ECC REPORT 133

Electronic Communications Committee (ECC)

within the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT)

INCREASING TRUST IN
CALLING LINE IDENTIFICATION
AND
ORIGINATING IDENTIFICATION

Kristiansand, September 2009

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Increasing Trust in Calling Line Identification and

Originating Identification
0

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Calling Line Identification (CLI) can be understood as a set of parameters within telecommunications networks that
provide users with capabilities of sending, receiving and displaying telephone numbers. The concept of Originating
Identification (OI) provides users with similar kind of capabilities as the CLI, but the OI extends the traditional calling
line identification to new networks, such as NGNs with identifiers other than E.164 numbers.
Communications today is more global than ever before and legislation within electronic communications vary hugely in
different parts of the world. As calls pass country borders the transiting and terminating operators have very little or no
means to verify correctness of electronic communications parameters received. Therefore, the correctness of various
electronic communications parameters, such as CLI, depends mainly in the originating network.
The CLI was never meant to be used for authentication purposes for service applications that need a high level of trust,
e.g. banking transactions, however, the CLI could be useful as one part of an authentication process. The CLI still has a
certain level of trustworthiness, and it is thus useful for network services and many applications that are not considered
as critical.
In some countries there are regulations/guidelines aiming to guarantee the trustworthiness of CLI. However, this report
draws attention to the fact that no legal trustworthiness exists in all countries within the CLI and even for information
purposes the CLI cannot necessarily be fully trusted, especially in cases where CLI is transferred between countries.
This problem is not of technical nature.
Finally, the report lists guidelines regarding the OI/CLI. The guidelines are useful for the NRAs, operators and endusers. The most important conclusions are that the NRA should implement the relevant ECC Recommendation
regarding the CLI as well as develop national OI/CLI related regulations/guidelines.
The annexes to this report provide more in-depth information on CLI and OI.

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Increasing Trust in Calling Line Identification and

Originating Identification

Table of contents
0

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY........................................................................................................................................2

INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................................................4

SCOPE.........................................................................................................................................................................4

REFERENCES...........................................................................................................................................................5

ABBREVIATIONS.....................................................................................................................................................6

CALLING LINE IDENTIFICATION......................................................................................................................6

5.1
5.2
5.3

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF CLI............................................................................................................................6

DIRECTIVES ASSOCIATED TO CLI.........................................................................................................................7
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION........................................................................................................................................7

ORIGINATING IDENTIFICATION.......................................................................................................................8

THE USE OF OI/CLI IN FUTURE NETWORKS.................................................................................................8

GUIDELINES.............................................................................................................................................................8
ANNEX 1: Use of the CLI...................................................................................................................................................... 10
ANNEX 2: Use of the OI........................................................................................................................................................ 12

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Increasing Trust in Calling Line Identification and

Originating Identification
1

INTRODUCTION

Calling Line Identification (CLI) can be understood as a set of parameters within telecommunications networks that
provide users with capabilities of sending, receiving and displaying telephone numbers. These parameters are used in
services like Calling Line Identification Presentation (CLIP) and Calling Line Identification Restriction (CLIR), and
their technical usage is standardized, for example, by ETSI [4] [9]. Furthermore, this issue is dealt with the
ECTRA/ECC Recommendations [1], [2], ETP Guidelines [3] and national regulations. Existing Recommendations and
guidelines deal with CLI implementation in networks and this stage has generally been reached in Europe already for
some time ago.
Today CLI information is widely passed worldwide between operators to provide end users with number information,
which the telephones and terminal equipment may use to display the name of the calling party. Furthermore, the CLI
information is used to call back, e.g. in a case of a missed call, to authenticate access to services such as a voice mail
box, to trace the source of a malicious call, to access location databases to locate the caller to emergency services and
route the call to its destination depending on the location or type of number (functionality e.g. in Intelligent Networks
(IN) translation services). The list is not exhaustive.
There appears to be instances to suppress the transmission of CLI for commercial reasons. Such practices have an
unfavourable effect on services based on CLI.
The concept of Originating Identification (OI) provides users with similar kind of capabilities as the CLI, but the OI
extends the traditional CLI to future networks, such as NGNs with identifiers other than E.164 numbers [20]. In this
report the term OI is understood to include also the CLI as an overall umbrella concept [10].
The usage of OI/CLI information is based on trust, that all operators involved in handling the call and in particular the
originating operators only allow the correct contents of parameters to be transferred in the networks. With a growth in
the electronic communication features offered and an increasing number of interconnected networks of different types
(e.g. IP based networks) handling calls there are increasing challenges to guarantee the correctness of the received
OI/CLI and some scope for abusing the OI/CLI facility.
Communications today is more global than ever before and legislation within electronic communications vary hugely in
different parts of the world. As calls pass country borders the transiting and terminating operators have very little or no
means to verify correctness of electronic communications parameters received. Therefore, the correctness of various
electronic communications parameters, such as CLI, depends mainly in the originating network.
2

SCOPE

The CLI was never meant to be used for authentication purposes for service applications that need a high level of trust,
e.g. banking transactions, however, the CLI could be useful as one part of an authentication process. The CLI still has a
certain level of trustworthiness, and it is thus useful for network services and many applications that are not considered
as critical.
In some countries there are regulations/guidelines aiming to guarantee the trustworthiness of CLI. However, this report
draws attention to the fact that no legal trustworthiness exists in all countries within the CLI and even for information
purposes the CLI cannot necessarily be fully trusted, especially in cases where CLI is transferred between countries.
This problem is not of technical nature.
As originating network operators have the responsibility for the correctness of the information passed into the network,
the user provided CLI information, which is not screened by the network, is out of scope of this. This means that the
user provided CLI (not screened and passed) is not discussed in the report, although some of the guidelines deal with it.
This report aims to answer the following questions:

How to ensure, to a certain level, that the correct OI/CLI information is generated and transferred in networks?

Why is the trust worthiness of identifiers as important in the future networks as in current networks?

What is the role for network operators and service providers in handling of the OI/CLI information?
This is not a technical report, but rather an informative one aimed for providing a general understanding regarding the
CLI and OI. The report describes the possible problem areas and gives guidelines that can be useful to NRAs, operators

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and end-users regarding the OI/CLI. In this report term OI or OI/CLI is used when originating information wider than
just an E.164 number is considered. The term CLI is used to refer to E.164 number as a calling line identification.
3

REFERENCES

The following references are some of the most important ones regarding the scope of this report:
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]

[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]

CEPT / ECTRA Recommendation of 22 June 2000 (ECTRA/REC(00)03)

on the implementation and use of CLI (Calling Line Identification) within CEPT countries
ECC Recommendation (03)01 of 25 March 2003 (ECC/REC(03)01)
implementation and use of CLI (Calling Line Identification) within CEPT countries
ETP European Telecommunications Platform / CLI Working Group:
ETP Guidelines for Calling Line Identification, Issue 4
September 2002
ETSI EN 300 089 (v3.1.1 2000-12)
Calling Line Identification Presentation (CLIP) supplementary service; Service description
ETSI EN 300 092-1 (v2.1.1 2001-02)
Calling Line Identification Presentation (CLIP) supplementary service;
Digital Subscriber Signalling System No. One (DSS1) protocol; Part 1: Protocol specification
ETSI EN 300 356-3 (v4.2.1 2001-07)
Signalling System No.7 (SS7);ISDN User Part (ISUP) version 4 for the international interface; Part 3: Calling
Line Identification Presentation (CLIP) supplementary service
ETSI EN 300 090 (v1.2.1 2000-12)
Calling Line Identification Restriction (CLIR) supplementary service; Service description
ETSI EN 300 093-1 (v1.2.4 1998-06)
Calling Line Identification Restriction (CLIR) supplementary service; Digital Subscriber Signalling System
No. one (DSS1) protocol; Part 1: Protocol specification
ETSI EN 300 356-4 (v4.2.1 2001-07)
Signalling System No.7 (SS7);ISDN User Part (ISUP) version 4 for the international interface; Part 3: Calling
Line Identification Restriction (CLIR) supplementary service
ETSI TS 183 007 (v1.3.0 2008-01)
Originating Identification Presentation (OIP) and Originating Identification Restriction (OIR);
Protocol specification
ETSI TS 129 163 V8.5.0 (2009-02)
Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
(UMTS); Interworking between the IP Multimedia (IM) Core Network (CN) subsystem and Circuit Switched
(CS) networks (3GPP TS 29.163 version 8.5.0 Release 8)
ECC Recommendation (07)02
Consumer Protection against Abuse of High Tariff Services
Recommendation E.1571 International Calling Party Number Delivery
ETSI EN 301 798 (v1.1.1 2000-10)
Anonymous Call Rejection (ACR) supplementary service; Service description
Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 7 March 2002 - on universal service
and users' rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive)
Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 12 July 2002 - concerning the
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive
on privacy and electronic communications)
Commission Recommendation 2003/558/EC, of 25 July 2003, on the processing of caller location
information in electronic communication networks for the purpose of location-enhanced emergency call
services
Commission Decision 2007/176/EC, of 11 December of 2006, establishing a list of standards and/or
specifications for electronic communications networks, services and associated facilities and services and
replacing all previous versions
Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 15 March 2006 on the retention of
data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications
services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC
ITU-T Rec. E.164 The international public telecommunication numbering plan

ITU-T Rec. E.157 has been determined and has the status of a draft recommendation (status of April 2009)

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ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation
ACR
CEPT
CLI
CLIP
CLIR
E.164
EC
ECC
ECTRA
ETP
ETSI
IN
IP
ISDN
ISUP
ITU-T
MCID
MMS
NGN
NRA
OI
OIP
OIR
PLMN
PSAP
PSTN
SCCP
SIP
SMS
SS7
USD
VoIP
5
5.1

Explanation
Anonymous Call Rejection
European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations
Calling Line Identification
Calling Line Identification Presentation
Calling Line Identification Restriction
ITU-T Recommendation E.164: The international public telecommunication numbering plan
European Community
Electronic Communications Committee (within the CEPT)
European Committee for Telecommunications Regulatory Affairs
(earlier organization within the CEPT)
European Telecommunications Platform
European Telecommunications Standards Institute
Intelligent Networks
Internet Protocol
Integrated Services Digital Network
ISDN User Part
International Telecommunication Union Standardization Sector
Malicious Call Identification
Multimedia Messaging Service
Next Generation Networks
National Regulatory Authority
Originating Identification
Originating Identification Presentation
Originating Identification Restriction
Public Land Mobile Network
Public Safety Answering Point
Public Switched Telephone Network
Signalling Connection Control Part
Session Initiation Protocol
Short Message Service
Signalling System no. 7
Universal Service Directive
Voice over Internet Protocol (based networks)

CALLING LINE IDENTIFICATION

General Description of CLI

The Calling Line Identification Presentation service (CLIP) provides the called party with the possibility to identify the
subscription of the calling party via the telephone number. Usually the called party associate (in case of a well known
number) the received CLI with the name of the calling party. CLI has for many years been used within networks and
forwarded between interconnected networks in order to support, for example, call processing, billing, operator
assistance, customer care, emergency services and managing the network.
Where feasible, the originating public telephone switch shall transmit CLI information into the network and provide
CLI restriction (CLIR) capabilities to calling users. Nevertheless, operators have full access to CLI information
irrespective of CLI restriction requested by callers. However, network operators should only make use of such restricted
CLI information where the information is essential to provide a telecommunications service or where legal requirements
are concerned.
The network shall deliver the calling line identity to the called party during call establishment, regardless of the
terminals capability to handle the information unless the calling party has activated the Calling Line Identification
Restriction.
Since the adoption of Recommendations Implementation and use of CLI within CEPT countries (ECTRA REC(00)03
[1] and ECC REC(03)01 [2] both with the same name) the CLI is widely used and available in the CEPT countries,

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and offers value for users. Furthermore, the European Telecommunications Platform (ETP) Guidelines for Calling Line
Identifications [3] support these Recommendations by providing the operators best practice solutions within the CLI
related issues. This implementation stage has now been reached in Europe.
5.2

Directives Associated to CLI

In the existing electronic communication framework Directives there are several requirements defined associated to the
provisioning of CLI, such as access to emergency services (including the location based services) and directly related
with a set of supplementary services used in modern telecommunications networks like CLIP, CLIR, ACR and MCID
that should be taken in account [15] [19].
The Universal Service Directive (USD) Article 29, foreseen that Member States shall ensure that national regulatory
authorities are able to require all undertakings that operate public telephone networks to make available to end-users the
CLI. This facility is restricted to extent of technical feasible and economic viability and should be available across
Member States boundaries.
The Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications (2002/58/EC) (Article 8) defines a set of requirements
associated to presentation and restriction of calling and connected line identification, namely that calling party's number
should be presented to the called party prior to the call being established. Some exceptions are applicable to the
restriction of CLI presentation (Article 10).
These legal requirements are included also in the draft proposals of Electronic Communications Reform that will
replace the existing legal framework 2.
5.3

Problem Description

This report draws attention to the fact that no legal trustworthiness exists in all countries within the CLI and even for
information purposes the CLI cannot necessarily be fully trusted, especially in cases where CLI is transferred between
countries. This problem is mainly not of technical nature.
In addition, the following issues may exist (the list is not exhaustive):
The use of VoIP and other non-traditional telecommunications systems without arrangements to send an OI/CLI
that relates to the calling party;
Incorrect implementations of software or configurations in the originating network elements and/or the end-user
equipment.
Examples of fraudulent or misleading use of OI/CLI:

Call return service:

In case of receiving a premium rate number or a high tariff number (e.g. a satellite or
international number), if the called party returns the call, the price charged is unexpectedly
high. According to existing recommendation [12], this procedure is prohibited.

Voice mail access:

Voice mail services may be accessed with a CLI. With a fake CLI an unauthorised user may
access voice mails and/or change voice mail configurations leaving the service inaccessible
to the original user.

Identity theft:

With a fake CLI one can make calls pretending to be someone else. This results in e.g.
billing/agreement problems with various services that are billed offline based on a CLI.

Use of unassigned
numbers as a CLI:

A CLI received is not a number assigned in the national (or international) numbering plan.
In this case a call return service is not possible and public authorities are not able to
determine the source of the call.

Use of numbers
unassigned to a
subscriber:

A number assigned to an operator but not assigned to any subscriber. In this case the call
return service is not possible. This practice is used by some operators, by modifying the
original CLI, in order to benefit from cheaper interconnection prices.

A service to provide
a false CLI:

There are service providers that give a possibility of using a false CLIs, e.g. by means of
calling cards.

Emergency
services / lawful
interception:

Malicious calls to emergency centres. Misleading of law-enforcement authorities.

The referenced Directives shall be reviewed after approval of the new regulatory framework.

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ORIGINATING IDENTIFICATION

The Originating Identification Presentation (OIP) service provides the destination party with the possibility of receiving
information about the source of the call. Usage of the OI is rather similar with usage of the CLI, but the OI concept is
extended to cover also other networks than PSTN/ISDN/PLMN. SIP protocol is used to carry the OI information,
meanwhile for the CLI Signalling System #7 (SS7) is used. Furthermore, the OI consists of different kinds of
identifiers, not only E.164 numbers as is the case with the CLI.
The Originating Identification Restriction (OIR) service is a service offered to the originating party. It restricts the
presentation of information regarding the source of the call to the destination party. When the OIR service is invoked,
the originating network operator provides the destination network operator with the indication that the OI is not allowed
to be presented to the destination party. In this case, no OI shall be included in the requests sent to the destination party.
The presentation restriction function shall not influence the forwarding of the OI within the network as part of other
services, such as communication diversion service.
7

THE USE OF OI/CLI IN FUTURE NETWORKS

As future networks, such as NGN, emulate PSTN as one of the function within them, no huge changes compared to
PSTN are expected on the traditional voice services. That is why requirements are also very similar between NGN and
PSTN. However, it should be noted that there are more roles for different players in future networks compared with
legacy networks. These roles and especially the interfaces between subsequent operators/service providers may require
additional security measures.
Terminals in future networks will have an increased linkage with the user and also with applications. This means that
the role of users and applications may bring end-to-end security mechanisms that are not provided by the networks.
Actually, end-to-end authentication will be increasingly used, and theoretically in addition to end-to-end
authentication no other mechanisms are required.3
However, it is expected that OI information will be used in similar network and service applications as CLI and
therefore it is essential that the aim is the OI (P-Asserted-Id in SIP) should have at least the same amount of trust. In
addition to this, OI/CLI authentication in combination with end-to-end authentication may be used. It is always up to
the application provider to decide what kinds of security mechanisms are applied.
It should be noticed that although a lot of standardization effort is going on to provide additional security measures in
future networks, it is recommended that in critical applications proper security methods should be done by end-users
themselves.
8

GUIDELINES

To increase trust in the usage of OI/CLI all parties in the electronic communication chain are required to follow the
same principles. These principles are based on international standards and governmental regulations and guidelines 4.
The operators and service providers play a main role here. The overall responsibility lies, however, at the public
authorities, typically within the NRAs.
The NRAs shall take the relevant EU Directives and the following guidelines into account when providing
regulations/guidelines for OI/CLI. The order of the guidelines does not imply the order of importance.
These guidelines are subject to national legislation.

3
4

1.

ECC Recommendation (03)01 of 25 March 2003 (ECC/REC(03)01) Implementation and use of CLI (Calling
Line Identification) within CEPT countries shall be implemented.

2.

National regulations/guidelines regarding the generating and handling of OI/CLI should be developed.

3.

All electronic communications operators and service providers, national and international, involved in an
electronic communication service that uses an E.164 number shall provide or transport and forward CLI
information.

Measures to ensure end-to-end secure communications at the application level are outside of the competences of the NRAs.
By governmental regulations and guidelines a national telecommunications law and/or orders by the NRA are meant.

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4.

The interconnecting operators shall include the transfer of the proper OI/CLI information in the interconnection
agreements according to the rules of the NRAs of countries involved.

5.

The access operator is responsible for the correctness of the CLI (network provided CLI or in case of user
provided CLI and the coding is verified and passed).

6.

An operator receiving electronic communications should not change the contents of the OI/CLI, if not specifically
allowed in cases mentioned in regulations/standards (e.g. when sending the OI/CLI to the called party, appropriate
prefixes can be added, for example in an international call, the prefix 00, + or other nationally valid prefix ).
However, an operator receiving communications may have to change the content of an OI/CLI to convert a
national significant number into the same number in an international E.164 format.

7.

The access operator for an electronic communication service that uses an E.164 number, in case of involvement of
transit operators should include in their contractual agreements that the CLI should not be unnecessarily modified
in network-network interfaces till the destination network. Any such modification should be supported by
international standards.

8.

It should be possible to return a call by using CLI information presented to the called user. Therefore, CLI
numbers used in an IP/PSTN interconnection with a VoIP provider without E.164 numbers should be marked as
presentation restricted.

9.

Depending on bilateral/multi-lateral agreement or restrictions in cases of national legal and regulatory

frameworks, the originating network may restrict calling party number from being sent to the destination network
when the CLIR supplementary service is applicable, in this case the calling party numbers sent across
international boundaries shall contain always the restriction indicator and may also include the country code of
the originating country, being marked in this case as a incomplete number in the international format [13].

10.

Where a network operator accepts caller-provided numbers unscreened into the public network for transfer in the
generic number parameter to be presented to the called user as the CLI, there should exist a written agreement
(subject to national legislation) between the access network operator and the calling subscriber which numbers
could be used.

11.

The OI/CLI may be marked as restricted if the operator can assure that the information is not valid according to
the national regulations. In this case the OI/CLI is not presented to the called party.

12.

Originating operator should only use an identifier/a number in the OI/CLI which the user has right to use.

13.

It is not allowed to use fictive/non-assigned identifiers/numbers as a OI/CLI.

14.

Premium rate numbers should not be used as OI/CLI [12]. The NRA decides what national number ranges could
or could not be used as OI/CLI.

15.

If an originating party has ported his number, the original (ported) number shall be used as a CLI.

16.

Calls to emergency services shall always carry the network validated CLI, only.

17.

The CLI does not identify the calling party; it is rather an identifier of the subscription.

18.

The CLI should not be used alone as an authorization tool for critical applications.

19.

The principles of these guidelines should also be applied, where relevant, in all electronic communications
networks and for all electronic communication services that make use of public numbering, naming and
addressing resources.

20.

These guidelines should also be applied, where technically feasible, in non-call-related services, such as
SMS/MMS.

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Increasing Trust in Calling Line Identification and

Originating Identification
The Annexes for this document are meant for background and additional information and they are not integral
part of the report. More detailed information on CLI and OI can be found in the reference documents.
ANNEX 1: Use of the CLI
The Calling Line Identification Presentation service (CLIP) provides the called party with the possibility to
identify the subscription of the calling party via the telephone number. Usually the called party associate (in case
of a well known number) the received CLI with the name of the calling party. In addition to the E.164 number,
the calling line identity may include a sub-address generated by the calling user and transparently transported by
the network. The network cannot be responsible for the content of this sub-address. The network shall deliver
the calling line identity to the called party during call establishment, regardless of the terminal capability to
handle the information unless the calling party has activated the Calling Line Identification Restriction (CLIR),
in this situation no information about the source of the call is sent to the terminating user. There is another
number identification option related to the Calling Party number identification. When the signalling network
supports the Generic number and the terminating network supports the two number delivery option, it is
possible to send to the users terminal 2 CLIs in the SETUP message. The CLI is delivered to emergency
services independently of the restriction value, for this it is necessary to configure the network interfaces to the
PSAP with the feature CLIR override.
Where more than one parameter is transferred, there is a choice about which parameter should be presented to
the user and this choice may be determined by the design of the called partys terminal and also by user
subscription. There are 3 options related to number delivery: CLI, generic number or both.
For more information please consult references [4] [9].
A critical issue is where the information in the parameter was generated as this affects the degree of trust that
should be put in the information. If the information was generated by a Communications Provider then it is
much more likely to be correct than if it was input by the calling party. The called party is not aware who
generated the information in case of 2 CLI delivery option. Information input by the caller is especially
vulnerable to deliberate errors and misrepresentations as in fraud.
The CLI information is also used to populate other kind of parameters in the signalling and used in several
supplementary services (e.g. Call Diversion services and Malicious Call Identification). The CLI is used both
for voice calls and for services, such as SMS and MMS, to identify the calling line used by a calling party [11].
The CLI may also be used for services such as:
call return service;
malicious call identification;
origin dependent routing;
caller location determination.
The originating public telephone exchange shall transmit CLI information into the network and provide
restriction capabilities to calling users. Network operators have full access to CLI information irrespective of
CLI restriction requested by callers. However, network operators should only make use of such restricted CLI
information where the information is essential to provide a telecommunications service. Where the caller has
deliberately restricted the presentation of their CLI an appropriate indication shall be given to the called user.
The CLI is delivered to emergency services independently of the restriction value.
A subscriber may generate a calling line identity for his network operator to be transferred to the called party
using the generic number parameter. Where a network operator accepts caller-provided numbers unscreened into
the public network for transfer in the generic number parameter and for presentation to the called user, there
should exist a written agreement (subject to national legislation) between the network operator and the calling
subscriber which numbers could be used. If the user provided number is screened and passed then it could be
used in the CLI parameter.
The NRA may define which number ranges can be used as a CLI. Usage of special numbering ranges with high
tariffs, such as premium rate numbers, should not be used as a CLI [12]. This is justified by possibility of caller
return the call to these numbers where the cost applied is higher than the cost to normal telephone number.
Therefore the risk for misuse is high. However, if these numbers are allowed by national legislation to be used
as a CLI, callers should be made aware of the charges prior to making any call to such a service.

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The originating network operator shall ensure that where a fixed network non-geographic number (for example
freephone or shared cost number) is used as a CLI, if allowed by the NRA, that the operation of emergency
services, and billing by interconnected network operators is not affected.

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ANNEX 2: Use of the OI

The Originating Identification Presentation (OIP) and the Calling Line Identification Presentation (CLIP) as a
subset of the OIP present the originating/calling line identifier provided by the originating network, such as
Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN)/Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) or the Public Land
Mobile Network (PLMN), to the called party. This identifier may be an E.164 telephone number.
Originating Identification (OI) within future networks, such as NGNs and IP-based PLMNs is basically the
same as CLI within PSTN/ISDN/PLMN (e.g. GSM). Protocols, like SIP, are used to carry the OI information,
meanwhile for the CLI Signalling System #7 (SS7) is used. Usage of the OI is rather similar with usage of the
CLI, but the OI concept is extended to cover also other networks than PSTN/ISDN and circuit-switched
PLMNs. Furthermore, the OI consists of different kinds of identifiers, not only E.164 numbers as is the case
with the CLI.
The Originating Identification Presentation (OIP) service provides the destination party with the possibility of
receiving information about the source of the call. In addition to this information, the OI from the originating
party may include additional information generated by the originating user and in general transparently
transported by the network. In the particular case where the no screening special arrangement does not apply;
the originating network shall verify the content of this user generated information. The network operators cannot
be responsible for the content of the user generated information unless the originating network operator has
agreed with the user on correctness of the possible user generated information.
The Originating Identification Restriction (OIR) service is a service offered to the originating party. It restricts
presentation of the originating partys OI information to the destination party. When the OIR service is invoked,
the originating network operator provides the destination network operator with the indication that the OIP is not
allowed to be presented to the destination party. In this case, no OI shall be included in the requests sent to the
destination party. The presentation restriction service shall not influence the forwarding of the OI within the
network as part of other services, such as communication diversion service.
OI Implementation in SIP
The relevant headers in the SIP requests are [10]:

The P-Preferred-Identity header field;

The P-Asserted-Identity header field;
The Privacy header field;
The From header field.

The P-Preferred-Identity header field is meant to give to the user a possibility to input a user generated
information. According to the specifications [10], the value input shall be checked by the network to see if it is
one of a stored list of identifiers registered by the subscriber and authorised by the network. If the value is not in
this list then it will be replaced by a default identifier.
The P-Asserted-Identity header field is meant to carry the network provided identifier (in ISUP the
corresponding parameter is the Calling-Party-Number parameter)
The Privacy header field gives a user a possibility to restrict the presentation of his/her OI contained in the PAsserted-Identity header.
The From header field contains the OI that the user wants to pass transparently through the network to the
destination. This is comparable with the user provided (not screened, generic number) parameter in ISUP.