LAUNCHING

OF THE
NEW SAN
CRISTOBAL
BRIDGE

MARWAN NADER

RAFAEL MANZANAREZ

BIOGRAPHY

SUMMARY

Marwan Nader is an Associate

Vice President at T.Y. Lin
International in San Francisco,
CA. Born in 1962, he received
his Ph.D. from the University
of California at Berkeley. He
has worked on the design and
construction of bridges for
over 18 years.

The San Cristobal Bridge in

Chiapas, Mexico is a 3-span
(235'591'235') curved steel
composite and orthotropic box
girder erected by incremental
launching. The following
paper discusses the lessons
learned from the collapse
during launching of this
bridge, as well as the re-design
and re-launching of the new
bridge. T.Y. Lin International
was hired to investigate the
cause of the collapse of the
original bridge, check the
redesign of the bridge and
perform
the
erection
engineering of the bridge.

Rafael Manzanarez is a Vice

President and Project Manager
at T.Y. Lin International in
San Francisco, CA. Mr.
Manzanarez has more than 25
years of experience in bridge
design and retrofit.
Jack Lopez-Jara is a Senior
Project Engineer at T.Y. Lin
International in San Francisco,
CA. Mr. Lopez-Jara has been
involved in the design and
construction
of
several
suspension and cable-stayed
bridges, with a special
emphasis on seismic analysis
and design.
Carlos de la Mora is Director
of Construction at ICA,
Mexicos largest construction
company. Mr. De la Mora has
more than 15 years of
experience managing the
construction
of
complex
infrastructure projects.

JACK LOPEZ-JARA

CARLOS DE LA MORA

LAUNCHING OF THE NEW SAN CRISTOBAL BRIDGE

Marwan Nader
Rafael Manzanarez
Jack Lopez-Jara
Carlos de la Mora

Description of The San Cristobal Bridge

The San Cristobal Bridge is part of a new highway connecting the cities of Tuxtla-Gutierrez and San
Cristobal in the State of Chiapas, Mexico. The bridge crosses a deep canyon with a 3-span, continuous curved
box girder supported on two intermediate piers and two end abutments. The total length of the bridge is
1,060 ft (591 ft main span and two 235 ft side spans).
Figures 1 and 2 show elevation and plan
views of the San Cristobal Bridge.
Due to the steep topography of the site, the
designer considered the incremental
launching of segments from both abutments
to reach first the piers, and then to connect
both ends at midspan.

Figure 1 San Cristobal Bridge - Elevation

The superstructure is an unconventional mix

of post-tensioned composite (steel/concrete)
and orthotropic-steel deck sections. The
central portion of the main span (Segments
0105) is formed by orthotropic segments,
whereas the rest of the main span and the
side spans (Segments 0614) are comprised
of composite sections. Figures 3 and 4 show
a typical composite segment, and a typical
orthotropic-steel segment, respectively.

The Designers selection of light steel orthotropic segments for the central segments of the main span, and
heavier steel-concrete composite segments for the back segments was intended to reduce the weight of the
launched cantilevers and to provide heavier back segments that would prevent the overturning of the bridge
during launching.

Figure 2 San Cristobal Bridge Plan View

Page 1 of 9

Figure 3 Typical Composite Section

Figure 4 Typical Orthotropic Section

This solution induces large negative moments at composite segments 07, 08 and 09 in the zones adjacent to
the piers. Deck post-tensioning was provided to resist those negative moments and to prevent tensile stresses
in the concrete slab.

Collapse of the Tuxtla Gutierrez Structure

The construction of the San Cristobal Bridge started in early 2003. On October 26, 2004, soon after all
segments had been launched, but before the closure of the bridge, the original structure on the TuxtlaGutierrez side collapsed, (See Figure 5).
The Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transportes de Mexico (SCT) hired a new contractor (Ingenieros Civiles
Asociados ICA) to rebuild the structure. Their work involved the fabrication and launching of the entire
bridge and rebuilding of Pier-2 on the Tuxtla Side, and the retracting, retrofitting, and relaunching of the
bridge on the San Cristobal Side.
ICA hired T.Y. Lin International (TYLI) to
perform the following tasks:

Investigate the Collapse

Original Structure

Check the Re-Design of the Bridge

Perform the Erection Engineering of

the New Structure

of

the

The principal cause of the collapse was later

identified as failure of the shear connectors in
the concrete slab. This failure induced the loss
of composite action and the collapse of the
structure due to the lack of redundancy of the
cantilever system. The shear failure of the
shear studs was caused by their insufficient
number and due to poor workmanship of the
welds connecting them to the top flanges of
the steel box girder, (See Figure 6).
Figure 5 Collapsed Structure on the Tuxtla-Gutierrez
Side October 2004
Page 2 of 9

A site evaluation of the collapsed structure

found several additional problems:

Significant delamination of concrete slab in TuxtlaGutierrez side.

Significant cracking of the concrete slabs on both the

Tuxtla-Gutierrez and San Cristobal sides.

Signs of local buckling during launching in the lower

web panels, especially on Segments 6 and 11.

Significant damage on Pier 2 due to impact of the

collapsed superstructure onto the pier.

Further evaluation of the design found the following:

Figure 6 TOP: Failed shear studs on

Tuxtla side of bridge, BOTTOM:
Existing shear studs on San Cristobal
side of the bridge

Overstress in the bottom flanges of the box girders

due to inadequate spacing and sizing of longitudinal
stiffeners.

Insufficient post-tensioning in the concrete slab to

prevent cracking and tension during launching.

Insufficient concrete slab strength.

Changes To The Original Design And

Construction Sequence

For the construction of the Tuxtla-Gutierrez side of the bridge and the retrofit of the superstructure on the San
Cristobal Side, the Designer implemented several changes in the details and in the construction sequence.

Changes to the Top Concrete Slab: Addition of Shear Studs and PT Tendons, Increase
in Concrete Slab Strength
The new details provided additional shear studs (almost double the original number) and required a higher
level of quality control for the welds connecting the studs to the top flange.
The original design had the deficiency of
placing many of the shear studs required
to provide composite action of the main
girders on top of a small I-Beam located in
the middle of the concrete slab instead of
placing them directly on top of the top
flange of the girders where they would
have be more effective.

Figure 7 Existing and Additional Shear Studs

Additional shear studs (See Figure 7) were

welded over the girder top flanges to
guarantee full composite action during
launching. Also, additional PT Tendons
were added to reduce the tensile stresses
in the concrete slab and prevent cracking
during launching.

Cracking of the concrete slab during launching of a composite cantilever has negative consequences since it
causes a change in the section properties, moves down the centroid of the section and causes redistribution in
the state of stresses and deformations in the structure.

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Changes to the Bottom Flange: Additional Plate Stiffeners

An evaluation of the details of the original design found deficiencies in the dimensioning of the longitudinal
and transverse stiffeners on the steel bottom flange.
Additional plates and angles were added to
prevent local buckling and to ensure adequate
capacity of the bottom flange in compression
zones. Figure 8 shows a typical stiffened
compression panel with the various forms of local
and global buckling.
The AASHTO Specifications (3) provide
guidelines for the dimensioning of compression
flanges in Composite Box Girders with both
longitudinal and transverse stiffeners (AASHTO
10.39.4.4). The intention of the Specifications is to
prevent local buckling of the flange plates or local
stiffener buckling, and to allow the panels to
develop their capacity without buckling in
between stiffeners.
Several changes had to be implemented in the
design of the compression flanges to satisfy the
AASHTO Specifications and to limit the
compressive stresses to the allowable limits
permitted by the code.
Figure 8 Buckling of Box Girder Compression
Flanges (1)

In many situations, it was not possible (or

practical) to fully implement the provisions of the
AASHTO specifications, especially on segments that had already been fabricated and in zones in the deck
where accessibility was an issue. For those situations, it was necessary to perform detailed finite element
analyses to more accurately calculate the capacity of the panels and evaluate the possibility of local or global
buckling. Figure 9 shows a FEM model of a bottom panel with its corresponding buckling mode shape.

Changes to the Web Plates:

Reinforcement and Stiffening of Web
Panels
Several Failure modes control the design of the
webs on steel- plate girder bridges that are
constructed using incremental launching.
Figure 10 show some of the predominant
failure modes.

Figure 9 Buckling Analysis of Bottom Flange

Stiffened Panels
Page 4 of 9

An evaluation of the web panels of the San

Cristobal Bridge found that the stiffeners
provided in the original design were not
adequate to resist the bearing forces during the
launching of the segments. Signs of local
yielding were already observed during the
launching of the original structures. This
prompted the designer to add triangular web
stiffeners on the lower web panels. A potential

stability problem due to web panel

buckling was also identified. This problem
becomes more evident on Segments 10
and 11 where the web panels used
relatively thin 13mm plates.

Figure 10 Local Failure Modes above Launching Bearings

(2)

Figure 11 Web Panel Buckling Mode Segment

11 Original Design

Finite Element Models of entire web

panels were developed to study these
problems. Figures 11 and 12 show FEM
models of Segment 11 with and without
the addition of longer triangular web
stiffeners. The study shows that the
inclusion of those stiffeners limits the
extent of local yielding and reduces the
potential of web instability by increasing
the bearing reaction required for panel
buckling and shifting the stability problem
to the upper web area at much higher
loads.

Figure 12 Web Panel Buckling Mode Segment

11 Re-Design

Changes to the Original Construction Sequence

Tuxtla-Gutierrez Side
A completely new structure was fabricated and launched incorporating all the recommended changes to the
shear studs, slab post-tensioning and additional stiffeners to the bottom flange and web plates.
The construction sequence resembled the original design with some changes made in the sequence of
application of post-tensioning forces.
The new structure was fabricated and assembled behind Abutment-01 and then launched towards the pier and
mid-span. Given the space limitations in the launching platform, the assembly and launching operations had
to be performed simultaneously.
As the launching progressed and more space was available in the launching platform, more segments were
assembled behind the abutments and prepared for launching.

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The PT force and sequence were modified to provide for a larger compression force in the concrete slab
before the full cantilever is launched and the deck reaches the position of maximum negative moment over the
pier.
San Cristobal Side
After the collapse of the original structure on the Tuxtla-Gutierrez side, the structure on the San Cristobal side
was pulled back with Segment 01 resting on top of Pier-03.
Due to restrictions and space limitations at the job site, it was impractical to completely pull back all 14
segments to perform the retrofit/strengthening work. The original design considered a maximum of 6
segments behind the abutment during launching, with additional segments to be assembled as the launching
pushed forward.
With the superstructure supported on the pier, abutment, and temporary supports behind the abutment, the
concrete slab (with all PT tendons de-stressed) was completely removed and replaced including additional
shear studs. The steel box was also reinforced with additional stiffeners in the bottom flange and lower web
panels.
The change in the slab casting sequence on the San Cristobal side caused a different stress distribution
compared to the structure on the Tuxtla side. The new construction sequence caused the weight of the
concrete slab on Segments 04, 05 and 06 to be carried by the steel girder only instead of the entire composite
section as in the case of the Tuxtla-Gutierrez Structure.
A reduction in the post-tensioning was necessary to prevent generating large compressive stresses in the
concrete slab in the back span where positive bending moments were expected during the service load of the
structure.
Figures 13 and 14 show the new construction sequences for the Tuxtla-Gutierrez and San Cristobal structures.

Figure 13 New Construction Sequence Phases I - VIII

Page 6 of 9

Figure 14 New Construction Sequence Phases IX - XVI

Stage Construction Analysis

A SAP2000 computer model was created to calculate the forces and deflections in the structure during the
launching of the bridge. Three-dimensional frame elements were used to model the composite and orthotropic
deck segments as a spine consistent with the actual geometry and alignment of the bridge. Tendon elements
were used to model the post-tensioning effects in the deck.
The actual modeling of the launching of the segments was accomplished with the use of non-linear springs to
simulate the support of the structure on temporary bearings behind the abutments and on top of the piers.
Since no vertical restraints were provided on those bearings, the non-linear springs had to allow uplift of the
structure under certain construction stages.
To simulate the movement of the superstructure on the launching platform, the non-linear springs were added
or removed accordingly to reflect the boundary conditions at each launching stage.
The force demands from the construction stage analysis were used to do a stress check of the structure at each
construction stage according to the Project Design Criteria.

Analytical Studies and Field Measurements

The AASHTO Specifications (3) indicate the use of the moment of inertia of the gross cross-sectional area to
compute the deflections of composite beams and girders (AASHTO 10.6.5), and the use of effective slab
widths for the calculation forces and stresses in the section (AASHTO 10.38.3).
Recent studies (4) also suggest the use of the full effective width for the calculation of both deflections and
stresses in the cross section.
Nevertheless some divergence was observed between the analytical results and the field measurements.
Therefore there was a need to calibrate the effective inertia and effective slab width of the section in order to
match the observed deflections with the analytical results.
The difference can be attributed in the particular case of the San Cristobal Bridge to the more predominant
effect of shear lag and differences in the assumed full-effective-width and actual-effective-slab-width on the
composite segments with a pre-stressed concrete slab.
After the initial launching of the structures a reduction factor to the gross inertia of about 20% was used to
calibrate the results. This reduction factor is consistent with the ratio of the gross inertia to the inertia of the
section considering an effective slab width equal to 12x the slab thickness. With this adjustment it was

Page 7 of 9

possible to achieve a good match between

the analytical results and the field
measurements deflections during the
remainder of the launching operations.
A comparison of the deflections calculated
using the SAP2000 model, and the field
measurement was also performed. Figure
15 shows a plot of the tip cantilever
deflections during launching for both the
Tuxtla and San Cristobal ends.

Figure 15 Comparison of Calculated and Field

Deflections during Launching

A discrepancy on the deflections of the

San Cristobal side was observed when the
full cantilever was launched (Full
launching of the superstructure but before
jacking of tendons C and D Stage 22 in
Figure 15). This discrepancy may be
explained by the occurrence of some
minor cracking on the concrete slab,
which has the potential of causing a
reduction on the effective inertia
introducing larger deflections than the
ones estimated with the computer model.
The difference in the elevation of the
cantilever ends before closure was
corrected by raising the abutment supports
and introducing a rigid body motion of the
Tuxtla-Gutierrez structure. The advantage
of this adjustment procedure is that no
permanent or residual forces were induced
in the structure and the behavior and stress
distribution in the bridges was not
affected. Figure 16 shows a picture of the
completed structure after closure.

Summary And Conclusions

Due to the restrictions imposed by the
steep topography of the site, erecting the
San Cristobal Bridge using incremental
launching of the superstructure from both
sides of the canyon is an economical
solution.

Figure 16 Completed Structure of the New San Cristobal

Bridge July 2006
Page 8 of 9

The selected structural system of the deck

is an unconventional mix of orthotropic
steel
segments
and
composite
(steel/concrete) post-tensioned box girder
segments. The ratio of the main span
length of 591 ft to the back span length of
235 ft is larger than 2.5. Overturning and
uplift at the abutments were expected. The

use of lighter steel orthotropic segments for midspan and heavier composite segments on the back span was
intended to prevent the overturning and uplift at the abutments, and to provide stability during launching.
This solution involved the launching of composite segments with the concrete deck already cast in place.
Therefore the composite segments adjacent to the pier were subjected to large negative moments.
Longitudinal slab post-tensioning had to be provided to overcome the negative moment and to prevent tension
and cracking of the concrete slab.
The collapse of the original structure was primarily caused by inadequate design of the shear connectors
combined with poor workmanship of the welds connecting the shear studs to the top flange. The failure of the
shear connectors caused the loss of composite action and led to a catastrophic failure due to non-redundancy
of the cantilevered box girder.
For the new design with additional shear studs, additional PT tendons and higher strength of the concrete slab,
a difference was noted between the predicted deflections (from computer models) and the values measured in
the field. These differences are attributed to shear lag effects and a discrepancy with the assumptions made for
the effective slab width of the concrete slab.
Corrections had to be made to calibrate the effective stiffness of the segments to the actual effective slab
width after the initial launching. With this calibration it was possible to achieve a good match of the analytical
and field deflections for the remainder of the launching operations.
Nevertheless additional discrepancies were still observed on the San Cristobal side when the full cantilever
was fully launched. Minor cracking in the concrete slab caused a change in the effective inertia of the
segments and resulted in an increase in the cantilever deflections.
It is concluded that the launching of a composite section with slab post-tensioning is not a practical solution
due to the complexities and uncertainties in the actual stress distribution and effective width of the slab. Even
with a careful analysis and control of the loads some cracking in the slab was experienced, inducing larger
deflections than the ones predicted by the structural analyses.
Due to the configuration of the bridge, it was possible to correct the discrepancy in the deflections on the
Tuxtla-Gutierrez and San Cristobal sides by raising the abutment supports at the Tuxtla side, inducing rigid
body rotations of the deck to match the tip elevations at both ends.
The behavior of longitudinally post-tensioned composite decks needs to be further investigated in order to
better understand the behavior of such deck segments under negative moments and the extents of the effective
slab width.

References
1. Galambos, T.V. Guide to Stability Design Criteria for Metal Structures. John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New
York, 1998.
2. Rosignoli, M. Bridge Launching. Thomas Telford Ltd., London, 2002.
3. AASHTO, Standard Specifications for Highway Bridges, Washington DC, 2002.
4. Chen, S.S. et al. NCHRP Report 543 Effective Slab Width for Composite Steel Bridge Members,
Transportation Research Board, Washington D.C. 2005.

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