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Villamor, in indicting the eight staff members of The Buzz, noted that each episode
was a product of their meeting and brainstorming, and that there was no merit to their
defense of ignorance.
Human experience and logic would dictate that these respondents who are
experienced employees in the field of broadcasting knew beforehand that a news item
about Jopay Paguia would be tackled in their program. This fact should have put them
on guard instead of making it appear that they were ignorant of the intended airing of
the footage of Daisy Siete without the consent and authority of FOCUS or GMA.
Ms. Paguia is a mainstay of GMA-7 afternoon program, Daisy Siete.
The assistant prosecutor recommended a bail of P6,000 each for the respondents
provisional liberty.
The case has then been raffled to Regional Trial Court Branch 90.
The case stemmed from a complaint filed by GMA Network Inc through its counsel Dick
Perez, and Focus Entertainment, Inc., which produced the soap opera Daisy Siete.
The two entities claimed that the unauthorized airing of footages from Daisy Siete
happened during the Feb. 13, 2005 broadcast of The Buzz.
In their complaint, GMA 7 and Focus alleged that the portion included in The Buzzs
opening billboard or OBB was the scene of Jopay Paguia walking beside and mounting a
jeepney while holding a yellow flower with the text Jopay Paguia at the bottom of the
screen.
The afternoon soap opera features the Sexbomb dancers, of which Paguia is a member.
The rival of ABS-CBN, GMA 7 claimed that the respondents allegedly used the footage
after rumors circulated that Paguia was quitting the group.
In their defense, the respondents maintained they didnt violate any copyright laws as
the airing of the footage was just for a few seconds and was intended as part of a report
on current events.
They added that under the Intellectual Property Codes Article 185, the reproduction of a
material has been allowed under the Fair Use principle.
buzz%e2%80%99-staff-charged-for-copyrightinfringement#ixzz3j4kznsZl
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Aside from the bank deposits, he also did not declare two real properties he acquired
during his stint in government: a condominium unit at the Columns, along Ayala Avenue
that he bought for P3.6 million in 2004 and a property in Fort Bonifacio that he bought
for P9.16 million in 2005.
Then, last February, Corona insisted before the Tax Court that he should be arraigned
only for violating Section 255, or failure to file income tax returns. They argued that
both sections 255 and 254 (attempt to void or defeat tax collection) constituted the
same acts of tax evasion under the NIRC.
But the Tax Court denied the bid and insisted he should be arraigned. Corona was
arraigned on the six counts for violation of Section 255 but deferred the arraignment on
the other six. Arraignment was set on April 15 then moved to May 6 and eventually July
1.
READ: Coronas bid to be arraigned on 6 tax cases only rejected
Atty. Reinhard Sanchez told the Tax Court that Coronas legs were swollen and he
needed to see a doctor.
Sanchez said they have no intention to delay the proceedings, but that Coronas
physical condition was important.
He is willing to be arraigned at the soonest possible opportunity, he assured.
Associate Justice Amelia Cotangco-Manalastas said he should show cause why he
should not be cited in contempt of court.
The camp of Corona was given five days to comply and submit a medical certificate.
Arraignment was reset to July 22. IDL
Plaintiff-employee worked for a printing company. His wife also owned a printing business. On the
side, plaintiff would broker printing jobs, sending them to his wifes company. He would bring his own
laptop to work and use that to conduct business for his wifes company while at work for his
employer.
One day, the boss came into plaintiffs office (apparently when plaintiff was not in the room) and saw
that the computer screen on plaintiffs computer showed a non-work related email account, with
messages concerning the brokering of print jobs to the wifes company. The boss printed out the
email messages.
Plaintiff sued, claiming, among other things, common law invasion of privacy and violation of a
provision of the Georgia Computer Systems Protection Act. The case went to trial, and plaintiff lost.
In fact, he ended up having to pay almost $40,000 to his employer on counterclaims for breach of
loyalty. Plaintiff sought review of the trial courts decision. On appeal, the court affirmed.
The appellate court affirmed the trial courts finding that the bosss access to plaintiffs computer did
not constitute common law invasion of privacy based upon an intrusion upon plaintiffs seclusion or
solitude, or into his private affairs. The court held that the bosss activity was reasonable in light of
the situation because:
He had every reason to suspect that plaintiff was conducting a competing business on the
side, as in fact he was.
To bolster this holding, the court cited from a Georgia Supreme Court case that said, [T]here are
some shocks, inconveniences and annoyances which members of society in the nature of things
must absorb without the right of redress.
Modern incarnations of right-to-privacy laws are also meant to address cultural sensibilities. Our own Civil
Code descended from the Spanish one, and traceable to the Napoleonic Codes prohibits prying into
the privacy of anothers residence; meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of
another; and intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends.
The Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act is another contemporary example of a privacy law. Tongue-in-cheek,
we can argue that this law is grounded in religion; after all, the 11th Commandment states: Thou Shalt
Not Get Caught.
But its important to emphasize that there is no black-letter right to privacy as such. The most our
Constitution will say is that [T]he privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable.
The usual example of this Constitutional right in action is the Anti-Wiretapping Act, which basically
prohibits the warrantless surveillance or interception of a telephone conversation.
Clearly, the right to privacy is not as handy as, say, the right to free speech, which you can whip out in
defense against the truncheon-wielding riot policeman bent on dispersing your rally.
In fact, the right to privacy is better defined in the breach than by observance. Its easier to say which are
invasions of privacy, rather than which are exercises of the right to privacy.
American tort law is the primary source for these invasions of privacy. A tort related to our Philippine
legal concept of a quasi-delict is basically a civil wrong (as opposed to a criminal act) for which the
injured party can claim damages.
The four types of invasions of privacy recognized by tort law include: (a) appropriation; (b) intrusion; (c)
revelation of private facts; and (d) false light.
An appropriation occurs when one uses anothers name, likeness or even voice for commercial or trade
purposes, without the latters consent. One of the first cases (in 1902) involved a young woman who found
her picture on advertisements for a certain brand of flour. Because the courts did not yet recognize the
right to privacy, she lost her case for damages.
Since then, however, individuals have sued successfully for the non-consensual use of their images. Their
premise was that the right to privacy prohibited the use of their image for publicity, and violated their right
to remain anonymous.
How then to explain that some of the largest awards of the past few years have been to celebrities whose
image or voice was appropriated to advertise a product? In this case, the right to privacy is no longer
predicated on a right to anonymity, but rather takes the form of a property right: the celebrities could
demand compensation because the illegal use of their likeness to advertise a product denied them
endorsement fees, or negatively affected a commercial image they sought to protect. Actor Dustin
Hoffman , singer/actresses Cher and Bette Midler, and boxer Muhammad Ali have all filed, and won,
cases like this.
Similar actions involving Filipino celebrities are pending in our regional trial courts: one involves a famous
actor who alleges that his image was appropriated to make it appear that he endorsed the defendants
alcoholic beverage. Another case involves an actress whose head was photographically grafted onto the
nearly naked body of another model for a series of sexy calendars. From a purely academic perspective,
one hopes these cases reach our Supreme Court, so that therell be some Philippine jurisprudence on
this type of invasion of privacy.
The second invasion tort, intrusion, means what its name implies: an actual physical intrusion into a
private space, akin to trespassing.
Early on, the paparazzi were the most frequent defendants for this tort. Celebrities then the usual
plaintiffs usually sought moral damages for past intrusions, and an injunction against future ones.
But of late, reality TV shows have also become targets for intrusion suits. In one case, the California
Supreme Court ruled that a road accident victim whose rescue by helicopter was broadcast over a reality
television program could sue for intrusion, because she had a reasonable expectation of privacy while in
the helicopter traveling to the hospital.
A revelation of private facts is the unauthorized disclosure of embarrassing personal facts about an
individual. For it to be considered tortious, the fact must offensive to a reasonable person and
unrelated to a matter of legitimate public interest.
Finally, a false light tort is one in which the defendant depicts the plaintiff in a false light. Fictionalization
is a good example of how this right is violated. In the 1979 case of Lagunzad v. Soto Vda. de Gonzales,
for instance, the Philippine Supreme Court declared that a public figures right to privacy extends to a
fictional or novelized representation of [the] person. While not a false light case, the rulings
significance is clear: anybody wanting to tell the fictionalized story of a real person has to get that persons
consent.
Despite all these cases, privacy law remains in flux. It is relatively young, tracing its beginnings to 1890,
when later-to-be U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, and Samuel Warren, wrote about the The
Right to Privacy. This article is widely acknowledged as the first piece of legal scholarship defining the
metes and bounds of a right to privacy.
Since then, discussions on privacy law have touched on reproductive health issues (a womans right to
use contraception and seek an abortion, in Griswold v Connecticut , and Roe v Wade ); civil rights (Katz v.
United States ); and even euthanasia (Washington v. Glucksberg, et al ).
In the Philippines, a legal article by U.P. College of Law Dean and later Philippine Supreme Court Justice
Irene R. Cortes, The Constitutional Foundations of a Right to Privacy, is credited with raising awareness
about the issue. But Philippine case law remains sparse.
The leading Philippine privacy case remains to be Ayer v. Capulong. Australian production company Ayer
sought to film a docu-drama about the 1986 EDSA Revolution. One of the main figures of EDSA I, Sen.
Juan Ponce Enrile, prohibited Ayer from using his name, image or likeness in the film, and secured an
injunction against Ayer. The Supreme Court recognized Sen. Enriles right to prohibit a fictional depiction
of his role in EDSA I. However, the Court also ruled that Enrile had no right to prohibit Ayer from
portraying publicly-known facts about the EDSA Revolution, including his participation in it. Enrile, by
playing a pivotal role in EDSA, was a public figure, and therefore had a limited right to privacy.
If the examples mentioned are to be any indication, the most frequent invaders of the right to privacy
seem to be the mass media. This seems inevitable: the right to be let alone seems to be in natural
conflict with the medias need for information.
But these two conflicting interests are not irreconcilable. With just a little extra care motivated by
compassion toward the subject and a healthy aversion to litigation media defendants will be in a position
to deter or defeat an invasion-of-privacy damages claim.
The first, and best course of action, is to secure the consent of the subject. The fact that the person
consented to be quoted or interviewed, revealed the private fact himself, or agreed to be the subject of a
photograph or video, goes a long way to overcoming his claim that his privacy was violated.
Two corollaries to this rule: (a) get the consent in writing this is the best evidence of the subjects
consent; and (b) bear in mind that not everybody can give consent. Minors, as a general rule, cannot give
knowing consent. A person in the middle of a heart attack who gargles Yes to your request to
document him for your reality TV show probably did not give knowing consent either.
Second and because securing consent is not always a convenient or practical option is to ensure that
the document relates to a matter of legitimate public concern. A useful defense against a invasion-ofprivacy tort is that the material was used for a news and information purpose. Then, the media
organization can claim its own affirmative right the right to free expression and to a free press, and in
some cases the right to information on matters of public concern versus the individuals right to
privacy.
Third: the media practitioner can take refuge in the fact that there are limited privacy rights (a) for public
figures; and (b) in public places.
Public figures include the usual culprits: public officials and celebrities, and those who had sought
publicity and consented to it. But the definition also includes those who have become unwilling public
figures because of some circumstance or event, like crime or accident victims. As a general rule, these
famous or notorious individuals do not have a privacy right in so far as those facts which made them a
public figure are concerned.
Similarly, people in public places have a limited right to privacy. A person in a public place which can be
viewed or accessed by other members of the public does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
there. Anything with a news or human interest value done in a public place, therefore, generally becomes
a legitimate matter of public interest subject to coverage.
Finally, remember that privacy law is a dynamic, and in the Philippines largely unexplored field of legal
practice. While American jurisprudence remains persuasive in the absence of Philippine cases and
principles, Philippine courts will no doubt apply Philippine cultural practices, and Filipino social values, in
determining whether damages are due for an invasion of privacy. Obviously, this can work against a
Philippine media defendant, given that our need to save face and the Filipino sense of hiya are more
stringent than American conceptions of privacy.
All told, there are compelling arguments for both sides of the privacy debate. But unlike disputes involving
free speech, this conflict pits the media not against the state but against individuals. Where then, to look
for better guidance in controversial situations involving these two preferred rights?
The best answer may not be legal, but rather ethical: the Journalists Code of Ethics provides useful
guidelines for the treatment of private individuals and private facts. In many situations, the ethical solution
will likely coincide with the legal one. When in doubt, then, decency should be my watch word. After all,
what better than decency to avert an unwanted gaze?
by the Supreme Court because of its limiting effect on the freedoms of speech and of assembly.
Rafael Mariano, chairman of the militant farmers alliance Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas
(KMP), said Friday the people should unite against "this new attack on civil liberties disguised
as an anticommunist campaign."
Mariano said it was "an old trick employed in the 1950s and '60s" that ultimately became "a
failure in stopping the mass movement from striving for real democracy, justice and freedom."
Bayan Muna Rep. Satur Ocampo, a victim of human rights abuses during Ferdinand Marcos'
dictatorship, described the planned revival of the law as "a throwback to martial law" that
would "worsen the state of human rights in the country."
Edre Olalia, president of the International Association of People's Lawyers, said it was "a
Jurassic legal step backward."
"It is simply Cold War McCarthyism," Olalia told the Philippine Daily Inquirer in a text
message, referring to the infamous US Sen. Joseph McCarthy's campaign to flush out
communists and their sympathizers during the Cold War era.
"That is a step backward. The language is so vague that it could be justifiably accused of
unconstitutional infringement of the freedom of assembly and association. Just because you
are a member of a party does not mean that you are guilty of whatever some members have
committed. That would be guilt by association, which has already been rejected by our
Supreme Court," said Santiago, a former judge and the Philippines' nominee to the Genevabased International Court of Justice.
Pointless, stupid
Under Republic Act No. 1700, or the Anti-Subversion Law, membership in such organizations
as the Communist Party of the Philippines was a crime. It was repealed in 1992 through RA
7636, thus making the CPP a legal group.
Olalia warned the public that a revival of RA 1700--which Sorsogon Rep. Jose Solis, a former
law enforcer and a staunch supporter of Ms Arroyo, plans to seek--would violate the basic
rights to due process and association and lead to more arbitrary arrests.
Said Ocampo in a statement: "Reviving it is pointless, stupid even. Mrs. Arroyo ought to
rethink her mindless support for [Solis' planned measure], which the dictator Marcos used to
arrest and detain tens of thousands without charges under martial law."
The party-list lawmaker said the President had made a "180-degree turn" in her position on
human rights.
He said that while Ms Arroyo vowed to work for "zero political violence" only on Wednesday
at the Human Rights Day celebration in Malacaang, she threw her support behind the planned
"Reviving RA 1700 is retrogressive. It is like going back to the primitive years when we label
people as 'communists' and 'insurgents,'" Villar said.
"If it was repealed at a time when insurgent forces were more numerous and more influential
than they are today, there is no reason to bring back to life this law against a group that the
government itself claims is near death," he said.
According to Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Pimentel Jr., the only reason Ms Arroyo is
thinking of reviving the law is to "consolidate" more authoritarian power.
"In her hands, the law, once revived, could mean a thousand torments for every man or woman
who disagrees with her, demonstrates against her, or supports her political opponents,"
Pimentel said.
Poverty, social injustice
At the House, Muntinlupa Rep. Rufino Rozzano Biazon said another law penalizing dissenters
for their political views would only give them reason to become armed insurgents.
"The continued insurgency is not caused by the absence of an Anti-Subversion Law but by the
continued existence of poverty exacerbated by social injustice, abuse by government
authorities and corruption," Biazon, a vice chair of the House committee on national defense,
added in a text message.
The militant labor alliance Kilusang Mayo Uno, through its chair Elmer Labog, said Ms
Arroyo should not "resurrect a corpse."
"It seems the President and Congressman Solis want a return to the Stone Age by turning back
on democracy. What they want is for the barbarism of dictatorship to reign in Philippine
society," Labog said.
Survival game plan
Fernando Hicap, national chair of the fisherfolk group Pamalakaya, said the planned revival of
the Anti-Subversion Law was part of the Arroyo administration's "survival game plan."
"She is endorsing this shotgun piece of legislation to justify the extrajudicial killings and
massive persecution of political foes and critics exposing her crimes against the Filipino
people, and against those championing the cause of truth and justice in the country," Hicap
said.
With reports from Jerome Aning and Norman Bordadora
Powers of anti-obscenity
board violate the law
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07:51 AM December 7th, 2011
Even with the makeover of the proposed Anti-Tabloid Ordinance into an AntiObscenity measure, it still did not get the nod of the multi-sector Cebu Citizens Press
Council (CCPC).
The CCPC yesterday
Cemla, a group of volunteer lawyers who also practice as journalists, said these powers
constitute prior restraint and violate due process of law.
Confiscation of property, under the guise of obscenity, is not within the power of the
Anti-Obscenity Board or the governor. Only the court can order the seizure after legal
steps are taken, said Cemla.
Cemal and the CCPC also said that the ordinance authored by Vice Gov. Agnes Magpale,
was unnecessary since the Revised Penal Code already embodied rules on obscenity.
It was dangerous, as it entrusted enforcement, which included the seizure of printed
materials, including tabloids, to town and city mayors in the province who might have
ax to grind against the publications, said Prof. Mayette Tabada, who read the position of
the CCPC.
Lawyer Pachico Seares, Sun Stars public and standards editor, also said newspapers
and magazines are highly perishable commodities that would suffer serious loss if
copies are confiscated, making the seizure an act of prior restraint and violation of due
process.
The proposed ordinance is still pending study at the PB committee on laws.
The CCPC resolution said it authorizes Cemla president Elias Espinoza to represent the
council at public hearings the PB may call.
Last month, the Cebu City Prosecutors Office dismissed complaints filed by the Cebu
City Anti-Indecency Board against Cebuano tabloids Sun.Star Superbalita and Freeman
Banat.
While the CAIB complained that columns From Junquera with love in Superbalita and
Wildflower in Banat were vulgar and obscene, prosecutors disagreed. The fiscals said
the content, taken in its entirety, had redeeming value as literary pieces.
EDITORIAL
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Philippine Daily Inquirer
01:09 AM September 20th, 2012
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And thats it. Theres nothing else, no distinctions made, no qualifications offered. When
we said unthinking, we meant our legislators did not think the matter through.
The Revised Penal Code was enacted into law some 80 years ago. While the provisions
on libel have since been amended, to include the broadcast media, the assumptions
behind them remain very much bound both to the print format and to the Codes
restrictive theories.
But the reality of online interaction, the networking that is made possible in cyberspace,
is very different. There is certainly a need for greater responsibility in online conduct, to
tame cyber-bullying, for instance, or to keep flaming wars from raging out of control.
Dumping the Codes provisions online and then hoping it will all work out, however, is
not the way to meet this need.
Consider the following:
When a newspaper reader e-mails a possibly libelous article to a friend, is that reader
now liable for libel, too? The unthinking extension suggests that the answer is yes.
When an online viewer tweets a link of a possibly libelous video to a friend, is that first
viewer now liable for libel, too? The unthinking extension suggests that the answer is
yes.
When a friend likes or shares or comments on a possibly libelous post on Facebook, is
that friend now liable for libel, too? The unthinking extension suggests that the answer
is yes.
When the subject of a possibly libelous article written by a city-based reporter reads it in
online form in a remote area, can the subject file a case against the reporter in that
place? The unthinking extension suggests that the answer, again, is yes.
We note that, in the penalties section, no sanctions are imposed on cyber-libel. Did our
legislators think that was enough of a safeguard? But the journalism professions sorry
experience with libel law in the Philippines has never been about conviction; it has
always been about prosecution.
In other words, and even though libel suits are difficult to win because the presence of
malice, a requirement of the law, is hard to prove, libel cases are filed against journalists
anywaybecause these cases are a form of harassment. They tie up a reporters time,
they run up an editors legal fees, they discombobulate a newsroom.
And now, courtesy of our legislators, the same form of harassment is available to
torment those who produce online content. That means, literally, tens of millions of
Filipinos, made vulnerable in one fell swoop.
Last year, the United Nations Human Rights Committee found that the Philippine libel
law, which penalizes those convicted with imprisonment, violates human rights
protocols. All of a sudden, it now runs afoul of Internet protocols, too.