Carla Nikasia V.

Roxas JD4a

CASE 22:

Remedial Law Review 1

BOYES SEMPIO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND

AURELIA L. TUAZON, respondents.

FACTS:
The petitioner is the son of Spounse Sempio. Sometime before, the Spouses and DBP
entered into a mortgaged containing a parcel of land situated at San Miguel, Bulacan as a
collateral. Due to the failure of the spouses to meet their obligation the DBP extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgage and emerged as a highest bigger in the public auction sale.
The DBP filed a petition of the issuance of the writ of possession. It was opposed by
Spouses Sempio. Subsequently, respondent Tuazon filed a complaint for intervention claiming
that she was the new owner of the land, having already purchased the same from the DBP.
The spouses filed a complaint for annulment of foreclosure, reconveyance of title and
damages contending that they were not notified of the foreclosure sale in violation of the notice,
posting and publication requirement of Act. No. 3135.
Tuazon, also filed complaint for injunction and damages. Invoking her exclusive right to
the land as owner.
Thereafter, the trial court nullify the extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding instituted by
DBP.
The trial court ordered the dismissal of the complaint filed by Tuazon on the ground of lis
pendens, specifically the pendency of petition of the DBP for the issuance of the writ of
possession. Furthermore, the trial court ruled that Tuazon should have sought protection of her
right as a new owner where the validity of the foreclosure proceedings was at issue.
Subsequently, the petition of the DBP was denied and the complaint for intervention filed
by Tuazon was also dismissed.
The respondents appealed before the Court of Appeals. The court affirmed the decision of
the trial court in refusing to issue a writ of possession and dismissing the complaint for
intervention, however, reversed the decision of the trial court when it nullified the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceeding.
Tuazon filed an appeal to the respondent court. The court ruled by setting aside the
dismissal order and remanding the case to the court at quo for further proceedings. The
petitioner, then filed a motion for reconsideration but denied by the court.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal based of lis pendence is proper.
HELD:
YES. The requisites for lis pendens are: (1) identity of parties, or at least such as
representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed
for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity in both cases is such that the
judgment that may be rendered in the pending case would, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the other.

According to Supreme Court, all these requisites concur in the instant case. Respondent
Tuazon contends that there is no identity of parties to justify the application of the doctrine of lis
pendens. Well-settled is the rule that only substantial, and not absolute, identity of parties is
required for lis pendens, or in any case, res judicata, to lie. There is substantial identity of parties
when there is a community of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second
case albeit the latter was not impleaded in the first case. The interests of respondent Tuazon are
inextricably intertwined with those of the DBP such that the former's exercise of her rights as
purchaser-transferee of the land foreclosed by the DBP, is conditioned on the latter's successful
defense of the validity of its foreclosure procedures.
There is also a similarity of causes of action, There is only one cause of action running
through respondent Tuazon's litigious undertakings: the continued violation of what she believes
to be her right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the land. Therefore, evidence of her
exclusive ownership of the land is indispensable in prosecuting her claims in both Civil
Cases. Although respondent Tuazon could not have proffered such evidence where she was not
impleaded, her rights are inherently contingent on those of the DBP since she may not be deemed
a purchaser in good faith and accorded legal protection as such. At any rate, the parties are bound
not only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand
but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all
other matters that could have been adjudged in that case.