Corina Dimitriu

The Sino-Soviet relationship collapsed due to ideological

differences. To what extent do you agree?
When Mao broadcasted the Chinese Communist victory in 1949,
it was widely believed that the USSR and PRC would establish a
monolithic Eurasian Communist bloc, which was reinforced by
the 1950 Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance.
However, by 1958, their relations had become strained and
deteriorated almost to the point of war. The growing rift
between the USSR and PRC was caused by a combination of
ideological clashes, national self-interest and personality.
Ultimately, the continuing hostility after the deposition of
Khrushchev suggests that personality had more of a peripheral
role, and the idea of ideological divisions being the central
cause is weakened by the USSRs refusal to involve themselves
in the Korean and Sino-Indian Wars for the cause of world
communism. Therefore, it really was national self-interest that
stemmed Sino-Soviet divisions, with their issues often being
expressed in ideological and personal terms.
Inherently weak from the start due to ideological differences,
the relationship between the PRC and the USSR was neither
pleasant nor gratifying, with Maos unorthodox method of
revolution, based on peasant mobilisation in the countryside,
tolerated by Moscow as legitimate only because all other types
of communist insurrection in China had failed. Khrushchev saw
Maos peasant-led communism as straying away from Marxism,
while the Chinese leader accused the USSR of revisionism at the
1957 Conference of Communist Parties as Deng Xiaoping
outargued the moderate Soviet theorist. Mao was highly critical
of the Secret Speech calling for destalinisation as well as
Khrushchevs policy of peaceful coexistence as he had
respected and imitated Stalins personality cult and thought any
kind of cooperation with the US was a betrayal of communism.
The Taiwan Straits crises also provided an ideological clash with
the PRC, as Maos regime was proclaimed Trotskyist and Mao a
fanatic due to his willingness to sacrifice half the worlds
population to eliminate capitalism in exchange for socialism

Corina Dimitriu

and his readiness to engage in conflict with the US.

Khrushchevs reluctance to get involved both in the Quemoy
Crisis and the Sino-Indian war both show his private
commitment to peaceful coexistence and how little he thought
of the Chinese Communists. Maos 1958 relinquishment of the
Soviet Five Year Plan in favour of his own Great Leap Forward
was particularly important in creating an ideological rift due to
the radically different approaches taken to industrialisation, of
high-quality heavy-industry steel compared to Chinese backyard furnace pig-iron. Economic advisers were withdrawn and
commercial contracts were cancelled, which marked the
beginning of the official undoing of their alliance. Feeling
humiliated and undermined due to the Soviets branding GLF as
faulty in design and erroneous in practice, the PRC now
needed to assert itself in the international Communist
community and was willing to support any Communist countries
that dissented from Moscows lead. This led to Mao encouraging
Ceauescu, the Romanian Communist president, to assert its
independence from Moscow, as well as replacing Soviet aid and
technical assistance in Albania when the latter was accused of
being Stalinist and backward. Furthermore, Khrushchevs
$800 million aid to India during the Sino-Indian as well as Maos
criticism over the Soviet leaders handling of the Cuban Missile
Crisis reinforced Maos belief that Khrushchev was a coward and
a redundant old boot and led to the Cultural Revolution which
purged China of Soviet revisionism and bureaucracy.
Ideological differences can therefore be seen as having had an
important role in the Sino-Soviet collapse as neither side
believed in the Communist authenticity of the other or
considered the other a true communist brother.
Personality clashes have also been seen as another corrosive
factor that led to the Sino-Soviet break. Mao held Stalin in high
respect and considered him a true Communist revolutionary
despite Stalins drawing out of the Korean War and Treaty
negotiations. The death of Stalin in 1953 brought about a shortlived honeymoon period in terms of treaties, but Mao had

Corina Dimitriu

always borne little respect for Khrushchev due to his revisionist

policies, considering him a cowardly bureaucrat. The Secret
Speech served to erase the little respect Mao had due to
Khrushchevs denounce of Stalins personality cult and
destalinisation. Mao saw this as a personal affront due to having
established his own personality cult. The public embarrassment
of Khrushchevs visit to Beijing, where he was forced to
humiliate himself had an enormous impact on Khrushchevs
attitude towards Mao as it served to inflame the already present
hostility between the two. Khrushchevs offers of aid following
the GLF and his desire to establish military bases in China, as
well as his suggestion of a joint control over Chinas nuclear
programme were seen as patronising and degrading. The Soviet
leader even went as far as to call Mao the Asian Hitler,
showing just how much their personal relationship had
deteriorated by 1961. However, it is important not to
exaggerate the role of personality even after the removal of
Khrushchev in 1964, relations continued to deteriorate further.
National self-interest was particularly crucial for the Sino-Soviet
collapse. From the very beginning, during the Chinese Civil War,
the USSR had supported Chiang Kai Shek due to Stalins need of
a strong leadership against Japan as well as the extended
border recognition the GMD would have given the USSR. Stalin
was also responsible for encouraging China to enter the Korean
War on behalf of the communists, which left China exhausted
and heavily dependent on aid. The terms of the 1950 Treaty of
Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance could also be seen as
having been governed by national security interests rather than
socialist brotherhood, as China desperately needed economic
aid after the Korean War as well as the Soviet nuclear umbrella,
while the USSR needed trade partners. The Treaty was also seen
by Mao and the US as strongly favouring the USSR, with US
claiming Moscow is making puppets out of China. This was due
to the economic help being loaned with high interest rather
than gifted as well as the Soviets refusal to negotiate over
Mongolia. The USSR also repeatedly refused to support the PRC

Corina Dimitriu

into peripheral expansion into Taiwan, India and Pakistan,

refusing to involve themselves in the Quemoy and Matsu Crises
and supplying India with weapons and aid during the SinoIndian war. Even the policy of peaceful coexistence was said to
have been pursued for national self-interest, as it allowed the
USSR to divert sources from military spending to raising living
standards as well as isolating China from the west. The Soviets
also refused to share nuclear knowledge with China, claiming
that due to their friendship the Chinese had no need for it. The
Czechoslovakian coup and Brezhnev doctrine in particular
played an important role in the deterioration of their
relationship, as the PRC, while claiming they condemned it for
ideological reasons, felt threatened by the USSRs entitlement
to invade states that seemed to undermine socialism. The last
straw was undoubtedly the border conflict over Damansky,
while on the surface ideological - imperialistic USSR
escalated because of existing tensions and the USSRs desire to
expand. Still under the banner of ideology, the PRC and USSR
fought to bring Vietnam to their side of the ideological split.
While this seemed ideological in nature, it really was about
asserting power in the communist world as well as gaining an
ally against the other side.
Other reasons for the split include the power struggle in the
communist world, with China wanting to assert itself as a
Communist world power by denouncing the USSRs revisionist
policies, as demonstrated by the PRCs support for Albania and
their Conference of the Communist Parties debates.
Furthermore, domestic issues might have played a part as well,
with the disaster of the GLF (14 million dead) as well as the
Cultural Revolutions purge of Soviet influence speeding up the
already imminent end of the Sino-Soviet Relationship.
All in all, the role of personality, domestic issues, struggle in the
communist world and even ideological differences come
subordinate to national self-interests in the cause of the SinoSoviet split. The role of personality, while often overplayed,
loses its edge due to the continuing worsening relationship

Corina Dimitriu

under the more cooperative Brezhna. Additionally, while

straying from true communism was what made the
relationship half-hearted from the beginning, ideology
eventually came to be used more as a pretext to mask the
pursuit of national self-interest rather than as a reason in itself.
Therefore, on the whole, national self-interests were most
important in the Sino-Soviet collapse, despite the issues raised
by it being concealed in ideological or personality garments.