the very extreme right of the road until its
front and rear wheels have gone over the pile of stones or gravel situated on
the rampart of the road. Said driver could not move the bus farther right and
run over a greater portion of the pile, the peak of which was about 3 feet high,
without endangering the safety of his passengers. And notwithstanding all
these efforts, the rear left side of the bus was hit by the pick-up car.
Of course, this finding is disputed by appellant who cannot see eye to eye with
the evidence for the appellee and insists that the collision took place because
the driver of the bus was going at a fast speed. He contends that, having seen
that a car was coming from the opposite direction at a distance which allows
the use of moderate care and prudence to avoid an accident, and knowing that
on the side of the road along which he was going there was a pile of gravel,
the driver of the bus should have stopped and waited for the vehicle from the
opposite direction to pass, and should have proceeded only after the other
vehicle had passed. In other words, according to appellant, the act of the
driver of the bus in squeezing his way through of the bus in squeezing his way
through between the oncoming pick-up and the pile of gravel under the
circumstances was considered negligent.
But this matter is one of credibility and evaluation of the evidence. This is
evidence. This is the function of the trial court. The trial court has already
spoken on this matter as we have pointed out above. This is also a matter of
appreciation of the situation on the part of the driver. While the position taken
by appellant appeals more to the sense of caution that one should observe in
a given situation to avoid an accident or mishap, such however can not always
be expected from one who is placed suddenly in a predicament where he is
not given enough time to take the course of action as he should under ordinary
circumstances. One who is placed in such a predicament cannot exercise
such coolness or accuracy of judgment as is required of him under ordinary
circumstances and he cannot therefore be expected to observe the same
judgment, care and precaution as in the latter. For this reason, authorities
abound where failure to observe the same degree of care that as ordinary
prudent man would exercise under ordinary circumstances when confronted
with a sadden emergency was held to be warranted and a justification to
exempt the carrier from liability. Thus, it was held that "where a carrier's
employee is confronted with a sudden emergency, the fact that he is obliged to
act quickly and without a chance for deliberation must be taken into account,
and he is held to the some degree of care that he would otherwise be required
to exercise in the absence of such emergency but must exercise only such
care as any ordinary prudent person would exercise under like circumstances
and conditions, and the failure on his part to exercise the best judgement the
case renders possible does not establish lack of care and skill on his part
which renders the company, liable. . . . (13 C. J. S., 1412; 10 C. J.,970).
Considering all the circumstances, we are persuaded to conclude that the
driver of the bus has done what a prudent man could have done to avoid the
collision and in our opinion this relieves appellee from legibility under our law.
A circumstances which miliates against the stand of appellant is the fact borne
out by the evidence that when he boarded the bus in question, he seated
himself on the left side thereof resting his left arm on the window sill but with
his left elbow outside the window, this being his position in the bus when the
collision took place. It is for this reason that the collision resulted in the
severance of said left arm from the body of appellant thus doing him a great
damage. It is therefore apparent that appellant is guilty of contributory
negligence. Had he not placed his left arm on the window sill with a portion
thereof protruding outside, perhaps the injury would have been avoided as is
the case with the other passenger. It is to be noted that appellant was the only
victim of the collision.
It is true that such contributory negligence cannot relieve appellee of its liability
but will only entitle it to a reduction of the amount of damage caused (Article
1762, new Civil Code), but this is a circumstance which further militates
against the position taken by appellant in this case.
It is the prevailing rule that it is negligence per se for a passenger on a railroad
voluntarily or inadvertently to protrude his arm, hand, elbow, or any other part
of his body through the window of a moving car beyond the outer edge of the
window or outer surface of the car, so as to come in contact with objects or
obstacles near the track, and that no recovery can be had for an injury which
but for such negligence would not have been sustained. (10 C. J. 1139)
Plaintiff, (passenger) while riding on an interurban car, to flick the ashes, from
his cigar, thrust his hand over the guard rail a sufficient distance beyond the
side line of the car to bring it in contact with the trunk of a tree standing beside
the track; the force of the blow breaking his wrist. Held, that he was guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law. (Malakia vs. Rhode Island Co., 89
A., 337.)
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with cost against appellant.
EI hecho de que el demandado, antes del choque, tuvo que hacer pasar su
truck encima de los montones de grava que estaban depositados en la orilla
del camino, sin que haya ido mas alla, por el grave riesgo que corrian las
vidas de sus pasajeros, es prueba concluyente de lo que tenemos dicho, a
saber: que el cuanto esuba de su parte, para evitar el accidente, sin que
haya podidoevitardo, por estar fuera de su control.
The evidence would appear to support the above finding. Thus, it appears that
Bus No. 31, immediately prior to the collision, was running at a moderate
speed because it had just stopped at the school zone of Matacong, Polangui,
Albay. The pick-up car was at full speed and was running outside of its proper
November 2, 2006
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision19 on May 21, 1990 in
favor of plaintiffs. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs Ethel
Brunty and Juan Manuel M. Garcia and against the defendant Philippine
National Railways directing the latter to pay the former the sum of:
1. Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) Philippine Currency, for the death of
Rhonda Brunty formerly a resident of 1595 Ashland Avenue, Des Plaines,
Illinois, U.S.A.;
2. One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) Philippine Currency for moral and actual
damages due the heirs of Rhonda Brunty;
3. Seventy-Two Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty Pesos (P72,760.00)
Philippine Currency for damages sustained by the Mercedes Benz;
4. Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) Philippine Currency as and for
attorney's fees, and;
5. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.20
Aggrieved, the PNR appealed the case to the CA, raising the following errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADJUDGING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PNR
LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF RHONDA BRUNTY AND THE CONSEQUENT
AWARD OF DAMAGES DUE THE HEIRS OF RHONDA BRUNTY.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADJUDGING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PNR
LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGES SUFFERED BY PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES
MERCEDES BENZ IN THE AMOUNT OF SEVENTY-TWO THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED AND SIXTY PESOS (P72,760.00).
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEYS FEES TO THE
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES.21
In its Brief, PNR insisted that the sole and proximate cause of the accident
was the negligence and recklessness of Garcia and Mercelita.22 It insisted
that it had provided adequate warning signals at the railroad crossing23 and
had exercised due care in the selection and supervision of its employees.24
The RTC erred in awarding damages to Rhonda Brunty as she cannot be
allowed to receive what she is not in a position to give, having been a nonresident alien who did not own a property in the Philippines.25 It likewise
questioned the award of damages on the Mercedes Benz as well as the grant
of attorneys fees.26 At the very least, Mercelita was guilty of contributory
negligence.27
For their part, appellees countered that appellant was grossly and recklessly
negligent in not properly providing the necessary equipment at the railroad
crossing in Rizal, Moncada, Tarlac;28 appellant was negligent in not exercising
due diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees,
particularly the train operator Alfonso Reyes;29 the car was driven in a careful
and diligent manner, and at a moderate speed, with due regard to all traffic
rules and regulations at that particular time;30 the doctrine of "last clear
chance" is not applicable;31 Ethel Brunty is a non-resident alien who can
rightfully file the instant case;32 and they are entitled to recover damages from
appellant.33
The CA rendered the assailed Decision34 on August 15, 2005. The dispositive
portion reads:
7.) Attorneys fees equivalent to at least 15% of the total award to plaintiffs
herein.12
In its Answer,13 PNR claimed that it exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family not only in the selection but also in the supervision of its
employees.14 By way of special and affirmative defense, it stressed that it had
the right of way on the railroad crossing in question, and that it has no legal
duty to put up a bar or red light signal in any such crossing. It insisted that
there were adequate, visible, and clear warning signs strategically posted on
the sides of the road before the railroad crossing. It countered that the
immediate and proximate cause of the accident was Mercelitas negligence,
and that he had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. The driver
disregarded the warning signs, the whistle blasts of the oncoming train and the
flashlight signals to stop given by the guard.15 As counterclaim, it prayed that
it be awarded actual and compensatory damages, and litigation expenses.16
Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint17 dated July 28, 1986 to include, as
party plaintiff, Chemical Industries of the Philippines, Inc. (Chemphil), Garcias
employer, who claimed to have paid for the latters medical and hospitalization
expenses, the services rendered by the funeral parlor of the deceased, and
the expenses in transferring the remains of Rhonda Brunty to the United
States.18
SO ORDERED.35
The appellate court affirmed the findings of the RTC as to the negligence of
the PNR. Considering the circumstances prevailing at the time of the fatal
accident, it ruled that the alleged safety measures installed by the PNR at the
railroad crossing were not merely inadequate they did not satisfy the wellsettled safety standards in transportation.36 However, the CA did not agree
with the RTCs findings on the contributory negligence of Mercelita, the driver
of the Mercedes Benz. It held that Mercelita could not have foreseen the harm
that would befall him and the two other passengers under the prevailing
circumstances, thus, could not be considered guilty of contributory
negligence.37
The PNR, now petitioner, comes before this Court in this Petition for Review
on Certiorari on the following grounds:
I.
27
quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: (1) damage to plaintiff; (2)
negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose
acts he must respond was guilty; and (3) connection of cause and effect
between such negligence and damage.53 Applying the foregoing requisites,
the CA correctly made the following conclusions:
It was clearly established that plaintiffs-appellees (respondents herein)
sustained damage or injury as a result of the collision. That there was
negligence on the part of PNR is, likewise, beyond cavil. Considering the
circumstances prevailing at the time of the fatal accident, the alleged safety
measures installed by the PNR at the railroad crossing is not only inadequate
but does not satisfy well-settled safety standards in transportation. x x x
xxxx
x x x An examination of the photographs of the railroad crossing at Moncada,
Tarlac presented as evidence by PNR itself would yield the following: (1.)
absence of flagbars or safety railroad bars; (2.) inadequacy of the installed
warning signals; and (3.) lack of proper lighting within the area. Thus, even if
there was a flagman stationed at the site as claimed by PNR (petitioner), it
would still be impossible to know or see that there is a railroad crossing/tracks
ahead, or that there is an approaching train from the Moncada side of the road
since ones view would be blocked by a cockpit arena. x x x54
Moreover, the CA held that a vehicle coming from the Moncada side would
have difficulty in knowing that there is an approaching train because of the
slight curve, more so, at an unholy hour as 2:00 a.m. Thus, it is imperative on
the part of the PNR to provide adequate safety equipment in the area.55
It may broadly be stated that railroad companies owe to the public a duty of
exercising a reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property
at railroad crossings, which duties pertain both in the operation of trains and in
the maintenance of the crossings.56 Moreover, every corporation constructing
or operating a railway shall make and construct at all points where such
railway crosses any public road, good, sufficient, and safe crossings and erect
at such points, at a sufficient elevation from such road as to admit a free
passage of vehicles of every kind, a sign with large and distinct letters placed
thereon, to give notice of the proximity of the railway, and warn persons of the
necessity of looking out for trains.57
This Court has previously determined the liability of the PNR for damages for
its failure to put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or
semaphores. Such failure is evidence of negligence and disregard of the
safety of the public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it because
public safety demands that said device or equipment be installed.58
In view of the foregoing, we affirm the factual findings of the CA as well as its
conclusion on petitioners negligence.
As to whether or not Mercelita was guilty of contributory negligence, we agree
with petitioner. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls
below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own
protection.59 To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be
shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of
warning or signs of an impending danger to health and body.60 To prove
contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link, although
not proximate, between the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury.
In a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when it contributes
proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its occurrence.61
The court below found that there was a slight curve before approaching the
tracks; the place was not properly illuminated; ones view was blocked by a
cockpit arena; and Mercelita was not familiar with the road. Yet, it was also
established that Mercelita was then driving the Mercedes Benz at a speed of
70 km/hr and, in fact, had overtaken a vehicle a few yards before reaching the
railroad track. Mercelita should not have driven the car the way he did.
However, while his acts contributed to the collision, they nevertheless do not
negate petitioners liability. Pursuant to Article 217962 of the New Civil Code,
the only effect such contributory negligence could have is to mitigate liability,
which, however, is not applicable in this case, as will be discussed
later.1wphi1
As to whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable, we rule in
the negative. The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties
are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the
other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused
the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed
to do so, is chargeable with the loss. Stated differently, the antecedent
negligence of plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused
by the supervening negligence of defendant, who had the last fair chance to
prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.63 The proximate
cause of the injury having been established to be the negligence of petitioner,
we hold that the above doctrine finds no application in the instant case.
We note that the damages awarded by the appellate court consist of (1)
P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Rhonda Brunty; (2) P1,000,000.00 as
actual and moral damages due the heirs of Rhonda Brunty; and (3)
P50,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees. No damages, however, were
awarded for the injuries suffered by Garcia, yet, the latter never interposed an
appeal before the CA nor even before this Court. The record is, likewise, bereft
of any allegation and proof as to the relationship between Mercelita (the driver)
28
SO ORDERED 1
From the judgment, private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals
where the appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 57354R. On 19 October
1979, the Court of Appeals, in a Special Division of Five, rendered judgment
reversing and setting aside the judgment of the court a quo.
Hence the present petition.
SO ORDERED.
We do not agree.
WE CONCUR:
Under Article 1733 of the Civil Code, common carriers are required to observe
extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passenger transported by them,
according to all the circumstances of each case. The requirement of
extraordinary diligence imposed upon common carriers is restated in Article
1755: "A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances." Further, in case
of death of or injuries to passengers, the law presumes said common carriers
to be at fault or to have acted negligently. 2
While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in
the safe transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of
negligence against them, it does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of
the absolute safety of its passengers. 3
PADILLA, J.:
Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary care, vigilance
and precaution in the carriage of passengers by common carriers to only such
29
as human care and foresight can provide. what constitutes compliance with
said duty is adjudged with due regard to all the circumstances.
We do not agree.
First, as stated earlier, the presumption of fault or negligence against the
carrier is only a disputable presumption. It gives in where contrary facts are
established proving either that the carrier had exercised the degree of
diligence required by law or the injury suffered by the passenger was due to a
fortuitous event. Where, as in the instant case, the injury sustained by the
petitioner was in no way due to any defect in the means of transport or in the
method of transporting or to the negligent or willful acts of private respondent's
employees, and therefore involving no issue of negligence in its duty to
provide safe and suitable cars as well as competent employees, with the injury
arising wholly from causes created by strangers over which the carrier had no
control or even knowledge or could not have prevented, the presumption is
rebutted and the carrier is not and ought not to be held liable. To rule otherwise
would make the common carrier the insurer of the absolute safety of its
passengers which is not the intention of the lawmakers.
Second, while as a general rule, common carriers are bound to exercise
extraordinary diligence in the safe transport of their passengers, it would seem
that this is not the standard by which its liability is to be determined when
intervening acts of strangers is to be determined directly cause the injury, while
the contract of carriage Article 1763 governs:
Article 1763.
A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by
a passenger on account of the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or
of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act
or omission.
Clearly under the above provision, a tort committed by a stranger which
causes injury to a passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action
against the carrier. The negligence for which a common carrier is held
responsible is the negligent omission by the carrier's employees to prevent the
tort from being committed when the same could have been foreseen and
prevented by them. Further, under the same provision, it is to be noted that
when the violation of the contract is due to the willful acts of strangers, as in
the instant case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by the common
carrier for the protection of its passenger is only that of a good father of a
family.
Petitioner has charged respondent carrier of negligence on the ground that the
injury complained of could have been prevented by the common carrier if
something like mesh-work grills had covered the windows of its bus.
We do not agree.
Although the suggested precaution could have prevented the injury
complained of, the rule of ordinary care and prudence is not so exacting as to
require one charged with its exercise to take doubtful or unreasonable
precautions to guard against unlawful acts of strangers. The carrier is not
charged with the duty of providing or maintaining vehicles as to absolutely
prevent any and all injuries to passengers. Where the carrier uses cars of the
most approved type, in general use by others engaged in the same
occupation, and exercises a high degree of care in maintaining them in
suitable condition, the carrier cannot be charged with negligence in this
respect. 6
Finally, petitioner contends that it is to the greater interest of the State if a
carrier were made liable for such stone-throwing incidents rather than have the
bus riding public lose confidence in the transportation system.
Sad to say, we are not in a position to so hold; such a policy would be better
left to the consideration of Congress which is empowered to enact laws to
protect the public from the increasing risks and dangers of lawlessness in
society.
PARAS, J.:
This is a, petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of First
Instance of South Cotabato, Branch 1, * promulgated on August 26, 1980
dismissing three (3) consolidated cases for damages: Civil Case No. 1701,
Civil Case No. 1773 and Civil Case No. 1797 (Rollo, p. 35).
The facts, as found by respondent court, are as follows:
Plaintiffs Franklin G. Gacal and his wife, Corazon M. Gacal, Bonifacio S.
Anislag and his wife, Mansueta L. Anislag, and the late Elma de Guzman,
were then passengers boarding defendant's BAC 1-11 at Davao Airport for a
flight to Manila, not knowing that on the same flight, Macalinog, Taurac
Pendatum known as Commander Zapata, Nasser Omar, Liling Pusuan Radia,
Dimantong Dimarosing and Mike Randa, all of Marawi City and members of
the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), were their co-passengers, three
(3) armed with grenades, two (2) with .45 caliber pistols, and one with a .22
caliber pistol. Ten (10) minutes after take off at about 2:30 in the afternoon, the
hijackers brandishing their respective firearms announced the hijacking of the
aircraft and directed its pilot to fly to Libya. With the pilot explaining to them
especially to its leader, Commander Zapata, of the inherent fuel limitations of
the plane and that they are not rated for international flights, the hijackers
directed the pilot to fly to Sabah. With the same explanation, they relented and
directed the aircraft to land at Zamboanga Airport, Zamboanga City for
refueling. The aircraft landed at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 21, 1976
at Zamboanga Airport. When the plane began to taxi at the runway, it was met
by two armored cars of the military with machine guns pointed at the plane,
and it stopped there. The rebels thru its commander demanded that a DCaircraft take them to Libya with the President of the defendant company as
hostage and that they be given $375,000 and six (6) armalites, otherwise they
will blow up the plane if their demands will not be met by the government and
Philippine Air Lines. Meanwhile, the passengers were not served any food nor
water and it was only on May 23, a Sunday, at about 1:00 o'clock in the
afternoon that they were served 1/4 slice of a sandwich and 1/10 cup of PAL
water. After that, relatives of the hijackers were allowed to board the plane but
immediately after they alighted therefrom, an armored car bumped the stairs.
That commenced the battle between the military and the hijackers which led
ultimately to the liberation of the surviving crew and the passengers, with the
final score of ten (10) passengers and three (3) hijackers dead on the spot and
three (3) hijackers captured.
City Fiscal Franklin G. Gacal was unhurt. Mrs. Corazon M. Gacal suffered
injuries in the course of her jumping out of the plane when it was peppered
with bullets by the army and after two (2) hand grenades exploded inside the
plane. She was hospitalized at General Santos Doctors Hospital, General
Santos City, for two (2) days, spending P245.60 for hospital and medical
expenses, Assistant City Fiscal Bonifacio S. Anislag also escaped unhurt but
Mrs. Anislag suffered a fracture at the radial bone of her left elbow for which
she was hospitalized and operated on at the San Pedro Hospital, Davao City,
and therefore, at Davao Regional Hospital, Davao City, spending P4,500.00.
Elma de Guzman died because of that battle. Hence, the action of damages
instituted by the plaintiffs demanding the following damages, to wit:
Civil Case No. 1701
City Fiscal Franklin G. Gacal and Mrs. Corazon M. Gacal actual damages:
P245.60 for hospital and medical expenses of Mrs Gacal; P8,995.00 for their
personal belongings which were lost and not recovered; P50,000.00 each for
moral damages; and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, apart from the prayer for
an award of exemplary damages (Record, pp. 4-6, Civil Case No. 1701).
Civil Case No. 1773
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xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
Applying the above guidelines to the case at bar, the failure to transport
petitioners safely from Davao to Manila was due to the skyjacking incident
staged by six (6) passengers of the same plane, all members of the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF), without any connection with private
respondent, hence, independent of the will of either the PAL or of its
passengers.
xxx
The trial court, on August 26, 1980, dismissed the complaints finding that all
the damages sustained in the premises were attributed to force majeure.
On September 12, 1980 the spouses Franklin G. Gacal and Corazon M.
Gacal, plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1701, filed a notice of appeal with the lower
court on pure questions of law (Rollo, p. 55) and the petition for review on
certiorari was filed with this Court on October 20, 1980 (Rollo, p. 30).
The Court gave due course to the petition (Rollo, p. 147) and both parties filed
their respective briefs but petitioner failed to file reply brief which was noted by
the Court in the resolution dated May 3, 1982 (Rollo, p. 183).
Petitioners alleged that the main cause of the unfortunate incident is the gross,
wanton and inexcusable negligence of respondent Airline personnel in their
failure to frisk the passengers adequately in order to discover hidden weapons
in the bodies of the six (6) hijackers. They claimed that despite the prevalence
of skyjacking, PAL did not use a metal detector which is the most effective
means of discovering potential skyjackers among the passengers (Rollo, pp.
6-7).
Respondent Airline averred that in the performance of its obligation to safely
transport passengers as far as human care and foresight can provide, it has
exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person with due regard to all
circumstances, but the security checks and measures and surveillance
precautions in all flights, including the inspection of baggages and cargo and
frisking of passengers at the Davao Airport were performed and rendered
solely by military personnel who under appropriate authority had assumed
exclusive jurisdiction over the same in all airports in the Philippines.
Similarly, the negotiations with the hijackers were a purely government matter
and a military operation, handled by and subject to the absolute and exclusive
jurisdiction of the military authorities. Hence, it concluded that the accident that
befell RP-C1161 was caused by fortuitous event, force majeure and other
causes beyond the control of the respondent Airline.
Under normal circumstances, PAL might have foreseen the skyjacking incident
which could have been avoided had there been a more thorough frisking of
passengers and inspection of baggages as authorized by R.A. No. 6235. But
the incident in question occurred during Martial Law where there was a military
take-over of airport security including the frisking of passengers and the
inspection of their luggage preparatory to boarding domestic and international
flights. In fact military take-over was specifically announced on October 20,
1973 by General Jose L. Rancudo, Commanding General of the Philippine Air
Force in a letter to Brig. Gen. Jesus Singson, then Director of the Civil
Aeronautics Administration (Rollo, pp. 71-72) later confirmed shortly before the
hijacking incident of May 21, 1976 by Letter of Instruction No. 399 issued on
April 28, 1976 (Rollo, p. 72).
Otherwise stated, these events rendered it impossible for PAL to perform its
obligations in a nominal manner and obviously it cannot be faulted with
negligence in the performance of duty taken over by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to the exclusion of the former.
Finally, there is no dispute that the fourth element has also been satisfied.
Consequently the existence of force majeure has been established exempting
respondent PAL from the payment of damages to its passengers who suffered
death or injuries in their persons and for loss of their baggages.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit
and the decision of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch I is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
The determinative issue in this case is whether or not hijacking or air piracy
during martial law and under the circumstances obtaining herein, is a caso
fortuito or force majeure which would exempt an aircraft from payment of
damages to its passengers whose lives were put in jeopardy and whose
personal belongings were lost during the incident.
Under the Civil Code, common carriers are required to exercise extraordinary
diligence in their vigilance over the goods and for the safety of passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case (Article
1733). They are presumed at fault or to have acted negligently whenever a
passenger dies or is injured (Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 124 SCRA 583 [1983]) or for the loss, destruction or
deterioration of goods in cases other than those enumerated in Article 1734 of
the Civil Code (Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
150 SCRA 463 [1987]).
The source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract of carriage, and
by entering into said contract, it binds itself to carry the passengers safely as
far as human care and foresight can provide. There is breach of this obligation
if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence according to all the circumstances of
the case in exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person (Isaac v.
Ammen Transportation Co., 101 Phil. 1046 [1957]; Juntilla v. Fontanar, 136
SCRA 624 [1985]).
It is the duty of a common carrier to overcome the presumption of negligence
(Philippine National Railways v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 87 [1985]) and it
must be shown that the carrier had observed the required extraordinary
diligence of a very cautious person as far as human care and foresight can
provide or that the accident was caused by a fortuitous event (Estrada v.
Consolacion, 71 SCRA 523 [1976]). Thus, as ruled by this Court, no person
shall be responsible for those "events which could not be foreseen or which
though foreseen were inevitable. (Article 1174, Civil Code). The term is
synonymous with caso fortuito (Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657 [1924]) which is
of the same sense as "force majeure" (Words and Phrases Permanent Edition,
Vol. 17, p. 362).
In order to constitute a caso fortuito or force majeure that would exempt a
person from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, it is necessary that
the following elements must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the
obligation must be independent of the human will (the will of the debtor or the
obligor); (b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the
event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any
participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor (Lasam v. Smith, 45
Phil. 657 [1924]; Austria v. Court of Appeals, 39 SCRA 527 [1971]; Estrada v.
Consolacion, supra; Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 553 [1985]; Juan
F. Nakpil & Sons v. Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA 596 [1986]). Caso fortuito or
force majeure, by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or
avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, are
inevitable. It is, therefore, not enough that the event should not have been
foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one
31