This article was downloaded by: [Vidushi Kaushik]

On: 23 March 2015, At: 11:00

Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered
office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Peace Review: A Journal of Social

Justice
Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cper20

Community-Based Protection
Mechanisms
Georgi Engelbrecht & Vidushi Kaushik
Accepted author version posted online: 23 Feb 2015.

Click for updates

To cite this article: Georgi Engelbrecht & Vidushi Kaushik (2015) Community-Based
Protection Mechanisms, Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 27:1, 43-51, DOI:
10.1080/10402659.2015.1000191
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10402659.2015.1000191

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the
Content) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,
our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to
the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions
and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,
and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content
should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources
of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,
proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or
howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising
out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any
substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,
systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &

Downloaded by [Vidushi Kaushik] at 11:00 23 March 2015

Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/termsand-conditions

Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 27:4351

C Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
Copyright 
ISSN 1040-2659 print; 1469-9982 online
DOI: 10.1080/10402659.2015.1000191

Community-Based Protection
Mechanisms

Downloaded by [Vidushi Kaushik] at 11:00 23 March 2015

GEORGI ENGELBRECHT AND VIDUSHI KAUSHIK

The global burden of conflict in the last decade shows that non-combatants
are among the most affected populations in conflict zones, particularly in
cases of protracted, low-intensity armed conflicts. For humanitarian actors it
is thus crucial to increase the capacity of vulnerable populations by supporting
them with tools to recognize threats, reduce impact of violence, and mitigate
consequences of armed conflict.

he modalities of community-work to safeguard capacities is derived

from the soft approach of unarmed civilian peacekeeping, stressing
the agency potential civilians have due to a better understanding of the
political, economic, and social terrain of a given conflict situation. With
adequate responsive and sensitive mechanisms that can be devised for effective peacekeeping and peacebuilding, the use of community-based EarlyWarning/Early-Response (EWER) mechanisms gains utmost importance.
Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) was invited to Mindanao by local organizations working for peace and justice in 2007. Some of these organizations are
formally involved in monitoring the ceasefire between the government and
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). NP deploys internationals to work
with local peacekeepers, contribute to their safety, help to maintain ceasefires,
and advance the peace process.
This essay is based on the field-work conducted in Mindanao, Philippines, in 2012 and 2013 as part of the NP team. It presents and analyzes a
toolkit of components that strengthen communities living in conflict-affected
areas. The study primarily draws on case-studies from Maguindanao, a
province of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The
essay is based on field immersion observatory analysis as well as interactions
with community leaders and combatants.

or decades, Mindanao and its neighboring islands has witnessed armed

conflict between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Muslim separatist groups who are demanding self-rule, most recently by the MILF

43

Downloaded by [Vidushi Kaushik] at 11:00 23 March 2015

44

GEORGI ENGELBRECHT AND VIDUSHI KAUSHIK

and its splinter group Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF).The region experiences significant presence of paramilitaries, private militias, and
criminal groups. Many localized conflicts, often concerning land entitlements,
are manifest in clan feuds called ridos, which are aggravated by an abundance of small arms and can draw in armed actors and provoke spirals of
violence. The cumulative effect of the conflicts have led to bitter divisions
within communities, widespread displacement, and deaths. The GPHMILF
conflict alone is said to have caused the death of 120,000 civilians. It has been
estimated that, in the last decade, approximately 40 percent of families in
Central Mindanao were displaced at least once, and in Maguindanao province
the figure rises to 82 percent.
Despite the ceasefire between GPH and MILF from 1997, violence was
witnessed in the years 2000 and 2003. August 2008 saw the most recent
large-scale fighting between the AFP and the MILF due to rejection of a proposed peace agreement by the Filipino Supreme Court. Hostilities displaced
750,000 people and while since then, smaller clashes and ceasefire violations are a periodic occurrence. From 2011 onwards, the GPHMILF Peace
Process has progressed following an unprecedented meeting between President Aquino and MILF Chairman Al-Haj Murad in Tokyo in August 2011.
In October 2012, the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) was
signed. It was followed by a number of agreements on specific issues and the
Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) was signed in March
2014. Currently, the Bangsamoro Basic Law is being deliberated in the
Congress and it would pave way for the Bangsamoro Transitional Authority
(BTA).
Most of the grievances voiced out against the GPHMILF peace talks
come from armed groups left out of the process, and apart from the protracted
armed conflict, there are other factors that derail the arrival of normalcy.
Central Mindanao is exposed to communal violence between the Christian
and Muslim communities grounded in a political culture whereby political
elites exert their domination through private militias that operate with (quasi)
impunity. Clan members compete with each other, primarily through processes
of elections and everyday exercise of political power and arms. Ridos, a regular
cause of violence, insecurity, and displacement in Mindanao, draw in actors
from multitude of backgrounds, including armed groups. In addition, rogue
lost commands from non-state armed groups create a pervading sense of
insecurity as the lines between conflict, politics, criminality, and shadow
economy blur. This contributes to heightened militarization in Maguindanao.

oday, most UN peacekeeping missions have incorporated the protection

of civilians as one of their mandates. This resulted in greater emphasis
on the protection of civilians and closer linkages of peacekeeping missions to
humanitarian actors in conflict and postconflict scenarios. These approaches

Downloaded by [Vidushi Kaushik] at 11:00 23 March 2015

COMMUNITY-BASED PROTECTION MECHANISMS

45

have included nongovernmental organizations working within communities

in an effort to increase civilian safety. Keeping these developments in mind,
operationally unarmed civilian peacekeeping (UCP) missions cater to issues
of civilian protection. Building local or grassroots networks and capacities
of the community affected with armed violence to find contextual and timely
strategies for safety is the key. While most of these initiatives are communitydriven, they at many occasions involve armed and unarmed stakeholders in
order to make these community initiatives effective.
Jean Paul Lederach outlines three levels of actors who can facilitate
current and contextual peace: Track 1, top military, political, and religious
leaders with high visibility; track 2, middle range leaders, academics, intellectuals, and religious leaderswith respect within the grassroots networks;
track 3, local community and indigenous leaders who are most familiar with effects of violent conflicts. As a part of civilian peacekeeping
discourse, most civilian-led peacekeeping efforts are direct interventions
at track-three and track-two levels. The linkages facilitated through these
grassroots-led initiatives can be successful in engaging stakeholders at track
one level as well-creating a harmony in efforts at all three levels: diplomatic, civil society, and people living and directly affected by conflict.
It is through these engagements that most practitioners deem peacekeeping as a stepping stone toward peacebuilding initiatives in post-conflict
societies.

n integral part of UCP remains embedded in principles of neutrality and

impartiality through presence of international actors in situations where
civilians or non-combatants may be susceptible to be viewed as supporters to one of the conflicting parties. In the context of Southern Philippines,
the presence of international unarmed civilian peacekeepers ensures safety
and protection of not only the community, but also of local civil society
movements/actors working on contended issues as human rights violations,
rido-reconciliation (specific to Mindanao), and protection of non-combatants
from state actors. A working definition of UCP as civil, society-driven peacekeeping efforts could contain two core principles of, one, monitoring agreements between conflicting parties and, two, protecting civilians from armed
violence.
The three following case studies based on fieldwork in Maguindanao
will elaborate on UCP efforts paving way for peacebuilding initiatives, creating grounds for more strategic, and effective peacebuilding initiatives once
a peace agreement is put in effect. In Mindanao, NP works as part of
the Civilian Protection Component of the International Monitoring Team
(IMT), which was established as part of the peace process in 2009, by
invitation of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
MILF.

Downloaded by [Vidushi Kaushik] at 11:00 23 March 2015

46

GEORGI ENGELBRECHT AND VIDUSHI KAUSHIK

UCP advocates for capacity-building between warring factions and the

communities supporting these movements to use nonviolent methods for resolution. Since the focus of the work is to enable and find localized methods to
control the impact of violence on civilians, community work is the backbone
for an effective protection strategy. The use of dialogue with stakeholders,
inclusion of the affected civilians to engage with combatants, and state-based
armed actors increases the chances of creating an environment where involved
actors understand their accountability toward civilian protection. In the experience of working on the GPHMILF conflict, capacity-building initiatives
provide the appropriate space to engage with communities. Such practices
become more and more relevant when there is plurality of armed actors that
may or may not be recognized by international or national institutions as
legitimate movements.

apacity-building is a method to engage communities and harness their

skills to operate efficiently in a conflict context. One way of capacitybuilding is the building of tools for early warning and early action. Early
Warning Early Response (EWER) gives tools of support during violent conflict
to those who need it most (grassroots level) and those who can use this
knowledge to further operate in the area of concern in sustainable ways (local
civil society) and create an EWER structure.
The goal of community-based EWER trainings is to give individuals the
tools to recognize conflict in its early stages by training them on detecting early
warning signs or indicators. Moreover, those monitors who then comprise an
EWER structure could be further trained on ways to formulate appropriate
responses to de-escalate tension or to be linked with institutions providing
a response. Hereby linking becomes a very crucial activity, as it ensures
the sustainability of the structure by connecting the monitors to the local
government units, line agencies at municipal and provincial levels, peace
structures, armed actors, and other NGOs and Service Providers. EWER also
plays an important role for local civil society because these locally rooted
organizations are well-grounded in the context and in a position to identify
early conflict and to seek a timely resolution and this is especially true in case
of ridos. The need to include organizations in EWER is a crucial task, since
local partners can take the lead in creating and nurturing the EWER structures
mentioned above.
Most EWER trainings for communities and civil society partners follow
the similar pattern, albeit with minor differences. The first section of the training gives an overview of the concept of early warning, objectives, and aims.
The succeeding modules deal with early response applicable for mitigating
violent conflict, and attempt to identify issues crucial from the perspective of
relevant service providers. Most of the modules have case studies and scenarios to give a very practical perspective on the theory behind EWER, although

COMMUNITY-BASED PROTECTION MECHANISMS

47

of course the real life situations are very complex and the case scenarios are
only indicative of such a context.

Downloaded by [Vidushi Kaushik] at 11:00 23 March 2015

nother approach to UCP in Maguindanao was the Zone-of-Peace initiative. In the following, an example will clarify this approach. Marred
by conflict during the early 1970s and ever since, the city of Datu Piang in
the province of Maguindanao, although corroded of its luster, still remains in
the imagination of the population as an important historical site. The proximity of villages in the municipality to the marsh as well as the mountains
makes these areas suitable for presence of armed actors, criminal syndicates,
and lawless groups, serving as safe havens for them during volatile times.
Although the armed conflict between the government and MILF has subsided
since 2009, the area has been the stage to several clan feuds damaging property and displacing civilians. Moreover, the splinter-group BIFF, which had
opposed the peace agreement, initiated waves of attack on military detachments since August 2012. Skirmishes and clashes have led to considerable
civilian displacement and a general feeling of insecurity in areas controlled
by the BIFF.
In that time, NP Philippines was approached by community-based organizations to facilitate an initiative that would mitigate violence, provide safe
spaces for civilians and non-combatants, and facilitate return of displaced
population. The concept of Dar-Us-Salam (house of peace), a genuine
zone of peace, was the leitmotif to work on that initiative, something that
had been previously established in Mindanao in the 1990s. In order to get the
peace zone in place the field team initiated a series of consultations with its
community monitors, local NGOs, MILF, Local Government Units, and the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to ensure inclusivity and acceptance.
The first round of consultations with the main partner organization resulted in an unanimous decision of marking spaces such as the madrassa,
primary health units, and primary and secondary schools as peace zones.
In order to capture the expectations of the residents from affected barangays
(village settlements) as well as to involve them in the process, NP with its
local partners then conducted a second series of community consultations.
These consultations let the team fathom the needs and expectations of the
residents and collect grievances related to security and livelihood.

n subsequent months, while community monitors were actively monitoring

the security situation in the areas, the team with local partners conducted
even more specific consultations involving local armed actors (state and nonstate) informing them about the initiative and incorporating their opinions for
an effective intervention. Finally, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
was drafted. This was considered as a written agreement between the conflict
stakeholders to adhere to protocols drafted as code of conduct (in the MoU).

Downloaded by [Vidushi Kaushik] at 11:00 23 March 2015

48

GEORGI ENGELBRECHT AND VIDUSHI KAUSHIK

The code of conduct put an embargo on unnecessary display of firearms and

elaborated on finer modalities of conduct of combatants in volatile circumstances.
The initiative marked some positive changes. During the consultations
the local partners and community leaders met with AFP commanders. This
was a remarkable step. In a conflict that has spanned for more than forty years
and the communities were often victims of counterinsurgency operations, their
relationship with state security forces is marred by mutual mistrust. In such a
context, the walls of mistrust and suspicion broke down and opened space for
constructive dialogue where safety and peaceful resolution took priority over
individual or institutional prejudices.
Another outcome was observed when the community articulated to the
combatants about unnecessary display of fire-arms. In a context where prevalence of arms is high, arms and use of force are considered normal. While for
an outsider, this causes a sense of alarm, for generations of people living with
conflict, possession of arms is probably the only way to safeguard their own
security. The zone of peace initiative, however, led to a discussion on issues
concerning proliferation of arms. While such discussions did not lead to any
immediate visible changes, the initiative provided a space for communities to
address sensitive issues that are normally considered outside the purview of
civilians.

n a highly militarized setting such as Maguindanao, engaging armed actors

on civilian protection is pertinent. Access to armed groups on the local level
enabled by NPs long-standing presence, the trust gained and the relationships
continuously nurtured, is an asset that gives NP teams the possibility to emphasize norms that strengthen compliance with ceasefire norms and build
peace potentials. Knowing the rules of combat and rights of individuals in
times of peace and conflict is a necessary precondition for ensuring rule of
law and awareness of international norms for armed actors.
The AFP and Bangsamor Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF), representative
of the conflict parties, the government, and the MILF, are bound to agreements
such as the GPHMILF Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities from
July 1997, as well as relevant humanitarian law and human rights laws. While
the upper echelons of Higher Commands are certainly aware of the legal status
of those documents, the rank and file forces are not always aware of them.
Here are a few examples of how NP has tried to spread awareness about these
laws: First, thorough orientations on Human Rights Law and International
Humanitarian Law to MILFBIAF, NP conducted trainings for members of
the 118, 107, 106, 105, 104, and 109 Base Commands of the BIAF. Moreover,
it has organized training to members of the Provincial Police Force (PPF) of the
MILF, comprising twenty municipalities and more than hundred participants.
NP introduced basic principles of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law and

Downloaded by [Vidushi Kaushik] at 11:00 23 March 2015

COMMUNITY-BASED PROTECTION MECHANISMS

49

dealt in particular with issues such as occupation, checkpoints, police rights,

and individual rights. Second, through trainings to the AFP on Human Rights,
Humanitarian Law, and Child Protection, several battalions of the AFP in
Maguindanao province have been trained by NP teams on those topics. Child
Protection issues were particularly interesting to the AFP; as schools are often
the targets of direct or indirect conflict, certain humanitarian rules pertaining
to child protection such as prohibition of school occupations are discussed
with the troops in detail.
Third, through ad-hoc interventions or follow-ups on civilian concerns,
through its monitoring structures, NP gets to know minor breaches of the
ceasefire or other civilian concerns relatively fast. On several occasions successful interventions were launched: proactive discussion with the AFP about
checkpoints or detachments close to civilian areas such as health centers,
schools, or mosques. Mostly, the detachments were either removed or moved
to distanced location; engagement with BIAF, AFP, and the IMT in case of
uncoordinated movement of armed actors in civilian areas; and follow-up on
specific instances of human rights or humanitarian law violations, in particular
the documentation and verification of the Six Grave Child Rights Violations.

rounded from field work over a year and a half in the Southern Philippines, the essay proposes three spheres of influence through which UCP
is effective: first is enabling communities to respond to incidents of violence.
EWER trainings are the most effective tools that enable communities to respond to incidents of violence. Through consistent engagement and identifying of community monitors, the community members are constantly engaged
with local combatants on issues concerning potential upsurge of violence. A
successful indicator of such an activity can be illustrated by NPs learning
during the July 6, 2013 military operation against one of the factionsBIFF.
Before the military action was conducted, both the military commanders and
the community monitors were duly informed about the operation, leading to
timely evacuation of civilians to safer spaces.
NP focused on the role of women in EWER and added a module on
election-related violence. While not directly monitoring the elections, local
partners and grassroots monitors could nevertheless grasp and analyze the
situation on the ground, informing NP of any significant incidents. A major
step for this capacity-building was NPs partnership with the Maguindanao
Peace Advocates (MPA), a coalition of local organizations monitoring safe
and fair municipal elections. NP capicitated members of the MPA on EWER
and its use for election-related violencea prevalant reality in the province.
A second sphere of influence involves building community resilience
and local peacebuilding potentials. Apart from the analytically clear EWER
interventions, there are instances that primarily target communities in conflict, yet ultimately help to create local space for follow-up peacebuilding

Downloaded by [Vidushi Kaushik] at 11:00 23 March 2015

50

GEORGI ENGELBRECHT AND VIDUSHI KAUSHIK

activities. The Zone of Peace started as an effort to strengthen the local partners in vulnerable villages through regular engagement in the community.
Subsequent community-driven work was supported by various peacebuilding
activities in the form of linking the local partners and community leaders with
stakeholders from the army, LGUs and MILF Base Commands. The drafting of the MoU and Code of Conduct led to a healthy discussion between
actors on sensitive topics such as disarmament and finding local solutions
to dangers of arms proliferation. These linkages play a strong role in building mutual trust between actors potentially engaging in future peacebuilding
activities.
The third sphere looks at creating future space for peacebuilding. Regular capacity-building on the themes of human rights/humanitarian law raises
awareness of the primary parties to the conflict and can further move these
actors to comprehend rule of law. Thus, in cases of violations it will
be possible to report those to the armed actors concerned and enable a
response to be made to the situation. The series of trainings conducted
within the province led to emergence of community leaders who subsequently took the lead in negotiating with conflict stakeholders. Examples
of that approach are the orientations on human rights to AFP and MILF,
which have created a comfortable space for dialogue, knowledge of relevant
norms, and linkages between these actors and local civil society or community
leaders.

n the context of Mindanao, UCP is a diverse set of methods to civilian protection that derives its strength from community-led interventions.
We consider UCP as a contextualized toolkit of components whose primary focus is to strengthen local capacities in prevention of conflict from
the grassroots and creation of space for future peacebuilding activities. The
case studies highlight the potential UCP has as a program strategy for both
peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives incorporating a participatory approach moving beyond the conventional track one diplomacy efforts in conflict
situations.

RECOMMENDED READINGS
Berghof Foundation. 2009. Berghof Glossary on Conflict Transformation. 20 Notions for
Theory and Practice, Chapter 10: Peace Peacebuilding, Peacemaking. Beatrix Austin,
Hans J. Giessmann, and Uli Jager (Eds.). 5964.
Gordon, Stuart. 2013. The Protection of Civilians: An Evolving Paradigm? Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 2(2): 40.
Magno Torres III, Wilfredo. 2007. Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao.
San Francisco: The Asia Foundation.
McCoy, Alfred. 2009. An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines. Madison,
WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

COMMUNITY-BASED PROTECTION MECHANISMS

51

Downloaded by [Vidushi Kaushik] at 11:00 23 March 2015

Schiavo-Campo, Salvatore and Mary Judd. 2005. The Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines:
Roots, Costs, and Potential Peace Dividend. Paper No. 24. Social Development Papers
(Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction). Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Schweitzer, Christine. 2010. Introducing Civilian PeacekeepingA Barely Tapped Resource.
Washington, DC: Institute of Peace Work and Nonviolent Conflict Transformation.
World Bank/World Food Programme. 2012. Violent Conflicts and Displacement in Central
Mindanao; Challenges for Recovery and Development Rome: World Food Programme.

Georgi Engelbrecht and Vidushi Kaushik worked in Central Mindanao, Philippines with Nonviolent
Peaceforce, Philippines. The organization is rooted in principles of unarmed civilian peacekeeping. While
Georgi has a background in international relations and human rights, Vidushi comes from an interdisciplinary background of emergencies, conflict, and peace. E-mail: georgi.engelbrecht@gmail.com and
vidushi.kaushik23@gmail.com